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<title>the red pen — GZERO Media</title>
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<title>Putin is responsible for bloodshed in Ukraine, and Ukraine&apos;s pro-Western positions</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/putin-is-responsible-for-bloodshed-in-ukraine-and-ukraines-pro-western-positions</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 08 Apr 2022 18:00:41 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>zachary witlin</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>the economist</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>john mearsheimer</category>
<category>graeme thompson</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<description>Who is responsible for the crisis in Ukraine? Political scientist John Mearsheimer argues in a recent op-ed in The Economist that while Vladimir Putin started the war, it was NATO&apos;s &quot;reckless&quot; expansion that provoked Russia to attack. In this episode of The Red Pen — where we do our best to keep op-eds honest — Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analysts Graeme Thompson and Zachary Witlin explain that nothing the West did, or didn&apos;t do, caused Putin&apos;s invasion of Ukraine.</description>
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<media:text>Putin Created the Very Pro-Western Ukraine That He Wanted To Avoid | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Does the West ultimately bear the responsibility for the crisis in Ukraine? Political scientist John Mearsheimer argues in a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/03/11/john-mearsheimer-on-why-the-west-is-principally-responsible-for-the-ukrainian-crisis">recent op-ed in The Economist</a> that while Vladimir Putin started the war, it was NATO's "reckless" expansion that provoked Russia to attack. In this episode of The Red Pen — where we do our best to keep op-eds honest — Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analysts Graeme Thompson and Zachary Witlin review Mearsheimer's points and show that nothing the West did, or didn't do, caused Putin's invasion of Ukraine.</p><p>Our topic today is who to blame for Russia's bloody and relentless attack on Ukraine, a war that has now entered six plus weeks and it's showing really no signs of resolution. And I've maintained that it's President Vladimir Putin alone who bears the responsibility for this invasion, that he is a war criminal, and he has single handedly damaged Russia's place in the world with these actions. But there are some who feel that the West, in particular the United States and NATO allies, who have provoked this situation and who bear the blame. And one of them is American political scientist, John Mearsheimer, whose ideas have generated quite a bit of conversation over the past few weeks. And I want to focus on a piece he recently wrote for the Economist titled “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/03/11/john-mearsheimer-on-why-the-west-is-principally-responsible-for-the-ukrainian-crisis">Why the West is principally responsible for the Ukrainian crisis.</a>” And the title alone merits bringing out the Red Pen.</p><p>So first, Mearsheimer argues that the West and especially America deserve blame for Russia's invasion of Ukraine because Moscow feared Kyiv was poised to join NATO. He further claims that Western support for Ukraine after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbas with military assistance, training, and weapons shipments amounted to de facto Ukrainian membership of NATO and led directly to the current war.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9g5ei67vj07myvcjnbv5q" alt="putin-is-responsible-for-bloodshed-in-ukraine-and-ukraines-pro-western-positions-29654390.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>I think this is a strawman argument. We shouldn't take Russia's claim that Ukraine was integrating with NATO at face value. It is true that nominally NATO had an open-door policy, but no one seriously thought that Ukraine was or is about to join NATO. And the support that NATO did provide after Russia had already sponsored a war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 as Mearsheimer notes, included things like advice and handheld weaponry and supplies like radios. A de facto NATO member would've received actual NATO troops to defend their country.<br><br>I accept that the West failed to anticipate Russia's reaction to NATO's eastward expansion and that miscalculation absolutely enhanced Russia's threat perception in their backyard. But to me, the principal West mistake was not about expanding NATO and embracing the East Europeans. No, the mistake in the 90’s was not creating a Marshall Plan for Russia, that is making Russia's prosperity and partnership and cooperation a top priority for the Western world. So, Russia's future wasn't just about how they lost the Cold War and that feeling of humiliation and that failure more than anything else, I would argue, laid the groundwork for the structural tensions that eventually led to this war. But to be clear, nothing the West did or didn't do caused Putin's invasion of Ukraine. Putin chose to do this and the responsibility for the war is his and his alone.</p><p>Now next Mearsheimer writes, "Bringing Ukraine closer to the EU and making it a pro-American democracy were part of a US plan to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia's border."</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9g5la6sdo07lqirbcj17p" alt="putin-is-responsible-for-bloodshed-in-ukraine-and-ukraines-pro-western-positions-29654429.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Now, wait a second. Ukrainians actually have agency. They want a democracy that's closer to the EU and they're grateful for Western help. Putin is paranoid about the example of a successful democratic Ukraine and the threat it would pose to his own increasingly autocratic regime. It was the Ukrainian people that voted for NATO and EU membership to be national goals. Neither of those choices were in any way forced upon them by the United States and its allies. In fact, I'll go further, the West was and still is reluctant to accept Ukraine into these institutions. Ukrainians haven't been dragged into NATO or the EU, the Americans and Europeans were and are actually putting up roadblocks. Ukrainians desire to draw closer to the West was not engineered by American strategists, it was a response to Russia's own threats on which Putin has acted. Ultimately, Putin created the very pro-Western Ukraine that he wanted to avoid.<br><br>Mearsheimer also dismisses the idea that Putin covets Ukraine for historical or ideological reasons. For Russian leaders, he writes, “what happens in Ukraine has little to do with their Imperial ambitions being thwarted. It's about dealing with what they regard as a direct threat to Russia's future.”</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9g63h67w407my3gbhv9y6" alt="putin-is-responsible-for-bloodshed-in-ukraine-and-ukraines-pro-western-positions-29654430.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>But Putin has consistently claimed that Ukraine is not a legitimate country and the Ukrainians are really Russians at heart. This is about more than just territorial security and Putin obviously has ambitions that are rooted in a nostalgic imperial nationalism. Now is that the only factor that drives his actions? Of course it isn't, but why would you dismiss it in the face of Putin's own repeated statements to that end?</p><p>And finally, and here, I want to give him credit, Mearsheimer concludes that the West may be able to prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine, but the country will be gravely damaged alongside lasting damage to the Russian economy and the threat of nuclear escalation.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9g6dv67wp07mywajk7fcy" alt="putin-is-responsible-for-bloodshed-in-ukraine-and-ukraines-pro-western-positions-29654432.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>And I have no argument with any of that. The cost of this war will be enormous for Ukraine and for Russia. Six weeks after Moscow launched this invasion and in the wake of the latest evidence of Russian war crimes, you can expect a ratcheting up of Western sanctions and an increasingly desperate Vladimir Putin. Ukrainians are fighting a war of survival, and we are still very firmly in an environment of escalation. That's ugly and it's going to do enormous damage to both nations, to Ukraine and to Russia. And it's going to have a rippling impact globally, but no, the West did not cause Putin's horrible choice to wage this war of aggression.</p><p>So, there you have it. That's your Red Pen. Stay tuned to GZERO for more news and analysis about the war in Ukraine. I am Ian Bremmer, see you again real soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Fix climate change, don&apos;t just adapt to its consequences</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/fix-climate-change-dont-just-adapt-to-its-consequences</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 05 Nov 2021 19:30:32 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>climate change</category>
<category>bjorn lomborg</category>
<category>adaptation</category>
<category>climate solutions</category>
<category>cop26</category>
<category>agriculture</category>
<category>sea level rise</category>
<description>Should the world be focusing more on adaptation as an answer to the climate crisis? In a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed, Danish author Bjorn Lomborg argues that countries - and the media - are panicking over climate change instead of concentrating on tactics like levees and floodwalls. Ian Bremmer takes out the Red Pen to explain why these solutions are not enough to protect the planet.</description>
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<media:text>Fix Climate Change, Don’t Just Adapt to Its Consequences | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Should the world be focusing more on adaptation as an answer to the climate crisis? In a recent <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/climate-change-adaptation-panic-exaggerating-disaster-11634760376">Wall Street Journal op-ed</a>, Danish author Bjorn Lomborg argues that countries - and the media - are panicking over climate change instead of concentrating on tactics like levees and floodwalls. Ian Bremmer takes out the Red Pen to explain why these solutions are not enough to protect the planet.</p><p>COP26 is in the air (that's the UN Climate Conference still underway in Scotland) so feels like a good time to take our <em>red</em> pen to an op-ed that…isn't very <em>green</em>. It's from the Wall Street Journal and written by Danish author and academic <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/BjornLomborg">Bjorn Lomborg</a>. The title sums it up: "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/climate-change-adaptation-panic-exaggerating-disaster-11634760376">Climate Change Calls for Adaptation, Not Panic.</a>"</p><p>A little background on Lomborg: He's a prominent critic of the global consensus on climate change and wrote a book called "False Alarm: How Climate Change Panic Costs Us Trillions, Hurts the Poor, and Fails to Fix the Planet." Let's be clear: his views are controversial, but given his platform and this week's focus on climate policy, it's important to address the substance of his claims. So, let's break out the Red Pen!</p><p>First, the core of Lomborg's argument is that countries need to spend more time focused on ways to adapt to climate change, instead of trying to change their economies to reduce its effect. He writes, "Adaptation doesn't make the cost of global warming go away entirely, but it does reduce it dramatically."</p><p>Nobody disagrees that adaptation is important (anymore—lots of people did when COP started 27 years ago, because they thought it was tantamount of surrender).</p><p>But it's not a comprehensive solution. Take rising temperature, for example. If the air gets too hot, why can't we just use more air conditioning? Well, air conditioning requires more energy, and more energy consumption leads to more emissions. Cleaner and more efficient air conditioning requires technology, industry, finance, and policy. That's a microcosm of the real conversations in Glasgow. This stuff is complicated. It's not just about a single solution.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9fqw3679p07myuw7hce3b" alt="fix-climate-change-dont-just-adapt-to-its-consequences-27910344.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Next, Lomborg suggests that farmers can adapt by shifting production from one place to another, like corn production in North America, which "has shifted away from the Southeast toward the Upper Midwest, where farmers take advantage of longer growing seasons and less-frequent extreme heat."</p><p>Moving agricultural production like this works only in big, relatively empty, and fertile countries like the US and Canada. It does not work in highly populated, smaller countries across South and Southeast Asia or Africa, already suffering from shortages of fresh water and arable land. Adaptation alone will not suffice.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9fr206rxq07lq1vrotlws" alt="fix-climate-change-dont-just-adapt-to-its-consequences-27910347.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Third, Lomborg blames the media for pushing "unrealistic projections of climate catastrophes, while ignoring adaptation."</p><p>The media is an easy target. When it bleeds (or floods, or burns), it leads. (Except at GZERO, of course). And it's true that everyone is talking about how we've missed 1.5 degrees as a target, nobody mentions that the worst case scenarios of 5 and 6 are also now extremely unlikely—because of steps taken to mitigate emissions. But let's be honest: The people who are doing the real work on climate, and the governments and organizations putting lots of dollar signs behind it, are looking at the whole picture, including adaptation. And they've long since concluded that you can't adapt yourself out of climate change.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9fr9i6rxx07lq812rtdx1" alt="fix-climate-change-dont-just-adapt-to-its-consequences-27910360.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Lomborg also writes: "When sea levels rise, governments build defenses—like the levees, flood walls and drainage systems that protected New Orleans from much of Hurricane Ida's ferocity this year."<br></p><p>Levees and New Orleans are not usually in the same sentence...in a good way. But setting that aside, building flood walls and drainage systems works regionally, at best. It is no long term defense against rising sea levels, especially in densely populated regions like South and Southeast Asia, where millions of people live on the coasts.</p><p>The biggest problem here has been the mass destruction of coastal mangrove forests, which also acted as flood plains. Flood walls and drainage systems won't solve these problems.</p><p>Also, you can't build a levee to protect against forest fires, nor will they keep out climate migrants (build the levee sounds even worse than build the wall). And many developing country governments can't afford levees and other adaption at all.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9fs0t6rz307lqp9d9enn0" alt="fix-climate-change-dont-just-adapt-to-its-consequences-27910363.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Finally, Lomborg concludes by arguing that "You don't have to portend doom to take climate change seriously. Ignoring the benefits of adaptation may make for better headlines, but it badly misinforms readers."<br></p><p>I agree with this conclusion – we don't need to warn people about a future doom to take climate change seriously. They're seeing it in their lives every single day, whether historically large fires in California or deadly floods in Germany or huge heatwaves in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. You know the other thing they're seeing? In a G-Zero world, no one is in charge, and governments and corporations are all moving in different directions, undermining pathways to a solution. That fact may end up scarier than anything Lomborg accuses the media of scheming up.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9frt96ryw07lq3y97735x" alt="fix-climate-change-dont-just-adapt-to-its-consequences-27910367.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>There you have it, that's your Red Pen for this week.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Biden&apos;s mistakes in Afghanistan were not &quot;dereliction of duty&quot;</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/bidens-mistakes-in-afghanistan-were-not-dereliction-of-duty</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 02 Sep 2021 22:21:23 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>marc thiessen</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>kabul bombing</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>military</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>afghanistan</category>
<category>biden administration</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>afghanistan withdrawal</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>taliban</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>isis-k</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>washington post</category>
<description>In his latest Washington Post op-ed, Marc Thiessen makes strong statements about how and why the Taliban came to take control of Kabul. There have been big mistakes in executing this exit. But &quot;dereliction of duty?&quot; Not in our view. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst Charles Dunst explain why in this edition of The Red Pen.</description>
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<media:text>TITLE PLACEHOLDER | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In his latest Washington Post op-ed, <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/marcthiessen">Marc Thiessen</a> makes strong statements about how and why the Taliban came to take control of Kabul. There have been big mistakes in executing this exit. But "dereliction of duty?" Not in our view. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/cdunst">Charles Dunst</a> explain why in this edition of The Red Pen.</p><p>Today we're taking our Red Pen to a recent op-ed from the Washington Post written by Marc Thiessen, a Post columnist, American Enterprise Institute fellow, and former speechwriter for President George W. Bush. It's titled, "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/30/greenlighting-talibans-takeover-kabul-is-national-disgrace/">Greenlighting the Taliban's takeover of Kabul is a national disgrace</a>," and makes some strong statements about how and why the Taliban came to take control of Afghanistan's capital city. I want to unpack some of his arguments for you and explain why we disagree. So, let's get out the Red Pen.</p><p>First, Thiessen argues that "all the horrors the world witnessed over the past two weeks…might have been prevented" had the United States opted to take over Kabul, rather than letting the Taliban do so.</p><p>Let's remember: "The enemy gets a vote." Thiessen is comparing the real world, with all of its unpredictability, to a counterfactual one where everything goes according to (his) plan. Even if the horrors he cited had been averted, wouldn't others have unfolded? Putting thousands of Americans back on Kabul's streets would have meant putting them in the crosshairs of terrorist groups like ISIS-K. Do we believe these groups wouldn't have targeted Americans in Kabul with suicide bombings, like the recent airport attack, or even engage them in firefights? Biden had to decide between two unpalatable options. He chose the one he believed would put the fewest Americans in harm's way.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f6zi6r8m07lq5prvp2pi" alt="bidens-mistakes-in-afghanistan-were-not-dereliction-of-duty-27378469.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Next, Thiessen cites a former American senior general officer to argue that the "US military could definitely have secured the capital"––at least the green zone where Western embassies are located, plus access to the airport.<br></p><p>For starters, Thiessen bases his argument on the views of one "former senior general officer" whose identity we don't know. How widely shared are those views among current military officials? If the 20-year war has taught us anything, it should be some caution before arguing the United States could secure a city of over six million people indefinitely with a few thousand troops. Before leaving office, the Trump administration brought US troop numbers in Afghanistan to just 2,500, a 19-year low. By the end of July 2021, only 650 remained. Taking over Kabul would've required something politically incredibly challenging: a substantial troop surge that would've put more Americans in danger. Thiessen doesn't explicitly call for a surge, but the upshot of his critique is clear enough. There's an argument for a surge (even if politically very unpopular), he should tell us how many additional troops we would have to send in and for how long to hold onto a city the United States had already lost.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f76g6r8t07lqwrm2t4hr" alt="bidens-mistakes-in-afghanistan-were-not-dereliction-of-duty-27378472.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Thiessen also calls the Biden administration's decision to "cede" Kabul to the Taliban "a dereliction of duty unlike any we have seen in modern times."<br></p><p>Keep in mind it was Trump, not Biden, who went over the Afghan government's head back in February 2020 to negotiate with the Taliban and agree to remove all US troops from the country. There were US political considerations for doing so, I get it. But from that point, the Taliban's takeover of Kabul had, at that point, become a foregone conclusion</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f7e46r9e07lq6obz7dmd" alt="bidens-mistakes-in-afghanistan-were-not-dereliction-of-duty-27378474.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Next point: Thiessen writes that the administration's withdrawal "put the safety of American civilians, service members and Afghan allies in the hands of terrorists" — referring to the Taliban — "rather than the U.S. armed forces" and "led directly to the deaths of 13 Americans in an Islamic State attack on the Kabul airport."<br></p><p>Earlier, though, he almost presents the Taliban as an organization whose word General McKenzie should've trusted: "[T]he Taliban offered to allow the US military to take responsibility for security in Kabul — but we declined." What makes him believe a terrorist organization intent on retaking power would honor a pledge to allow US forces to secure the capital city? Which Taliban is it?</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f80566ob07my0cepo9jd" alt="bidens-mistakes-in-afghanistan-were-not-dereliction-of-duty-27378748.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Finally, Thiessen concludes by arguing that Biden's decision to let the Taliban take over Kabul "led directly to the deaths of 13 Americans in an Islamic State attack on the Kabul airport."</p><p>Harrowing as the images coming out of Afghanistan are, Biden had decided to not risk even more US lives in the war's twilight. Staying at the airport and trying to hold onto Kabul for a few more weeks would have helped the United States evacuate more Afghan partners, but it would also have risked the lives of thousands of US soldiers.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f86k66ok07my6r52qnjd" alt="bidens-mistakes-in-afghanistan-were-not-dereliction-of-duty-27378478.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>One thing I think many of us agree on — this has been a sad and embarrassing ending to the 20-year war in Afghanistan. We've left countless Afghan allies behind, despite promising them safe passage. August's events will no doubt cast an added shadow of grief over the coming anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The Biden team certainly made mistakes in executing this exit. But "dereliction of duty?" No, not in my view.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>US global power remains strong, despite Afghanistan mistakes</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/us-global-power-remains-strong-despite-afghanistan-mistakes</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 25 Aug 2021 13:56:49 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>afghanistan withdrawal</category>
<category>afghanistan</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>taliban</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>asia</category>
<description>While the US withdrawal from Afghanistan has been deeply flawed in execution, does this really mark &quot;the end of the American era&quot; as foreign affairs reporter Robin Wright argues in a New Yorker op-ed? Not at all – and in fact, the US will emerge from this crisis not only with important lessons learned but in a position of power. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst Charles Dunst explain why in this edition of The Red Pen.</description>
