<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/">
<channel>
<title>middle east war — GZERO Media</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/tag/middle-east-war</link>
<description>The latest news and analysis from GZERO Media.</description>
<language>en</language>
<copyright>© GZERO Media</copyright>
<atom:link href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/feeds/tag/middle-east-war.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
<lastBuildDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 20:13:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
<item>
<title>Palestinian UN Ambassador Riyad Mansour says give peace a chance</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/podcast/gzero-world-podcast/palestinian-un-ambassador-riyad-mansour-says-give-peace-a-chance</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfrqhwju7k07my2p13l42j</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 06 Jul 2024 11:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>benjamin netanyahu</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>riyad mansour</category>
<category>gaza</category>
<category>israel-palestinian conflict</category>
<category>gzero world podcast</category>
<category>podcast</category>
<category>ceasefire</category>
<category>us israel relations</category>
<category>GZERO World with Ian Bremmer Podcast</category>
<description>On the season premiere of the GZERO World Podcast, Palestinian ambassador to the United Nations Riyad Mansour joins Ian Bremmer to talk about how the war in Gaza might end and what would come next for Palestinians and Israelis alike.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmw3zfz2ahxin07lm0t08cx4c" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1500" height="1500" />
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmw3zfz2ahxin07lm0t08cx4c" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On the season premiere of the <strong>GZERO World Podcast</strong>, Palestinian ambassador to the United Nations <strong>Riyad Mansour</strong> joins <strong>Ian Bremmer</strong> to talk about how the war in Gaza might end and what would come next for Palestinians and Israelis alike.<br></p><p>Nine months into the Israel-Hamas war, is peace a possibility? Around 40,000 Palestinians and over a thousand Israelis have died, according to the Israeli army and the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry (as always, exact numbers are impossible to verify given limited access to the Gaza strip). According to the UN, sixty percent of Gazan homes—and over eighty percent of commercial buildings and schools—have been destroyed or damaged. The UN also warns that over a million Gazans could face the highest levels of starvation by mid-July if the fighting doesn’t end.</p><p>Joining the podcast with the Palestinian perspective is Mansour, the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations. He’s a Palestinian-American himself (the son of an Ohio steelworker) and says that this moment in the Middle East is the most significant period of transformation in his decades of representing the Palestinian people on the global stage. "There is something in the air. People want justice for the Palestinians. People want this war and this conflict to end. People want the occupation to end because it's good for Israel and it's good for the Palestinians."</p><p><em>Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on </em><a target="_blank" href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/id1294461271"><em>Apple Podcasts</em></a><em>, </em><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://open.spotify.com/show/13QW2sLPCjVbdDE6fmJCNf"><em>Spotify</em></a><em>, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Palestinian UN Ambassador on Trump&apos;s radical Gaza plan and the Israel-Hamas ceasefire</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/podcast/gzero-world-podcast/trumps-radical-gaza-plan</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg2hsnlmbw07lqm5qbps4i</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 15 Feb 2025 11:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>riyad mansour</category>
<category>gzero world podcast</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>gaza</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>benjamin netanyahu</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>GZERO World with Ian Bremmer Podcast</category>
<description>Listen: Palestinian UN Ambassador Riyad Mansour joins Ian Bremmer on the GZERO World Podcast to discuss Trump’s Gaza proposal, the Palestinian right to return, and whether Gaza’s future will be decided by its people or global powers.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmw3zef9xhuo307ljz7vupssa" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1500" height="1500" />
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmw3zef9xhuo307ljz7vupssa" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/podcast/gzero-world-podcast/trumps-radical-gaza-plan"><strong>Transcript</strong></a></p><p><strong>Listen:&nbsp;</strong>On the GZERO World Podcast, <strong>Ian Bremmer&nbsp;</strong>sits down with Palestinian Ambassador to the UN <strong>Riyad Mansour</strong> to discuss the future of Gaza, <strong>Trump</strong>’s radical proposal, and what Palestinians want. As a fragile ceasefire holds, Trump has suggested that the US take over Gaza and turn it into the “Riviera of the Middle East” while relocating displaced Gazans elsewhere. The idea has been widely rejected by America’s Middle Eastern allies, but does it signal a new phase in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?</p><p>For Mansour, the issue is about more than just geopolitics—it’s about identity, history, and the right to return. He rejects the idea of mass displacement, pointing to the thousands of Palestinians who have already marched back to their destroyed neighborhoods. “We have very, very strong attachment to the land, whether it is you have a palace on it or whether it is destroyed,” he says. He also warns that Trump’s plan reflects a long-standing effort to erase Palestinian identity, arguing, “The Zionist movement has been working all along to push the idea that Palestine is a land without a people.</p><p>Mansour asks whether Gaza's future will be shaped by the people who live there or by the world's most powerful people.</p><p><em>S</em><em>ubscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on </em><a target="_blank" href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/id1294461271"><em>Apple Podcasts</em></a><em>, </em><a target="_blank" href="https://open.spotify.com/show/13QW2sLPCjVbdDE6fmJCNf"><em>Spotify</em></a><em>, </em><a target="_blank" href="https://www.stitcher.com/show/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer"><em>Stitcher</em></a><em>, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Trump 2.0 could reshape US foreign policy, with the New York Times&apos; David Sanger</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/podcast/gzero-world-podcast/how-trump-20-could-reshape-us-foreign-policy-with-the-new-york-times-david-sanger</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfyvchlaro07lq89iwgz47</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 23 Nov 2024 11:15:02 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>david sanger</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>gzero world podcast</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>2024 presidential election</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>us election</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>china taiwan relations</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>GZERO World with Ian Bremmer Podcast</category>
<description>Listen: New York Times national security and White House correspondent David Sanger joins Ian Bremmer on the GZERO World Podcast to break down the foreign policy implications of Trump 2.0.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmw3xm8gxdqpw07lj7q0au50t" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1500" height="1500" />
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmw3xm8gxdqpw07lj7q0au50t" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/podcast/gzero-world-podcast/how-trump-20-could-reshape-us-foreign-policy-with-the-new-york-times-david-sanger"><strong>Transcript</strong></a></p><p><strong>Listen:&nbsp;</strong>On January 20, 2025, <strong>Donald Trump</strong> will re-assume the most powerful office in the world amidst the global backdrop of two major wars, comparatively weaker US allies, more aggressive rogue states, and a more complex and competitive international architecture. On the GZERO World Podcast,<strong> Ian Bremmer</strong> sits down with New York Times national security and White House correspondent <strong>David Sanger&nbsp;</strong>to talk about what US foreign policy might look like under Trump 2.0.</p><p>"It's a Donald Trump administration," Sanger tells Bremmer, which means that ideological consistency is not the currency of the moment. Loyalty is the currency of the moment." Some of Trump's picks so far show how important loyalty is to him and also that he's no longer going to defer to any "adults" in the room. He wants a cabinet that empowers him rather than reining him in. Moreover, Sanger notes that Trump will be taking the reins of the world’s most powerful office with the full support of the Senate, House, and a deeply conservative Supreme Court. Oh, and those moderating guardrails—like Mattis and Kelly—from the first Trump term? Gone. In short order, the entire world will know what Trump unleashed looks like. Whether or not that's a good thing...only time will tell.</p><p><em>S</em><em>ubscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on </em><a target="_blank" href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/id1294461271"><em>Apple Podcasts</em></a><em>, </em><a target="_blank" href="https://open.spotify.com/show/13QW2sLPCjVbdDE6fmJCNf"><em>Spotify</em></a><em>, </em><a target="_blank" href="https://www.stitcher.com/show/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer"><em>Stitcher</em></a><em>, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>HARD NUMBERS: Oil prices spike, China stops drinking, BTS eyes reunion, and more…</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/hard-numbers/hard-numbers-june-13-2025</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg792hm14107lqq7vfm8n0</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 13 Jun 2025 14:17:29 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Alex Kliment</dc:creator>
<category>oil</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>latin america-caribbean</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>school shooting</category>
<category>argentina</category>
<category>k-pop</category>
<category>inflation</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>Hard Numbers</category>
<description>12%: Oil prices spiked 12% in early trading on Friday following Israel’s attacks on Iran, reflecting fears that a wider Middle East conflict could restrict access to crude exports.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrdednydg8d07my8n0jcwaw" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1200" height="675">
<media:credit>IMAGO/Michael Gstettenbauer via Reuters Connect</media:credit>
<media:text>A gas station in Düsseldorf, Germany, on June 10, 2025.</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrdednydg8d07my8n0jcwaw" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>12%:</strong> Oil prices <a target="_blank" href="https://on.ft.com/44dw2jj"><u>spiked</u></a> 12% in early trading on Friday following Israel’s attacks on Iran, reflecting fears that a wider Middle East conflict could restrict access to crude exports. Later in the morning prices softened slightly, but were still up nearly 9%, to more than $75 per barrel.</p><p><strong>4:</strong> Although school shootings are rare in Europe, four of the worst incidents this century<a target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/killings-european-schools-fan-concern-us-problem-is-spreading-2025-06-13/"> <u>have occurred</u></a> since 2023, raising concern about whether the phenomenon – until now largely a US problem – is spreading more rapidly.</p><p><strong>3:</strong> Is the wait over? Millions of BTS fans hope so. The K-Pop supergroup has not performed together in three years due to its members’ mandatory South Korean military service. But now that they have been discharged (honorably!), rumors are flying that the group <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/international-k-pop-fans-thrill-prospect-bts-reunion-2025-06-13/"><u>could take the stage again</u></a> at a festival outside Seoul this weekend.</p><p><strong>1.5%:</strong> Argentina’s monthly inflation <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-inflation-cools-may-lowest-over-five-years-2025-06-12/"><u>fell</u></a> to just 1.5% in May. That’s the lowest level in five years – and a stark fall from early 2024, when it exceeded 25%. President <strong>Javier Milei</strong>’s radical cost-cutting policies have helped put a lid on rising prices.</p><p><strong>50%:</strong> China’s production of <em>baijiu</em> liquor, the country’s go-to tipple, has <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.economist.com/china/2025/06/11/chinas-booze-business-looks-smashed#:~:text=Between%202020%20and%202024%20China,R%C3%A9my%20Cointreau%20and%20Pernod%20Ricard."><u>dropped</u></a> more than 50% since 2016. Demand for alcohol overall in China is plummeting as a result of changing tastes, a slowing economy, and a new campaign to stamp out drinking among the Communist Party’s 100 million members.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>If Trump&apos;s foreign policy pushes allies away, can the US go it alone?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/editors-picks/can-trump-us-succeed-without-allies</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg3j7ukynx07my2fvmf7rx</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 10 Mar 2025 17:36:55 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>ukraine aid</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>volodymyr zelensky</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>ukraine-us relations</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>Editor&apos;s Picks</category>
<description>The Trump administration’s approach to foreign policy is clear: allies and alliances are expendable, and America is stronger alone. With support for Ukraine waning and European allies sidelined, long-term damage to transatlantic relationships may be inevitable. On Quick Take, Ian Bremmer unpacks this shift and its likely consequences.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd8qlge0pp07lq2tn9rmzm" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd8qlge0pp07lq2tn9rmzm" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. Marco Rubio heading to Saudi Arabia to talk with the Ukrainians. That's clearly the most important of a lot of moving parts geopolitically in the world right now. I say that because so much of what the Americans decide to do and not do with the Ukrainians is going to have massive impact on the transatlantic relationship, on NATO, on US-Europe relations, and on the nature of what has been the most important collective security arrangement in the world and is now experiencing crisis. It's very clear that the Ukrainians, as Trump says, lack the cards. And so the outcome is going to be determined largely by countries outside of Ukraine, not just the willingness and the capacity of the Ukrainians themselves to continue to fight. The United States, on the one hand, is pushing the Europeans to do a lot more. A lot more in terms of providing economic support, providing military support, and having a security backstop for a post-ceasefire environment that the Americans are not prepared to participate in.</p><p>Now, if all of that happens, and of course that's a big if, but certainly the Europeans are moving in that direction, then the interesting point is the Americans aren't going to determine the outcome. In the sense that the ultimate ceasefire terms will be driven not by the United States, who's basically saying, "We're washing our hands of it." But instead by the Europeans and the Ukrainians, in concert with Russia. And first of all, that's analogous to what's been happening in the Middle East. Everybody remembers that Trump said, "We're going to own Gaza and all the Palestinians are going to leave," and of course, that's not where we're heading. And the eventual outcome will be determined overwhelmingly by the countries that are prepared to spend the actual money and provide the security and figure out the politics. And that means the Arab States, that means Egypt and Jordan, it means Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and it means the potential for blocking by Israel.</p><p>That's the environment that we are increasingly going to be seeing on the ground in Ukraine. That the Europeans are going to be doing the driving. The Ukrainians are going to have to align with that and the blocking potentially by Russia. The big difference, of course, is that in the case of Ukraine, the United States is also very interested in doing a deal with Russia over the head of the Ukrainians and the Europeans. There's no equivalent in the Middle East at all. And here, the reason it's so important is because the ability of the Ukrainians to continue to engage in their willingness with the US and Europe together will determine in large part whether a deal between the US and Russia involves a ceasefire with Ukraine or doesn't. If Trump can say, "Hey, the reason we didn't get a deal and the reason they're still fighting is because Ukraine refuses to be a part of it," then a deal with Russia is actually much easier to get to by Trump. Because it involves just re-engagement diplomatically, investment by the US and Russia, joint projects, reopening of arms control conversations, and doesn't involve a Ukraine ceasefire.</p><p>Trump has said, "Not only does Ukraine not have cards, but Russia doesn't have cards." Of course, the reality is that if the Russians are willing to do the fighting for a longer period of time, and the Americans don't care and the Europeans can't stand up, then the Russians are the ones with the cards. That is where we are heading. And if the Americans are prepared to do a deal with the Russians irrespective of what happens on the ground in Ukraine, and that is being tested very much over the coming days, that's perhaps the most important outcome of what we see from the US-Ukrainian talks in Saudi Arabia, then the transatlantic relationship is in a lot more trouble than it is right now.</p><p>So I think those are the pieces that we're talking about here. It is very clear that the Americans see alliances and see allies as expendable, that it's not that important for the Americans to treat allies with respect. If they're smaller, if they're less powerful, you can do whatever you want. And we saw that with Elon Musk beating up on Poland and the Foreign Minister, Radek Sikorski, someone I've been actually friends with for a very long time, and I think that's not a smart way to conduct business. Poland's been a steadfast ally, they're spending upwards of 4% of their GDP on defense, heading towards 5% going forward. They've housed millions of Ukrainian refugees. They've done far more on the ground in Ukraine per capita than the Americans have on pretty much every front. And also, by the way, there are a lot of Polish Americans that vote, and some of them vote Republican. Far more important than the Ukrainian vote, for example, and that seems to matter too, but maybe not to Elon.</p><p>I think that these sorts of insults are unnecessary, and they damage American allies. But I think the Trump administration's perspective is as long as the US is the most powerful country in the world, that America alone is stronger than America with friends, and it's probably the area of greatest geopolitical disagreement that I have with this administration. But we will see how it plays out. I certainly agree that there will be a lot of wins that we will continue to see, because less powerful countries do not want to get into a big fight with the United States. But long-term, I think this is going to play out badly. And I particularly think that's true in the transatlantic relationship where permanent damage is being done irrespective of what happens after Trump. Anyway, a lot to talk about, a lot of moving pieces. We'll talk real soon, and that's it from me.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Why Trump won’t break the Putin-Xi alliance</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/ask-ian/why-trump-wont-break-putin-xi-alliance</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg3b18lolo07lqtlnanl1v</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 04 Mar 2025 16:26:14 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>in 60 seconds</category>
<category>iran</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>ceasefire</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>ai</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>mohammad javad zarif</category>
<category>turkey</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>ask ian</category>
