Trending Now
We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
Middle East
The Israeli Air Force launched an airstrike on Thursday, targeting a building in the Mashrou Dummar area of Damascus. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant confirmed Israel's responsibility for the attack, which resulted in one fatality.
Aswe wrote in February, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has big plans for Syria. Erdogan’s government was a crucial backer of the HTS militia, an Islamist rebel group that ousted longtime Syrian strongman Bashar Assad in December, and he now wants Turkey’s military to take over some air bases on Syrian territory in exchange for Turkish training of Syria’s new army.
This, Erdogan hopes, will allow Turkey to greatly expand its regional influence, return many of the millions of Syrian refugees still living inside Turkey, and clamp down on Kurdish militants who have used Syria as a base of operations against Turkey’s military.
That’s the backdrop for awave of Israeli airstrikes on military targets inside Syria early Thursday. The Syrian government called the attacks a “deliberate attempt to destabilize Syria” and “a blatant violation of international law and Syrian sovereignty.”
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz quickly fired back at Syria’s president: “If you allow forces hostile to Israel to enter Syria and endanger Israeli security interests, you will pay a very heavy price.” Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar warned that Erdogan is doing his “utmost to have Syria as a Turkish protectorate.”
Syria’s fledgling military is no match for its neighbors, and its new government remains at the mercy of outside players. This dangerous competition to fill the vacuum in Syria created by the ouster of Assad is just beginning.
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Stockholm, Sweden.
Do you think the Signal controversy in the US will have an impact on the transatlantic relationship?
Well, not in itself. It does betray an attitude to security issues that is somewhat too relaxed, to put it very mildly. But what does betray as well is the disdain, the resentment, the anger against Europeans that is there from the vice president, the secretary of defense, and others, and that is duly noted. And of course, something that is subject of what we have to note it. It's there. It's a fact.
What impact do you think the Turkish protest and instability will have on Turkish relationships with its European allies?
Well, it's certainly not going to be a good thing. We have an interest in good relationship and stable relationship with Turkey. It's a significant EU strategic actor. It's a significant economy. But of course, when we have these arrests of a prominent opposition, politicians, we have massive protests that are repressed, that we have massive violations of social media and arrests of journalists and things like that. It does complicate things to put it very mildly. We haven't seen the end of that story yet.
Palestinians travel in vehicles between the northern and southern Gaza Strip along the Rashid Road on April 2, 2025.
Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahusaid Wednesday that Israel was seizing more territory in Gaza to “divide up” the besieged enclave. He spoke as Israeli forces increased the intensity of their assault on Hamas in Gaza, which resumed two weeks ago after phase one of the ceasefire agreed to in January ended.
The context: Hamas still holds 59 hostages captured during the group’s Oct. 7, 2023, attacks in southern Israel. The two sides are deadlocked on reaching a further deal: Netanyahu wants full Hamas disarmament, Israeli security control of Gaza, and the “voluntary” migration of Gazans. Hamas rejects that and says it will release the remaining hostages – 24 are believed to still be alive – only if Israel withdraws fully.
What territory is Israel taking? Netanyahu pointed specifically to a new “Morag Corridor,” which would bisect southern Gaza, cutting off the cities of Rafah and Khan Younis from each other. Since October 2023, the IDF has already occupied nearly 20% of Gazan territory, forming “buffer zones” around the edges of the enclave.
The big question: Is this a tactical move meant to heighten the pressure on Hamas to release the remaining hostages? Or is Israel planning to hold onto vast swathes of Gaza … indefinitely?Trump and Khamenei staring at eachother across an Iranian flag.
The United States is ramping up its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran.
In a letter sent to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in early March, President Donald Trump gave Tehran an ultimatum: reach a new nuclear deal with the US within two months or face direct military action – “bombing the likes of which they have never seen before,” as he told NBC News’ Kristen Welker on Sunday.
The letter proposed mediation by the United Arab Emirates (whose emissaries delivered the missive in question) and expressed Trump’s preference for a diplomatic solution. “I would rather have a peace deal than the other option, but the other option will solve the problem,” the president said.
In the three weeks it took the Iranian leadership to figure out how to respond, the US turned up the temperature.
First came intense airstrikes (of Signalgate fame) against Iran’s last remaining functional ally in the region, the Houthis in Yemen, starting on March 15 and continuing to this day. Then, the US issued its first-ever sanctions against Chinese entities for buying Iranian crude oil, including a “teapot” refinery in Shandong and an import and storage terminal in Guangzhou. And in recent days, the US military deployed a fleet of B-2 stealth bombers – capable of carrying the 30,000-lb. bunker-busting bombs needed to blast through Iran’s hardened enrichment sites – to its Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, in range of both Yemen and Iran. This move was “not unrelated” to Trump’s ultimatum, according to a senior US official.
Iran finally rejected direct negotiations with the US in a formal response to Trump’s letter delivered last Thursday via Oman, its preferred mediator. President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on Sunday that although the Islamic Republic won’t speak directly with the Trump administration while maximum pressure is in place, Tehran is willing to engage with Washington indirectly through the Omanis.