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<media:text>US Global Power Remains Strong, Despite Afghanistan Mistakes | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>While the US withdrawal from Afghanistan has been deeply flawed in execution, does this really mark "the end of the American era" as foreign affairs reporter <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/wrightr">Robin Wright</a> argues in a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/does-the-great-retreat-from-afghanistan-mark-the-end-of-the-american-era">New Yorker op-ed</a>? Not at all – and in fact, the US will emerge from this crisis not only with important lessons learned but in a position of power. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/cdunst">Charles Dunst</a> explain why in this edition of The Red Pen.</p><p>Today we are taking our red pen to a recent column from New Yorker contributor and veteran foreign affairs reporter, Robin Wright, a good friend, very, very smart. It's titled "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/does-the-great-retreat-from-afghanistan-mark-the-end-of-the-american-era">Does the Great Retreat from Afghanistan Mark the End of the American Era?</a>" And I mean, that's quite an argument. Over the course of the past couple of weeks, I've had quite a bit to say about the story, of course, and all the horrible images that we've seen coming from Afghanistan, and even Qatar in the last 24 hours, the transit. While the withdrawal, from my perspective, was the right decision on balance, there had been huge mistakes and missteps in the execution. That much, I think that many of us agree on, but is this particular moment the end of the United States as the number one global power? No, I don't think so, and that's why we're getting out the red pen on this article. So let's get into it.</p><p>First, Robin argues that the United States will be widely perceived by the world today as having lost the war on terrorism, because Afghanistan will, again, almost certainly become a haven for like-minded militants. Well, first of all, we need to break out the US perspective on this because the threat of foreign directed Islamic terrorism against the US Homeland, which is of course the reason the US engaged in the War on Terror has vastly diminished since 9/11. There have been incidents, including the Boston Marathon bombing and the 2015 San Bernardino attack, along with various domestic based attempts by Islamists, but US counter-terrorism capabilities have vastly improved in the two decades since 9/11. In fact, by far, the biggest terrorist threat in the United States today comes from white nationalists. That's a very different red pen to write. I have zero sympathy for the Taliban, and I certainly think that Afghanistan will increasingly become more of a haven again for radical Islamic terror, in part because the Taliban won't be able to control most of their territory. Though, I will say that I don't believe that the Taliban wants to repeat their previous mistake of embracing Al-Qaeda, because that would make them much more of a target for the West. So again, I agree in part with that comment.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f3iw66k407myv0jtah7s" alt="us-global-power-remains-strong-despite-afghanistan-mistakes-27281467.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Wright calls the withdrawal an epic defeat for US forces at the hands of a ragtag militia with no air power or significant armor or artillery in one of the poorest countries in the world. I want to be clear, the Taliban didn't militarily defeat US forces. US forces haven't been fighting for quite some time there. That's why they weren't US casualties. The United States forces left. Like so many other commentaries that have attended the Taliban's resurgence to power, Robin's piece suggests that the United States lost without specifying what it would mean for Washington to have won. America's choices this year weren't defeat and victory, but a range of bad alternatives that would have each involved very, very painful trade-offs. Biden's options ranged from bad to really horrible, not from acceptable to superb, and Robin acknowledged that in a column she wrote on March 24th, writing that, "Biden has no good choices. Neither does the US military, which has reduced troop levels from 15,000 when the US-Taliban pact was signed a year ago, to around 3,000 today."</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f42w66l807myj32hlz2q" alt="us-global-power-remains-strong-despite-afghanistan-mistakes-27281471.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Three, next, Wright laminates that, "Afghanistan and Iraq have proved that the United States can neither build nations nor create armies out of scratch," warning that the repercussions of this failure will long endure. Oh, I agree with that, but I would argue that that's a good thing. The realization is that Washington needs to reevaluate its democracy promotion model, and focus on advancing aims of open societies by means other than military force. In other words, working within the confines of reality in other countries, rather than trying to mold the world in America's own image. I mean, beyond enhancing US influence abroad, I also think that kind of a shift would free up a lot of sums of money that we could be spending on the United States, think trillions of dollars of infrastructure, for example.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f4br6r7c07lqitqmhzu9" alt="us-global-power-remains-strong-despite-afghanistan-mistakes-27281478.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Wright also argues that America's post-withdrawal standing is "profoundly weakened," and questions "how the United States salvages its reputation or position any time soon." And I am sympathetic to this point, but I think it's overdone. Despite some fiery statements from European officials, leaders from London, to Tokyo, to New Delhi and beyond remain pro-US. Washington's very much blown exit from Afghanistan doesn't mean we won't be able to form a coalition if say, China invades Taiwan. In fact, for all the world's criticism over the last 18 months and the last five years, really, if one begins with Trump's election, which was not popular with American allies, clearly, actual US power vis-à-vis the allies, has increased since the start of the pandemic. America's financial system has only become more important, America's technological prowess has only improved. The US is far stronger now than its G7 allies. And don't get me started on China, which continues to self-inflict wounds by stonewalling on COVID-19 origins, producing poorly performing vaccines, and inflaming tensions with almost everybody; India, Australia, Canada, Europe. So much so with Europe that Brussels has frozen ratification of its own investment accord with Beijing. So, I mean, if the United States has made big mistakes with Afghanistan, I'd argue that China's mistakes over the last year have been even greater. And don't get me started on the demographic challenges. So if you had to pick a country that you wanted to be in today's messy, GZERO world, from a power position, it's clearly the United States, and Afghanistan doesn't change that.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f4j866lk07mylh00pnqe" alt="us-global-power-remains-strong-despite-afghanistan-mistakes-27281488.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Finally, Robin concludes by writing, "On Sunday as America erased its presence in Afghanistan in a race to get out, I wondered: Was it all for naught? What other consequences will America face from its failed campaign in Afghanistan decades from now? We barely know the answers." Very good question. The Taliban's return to power will be devastating for human rights in Afghanistan, especially for women, children, LGBT people, and ethnic and religious minorities. There's no avoiding that very tragic conclusion. The strategic consequences of US withdrawal are likely to be much more limited, in my view. In fact, President Biden's disdain for open-ended wars suggests that Washington will avoid stumbling into another one soon; I would argue that's a good thing. And drawing down from Afghanistan will also enable the US to focus on the biggest foreign policy challenge. Wright's worst-case scenario, the collapse of US power remains, for now at least, really just the scenario.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f50966lu07myisxwnfr0" alt="us-global-power-remains-strong-despite-afghanistan-mistakes-27281498.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>So that's your Red Pen for this week, stick with GZERO Media for more analysis of the unfolding situation in Afghanistan, and the upcoming anniversary of the 9/11 terror attack. See you again very soon.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>The US couldn’t have won in Afghanistan - but Biden’s mistakes lost US credibility</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/the-us-couldnt-have-won-in-afghanistan-but-bidens-mistakes-lost-us-credibility</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrepigjhcl907lqtoxukbzq</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 18 Aug 2021 21:35:12 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>afghanistan</category>
<category>taliban</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>taiwan</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>us allies</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>bradley bowman</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>h.r. mcmaster</category>
<category>wall street journal</category>
<category>japan</category>
<category>afghanistan withdrawal</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<description>In a Wall Street Journal op-ed, former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster and Bradley Bowman of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. argue that maintaining US military, financial, and political support in Afghanistan could have staved off a Taliban takeover. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst Charles Dunst take out the Red Pen to break down why staying in Afghanistan is not a reasonable option.</description>
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<media:text>The US Couldn’t Have Won in Afghanistan | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghanistan-withdrawal-biden-human-rights-terrorist-jihadist-islamist-taliban-kabul-11629044191?mod=opinion_lead_pos5">Wall Street Journal op-ed</a>, former National Security Adviser <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/LTGHRMcMaster">H.R. McMaster</a> and Bradley Bowman of the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/FDD">Foundation for Defense of Democracies</a> argue that maintaining US military, financial, and political support in Afghanistan could have staved off a Taliban takeover. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/cdunst">Charles Dunst</a> take out the Red Pen to break down why staying in Afghanistan is not a reasonable option.</p><p>I'm sure it comes as no surprise that this week we're taking our red pen to an op-ed about Afghanistan and the heartbreaking, and frankly infuriating images we've seen coming from that country as the Taliban took control.</p><p>It is impossible to argue that what we're witnessing isn't a disaster and an epically bad ending to America's longest war in history. But there are some robust debates in the foreign policy and defense community about whether or not a continued US military presence after so much blood and treasure were already lost could have ultimately led to a different outcome in the country.</p><p>Case in point: A jointly written Wall Street Journal <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghanistan-withdrawal-biden-human-rights-terrorist-jihadist-islamist-taliban-kabul-11629044191?mod=opinion_lead_pos5">piece</a> by former National Security Adviser <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/LTGHRMcMaster">H.R. McMaster</a> and Bradley Bowman of the <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/FDD">Foundation for Defense of Democracies</a>. The two argue that maintaining US military, financial, and political support for the Afghan government and security forces could have staved off a Taliban takeover and that Biden's actions have made America less safe. We disagree.</p><p>Let's get out the Red Pen.</p><p>So point one, McMaster and Bowman dismiss characterizations of the American campaign in Afghanistan as a "costly forever war," pointing out that when Biden decided to withdraw, there were no more than 3,500 US troops left in Afghanistan, and not a single American soldier had been killed in combat in over a year.</p><p>This is true. It's a very important point. This was not the war the US was fighting when they had 120,000 troops on the ground with NATO, but it was also a war that was being lost. Lots of Afghans were losing their lives, and they, the Afghan defense forces, were losing territory to an emboldened and stronger than ever, since 9/11, Taliban. The existing US presence as it stood was not sustainable, especially when the ceasefire with the Taliban was set to end in May. It was either expand the NATO footprint or leave. I think if you could have made the argument that you could maintain the existing presence and it would be sustainable ongoing, very different discussion we are having here.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f24c66jh07my8ka8xz3z" alt="the-us-couldnt-have-won-in-afghanistan-but-bidens-mistakes-lost-us-credibility-27249643.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Point two, they say that "the idea that the Taliban is concerned about its reputation in New York or Geneva would be laughable if the circumstances weren't so grim."<br></p><p>Certainly, agree on New York and Geneva, Taliban leaders won't cozy up to Washington or Brussels any time soon. But I do want to say, that doesn't mean they aren't concerned about their international image. There's a reason why the Taliban took over the country without inflicting needless bloodshed, why they're giving interviews to CNN and even female Afghan journalists, why they're saying that Afghan women will have the right to work and be educated up to university level, and why they reached a "deconfliction mechanism" with the US to allow American officials and even some Afghans to leave the country safely. Indeed, it matters and it's a major PR win for the Taliban, and I hate to say this cause we don't want that, that the images flowing out of Afghanistan right now are <em>not&nbsp;</em>of Taliban violence, but of America's flight out of the country. I want to be clear, I think there is no reason to trust the Taliban or to think this is not going to be a horrifically brutal regime that does not respect humanitarian rights, that does not respect the rights of women on the ground, but they do care about their international image much more than they did 20 years ago. And that is going to be a challenge for the Americans to manage.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f2az66jo07myjh93uu45" alt="the-us-couldnt-have-won-in-afghanistan-but-bidens-mistakes-lost-us-credibility-27249647.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Point three, the authors point out that while Washington pundits said that there was "no military solution" in Afghanistan, the "Taliban seem to have come up with one."<br></p><p>So there was no American<em>&nbsp;</em>military solution in Afghanistan: The Americans were never going to dismantle the Taliban fully, just as they couldn't dismantle the Viet Cong fully 50 years ago. And just as the Viet Cong were prepared to wait out the Americans for as long as needed, and defeat inept native forces after Washington withdrew, so was the Taliban. The US needed complete victory, which it couldn't achieve. The Taliban just needed to hold on. And it's also very early to say that the Taliban's victory over the Americans means they are going to be able to hold onto the country, especially given that most of the Afghan budget was US aid, and that's now gone.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f2kc6r5207lqfommgrgp" alt="the-us-couldnt-have-won-in-afghanistan-but-bidens-mistakes-lost-us-credibility-27249652.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Point four, McMaster and Bowman also argue that the unfolding "humanitarian catastrophe" in Afghanistan "emboldens China, Russia and other adversaries eager to proclaim the United States an unreliable partner and a declining power."<br></p><p>In fact, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, which borders China, is going to be a headache for Beijing, because they need stability in the broader Middle East to ensure a reliable supply of energy and expand the reach of its Belt and Road initiative. They are not happy that the Americans left. In fact, that's why Chinese diplomats and state media are castigating the US's exit as "hasty and irresponsible". Much better for the Chinese to have the Americans providing some level of stability and paying for it in blood and treasure. And while the Russians certainly are painting the US as unreliable and are happy for more chaos in the region, this is in my view more similar to Ukraine and Georgia, where the United States didn't have strong national interests. And so, as a consequence, ultimately chose not to defend friendly governments when they were invaded. Washington's closest partners know differently. So, I don't believe that Taiwan and Japan are fundamentally changing their calculus of national interests with the United States on the basis of what they've just seen in Kabul. The real problem for American credibility is that the Americans made the decision to leave alone. They didn't in the Afghan policy review, bring the allies that they fought side by side with for 20 years now, into the conversation at all. That's why the Europeans, in particular, are so upset and that's why they are likely to see the Americans, going forward, as more unreliable. It's a process, it's not a decision.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f35066jv07myrk0s27z0" alt="the-us-couldnt-have-won-in-afghanistan-but-bidens-mistakes-lost-us-credibility-27249781.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Finally, the authors conclude by suggesting that the United States "should begin the painstaking work of mitigating the humanitarian and security catastrophe" because "jihadist terror in Afghanistan won't stay in Afghanistan."<br></p><p>We all want to mitigate Afghan suffering, but I need to know what exactly is this "work"? Is it sending forces back in? Is it providing money to the same civil society groups the Taliban is about to destroy? Is it covert intervention? These are vague talking points but they are not real policy solutions. Without an additional surge, which is politically impossible, the Afghan government was always going to fall. Following the same playbook that failed over the last 20 years is not a reasonable option.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f3c56r5j07lqh66c9iuz" alt="the-us-couldnt-have-won-in-afghanistan-but-bidens-mistakes-lost-us-credibility-27249802.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>So, there you have it. That's your Red Pen on this very busy, very upsetting news week. As the situation in Afghanistan unfolds, we'll be sure to bring you ongoing analysis, and we'll also be taking a look at state of the war on terror as we approach the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. You can be sure the Taliban will be doing that on the ground in Kabul.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>The US can advance democracy without being the world&apos;s sheriff</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/the-us-can-advance-democracy-without-being-the-worlds-sheriff</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 22 Jul 2021 22:12:08 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>afghanistan</category>
<category>america superpower</category>
<category>human rights</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>david brooks</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>afghanistan withdrawal</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>democracy</category>
<category>authoritarianism</category>
<category>canada</category>
<description>In his New York Times op-ed, David Brooks says the US is facing an identity crisis — protecting liberal and progressive values at home while doing little to stop autocrats elsewhere. But has the US really abandoned its values abroad just because it&apos;s withdrawing from Afghanistan? Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst Charles Dunst take out the Red Pen to argue that the US can advance democracy without being the world&apos;s sheriff.</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>The US Can Advance Democracy Without Being the World&apos;s Sheriff | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvratq778y9707lqzkf9rxkw" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In his New York Times op-ed, David Brooks says the US is facing an identity crisis — protecting liberal and progressive values at home while doing little to stop autocrats elsewhere. But has the US really abandoned its values abroad just because it's withdrawing from Afghanistan? Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/cdunst">Charles Dunst</a> take out the Red Pen to argue that the US can advance democracy without being the world's sheriff.</p><p>Today we are taking our Red Pen, first time we're doing this, through recent op-ed by veteran columnist and best-selling author <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/nytdavidbrooks">David Brooks</a> of The New York Times.</p><p>The title of the piece is "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/15/opinion/us-foreign-policy.html">The American Identity Crisis</a>," and it focuses on the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Coming to a theater not so near you real soon. And how it represents a double standard that Brooks believes America is experiencing—protecting liberal and progressive values at home (and many would argue with that point alone by the way) while abandoning allies in Afghanistan and doing little to stop the rise of autocrats elsewhere.</p><p>Let's get out the Red Pen.</p><p>First, Brooks laments that in, quote, "Iraq and Afghanistan, America lost faith in itself and its global role—like a pitcher who has been shelled and no longer has confidence in his own stuff."</p><p>That's right, but I'd argue the roots of this lost confidence go back a lot further. It was after the Vietnam War that Americans seriously began to question their ability to transform the world. And let's also remember the deaths of American soldiers in Somalia back in 1993, reinforced that sentiment: President Bill Clinton was so shell-shocked that he refused to intervene in Rwanda during that country's genocide.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f0cz6r3r07lqh40s32e0" alt="the-us-can-advance-democracy-without-being-the-worlds-sheriff-27029328.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Next, Brooks writes that the "two-decade strategy of taking the fight to the terrorists, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, has meant that global terrorism is no longer seen as a major concern in daily American life."<br></p><p>I'd say it's no longer seen that way because it's no longer a daily concern in terms of actions taken at home. US intelligence and law enforcement officials have spent vast sums over the past 20 years in the United States and on borders to protect the American people. If anything, US interventions abroad have made Americans less safe, not more: Exhibit A, destabilizing Iraq fostered the rise of the Islamic State, which continues to wreak havoc in and beyond the Middle East.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f0ka66iv07myx3wzn41p" alt="the-us-can-advance-democracy-without-being-the-worlds-sheriff-27029338.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Brooks also writes that there's "a strong possibility" that the US withdraw from Afghanistan "will produce a strategic setback and a humanitarian disaster."<br></p><p>Yes, a humanitarian disaster if the Taliban does take over, and I think that's likely—women and ethnic minorities will suffer. But that was already looking pretty likely—in fact, the Biden policy review expected that the Taliban was likely to take over the course of the Biden administration, absent a troop surge, and nobody thought that that was politically feasible. And a strategic setback for the United States? Well, that's a harder one to argue. I mean, a Taliban-led Afghanistan might be a thorn in Biden's side but it's not going to derail his top foreign policy priority by far, which is managing over surging China. And on that issue, by the way, that's a key reason that Beijing wants the Americans to stay in Afghanistan because the Chinese government knows that they're going to end up supporting the Taliban government while facing blow back from regional warlords in Afghanistan. That doesn't work.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f1436r4c07lqz6duvaq9" alt="the-us-can-advance-democracy-without-being-the-worlds-sheriff-27029565.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>You still with me? I've got a couple more points to go and still have a little red ink. Brooks writes that the United States is competing against countries like China and Russia "in an economic, cultural, intellectual, and political contest all at once—A struggle between the forces of progressive modernity and reaction."<br></p><p>Now, if values are so important to US foreign policy, why is Washington on such good terms with Egypt or Saudi Arabia, whose positions on LGBTQ and women's rights are anything but progressive. Some in the United States do want to advance liberal values the world over, but the US doesn't have either the capacity or the inclination to do so everywhere. Plus, the struggle between the United States and China, and with Russia to a lesser extent, is less about exporting culture than about shaping the global order.</p><p>And finally, Brooks says "to fight Trumpian authoritarianism at home, we have to fight the more venomous brands of authoritarianism that thrive around the world. That means staying on the field."</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f1c766j207myhhjqcwo3" alt="the-us-can-advance-democracy-without-being-the-worlds-sheriff-27030913.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Now the United States should remain an active player in global affairs, I certainly agree with that. But "staying on the field" does not equal military intervention. Should the United States send forces into Myanmar as the country edges closer to becoming a failed state? I mean, how about Haiti, right in American backyard, following the president's assassination in his home. The United States can't afford to use military force whenever something goes wrong all over the world. There are plenty of ways to advance democracy—such as sending humanitarian aid and establishing cultural changes—without becoming the world's sheriff. Given how Afghanistan, Iraq, and other recent US military interventions have turned out, these soft power tools deserve a lot more attention.<br></p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmwf7rn9mkol207ltyb2svkme" alt="the-us-can-advance-democracy-without-being-the-worlds-sheriff-27029345.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>So there you have it. That's your Red Pen for today. We'll see you again soon. In the meantime, stay cool in the dog days of summer. Moose told me to let you know that. Be good. Talk to you soon.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Europe&apos;s &quot;clear vision&quot; for relations with China is one-sided</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/europe-clear-vision-for-relations-with-china-is-one-sided</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvreodmbgdlp07myv77z3xu3</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 01 Jul 2021 21:00:12 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>eu-china relations</category>
<category>trade</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>quad</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>bruno maçães</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>human rights</category>
<description>Does the European Union have a better plan for dealing with China than the US does, as Bruno Maçães argues in his latest op-ed for Politico Europe ? While there are differences in how the EU and US are approaching Beijing, the EU&apos;s plan to separate politics from economics isn&apos;t quite working out the the way Maçães describes. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst Charles Dunst take out the Red Pen to take the other side.</description>