<description>Does Trump&apos;s relationship with Putin isolate or concern China? What does the resignation of Iran&apos;s Vice President Zarif signal about tensions in the country? What&apos;s next for the Israel-Hamas ceasefire as the first phase comes to an end? Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd8c3ee0bl07lq8rt66am8" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd8c3ee0bl07lq8rt66am8" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer&nbsp;</strong>shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.</p><p><strong>Does Trump's relationship with Putin isolate or concern China?</strong></p><p>I wouldn't say so. I think that Putin and Xi Jinping have one of the stronger relationships on the global stage today. I think they've met something like 81 times bilaterally since the two have been in power. They're both leaders for life, they run dictatorships, and they support each other all the time at the United Nations. There's a lot of technology and trade, and China needs to buy Russian energy. The Americans certainly don't. So, for lots of reasons, this relationship is much more stable and strong than anything that Trump is likely to build with Putin. Especially because Trump is a one more term president, 78 years old, with checks and balances in the US, even if they're getting weaker, they exist. That's not true in Russia. It's not true in China. So, I don't think Beijing is very worried about that.</p><p><strong>What does the resignation of Iran's Vice President Zarif signal about tensions in the country?</strong></p><p>Well, given the fact that the finance minister was also just impeached this weekend, also a would-be reformist, a moderate, in the context of the Iranian political spectrum, it means the supreme leader and the conservatives do not trust these guys to engage with the Americans or the West. It's a harder line Iranian policy as they move towards greater levels of stockpiling, of enriched uranium, and as their military strategy has fallen apart for the region. If anyone is going to talk to the Americans, and if anyone is going to try to forestall attacks from Israel, and maybe by the US as well, it's not going to be the people that got the original Iranian nuclear deal done, the JCPOA. So, that's what it looks like in reform. Nascent under a lot of trouble. The Iranian president under a lot of pressure right now at home.</p><p><strong>What's next for the Israel-Hamas ceasefire as the first phase comes to an end?</strong></p><p>Well, I think what everyone is waiting for is the Egypt deal, which is being penned and is being sent over in advance of an Arab League summit to Trump in the coming hours, if not day. Originally, it was a few hundred pages long. The Saudis told the Egyptians, "Maybe you want to have an executive summary that's a little glossier for Trump? He's not reading a couple hundred pages." That's been worked on all weekend. And it certainly isn't the Americans owning Gaza. It certainly isn't the Palestinians being forced out or all voluntarily leaving. Whether or not Trump is prepared to sign off on that, or at least allow it to go forward and not veto it, as long as it hits that hurdle, I think you'll have pretty much all of the Arab states signing off on it in the Arab summit. That's where we are right now, and I'll talk to you all real soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>What if Palestinians want to leave Gaza?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-clips/if-palestinians-want-leave-gaza</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg2l2nlmn507lqfbo42uy0</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 18 Feb 2025 17:22:50 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>israel-palestinian conflict</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>riyad mansour</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>gaza</category>
<category>benjamin netanyahu</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>two-state solution</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>GZERO World Highlights</category>
<description>Palestinian UN Ambassador Riyad Mansour rejects Trump’s proposal to resettle Gazans, insisting that Palestinians are deeply tied to their land and warning that any relocation effort is part of a broader attempt to erase Palestinian identity.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd76r2d8hg07mycv8hu03u" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd76r2d8hg07mycv8hu03u" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>President <strong>Trump</strong> recently shocked the world by proposing that the United States take over Gaza and that displaced Gazans should be resettled elsewhere. On GZERO World with <strong>Ian Bremmer</strong>, Palestinian UN Ambassador <strong>Riyad Mansour&nbsp;</strong>pushes back, arguing that Palestinians are deeply tied to their land and will not abandon it—even in ruins. Mansour highlights the 450,000 Palestinians who marched back to North Gaza despite the destruction, illustrating their unwavering commitment to their homeland. “We have very, very strong attachment to the land, whether it is you have a palace on it or whether it is destroyed,” he says.</p><p>Mansour also warns that efforts to encourage Palestinian relocation—whether voluntary or forced—are part of a broader strategy to erase Palestinian identity. “The Zionist movement has been working all along to push the idea that Palestine is a land without a people,” he asserts, rejecting any large-scale displacement plans. Instead, he advocates for temporary housing solutions within Gaza as reconstruction begins. This exchange is part of a larger interview that Ian Bremmer filmed with Ambassador Mansour for the latest episode of GZERO World.</p><h5>Watch full episode: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/who-decides-gaza-future">Who gets to decide Gaza's future?</a></h5><h5><a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).</h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: </strong><a target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Who gets to decide Gaza&apos;s future?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/who-decides-gaza-future</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg2id9kvg807mym9ivhmwk</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 17 Feb 2025 11:15:02 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>israel-palestinian conflict</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>riyad mansour</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>gaza</category>
<category>benjamin netanyahu</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>two-state solution</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>GZERO World with Ian Bremmer</category>
<description>On GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, Palestinian UN Ambassador Riyad Mansour reacts to Trump’s proposal to take over Gaza and discusses the Palestinian right to return and the broader challenges of rebuilding and achieving a two-state solution.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd72mqd8f507myyg60u9gy" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd72mqd8f507myyg60u9gy" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>President <strong>Trump</strong> stunned the world when he proposed that the United States take over Gaza and transform it into the "Riviera of the Middle East," suggesting that displaced Gazans should be resettled elsewhere. America’s Middle Eastern allies have widely rejected the proposal, but what does it mean for the future of Gaza and its people? On GZERO World, Palestinian Ambassador to the UN <strong>Riyad Mansour</strong> joins<strong> Ian Bremmer</strong> to discuss Trump’s remarks, the realities of displacement, and what Palestinians want.</p><p>Mansour pushes back against the idea that Gazans should leave, pointing to the hundreds of thousands who have already returned to their devastated homes despite the destruction. He emphasizes the deep connection Palestinians have to their land, saying, “We have a very, very strong attachment to the land, whether it is you have a palace on it, or whether it is destroyed.” He also warns that forced displacement—no matter how it’s framed—creates instability for both Palestinians and neighboring countries like Egypt and Jordan, which have rejected any large-scale resettlement plans.</p><p>Beyond Trump’s proposal, Bremmer and Mansour examine Gaza's broader political future, the stalled peace process, and the challenges of rebuilding after the war. With global powers like China expressing interest in Palestinian statehood and an upcoming international conference on a two-state solution, could diplomatic momentum finally shift in Palestine’s favor? Mansour remains cautious but hopeful, acknowledging that “it gets so dark early in the morning before we see the sunlight.”</p><h5><a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).</h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: </strong><a target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Putin trolls Europe about &quot;the master&quot; Trump</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/ask-ian/putin-trolls-europe-about-trump</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg1z1plkai07lq5pbrma1w</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 04 Feb 2025 19:39:24 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>syria</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>belt and road</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>in 60 seconds</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>panama</category>
<category>ai</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>turkey</category>
<category>latin america-caribbean</category>
<category>ask ian</category>
<description>What does Putin mean when he says Europe &quot;will stand at the feet of the master&quot;? What&apos;s next for Panama after deciding to exit China&apos;s Belt and Road Initiative? How would a potential Turkey defense pact with Syria reshape power dynamics in the Middle East? Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd67h6d7ho07my0m3dzneo" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd67h6d7ho07my0m3dzneo" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer&nbsp;</strong>shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.</p><p><strong>What does Putin mean when he says Europe "will stand at the feet of the master"?</strong></p><p>It means that he loves to troll his adversaries. Don't you remember when he said that he actually thought Biden would be a better president from Russia's perspective than Trump? He trolls. It's all misinformation. It's propaganda. It's all served to undermine and show that he's powerful, and he can say whatever he wants. And of course, he would love to see a fight between the Americans and their allies, whether it's the Nordics on Greenland or it's Canada on 51st state, or it's Panama on the canal, or it's Europe on tariffs. And he wants to undermine the countries that gets a divide and conquer kind of response from Putin. And that is what he is doing when he trolls the Europeans.</p><p><strong>What's next for Panama after deciding to exit China's Belt and Road Initiative?</strong></p><p>Well, certainly, of all the countries that are facing a deeply asymmetric relationship on the back of threats from President Trump, Panama is high on that list. And they really are trying to find a way to avoid tariffs and avoid the Americans squeezing them on the canal. And an easy way to do that, because they've heard this now directly from Trump and from Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, is that the Chinese have too much influence over transit. And that is particularly true through these port facilities that a Hong Kong-based company, read, China, is in charge of. And so, they are opening investigations into the contract and into how they engage there. And they're also saying they'll pull out of Belt and Road. All of that is clearly going to upset and antagonize the Chinese. And I think that the Panamanians are very, very comfortable showing that they are going to orient much more towards the United States, given how much more they rely on the Americans.</p><p><strong>How would a potential Turkey defense pact with Syria reshape power dynamics in the Middle East?</strong></p><p>Given who's on the ground in Syria and the fact that the Americans are likely to pull out the over 2,000 troops they have there, and that Trump has said it's really up to Turkey to maintain that relationship, they were the ones that were closest to the rebels that ended up defeating, overthrowing Assad's regime. Not surprised at all that that is where the diplomacy is heading. But that doesn't mean that it's going to be stable, and it certainly doesn't mean that the Kurds on the ground are going to be handled well. And that will be what we need to watch carefully. But Turkey, a NATO ally that has a lot of influence across the region and particularly now on the ground with Syria, I think that'll be relatively stable given the support from the United States. That's it for me, and I'll talk to you all real soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>At Davos, all eyes are on Trump</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-europe/at-davos-eyes-on-trump</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg1ejwkrxs07my61yuu0mi</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 Jan 2025 16:16:50 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Carl Bildt</dc:creator>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>greenland</category>
<category>us election</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>panama canal</category>
<category>denmark</category>
<category>davos</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>carl bildt</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>GZERO Europe</category>
<description>What’s been going on here in Davos? It’s been Trump, Trump, Trump. Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Davos, Switzerland.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd5axkd08d07my3ma8jky6" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd5axkd08d07my3ma8jky6" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Carl Bildt</strong>, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Davos, Switzerland.</p><p><strong>What’s been going on here?</strong></p><p>It’s been Trump, Trump, Trump, Trump. It’s been very much dominated by assessments, curiosity, concern about the transition in the US. A lot of businessmen are fairly, sort of, upbeat. They think there’s sort of a deregulation and lower taxes, that’s good. Economists are more worried. Debts and deficits, that’s not good. And those dealing with geopolitics, like myself, are deeply concerned.</p><p>Is he going to go to war with Denmark over Greenland? What’s going to happen with the Panama Canal? Is their Middle East policy that is credible? And what is he really up to when it comes to dealing with Mr. Putin on Ukraine? There are lots of questions, lots of concerns. But, upbeat assessment, in spite of that.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Biden’s presidency will be remembered</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/us-politics-in-60/bidens-presidency-remembered</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg14lplhj507lqvf0q25hf</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 18 Jan 2025 13:15:02 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Jon  Lieber</dc:creator>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us politics</category>
<category>inflation</category>
<category>republicans</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>us economy</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>us election</category>
<category>jon lieber</category>
<category>US Politics In 60 Seconds</category>
<description>As President Biden makes way for Trump in the Oval Office, how will he be remembered? Jon Lieber explains how global crises, inflation, and his China tech policy will shape history&apos;s perception of him.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd4vw4cskh07myzsn98dcq" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="480" height="360">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd4vw4cskh07myzsn98dcq" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Jon Lieber</strong>, Eurasia Group's head of research and managing director for the firm's coverage of United States political and policy developments, shares his perspective on US politics from Washington, DC.</p><p>This is what we're watching in US Politics this week: One question that's going to be debated for a long time in the coming years is what is President Biden's legacy? I think there are a couple of things that he's going to be remembered for.</p><p>The first is the extraordinarily chaotic global environment over which he presided. Republicans will tie this back to the shambolic withdrawal from Afghanistan that President Biden presided over. But following that, you had the Russian invasion in Ukraine and the events of October 7th in the Middle East that led to the ongoing war there that is just now starting to look like it's settling down. But this is clearly going to be one of the background themes of any assessments of President Biden's legacy.</p><p>Biden's now one of four one-term presidents in the last 50 years, and one of the reasons that he lost was of course inflation. And inflation, you could argue was fueled by the pandemic or you could argue it was fueled by early actions taken by the Biden administration to spend a lot of money, perhaps more money than was necessary. But either way, the inflationary story of 2021 and 2022 is going to be remembered as one of his key legacies and one of the reasons that he lost reelection. Now that loss to Donald Trump, allowing probably one of the more controversial presidents in certainly recent American history, to come back into office and mount an unprecedented political comeback is also going to be part of Biden's legacy. Because of the fact that he decided that he was able to run even at his advanced age, that blocked out the Democrats from having an opportunity to hold a primary and then forced the Democrats to change horses midstream and move over to Kamala Harris in the middle of the election cycle, who of course lost to Trump. That is also going to be part of his legacy.</p><p>And it's unclear. Biden thinks, says it publicly, he could have won election if he just stayed in. He's 82 years old. He'd be the oldest president ever if he did, and there's obvious decline in his faculties over the course of the year. But more importantly, the American people really started to lose confidence in Biden as time went on this year. So not at all clear that he would've won that election or that any other Democrat could have won that election if there were a primary process. But his sticking around and the White House staff and other Democratic operatives that covered for the age-related decline that he was experiencing is also going to be a part of President Biden's election.</p><p>Probably one of the more consequential things I think he's going to end up having done over the longer term is increasing the US confrontation with China, particularly over technology policy. The world is at a critical juncture when it comes to the advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence. And the wall that the Biden administration has been trying to erect around Chinese access to US advanced technologies is going to have ripple effects and repercussions for years to come. The Trump administration's likely to continue a lot of that, and this could potentially be an inflection point in 10 years time as we look back and look at the two different tech ecosystems that are being built out. A lot of that legacy is going to trace back to the Biden administration.</p><p>So that's a pretty complex, mixed legacy. The US doesn't have lot of one-term presidents in recent history. Most one-term presidents aren't remembered that fondly. Presidents like George H.W. Bush look a lot better in the long distance of history, whereas President Jimmy Carter who recently passed away still has a bit of a mixed legacy. And that's probably where Biden's going to end up.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Gaza ceasefire likely as Biden and Trump both push</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/ask-ian/gaza-ceasefire-likely-biden-trump</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg0vd5lgxx07lq05lsbcex</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 14 Jan 2025 19:29:39 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>gaza</category>
<category>ceasefire</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>hezbollah</category>
<category>palestine</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>tiktok</category>
<category>in 60 seconds</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>lebanon</category>
<category>elon musk</category>
<category>ask ian</category>
<description>A Gaza ceasefire has gained momentum. What is the likelihood a deal will be reached soon? What do I make of a potential sale of TikTok to Elon Musk? What does Lebanon&apos;s new president mean for Hezbollah? Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd4ihlcqvq07myse7f3nse" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd4ihlcqvq07myse7f3nse" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer&nbsp;</strong>shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.</p><p><strong>A Gaza ceasefire has gained momentum. What is the likelihood a deal will be reached soon?</strong></p><p>We've heard this news before. At least five times over the last year that we've heard we were almost at a Gaza ceasefire. This time around though it looks much more likely. Why is that? Because Trump is about to be president, because Trump's envoys and Biden's envoys have been working together on these issues, and also because that means pressing the Israeli government in a way that feels much more serious if you are the prime minister. And also because Trump has been pressing Hamas. And so, I think the unilateralism is there. The fact the deal was already very close, and now this means Biden gets to say he got the deal and Trump gets to say he's ended a war, at least for the time being, and a lot more hostages get freed. So yeah, this time around it looks pretty likely.</p><p><strong>What do I make of a potential sale of TikTok to Elon Musk?</strong></p><p>Well, it's just been announced that the Chinese are considering it. I always thought that it was more likely than not that if the Supreme Court were to uphold a ban that the Chinese would probably allow a sale to go through. Though they were going to say they were never going to until the last moment because why give up leverage when you don't necessarily have to? So their historic unwillingness doesn't mean to me that they're actually unwilling. To the extent that there is a deal and it goes to Elon, he becomes more powerful, and he also is seen by the Chinese as owing them one. So would he facilitate an improved, a more stable relationship between the US and China? It's an early indication that he could play a role. He hasn't said anything on the China front yet, but certainly you would expect that he would meet with the high-level envoy that's going to the inauguration that Xi Jinping was invited to on the 20th. That's what we should watch in the next week. Okay, that's it for that one.</p><p><strong>What does Lebanon's new president mean for Hezbollah?</strong></p><p>Weaker Hezbollah, but so much is going to be determined on what Israel decides to do on the ground in the south of Lebanon. Are they staying there for a longer period of time? We've heard news of late that they intend to maintain that occupation in a longer than just couple of weeks, couple of months environment, which makes it harder to keep Hezbollah from starting fighting again. On balance, I think this ceasefire is looking a little shakier right now, even with the new Lebanese president than it had a few weeks ago. We'll see. But if it does break down, the level of fighting won't be what it was a few months ago because Hezbollah doesn't have that capacity and the Iranians can't restock their weapons because Assad has fallen in Syria.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Ian Bremmer explains the 10 Top Risks of 2025</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-live/ian-bremmer-explains-the-10-top-risks-of-2025</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg0k9qlg0i07lqdrgy7gyp</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 07 Jan 2025 23:11:25 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>ai regulation</category>
<category>ai</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>cliff kupchan</category>
<category>gaza</category>
<category>gzero media</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us economy</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>global economy</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>iran</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>mexico</category>
<category>politics</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>top risks</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>GZERO Live</category>
<description>Every January, Eurasia Group, our parent company, produces a report with its forecast for the world&apos;s Top 10 Risks in the year ahead. Its authors are EG President Ian Bremmer and EG Chairman Cliff Kupchan. Ian explains the Top 10 Risks for 2025, one after the other. He also discusses the three Red Herrings.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd3u8vdeep07lqt1blxw3d" type="image/png" medium="image" width="1200" height="675">
<media:credit>Annie Gugliotta</media:credit>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd3u8vdeep07lqt1blxw3d" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Every January, Eurasia Group, our parent company, produces a report with its forecast for the world's Top 10 Risks in the year ahead. Its authors are EG President <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/IBremmer"><strong>Ian Bremmer</strong></a> and EG Chairman <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/people/CKupchan"><strong>Cliff Kupchan</strong></a>. Ian explains the Top 10 Risks for 2025, one after the other. He also discusses the three Red Herrings.<br><br><a target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/issues/Top-Risks-2025">Read the full report here</a>.</p><h2>Red Herrings</h2><a href="https://youtu.be/K_-MrMUXLu8">https://youtu.be/K_-MrMUXLu8</a><p><strong>Trump Fails:&nbsp;</strong>Over time, Trump’s transactional foreign-policy approach will weaken US alliances, erode America’s influence on the global stage, heighten geopolitical volatility, and make the world a more dangerous place. But in 2025, Trump is score likely to score victories than to fail.</p><p><strong>Europe Breaks:&nbsp;</strong>Economic malaise, security threats, and defense shortcomings will test Europe’s unity in 2025. But as with the Eurozone crisis, Brexit, the pandemic, and Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the EU will likely overcome, or at least muddle through, these latest challenges.</p><p><strong>Global Energy Transition Stalls:&nbsp;</strong>The return of Donald Trump has raised anxieties in sustainability circles that the global energy transition will be thrown into reverse this year. But the global energy transition survived the first Trump administration, and it will survive the second, especially since it has much more momentum now than in 2017.</p><h2>Risk #10: Mexican Standoff</h2><a href="https://youtu.be/UPP6URsgBhE">https://youtu.be/UPP6URsgBhE</a><p>Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has a strong mandate and few checks on her executive power. Still, she will face formidable challenges this year in her relations with the Trump administration at a time of ongoing constitutional overhauls and fiscal stresses at home. Her diplomatic and governance skills will soon be tested.</p><h2>Risk #9: Ungoverned spaces</h2><a href="https://youtu.be/-E4eProNDgQ">https://youtu.be/-E4eProNDgQ</a><p>The deepening G-Zero leaves many places thinly governed. Conflict in the Middle East has left ungoverned spaces within Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. In Africa, the aftermath of the war in Ethiopia and the ongoing civil war in Sudan have worsened humanitarian conditions. In Myanmar, more than three million civilians have been displaced since the coup in 2021. In Haiti, political turmoil, civil unrest, gang violence, and natural disasters compound the misery of its people. These neglected spaces and people won’t pose broader geopolitical risks in 2025, but the consequences of the neglect will eventually be felt far beyond the countries directly affected.</p><h2>Risk #8: AI unbound</h2><a href="https://youtu.be/reJjOclTMdI">https://youtu.be/reJjOclTMdI</a><p>Some notable AI governance initiatives came to fruition in 2024. Still, without strong, sustained buy-in from governments and tech companies, they will not be enough to keep pace with technological advances. The deteriorating state of global cooperation resulting from the G-Zero leadership vacuum compounds these risks.</p><p>This year will mark another period of relentless technological development unbound by adequate safeguards and governance frameworks. Given the incentives to build ever more powerful AI, meaningful constraints will likely emerge only when developers hit hard limits on data, compute, energy, or funding access. Until then, the technology’s capabilities and risks will continue to grow unchecked.</p><h2>Risk #7: Beggar thy world</h2><a href="https://youtu.be/IiynT1pDoHU">https://youtu.be/IiynT1pDoHU</a><p>The US-China rivalry will export disruption to everyone else this year, short-circuiting the global recovery and accelerating geoeconomic fragmentation at a time when global growth is tepid, inflation remains sticky, and debt levels stand at historic highs.<br></p><p>New governments promising better times ahead will face harsh realities as global economic pressures turn political. Many emerging and frontier economies must decide between raising taxes or slashing spending. Even within the G7, budget battles toppled a French government last year, and Canada's finance minister resigned over fiscal disputes. Few countries face imminent risk of sovereign default, but cracks in government stability will undermine investor confidence.</p><h2>Risk #6: Iran on the ropes</h2><a href="https://youtu.be/rGtYTU7bcC0">https://youtu.be/rGtYTU7bcC0</a><p>The Middle East will remain a combustible environment in 2025 for one big reason: Iran hasn’t been this weak in decades. The country’s geopolitical position has been dealt a series of devastating blows in recent months. Israel has crippled its most potent proxies—Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran’s ally, Bashar al Assad, has been driven from Syria.</p><p>Tehran is wounded, but it still has a massive missile and drone arsenal, and it could be provoked into another direct exchange of missiles with Israel. Any accident or miscalculation that kills a significant number of Israelis or Americans could trigger an escalatory spiral with material implications for the supply and price of oil.</p><h2>Risk #5: Russia still rogue</h2><a href="https://youtu.be/3w94ZwZ5vS0">https://youtu.be/3w94ZwZ5vS0</a><p>Russia is now the world’s leading rogue power by a large margin, and Vladimir Putin will pursue more policies that undermine the US-led global order despite a likely ceasefire in Ukraine. Russia will take hostile action against EU countries with cyber, sabotage, and other “asymmetric attacks”; it will also build on strategic military partnerships with Iran and North Korea in 2025. Putin will continue attempts at arson and even assassination while using Telegram to propagate pro-Kremlin views across Europe. Russia will do more than any other country to subvert the global order in 2025.</p><h2>Risk#4: Trumponomics</h2><a href="https://youtu.be/TgTf1Bdppi4">https://youtu.be/TgTf1Bdppi4</a><p>In January, Trump will inherit a robust US economy, but his policies will bring higher inflation and lower growth in 2025.</p><p>First, Trump will significantly hike tariffs to reduce America’s trade deficits, leading to fewer affordable options for many goods and increased US inflation. Higher interest rates and slower growth will result. The dollar will strengthen, making US exports less competitive. Some countries targeted by Trump will retaliate, raising the risk of disruptive trade wars. Second, the Trump administration could deport up to one million people in 2025 and up to five million over four years.</p><p>Reduced illegal immigration and mass deportations would shrink the US workforce, driving up wages and consumer prices and limiting the economy’s productive capacity.</p><h2>Risk #3: US-China breakdown</h2><a href="https://youtu.be/tdMDEszufTc">https://youtu.be/tdMDEszufTc</a><p>Trump's return to office will unleash an unmanaged decoupling in the world’s most important geopolitical relationship. That, in turn, risks a major economic disruption and broader crisis. Trump will set new tariffs on Chinese goods to pressure Beijing for concessions on a host of issues, and China’s leaders, despite real economic weakness at home, will respond more forcefully to prove to both Trump and China’s people that they can and will fight back. Tensions over Taiwan will probably rise, though a full-blown crisis remains unlikely in 2025.</p><p>Technology policy will be the true frontline in this conflict. Battles over trade and investment in everything from semiconductors to critical minerals will erupt in 2025.</p><h2>Risk #2: Rule of Don</h2><a href="https://youtu.be/I23KGFtmf6E">https://youtu.be/I23KGFtmf6E</a><p>Trump will enter office more experienced and better organized than in 2017. He will populate his administration with loyalists who better understand how the federal government works. He will have consolidated control of Congress and a 6-3 conservative Supreme Court majority.</p><p>From this solid foundation, Trump will purge the federal bureaucracy of professional civil servants and replace them with political loyalists, particularly at the Justice Department and the FBI. The erosion of independent checks on executive power and an active undermining of the rule of law will leave more of US policy dependent on the decisions of one powerful man rather than on established and politically impartial legal principles.</p><p>Democracy itself will not be threatened. The US isn’t Hungary. But Trump’s indifference, and in some cases hostility, to longstanding American values will set dangerous new precedents for “political vandalism” by future presidents of both parties.</p><h2>Risk #1: The G-Zero wins</h2><a href="https://youtu.be/SlUbxa4xwmg">https://youtu.be/SlUbxa4xwmg</a><p>The G-Zero world is an era when no one power or group of powers is both willing and able to drive a global agenda and maintain international order. We’ve lived with this lack of international leadership for nearly a decade now, but in 2025, the problem will get much worse.</p><p>Expect new and expanding power vacuums, emboldened rogue actors, and a heightened risk of dangerous accidents, miscalculations, and conflict. The risk of a geopolitical crisis is now higher than at any point since the 1930s or the early Cold War.</p><p>Russia and China remain challengers to the Western-led security order, though in very different ways. Rising inequality, shifting demographics, and warp-speed technological change have persuaded a growing number of citizens in advanced industrial democracies that “globalism” hasn’t worked in their favor. And the world’s military superpower will again be led by the only post-WWII president who rejects the assumption that a US global leadership role serves the American people.</p><p>This Top Risk is not a single event. It’s the cumulative impact of the deepening G-Zero leadership deficit.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Trump foreign policy in a MAGA, MAGA world</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/trump-foreign-policy-in-a-maga-maga-world</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfywhzlav607lqe6wn1p79</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 25 Nov 2024 11:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>david sanger</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>maga</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>us election</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>GZERO World with Ian Bremmer</category>
<description>As Trump prepares to return to the White House, his foreign policy picks are already showing just how radically his presidency could reshape geopolitics. New York Times Correspondent David Sanger joins Ian Bremmer on GZERO World to discuss what a Trump 2.0 foreign policy could look like for some of today&apos;s key geopolitical flashpoints.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd1dfqcmsh07myu7ztqa8v" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd1dfqcmsh07myu7ztqa8v" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As <strong>Trump</strong> prepares to return to the White House, his foreign policy picks are already showing just how radically his presidency could reshape geopolitics. New York Times Correspondent <strong>David Sanger</strong> joins <strong>Ian Bremmer&nbsp;</strong>on GZERO World to discuss just what a Trump 2.0 foreign policy could look like for some of the key geopolitical flashpoints today. From the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East to the increasingly strained US-China relationship, the only thing we can say for sure is that the Trump sequel will look far different from the original.</p><p>And that uncertainty, Sanger tells Bremmer, is why Trump won the election. "If you voted for Donald Trump in the 2024 election, it was probably with a thought that these institutions need to be blown up." One of the biggest questions, however, is just how Trump will approach the Ukraine war, and if he'll follow through on his campaign pledge to end the conflict in "24 hours." "Trump would love to come in as the man who ended the Ukraine war" Sanger says, "But the only way I can imagine in my limited way for how you do that in 24 hours is you have a call of Vladimir Putin and you say, Vlad, what do you need?"</p><h5><a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).</h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: </strong><a target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Israel&apos;s next move</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/israels-next-move</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfwtcgkaa207myoe6rvbyk</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 14 Oct 2024 20:23:43 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>us israel relations</category>
<category>idf</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>iran</category>
<description>Ian Bremmer&apos;s Quick Take: After Iran’s latest strikes on Israel, all eyes are on how Israel will respond and what role the US will play. Ian Bremmer shares insight on these and more.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcxigmd6ng07lqfztt5k4a" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcxigmd6ng07lqfztt5k4a" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:&nbsp;</strong>A Quick Take to kick off your week.</p><p><strong></strong>It's everything everywhere all the time in terms of geopolitical risk in the environment right now. Pretty much everywhere you look, we have increasing conflict. But the Middle East is still taking up more of my time than most things. In part, that is because we are awaiting what kind of an Israeli response there will be to those Iranian attacks. The 180 ballistic missiles that were sent towards and into Israel a couple of weeks ago, at the same time that the war in Lebanon continues to escalate between Israel and Hezbollah. Maybe start with the Iran side. The big news right now is a couple of pieces of information from the Americans. First that the US is sending over a THAAD missile defense system, along with 100 US soldiers, to operate it to Israel to improve Israeli air defenses against incoming attacks from outside the country.</p><p>And secondly, the US Treasury Department has announced additional sanctions against tankers that have shut off their transponders and are helping the Iranians to illegally export significant amounts of sanction-breaking oil. Prices can go up on the back of that. An unusual thing for the Americans to do a few weeks before the election, but shows just how concerned they are about potential escalation in the region. So let me give you some context here. First point. On the one hand, the Americans have sent THAAD systems to Israel before. So it's not like there aren't any American soldiers on the ground operating in Israel. This is not such a game-changer. In fact, such a decision was made not only years ago, but also after October 7th. But it is notable that it comes a year later on the back of potential significant escalation, both in the Northern front that we're already seeing and with Iran that we might be.<br></p><p>Second point is that the oil prices continue to be a little bit under 80 bucks. OPEC has a lot of spare capacity they could put on the market. China continues to have pretty poor numbers in terms of demand. So this isn't likely to have the American move to hit more Iranian oil, isn't likely to have a lot of impact in terms of oil prices. But if the Americans could have stopped what is right now 1.5 million barrels of Iranian export if they could have taken that down and the Iranians are using that money to pay for the Axis of Resistance that's targeting not only Israel but targeting ships in the Middle East, targeting American and UK military assets, why did Biden wait? Why is it only being announced now? And why is it only being announced now in a way that seems to be a gimme for the Israeli Prime Minister and his government in return for not engaging in significant retaliatory escalation against the Iranians?<br></p><p>This is a US policy that continues to look very weak, that continues to be out of step with most of its allies at this point. You see even French President Macron saying that he doesn't want to provide any more military support for Israel. Of course, it's easy for him to say that. He doesn't provide much to begin with. If it was a significant export, I'm sure Macron wouldn't be saying that. But nonetheless, the Americans are on really one very isolated side at this point compared to the rest of the international community, whether you like the United States or you don't. And their ability to influence the Israeli government appears to be virtually zero. And that has been shown with the recent attacks by the Israeli Defense Forces against UN peacekeepers in Lebanon. And we've seen that on the back of those attacks that the United States, France, Spain, Italy, which is a strong right-wing government, but also has a thousand peacekeepers on the ground in Lebanon, all strongly condemning the Israelis for making these attacks.</p><p>But not prepared to actually do anything in response and certainly not making the Israelis feel like they need to stop. Now the Israeli perspective is these peacekeepers have not been capable of upholding Security Council resolution that required that Hezbollah pull back from the border area, a buffer zone, that they've been launching military strikes against Israel. And that also Hezbollah fighters are essentially using the presence of the peacekeepers as shields. And that they're operating not on the peacekeeper's bases but in proximity, which makes it harder for the Israelis to go after them. That certainly doesn't justify firing directly on the peacekeepers base, which has happened, and which now the IDF says a mistake. In return, the Israeli Prime Minister has called on the UN Secretary-General to withdraw the peacekeepers. I find it implausible that the Israeli Prime Minister doesn't realize that the Secretary-General has actually no authority over the peacekeepers.