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<media:text>Europe&apos;s &quot;Clear Vision&quot; for Relations with China Is One-sided | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Does the European Union have a better plan for dealing with China than the US does, as <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/MacaesBruno">Bruno Maçães</a> argues in his latest op-ed for Politico Europe? While there are differences in how the EU and US are approaching Beijing, the EU's plan to separate politics from economics isn't quite working out the the way Maçães describes. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/cdunst">Charles Dunst</a> take out the Red Pen to take the other side.</p><p>Today we are taking our Red Pen to a piece from Politico's "Geopolitical Union" column. It's written by former Portuguese Secretary of State for European Affairs and author Bruno Maçães. Disclaimer for you, Bruno is an exceedingly smart dude, who I happen to really like. I read him all the time. But that doesn't stop us from taking the red pen to this piece.<br></p><p>It is titled, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-china-strategy-geopolitics/">"Surprise! The EU knows how to handle China."</a> That would be a surprise. Bruno argues that the European Union is ahead of the United States in handling its relationship, both political and economic, with the People's Republic.</p><p>Obviously, a big goal of President Biden's first major trip abroad, we talked about it a lot here, meeting with the G7, NATO, and European leaders, the EU, was to push for Europe to get onboard with a tougher stance on China. Kind of like they are trying to do with the Quad across the Pacific. And there is a disparity in how the EU and US are approaching Beijing right now, that's clear. But we don't agree with Bruno on the reasons.</p><p>So, let's get out the Red Pen.</p><p>First, Bruno dismisses the notion that Europeans are "reluctant to get on board with Biden's efforts" because they simply don't want to confront China. Rather, he says, "they have a plan of their own.".</p><p>Several European countries have made it pretty clear that they don't want to confront China at all, let alone in the strong way that the United States, whether Trump or Biden, has been. While Brussels is growing increasingly apprehensive of Beijing, agree with that, June's G7, NATO, and US-EU summits all underscored that few of the EU's members are prepared to challenge China comprehensively in any way.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ez2w66h407my4gr3f95g" alt="europe-clear-vision-for-relations-with-china-is-one-sided-26852490.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Next, Bruno praises the EU's "plan" for dealing with China, writing that the European Commission and the European External Action Service drafted "a bold [China strategy] that never traveled to national capitals for assent."<br></p><p>But the EU's plan appears to be grounded in a hope that "politics and the economy can be insulated from each other." Unfortunately, as Bruno himself explains, China makes "no separation between market and state." Indeed, it leverages its economic ties for political aims. Remember when China imposed tariffs, started a trade war, on Australian goods after Australia called for an investigation into Covid-19's origins? You can't just unwind the politics versus economics. And it's getting harder to do as China gets more powerful.</p><p>Plus, if EU member countries had no say in the plan that Brussels penned, then how can we credibly speak of "the European response" to China? The truth is that there really isn't a coherent response. Hungary, for its part, has become China's closest partner in the bloc, vetoing EU statements that are critical of Beijing. Sweden, on the other hand, continues to hammer China on human rights abuses. Do both really subscribe to the same European-China policy? I'm skeptical on that.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ezaw66hb07mypkwi217i" alt="europe-clear-vision-for-relations-with-china-is-one-sided-26852492.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Third point: In explaining the collapse of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), a major potential deal between the EU and China, (they gave their thumbs-up on after Biden was elected, before he became inaugurated, a big to-do in the United States), Bruno cites a Chinese scholar's lament that the EU has the upper hand in dealing with China, giving Beijing little choice but to accept penalties Brussels imposes.<br></p><p>If Beijing really felt that pressure, why did it "put its foot down" and "kill the investment agreement?" We'd argue that China's leadership increasingly actually believes that the West is in irreversible decline, much more significantly than after the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, and that because of China's growing economic heft and technological capacity, which is significantly greater than that of the European countries right now and will continue to be, they don't need to yield to European pressure. The EU may assume that China will come back to the table on European terms, but Beijing probably won't feel much urgency to return.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ezj76r2s07lqwtich096" alt="europe-clear-vision-for-relations-with-china-is-one-sided-26852499.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Finally, Bruno concludes that Brussels "has a clear vision of what the terms of the relationship between the West and China should be: economic integration but on a European not a Chinese model."<br></p><p>But bottom line here is that China doesn't share that vision. Brussels is going to continue to struggle in its relationship with Beijing if it intends to preserve a boundary between politics and economics. And this is a core difference. The back-and-forth battle between the European Parliament and China over sanctions and countersanctions, a tit for tat over punishing China for treatment of the Uyghurs and China firing back by sanctioning European parliamentarians and think tanks, led to a freeze in the ratification of the CAI. The EU can't unilaterally separate politics and economics when dealing with China. For the relationship to operate on these dual tracks, both sides need to accept the boundary. And Beijing doesn't.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9f05i66ia07my4zv2khc5" alt="europe-clear-vision-for-relations-with-china-is-one-sided-26852506.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Anyway, that's your red pen for today. Have a look at <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-china-strategy-geopolitics/">Bruno's piece</a>, see which side you come out on. We'll see you again soon. One thing we can all agree on, the European and China have a great 4th of July weekend. See you soon.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>NATO’s role as a deterrent is still critically important to the US</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/nato-role-as-a-deterrent-is-still-critically-important-to-the-us</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 17 Jun 2021 00:28:31 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>cyber attack</category>
<category>jens stoltenberg</category>
<category>lithuania</category>
<category>estonia</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>europe</category>
<description>In his New York Times op-ed, Stephen Wertheim says that Americans should &quot;want no part&quot; in NATO. It&apos;s a provocative argument, but misses the mark, according to Ian Bremmer, who breaks out the Red Pen with Eurasia Group analyst Charles Dunst to argue that now is not the time for the US to back out of NATO.</description>
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<media:text>NATO Still Plays A Vital Role for US Interests | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In his New York Times op-ed, <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/stephenwertheim">Stephen Wertheim</a> says that Americans should "want no part" in NATO. It's a provocative argument, but misses the mark, according to Ian Bremmer, who breaks out the Red Pen with Eurasia Group analyst <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/cdunst">Charles Dunst</a> to argue that now is not the time for the US to back out of NATO.</p><p>Joe Biden this week is wrapping up his first trip abroad as President of the United States. Reasonably successful week, brought him to the G7, EU, face-to-face with Vladimir Putin. He also attended a meeting that brought NATO heads of state together for the first time since December 2019. Former President Donald Trump was no fan of NATO, though saying it was obsolete was the one thing he admitted he was wrong about in foreign policy as president, so kind of interesting. But Biden's strong support for the organization was a welcome change for the military alliance.</p><p>Not everyone out there is happy about a warm embrace from the US of NATO. Historian Stephen Wertheim just wrote a piece in The New York Times entitled <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/14/opinion/biden-nato-summit.html">"Sorry, Liberals. But You Really Shouldn't Love NATO."</a> It's a provocative argument and we think it misses the mark in a few important ways. So we're taking out the Red Pen.</p><p>Let's start at the beginning. NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was founded back in 1949 in the wake of World War II. It was largely a response to the Soviet Union. Its mission was to protect European democracies, both diplomatically and, if necessary, with military force. Many people have challenged the existence and the point of NATO since the Soviet collapse back in '91, not just Wertheim, but we take issue with some of the arguments that are presented here.</p><p>Number one, Wertheim argues that NATO's existence risks great power war, I quote, "that the US should avoid like the plague." Does NATO really bring that risk though? On the contrary, we'd say it's helped to prevent a great power conflict by deterring Russian attacks on its members for decades and still now. Even Putin has said, as president, that only an insane person can imagine that Russia would suddenly attack NATO. That feels like a deterrent effect to me. Keep in mind that Article 5 of NATO, the pledge that an attack on one member nation is an attack on all, has actually only been invoked once, by the United States, after 9/11.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9exnq6r1f07lqnece7rqh" alt="nato-role-as-a-deterrent-is-still-critically-important-to-the-us-26725019.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Next, Wertheim contends that "the Biden administration now faces a stark choice, commit to fight for Ukraine, creating a serious risk of war with Russia, or admit that NATO expansion has come to an overdue end." Wait, what? Neither Obama nor Trump actually faced such a "stark choice." Biden can continue bolstering Ukraine's defenses, Obama didn't want to do that, Trump did, work to lower the temperature with Russia and back NATO. This is frustrating to Ukraine's president who wants full membership and during the NATO summit tried tweeting that Ukraine was really, really, really about to become a member, and he got precisely nowhere. It's not actually an either/or.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9exzk66fz07myxjifeq2q" alt="nato-role-as-a-deterrent-is-still-critically-important-to-the-us-26725028.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Wertheim also writes that "Europe is stable and affluent far removed from its warring past." Meaning, of course, that it no longer needs a military alliance with the US or US involvement in it for protection. But remember, when Russia attacked Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine six years later, just a few weeks ago, Russia was massing troops on Ukraine's border. No one thinks Russia wants to overrun the continent with tanks as Wertheim suggests. But how about threatening Europeans with cyberattacks, with nerve agents on their individual citizens? These concerns are real, they cannot easily be dispensed with.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eyag6r2907lqjvm6fy84" alt="nato-role-as-a-deterrent-is-still-critically-important-to-the-us-26725030.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Finally, Wertheim concludes that if the United States doesn't trust the Europeans to defend themselves then it "truly intends to dominate the world in perpetuity." Number one, that's wildly overstated given the role and impact and power of China globally. But to talk just about the North Atlantic frame, supporting European allies who want help from the United States, by the way, as is very clear from the NATO summit itself, is not the same as wanting to dominate the world. Indeed, the United States wants Europe to take a bigger stake in its own defense to allow America to shift more of its attention to China. And Wertheim's argument ignores the fact that Europe still trusts the United States, even if not as much as it has historically and wants the US to contribute to the continent security through NATO. In fact, the Alliance expanded precisely because Eastern and Central European and Baltic countries like Lithuania and Estonia wanted a guarantee against Russian military aggression. NATO has served its purpose on that front.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eym56r2g07lq6cgdyg56" alt="nato-role-as-a-deterrent-is-still-critically-important-to-the-us-26725033.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>In a meeting this week with NATO's secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, President Biden affirmed the US commitment saying of the Alliance, "If there weren't one, we'd have to invent one." Well, there is one, and I grant you NATO needs a bit of reinvention. But should the US back out completely? Sorry, Stephen Wertheim, but not right now.<br></p><p>That's your Red Pen. Hope you found it useful. See you again soon. In the meantime, stay safe and avoid fewer people.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Multinational corporations aren&apos;t about to give up on global business</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/multinational-corporations-arent-about-to-give-up-on-global-business</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 20 May 2021 14:29:52 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>pepsi</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>technology</category>
<category>amazon</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>trade</category>
<category>elon musk</category>
<category>global economy</category>
<category>microsoft</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>financial times</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>aei</category>
<category>ramon laguarta</category>
<category>satya nadella</category>
<category>mark zuckerberg</category>
<category>geopolitics</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>multinational corporations</category>
<description>An op-ed in the Financial Times argues that the era of borderless enterprise may be past, thanks to rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China. In &quot;Geopolitics spells the demise of the global chief executive,&quot; Elisabeth Braw writes that the nationalities of companies and their chief executives now matter again and their ability to pursue a truly global business strategy will be limited. But has the situation actually changed? Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst Charles Dunst take out the Red Pen to explain that nationalities have always mattered, and many of these risks aren&apos;t new.</description>
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<media:text>Multinational Corporations Aren’t About To Give Up on Global Business | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An op-ed in the Financial Times argues that the era of borderless enterprise may be past, thanks to rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China. In "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/4635c387-1ecf-41ce-82f4-592691dfc894">Geopolitics spells the demise of the global chief executive</a>," <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/elisabethbraw">Elisabeth Braw</a> writes that the nationalities of companies and their chief executives now matter again and their ability to pursue a truly global business strategy will be limited. But has the situation actually changed? Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/cdunst">Charles Dunst</a> take out the Red Pen to explain that nationalities have always mattered, and many of these risks aren't new.</p><p>Today we are talking about the impact that increasing geopolitical tensions could have on big, multinational corporations. In a recent op-ed for the Financial Times, Elisabeth Braw of the <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/AEI">American Enterprise Institute, AEI</a>, argues that we could be entering a distinctly new chapter in global business, one in which <em>where</em> a company comes from matters much more. In other words, a move <em>away</em> from borderless companies and toward nationalism.</p><p>She cites CEOs like Ramon Laguarta of Pepsi and Satya Nadella of Microsoft, both foreign-born executives leading American companies, as a positive trend of globalization that may come to an end in the current political reality.</p><p>It's an extremely interesting and provocative piece. You should definitely read it.</p><p>We are not convinced. Let's get out the Red Pen.</p><p>First, Braw writes that "the era of borderless enterprise may be past" and argues that "suddenly companies', and executives', nationalities matter again."</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9erlx669t07myjt6v32kj" alt="multinational-corporations-arent-about-to-give-up-on-global-business-26418959.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>So question, when did nationalities stop mattering? Governments have long supported their national champions. In the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis, the German government spent 1.5 billion euros to bail out their auto industry. BMW, for one, might have had non-German higher ups, but when the rubber met the road, it mattered the most was that BMW was a German company. The era of the globalization never meant an end to national pride or responsibility when things got tough.<br></p><p>Secondly, the number of foreign CEOs of Global Fortune 500 companies has remained pretty constant since the 2008 financial crisis. I'd also point out that as of 2019, the last date we could find good numbers for, 45% of the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.newsweek.com/immigrant-founded-fortune-500-companies-us-gdp-1450498">companies</a> on that list were founded by immigrants or the children of immigrants. No real change.</p><p>Next, Braw suggests that Western corporate titans may now conclude that the companies they run "should be loyal not just to their shareholders but to the company's home country if it provides democracy, rule of law and a safe business environment."</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ersv66a007myl0hgm7ai" alt="multinational-corporations-arent-about-to-give-up-on-global-business-26418965.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>I'm not ready to bet on that. Western companies have long done business in nondemocratic countries, and some major US businesses haven't blinked twice in recent years even on issues like Uighur forced labor. In fact, China overtook the United States last year as the top recipient of new foreign direct investment. Goldman Sachs just announced an expansion of its staff there by 2024. Amazon, Apple, Nike, Gap…the list goes on. Still doing business and expecting growth in China.<br></p><p>Finally, Braw writes that "executives may consider themselves citizens of nowhere, but a business can be harmed because of where it is based."</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9esa36qw207lqlew0lnv5" alt="multinational-corporations-arent-about-to-give-up-on-global-business-26418977.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>That's true. But is that risk new? There were boycotts of German companies in the 1930s, of course, and the same in South Africa during Apartheid in the 1960s.<br></p><p>Yes, Apple and Google are enthusiastic citizens of nowhere. But not so much for Microsoft and Amazon, which are increasingly US national champions.</p><p>In conclusion, do rising tensions between, say, the United States and China mean that a new era of business with borders is on the horizon? A Standard Chartered <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sc.com/en/banking/europe-americas/international-expansion-strategies/">report</a><u>,</u> just from a couple of months ago, back in March found that of multinational corporations based in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, 42% "see their best growth opportunities outside of their home market." That's actually "5% higher than six months ago."</p><p>So…no.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Would China really invade Taiwan?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/would-china-really-invade-taiwan</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvremzfpg9kc07my1h4yo6d2</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 06 May 2021 11:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>hong kong</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>taiwan</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>xi jinping</category>
<category>uighurs</category>
<category>olympics</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>semiconductors</category>
<description>The cover story of The Economist declares that Taiwan is &quot;the most dangerous place on Earth,&quot; because China might finally be ready to plan an invasion of the island. Ian Bremmer breaks out the Red Pen to explain why a US-China war over Taiwan is unlikely.</description>
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<media:text>Would China Really Attack Taiwan? | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The cover story of The Economist declares that Taiwan is "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/05/01/the-most-dangerous-place-on-earth">The most dangerous place on Earth</a>," because China might finally be ready to plan an invasion of the island. But are the consequences of such a move worth the many risks to China and its President Xi Jinping? Ian Bremmer breaks out the Red Pen to to explain why a US-China war over Taiwan is unlikely.</p><p>We are taking our red pen to a recent article from <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/theeconomist/status/1387753511446880261">The Economist</a>. The Economist, you ask, how could I? I love The Economist, I know, I know. But you'd lose respect if I give this piece a pass. In fact, it was the magazine's cover story this week, so I had no choice. The image and headline say it all. Here it is, Taiwan is now "the most dangerous place on earth" as US/China relations continue to sour in the opening months of President Biden's administration.</p><p>And it <em>is</em> true, of course, that the relationship between the two most powerful countries in the world, the US and China, is very rocky indeed. Back in March, a meeting between the US Secretary of State Tony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and their counterparts from China got off to an icy start, in Anchorage, Alaska no less. The Biden administration has declared that China's treatment of Muslim minorities constitutes "genocide" and also continues to push back on the unilateral erosion from Beijing of Hong Kong's autonomy. So, this is not a good relationship.</p><p>Of all the issues, the most volatile and explosive could well be Taiwan. The Economist argues that China may finally look to capture the small island democracy.</p><p>And yes, there is a lot to be concerned about, but The Economist doesn't have it quite right.</p><p>So, let's get out the Red Pen.</p><p>First, a central point in the magazine's argument is that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would have global economic repercussions, including disrupting the world's most important semiconductor manufacturer, TSMC, that's Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. That company makes more than half of all of the chips outsourced by all foreign companies globally. A quote from the piece: "Were production at TSMC to stop, so would the global electronics industry, at incalculable cost."</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9epnx668107myp8gpcyk8" alt="would-china-really-invade-taiwan-26140107.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>And yes, war would be devastating for many reasons, including the interruption of TSMC's operations. But that's precisely why it's not going to happen. China relies on a functional TSMC as much as the United States does for advanced semiconductors. In fact, China right now is way behind the US in this particular aspect, though not all, of the technology battle. Taiwan is a critical player in the great decoupling battle and an attack would seriously set back China's own tech ambitions.<br></p><p>The article also states that "China would overnight become the dominant power in Asia" if China attacked Taiwan and the United States didn't intervene.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9epud668807mya6yx9hz0" alt="would-china-really-invade-taiwan-26140118.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>That's doubtful. Actually, the "Quad," the US, Australia, India, and Japan, would be turbocharged overnight. China could completely undermine its own bid for regional dominance if it were to suddenly assault Taiwan. Also, the argument fails to acknowledge that Taiwan itself could mount significant military resistance, exposing weaknesses in Beijing's military power. Not to mention any such attack by China would further damage its ties to the European Union.<br></p><p>Finally, The Economist speculates that China's President Xi Jinping may want to "crown his legacy" as they say, with the takeover of Taiwan.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eq226quj07lqhv7oh76l" alt="would-china-really-invade-taiwan-26140119.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>That is a huge gamble. What happens if Xi attempts an invasion and fails? His legacy would be defined by a reckless move that would destroy China's long-term strategic prospects.<br></p><p>Which brings us back to that very splashy and provocative cover and headline. Is Taiwan really "the most dangerous place on earth?" No. Or at least, not right now.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eqt36qv407lqjoy1ocdh" alt="would-china-really-invade-taiwan-26140123.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>We've laid out a few of the reasons, but here a couple more: The Winter Olympics in Beijing, already super controversial as human rights groups call for boycotts based on abuses of Uighurs, Tibetans, and actions in Hong Kong. Beijing wants to avoid boycotts as much as possible, they see themselves as quite vulnerable in the upcoming Winter Olympics and attacking Taiwan would make matters far worse.<br></p><p>Also, President Xi is looking to secure a third term next fall. Remember, he ended term limits. A military attack on Taiwan could weaken China's standing if it fails. Xi's not likely to go there.</p><p>Still, there <em>are</em> other ways for China to assert greater control. For example, the very fear of a looming threat would likely erode Taiwan's quest for independence over time without any shots fired. How do the United States, the Quad, and Europe respond to that? The answer to that question is going to tell us a lot about where the GZERO world is heading.</p><p>That's your Red Pen for this week. Stay safe and we'll see you again here real soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>A gentler US approach to China wouldn&apos;t fix their relationship</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/a-gentler-us-approach-to-china-wouldnt-fix-the-relationship</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvremf9wg7yh07mypvz45nwu</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 15 Apr 2021 13:54:14 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>kishore mahbubani</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>taiwan</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>covid-19</category>
<category>uighurs</category>
<category>financial times</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>hong kong</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>covid-19 vaccine</category>
<description>Should the Biden administration &quot;reverse course on China&quot; in the hope of establishing a friendlier relationship, as diplomat Kishore Mahbubani argues in a recent Financial Times op-ed? Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst Michael Hirson take out the Red Pen to explain why it&apos;s not that simple.</description>