<br></p><p>They're sent there on the basis of the Security Council. So in other words, if the Israeli Prime Minister wants to make a demand, he's making it of the permanent members of the Security Council like the United States and China and France, the UK and Russia. He apparently doesn't want to make that statement. But again, the point here is the comparative impunity, and the major headlines, of course, are in the last 24 hours, around four Israeli soldiers that have been targeted and killed, as well as a large number of injuries on Israeli military bases by Hezbollah drones. Hezbollah is much more capable than Hamas has been, and there will be more significant Israeli casualties as this war continues. But most of the casualties, of course, even though it's not most of the headlines, will be among the Lebanese, among the Hezbollah fighters, and among the Lebanon civilian population, of which we've seen about 2,000 killed so far.<br></p><p>And that is because the military dominance in the region, again, both offense and defense and intelligence and surveillance, is overwhelmingly in the hands of Israel. So if there's going to be significant escalation in the war going forward, that escalation will be decided overwhelmingly by the Israeli government. And so that's what is particularly interesting to watch over the coming weeks. I am not expecting very much against Iran, frankly. The fact that the Israelis have already waited for a couple of weeks takes a lot of the urgency out of that. The fact that the Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has said, "It will be the time of our choosing and what we do, they'll know that it was us, but they won't know how we did it," implies something that is a much more targeted attack than lots and lots of bombs raining down against, you know, sort of a nuclear facility or against oil production.</p><p>It would not surprise me if it was a high-level assassination, for example, against the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the IRGC. Especially because we already saw that when the Trump administration assassinated Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian response was virtually nothing. So there's precedent for that, and the Iranians have very little at this point that they can do that wouldn't hurt them a hell of a lot more than they can hurt Israel or Israel's allies. So that's where we are right now. A war that continues to escalate with a lot of suffering on the back of it. An incredibly ineffective US policy in the region, and everybody else pretty much sitting on the sidelines.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>How October 7th changed Israel and the Middle East</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/how-october-7th-changed-israel-and-the-middle-east</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfwhapl0mq07lq2f58tzx6</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Oct 2024 17:24:09 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>hamas</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>idf</category>
<category>lebanon</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>hezbollah</category>
<category>iran</category>
<description>Ian Bremmer&apos;s Quick Take: One year after the October 7th Hamas attack on Israel, Ian Bremmer takes a look at how its repercussions have impacted Israel, the Middle East region, and the world.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcwyetd66b07lq26blckeu" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcwyetd66b07lq26blckeu" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:</strong> A Quick Take to kick off your week. It is October 7th, and that means one year since Hamas perpetrated the worst terrorist attacks since 9/11. Almost 1,200 Israelis dead, mostly civilians, and still a hundred plus held hostage from that day a year ago. Not much progress on that latter front or on a ceasefire. Not much progress in the region since then. What it did do, of course, on October 7th, is it outraged and unified what had been a very divided Israeli population, divided with massive internal demonstrations on domestic political issues. And suddenly the only issue that mattered was responding to, redressing those attacks, whether you're on the left or the right in Israel and being able to defend the Israeli homeland and get the hostages back.<br></p><p>On the former, they've certainly been effective, hitting back as hard as possible. We've seen that Hamas today is a shell of what it was on October 7th a year ago. The leadership mostly dead. The weapons caches mostly destroyed. The tunnels mostly sealed. Hezbollah, the most powerful non-state military actor in the world, has been damaged critically, and they started rocket attacks against Israel a day after the October 7th terrorist attacks. Israel has now opened up a second front, really the primary front now in the war, and after a couple of weeks of that war, Hezbollah's leadership is dead. Their communication capacity was critically destroyed. The war is ongoing but is certainly not going well for Hezbollah. On the one hand, you've seen a major escalation from the rockets and the bombing happening in Gaza to a ground war across the entirety of that territory now to Lebanon and with significant shots fired missiles and the rest military operations with Iran's other proxies, the Houthis and Yemen, Shia militants in Syria and Iraq, and of course involving Iran itself.<br></p><p>On the other hand, the capacity of these proxy organizations to escalate in return is now far, far less capable, far less serious. Hamas cannot threaten Israel the way they could on October 7th. Hezbollah certainly far, far diminished in their ability to escalate even if they want to. Two big questions are remaining. First, Iran. They are a country that still has all sorts of capabilities to escalate if they wish, possibly not effectively against Israel itself, but against the West, against the world. If they wanted to, they could completely disrupt oil tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and as a consequence, ensure that much of the oil that comes out of the Middle East, not just Iran's one and a half million barrels a day of export but from the Gulf states is stuck in place. And that would mean oil prices towards $150, even in a depressed demand environment as we see now, and a global recession.<br></p><p>So Iran's capacity, if they want to escalate, is far, far greater than that of Hezbollah or Hamas or anyone else in the region. And they have shown themselves to be quite risk-averse in response to Israeli strikes against Iranian leaders across the region, military leaders, and also against Hamas leadership in Tehran. And that was true back in April, and that was true back a week ago. But still, we are awaiting what is almost certainly going to be an Israeli response, a military response, against Iran for the 180 ballistic missiles that they launched against Israel with no fatalities in Israel. One in the West Bank of a Palestinian, but nonetheless, certainly could have caused a lot of people to be killed. And we will see if that the Israeli response leads to further Iranian escalation. I am at this point hopeful, and I would even say optimistic, that it does not, but optimism feels like exactly the wrong word to describe any of this in the region.</p><p>Then the second big question remaining is about the devastation on the ground. In Gaza, for the last year, a million and a half Palestinians are now living on the back of humanitarian aid of on average 125-ish trucks coming in a day. That's compared to 800 to 1000 on average before October 7th. As well as all of those tunnels which have now been sealed, they brought a lot of arms and illicit goods in. They also brought things like food, luxury food stuffs, and other things that you could buy on the gray market in Gaza. Those are closed, and there's no Gaza economy. There's no local Gaza agriculture right now. So the 1.5 million Palestinians are living in an absolutely unimaginable condition on single-digit percentage calories, many of them, in terms of consumption from what they would have been living on before October 7th.<br></p><p>Then you have the West Bank, which has been indirectly involved in the fighting. There's been a lot of skirmishing, a lot of shooting, a lot of people getting killed. And then also Israeli settlers and the IDF taking and securing more land from the Palestinians there. Then of course, in Lebanon in the last two weeks, you have over a million Lebanese who have been displaced from that fighting. Far more will be displaced in all likelihood in the coming weeks. All of this from a humanitarian perspective unacceptable by any yardstick. The United States seen by most of the world as complicit in watching it and not providing the either restraint on Israel or the humanitarian support effectively to help ensure that the suffering is reduced. And of course, this is going to cause hatred and radicalization for generations. And antisemitism was already way too high and on an upswing before October 7th, certainly only greater in this environment a year later.<br></p><p>And of course, with all of this, we don't know what's going to happen with upcoming elections. Kamala Harris came out on "60 Minutes" and described the United States as the best friend of the Israeli people around the world, refused to say whether or not the US was an ally of Prime Minister Netanyahu himself. A very strained relationship between the United States and the Israeli Prime Minister today. While former President Trump came out publicly in the last few days and said that the Israeli government, the Israeli military, should actively take out Iran's nuclear capabilities. So frankly, I would say between Harris and Trump, their policies, their orientation specifically on the Middle East and the Israeli wars in Gaza, in Lebanon, and the fighting we're seeing with Iran, probably the biggest difference on foreign policy between those two candidates would be on this issue. And we will find out in a month plus who is going to lead the United States, but utterly critical as we think about the future of this conflict in the region.<br></p><p>So that is where we are a year after the October 7th terrorist attacks, and now very deep in expanding war that is affecting much of the region. And I will continue to talk about it and follow it for you. So I hope everyone's going well, and I'll talk to you all real soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Israel strikes: Why Hezbollah remains silent</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/israel-strikes-why-hezbollah-remains-silent</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfw3y6kzh207lq186nbq8m</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 30 Sep 2024 18:58:44 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>middle east proxy wars</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>hezbollah</category>
<category>hassan nasrallah</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>israel</category>
<description>Ian Bremmer&apos;s Quick Take: The assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah saw &quot;virtually no response,&quot; demonstrating Israel&apos;s ability to &quot;strike their enemies with virtual impunity and with virtually no capacity for them to strike back effectively,&quot; says Ian Bremmer. This has politically bolstered Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from being blamed for the Oct. 7 attacks to gaining more popularity.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcwbrcch3z07myj1ydvql1" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcwbrcch3z07myj1ydvql1" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:&nbsp;</strong>A quick take to kick off your week. We are talking about the Middle East and the significant escalation in Lebanon primarily that has so far culminated with the assassination of <strong>Hassan Nasrallah</strong>, the leader of Hezbollah, and most of Hezbollah's senior leadership, with virtually no response by Hezbollah against Israel. Lots of things to think about here.</p><p>First is the fact that Israel's asymmetric military and intelligence capabilities really matter. For a long time, people have talked about the potential of existential threats against Israel. It certainly does not appear that way today, and in fact, it shows just how asleep at the switch the Israeli defense forces and more important leadership were back on October 7th in terms of border security, in terms of ignoring intelligence, in terms of most of the IDF being redeployed to the West Bank as opposed to Gaza, that allowed Hamas to pull off this spectacular and horrific terrorist attack against the Israeli citizens, killing over 1,000.</p><p>In today's environment, the ability of the Israel military to strike their enemies with virtual impunity, and with virtually no capacity for them to strike back effectively against Israel, is what's really dramatic here, and that's led to a few things in the region. First, it's led to the ability of Prime Minister Netanyahu to gain a lot of popularity. He was blamed for the October 7th attacks, for them happening on his watch, for him not being capable of defending Israel back then. Today, it's a very different story. It's being able to destroy Hamas, irrespective of the civilian consequences for the Palestinians there, it's his ability to take on and decapitate Hezbollah and Israel post-October 7th has taken virtually no hits as a consequence. That's led Netanyahu's former adversary, political opponent, Gideon Sa'ar, former Minister of Defense, to join Netanyahu's government, join his cabinet and their New Hope Party.<br></p><p>It means that if there were new elections today, a good chance... There's always a of coalition formation because it's a very fragmented political party system, but much easier to imagine that Israel's Prime Minister would be able to win a new election today, as opposed to the absolute thumping he would've taken over the course of the last year. It's a very different environment, and the fact is that the Israeli population supports these wars, and I say that really across almost the entire political spectrum. They support the war in Gaza, they support the attacks against Hezbollah, they support getting their citizens back into their homes in the north, there's some 60,000 that have been evacuated, and they do not support a two-state solution for the Palestinians, virtually none of them.<br></p><p>That is, of course, very, very different from pretty much everyone else in the world who does support territorial integrity and self-determination for the Palestinians, but they don't have the ability or the willingness to make that happen, and certainly none of Israel's friends are prepared to truly cut off Israel. We've seen the Brits stop with a few of the weapons systems, we've seen some targeted sanctions, tiny, from the Europeans and the Americans against Israel. But the military aid, the weapons sales, the trade, that all continues as it has. And by the way, that's also true in terms of the Abraham Accords, the Gulf states that have been working with the Israelis and others in the Arab world, they're very unhappy about what's happening on the ground in the Middle East, but they're also not prepared to change their relationship with Israel.<br></p><p>So where else does this go? Does this mean all-out war with Hezbollah? I don't think so, and I say I don't think so because I don't think Hezbollah has that capability. They do have men that are far better trained than Hamas; they have about 10 times the numbers of missiles and delivery systems than Hamas ever had, though a lot of them have been destroyed clearly, and certainly their leadership is gone. But even if they were to launch everything they had against Israel, it's hard to see them doing much damage. They could kill some Israelis, no question, but probably not that many, and they certainly couldn't do any real damage to the Israeli defense forces or the Israeli government. Meanwhile, Hezbollah would be utterly destroyed and the Lebanese economy would be in shambles. So it's hard to imagine any Hezbollah leadership, even a more hardline, hard as that is to imagine, leader of Hezbollah than Nasrallah taking those steps against Israel.<br></p><p>That then leads the bigger question, which is, okay, so the Axis of Resistance has been engaging in attacks, Red Sea, we'll see more of that from the Houthis, potshots at Americans, British military in the region, not very effective, some missiles against Israel, not very effective. What about Iran, might the Iranians do anything. Answer here, no. I spent an hour last week with the Iranian Vice President, Javad Zarif, and he made it very clear that his country, his government, is not going to fall into the, as he called it, Israeli trap, that they want nothing more than Iran to engage in what would be ineffective strikes against Israel that would bring the Americans into the war against Iran, that they are not going to take that bait.<br></p><p>And you'll remember, lest you think this is just propaganda, that back in the Trump administration when Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Iranian defense forces, was assassinated, so not so different than Israel taking out Hassan Nasrallah, the Iranian response was virtually nothing. Rhetoric, but no efforts to go after the Americans because they just didn't have the capabilities, and that's what we're seeing with the Iranians vis-a-vis Israel today. Now, the bigger question is whether Bibi Netanyahu, on a roll in the region, decides that he's going to go after Iran directly, and there, I think it's a question of their capabilities. The bunker that Nasrallah was in was comparatively easy to hit when you had intelligence that he was there. Yes, bunker-buster bombs, but limited and available to the Israelis.<br></p><p>The incredibly deep underground nuclear program, for example, at Fordow of Iran, under meters and meters of granite reinforced, the Americans are the only ones with the clear capabilities to destroy that. Israel could clearly set back Iran's program, but those kind of strikes would likely only redouble the efforts of the Iranians to build a full nuclear weapons capability, and a glancing blow by Israel, that would antagonize the United States and others and potentially lead to blow-back that Israel hasn't had to face so far, but might, that they wouldn't like; that's a risk that I think is greater than Israel would want to take, especially for not destroying the Iranian nuclear program, but only a limited amount of damage.<br></p><p>So I think you'd still see espionage, you'll still see sabotage, you'll still see willingness for the Israelis to go after members of the IRGC that they find in Syria, Iraq, other places, absolutely. But direct strikes on Iran, specifically the nuclear program, which is the target that the Israelis are most interested in, that seems like a bigger stretch to me. Not impossible, more likely today than it was a week ago, but still, I think that the escalation that we have been seeing in the war in the Middle East may be close to having played itself out now, simply because Israeli military capabilities are so much greater than that of their adversaries, and their ability to now focus on defense and security makes it more challenging for them to do anything, their enemies to do anything against them.</p><p>So anyway, that's where we are right now. I hope everyone's doing well, and I'll talk to you all real soon.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Palestine and Lebanon’s leaders address UNGA ahead of Netanyahu’s arrival</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/palestine-and-lebanons-leaders-address-unga-ahead-of-netanyahus-arrival</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfvzg4k7id07myma25ad3i</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 27 Sep 2024 00:35:32 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Riley Callanan</dc:creator>
<category>mahmoud abbas</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>benjamin netanyahu</category>
<category>lebanon</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>unga</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>palestine</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>Mahmoud Abbas and Abdallah Bouhabib demand cease-fires in Gaza and Lebanon ahead of Friday&apos;s UNGA address by Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcw4wbd5dk07lqfl8ydgap" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1143" height="672">
<media:credit>REUTERS/Shannon Stapleton</media:credit>
<media:text>A representation of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as Pro-Palestinian protesters rally against Israel&apos;s strikes in Gaza and Lebanon during demonstrations in New York City, on Sept. 26, 2024.</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcw4wbd5dk07lqfl8ydgap" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>UNITED NATIONS – When <strong>Mahmoud Abbas</strong>, the Palestinian Authority leader, addressed the United Nations General Assembly on Thursday, he began, “We will not leave. Palestine is our homeland. If anyone were to leave, it would be the occupier.” He called on the international community to stop sending weapons to Israel — which he accused of “launching wars of genocide” in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon — and instead implement sanctions.</p><p>Abbas then laid out a 12-point policy for what is needed “immediately and on day one after the war ends.” The plan included a permanent cease-fire in Gaza, an end to the “military aggression by settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem,” humanitarian aid, and the return of displaced peoples. He called for Palestine to be given full membership to the UN, and disparaged the <a target="_blank" href="https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-vote-delivered-at-the-un-general-assembly-emergency-special-session-on-the-palestinian-un-membership-resolution/#:~:text=This%20General%20Assembly%20resolution%20was,seek%20to%20advance%20it%20meaningfully.">US</a> for being “the only member in the Security Council that voted against granting the state of Palestine full membership.”<br></p><p>Later that evening, Lebanon’s Minister for Foreign Affairs <strong>Abdallah Bouhabib&nbsp;</strong>called on Israel to adopt an immediate cease-fire and halt its strikes within Lebanese borders, noting that the cause of the current conflict was Israel's ongoing occupation. "The shortest path for the return [of displaced Israelis in the North]," he said, "is a comprehensive, immediate cease-fire as stipulated in the US-Franco declaration yesterday ... as part of a comprehensive framework accompanied by clear international guarantees, transparency, and a definitive end to land, sea, and air incursions and breaches of Lebanese sovereignty."</p><p>Both speeches came as the US, France, and several Arab nations tried to use the tail end of the UN General Assembly to broker a temporary Israel to agree to a cease-fire with Lebanon.</p><p>Meanwhile, protesters began marching outside the UN security perimeter on Thursday in anticipation of Friday's appearance at UNGA by Prime Minister <strong>Benjamin Netanyahu</strong>, who has instructed his military to keep fighting “with full force” in Lebanon. Netanyahu said on Thursday that "we will not stop until we achieve our goals, first and foremost returning the residents of the north safely to their homes."</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Is all hope lost for a cease-fire in Gaza?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/watching/is-all-hope-lost-for-a-cease-fire-in-gaza</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrft7sskqsq07lq2ayghm2u</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 01 Aug 2024 22:40:32 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Tracy Moran</dc:creator>
<category>politics</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>iran</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>hamas</category>
<category>gaza</category>
<category>hezbollah</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>What We&apos;re Watching</category>
<description>Strikes that killed a Hezbollah commander in Beirut and a Hamas leader in Tehran this week threaten to undermine months of US efforts to secure a truce in Gaza and prevent a wider conflict in the Middle East.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcr6wlczbn07lq557ig23h" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1200" height="675">
<media:credit>REUTERS/Amir Cohen</media:credit>
<media:text>A tank manoeuvres on the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Israel, August 1, 2024.</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcr6wlczbn07lq557ig23h" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Strikes that killed a Hezbollah commander in Beirut and a <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/watching/iran-vows-revenge-for-assassination-of-hamas-leader-in-tehran"><u>Hamas leader in Tehran</u></a> this week threaten to undermine months of US efforts to secure a truce in Gaza and prevent a wider conflict in the Middle East. The strike in Tehran killed Hamas’ political leader and chief negotiator, <strong>Ismail Haniyeh</strong>, who was considered relatively moderate compared to some of the more hard-line, radical figures in the militant group.</p><p>Israel has not explicitly claimed responsibility for killing Haniyeh, but Iran blames the Jewish state, and Prime Minister <strong>Benjamin Netanyahu</strong> on Wednesday boasted that <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/31/world/video/netanyahu-israel-enemies-crushing-blows-sot-digvid"><u>“crushing blows”</u></a> were dealt to Israel’s enemies this week.</p><p>Iranian officials <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranians-mourn-hamas-leader-haniyehs-assassination-2024-08-01/"><u>met with regional allies</u></a> on Thursday to discuss how to retaliate, and the region is bracing for what comes next. US officials expect Iranian retaliation in the next few days and are reportedly <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.axios.com/2024/08/01/us-iran-israel-attack-preparation"><u>making preparations</u></a> as they did in April when Iran launched a drone and missile attack against Israel in retaliation for Israel’s strike against the Iranian Consulate in Syria.</p><p>US Defense Secretary <strong>Lloyd Austin</strong> warned that if Israel is attacked, the US will defend it. “You saw us do that in April; you can expect to see us do that again,” he said. But the White House is less certain it can drum up the same level of allied support it did in April when Arab nations like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan helped defend Israel. Further escalation by Israel against Iran put that support at risk.</p><p><strong>Where do the cease-fire talks stand?</strong> “These two strikes will put these talks on hold, though not necessarily upend them,” says <strong>Randa Slim</strong>, a senior fellow and director of conflict resolution at the Middle East Institute.</p><p><strong>Aaron David Miller</strong>, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former US diplomat who advised multiple administrations on the Middle East, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/aarondmiller2/status/1818634001646498240"><u>tweeted</u></a> that it’s “too early to predict” the impact of the Haniyeh strike on a Gaza deal, but added that “common sense might suggest” his killing reduces the chances of reaching one. The talks are now in a “deep freeze,” Miller <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/aarondmiller2/status/1818584364545937867"><u>tweeted</u></a>, adding that a regional war is “not inevitable,” but the “odds have gone up.”</p><p>Efforts to secure a cease-fire in Gaza already faced serious hurdles before this week’s strikes, including Hamas demanding a guarantee of an end to the war and Netanyahu’s vow that the fighting won’t end until Hamas is destroyed — though even the Israeli military has <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/20/middleeast/hagari-netanyahu-destroy-hamas-israel-intl/index.html#:~:text=World%20/%20Middle%20East-,Israeli%20military%20official%20says%20Hamas%20cannot%20be,as%20rift%20with%20Netanyahu%20widens&amp;text=Israeli%20military%20spokesman%20Rear%20Adm,war%20aims%20can%20be%20achieved."><u>expressed doubts</u></a> about whether that objective can be achieved.</p><p>Meanwhile, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-07-31/ty-article/.premium/haniyehs-killing-raises-concern-among-hostages-families-over-impact-to-cease-fire-deal/00000191-0735-dd56-a9f5-6f77efef0000?lts=1722536116099"><u>family members of hostages</u></a> in Gaza are concerned that killing Haniyeh could put their relatives in greater danger. They accused Netanyahu of prioritizing political concerns over a deal.</p><p>US Secretary of State <strong>Antony Blinken</strong> on Thursday <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/blinken-calls-on-all-parties-to-stop-escalatory-actions-reach-ceasefire-in-gaza/#:~:text=US%20Secretary%20of%20State%20Antony%20Blinken%20on%20Thursday%20urged%20%E2%80%9Call,and%20Iran%20and%20its%20proxies."><u>urged</u></a> “all parties to talk, to stop taking any escalatory action,” and pave the way for an agreement and cease-fire. We’ll be watching to see if the US has any success in lowering the temperature in the region.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Palestine’s UN ambassador asks the US to be ‘courageous’ and push for a cease-fire</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-clips/palestines-un-ambassador-asks-the-us-to-be-courageous-and-push-for-a-cease-fire</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfrx9yjuxr07mymtz2u18s</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 10 Jul 2024 13:58:11 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>two-state solution</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>us israel relations</category>
<category>riyad mansour</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>gaza</category>
<category>ceasefire</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>GZERO World Highlights</category>
<description>Palestinian Ambassador to the UN Riyad Mansour discusses the United States’ role in brokering a peace deal in the Israel-Hamas war role and warns against justifying the &apos;logic of extremists&apos; on either side of the conflict.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcoy00cvsf07lq96simsfx" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>Palestine’s UN Ambassador asks the US to be ‘courageous’ and push for a cease-fire | GZERO World</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcoy00cvsf07lq96simsfx" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What will it take to end the stalemate between Israel and Hamas and actually achieve a lasting cease-fire in Gaza? On GZERO World with <strong>Ian Bremmer</strong>, <strong>Riyad Mansour</strong>, Palestine’s ambassador to the United Nations, says the answer ultimately comes down to the country with the most influence over Israel, states in the Middle East, and the UN General Assembly: the United States.</p><p>Given that the recent US-backed cease-fire proposal has stalled in negotiations, Bremmer pushed Ambassador Mansour on what needs to happen to make meaningful progress and whether either side has enough incentive to agree to a peace deal, as both appear to benefit politically from the conflict. Mansour argues the US is still influential enough to force both sides to the table, that public sentiment is overwhelmingly on the side of peace, and warns of the danger of descending the "logic of extremists" who benefit politically from the conflict continuing.</p><p>“The US is capable of being an honest broker, they need to be decisive, they need to be fair, they need to listen to the sentiment of the American people and almost everyone at the United Nations,” Mansour stresses, “There is something in the air. People want justice for the Palestinians.”</p><h5>Season 7 of <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, launches nationwide on public television stations beginning Friday, July 5 (check local listings).</h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don''t miss an episode: </strong><a target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>A Palestinian perspective on the Gaza war</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/palestinian-perspective-gaza-war</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfrs2ejui707my1cwzpbh7</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 08 Jul 2024 10:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>palestine</category>
<category>benjamin netanyahu</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>us israel relations</category>
<category>riyad mansour</category>
<category>israel-palestinian conflict</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>two-state solution</category>
<category>GZERO World with Ian Bremmer</category>
<description>On the season premiere of GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, Palestinian Ambassador to the UN Riyad Mansour discusses the Gaza war, the role of the US in achieving a ceasefire and a two-state solution, and the future governance of Gaza, with or without Hamas.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcooh6cvaq07lq1ifmw98n" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcooh6cvaq07lq1ifmw98n" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With nearly 40,000 Palestinians and over 1,000 Israelis dead, the war in Gaza is still far from over. But one day, it will end. And then what? On the season premiere of GZERO World,<strong> Ian Bremmer</strong> sits down with Palestinian-American diplomat <strong>Riyad Mansour</strong> to discuss the Gaza war and how it might end. Mansour serves as the Palestinian ambassador to the United Nations and was appointed to his role by Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Palestinian Authority, which governs the West Bank in partnership with Israel but has no jurisdiction, for now at least, over Gaza.</p><p>In a wide-ranging and candid interview, Mansour emphasizes the need for justice and an end to the occupation for both Israelis and Palestinians. He discusses the role of the United States in facilitating a ceasefire and a two-state solution and highlights the growing international support for the Palestinian cause. "There is something in the air,” Mansour tells Bremmer. “People want justice for the Palestinians. People want this war and this conflict to end. People want the occupation to end because it's good for Israel and it's good for the Palestinians."</p><p>Perhaps the most contentious part of the interview has to do with Hamas, an organization that Mansour takes pains to distance himself from without condemning it outright. Mansour laments the killing of innocent civilians and calls for the release of hostages and prisoners on both sides. “Innocent people, innocent civilians, should not be exposed to any harm. This is international law."</p><p>He also touches on Gaza's future governance and Hamas’ problematic role in those talks, stating that negotiations are ongoing and that progress can be made through diplomatic efforts. “Now for us, internally, we need to put our house in order with all political groups,” Mansour says, implying that Hamas’ role in Gaza’s future is far from certain.</p><h5>Season 7 of <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, began nationwide on public television stations beginning Friday, July 5 (check local listings).</h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don''t miss an episode: </strong><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>UN Palestinian Ambassador Riyad Mansour urges Palestinian statehood as a path to peace</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-clips/un-palestinian-ambassador-riyad-mansour-urges-palestinian-statehood-as-a-path-to-peace</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfrpduklnh07lqlhyoun3s</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jul 2024 16:29:34 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>palestine</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>riyad mansour</category>
<category>israel-palestinian conflict</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>two-state solution</category>
<category>GZERO World Highlights</category>
<description>Palestine&apos;s Permanent Observer to the UN Riyad Mansour discusses the need for a two-state solution with Israel and Palestine to achieve lasting peace in the Middle East and the growing global support for Palestinian statehood in the United Nations.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcoja5cv3y07lq67pwrdp1" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>UN Palestinian Ambassador Riyad Mansour urges Palestinian statehood as a path to peace | GZERO World</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcoja5cv3y07lq67pwrdp1" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On the season premiere of GZERO World's seventh season, <strong>Ian Bremmer</strong> sat down with Palestine's Permanent Observer to the UN <strong>Riyad Mansour</strong> to discuss the challenges of representing Palestinians at the United Nations, given the fact that Palestine is not recognized as a voting member. Mansour says the idea of Palestinian statehood being a security issue for Israel doesn’t make sense. He points out that Israel has fought Palestine for decades with tanks, soldiers, and weapons, which ultimately failed. What hasn’t been tried, he argues, is fully committing to a two-state solution and trying good-faith diplomacy instead of military force.</p><p>As Palestine’s Permanent Observer, Mansour also has to navigate the delicate balance between political forces in Gaza and the West Bank. He was appointed by Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, which governs parts of the West Bank and is separate from Hamas, which governs Gaza. But the ambassador insists he represents all Palestinian people, not a political platform or party. He says he supports the release of all the Israeli hostages held by Hamas, condemns the killing of innocent people, and questions whether his counterparts on the other side of the conflict could say the same.</p><p>“Judge me by my conduct at the United Nations and judge the other side by their conduct,” Mansour argued, “When we have 149 states recognizing the state of Palestine and the representative of the state of Israel, cursing everyone, accusing them of being anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic, what should you believe? My rhetoric or his rhetoric or the judgment of the jury of our colleagues who are from all corners of the globe?”</p><h5>Season 7 of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, launches nationwide on public television stations beginning Friday, July 5 (check local listings).</h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don''t miss an episode: </strong><a target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Iran’s attack on Israel, explained</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/by-ian-bremmer/irans-attack-on-israel-explained</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfnwnak95b07lqniv0um7z</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 17 Apr 2024 16:51:52 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>israel</category>
<category>iran</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>by ian bremmer</category>
<description>On April 13, Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles from its own territory in its first-ever direct, attributable attack against Israel, thrusting the long-simmering shadow war between the two regional foes into the light.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcie71cka207lq1pv46a2t" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1200" height="675">
<media:credit>Jess Frampton</media:credit>