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<media:text>A Gentler US Approach To China Wouldn&apos;t Fix The Relationship | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Should the Biden administration "reverse course on China" in the hope of establishing a friendlier relationship, as diplomat Kishore Mahbubani argues in a recent Financial Times op-ed? <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/ibremmer">Ian Bremmer</a> and Eurasia Group analyst <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/mhirson">Michael Hirson</a> take out the Red Pen to explain why it's not that simple.</p><p>And today, we are talking about the United States and China. The relationship between the two most powerful nations in the world is the worst it's been since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Pundits and policymakers alike all around the world are trying to figure out how Washington and Beijing can at least stop the bleeding because a reset is nowhere in the cards.<br></p><p>That's the topic of the op-ed that we are looking at today. It's from the Financial Times, written by Singaporean diplomat <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/mahbubani_k">Kishore Mahbubani</a>, and the title summarizes the key argument: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/43421aa9-7b67-4fe3-8559-90c2e3597030">"Biden should summon the courage to reverse course on China."</a> Meaning, he should throw out the Trump era approach and open the door to more cooperation and kinder, gentler relations.</p><p>Now, first of all, truth in advertising, Kishore is former ambassador to the UN, former dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School – it's like the Kennedy School but of Singapore, and a decidedly good guy. We've known each other for decades, heck, I even blurbed one of his books. But is that going to stop us from adding red ink to the Pink Paper, the Financial Times? No, sir! Let's get out that pen.</p><p>So first, Kishore cites the late American diplomat and strategist George Kennan, always a good thing to do in an op-ed, who wrote during the Cold War that the United States should aspire "to create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problem of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a world power." And Kishore says that China is checking all these boxes right now and the United States is not. He mentions things like declining life expectancy and mounting income inequality as woes that are undermining America's standing.</p><p>And I admit that China certainly seems to know what it wants. But China has massive internal structural problems of its own, including demographic decline and massively growing pollution. So long as Beijing is interning Uighurs en masse, and cracking down on democracy in Hong Kong, or alienating most of the world's advanced democracies with a belligerent foreign policy, that argument of Kennan's is a tough sell to apply.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9enr86qrz07lqqv2yhdnl" alt="a-gentler-us-approach-to-china-wouldnt-fix-the-relationship-26053795.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>OK, next Kishore argues that "the US cold war strategy" won't work to isolate China.<br></p><p>That's right, a cold war strategy won't work. But the United States isn't using one. China is too deeply embedded in the global economy, and the United States isn't expecting China to have a Soviet-style collapse. No one in the Biden administration thinks that. It's actually trying to balance decades of cooperation with growing competition. Now there are some people out there that say the United States is in a cold war with China, like Niall Ferguson. But we're not and they're wrong. And that's a whole different Red Pen. Next week we can cover that one.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9enyl6qs607lql5jow5t4" alt="a-gentler-us-approach-to-china-wouldnt-fix-the-relationship-26053807.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Mahbubani, Kishore also writes that "the Chinese people can see that their government has protected them well in the Covid-19 emergency."<br></p><p>Now, it's also certainly the case the United States absolutely blew the pandemic response for some time. But today it is administering far more vaccine doses and far more quickly than has China. And China's vaccines don't work so well. And let's also not forget how one government's mismanagement hastened the spread of a global pandemic. Hint, it's not the United States.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eop6667i07my9dtqglko" alt="a-gentler-us-approach-to-china-wouldnt-fix-the-relationship-26053812.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Fourth point, Kishore writes that Biden is "making a strategic mistake" he says, "in carrying on with Donald Trump's policies towards China." He adds that Biden should declare "that Trump was wrong on China."<br></p><p>Never mind that that would be horrible domestic politics for Biden but a broader question, was Trump really wrong about the long-term challenge in the United States-China relationship? I mean sure, his policy implementation was erratic, and Trump's tweets generally sucked. The Biden team realizes it's going to have to compete with Beijing in a much more disciplined and coordinated way than the Trump administration. But China's deepening authoritarianism and increased power and presence on the global stage has meant that the United States was eventually going to recalibrate policy, whoever the president. That's why China policy is one of the very few issues in the United States right now that has broad bipartisan agreement in orientation.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ep2h6qtc07lq12msa0zx" alt="a-gentler-us-approach-to-china-wouldnt-fix-the-relationship-26053814.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Finally, Kishore says that Washington "should press the pause button on the US-Chinese geopolitical contest."<br></p><p>If only it were that easy, Kishore! It takes two to tango. If China is willing to do so, a pause may be possible. But there's no sign of that at this stage at all.</p><p>That's your Red Pen for today, folks. We'll see you again soon with another edition. Have a suggestion for a piece we should take our pen to? Tweet it out to <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/gzeromedia">@gzeromedia</a> using #TheRedPen and we'll check it out.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Putin&apos;s next move won&apos;t be a Baltic invasion that could unify NATO</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/putins-next-move-wont-be-a-baltic-invasion-that-could-unify-nato</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrelsgtgyme07lqxxfwqu52</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 19 Mar 2021 19:09:49 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>estonia</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>baltic states</category>
<category>lithuania</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>politico</category>
<category>leon aron</category>
<category>aei</category>
<category>military</category>
<category>russian economy</category>
<category>crimea</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>latvia</category>
<category>us-russia relations</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<description>Russian President Vladimir Putin needs a way to boost his popularity at home, but is he likely to launch a military campaign targeting the Baltic states, as Russian studies expert Leon Aron argues in a recent Politico op-ed? Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst Zachary Witlin take out the Red Pen to break down why a Baltic invasion is unlikely to be on Putin&apos;s agenda.</description>
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<media:text>Putin&apos;s Next Move Won&apos;t Be A Baltic Invasion That Could Unify NATO | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin needs a way to boost his popularity at home, but is he likely to launch a military campaign targeting the Baltic states, as Russian studies expert <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/AronRTTT">Leon Aron</a> argues in a recent Politico op-ed? <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/ianbremmer">Ian Bremmer</a> and Eurasia Group analysts <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/ABrideau">Alex Brideau</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/ZWitlin">Zachary Witlin&nbsp;</a>take out the Red Pen to break down why a Baltic invasion is unlikely to be on Putin's agenda.</p><p>Today we're taking a look at a recent op-ed from Politico, penned by Russian studies scholar Leon Aron of AEI.</p><p>And the title asks a provocative question, "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/03/15/russia-putin-invasion-ukraine-baltics-nato-475527">Could Putin launch another invasion?</a>" Aron links the current political moment in Russia, big protests, struggling economy, and Putin's own thirst for power and popularity, with the factors that led to Russia's incursion into Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014. He lays out the possibility that Russia could make military moves yet again, potentially against Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, the three Baltic states that all happen to be members of both the European Union and NATO.</p><p>Some context: This has been quite a week for US/Russia relations. President Biden in an interview with ABC News agreed with an assertion that Vladimir Putin is a "killer," I think he called him "soulless," too. And Russia responded by recalling their ambassador to the United States. All this comes as the American intelligence community released a report this week claiming that Russia had launched yet another campaign in the 2020 election to undermine Biden.</p><p>So a logical question would be: What is Putin's next move? Could he wage yet another military campaign?</p><p>Now, as with many of the pieces that we look at, some points Aron makes are right on the money. Yes, Putin did gain a lot of popularity after the operation in Crimea, especially. And yes, NATO faces real issues; Turkey is barely an ally these days, countries are slow rolling in terms of spending cash that they're promised, the French are talking about strategic autonomy, and yes, Putin always seems to have a surprise or two up his sleeve. But we are completely not convinced by the argument that an invasion of the Balts may be on its way.</p><p>So let's take out the Red Pen.</p><p>First, Aron writes that Putin's interventions, especially in Ukraine "worked," driving a "Crimean consensus" that victory in war overshadows troubles at home.</p><p>Sure, the Crimea intervention "worked" for Putin. Until it didn't. Putin has had to downplay military involvement in Ukraine of late to avoid a backlash from a Russian public that cares primarily about domestic issues still, like pensions, for example. And let's not forget that getting involved in Libya, in Syria, even in Nagorno-Karabakh didn't yield any real popularity bump of note for Putin.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9emrh666607mybeq556hm" alt="putins-next-move-wont-be-a-baltic-invasion-that-could-unify-nato-25852422.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Next, Aron writes that "we tend to repeat what worked." That is, Putin reached for the military lever before when he faced trouble, so he might do so again.<br></p><p>Well, Putin's decision making doesn't occur in a vacuum. Every past intervention was driven by national interest and foreign policy goals. Does Putin care about Putin? Of course. But Putin can't be sure that cooking up a foreign war would help matters it home. In fact, it might actually make them worse.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9emz36qrc07lq9cifqt0t" alt="putins-next-move-wont-be-a-baltic-invasion-that-could-unify-nato-25852488.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Finally, Aron says that Putin may consider a "fast and victorious poke at NATO's eastern flank," targeting the Baltic states and breaking NATO.<br></p><p>An attack on the Balts may be fast or it may be victorious, but probably not both. And Putin knows this. Western leaders are conflicted about the alliance, but an assault on full-fledged NATO State and EU members is exactly the kind of provocation that could awaken it. Putin understands this. He hardly wants to bring the alliance together as it's eroding. Low-cost efforts to steadily undermine legitimacy and grabbing targets of opportunity when available, that is much more Putin's speed.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9enub666p07myvzy4upjd" alt="putins-next-move-wont-be-a-baltic-invasion-that-could-unify-nato-25852515.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Putin certainly seems to want to be president for life and probably is going to end up running for a fifth term, though a lot can happen in three years. Military moves that diminish his popularity or lead to further widespread protest, never mind bring together his adversaries, that is a strong <strong>NYET</strong> for now tovarishchey.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Mitt Romney isn&apos;t the future of the GOP. He&apos;s the past.</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/mitt-romney-isnt-the-future-of-the-gop-hes-the-past</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrekzrtg3mp07my74q8z21r</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 12 Feb 2021 21:40:50 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>republicans</category>
<category>impeachment</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>jon lieber</category>
<category>us politics</category>
<category>maga</category>
<category>us senate</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>mitt romney</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>us congress</category>
<description>In this edition of The Red Pen, we take a look at an editorial by the FT&apos;s Janan Ganesh, who argues that Mitt Romney represents a future for US conservatism post-Trump and is in a unique position to turn around the Republican Party. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group&apos;s Jon Lieber point out that the GOP is actually moving in a very different direction.</description>
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<media:text>Mitt Romney Isn’t the Future of the GOP. He’s the Past | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this edition of The Red Pen, we take a look at an editorial by the FT's <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/janan-ganesh">Janan Ganesh</a>, who argues that Mitt Romney represents a future for US conservatism post-Trump and is in a unique position to turn around the Republican Party. <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/ianbremmer">Ian Bremmer</a> and Eurasia Group's <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/lieber2k">Jon Lieber</a> point out that the GOP is actually moving in a very different direction.</p><p>Today we're taking our red pen to an op-ed published in the Financial Times, the Pinks, written by Janan Ganesh, the newspaper's chief US political commentator.</p><p>And it's titled, "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/36b2741d-2bf8-4656-bf37-878073b3620a">Mitt Romney is the model for a new Republican party,</a>" and argues that the Utah Senator and former presidential candidate is an example of how the GOP should approach the post-Trump political world.</p><p>Now, Ganesh is a sharp observer of US politics, but we think this one misses the mark. Let me explain.</p><p>The op-ed is framed in the context of Trump's second impeachment trial, and whether Republican Senators should stand for their collective good or vote to acquit for political protection. Of course, the last few days have all focused on Trump's actions and behavior after the November election and his role in inciting the insurrection we witnessed at the Capitol on January 6th. But it also has implications for the 2024 election, 2022 midterms, and what happens to the GOP in the interim.</p><p>So let's get out the Red Pen and dive into Ganesh's arguments.</p><p>First, he writes that "if there is a future for US conservatism beyond hot-tempered quackery, Romney points the way." He adds that while Romney himself is nearing the end of his career, he can "serve as the model for whoever does one day redeem the party."</p><p>Romney is not the future of the GOP. He (and his ideas) are the embodiment of the past of a party that's actually getting Trumpier and Trumpier. And it's important to note that while he has taken stands against President Trump, one of few Republicans in Congress to loudly do so, he also represents a state, Utah, where Trump underperformed in both 2016 and 2020 relative to other red states, and relative to other Republicans over the years. But in the totality of the GOP, Romney is an outlier, he's increasingly becoming his own island. And in general, we question how many Never Trumpers or Lincoln Project folks will even be Republicans in five years.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmwf7rngskom107lt9kwqrges" alt="mitt-romney-isnt-the-future-of-the-gop-hes-the-past-25643891.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Next, Ganesh writes that Romney is an "agent for change" and that, if it wasn't for his age, he would be the perfect person to turn around the party.<br></p><p>Here's the thing, the GOP doesn't think it needs a turnaround. Trump almost won re-election in the midst of a global pandemic (that he seriously, even epically, mismanaged). Republicans may take back the House next year, and maybe even the Senate. GOP donors, voters, and the base support the way the party is going. Ganesh is offering a potential cure for patients who don't believe they're sick and didn't come seeking a diagnosis.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ek4c6qod07lqbnwjguaq" alt="mitt-romney-isnt-the-future-of-the-gop-hes-the-past-25643919.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Ganesh also writes that Romney "questions the small-government bias of a party that has let its economic views become articles of faith," and cites his "break with Republican convention."<br></p><p>Are we talking about the same Mitt Romney? Romney supports tax cuts, he opposes the ACA, and is the lead sponsor of the only budget amendment that is meant to deal with debts and deficits and reforming entitlements. There is one exception, and it's important, Romney's plan for generous reforms to family tax credits. And to be sure, it's admirable that Senator Romney is proposing it, but these ideas have been kicked around for years, including by George W. Bush. It's not the future of the GOP, it's a flashback to "compassionate conservatism."</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ekj1663107myve5knot1" alt="mitt-romney-isnt-the-future-of-the-gop-hes-the-past-25643934.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Finally, to return to impeachment, Ganesh argues "it is in the collective interest of sensible Republicans in that chamber to convict the former president over last month's Capitol siege."</p><p>Really? How is it in the collective interest of the party to break from and condemn its most popular member? Even if they bar him from running again, Trump is not going to simply fade away. He lost the 2020 election by plenty. But he also won 74 million votes across this nation. That's enough political mojo to be a big voice in the Republican party or to bring millions of people into a new one.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ekr56qpi07lq0613kb2v" alt="mitt-romney-isnt-the-future-of-the-gop-hes-the-past-25643977.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Look, I'd love to be able to say that it's in the political interest of Republicans to convict Trump. I do think it's in the interests of the country. But the political interest of the party? Sorry, Ganesh. And that's part of why we're in the fix we're in right now.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Israel-UAE relations &amp; the Abraham Accords are not at risk under Biden</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/israel-uae-relations-the-abraham-accords-are-not-at-risk-under-biden</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrektqcgvzf07lq9i31snja</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 05 Feb 2021 12:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>israel</category>
<category>abraham accords</category>
<category>palestine</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>iran nuclear deal</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>biden administration</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>united arab emirates</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>antony blinken</category>
<category>washington post</category>
<category>hugh hewitt</category>
<description>In a Washington Post op-ed, commentator Hugh Hewitt states his concern that President Biden will continue his streak of policy reversals in the Middle East, specifically regarding the peace deals that Trump brokered in his final year in office. But in fact, Biden has consistently supported the Abraham Accords, even during the heat of the presidential campaign. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analysts Jeffrey Wright and Sofia Meranto take out the Red Pen to point out that Hewitt may be overreacting to Biden&apos;s recent freeze on a fighter jet deal to the UAE.</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>The Abraham Accords Are Not at Risk Under Biden | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In a Washington Post op-ed, commentator Hugh Hewitt states his concern that President Biden will continue his streak of policy reversals in the Middle East, specifically regarding the peace deals that Trump brokered in his final year in office. But in fact, Biden has consistently supported the Abraham Accords, even during the heat of the presidential campaign. Ian Bremmer and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/">Eurasia Group</a> analysts Jeffrey Wright and Sofia Meranto take out the Red Pen to point out that Hewitt may be overreacting to Biden's recent freeze on a fighter jet deal to the UAE.</p><p>We're taking our Red Pen to an op-ed from the Washington Post, written by well-known radio host and columnist <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/hughhewitt">Hugh Hewitt</a>. It's titled, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/31/biden-administration-could-derail-abraham-accords-it-mustnt/">"The Biden Administration could derail the Abraham Accords. It mustn't."</a></p><p>Hewitt is arguing that one of the most important foreign policy accomplishments of the Trump presidency, no question there, the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco should not be unraveled by President Biden and his foreign policy team.</p><p>Now in fairness, President Biden has spent the bulk of his first few weeks in office undoing many of Trump's policy decisions. Rejoining the Paris Climate Accord for example, and the World Health Organization, ending the Muslim ban, reversing the ban on transgender people joining the military, to name just a few. But does that mean the Abraham Accords are kaput? Not a chance. Let's get out the red pen.</p><p>Hewitt hangs the bulk of his evidence on a specific aspect of the deal with the UAE involving the sale of US fighter jets to the Gulf nation. The Biden administration has halted that sale for the moment. And Hewitt writes, "With the announcement last week that the new administration will review a sale of a batch of fighter jets to the UAE, one of the most important diplomatic achievements could be in question."</p><p>That's a really big leap. To be clear, we're talking about one specific aspect of the deal, for starters, not the whole enchilada. Let's look at the context. It's not actually unusual for a new administration, either Democrat or Republican, to press pause on arms sales initiated by the previous one. It happens frequently, and those deals usually tend to get approved and eventually move forward. Further, the UAE doesn't seem all too worried. Its US Embassy, which had fantastically close relations with Jared Kushner in the Trump administration, <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/UAEEmbassyUS/status/1354527960020221955">tweeted&nbsp;</a>that the pause was expected, and the nation is looking forward to working with the Biden administration.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ej556qnk07lqlj69sm1v" alt="israel-uae-relations-the-abraham-accords-are-not-at-risk-under-biden-25598557.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Next, Hewitt argues that the fighter jets are "the crucial glue holding together US interests in the regions" and that the Abraham Accords could unravel without them. The Accord was important because it recognized the reality that Israel and the Gulf States had actually built a productive and quiet relationship, something frankly not appreciated under the previous Obama-Biden administration. The Trump deal didn't actually create that relationship, though it certainly did help it along. Remember, Trumps first trip as president was actually to Saudi Arabia and Israel, very unusual. And the UAE is not about to throw away its relationship with Israel, which it finds strategically very important, much less with the United States it's critical ally, even if the fighter jet sale were to go south. Which again, we don't expect.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ejkq6qnx07lqu2qmf6d5" alt="israel-uae-relations-the-abraham-accords-are-not-at-risk-under-biden-25598567.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Hewitt also writes, "The Iranians are not happy that the UAE may prove to be our wingman in any future conflict with the mullahs in Tehran." Well, to be fair, the UAE didn't actually sign up to be a "wingman." The US and UAE have differing views about the threat that's posed by Iran. And the Iranians are more concerned about the political alignment against them than they are more fighter jets in the region.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ejrp662107myif6mhtd4" alt="israel-uae-relations-the-abraham-accords-are-not-at-risk-under-biden-25598579.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>And finally, if you want to have a better sense of where the Biden Administration is heading on this issue, all you have to do is look at what they've already publicly said. During his Senate confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Tony Blinken said the US would keep its embassy in Jerusalem. And National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan described the Abraham Accords as "positive" for both security and the economy in the Middle East. Two big Trump accomplishments that the Biden team is absolutely signed up for. And keep in mind that even at the height of an incredibly heated presidential campaign, Joe Biden himself never denounced the deal. In fact, he actually openly supported it.<br></p><p>So, a great undoing really isn't in the works, at least when it comes to the Abraham Accords. We can expect a different approach to a lot of things in the Middle East from the Biden Administration, in terms of the Iranian Nuclear deal for example, no question. Also, restoring aid to and diplomacy with Palestinians who were not directly engaged in the Trump deal.</p><p>But a 180 on the Abraham Accords, that's not happening.</p><p>So, that's your Red Pen for this week. Stay safe, stay warm, and watch the Super Bowl, but be sure to avoid people. Talk to you soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>US-China relations can be improved under Biden, but geopolitical rivalry &amp; human rights can&apos;t be ignored</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/us-china-relations-can-be-improved-under-biden-but-geopolitical-rivalry-human-rights-cant-be-ignored</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 28 Jan 2021 21:09:35 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>human rights</category>
<category>democracy</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>xi jinping</category>
<category>uighurs</category>
<category>eu-china relations</category>
<category>project syndicate</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>hong kong</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>one country two systems</category>
<description>In their latest op-ed for Project Syndicate, Javier Solana and Eugenio Bregolat stress the importance of the US and China not becoming staunch enemies. But the piece, entitled &quot;Biden Can Pass His China Test,&quot; also avoids some uncomfortable truths about the US-China competition. Ian Bremmer, along with Eurasia Group analysts Michael Hirson and Jeffrey Wright, grabbed The Red Pen to clarify a few points re the US-China relationship.</description>
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<media:text>US-China Relations Can Improve | Geopolitical Rivalry Remains | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In their latest op-ed for <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/ProSyn">Project Syndicate</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/javiersolana">Javier Solana</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/eugenio-bregolat">Eugenio Bregolat</a> stress the importance of the US and China not becoming staunch enemies - but the piece also avoids some uncomfortable truths about the US-China competition. <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/ianbremmer">Ian Bremmer</a>, along with Eurasia Group analysts <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/MichaelHirson">Michael Hirson</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/jwright">Jeffrey Wright</a>, grabbed The Red Pen to clarify a few points re the US-China relationship.</p><p>Today we are taking our Red Pen to an op-ed from Project Syndicate, always gets distributed globally, written by two veteran Spanish diplomats, Javier Solana and Eugenio Bregolat. Among their many accolades, Solana served as Secretary-General of NATO and Bregolat was Spain's ambassador to China. So, not too shabby. And full disclosure, Javier is actually a dear and longstanding friend. So, I'm biased. But that doesn't stop The Red Pen.</p><p>Their article is titled "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joe-biden-america-china-relations-cooperation-competition-by-javier-solana-and-eugenio-bregolat-2021-01?a_la=english&amp;a_d=60097efac2f05a60d0059c3a&amp;a_m=&amp;a_a=click&amp;a_s=&amp;a_p=homepage&amp;a_li=joe-biden-america-china-relations-cooperation-competition-by-javier-solana-and-eugenio-bregolat-2021-01">Biden Can Pass His China Test</a>," and it focuses on what will be the most important foreign policy challenge that Biden will face as president, America's relationship with China, the second most powerful country in the world. The authors argue that under Trump that relationship deteriorated significantly, all-out battles over technology, trade, human rights, and even a giant global blame game over the coronavirus pandemic.</p><p>The piece makes solid points about the importance of the two nations not becoming staunch enemies. Their cooperation on everything from climate change to nuclear proliferation to cyber norms no doubt will be critical in the coming years. And we agree that the Trump administration's approach, particularly its rhetoric, requires recalibration in the Biden presidency. But the piece also avoids some uncomfortable truths about how difficult the road ahead is going to be in US/China diplomacy.</p><p>So first, Solana and Bregolat argue that "despite their obvious rivalry, the United States and China must try to understand each other" as they seek peaceful coexistence.</p><p>Now, let's be real: The rivalry between these two nations isn't about a failure to listen to one another. It's a geopolitical competition, particularly in and over Asia (though it's increasingly global) to dominate commercial sectors like technology and also increasingly zero-sum direct security concerns. Talking helps, absolutely, but won't change that underlying reality.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ei7o6qna07lqntzgajof" alt="us-china-relations-can-be-improved-under-biden-but-geopolitical-rivalry-human-rights-cant-be-ignored-25547454.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Next, the authors urge Biden to promote democracy and human rights in a "calm, consistent, and sensible manner" and avoid "trying to impose values."<br><br>Never mind the fact that actually, Trump himself did virtually none of that, but calling for regime change in China is clearly not a sensible strategy. But neither is ignoring our values or Western values. And the United States can urge China to adhere to basic human rights standards without also demanding it become a liberal democracy. Treatment of Uighurs is at the top of the list. As is breaking the "one country, two systems" promise in Hong Kong. These things can't be swept under the rug, by the Americans or our allies across the pond, for that matter.<br></p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eil7661907myltc4xcpw" alt="us-china-relations-can-be-improved-under-biden-but-geopolitical-rivalry-human-rights-cant-be-ignored-25547520.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Solana and Bregolat also write that "a relationship built on cooperation and competition must exclude the open confrontation sought by Trump and his hawks."</p><p>And here, I want to say that Trump's strategy, while in many ways' imperfect, actually also held some truth. Relying on engagement alone, which is what we mostly saw under the old Obama administration, wasn't working to shape Chinese behavior. The smartest people on Team Trump and Team Biden both recognize that confrontation on some issues is necessary. Indeed, in overall policy orientation, Team Biden and Team Trump probably closer and see eye-to-eye on China than any other foreign policy issue.<br></p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eisb661g07myxwl0tdqj" alt="us-china-relations-can-be-improved-under-biden-but-geopolitical-rivalry-human-rights-cant-be-ignored-25547552.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Finally, Solana and Bregolat say that the EU is exercising "strategic autonomy" by developing "an ambitious agenda for collaboration" with Biden while also "concluding a comprehensive investment agreement with China."<br><br>Yep, Europe is a significant part of the equation here. But just as the EU doesn't need to slavishly follow the United States, it also shouldn't sign a last-minute deal with China and expect a pat on the back from Washington. Europe has just as much stake in preserving the liberal international system as does the United States, even though that is getting harder and the support for it is eroding.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmwf7rn2dku3607lgqe8wbkwb" alt="us-china-relations-can-be-improved-under-biden-but-geopolitical-rivalry-human-rights-cant-be-ignored-25547558.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Well, there you have it, that's your Red Pen for this week. We will have much more to say about the US and China in the coming months, that is for sure. Stay tuned.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Returning Cuba to terror list is an 11th hour move by Pompeo and Trump</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/returning-cuba-to-terror-list-is-an-11th-hour-move-by-pompeo-and-trump</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 15 Jan 2021 22:55:20 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>mike pompeo</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>iran</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>state sponsors of terrorism list</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>nicolas maduro</category>
<category>latin america-caribbean</category>
<category>us state department</category>
<category>terrorism</category>
<category>cuba</category>
<category>venezuela</category>
<description>Does Cuba belong back on the US&apos;s State Sponsors of Terrorism list? The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board showed their support for Secretary of State Mike Pompeo&apos;s decision on this issue in a recent opinion piece, &quot;Cuba&apos;s Support for Terror.&quot; But in this edition of The Red Pen, Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analysts Risa Grais-Targow, Jeffrey Wright and Regina Argenzio argue that the WSJ&apos;s op-ed goes too far.</description>
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<media:text>Returning Cuba To Terror List Is An 11th Hour Move By Pompeo &amp; Trump | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Does Cuba belong back on the US's State Sponsors of Terrorism list? The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board showed their support for Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's decision on this issue in a recent opinion piece, "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/cubas-support-for-terror-11610494583">Cuba's Support for Terror</a>." But in this edition of The Red Pen, <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/ianbremmer">Ian Bremmer</a> and Eurasia Group analysts <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/risaclaire">Risa Grais-Targow</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/jwright">Jeffrey Wright</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/ArgenzioRegina">Regina Argenzio</a> argue that the WSJ's op-ed goes too far.</p><p>We are now just a few days away from the official end of Donald Trump's presidency, but the impacts of his latest moves in office will obviously last far beyond Joe Biden's inauguration. There's the deep structural political polarization, the ongoing investigations into the violence we saw at the Capitol, lord knows what happens over the next few days, there's also last-minute policy decisions here and abroad. And that's where we're taking our Red Pen this week, specifically US relations with Cuba.</p><p>The Trump administration this past week declared Cuba a "state sponsor of terrorism." Just to remind you, the Obama administration removed Cuba from that list in 2015 as part of a broader opening with the communist country. The Wall Street Journal editorial board is a big fan of the decision to put it back on the list.</p><p>Cuba has problems when it comes to human rights and suppression of political opponents, plus close ties to countries that the United States hardly friendly with, like Iran and Venezuela. But we think this op-ed actually goes too far, as does Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's parting shot of putting that nation back on this list.</p><p>So, let's get to it. First, The Editorial Board writes that "Cuba will attempt to coax Joe Biden to resume Mr. Obama's courtship, but the regime never honored its promises at home or abroad."</p><p>Well, Cuba wasn't really given a chance, and that wasn't the point. Trump started to roll back Obama's policies immediately after becoming president. Obama intended to engage the Cuban population and encourage economic opening with the United States as a way to bring about political change. The policy was never about the communist regime's "promises."</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9egsg6qlz07lq4y99fb1c" alt="returning-cuba-to-terror-list-is-an-11th-hour-move-by-pompeo-and-trump-25460424.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Next, the Wall Street Journal argues that Cuba is responsible for the "collapse of Venezuela's democracy." Maduro "survives in power thanks to Cuba," and Venezuela has become a "base for transnational crime and terrorism."<br></p><p>Now, it's true, Cuba has and does support the Maduro regime. So have Russia, Turkey, China, and Iran. US sanctions have also deepened Venezuela's crisis. And the United States doesn't seem so concerned about Venezuela being a terrorist base since Venezuela is not actually on the terrorist list itself.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eh0s6qmv07lqbdjz26fz" alt="returning-cuba-to-terror-list-is-an-11th-hour-move-by-pompeo-and-trump-25460439.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>The op-ed also states that Cuba has "deepened and broadened its commitment to terrorism," and that the nation harbors terrorists and criminals wanted by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies.<br></p><p>By this standard it's true, but many US allies would also need to make the list. Saudi Arabia for example, has long harbored people suspected of involvement in terrorist attacks. France refuses to extradite its own citizens to face US courts. And by the way, the United States has harbored many anti-Castro exiles who have committed acts of violence in Cuba.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ehl16qn307lq8wdfgyc5" alt="returning-cuba-to-terror-list-is-an-11th-hour-move-by-pompeo-and-trump-25460459.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Now Cuba is far from being blameless, but that's not the point. Why put Cuba back on this list now? The decision has a lot more to do with the US political calendar than anything Cuba has done. The 11th hour move is intended to complicate Biden's Cuba plans, nothing more.<br></p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ehsw661207my1wqqz9nr" alt="returning-cuba-to-terror-list-is-an-11th-hour-move-by-pompeo-and-trump-25460480.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>It was Ronald Reagan who first added Cuba to the terrorism list back in 1982, and the US had embargoes in place with Cuba for nearly 50 years. Communist government is still in power and still repressive.</p><p>What makes Trump, or the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board, think this time around is going to be any different? It feels more like another mess to toss at the incoming president and his administration.<br></p><p>Add it to the growing pile.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>China&apos;s EU deal betrays insecurity; not a wedge between US &amp; EU</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/chinas-eu-deal-betrays-insecurity-not-a-wedge-between-us-eu</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrek4nvg12907mysfhf7r0p</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2021 23:06:39 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>eu china deal</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>gideon rachman</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>financial times</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>michael hirson</category>
<description>In our first edition of The Red Pen for 2021, we take a look at an editorial by the FT&apos;s Gideon Rachman, who argues that the recent EU-China treaty will complicate President-elect Biden&apos;s ability to handle China and rebuild the US-EU relationship. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group&apos;s Michael Hirson point out that the deal actually demonstrates how much Beijing fears being out-maneuvered by Biden.</description>
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<media:text>China&apos;s EU Deal Betrays Insecurity; Not a Wedge Between US &amp; EU | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In our first edition of The Red Pen for 2021, we take a look at an editorial by the FT's Gideon Rachman, who argues that the recent EU-China treaty will complicate President-elect Biden's ability to handle China and rebuild the US-EU relationship. <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/ianbremmer">Ian Bremmer</a> and Eurasia Group's <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/michaelhirson">Michael Hirson</a> point out the deal actually demonstrates how much Beijing fears being out-maneuvered by Biden.</p><p>There's a lot going on in the world, and obviously plenty to discuss right here in the United States where our democracy is getting tested like nobody's business. But that doesn't mean that good op-eds out there don't deserve to be sparred with. And, I don't want to just neglect all those perfectly important writers, so we have one this week.</p><p>Turning our attention abroad to how China factors in as President-elect Joe Biden takes office in a short period of time … and what role Europe will play in how the United States approaches the second biggest economy, soon to be first, on the planet.</p><p>The op-ed we're marking up is by <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/gideonrachman">Gideon Rachman</a>. He's the chief foreign affairs commentator at the Financial Times. And the piece is entitled, "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/2d759671-0b1d-4587-ba63-7480990f0438">Europe Has Handed China A Strategic Victory.</a>" He argues against a recent investment treaty between Europe and China championed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, also heavily supported by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. And it's viewed overall as a deepening of financial ties and commerce between Europe and China.</p><p>Now as a little bit of background, the deal, which was several years in the making, boosts market access in China for European firms in sectors such as autos and finance.</p><p>Now Gideon argues that the European Union has just handed China a big win despite all of that nation's diplomatic and humanitarian transgressions…and that this is going to further complicate things for incoming President Joe Biden as he tries to figure out how to deal with China.</p><p>Now, agree with Gideon, it's a significant development. And also, it's true that Europe does appear to be flexing its muscles a bit here: The US can do a unilateral trade deal with China (Phase One) and so can Europe. But is this going to change the geopolitical landscape? No, and the argument goes too far on that point.</p><p>First, Gideon writes, "Ms. Von der Leyen concluded 2020 by sending a truly awful geopolitical message — as her commission signed off on an investment treaty between the EU and China."</p><p>Well, the EU also has said it agrees with the United States "on the strategic challenge presented by China's growing international assertiveness." And there are many humanitarian and diplomatic issues Europe as a whole has strongly condemned—from China's attack on democracy in Hong Kong to its treatment of Muslim minorities. This is a fairly narrow deal, not a white flag on the relationship.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9efre6qg507lq4xdjcs2y" alt="chinas-eu-deal-betrays-insecurity-not-a-wedge-between-us-eu-25266164.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Number two, Gideon describes the timing of the deal as "exquisite" for China, driving a wedge between Europe and the US on the eve of Biden's inauguration.<br></p><p>Now you can make that argument, but let's be clear, Beijing was clearly intent on rushing to get the deal done before Biden took office and ended up giving a lot of benefits to the Europeans accordingly. Does that sound like a confident superpower? Or, rather, like an insecure country worried about being out maneuvered by Biden and preparing to face a lot more coordinated and multilateral pressure? In other words, China might have grabbed what it could at a fire sale before Biden comes in to remove the wedge that has existed between Europe and the United States under the Trump administration.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9efjx6qfr07lqd0iho829" alt="chinas-eu-deal-betrays-insecurity-not-a-wedge-between-us-eu-25266173.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Now on that, Gideon describes this deal as a "kick in the teeth" to Biden, who wants to restore ties to some of our strongest global allies in Europe.<br></p><p>Now, it's a wake-up call. But Beijing keeps digging its own diplomatic hole, from turning away WHO inspectors to conducting mass arrests in Hong Kong. And that's just this week. The new Biden team's commitment to transatlantic cooperation is going to go a long way to repairing the US-Europe relationship.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eg2i6qgj07lq5f3k2a19" alt="chinas-eu-deal-betrays-insecurity-not-a-wedge-between-us-eu-25266175.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Finally, Gideon writes that Europe "is naive to believe that China will respect the agreement it has signed…And it is naive to think that the darkening political climate in Beijing will never affect life in Brussels or Berlin."<br></p><p>Now sure, you can point to plenty of examples of China not holding up its end of the bargain. Gideon mentions the WTO agreement in 2001. He's right. Also, in the terms of this EU/China deal, Beijing is expected to deliver on things like climate action, reducing favoritism to state-owned businesses, and improving labor practices. All kind of red lines for the Chinese state capitalist system. Good luck with that. But let's be clear, when China fails to meet those terms, that ends up working in America's favor and makes any EU/China agreement short-lived at best. It gets weaker as a consequence of that.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9egkh65xy07myn150uklq" alt="chinas-eu-deal-betrays-insecurity-not-a-wedge-between-us-eu-25266179.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>So, is it the end of the world order as we know it? No. But is China, and how its growing economic influence and power impacts every nation, going to be a big issue for Biden…and beyond? Yes. We just don't think Ursula von der Leyen or the EU did something "truly awful," as Gideon states.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Donald Trump&apos;s relevance to US politics doesn&apos;t disappear on Jan 20, 2021</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/donald-trump-relevance-in-us-politics-maintained-jan-20-2021</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 18 Dec 2020 21:02:23 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>us election</category>
<category>democracy</category>
<category>2020 election</category>
<category>eurasia group</category>
<category>republicans</category>
<category>jon lieber</category>
<category>us politics</category>
<category>politico</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>video</category>
<category>partisanship</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<description>On January 20th, Joe Biden will become the 46th President of the United States. How long will Donald Trump still be a thing in US politics, and does he have another shot at the White House? John Harris writes in Politico that &quot;a Trump comeback in 2024 is not going to happen,&quot; but Ian Bremmer and the US analysts at Eurasia Group aren&apos;t so sure that Trump will lose relevance once Joe Biden is inaugurated as president. Watch as Ian explains on 2020&apos;s final installment of The Red Pen.</description>
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<media:text>Donald Trump Can Maintain Relevance in US Politics after Jan 20, 2021 | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2020's final installment of The Red Pen — as we say goodbye not only to this tumultuous year, but also to the Trump presidency -- <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/ianbremmer">Ian Bremmer</a> and Eurasia Group's US team: <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/lieber2k">Jon Lieber</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/JWright">Jeffrey Wright</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/clayton_allen">Clayton Allen</a>, and <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/ArgenzioRegina">Regina Argenzio</a> are taking the Red Pen to an op-ed by <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/harrispolitico">John Harris</a>, veteran political journalist and co-founder of Politico, optimistically titled, "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/12/10/trump-comeback-2024-not-happening-444135">Relax, a Trump comeback in 2024 is not going to happen</a>."</p><p>On January 20th, Joe Biden will become the 46th President of the United States. So how long will Donald Trump still be a thing in US politics, and does he have another shot at the White House? John Harris makes his case that Trump is going to fade away based on historical precedent that the US system has seen disruptors before and endured other politicians who were more obsessed with their own publicity than the greater goals of their party. And that's true, but we're not so sure that Donald Trump is quite the same phenomenon.</p><p>Let's get into it. First, Harris writes, "There are abundant precedents suggesting that Trump does not have another important act in national politics." He points to Joseph McCarthy, George Wallace, and Ross Perot. And he argues that while cults of personality in American politics are quite common, they never live long, and Trump has offered no reason to suppose he will be an exception. Well, hold on a second.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eebr6qe207lqt2d212oy" alt="donald-trump-relevance-in-us-politics-maintained-jan-20-2021-24977808.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>The biggest difference between Trump and McCarthy, Wallace, and Perot is that Trump actually got elected president. He's got a very broad base of support, unending media presence, and the ability to fundraise at a massive scale. Ross Perot got 8 million votes when he ran as a third-party candidate against Bill Clinton and Republican challenger Bob Dole back in '96. Trump lost the 2020 election as the incumbent Republican president and he got more than 74 million votes as he keeps reminding us. Big, big difference there.<br></p><p>Next Harris argues, "No one can seriously believe that Trump cares more about the public's problems than his own and that is not a recipe for sustaining political power in contrast to his 2015 agenda, which addressed trade, immigration, globalization and perceptions of national decline."</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eenn65v307mybjk57kph" alt="donald-trump-relevance-in-us-politics-maintained-jan-20-2021-24977809.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>That's not exactly breaking news to anyone who is a critic of Trump on both sides of the aisle, but clearly, it's not how Trump's supporters feel. Remember, if it wasn't for coronavirus, Trump wins this election. He still did better with Black and Hispanic voters than in 2016 and among people who thought the economy was the most important issue in the election. And Republican voters who stood by Trump are angry. Most of them believe the election was stolen and that's not a sentiment that can be waved away on inauguration day.</p><p>Harris also writes that, "Trump is essentially a one trick pony. He goes to extreme and he doubles down no matter what. That combination of flawed judgment and impoverished imagination hardly supports optimism about his ability to retain power after January 20th," he writes.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eevx65va07mytkpjsl93" alt="donald-trump-relevance-in-us-politics-maintained-jan-20-2021-24977810.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>We say again, "Is that news?" Trump has been going to extremes and demonstrating flawed judgment for four years and yet he still has tens of millions of supporters and he will now have tons of free time and the largest megaphone in the Republican party to promote his message. It's a recipe to stay prominent.</p><p>Finally, Harris argues that, "Republicans who want to regain control of the party and become president themselves can simply transcend Trump. They can make Trump look irrelevant, an artifact of an era that has passed." Yeah, they've done such a great job of transcending him so far. Look, let's face it, the GOP right now has very little bench. There is no real era parent to claim that mantle and begin the road to 2024.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9efbx65vh07myf0h7s0kv" alt="donald-trump-relevance-in-us-politics-maintained-jan-20-2021-24977813.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Rather than comparing Trump to McCarthy or Ross Perot, we should look a little deeper into American history at Andrew Jackson, the seventh US president. In a very divided 19th century America, Jackson embodied all the same anti elite and populous arguments as Trump and had a very similar band of aggressive and highly motivated supporters. Trump has expressed his admiration for Jackson several times in his presidency, he even put a portrait of Jackson right in the oval office. (I think that's probably coming down on the 21st of Jan.) Jackson, by the way, served two terms. They were consecutive, and that is certainly not happening this time. But it's way too soon to say that President Trump has no voice beyond January 20th.<br></p><p>That's your Red Pen this week and for this year. We'll see you again real soon in 2021.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>America is still a democracy post-Trump, but is it a healthy one?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/america-is-still-a-democracy-post-trump-but-is-it-a-healthy-one</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 11 Dec 2020 12:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>us politics</category>
<category>partisanship</category>