<media:text>Leaders of Israel and Iran in front of fighter jets.</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcie71cka207lq1pv46a2t" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On April 13, Iran <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/watching/iran-launches-ballistic-missiles-at-israel-in-revenge-attack">launched</a> hundreds of drones and missiles from its own territory in its first-ever direct, attributable attack against Israel, thrusting the long-simmering shadow war between the two regional foes into the light.<br></p><p>This show of force reflects a dramatic shift in strategy from Tehran, which had previously relied exclusively on its proxies to target Israel. The inflection point was Israel’s bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1, which killed the senior-most Iranian military leader in Syria and was compared to an attack “on Iranian soil” – a bright red line for the Islamic Republic. So from Iran’s perspective, it was Israel that crossed the rubicon first. Last weekend’s attack was a proportional response in that view – and a measured one at that.</p><p>Does that hold up? What comes next? And what does it all mean?</p><h3>Iran’s not-so-escalatory escalation</h3><p>On one hand, last weekend’s attack was dangerous and provocative, posing the first serious external threat to Israel’s security since Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles at the Jewish state in 1991 and heightening the deep sense of existential insecurity Israelis have felt since Oct. 7. Had any sensitive military targets been hit or Israelis killed, we would now be looking at direct war between Iran and Israel, likely also involving the United States. Not World War III, but a major regional war.</p><p>On the other hand, the fact that we aren’t currently in that scenario means that the attack could have been a heck of a lot worse. That it wasn’t was mostly by design (the other bit was luck): Iran telegraphed its attack well in advance both publicly and through backchannels with several regional powers to minimize the damage and prevent an escalatory response. The heads-up given to the United States via Iraq and Turkey – and the use of low-altitude, slow-moving drones that could be seen coming from literally 1,000 miles away – allowed Israel and its partners ample time to pre-position their military assets and intercept nearly all Iranian projectiles (as well as get Israeli citizens into bomb shelters, out of harm’s way). As a result, of the roughly 170 drones, 120 ballistic missiles, and 30 cruise missiles that Iran launched, 99% were shot down, most before they could reach Israeli airspace. All of them were aimed at military rather than civilian targets.</p><p>The advance notice, as well as the choice of targets and weaponry, suggest that Iran deliberately calibrated the strike to limit casualties and keep a lid on potential retaliation. That’s why Iran refrained from using Hezbollah and attacking US forces throughout the region. It’s also why it announced that no further (direct) attacks would be forthcoming and it considered the matter closed as long as the Israelis took it on the chin.</p><p>Incidentally, this is exactly the same playbook the US used to respond to the Iranian proxy attacks that killed three American servicemembers in Jordan at the end of January. The Biden administration didn’t want to start a shooting war with Iran (for obvious reasons), so they waited four days to hit back and gave a heads-up to Tehran via Iraq so the Iranians could get their forces out of the area, while cautioning them that next time there would be direct consequences and no such forewarning.</p><p>In both cases, if the US and Iran had wanted to seriously escalate, they could have. But the goal wasn’t to escalate – it was to reset the bar on deterrence and relieve domestic pressure in response to a provocation while preventing damage that would bring the conflict into a wide-scale regional war.</p><p>None of this means that this was an easy balance for Tehran to strike (no pun intended) in practice. Despite all the calibration and telegraphing that went into the attack, it was still a risky gamble, with lots of room for accidents and miscalculation. Some drones or missiles could have evaded defenses and found their targets. Israeli soldiers or civilians could have died. The US would have treated a successful Iranian strike on Israeli soil as an attack on itself and responded accordingly. The risk of a shooting war with America was not zero, and the Iranians were willing to live with that.</p><h3>What will Israel do next?</h3><p>The ball is now in Israel’s court. Israel needs to respond somehow to signal that this type of attack won’t be tolerated in the future, but it is up to war cabinet members Prime Minister <strong>Benjamin Netanyahu</strong>, Defense Minister <strong>Yoav Gallant</strong>, and opposition leader <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/watching/gantz-effectively-abandons-bibi"><strong>Benny Gantz</strong></a> to decide exactly when, where, and how to strike back, weighing the benefits of retaliation against the risk of provoking further escalation and alienating Israel’s allies.</p><p>Domestic views are currently split between revenge and restraint. The far right is pushing for a strong, immediate, and direct strike on Iranian soil that would likely require US cooperation but that Washington wants nothing to do with, as it would compel Tehran to counterattack and dramatically expand the conflict. Netanyahu wouldn’t mind a war with Iran that draws the US in and extends his time in office, but Gantz and Gallant prefer a more calibrated and strategic response that the US can get behind – one that allows Israel to build a strong anti-Iran alliance and maintain robust US defense support without precipitating a regionwide conflict.</p><p>For its part, the Biden administration is working overtime to persuade the Israeli government to opt for a more muted response. Here, the critical role the US played in helping Israel counter the Iranian attack will probably give it enough leverage to succeed where it has previously failed in Gaza.</p><p>My bet is that the Israelis will give in to US influence, take the win, and refrain from an escalatory response at this time – meaning no major direct strikes on Iranian territory (for now at least). Of course, that doesn’t mean they’ll sit on their hands. At a minimum, they will hit Iranian proxies and Iranian assets outside Iran. They might even carry out covert and non-kinetic attacks within Iran, such as cyber or sabotage, on an opportunistic basis. These are the kinds of responses that Tehran will be willing to absorb without derailing the current de-escalatory path.</p><p>The danger: I could be wrong and the Israelis could overreact as they have consistently since Oct. 7, choosing to directly and overtly strike the Iranian homeland or take out high-value IRGC targets against America’s advice and their own best interests. Such actions would likely cross the Islamic Republic’s red lines and trigger an immediate escalatory response that could quickly spiral into a major war.</p><h3>What it means</h3><p>Even assuming cooler heads prevail in Jerusalem and Iran-Israel tensions stay in a de-escalatory phase, last weekend’s attack will have long-lasting implications.</p><p>First, Netanyahu’s domestic standing has improved on the back of Israel’s successful defense against an unprecedented Iranian threat in a united front with the US and other allies. This increases the embattled prime minister’s political breathing room and will prolong his time in office. Classic Bibi.</p><p>Second, the attack has <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/watching/war-in-gaza-rages-on-as-all-eyes-turn-to-israel-iran-tensions">pushed the war in Gaza</a> off the front pages, as international focus has shifted toward averting regional war and away from the humanitarian crisis in the Strip. As a result, there is less pressure for Israel to compromise with Hamas on a cease-fire deal. At the same time, an Israeli ground operation in Rafah has become more likely, as the Biden administration is now principally focused on getting Israel to limit its escalation against Iran. The biggest losers, as always, will be Palestinian civilians.</p><p>Third, the attack is a political liability for US President<strong> Joe Biden</strong>, who will pay the price for any further escalation of the conflict but now lacks domestic political space to publicly criticize Israel’s actions and can only offer “ironclad” support going forward. Biden’s best hope going into the November election is to dissuade Netanyahu from expanding the conflict, lest he be blamed for presiding over yet another major war. But if he pushes too far in trying to constrain Israel, he’ll be blamed for abandoning a key US ally most voters still support (despite Gaza). Damned if he does, <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/watching/biden-puts-bibi-on-notice">damned</a> if he doesn’t.</p><p>Finally, Israeli and Iranian deterrence has eroded as both sides have crossed each other’s red lines, dropped long-standing strategic restraint policies, and raised the threshold for future responses. Iran has no plans to stop supporting its proxies in the region, and Israel has no plans to stop targeting said proxies (including Hamas in Gaza). So while Israel and Iran may have narrowly avoided major war over the weekend, the likelihood that further tit-for-tat strikes spiral into a broader regional war is increasing. The longer-term trajectory of this conflict is still expansionary. Sorry about that.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Is the global economy finally on the right track?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/is-the-global-economy-finally-on-the-right-track</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfmbe8k46c07lqvz8vnx48</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 18 Mar 2024 10:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>us economy</category>
<category>global economy</category>
<category>dambisa moyo</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>covid-19</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>economic recovery</category>
<category>china economy</category>
<category>us election</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>inflation</category>
<category>economy</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>trade</category>
<category>GZERO World with Ian Bremmer</category>
<description>How’s the global economy doing… really? When it comes to the world’s post-Covid recovery, it’s a tale of two economies: the United States and everyone else. On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer sits down with economist and author Dambisa Moyo for a hard look at the health of the world’s finances and the impact of geopolitical crises in Europe and the Middle East on trade flows and inflation.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcfupobqxh07myk1oga2kv" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>Is the global economy finally on the right track? | GZERO World with Ian Bremmer</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcfupobqxh07myk1oga2kv" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>How’s the global economy doing… really? When it comes to the world’s post-COVID recovery, it’s a tale of two economies: the United States and everyone else. On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer sits down with economist and author Dambisa Moyo for a hard look at the health of the world’s finances and the impact of geopolitical crises in Europe and the Middle East on trade flows and inflation.</p><p>Right now, US indicators are strong, but Germany and the UK are slipping into mild recessions, and China’s collapsing real estate sector, local government debt, and exodus of foreign investment is dragging the world’s second-largest economy into stagnation. Not to mention, Global South countries are holding record amounts of debt. So what does it all mean moving forward? Is the global economy still shaking off its post-Covid hangover or are some of these problems more entrenched?</p><p>“We need to be growing at 3% per year in order to double per capita incomes in a generation which is 25 years,” Moyo says, “Most of the global south is growing below that number, materially.”</p><p>Ian Bremmer and Dambisa Moyo unpack the confusing state of the global economy, China’s economic woes, and where they see the biggest potential for growth in developing economies during the next decade.</p><h5></h5><h5></h5><h5>Catch <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer</a> every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.</h5>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Munich Security Conference 2024: What to expect</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/munich-security-conference-2024-what-to-expect</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfkpuujyhr07lq9lwumm8u</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Feb 2024 18:43:40 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>us election</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>us politics</category>
<category>defense spending</category>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>immigration</category>
<category>munich security conference</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>2024 presidential election</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<description>Ian Bremmer&apos;s Quick Take: It&apos;s that time of year, yet again. The 60th Munich Security Conference. And you would think that that would be like a big anniversary. It&apos;s like platinum or diamonds or something very valuable and exciting. And yet the value of the conference is becoming undermined. And it&apos;s becoming undermined not because it doesn&apos;t matter, but rather because leaders are less committed to it.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcdbw0bjgs07myewrx55pp" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>Munich Security Conference 2024: What to expect | Ian Bremmer | Quick Take</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcdbw0bjgs07myewrx55pp" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:</strong> Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here. It is the Munich Security Conference. It's that time of year, yet again, the 60th Munich Security Conference this year. And you would think that that would be like a big anniversary. It's like platinum or diamonds or something very valuable and exciting. And yet the value of the conference is becoming undermined. And it's becoming undermined not because it doesn't matter, but rather because leaders are less committed to it.</p><p>And that is a very deep concern. There's no annual theme to this year's conference, but every year they do put out an annual report. Came out a couple of days ago, and the theme this year was “lose-lose” dynamics. In other words, less focus on multilateralism, less focus on collective security, less focus on global cooperation and instead a prioritization of individual gain of countries and even of leaders. And that's not a great backdrop against a incredibly contentious US election, a war between Russia-Ukraine that isn't going very well, certainly not from the perspective of those that are attending the security conference and also a Middle East war that is expanding and threatens to get the Europeans and the Americans more and more involved. A couple of things that are worth paying attention to that may not be getting as much attention outside Germany.</p><p>One is that Christoph Heusgen, the chair of the conference and a good friend of mine for many years now, has come out saying that Trump has a point in terms of his strong criticism of NATO nations not meeting their 2% defense goal. And that, of course, especially means Germany, which is the largest economy in Europe. And they've made lots of commitments, but they've got an economic crisis right now, and there are lots of competing demands inside that country that don't focus on security and defense after all. Germany, not a frontline country dealing with Ukraine or Russia a little bit farther back. And you can really see defense spending fall off the farther you get from Russia, unless, of course, you're talking about the United States.</p><p>Another thing that's worth paying attention to and it's going to make it a little harder. Germany last year perceived Russia as their number one security threat.This year, Russia's fallen to number seven. Top issues for the Germans, mass migration and radical Islamic terrorism. That is the Munich Security index that they, you know, sort of take surveys of attendees and of participants. And it's very interesting to see that. That's similar to the view that I got at Davos a few weeks ago. And just talking to people around the world outside of these conferences, Ukraine is nowhere close to the level of prioritization these days, even for countries that are pretty close to it, that it was getting 6 months ago, 12 months ago, 24 months ago, and that, of course, is also a very big problem for the Ukrainians, a very big problem for the frontline states like the Estonians and the Poles and the Nordics, who consider this their top priority but having a harder time telling others that that's what really matters. So those are some of the issues we're looking forward to discussing and you'll be hearing from us again real soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>US-Iran tensions complicate Biden&apos;s Middle East strategy</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/us-iran-tensions-complicate-bidens-middle-east-strategy</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfk7jwjwp907lqkwg7xz2v</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 05 Feb 2024 22:10:03 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>hamas</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>gaza</category>
<category>us-iran relations</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>iran</category>
<category>drone attacks</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>military</category>
<description>Ian Bremmer&apos;s Quick Take: We are still very much focused on the Middle East. That is the top priority. Tony Blinken, Secretary of State, for his fifth trip to the Gulf since October 7th, those horrible terrorist attacks, Ukraine very far down the priority list compared to the engagement the Middle East is presently getting. It certainly feels that way. But that&apos;s what we&apos;re focusing on.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcch4jc79w07lqrs3rr9t9" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>US-Iran tensions complicate Biden&apos;s Middle East strategy | Ian Bremmer | Quick Take</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcch4jc79w07lqrs3rr9t9" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:&nbsp;</strong>Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week. We are still very much focused on the Middle East. That is the top priority. Tony Blinken, Secretary of State, for his fifth trip to the Gulf since October 7th, those horrible terrorist attacks, Ukraine very far down the priority list compared to the engagement the Middle East is presently getting. It certainly feels that way. But that's what we're focusing on.</p><p>And the big issue is the American military response to that nightmare scenario that came to pass when US servicemen and women, dozens injured, three killed in Iranian proxy attacks on the Jordan-Syria border. The United States had to respond militarily, did respond militarily, but they also did not want to precipitate an Iranian war with the United States. So they tried to have their way on both sides of the equation and probably end up getting nothing that they want. What do I mean by that? Well, the United States did attack direct Iranian military assets, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps military capabilities on the ground in Syria and Iraq, but also telegraphed that very clearly, very publicly, for about five days before they started the attacks, which meant that proxy leaders and most importantly, Iranian leaders were able to get out of Dodge and potentially protect the most sensitive equipment information from those US strikes.</p><p>That meant that the Americans got to show that they would take significant military action, but also did not precipitate an Iranian military response. We aren't going to see war right now between the US and Iran, but we also aren't going to see deterrence by the Iranian proxies or by the Iranians in continuing to engage in strikes in civilian tanker traffic through the Red Sea or against Americans on the ground in the region.</p><p>Now, if it doesn't resolve any of that conflict that continues to get worse, what does it resolve? Well, it continues to give the Americans a little bit of time, maybe to get a temporary cease-fire in Gaza. That's really where the effort is right now, particularly being engaged with Qatar in coordinating with the Israelis and with Hamas. The hope is that in the next week or two, you get a month of committed cease-fire from the Israelis and you get large numbers of remaining hostages being held by Hamas released to Israel.</p><p>Now, Prime Minister Netanyahu and the war cabinet are nowhere close to succeeding in their war on the ground against Hamas. And that means they have months minimum before they're willing to think about wrapping up that conflict, irrespective of all the international pressure. So what does a month accomplish? While the hope is that a month accomplishes movement towards a Saudi-Israel peace deal where the Americans would proactively recognize a Palestinian state together with the UK and others. The Israeli war cabinet would outline the potential for such a political recognition while security would be provided by somebody else. Don't have to have your own security forces to have your own state, and nobody says that's a requirement. Would it be provided by the Israelis? Well, that wouldn't be acceptable, though. They could have a buffer zone perhaps, would need to be worked out with the Gulf allies, with Egypt, with Jordan. Can that be done in a month? In terms of sticking the landing, that's about the highest degree of difficulty you'd see in gymnastics. And certainly I would take the under in terms of expectations of a peace deal here.</p><p>But does Biden feel like he has any better alternatives at this point? And the answer to that is no. Meanwhile, he's being squeezed by the Republicans at home who are pushing for more aid for Israel, not linked to anything. And he's getting squeezed by the progressives that are his own Democratic supporters that are more aligned towards the Palestinians than they are Israel. This is feeling like a no win situation for Biden. And so if he can get a cease-fire and get a few weeks, engage diplomatically, see what shakes loose. Still at the end of the day, there are far more actors around this war, both in Gaza and also more broadly in the Middle East, that are interested in finding ways not to have a lasting cease fire than to see a peace agreement work out. That's true certainly for Hamas. It's true certainly for Netanyahu. It's also true for the Iranian government and the so-called axis of resistance.</p><p>And for all of those reasons, I fear that we are still heading for further escalation as opposed to a window that would end this war. Really tough for Biden in an election year, really tough for those in the Middle East living with this at any time.</p><p>That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>US-Iran tensions escalate after deadly drone attack</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/us-iran-tensions-escalate-after-deadly-drone-attack</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfjuhsj46b07myhcep820p</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jan 2024 22:35:45 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>hamas</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>gaza</category>
<category>us-iran relations</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>jordan</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>iran</category>
<category>drone attacks</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>military</category>