<category>2020 election</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>eric posner</category>
<category>jon lieber</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>democracy</category>
<category>elections</category>
<category>republicans</category>
<category>democrats</category>
<description>Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group&apos;s Jon Lieber, Jeffrey Wright, and Clayton Allen are taking the Red Pen to an op-ed by Eric Posner, an author and law professor at the University of Chicago. It&apos;s titled &quot;America Passed the Trump Stress Test&quot; and was published recently by Project Syndicate. Professor Posner&apos;s argument is basically this: sure, President Trump has violated norms and challenged legitimate election results, but in the end, no real harm done to American institutions, or America&apos;s democracy itself. Now it&apos;s certainly true that Trump&apos;s behavior hasn&apos;t led to meaningful policy change, but Posner is blowing the whole thing off as a, &quot;Nothing to see here, no big deal,&quot; moment. And we think it&apos;s a bit more serious than that.</description>
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<media:text>America is Still a Democracy Post-Trump, But is it a Healthy One? | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/ianbremmer">Ian Bremmer</a> and Eurasia Group's <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/lieber2k">Jon Lieber</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/JWright">Jeffrey Wright</a>, and Clayton Allen are taking the Red Pen to an op-ed by <a target="_blank" href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/eric-posner">Eric Posner</a>, an author and law professor at the University of Chicago. It's titled <a target="_blank" href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-strengthened-american-democracy-by-eric-posner-2020-12?a_la=english&amp;a_d=5fce4059cbe9cc3ec0c9ee48&amp;a_m=&amp;a_a=click&amp;a_s=&amp;a_p=homepage&amp;a_li=trump-strengthened-american-democracy-by-eric-posner-2020-12&amp;a_pa=curated&amp;a_ps=&amp;a_ms=&amp;a_r=">"America Passed the Trump Stress Test"</a> and was published recently by Project Syndicate.</p><p>Professor Posner's argument is basically this: sure, President Trump has violated norms and challenged legitimate election results, but in the end, no real harm done to American institutions, or America's democracy itself. Now it's certainly true that Trump's behavior hasn't led to meaningful policy change, but Posner is blowing the whole thing off as a, "Nothing to see here, no big deal," moment. And we think it's a bit more serious than that.</p><p>First, Posner writes, "While many Republican voters tell pollsters that the election was stolen, hardly any of them have taken to the streets or pursued tactics that one would expect from people who truly believe that democracy has been subverted. There has been no Hong Kong style uprising. Trump's attacks on American institutions are largely a form of political performance art."<br></p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ed8r65tl07mync1tq9dk" alt="america-is-still-a-democracy-post-trump-but-is-it-a-healthy-one-24945679.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Okay. For starters, it is obvious that the US democracy has withstood Trump's challenge of the election results, and refusal to concede. Heck, that's my whole, "Don't panic," shtick, but that's a low bar. Trump has also in the process, reshaped the Republican party and accelerated the deep partisanship that has nearly destroyed the possibility of compromise in Washington. You do actually need legislation to get done in a country. Further, Trump isn't going anywhere. I mean, we'll see how Twitter treats him in his days, post Pennsylvania Avenue, when we all know he's still going to be tweeting, and he's still going to be talking to his base.</p><p>Next, on the matter of civic discourse and participation throughout the election, Posner writes, "Despite the hardships and constraints of the worst health crisis in a century, people donated money to candidates, argued with each other online, organized on a massive scale, notwithstanding the conspiracy theorizing, polarization, and persistent sense of turmoil. These are signs of a healthy democracy."<br></p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9edos6qdv07lq7k0poei4" alt="america-is-still-a-democracy-post-trump-but-is-it-a-healthy-one-24945683.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>May I remind you, Eric, that a majority of Trump voters don't think that Biden legitimately won, and the voting system was seriously stretched; hours long waits, mail-in ballot hiccups and the like. Look, America is surely a democracy, but saying that the American democracy is healthy? Most Americans don't think so, most foreigners too. That's a problem. I'd also point out that Trump's attacks on the legitimacy of the election have reinforced distrust in the system, particularly among his own 70 plus million supporters. That isn't the sign of a healthy democracy either.</p><p>Finally, Posner writes of Trump's hope of overturning the election results, "Perhaps," he says, "If enough voters took to the streets and enough officials calculated that a grateful Trump would award them with future Senate cures, these officials would have delivered for him, but that didn't happen."<br></p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9edxv65u607myr4mszwul" alt="america-is-still-a-democracy-post-trump-but-is-it-a-healthy-one-24945689.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Actually, it didn't happen because the election wasn't close enough to rig in key swing States, but President Trump has created the toxic environment for all of these things to happen, following a potential closer vote. So, yes, overall, it's true that a concession would be nice, but it's not at all necessary for a transition of power to happen; Biden will be ascending to the presidency on January 20th, I have no doubt at all. And yes, American democracy still stands, but Trump's throwing out of conventional norms is not something to simply shrug off. US political institutions have been eroding considerably over the past decades, and that erosion has only accelerated under, and because of President Trump, it doesn't matter that Trump refused to show up at the White House Correspondence Dinner; I could care less. Refusing to release his tax returns. That's another matter. And Trump's overall strategy was not about shaking up Washington, so much as advancing his own personal interests and abusing American power. And that should not be ignored.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Don’t &quot;give up&quot; on all 73 million Americans who voted for Trump</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/dont-give-up-on-all-73-million-americans-who-voted-for-trump</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2020 22:16:38 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>jon lieber</category>
<category>wajahat ali</category>
<category>new york times</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>maga</category>
<category>us politics</category>
<category>democracy</category>
<category>republicans</category>
<category>democrats</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<description>In an op-ed in the New York Times, author Wajahat Ali says he&apos;s giving up on reaching out to Trump supporters and thinks Ian Bremmer and others shouldn&apos;t bother trying. On this edition of The Red Pen, where we pick apart the argument in a major opinion piece, Ian and Eurasia Group&apos;s Jon Lieber explain what Ali got wrong - and right - and why it&apos;s important to see the 73 million Americans who voted for Trump with nuance.</description>
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<media:text>Don’t &quot;Give Up&quot; on All 73 Million Americans Who Voted For Trump | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In an op-ed in the New York Times, author <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/WajahatAli">Wajahat Ali</a> says he's giving up on reaching out to Trump supporters and thinks <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/ianbremmer">Ian Bremmer</a> and others shouldn't bother trying. On this edition of The Red Pen, where we pick apart the argument in a major opinion piece, Ian and Eurasia Group's <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/lieber2k">Jon Lieber</a> explain what Ali got wrong - and right - and why it's important to see the 73 million Americans who voted for Trump with nuance.<br></p><p>Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here with your latest edition of The Red Pen. And today we're taking our red pen to an op-ed by New York Times contributor and author, Wajahat Ali. The title says it all, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/19/opinion/trump-supporters.html">Reach Out to Trump Supporters, They Said. I Tried. I Give Up.</a>Wajahat is saying that trying to understand and connect with Trump supporters is futile for the other side, and that a chorus of voices, mine included, according to Wajahat, who name-checks me and Pete Buttigieg as wasting our breath, are fighting a losing game trying to promote empathy. Here's the tweet from me he specifically referenced.</p><p>So, I want to start by saying that there is a lot that Wajahat points out in this piece that is irrefutable. He's right that Trump has worked hard to further divide America. He's right that racism and Islamophobia are real, and that people who hold those bigoted views have been emboldened by President Trump. There have been Trump policies like the Muslim ban that only fueled the notion that there are good immigrants and bad ones, as he states. And yes, way too many people see whiteness as good and blackness as bad, even though they might not admit it. That shouldn't be tolerated. None of it. And I get why Wajahat doesn't want to engage in that conversation any longer.</p><p>But I want to defend the idea that we are one country and need to be talking to each other. Canceling 73 million Americans, fellow Americans, the Trump voters, and refusing to find those within that wide swath who might see your point on an issue or three feels like more than a missed opportunity to me. So, let's get out the red pen.</p><p>Wajahat argues that he sought to reach out to Trump supporters after the 2016 election, quoting his own video that included the message, "You might not like me and I might not like you, but we share the same real estate." Okay.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9e9mm65px07mybymzu7b7" alt="dont-give-up-on-all-73-million-americans-who-voted-for-trump-24797907.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>So, I'm starting off with an easy one. As Biden might say, "Come on, man." How do you think Trump supporters felt when you started off by saying you don't like them or assuming they don't like you? I got to tell you, if someone started a conversation with me by saying, "I don't like you," I am not inclined to listen to you for much more. Okay. That's the easy one.<br></p><p>Now let's be more serious. Next, Wajahat describes engaging Trump supporters solely on the issue of race. I warned them that supporting white nationalism and Trump in particular would be self-destructive. Here's the heart of the problem. Wajahat's belief that Trump supporters are irredeemably racist blinds him to the fact that there are other economic, social and cultural concerns that really, really matter. In fact, the top issue for voters in the exit poll was the economy, as it most often is.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9ea936q8s07lqyoqjj10y" alt="dont-give-up-on-all-73-million-americans-who-voted-for-trump-24797910.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Now, I understand the view that by voting for Trump, you've endorsed those uglier elements, including Trump's racism. But there is a lot more nuance in the 40% of the American population that Wajahat is not acknowledging.<br></p><p>He also writes, "The majority of the people of color rejected Trump's cruelty and vulgarity, and that he supports creating a multicultural coalition of the willing, including white Trump supporters." And look, Wajahat is right that a majority of people of color voted for Joe Biden, but Donald Trump earned more votes from people of color in 2020 than he did in 2016, especially among black voters. It's a sign that the GOP's base is shifting, and the conventional lines and the assumptions about politics in America are no longer totally true. There are lots of other factors at play here that the argument does not address.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eag665qe07myozx6ypty" alt="dont-give-up-on-all-73-million-americans-who-voted-for-trump-24797914.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Heck, maybe it's easier for me because I don't usually talk about race when I'm talking to audiences across the political spectrum. I talk about global issues, and that's where things get a lot less black and white. I mean, hey, the 20-year war in Afghanistan failed. Hey, free trade might be great for me in the 1%, but what have you gotten from it? Even immigration, should we be bringing in as many people when labor needs are actually decreasing? These are conversations that you can have across the entire political spectrum that also matter and that engage people, real people. The future of our country also relies on them.<br></p><p>So, I mean, in the same way you say in your family you used to avoid race and sex and politics, maybe going right into the most divisive issue is not the way you start the conversation with people that you're trying to create any sort of bridge with.</p><p>Finally, Wajahat writes that he did his part in reaching out to Trump supporters by going on a speaking tour in states where Trump won. And I want to say here that empathy is more than just being paid to deliver a dozen speeches, and it's more than just chatting with your driver. That's an anecdote that Wajahat actually describes. You can't grab Tom Friedman's talking to your drivers stick in the New York Times op-ed. I mean, that's ballsy. But it's about not assuming the worst of people and trying for a moment to put yourself in the shoes of someone who may support Trump's economic or conservative social policies and is tired of being told he's racist by liberals in New York. I assume Wajahat isn't going to agree with my last point, and maybe some of you won't either. But I still argue there's truth in it.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9eaoa65ql07my64g5g4hx" alt="dont-give-up-on-all-73-million-americans-who-voted-for-trump-24797922.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Now, in his final sentences, Wajahat makes an argument I strongly agree with. We should all work to combat misinformation and lies coming from political henchmen and landing onto social media sites. And those sites need to be doing a hell of a lot more to prevent those lies from catching like wildfire. Agreed. But no, I do not believe we should stop talking to people who don't see it our way. And I don't think Joe Biden as president will get very much accomplished if he can't find a way to connect with some of the 73 million people who didn't vote for him.<br></p><p>The main reason to engage with people you disagree with in your own country is they are fellow citizens, regardless of what they believe. And I tell you, if you don't, you can be damn sure that somebody else will. If you want to give 73 million Americans over to the Proud Boys and Steve Bannons of the world, they'll be more than happy to organize them on Facebook.</p><p>Anyway, that's your edition of The Red Pen this week. I'm Ian Bremmer. Stay safe and avoid people.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Trump didn&apos;t invent Americans&apos; rejection of US post-war leadership role</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/trump-didnt-invent-americans-rejection-of-us-post-war-leadership-role</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvreisbmfx2s07myq3fgypem</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2020 18:10:19 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>financial times</category>
<category>martin wolf</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>2020 election</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<description>In his latest Financial Times op-ed, Martin Wolf argues that the US global role is at stake in this election and that a Trump re-election would undo America&apos;s legacy of democratic leadership in the world. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group&apos;s Jeffrey Wright grabbed the Red Pen to argue that a Trump presidency exists in part because of Americans&apos; rejection of the US&apos;s post-war leadership role, and these feelings run deeper than the article suggests.</description>
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<media:text>Trump Didn&apos;t Create Americans&apos; Rejection of US Post-War Leadership Role | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In his latest <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/61e731be-dc67-476a-bdd8-eab4e4d34007">Financial Times op-ed</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/martinwolf_">Martin Wolf</a> argues that the US global role is at stake in this election and that a Trump re-election would undo America's legacy of democratic leadership in the world. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group's <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/jwright">Jeffrey Wright</a> grabbed the Red Pen to argue that a Trump presidency exists in part because of Americans' rejection of the US's post-war leadership role, and these feelings run deeper than the article suggests.</p><p>Today, we're taking The Red Pen to a recent op-ed published in The Financial Times from my good friend, the chief economics commentator Martin Wolf. Martin argues the global role of the United States is at stake on November 3rd, and that a Trump reelection would undo America's legacy of democratic leadership in the world. There's been a lot of this sort of thing recently. I know, we did it once, but if we do it twice, it's all over and I'm not there. To be clear, we don't totally reject what Martin is presenting in this piece. Rather, we'd argue that a Trump presidency exists because there were feelings that were present in the United States before he came along and they run a lot deeper than the article suggests. In other words, it's really not all about Trump.</p><p>First, Martin writes about America's long history as a leading model of functioning democracy, a leader among nations that share its values and essential player in resolving big global challenges. To quote, "The reelection of Mr. Trump would signify a rejection of all three roles by the American people," he writes. Let's bring out that red pen, this misses a larger point. Many Americans have already rejected those roles. Two decades of wars, trade agreements that have left working people behind and a feeling that other nations were just freeloading and letting the US be the world's policemen. That didn't start with Trump.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9e6fj65mr07myai9olli3" alt="trump-didnt-invent-americans-rejection-of-us-post-war-leadership-role-24641582.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Irrespective of whether you agree with the perspective or not, it's been growing any United States with massive levels of inequality and large numbers of Americans that feel like the system doesn't work for them, and that includes first and foremost, how America has projected its power internationally. Don't you remember on the other side of this equation just how many US allies were saying that the Obama-Biden team were leading from behind? Again, didn't start with Trump. Martin sees the president as a threat to US leadership in the world. But a lot of Trump's supporters think he's just standing up for them and not letting other countries take advantage of the United States.<br></p><p>Next, is Trump's goal to do whatever he likes, laws be damned? Martin writes, "He wants to be an autocrat. If he wins again, he may largely achieve his aim." Disagree. Trump wanting to be an autocrat and Trump actually having that capacity, not to mention competence, are two radically different things. Trump focuses more on tweeting and petty grievances than actually consolidating power. Heck. Remember, when the biggest crisis of not only his administration, but my lifetime came, coronavirus, that would have given any president the chance to consolidate power, emergency rule, really take control in the United States, President Trump wanted none of it. He said, "Not my responsibility. The states are in charge." That isn't someone who's about to become an autocrat.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9e6nm65n807myfsmjg4hm" alt="trump-didnt-invent-americans-rejection-of-us-post-war-leadership-role-24641620.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Many American political institutions have eroded not only under Trump, but over the past 30 years. Congress, the executive, the bureaucracy, the mass media, and indeed American elections. I'd argue the American judiciary and the military largely are as strong as they have been, and that process has indeed sped up under four years of Trump. It's been a long time since the United States has truly led by example. Other countries don't look at the US today and say, "We want our government to run like that," and that's also true of the United Kingdom, by the way. I mean, we aren't Canada, we're not Germany, we're not the Nordics, and it's true that we will slip further away faster under a potential second Trump term. But autocracy is not a potential outcome of this election.<br></p><p>Finally, Martin writes that Trump is indifferent to pass promises, rejects multilateralism and happily pulls out of commitments, such as the Paris Climate Accord. Sure. Trump has been louder and prouder about this. It's true, though, you can't exactly say that the Iraq War was a group effort. Look, to that larger point, I think that Martin paints an overly rosy picture of American democracy of yore. FDR gets credit for saving democracy globally as the article points out, but systemic racism abounded in the US and still has a ways to go today. During World War II, Japanese Americans were held in prison camps.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9e6z665nf07myp3erhz76" alt="trump-didnt-invent-americans-rejection-of-us-post-war-leadership-role-24641623.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Look, a Biden presidency will end up being a lot more similar to Trump on foreign policy than the establishment thinks, both because he'll be in part more aligned than they think, and in part, because he'll be more constrained than they think, and that's in part because the world has changed and in part because the United States has.<br></p><p>Speaking of that, be sure to vote if you haven't already. That's your Red Pen for this week. Stay safe and avoid people.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>The Iran arms embargo concession won&apos;t limit Biden&apos;s shot at a new deal</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/the-iran-arms-embargo-concession-wont-limit-bidens-shot-at-a-new-deal</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvreikqpgp2g07lqhmf0abr3</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2020 23:11:45 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>barack obama</category>
<category>united nations</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>iran nuclear deal</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>iran</category>
<category>iran arms embargo</category>
<description>In an op-ed titled &quot;Iran Arms Embargo Reckoning,&quot; the Wall Street Journal editorial board argues that ending the UN arms embargo on Iran was a major flaw of the 2015 nuclear deal and questions whether Biden could do anything to contain Iran at this point. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group&apos;s Henry Rome take out the Red Pen to explain why this discussion misrepresents the importance of the embargo and the consequences for its expiration.</description>
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<media:text>The Iran Arms Embargo Concession Won&apos;t Limit Biden&apos;s Shot At A New Deal | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In an op-ed titled <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-arms-embargo-reckoning-11603149103?mod=opinion_major_pos2">"Iran Arms Embargo Reckoning,"</a> the Wall Street Journal editorial board argues that ending the UN arms embargo on Iran was a major flaw of the 2015 nuclear deal and questions whether Biden could do anything to contain Iran at this point. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group's <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/hrome2">Henry Rome</a> take out the Red Pen to explain why this discussion misrepresents the importance of the embargo and the consequences for its expiration.</p><p>So, the US presidential election is now just days away, and today's selection is focusing on a specific aspect of foreign policy that will certainly change depending on who wins in the presidential contest—namely America's approach to Iran.<br></p><p>You've heard me talk before about the many similarities between Trump and Biden on some international policies, like on China or on Afghanistan. But Iran is definitely not one of those. Trump hated the JCPOA, the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal, put together under the Obama administration, and he walked away from it unilaterally. Joe Biden, if he were to become president, would try to bring it back.</p><p>But this article focuses on one specific aspect of the deal—it was a concession made to Iran in exchange for the promise of curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions. There was a long-standing UN embargo that prevented Iran from buying conventional weapons like tanks and missiles and exporting arms. As a tradeoff in the 2015 agreement, that embargo was set to end—and it did—just a few days ago.</p><p>The Wall Street Journal is not happy about that one bit and the piece calls this concession a flaw of the Obama deal. It also questions whether Biden could do anything to contain Iran at this point.</p><p>So, let's get out the Red Pen.</p><p>The Wall Street Journal is not happy about that one bit and the piece calls this concession a flaw of the Obama deal. It also questions whether Biden could do anything to contain Iran at this point.</p><p>So, let's get out the Red Pen.</p><p>Number one, the Trump administration sought an extension of the embargo this past summer which was blocked in the United Nations Security Council by China and Russia. The Wall Street Journal writes that the countries that abstained in that vote—including the UK, Germany and France, "stayed silent despite Iran's history of promoting terror in Europe."</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9e4k865lr07my6yjjuxwy" alt="the-iran-arms-embargo-concession-wont-limit-bidens-shot-at-a-new-deal-24562114.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Actually, the United States ignored real efforts by Europe to find a compromise on the arms embargo this summer. Like proposing a temporary extension of the ban on Iranian weapons imports and tightening restrictions on Iranian exports. They suggested that the United States under the Trump administration stuck to an all-or-nothing stance and blew the Europeans off. So, no, America didn't get its way. But also, there was no real negotiating done here. Not even an effort.<br></p><p>Next, on the issue of the snapped-back sanctions themselves, the Wall Street Journal says, "this is another case when the United Nations is more obstacle than ally to US interests."</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9e50p65m207myd6wdcyq9" alt="the-iran-arms-embargo-concession-wont-limit-bidens-shot-at-a-new-deal-24562138.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>That's just not the case at all. The thing is that the Obama administration created the snap back mechanism in this case—it was a bargaining chip, something the American's gave to get the Iranian's into the deal. So, the Trump administration's issue here is a legitimate grievance but what the Obama administration, not about the United Nations at all.<br></p><p>And finally, the editorial board asks, "How is Mr. Biden going to contain Iran's regional imperialism and support for terrorism without an arms embargo?"</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9e5dm65m907myhqccky2o" alt="the-iran-arms-embargo-concession-wont-limit-bidens-shot-at-a-new-deal-24562140.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Well, one thing here is Iran is not going to go on a tank and fighter jet spending spree like it's Black Friday at Costco, because Tehran doesn't have the cash and they also don't want more sanctions right now—and neither do Iran's allies China and Russia. Let's keep in mind, the Iranian economy is in parlous condition right now. In part because of mishandling coronavirus, but in part because the United States has pushed much tougher sanctions against Iran.<br></p><p>So, I mean, the ability of the Iranians to go and spend a lot on the military now is significantly less than it was when the Iranian deal was struck with the Obama administration. To the broader point of getting back to an acceptable nuclear deal—far more important than conventional arms—sure, it's going to be messy. Not at all convinced that it is going to happen. But Biden will have international support. Remember, the United States left the nuclear deal unilaterally. Every one of America's allies that were confederates in getting the deal done, opposed that from happening. And they've got a better shot at getting back than the United States does right now.</p><p>I'd also say on that introductory point about this concession being a flaw of the 2015 agreement: Deals involve tradeoffs. They are about bargaining. Keeping Iran away from a nuclear bomb was the goal, pushing that capacity off for a decade or more, and was considered a higher priority than the arms embargo at the time.</p><p>Different people can have different judgements on that one, but it is how diplomacy works.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>&quot;Fixing&quot; US foreign policy isn&apos;t the real challenge Biden would face</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/fixing-us-foreign-policy-isnt-the-real-challenge-biden-would-face</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvreifvxgoq007lqtmf6kqeb</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2020 21:15:53 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>iran</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>josh rogin</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>world trade organization</category>