<description>Ian Bremmer&apos;s Quick Take: The Middle East war continuing to expand as we have been convinced it would. This weekend, really the nightmare scenario for the Americans that given all of the Iranian proxy attacks against shipping and against US troops in the region, that eventually they would get through and kill some. And that is exactly what happened. Three American servicemen killed, dozens injured, and now the Americans have to respond. That response will almost certainly be against Iranian forces to some degree directly.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcbwwac6ni07lqhivix2yj" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>How will the US respond to Iranian proxy attacks? | Ian Bremmer | Quick Take</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcbwwac6ni07lqhivix2yj" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:&nbsp;</strong>Hi everybody, Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week right in midtown Manhattan, New York City. And the Middle East war continuing to expand as we have been convinced it would. This was this weekend, really the nightmare scenario for the Americans that given all of the Iranian proxy attacks against shipping and against US troops in the region, but eventually they would get through and kill some.</p><p>And that is exactly what happened. Three American servicemen killed, dozens injured, and now the Americans have to respond. That response will almost certainly be against Iranian forces to some degree directly. Whether or not that means hitting Iranian territory, that's an open question. But even though the Iranian government denied it, the United States has been very clear, “these are Iran supported attacks.”And while I'm fairly comfortable saying that the Iranians didn't likely order these attacks directly, they're certainly comfortable with the fact that they're going on. They're providing real time intelligence to the groups. They're providing real time weapons to the groups. So it's not like they had nothing to do with it.</p><p>Now, the United States doesn't want war with Iran, you know, no holds barred across the region. The Iranians don't want war with the US. But that doesn't mean war is not going to happen. And we're certainly taking a step closer to that right now. Will American strikes be sufficient to stop Iranian proxies from hitting the United States? That's very hard to imagine. It might be uncomfortable with it, but I can't see the Iranians cutting off all of these groups just on the basis of the likely American strikes that are coming next, which means even though we're escalating, we're still not yet at sort of a place where anyone is panicking enough to start restraining and reining in the continued escalation that we're seeing.</p><p>The other side of this is we do see the United States working very hard with Qatar and the Israelis to try to facilitate a breakthrough on the hostages. And the Israelis are willing to engage in ways that they were not, even a couple of weeks ago, willing to take a deal that would not be as attractive for them. For example, a longer ceasefire in the strikes in Gaza in return for the hostages being released. In part, the Hamas has been unwilling to engage and has been unwilling to give very much. But that could change if the Iranian government now starts pressing them hard. And that is where we could see a bit of a breakthrough, especially if the United States response is serious to what we've just seen over the weekend.</p><p>So are we going to see the Iranians stopping support of the proxies in the region, stopping the attacks? No. But might we see a temporary ceasefire and a breakthrough on the hostage side? That looks more likely to me in the coming days and weeks than it was last week. So, you know, it's dangerous environment. We're continuing to see escalation, but there's certainly lots of moving pieces and not everybody wants to see war.</p><p>That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Playing with fire: Is retaliation the new normal in the Middle East?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/playing-with-fire-is-retaliation-the-new-normal-in-the-middle-east</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfj666jtgq07lqnpz2n1e9</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 16 Jan 2024 22:49:23 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Riley Callanan</dc:creator>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>iran</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>houthis</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>The region was already a tinderbox, and now the adversaries are playing with matches.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcati3bb6r07my6hdet80k" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="5500" height="3353">
<media:credit>REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah</media:credit>
<media:text>Houthi fighters and tribal supporters hold up their firearms during a protest against recent U.S.-led strikes on Houthi targets, near Sanaa, Yemen January 14, 2024.</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcati3bb6r07my6hdet80k" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The region was already a tinderbox, and now the adversaries are playing with matches.</p><p><strong>Tehran takes aim:&nbsp;</strong>Iran launched an unprecedented – and unprovoked – attack on nuclear-armed Pakistan. The missile and drone attack was aimed at Jaish al-Adl, a Sunni militant group operating along Pakistan’s border and marks a massive escalation from Iran’s previous military exchanges with the group as Iran continues to retaliate for the suicide bombing that killed <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/who-will-iran-blame-for-deadly-explosions-near-soleimanis-grave">86</a> people this month at a memorial procession for Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani. Pakistan has vowed that the attacks will have “<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-iraq-militant-bases-attack-05c7530d66fb05dd6f2868527003ba2d">serious consequences</a>.”</p><p>The attack comes the day after Iran launched ballistic missiles into Iraq and Syria with claims it was targeting Israel’s “headquarters of spies” and other places used to plan the bombing. The last two days have been Iran’s most direct show of force since January 2020, when it responded to Washington’s killing of Suleimani with missile strikes on US troops in Iraq. Ten of Monday’s missiles landed near the US consulate in northern Iraq, reflecting the escalatory risk involved with such strikes.</p><p><strong>And don’t forget about Israel:&nbsp;</strong>Palestinian militants on Tuesday fired 25 rockets out of Gaza at the Israeli city of Netivot, which lies about six miles from the Gaza border. Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system generally intercepts rockets, and although there were no casualties, the attack exacerbates fears of Hamas’s enduring threat.</p><p>The attack is being used by <strong>Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu</strong>’s war council as an excuse to backtrack on rhetoric that Israel is shifting to a more targeted campaign in Gaza. But many were already skeptical of this amid escalating attacks in North Gaza. More <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/israel-signals-shift-in-gaza-amid-us-pressure-but-war-presses-on/ar-AA1moHbZ">likely</a>, the announcements and troop withdrawals aimed to bolster the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/01/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-troop-withdrawal.html">economy</a> and placate international criticism – particularly in the US, where <strong>Sen. Bernie Sanders</strong> has called for a <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/bernie-sanders-to-force-vote-on-israel-s-human-rights-practices-in-gaza/ar-AA1n3kKa">Tuesday night vote</a> to require the Biden administration to report on Israel's human rights practices.</p><p>However, <strong>Itamar Ben-Gvir</strong>, Israel’s far-right national security minister, has said that the attack in Netivot “proves that conquering Gaza is essential to realizing the war’s goals,” and that Israelis should prepare for the war to continue for months as support for retaliating for Oct. 7 and rescuing the hostages remains high domestically.</p><p><strong>The rub:&nbsp;</strong>Whether it's Iran, the US, the Houthis, Israel, or Hamas, all sides see their attacks as retaliatory, which could quickly evolve into a cycle of escalation.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Ian Explains: How is America&apos;s &quot;Pivot to Asia&quot; playing out?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/ian-explains/ian-explains-how-is-americas-pivot-to-asia-playing-out</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfhr4sjow607lqoa5b872g</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 08 Dec 2023 19:25:15 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>japan</category>
<category>economy</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>pivot to asia</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>ian explains</category>
<category>israel-palestinian conflict</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<description>Why can&apos;t the US seem to focus on the Asia-Pacific region instead of the Middle East?</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrc8frsb0nl07myzuefqv2j" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>Ian Explains: How is America&apos;s &quot;Pivot to Asia&quot; playing out? | GZERO World with Ian Bremmer</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrc8frsb0nl07myzuefqv2j" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why can't the US seem to focus on the Asia-Pacific region instead of the Middle East?<br></p><p>In November 2011, President Barack Obama laid out his vision for America’s expanded role in the Asia-Pacific region, which soon became known as the "pivot to Asia.” American foreign policy, Obama announced, would be shifting its focus away from costly wars in the Middle East and towards strengthening partnerships in the Asia-Pacific to curb a rising China. In short, America’s 21st-century foreign policy would be pointed firmly to the East.</p><p>Fast-forward to 2023, and America’s “Pivot to Asia” is a little more complicated. The Israel-Hamas conflict, which could quite easily spiral into a larger regional war with the US and Iran, is only the latest example. And though not in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine remains one of the biggest and most expensive US foreign policy priorities. This is not, in short, the 21st-century foreign policy vision that President Obama had in mind.</p><p>And yet, if you talk to any American national security official, they’ll tell you that China’s rise remains Washington’s main national security challenge – after all, America’s biggest global rival is also one of its largest trade partners. That’s just one of the many reasons that President Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping met at the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Forum in San Francisco last month.</p><p>If the US is ever going to fully “pivot to Asia,” they must bring Japan along for the ride.</p><p>So, will 2024 be the year that the United States government makes good on decade-old pivot-to-Asia promise?</p><h5></h5><h5></h5><h5>Watch the upcoming episode of <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer</a> on US public television (check local listings) and at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld.</h5>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>What should Israel do next?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/by-ian-bremmer/what-should-israel-do-next</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrffs9rji1n07lqh6dem4ur</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 25 Oct 2023 15:24:25 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>occupation</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>gaza</category>
<category>hostages</category>
<category>idf</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>by ian bremmer</category>
<description>An Israeli ground incursion into Gaza has been inevitable from the moment Hamas launched its shocking Oct. 7 surprise attack into southern Israel, where it brutally massacred more than 1,400 Israeli citizens and took over 200 to Gaza as hostages. Israel’s objective: to destroy Hamas once and for all, ensuring it can never pose a threat to Israeli security again.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrc4zmkbm3d07lq4l0rhtum" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1200" height="675">
<media:credit>Art by Jess Frampton</media:credit>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrc4zmkbm3d07lq4l0rhtum" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An Israeli ground incursion into Gaza has been inevitable from the moment Hamas launched its shocking Oct. 7 surprise attack into southern Israel, where it brutally massacred more than 1,400 Israeli citizens and took over 200 to Gaza as hostages. Israel’s objective: to destroy Hamas once and for all, ensuring it can never pose a threat to Israeli security again.</p><p>This long-anticipated offensive has thus far been delayed by international efforts to reduce the humanitarian impact, ongoing negotiations to release hostages, divisions within Israel’s unity government about what to do next, and pressure from Washington to wait until both Israel and the US are prepared to handle any resulting escalation. But the invasion will take place in short order.<br></p><p>This will be a terrible mistake for Israel, graver even than the one the US committed in Iraq and Afghanistan in response to 9/11. To be clear, I fully understand and share Israel’s desire to destroy the terrorist organization that is Hamas. Israel has every right to defend itself and retaliate against attacks on its citizens. But just because this objective is understandable, legitimate, and desirable, it does not mean it is feasible or strategically wise.</p><h3>A large-scale invasion of Gaza would be counterproductive</h3><p>There is no military way for Israel to fully destroy Hamas without killing tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians and radicalizing even more. An invasion of Gaza would be a humanitarian, moral, and strategic catastrophe, not only inflicting unfathomable human costs but also badly undermining Israel’s long-term security. Nothing it can hope to achieve – beyond satisfying Israeli demands for revenge – can outweigh the harm it is certain to do even in the best of scenarios.</p><p>Because Hamas’ military infrastructure is embedded in civilian areas and its 30,000-40,000 fighters hide among noncombatants, any attempt to destroy Hamas in Gaza would have to be conducted block by block, building by building, and door by door in one of the most densely populated and urbanized environments in the world, amid a uniquely hostile population and against a highly motivated enemy that has been preparing for this fight on their home turf for a long time. This slow and grinding urban battle would be tactically harder to prosecute and costlier in terms of Israeli military casualties than Fallujah was for the US. Even if Israel takes every precaution to protect civilian lives, many innocent people will inevitably be killed, injured, and displaced. Before Oct. 7, 50% of Palestinians in Gaza faced chronic hunger and 90% didn’t have access to clean water; under siege and without a way out of the territory, this will only get worse for them.</p><p><em>Want to understand the world a little better? </em><a rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/subscribe/"><em>Subscribe to GZERO Daily by Ian Bremmer</em></a><em> for free and get new posts delivered to your inbox every week.</em></p><p>The death and suffering of innocent civilians will in turn radicalize many more Palestinians in Gaza and elsewhere, increasing support for Hamas and multiplying the threat to Israel. At a minimum, widespread anti-Israel demonstrations will occur across the region, with terrorist attacks more likely. More social unrest will also emerge in the West Bank, Egypt, and Jordan, potentially destabilizing the broader region and sparking wider conflict beyond Gaza, with retaliation from Hezbollah in Lebanon or even Iran.</p><p>At the same time, the more damage Israel’s offensive inflicts, the more its own moral legitimacy and international standing will suffer. Western support for Israel will be tested, and Israel’s relations with Arab states and much of the Global South will become untenable, as will normalization with Saudi Arabia. Popular anger toward Israel among Arab populations could cause trouble for even the most repressive Arab regimes, lead them to distance themselves from the US and Israel, and drive a surge in extremist violence in the US and Europe.</p><p>Perhaps the biggest problem with a ground invasion is that even if Israel succeeded in eliminating Hamas, it has no plan for what to do with Gaza the “day after.” This is the same problem that befell the US after toppling the ruling regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Israel can’t install the Palestinian Authority, which is too weak and unpopular to take Hamas’s place. And it’s hard to imagine Egypt or the Gulf states would step up to administer Gaza after decades of washing their hands of the Palestinian problem. Yet if Israel simply pulls out, a reconstituted Hamas or another militant group like it would no doubt fill the power vacuum. Which means that once started, an invasion would lead to an indefinite occupation and an unwinnable counterinsurgency.</p><h3>What’s the alternative?</h3><p>Ultimately, there is no military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hamas is as much an idea as it is an organization made up of specific people: Israel can kill its entire leadership and destroy its infrastructure, but the movement and ideology will survive in one form or another so long as the political conditions that underpin its support continue to fester. The only way Israelis can achieve lasting security is by offering Palestinians a credible pathway to realize their legitimate aspirations for self-determination by peaceful means.</p><p>That's not to say Israel shouldn’t retaliate militarily against Hamas for the horrific Oct. 7 attacks. In fact, it must: Israel has a right to self-defense, and its government has an obligation to protect citizens from harm. Insofar as Hamas continues to pose a threat to Israelis, a (non-temporary) ceasefire and de-escalation is both politically impossible and morally unacceptable. In addition to physically preventing Hamas from attacking Israel in the near future, Israel must also reestablish deterrence both to prevent a bloodier assault down the line and to make diplomacy conceivable in the distant future. If its enemies believe Israel is weak, they will have no incentive to eventually work toward a peaceful solution.</p><p>So how can Israel achieve these aims without worsening the growing humanitarian crisis and causing more problems for itself? In other words, how can Israel fight a monster without becoming a monster? Instead of a full ground invasion that would inflict collective punishment on innocent Gazans and inevitably lead to a forever occupation, Israel should employ targeted strikes against Hamas leaders, fighters, and infrastructure to degrade the terrorist organization’s capabilities while minimizing Israeli military and Palestinian civilian casualties.</p><p>This counterterrorism campaign (as opposed to the regime change and counterinsurgency campaign that’s about to begin) should be paired with more pressure on Qatar to end its hosting of Hamas’s political leaders, negotiations and special forces operations to rescue hostages, and immediate (and sufficient) humanitarian aid for Gaza civilians. And it should only start once far more civilians have been able to get to safety. After all, Hamas is not going anywhere; no one in Gaza is. There’s no real reason not to take the time to set up the requisite safe zones and refugee camps, deploy humanitarian aid, evacuate greater numbers of northern Gazans, and negotiate the release of more hostages.</p><h3>The heart wants what the heart wants</h3><p>Alas, all signs point to Israel still going ahead with the ground incursion – and soon. This retribution campaign, which the White House has characterized to me as “emotional rather than strategic,” is supported not just by Netanyahu but by his entire war cabinet and most Israelis across the political spectrum. The military and intelligence services understand the difficulty and danger of a long-term occupation, but the leadership and citizenry are intent on going in hard and going in now, consequences be damned.</p><p>Despite the enormous leverage the US has on Israel, the Biden administration doesn’t believe it can forestall the invasion for much longer and is instead focused on limiting the consequent damage. They have accordingly privately advised the Israeli government to “go in quick, get out quick,” minimize areas of operation, and create safe zones inside northern Gaza where civilians can take shelter and access water, food, medicine, and fuel. Several relief trucks did finally get to civilians in southern Gaza over the weekend, but not nearly enough to meet Gaza’s minimum humanitarian needs. And there’s little hope Israel will agree to the ”humanitarian pause” the White House has been advocating.</p><p>To reiterate, Israel has a sovereign, inalienable right to security. But a ground invasion into Gaza does not accomplish that; it does the opposite, playing straight into the hands of Israel’s enemies and undermining regional stability without fundamentally solving any of Israel’s strategic dilemmas.</p><p>I truly hope cooler heads prevail to save Israel from itself, but absent a miracle, it’s going to get much worse before it gets better.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Israel-Hamas war: Where we are, two weeks in</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/editors-picks/the-israel-hamas-war-where-we-are-two-weeks-in</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrffmirjhlh07lqbxkwuh5h</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 20 Oct 2023 23:51:35 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Alex Kliment</dc:creator>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>hamas</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>gaza</category>