<category>us state department</category>
<category>diplomacy</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>washington post</category>
<category>geopolitics</category>
<description>Josh Rogin&apos;s Washington Post op-ed argues that Donald Trump&apos;s assault on US foreign policy could take decades to repair. But Rogin gives Trump too much credit and misses the real challenge to American global leadership. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst Jeffrey Wright use The Red Pen to keep the op-ed honest.</description>
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<media:text>&quot;Fixing&quot; US Foreign Policy Isn&apos;t The Real Challenge Biden Would Face | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Josh Rogin's Washington Post op-ed argues that Donald Trump's assault on US foreign policy could take decades to repair. But Rogin gives Trump too much credit and misses the real challenge to American global leadership. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/jwright">Jeffrey Wright</a> use The Red Pen to keep the op-ed honest.</p><p>Today, we're taking our red pen to an op-ed from the Washington Post written by <a target="_blank" href="https://www.twitter.com/joshrogin">Josh Rogin</a>, a columnist for the Global Opinions section.</p><p>The piece is called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/us-foreign-policy-might-be-too-broken-for-biden-to-fix/2020/10/08/b82cfcf0-09a0-11eb-859b-f9c27abe638d_story.html">"U.S. foreign policy might be too broken for Biden to fix"</a> it. I mean, we could start with the title--which encapsulates just how much we feel Josh overstates the damage done in the past four years and fails to recognize the resilience of US institutions in general.</p><p>But let's get specific.</p><p>Number one, Rogin writes that President Trump has attacked "the previous bipartisan consensus that the United States has a unique duty to lead a global world order based on the advancement of freedom, human rights and the rule of law."</p><p>Hey, Josh—the Iraq War, GITMO, and drone strikes are calling. They want you to know America acted unilaterally long before Trump became President. It's true. President Trump was the first to say "America First" out loud—(I mean, since we tried to stay out of WWII, that is)--but it's far from a new philosophy.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9e17w65ib07myzjr9qkrt" alt="fixing-us-foreign-policy-isnt-the-real-challenge-biden-would-face-24525184.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Number two, on the point of Trump potentially having broken the systems critical to diplomacy, he writes, "It could take decades to repair the institutions Trump intentionally damaged…"<br></p><p>Now sure, Trump gutted the State Department and he's clogged up the World Trade Organization, and this is…a bad thing. Though we'd argue the institutions are resilient and it won't take decades for them to bounce back, if we want to actually rebuild them. While others, so far, he's talked a big game, but hasn't done very much—take NATO, the IMF, the United Nations, even the World Health Organization.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9e25t6q0m07lqif9h2s5m" alt="fixing-us-foreign-policy-isnt-the-real-challenge-biden-would-face-24525190.png" width="1832" height="1032"><p>On Iran, Rogin writes "Biden can't return to the Iran deal but won't be able to strike a new one.<br></p><p>Who says? I mean, I'm not saying a new deal with Iran will be easy (the last one wasn't, and it wasn't exactly comprehensive), but Biden is going to resume negotiations (if he becomes president) and will have broad international support for doing so. Plus, Iran is in far more desperate economic shape now than they were four years ago. They're incented.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9e1yg65ip07my5y0yad5c" alt="fixing-us-foreign-policy-isnt-the-real-challenge-biden-would-face-24525192.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>I also think there's a big point about the United States that Rogin's article ignores. The barriers to becoming the world's policeman again aren't just partisanship—or because of Trump's presidency or GOP leadership in Congress. Polls consistently show that Americans are tired of so-called "endless wars" and extensive international engagement. There's also real discontent about US trade policy--which many feel hasn't done much to help everyday Americans.<br></p><p>Joe Biden, should he win on November 3 or later,&nbsp;will face major challenges in restoring global leadership—but they aren't just coming from Republicans or Trump supporters. He would have to overcome domestic political opposition—including from a lot of Democrats—if he wants to set the nation on a different path.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Calling AMLO authoritarian is a gross exaggeration</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/calling-amlo-authoritarian-is-a-gross-exaggeration</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrei7wzfvm707mynz2l7cwq</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2020 20:58:04 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>financial times</category>
<category>latin america-caribbean</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>populism</category>
<category>mexico</category>
<category>authoritarianism</category>
<category>andres manuel lopez obrador</category>
<description>On this edition of The Red Pen, where we pick apart the argument in a major opinion piece, Ian Bremmer is joined by Eurasia Group&apos;s Daniel Kerner, Carlos Petersen, and Ana Abad to take on an an op-ed from the FT about Andrés Manuel López Obrador, aka AMLO. titled &quot;Lopez Obrador Becomes Latin America&apos;s New Strongman.&quot;</description>
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<media:text>Calling AMLO Authoritarian Is A Gross Exaggeration | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On this edition of The Red Pen, where we pick apart the argument in a major opinion piece, Ian Bremmer is joined by Eurasia Group's <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/dkernerb">Daniel Kerner</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/carlospetersen">Carlos Petersen</a>, and <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/Ana_abadb">Ana Abad</a> to take on an an op-ed from the FT about Andrés Manuel López Obrador, aka AMLO.</p><p>Today's selection comes from the Financial Times editorial board, an op-ed titled "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/ae1f61d8-d421-4b70-97a1-891a5e9d34b1">Lopez Obrador Becomes Latin America's New Strongman</a>."</p><p>It's about Mexico's president Andrés Manuel López Obrador, or AMLO as he's widely known. AMLO was elected in a landslide victory nearly two years ago by voters who were fed up with corruption in their nation. Now, a growing number have buyer's remorse as the economy continues to spiral downward and crime and corruption still remain high.</p><p>The article correctly points out this has not been a good couple of years for Mexico or for AMLO, and we agree with that assertion. But it's time to get out the red pen, because we're not buying a central argument of this piece.</p><p>The FT writes that AMLO is an "authoritarian populist," and under his leadership, Mexico is headed for a "more repressive" system. The article cites a litany of aggressive behavior against his critics, such as intimidating the media or calling out environmentalists who don't like his infrastructure projects. "When a president demands 'blind loyalty,' from officials," the FT writes, "alarm bells should ring."</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dzqf6pwg07lqkp651vfw" alt="calling-amlo-authoritarian-is-a-gross-exaggeration-24476926.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Sure, AMLO is incompetent, his policies are messy, and he uses aggressive rhetoric. But we need to separate his bark from his bite. Is he intolerant and hostile? Yes. Is he suppressing protests, shutting down media outlets, and disrupting the electoral process? No.<br></p><p><br>Next, the FT writes that while AMLO won a big victory in 2018, he did not win "a mandate to dismantle institutions" in Mexico.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dzy76pwr07lqie553pbf" alt="calling-amlo-authoritarian-is-a-gross-exaggeration-24476931.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>Actually, Mexicans elected him president precisely they didn't trust those institutions and felt they were only there to benefit the rich. Many of those same institutions were already weak or in need of reform. AMLO has accepted limits in congress and the judiciary and has made no mention of broad institutional changes--as other truly authoritarian leaders have done.<br></p><p>Finally, the FT writes that under AMLO, "The golden opportunity offered by the newly-agreed US-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement to lure American companies returning from China to Mexico is being squandered." And that is just wrong.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9e05z6pwy07lqx6se1ipi" alt="calling-amlo-authoritarian-is-a-gross-exaggeration-24476936.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>We definitely need some red ink on this one. USMCA would not have advanced without AMLO's full support. It was approved just last year, and then the pandemic hit the economy. It's hard to say what longer-term impact it will have. But while AMLO could have played hardball with Trump and ruined one of the most positive developments in the Mexican economy, he did the opposite.<br></p><p>There's another point the op-ed misses which better explains why AMLO is president at all—Mexico endured a couple of decades of weak leadership, widespread corruption and the impact of violent drug wars, and disappointing economic growth.</p><p>AMLO may not end up being the right guy to turn all that around for a number of reasons, but calling him authoritarian is a gross exaggeration.</p><p>There you have it. That's your latest edition of The Red Pen.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>The US COVID response under Trump was not &quot;merely mediocre&quot;</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/the-us-covid-response-under-trump-was-not-merely-mediocre</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvreh6vngld807lqxfh8qhu7</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2020 23:10:33 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>covid-19</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>covid-19 vaccine</category>
<category>science-tech</category>
<category>jair bolsonaro</category>
<category>japan</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>angela merkel</category>
<category>latin america-caribbean</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>mexico</category>
<description>An op-ed in the New York Times says that the US coronavirus response under President Trump was mediocre, but not catastrophic, when compared to the response of other countries. But the &quot;peer country&quot; examples selected by columnist Ross Douthat don&apos;t paint an accurate picture. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst Scott Rosenstein take issue with Douthat&apos;s argument in this edition of The Red Pen (where we keep op-eds honest).</description>
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<media:text>The US COVID Response Under Trump Was Not &quot;Merely Mediocre&quot; | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An op-ed in the New York Times says that the US coronavirus response under President Trump was mediocre, but not catastrophic, when compared to the response of other countries. But the "peer country" examples selected by columnist Ross Douthat don't paint an accurate picture. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst Scott Rosenstein take issue with Douthat's argument in this edition of The Red Pen (where we keep op-eds honest).</p><p>Today, we're taking our red pen to a recent piece from New York Times columnist Ross Douthat. The title is provocative, "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/05/opinion/sunday/covid-19-trump.html">How Many Lives Would a More Normal President Have Saved?</a>" It sounds like Douthat is about to go big on the failure of President Trump's response to the pandemic. But no, that's just the headline. In reality, what he's saying is it isn't a catastrophe and may end up just being, meh, especially when you compare the US to peer nations. Not so fast, Ross. Let's break down the argument and get out the red pen.</p><p>First, how are we defining peer nations? Douthat writes, "It probably makes more sense to compare the United States death toll to similarly positioned and sized countries - meaning the biggest countries in Western Europe and our major neighbors in the Americas - than to compare us to a global average." Why not compare, my view, the United States to the EU rather than individual nations for a similar landmass and population? That makes the most sense. If you did, you'd realize that comparison doesn't paint a pretty picture for the United States.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dsvn656a07myhqu4zecp" alt="the-us-covid-response-under-trump-was-not-merely-mediocre-23864105.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>And by the way, if you are going to single out peers, you should also include Canada, Japan, South Korea, all of which have a lot fewer cases and deaths per capita than the United States. Now, to be fair, since publication, Douthat has posted a pretty lengthy thread on Twitter explaining a few of his more controversial points and admitting he should have included Canada as analysis. Fair enough. But in broad terms, comparing the United States to a conveniently selected cohort and ignoring both the different starting points within that comparison and all other counterexamples - like Canada and the EU a whole - seems like you're forcing the argument. Also, the US is far better equipped in terms of federal government resources, pandemic planning, the private sector, and research institutions - the best in the world - than pretty much any other country. So therefore, the extent to which the US underperformed, what should have been our expectations is much greater. Also, keep in mind, the United States population is considerably younger than the European countries that are under comparison, which should have helped minimize deaths and severe illness, since we know that overwhelmingly coronavirus hits older populations.<br></p><p>Next, Douthat focuses on left versus right politics and not anti-science populism versus pro-science pragmatism. That's a lot more important as a split, not left versus right. He writes, "Overall, once you observe the general pattern where the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe have been particularly hard hit, it's hard to distinguish the big countries run by centrists or socialists from the country run by Donald Trump." But when you compare anti-science populists like Trump or AMLO in Mexico, Bolsonaro in Brazil, with Angela Merkel in Germany, or Jacinda Ardern in New Zealand, you see a pattern that suggests that Trump's rhetoric, an unwillingness to demonstrate strong leadership, have done more than a little damage.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dtci6pn307lqr9f9thmz" alt="the-us-covid-response-under-trump-was-not-merely-mediocre-23864360.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>One of the most important points in dealing with a pandemic is not whether you on the left or on the right, whether you're small or whether you're big, or even whether you're rich or whether you're poor, it's whether or not you're leading with science and expertise. That's been a really fundamental divide in the United States. And President Trump have not led well on that.<br></p><p>Finally, when we get to the "normal president" part from the title of the column, Douthat writes that the actions necessary to save a hundred thousand or more lives "would probably required presidential greatness, not merely replacement level competence." Really? I mean, do you have to be an exceptional leader like Merkel to listen to public health experts and avoid the politicization of vaccines and treatments?</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dtlr657t07myw48r0ayy" alt="the-us-covid-response-under-trump-was-not-merely-mediocre-23864700.png" width="1920" height="1080"><p>You don't need to be Winston Churchill to level with people and not intentionally downplay the threat of the pandemic, which is exactly what President Trump told Bob Woodward he was doing. It's all in Woodward's new book, by the way. Speaking of vaccines, Douthat also writes that if one is developed in record time, as Trump is promised, that will also be part of Trump's coronavirus legacy. And absolutely agree. But let's keep in mind that President Trump has also stoked vaccine skepticism since before he was elected and now his actions on coronavirus vaccines are contributing to even more skepticism. So if Operation Warp Speed is successful, it may also succeed in further undermining vaccines for coronavirus and for other illnesses for a long time to come.<br></p><p>That's it for this week's edition of The Red Pen.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>US-Russia: An all-or-nothing approach leaves US with nothing</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/us-russia-an-all-or-nothing-approach-leaves-us-with-nothing-red-pen</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvregij1gjjh07lq0zkgp94z</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 14 Aug 2020 11:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>diplomacy</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>nuclear weapons</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>election interference</category>
<category>politico</category>
<category>us-russia relations</category>
<category>europe</category>
<description>An open letter in Politico by a group of foreign policy experts says the US should take a much tougher approach on Russia. In this edition of The Red Pen,Ian Bremmer is joined by Eurasia Group analysts Alex Brideau and Zach Witlin to point out some reasons why diplomacy and realism are critical in the US approach to Russia.</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>US-Russia: An All-or-Nothing Approach Leaves US With Nothing | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An open letter in Politico by a group of foreign policy experts says the US should take a much tougher approach on Russia. In this edition of The Red Pen, Ian Bremmer is joined by Eurasia Group analysts <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/ABrideau">Alex Brideau</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/ZWitlin">Zach Witlin</a><a rel="dofollow" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/ZWitlin"></a> to point out some reasons why diplomacy and realism are critical in the US approach to Russia.</p><p>And today, we're taking our Red Pen to an open letter titled "<a rel="dofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/08/11/russia-reset-response-open-letter-393176">No, Now Is Not the Time for Another Russia Reset</a>." It was published in Politico and signed by 33 foreign policy experts, including diplomats Bill Taylor and Kurt Volker, who both testified at the impeachment hearings, as well as a bunch of military intelligence and diplomatic figures. And as it turned out, actually, we were Red Penned here, because it's a response to <a rel="dofollow" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/08/05/open-letter-russia-policy-391434">this piece</a>, also in Politico recently, that I cosigned with a different group of Russia experts, including Fiona Hill and Jon Huntsman.</p><p>Both letters talk about the road ahead for US relations with Russia. The one I signed argued that the US needs to know when there will be opportunities to work with Russia and when Washington has to push back. The central argument in this article is that there's no point in talking to Russia until Putin changes his mind. So, what we have here is an open debate about the issue. Don't get me wrong, there's plenty we agree on and plenty of places where no red ink is required.</p><p>We agree that Russia bears plenty of responsibility for the current state of affairs. It occupies territory that belongs to Georgia and Ukraine, two sovereign states. And it interfered in the 2016 US election and continues to do so as we speak. Moscow has also killed dissidents in Europe, assassinated them. So, I mean, you know, no one is trying to justify any of that belligerent behavior. And we also agree that while the United States can fine tune its policy all we want, it actually takes two to tango. Recent talks with the Russians have not been too successful, but since the red pen is here, it is time to highlight some areas of disagreement. So, here they are.</p><p>Point one, the authors argue that there's no point in talking to Russia about much of anything until Putin changes his act. They write that "by arguing that it is the United States and not Russia that needs a 'current change of course' the authors of the open letter (that's us) get it exactly backward."</p><p>If the US takes an all or nothing approach with Russia, it will end up with nothing. Look, I mean, I certainly expect and understand that we should have a more hawkish line on a bunch of things with the Chinese as well, but that doesn't mean you can't work with these countries on climate change, on space, on a bunch of areas where it's actually really important. These are still large economies. In the case of the Russians, the largest nuclear arsenal in the world along with the United States, and I would argue that leaving the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement was a mistake, leaving the Blue Skies Agreement, the Open Skies Agreement was a mistake. That you have to work even with your antagonists, and that's important. That means that we should be pursuing diplomacy and cooperation where we can while also vigorously defending our own interests where we can't. This strikes me as a fairly obvious baseline understanding of international diplomacy, and I'm always surprised when people push back against it.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9djhu64uy07mymoiu7ypu" alt="us-russia-an-all-or-nothing-approach-leaves-us-with-nothing-red-pen-23557401.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Point two, the authors write that the US should "maintain, even enhance sanctions" on Russia unless a long list of demands are met, like withdrawing troops from Ukraine, including Crimea, and ending cyberattacks and election interference.<br></p><p>Nobody is saying we should give in to Russia on any of those issues. The bottom line is that the above list of demands is already US policy. How more sanctions would change Russian behavior? Doesn't make a lot of sense. You need your allies on board for sanctions to work. And sanctions work best when they're calibrated and targeted. When they have clear benchmarks that when met, lead to easing of those sanctions. And when they're paired with diplomacy. Russia's a big nuclear armed country, unlike, say, South Africa. Russia's not going to simply be sanctioned into surrender. Maintain the sanctions but expanding them at this point strikes me as having very little likelihood of return and only marginal increase of sanctions that we could do.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9djwz6pde07lqprmh9n4b" alt="us-russia-an-all-or-nothing-approach-leaves-us-with-nothing-red-pen-23557402.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Point three, the authors say that the US should not resign itself to accepting "Russia's repression, kleptocracy and aggression" as that provides no incentive for Putin to change.<br></p><p>Now, we agree. The US cannot accept Russian misbehavior, but we need to be realistic about what we can actually change, like stopping Russian election meddling, and what we can't, like Russia's kleptocracy. We can and should do our part to stop dirty money from coming into the US and Europe but changing Russia's domestic system is another story.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dk3g6pdl07lqmlimg0jq" alt="us-russia-an-all-or-nothing-approach-leaves-us-with-nothing-red-pen-23557403.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>So, in conclusion, the Russians are an antagonist of the United States. Their revisionist power, they're in decline. They are trying to undermine the Americans, the Europeans, and the transatlantic relationship. All true. But I actually think that there are areas where we still need to be working with lots of states that we really don't like and don't trust, and yes, Russia is one of them. By the way, New START, the nuclear arms reduction treaty signed in 2010 by the US and Russia expires in February 2021. Open dialog right now could save it and I think it's worth saving. Let's work on that.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>The evidence doesn&apos;t absolve Trump for the high US COVID death rate</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/the-evidence-doesnt-absolve-trump-for-the-high-us-covid-death-rate</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvregbazfq8007my9h38fv29</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2020 20:47:15 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>covid-19</category>