<category>palestine</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>Editor&apos;s Picks</category>
<description>It’s now been exactly two weeks since Hamas militants broke out of the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7 and went on a murderous rampage in southern Israel, killing more than 1,300 Israelis, most of them civilians, and kidnapping more than 200.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrc4p9yblt207lq22b72bn9" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="4529" height="2982">
<media:credit>Majdi Fathi/NurPhoto</media:credit>
<media:text>Palestinians evacuate an injured girl following an Israeli airstrike in central Gaza, on Oct. 18, 2023, amid the ongoing battles between Israel and Hamas.</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrc4p9yblt207lq22b72bn9" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It’s now been exactly two weeks since Hamas militants broke out of the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7 and went on a murderous rampage in southern Israel, killing more than 1,300 Israelis, most of them civilians, and kidnapping more than 200.<br></p><p>Israel’s resulting siege of Gaza and ongoing airstrikes have killed at least 3,000 people, including hundreds of children, and wounded thousands more. Nearly a quarter of Gaza’s two million people have fled their homes in the densely packed enclave, and the UN warns of a desperate humanitarian crisis there.</p><p><strong>Now the conflict is set to get worse.</strong> Israel is preparing a massive ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, which could begin at any moment. The stated aim is to remove Hamas from power, but experts say this will entail gruesome urban combat, and it’s not clear what Israel’s political strategy for Gaza will be afterward. Israel's Defense Minister on Friday suggested it would be to renounce any "responsibility for life" in a post-war Gaza. With views on both sides of the Israel-Palestine now hardened into a new “holy war” (see our viewpoint on that <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/viewpoint-how-israel-palestine-conflict-became-a-real-holy-war">here</a>), it is hard to imagine any path to peace in the near future.</p><p>At the same time, the war has shattered the notion – increasingly taken for granted by Israeli and Arab leaders alike in recent years – that the Palestinian issue could simply be contained and forgotten. As recent mass protests have shown, Arab capitals must reckon again with popular anger about Palestinian suffering in a way that they have not had to for many years. There is no more talk, for example, of that <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/are-saudi-and-israel-getting-close-to-a-normalization-deal">Saudi-Israel normalization deal</a>.</p><p>Now, as the conflict moves to a different phase, here are a few things to keep an eye on:<br></p><p><strong>Will it become a regional war?</strong> Despite cheering on their Hamas protégés, Iran has shown no interest in entering the war, as Ian Bremmer <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/by-ian-bremmer/what-we-know-and-dont-know-about-irans-role-in-the-israel-hamas-war">pointed out</a> this week. Israel and the US, meanwhile, have downplayed Iran’s involvement in the Oct. 7 attacks as well. That’s all good. But Iran’s proxies are a different story.</p><p>Israeli forces in the north have already had limited clashes with Hezbollah, the powerful Iran-backed Lebanese militant group that is also part of the Lebanese government. And on Thursday, Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen reportedly launched several missiles toward Israel.</p><p>For now, watch Hezbollah. It has signaled solidarity with Hamas and warned of an “earthquake” if Israel invades Gaza. But the group also has to tread carefully: Lebanon is already wracked by economic crisis, and a full-scale war with Israel could inflict even deeper pain – especially since the US now has two carrier groups bobbing off the Israeli coast, ready to intervene if the fighting spreads. For a look at how people in the Lebanese capital of Beirut are feeling, see our <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-reports/will-israels-war-with-hamas-spread-north-to-lebanon">special report here</a>.<br></p><figure><img src="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvr9h8qi690s07myd2vnjvx2" alt="the-israel-hamas-war-where-we-are-two-weeks-in-50052758.jpg" width="8256" height="5504"><figcaption>Families of Israelis held hostage by Hamas militants in Gaza set a Shabbat table with more than 200 empty seats for them\u00a0at the Credit: Gili Yaari/NurPhoto</figcaption></figure><p>Families of Israelis held hostage by Hamas militants in Gaza set a Shabbat table with more than 200 empty seats for them at the "Hostages Square" outside the Art Museum of Tel Aviv, on Oct. 20, 2023.&nbsp;Gili Yaari/NurPhoto</p><p><strong>Watch the occupied West Bank too.</strong> Violence between Israel and Palestinians was already at multi-year highs even before the Hamas rampage. Since then, protests have spread, and clashes have intensified: Settlers have opened fire on civilians, while Israel launched airstrikes on a refugee camp that it said was home to militants. More than 70 Palestinians have been killed, and hundreds have been arrested over the past two weeks. Aging Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas – who governs the West Bank – is struggling to master the situation, and the threat of a new intifada (mass uprising) is real.<br></p><p><strong>The US role.</strong> President Joe Biden – who <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/biden-lands-in-israel-with-half-an-agenda">made at least half a trip</a> to the region this week – has signaled strong moral, military, and financial solidarity with Israel, while also demanding humanitarian relief for Gaza. A deal to get aid in via Egypt was close on Friday, but Israel was seeking further assurances that any aid trucks wouldn’t include fuel or smuggled weapons for Hamas.</p><p>Biden returned home to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/biden-seeks-urgent-aid-package-for-israel-ukraine">deliver a prime-time foreign policy speech</a>, framing Ukraine and Israel as part of the same US-led fight against “terrorism” and “dictatorships.” The upshot? He wants $105 billion from Congress for Ukraine, Israel, Gaza, and the US border. How much of that he’ll get will become clear in the coming weeks.</p><p>For a look at the challenges facing US policy towards Israel right now, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/america-tightrope-walk-with-the-israel-hamas-war">this week's episode</a> of <em>GZERO World with Ian Bremmer</em> features interviews with Democratic Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut, and Republican Representative Mike Waltz, of Florida.</p><p>Speaking of Congress, by the way, the House of Representatives is still without a speaker – we’re just happy that with Jim Jordan seemingly out of the race, we won’t be confused by headlines that seem to suggest <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/SaoSasha/status/1714699200640794772?s=20">King Abdullah is meddling in US politics</a>.</p><p><strong>The real costs of fake news.</strong> This war, like all conflicts in the social media age, is being fought not only on the ground but on the web, where the fog of war is as thick as cotton candy.</p><p>The costs of misinformation became clear this week when the Al Ahli Arab hospital in Gaza City was struck by a munition of some kind on Tuesday night. International media initially reported Hamas claims that it was an Israeli bomb and that 500 were dead. Mass riots across the Arab world caused King Abdullah to cancel a scheduled summit of Arab leaders with Biden, which was meant to focus on humanitarian relief for Gaza.<br><br>Subsequent analysis of the hospital damage, including by open source investigators, seemed to lend credence to Israeli claims that it was a misfired or damaged rocket from within the Gaza Strip.</p><p>As of this writing, we still don’t know what happened, and with Israel preventing journalists or investigators from entering Gaza, we likely won’t for some time. But still, the lesson was clear: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/lessons-from-gaza-think-before-you-tweet">Think before you tweet</a>.</p><p><em>See all of our coverage of the Israel-Hamas war </em><a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/middle-east/"><em>here</em></a><em>, including explainers of who </em><a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/hamas-what-is-it"><em>Hamas</em></a><em> and </em><a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/what-is-palestinian-islamic-jihad"><em>Palestinian Islamic Jihad</em></a><em> are, our wildly popular </em><a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/the-graphic-truth-where-do-palestinian-refugees-live"><em>map of Palestinian refugees</em></a><em>, and our </em><a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-clips/saving-hostages-in-gaza-egypt-intermediary-urges-rep-mike-waltz"><em>interview</em></a><em> with a former US Green Beret about how to rescue the US citizens currently held hostage in Gaza.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Biden lands in Israel with half an agenda</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/biden-lands-in-israel-with-half-an-agenda</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrffgwrjgzg07lqpo645diu</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 18 Oct 2023 10:03:11 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Alex Kliment</dc:creator>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>hamas</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>us israel relations</category>
<category>benjamin netanyahu</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>Half of Joe Biden’s trip to the Middle East fell apart before he even boarded Air Force One. The US president was meant to spend part of Wednesday with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, before traveling onwards to Amman for a summit with the leaders of Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrc4eupblhp07lqli972tp8" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1159" height="828">
<media:credit>Reuters Marketplace/DPA Multimedia Wire</media:credit>
<media:text>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomes US President Joe Biden upon his arrival in Israel on Wednesday, Oct. 18, in a show of solidarity following the unprecedented Hamas attack mounted from Gaza.</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrc4eupblhp07lqli972tp8" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Half of Joe Biden’s trip to the Middle East fell apart before he even boarded Air Force One. The US president was meant to spend part of Wednesday with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, before traveling onwards to Amman for a summit with the leaders of Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority.<br></p><p><strong>So much for plans.&nbsp;</strong>Things changed dramatically when a blast destroyed the Al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza City Tuesday night, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/10/17/world/gaza-news-israel-hamas-war">killing hundreds</a> of people. Hamas blames Israel, and Israel blames an errant rocket launched from within Gaza. Neither side showed fully convincing evidence, but with anger against Israel already surging on Arab streets, Jordan’s King Abdullah scrapped the Amman summit altogether.</p><p><strong>Biden could have pulled the plug on the trip then.</strong> The risks, after all, are tremendous. Personal security is one thing – Israel’s Ben Gurion airport is within range of Hamas rockets, as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/scholz-forced-to-lie-on-ground-at-airport-as-air-raid-siren-sounds-while-boarding-plane/">learned</a> the hard way on Tuesday.</p><p>But more than that, without the Amman leg of the trip, Biden’s visit will play in the Arab world as a further endorsement of Israel amid soaring popular rage against the Jewish State.</p><p>Still, Biden landed in Tel Aviv on Wednesday, where he <a target="_blank" href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-israel-hamas-gaza-palestinians-a85cb682fdc61b80285cf4ab354354ce">told Netanyahu</a> that the hospital blast "appears as though it was done by the other team."</p><p>With Israel about to launch what’s likely to be a long and bloody ground invasion to clear Hamas from the Gaza Strip, Biden likely sees two key reasons for going anyway:</p><p><strong>First, to try to prevent the war from spreading.</strong> Biden will stress that any strikes on Israel from Iran or its proxies in Hezbollah would invite a response from US carrier groups that are now stationed off the Israeli coast. Hezbollah is a vastly larger, better-armed, and better-trained fighting force than Hamas. Recent days have already seen some limited clashes between Israel and Hezbollah along Israel’s northern border.</p><p><strong>Second, to pose “tough questions” directly to Netanyahu</strong> about Israel’s tactics and longer-term objectives, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-hospital-strike-complicates-risky-biden-trip-israel-2023-10-17/">according to</a> White House spokesman John Kirby. Note that over the weekend, in a subtle shift of tone, Biden urged Israel to take steps to ease the deepening humanitarian crisis in besieged Gaza, and to make sure that a “path to a Palestinian state” remains viable. That was before the hospital blast – it remains to be seen whether Biden’s attempt at tough love will play convincingly in Arab capitals that are visibly chilly toward Washington right now.</p><p><strong>Meanwhile, West Bank tremors are growing</strong>: In response to the hospital blast, protests erupted on the streets of the West Bank. Tensions between Israel and West Bank Palestinians were <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/israel-launches-new-operation-in-jenin">already rising</a> even before Hamas’ rampage, raising fears that the Israel-Hamas war could trigger a possible third “Intifada” or “mass uprising” in the occupied territories.</p><p>While Israel is more insulated from the West Bank now than it was during the last intifada of 2000-2005, any significant upheaval in the occupied territories could further tax Israel’s security forces just as the country opens a southern front against Gaza while watching for a potential northern one against Hezbollah.</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
<item>
<title>Trump&apos;s military exit ramp</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/trumps-military-exit-ramp</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrej945fyu107mybvrd6i4g</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 21:27:38 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Willis Sparks</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>military</category>
<category>afghanistan withdrawal</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>afghanistan</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>President Trump wants to pull thousands of US troops from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. The Pentagon and many senior members of his own party are pushing back. This is a debate we need to have. Read the full story.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrajfyw7w8v07mydq89h1zs" type="image/png" medium="image" width="1200" height="675" />
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrajfyw7w8v07mydq89h1zs" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">CNN</a> and the <a target="_blank">New York Times</a> reported on Monday that before he leaves office on January 20, President Trump will order the withdrawal of nearly half the US troops still serving in Afghanistan and Iraq, and nearly all who remain in Somalia.<br></p><p>If he follows through, this will be the president's final step toward ending the costly US commitment to fight terrorism and bolstering the stability of fragile governments in these countries.</p><p><strong>The plan has drawn plenty of fire from within the US government.&nbsp;</strong>Trump <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/16/politics/esper-memo-troop-withdrawal/">fired</a> Defense Secretary Mark Esper not long after Esper had <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">informed</a> the White House that he and Pentagon top brass believed that security conditions had not been met for a troop drawdown.</p><p>In addition, Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">warned</a> this week that "a rapid withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan now would hurt our allies and delight the people who wish us harm." He compared the idea with "the humiliating American departure from Saigon in 1975."</p><p><strong>The debate over this plan gets at the heart of President Trump's attempt to redefine the US role in the world.</strong> Before 2017, all post-World War II US presidents had argued that an assertive US global leadership role serves the US national interest.</p><p>Trump has challenged this orthodoxy, both <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">before</a> and <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">during</a> his presidency. Too often, he's argued, his predecessors have pushed US soldiers into endless commitments to the security of other countries and allowed selfish "allies" to free-ride at the expense of US taxpayers.</p><p><strong>There are strong arguments on both sides of this debate. Here are the most notable:</strong></p><p><strong>Against withdrawal</strong></p><p>Critics of Trump's plan say that Bush and Obama administration drawdowns of US troops from Iraq (2007-2011) <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.npr.org/2015/12/19/459850716/fact-check-did-obama-withdraw-from-iraq-too-soon-allowing-isis-to-grow">enabled the emergence of ISIS</a> in Iraq and Syria, a problem that proved costlier and more dangerous than the US troop presence.</p><p>On Tuesday, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/17/politics/jens-stoltenberg-afghanistan-withdrawal/index.html?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed:+rss/cnn_allpolitics+(RSS:+CNN+-+Politics)">warned</a> against a "premature withdrawal" from Afghanistan. In fact, the Taliban have become more aggressive in recent months, particularly against Afghan government forces, and October was the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/08/magazine/afghan-war-casualty-report-october-2020.html">deadliest month for Afghan civilians</a> in more than a year.</p><p>Abandoning the fight against terrorists in vulnerable countries signals to US allies (and potential allies) that Washington is not to be trusted.</p><p><strong>For withdrawal</strong></p><p>For how many years will withdrawal from these countries remain "premature?" Must US troops wait for the day when Afghanistan has a stable government capable of controlling all of Afghan territory? If the goal is more modest than that, why hasn't it been achieved in the 19 years that US and NATO forces have been there?</p><p>Must Washington wait until al-Qaeda and ISIS renounce terrorism, and Iran withdraws support for militias in Iraq? Or until Somalia becomes a stable country?</p><p>By remaining in these countries all these years, doesn't Washington allow its allies there to believe that they don't really need to prepare to function without US help?</p><p>In Somalia, much of the recent US military effort has focused on training and backing <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/18/world/africa/somalia-us-troops.html">a Somali commando unit</a> of 850 troops that has scored major wins against al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist group. <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Critics</a> of Trump's plan say this force can't function without active US involvement, but why should Somalis prepare to survive without US help as long as they believe the Americans will stay?</p><p><strong>So why not withdraw all the troops?</strong> President Trump <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1313984510749544450?s=20">tweeted</a> on October 7 that <em>all</em> US troops should be brought home from Afghanistan by Christmas. In Iraq and Afghanistan, a small number of remaining troops will allow the US to launch counterterrorism strikes from a single command center. US forces will also remain in Kenya and Djibouti, allowing for drone attacks on al-Shabab inside Somalia. The plan leaked to the press this week looks like a compromise.</p><p><strong>Give Trump's arguments their due.&nbsp;</strong>Americans need to debate these questions, and past presidents have too often fallen back on bromides about "America's responsibility to lead."</p><p>What is America's proper role in the 21st century world? What do you think?</p>]]></content:encoded>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>