<category>pandemic</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>coronavirus mortality rates</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>science-tech</category>
<category>national review</category>
<description>Jim Geraghty argues in a National Review op-ed that we shouldn&apos;t blame Trump for the fact that the US has one of the highest coronavirus death rates in the world. But though he&apos;s right that not everything is Trump&apos;s fault, Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst Scott Rosenstein take out The Red Pen to show that the evidence he cites to let Trump off the hook doesn&apos;t hold water.</description>
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<media:text>The Evidence Doesn&apos;t Absolve Trump for the High US COVID Death Rate | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Jim Geraghty argues in a National Review op-ed that we shouldn't blame Trump for the fact that the US has one of the highest coronavirus death rates in the world. But though he's right that not <em>everything</em> is Trump's fault, Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group analyst <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/scottrosenstein">Scott Rosenstein</a> take out The Red Pen to show that the evidence he cites to let Trump off the hook doesn't hold water.</p><p>Today we are taking our Red Pen to an op-ed entitled "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/why-the-u-s-ranks-so-poorly-in-coronavirus-deaths-per-million/">Why the U.S. Ranks So Poorly in Coronavirus Deaths Per Million</a>." A very straightforward title for an oped. It was written by senior political correspondent <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/jimgeraghty">Jim Geraghty</a> of the National Review.<br></p><p>The US ranks in the top ten in per capita death rates, with as of this recording, roughly 488 deaths per million. And Geraghty argues that we shouldn't blame Trump for the fact that the US has one of the highest coronavirus death rates in the world. Now, he's right that not everything is Trump's fault, I've made that point many times myself, but the evidence that he cites doesn't actually let Trump off the hook. So, let's dive in.</p><p>First, Geraghty are argues the coronavirus data from other countries are greatly underreported and that their actual deaths per capita might be as high or higher than the United States. He cites Indonesia, China, Russia and Bangladesh. It's safe to say that pretty much every country in the world is undercounting Covid case rates and death rate for a variety of factors like insufficient testing and plain old corruption. And the United States is no doubt, undercounting, too. But let's do the math: the US has reported, so far, about 160,000 deaths out of a population of 330 million. China has confirmed about 4,000 deaths with about 1.4 billion people. Now, very few outside observers, myself included, trust that China's numbers are accurate. But to come close to US deaths per capita, China would have to be, have them reported elsewhere, some 700,000 deaths. I mean, are we really ready to suggest that China's missed or are covering up 700,000 deaths? That's kind of insane, right? I mean, even for China, that's a crazy tall order. So, no.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9diha64u607myjtqy8q1f" alt="the-evidence-doesnt-absolve-trump-for-the-high-us-covid-death-rate-23539692.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Next, Geraghty writes that other countries held advantages over the US that left them better prepared to fight the pandemic, including more experience with SARS and other disease outbreaks. And I need to push back against this. The reality is the United States was in the best possible position to handle this pandemic. We have the best scientists, the best labs, and many billions of dollars a year since SARS - more than any other country - invested in pandemic preparedness. Other countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, did have a lot of experience with past disease outbreaks, but they had nowhere near the resources of Washington, DC. There are many reasons the US handled coronavirus terribly, but a lack of resources and a lack of planning for this kind of pandemic is really not one of them.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9diwh64ur07myo0eg4xta" alt="the-evidence-doesnt-absolve-trump-for-the-high-us-covid-death-rate-23539695.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>And then finally, Geraghty suggests that blame should be spread out to include other leaders whose decisions were off the mark early. And I completely agree that leaders at all levels of American government made mistakes early on, when information was scant, including governors like my own Andrew Cuomo in New York. And certainly, the decision to reduce hospital strain and order nursing homes to take coronavirus patients early in the pandemic was a tragic mistake that led to unnecessary deaths. Almost half of the deaths in the New York City metropolitan area were in assisted living facilities. Did not need to happen. You can't blame Trump for that. But what matters is whether leaders can change course as new information emerges and avoid politicizing science. And that's where President Trump has come up short, time and again. As the pandemic continues to rage across the United States, it's become painfully clear that the federal government failed to put together a national coordinated response. And as president of the United States, the buck and ultimately the deaths per capita, stops with the commander in chief.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dj3v6pct07lq8us2oifp" alt="the-evidence-doesnt-absolve-trump-for-the-high-us-covid-death-rate-23539698.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>That's our Red Pen this week. I hope you found this worthwhile. I'll see you again soon. In the meantime, stay safe and avoid people.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>The recovery will be a jagged swoosh, not a V-shape</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/the-recovery-will-be-a-jagged-swoosh-not-a-v-shape</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2020 21:47:46 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>economic recovery</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>jim o&apos;neil</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>economic depression</category>
<category>science-tech</category>
<category>project syndicate</category>
<category>v-shaped recovery</category>
<category>covid-19</category>
<category>geopolitics</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>pandemic</category>
<description>British economist Jim O&apos;Neill says the global economy can bounce back right to where it was before, in a V-shaped recovery. But his argument is based on a lot of &quot;ifs,&quot; plus comparisons to the 2008 recession and conditions in China and South Korea that may not truly apply. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group&apos;s Robert Kahn take issue with O&apos;Neill&apos;s op-ed, on this edition of The Red Pen. Read the full story.</description>
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<media:text>The Recovery Will Be a Jagged Swoosh, Not a V-Shape | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>British economist Jim O'Neill says the global economy can bounce back right to where it was before, in a V-shaped recovery. But his argument is based on a lot of "ifs," plus comparisons to the 2008 recession and conditions in China and South Korea that may not truly apply. Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group's <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/rkahn">Robert Kahn</a> take issue with O'Neill's op-ed, on this edition of The Red Pen.</p><p>Today, we're taking our Red Pen to an article titled "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/v-shaped-recovery-could-still-happen-by-jim-o-neill-2020-07">A V-Shaped Recovery Could Still Happen</a>." I'm not buying it. It's published recently by Project Syndicate, authored by British economist named Jim O'Neill. Jim O'Neill is very well known. He was chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management. He's the guy that coined the acronym BRICS, Brazil, Russia, India, China. So, no slouch. But as you know, we don't agree with everything out there. And this is the case. Brought to you by the letter V. We're taking sharp issue with the idea that recovery from all the economic devastation created by the coronavirus pandemic is going to happen quickly. That after the sharp drop that the world has experienced, everything bounces back to where it was before. That's the V. Economists around the world are debating how quickly recovery will happen to be sure. But we're not buying the V. Here's why. W-H-Y.</p><p>First, among his arguments, O'Neill points to stimulus money pouring in from all corners of the globe. He writes, "After all, governments around the world have mustered an absolutely massive economic response, exceeding the amounts even provided during the 2000, 2008-2010 financial crisis." No question. But this is not the 2008 recession. This moment has brought the entire world's supply chain, massive disruption, debt-distress, unlike anything we've seen in our lifetimes. And with the virus very much still exploding around the world and no vaccine for the moment and none really expected that would work and be distributed globally until at best, mid, late next year, we're likely to see a relentlessly stop and start economy that more resembles what we think is a jagged swoosh, then a V. Sure, we've had a good balance after a very steep decline, but all indications are that the hard part is still to come.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dghc6p9w07lqkkaln9k5" alt="the-recovery-will-be-a-jagged-swoosh-not-a-v-shape-23449155.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Second, O'Neill writes that improving conditions in China and South Korea bode well for the rest of the world. He writes, "despite China's ongoing challenges, the Caixin services PMI index rose to a 10-year high in June," and he points to increased exports from South Korea, too. Sure, China and South Korea, but they're doing particularly well because they contained the virus. They quarantined. They had contact tracing. They had early testing. That's not true in much of the rest of the world. Certainly not in my own United States, the world's largest economy. Not in Brazil. Not in India. Not in most of the world's emerging markets. A global recovery will not gain momentum while the world is following completely divergent parts.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dgx16pah07lqxddnh14e" alt="the-recovery-will-be-a-jagged-swoosh-not-a-v-shape-23449177.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>And finally, O'Neill writes, "If lockdowns remain localized and temporary, if health systems continue to expand testing, and especially if a vaccine or more effective treatments are developed, the economic outlook need not be as bleak as many believe." Those are some very big "ifs", my friend. Testing is nowhere close to what it needs to be in the United States and in most of the developing world, aside from China.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dh4r64st07myug9a9nuj" alt="the-recovery-will-be-a-jagged-swoosh-not-a-v-shape-23449202.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Yes, the United States is testing a lot more than it used to, but nowhere close to the explosion of cases that we have right now. We're still looking for effective treatment options, let alone the vaccine that could potentially take years to develop and distribute globally. And if the first vaccines are not seen as effective, a lot of people are going to wait. They're not going to take them immediately. That's even with good education. That's even, never mind, anti-vaxxer sentiment. And it's not paying attention to vaccine nationalism and the fact that the world is not rowing together in developing a vaccine together, which is what you want to respond to a global pandemic.<br></p><p>In other words, all of this is not pointing to a V. It's this jagged swoosh. It's going to be a lot uglier than we'd like it to be. That's your Red Pen for today.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Criticisms of US COVID response vs EU are not partisan</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/criticisms-of-us-covid-response-vs-eu-are-not-partisan-red-pen</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrefgbefltf07mypxnpzoji</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2020 22:06:42 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>geopolitics</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>politics</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>covid-19</category>
<description>The Wall Street Journal says that it&apos;s partisan to compare the US pandemic response to Europe. In this episode of The Red Pen — where we do our best to keep op-eds honest — Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group&apos;s Scott Rosenstein point out some flaws in the WSJ&apos;s argument.</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Wall Street Journal says that it's partisan to compare the US pandemic response to Europe. In this episode of The Red Pen — where we do our best to keep op-eds honest — Ian Bremmer and Eurasia Group's Scott Rosenstein point out some flaws in the WSJ's argument.</p><p>Today we're taking our red pen to a recent piece from the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal. It's titled COVID Comparisons, Europe and the United States, and it argues that those who criticized US pandemic response by comparing it to Europe are guilty of partisan opportunism in an election year.</p><p>Four points we really want to dissect in this article. Let's start with the Wall Street Journal's argument that the United States has recorded fewer deaths per 100,000 people than the UK, Spain, Italy, and France. That's true for some European states, but the argument being made by the Wall Street Journal is that you're politicizing if you compare the US to Europe.</p><p>And actually, you compare the US to Europe as a whole, which seems the more appropriate point, because some places in Europe do well, some do badly. Some places in the US do well, some do badly. We all found out about coronavirus at the same time.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dewl64qw07myplqdwuzz" alt="criticisms-of-us-covid-response-vs-eu-are-not-partisan-red-pen-23430598.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>And in fact, since the coronavirus hit Europe, about 10 days earlier and scaled, than it did the United States, you'd expect we'd have more time to learn from those lessons. Especially since we didn't get a month because the Chinese were covering it up for both the Americans and the Europeans.<br></p><p>The EU had 300 deaths per million people. Here in the United States right now, it's 390. And certainly you'd expect, given caseload, that that gap is going to grow and not in America's favor. Also, it's important to note that, of course, overall, the outbreak in Europe is now receding. Again, the United States very dramatically different from that.</p><p>Number two, the Journal also claims that Southern states in the US didn't open up too early, that they lifted their lockdowns gradually and at around the same time as most European countries. That's actually deeply misleading. Europe had been closed longer and waited to open until its case count declined consistently. Florida, Texas, and Arizona all opened when daily cases were either steady or rising and with insufficient testing and tracing infrastructure.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9df5764r307myulmj1i96" alt="criticisms-of-us-covid-response-vs-eu-are-not-partisan-red-pen-23430600.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>One of the biggest issues that the Centers for Disease Control in the United States actually laid out what the opening guidelines and principles should be. And then a number of US states, including some of the largest American states in population, simply ignored them. And the fact that now you have governors, lieutenant governors, with some of those very same states saying they're going to ignore continued directives from the CDC and from Dr. Fauci, while their cases are exploding, does not make you more optimistic about where the US is going to be versus Europe.<br></p><p>Third, a point about chastising GOP governors for letting wild and crazy youngsters crowd into bars. European countries are struggling to corral their youth too, writes the Wall Street Journal. And this is certainly true, but the issue is how significant the community spread is and whether governments can detect and stop outbreaks. Many European states have that capacity, the United States does not.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dfj56p9707lqppa19hum" alt="criticisms-of-us-covid-response-vs-eu-are-not-partisan-red-pen-23430601.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>And finally, the Journal's editorial board asserts that a return to strict lockdowns isn't sustainable economically or politically, as even democratic governors admit. This is not a partisan issue. If deaths and hospitalizations continue to skyrocket, we could reach a threshold that makes strict lockdown the only option.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dfv16p9i07lqukcfeir3" alt="criticisms-of-us-covid-response-vs-eu-are-not-partisan-red-pen-23430602.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>The biggest concern would be if we get to the point that you no longer have adequate ICU beds and healthcare for people that have cases, like you saw in Northern Italy. If we have to triage between patients that can and cannot get healthcare, that's when death rates, not just case rates, would suddenly explode across the United States.<br></p><p>Let's hope we don't get there. Right now, we're not, but it's naive to pretend that that possibility doesn't exist, given where the United States is right now. So there you have it folks. That's our latest edition of the Red Pen.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Hong Kong is a tragedy, not a domino</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/hong-kong-is-a-tragedy-not-a-domino</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2020 01:13:30 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>new york times</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>geopolitics</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>taiwan</category>
<category>hong kong</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>bret stephens</category>
<category>asia</category>
<description>This week, Ian Bremmer is joined by analyst Michael Hirson to take the Red Pen to an op-ed by New York Times Opinion columnist Bret Stephens. Today, we&apos;re marking up a recent op-ed by New York Times columnist Bret Stephens, entitled &quot;China and the Rhineland Moment.&quot; And the subheading here is that &quot;America and its allies must not simply accept Beijing&apos;s aggression.&quot; Basically, Bret is arguing that US-China relations are at a tipping point brought on by China&apos;s implementation of a new national security law for Hong Kong. And he compares this to Hitler&apos;s occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, describes it as the first domino to fall in Beijing&apos;s ambitions. Read the full story.</description>
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<media:text>No, Bret, China&apos;s HK Actions Are a Tragedy, Not a &quot;Rhineland Moment&quot; | The Red Pen | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This week, Ian Bremmer is joined by analyst <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/MichaelHirson">Michael Hirson</a> to take the Red Pen to an <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/opinion/china-hong-kong.html">op-ed by New York Times Opinion columnist Bret Stephens</a>.</p><p>Today, we're marking up a recent op-ed by New York Times columnist Bret Stephens, entitled "China and the Rhineland Moment." And the subheading here is that "America and its allies must not simply accept Beijing's aggression." Basically, Bret is arguing that US-China relations are at a tipping point brought on by China's implementation of a new national security law for Hong Kong. And he compares this to Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, describes it as the first domino to fall in Beijing's ambitions.</p><p>Now, I mean, no question, the United States and China are at a precarious place in our relationship. The worst US-China relationship that we've seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union, maybe even the start of a Cold War. But to imply that this is the brink of an actual war, as the Rhineland moment was with the Germans, is a bit misguided. Let's take a look at some of his key points.</p><p>First, let's start with China's actions mirroring a Nazi Germany's attempt to take over Europe. Stephen writes, "The concept of one country, two systems was supposed to last until 2047 under the terms of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration ..." (The handover in 1997.) "...Now, China's rulers have been openly violating that treaty, much as Germany openly violated the trees of Locarno and Versailles." Hong Kong is definitely a tragedy and it is a breach, but it's not a domino. And setting aside Taiwan, an ally of the United States, that China does indeed intend to take over, it's hard to make the argument that China has imperial ambitions across Asia the way that the Nazis did in Europe. And I mean, leaving aside the immense pushback that we already see across Asia against Chinese efforts to have more influence, the South China Sea for example, Belt and Road for example, the rise of India for example, it's not as if the Chinese - this is not territorial ambitions, this is economic investment and leverage. Again, not leading to a tipping point into war.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dbue6p5y07lqrwhx4o3r" alt="hong-kong-is-a-tragedy-not-a-domino-23367894.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Second point: On Taiwan, Bret Stephens writes, "The United States should upgrade relations with Taiwan and increase arms sales, including top shelf weapons' systems such as the F-35 and the Navy's future frigate." And actually, I mean, if you wanted to tip into war, this is where you actually need to be the most careful. The fact is that the United States should clearly continue to support Taiwan, including militarily. But you want to do so without backing Beijing into a corner. And it's been very clear they've been red lines on both sides in this relationship. Consistently, the one for Beijing that they have maximally escalated over has been Taiwan. The Americans have every capacity to maintain status quo and there is very strong nationalism against Beijing. In Taiwan, a new nationalist elected government, stronger support for the United States, technology integration with the United States. There is no need to actively wave a red rag to the bull by trying to sell your most advanced military equipment to the Taiwanese, in addition to that.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dc1t6p6507lq7acy4jzx" alt="hong-kong-is-a-tragedy-not-a-domino-23367918.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Finally, Stephens argues that the world is waking up to the fact that the Chinese are not a "responsible stakeholder" in a "rules-based order." And it is certainly true that China is not, has not been a "responsible stakeholder." But of course, keep in mind that "responsible stakeholder" for the Chinese means living by American rules in American institutions that the Chinese don't get a say over. Now, the United States is actively ripping up that script right now in terms of not being interested to follow the rules of a lot of those institutions. Whether it's the World Trade Organization or the World Health Organization. Of course, the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. So, I mean, if the question is, do we expect the Chinese to align more with the Americans? The answer is no. Do we expect the Americans to align more with the Americans and bring the Europeans and others along? The answer is we could be doing an awful lot more by trying to lead by example.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dchj6p6m07lq6gy7bt3i" alt="hong-kong-is-a-tragedy-not-a-domino-23367925.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>So, in conclusion, we are not at the precipice of war. This is not the Rhineland moment. But it is indeed a very dangerous period of time between the Americans and Chinese. And ones that if we did a better job, we could have a lot more allies playing in our favor.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>The US can compete with China without starting a new Cold War</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/the-red-pen/us-china-cold-war-red-pen</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvreekp7fjkx07myxxjjhdvw</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 21 May 2020 22:33:59 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>china</category>
<category>world bank</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>the red pen</category>
<category>xi jinping</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>cold war</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>robert zoellick</category>
<category>science-tech</category>
<description>Have you ever read a major op-ed and thought to yourself, &amp;quot;no!</description>
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<media:text>YouTube</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Have you ever read a major op-ed and thought to yourself, "no! no! no! That's just not right!" Us too. This week, Ian Bremmer is joined by analysts <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/kelsbroderick">Kelsey Broderick</a> and Jeffrey Wright to take the Red Pen to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-doesnt-need-a-new-cold-war-11589842987">former World Bank president Robert B. Zoellick's Wall Street Journal op-ed</a>.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dalh64ly07myux4m8hg6" alt="us-china-cold-war-red-pen-23308773.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Hawks are pretty clear about what they want: to force supply chains out of China, reduce financial integration, keep China from dominating key technologies, and prevent China from undermining US power in Asia.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dat864m507mye9t6zv4j" alt="us-china-cold-war-red-pen-23308774.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>The trade deal tackled restrictions on US crops, allowed market access for exports, and more. It's not a fix-all, but it shows that China responds to pressure.</p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9db0k64mc07myuwe9aqwc" alt="us-china-cold-war-red-pen-23309049.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>China has become more assertive/authoritarian under Xi, while the coronavirus has exacerbated suspicions Americans hold toward Beijing. Cooperation is possible, but politics in both countries make it increasingly difficult.<br></p><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9dbiy64nf07myid6x2qiv" alt="us-china-cold-war-red-pen-23308776.png" width="1200" height="630"><p>Cooperation HAS served US interests—to an extent. But many core issues between the US and China (on trade, technology, human rights, etc.) come from fundamentally different economic models and can't just be cooperated away.</p><p><em>—With research by </em><a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/kelsbroderick"><em>Kelsey Broderick</em></a><em> and Jeffrey Wright</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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