Whether Trump’s two-month deadline was to strike a deal or to begin negotiations remains unclear. Either way, there’s no chance that two sides that deeply mistrust each other – especially after Trump unilaterally withdrew from the original nuclear deal in 2018 – could reach an agreement over issues as complex as Iran’s nuclear program and support for regional proxies in just a couple, or a few, months (let alone a single one).
But does that mean that Trump’s ultimatum is doomed to end in confrontation? Not necessarily. In fact, his “escalate to de-escalate” strategy could be the best hope to avoid a crisis this year.
A ticking time bomb
While US intelligence assesses that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon, it has become a threshold nuclear state with enough 60% enriched uranium to produce six nuclear weapons (if enriched to 90%) and the ability to “dash to a bomb” in about six months (though weaponizing a device would probably take it 1-2 years).
European governments have long made it clear that unless Iran reins in its enrichment activities by this summer, they will “snap back” the UN sanctions that were lifted as part of the 2015 nuclear deal before the agreement expires in October and they can no longer do so.
Iran has vowed to respond to snapback sanctions by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Given the precedent set by North Korea – whose NPT exit in 2003 was followed by ever-greater steps toward weaponization – and the already advanced state of Tehran’s nuclear program, NPT withdrawal could be the action-forcing event Israel needs to convince Trump to support a joint strike on Iran’s underground nuclear facilities.
Which means that the US and Iran were likely headed for a collision later this year even if Trump hadn’t issued his ultimatum.
Strange bedfellows
And yet, both Trump and Iran’s leadership would much prefer to avoid a military confrontation in the near term.
Trump’s political coalition includes both traditional Republican war hawks and “America First” isolationists who are averse to US involvement in new forever wars. Whereas cabinet officials like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth advocate for a more combative approach toward the Islamic Republic, none of these prominent national security hawks are in charge of the Iran file – Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, a Washington outsider and a restrainer, is.
Most importantly, Trump ran as a peacemaker and has repeatedly stated his preference for a deal, believing that bombing Iran could mire the US in an unpopular war that’d divert precious resources from his domestic priorities and endanger his friends in the Gulf for little political upside. The solidly MAGA Vice President JD Vance echoed this concern when, in the leaked Signal group chat, he flagged the risk to oil prices from striking the Houthis for the sake of “bailing out” the Europeans.
For its part, Iran is historically vulnerable and eager to negotiate a deal that brings sanctions relief to its battered economy. While capitulating to Trump’s demands is politically dangerous for Khamenei and would weaken the regime’s domestic position, neither he nor other hardliners would welcome a military showdown with the US and Israel.
Take it or leave it
The threat of a crisis later this year creates an opening for Trump to pressure Tehran into offering concessions that allow the US president to claim progress and avoid triggering snapback sanctions.
Last year’s effective destruction of Iran’s regional proxy network – Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria – dealt a blow to the country’s conventional deterrence and heightened the importance of its nuclear program. Iran will therefore resist making any meaningful concessions on this front. If there’s one piece of the nuclear file it could cede ground on, it’s its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, which Tehran could conceivably agree to freeze.
Where Iran could potentially offer more is in backing away from its proxies, at least temporarily. Though it doesn’t have operational control over the Houthis (unlike the decimated Hezbollah), the Islamic Republic could deprive them of the bulk of the weapons systems and intelligence they rely on to attack Red Sea shipping lanes. It could also instruct Shia militias in Iraq to refrain from targeting US troops.
The regime would find these choices politically and ideologically unpalatable. But with its so-called Axis of Resistance already in shambles and little Tehran can do to rebuild it in the near term, its strategic value is nowhere near what it was a year ago. A chance at avoiding a snapback and US bombing could accordingly be seen as a worthwhile trade.
Less for less
While a breakthrough agreement is highly unlikely to be reached before the summer (or at all), the two sides’ mutual desire to avoid escalation suggests that Trump would be receptive to the relatively minor concessions Tehran could be willing to make – the most it can conceivably offer under the circumstances.
But those concessions would need to come soon, before snapback is triggered. And even this best-case scenario wouldn’t buy Iran any sanctions relief. Instead, they’d get to kick the can on snapback sanctions and possible US military action while negotiations on a more comprehensive – and aspirational – deal are underway.
If, however, Iran’s modest concessions fall short of what Trump deems acceptable, the risk of military escalation this year will rise sharply – either when Trump’s ultimatum comes to a head or when snapback gets triggered, Iran exits the NPT, and Israel considers a strike (whether solo or joint with the US).
Iran has not yet made the decision to build a nuclear weapon. And unless it’s attacked, it remains unlikely to do so, knowing full well that any overt steps toward weaponization would invite certain, immediate, and devastating retaliation. But nothing would make the Islamic Republic dash for a bomb more than getting bombed.
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
If China, Japan, and South Korea formed a united front, what kind of leverage would they have in negotiating against US tariffs?
Oh, if that were to happen, they'd have incredible leverage because China's the second-largest economy in the world, Japan's the third. This would be a really, really big deal. Except for the fact that it's not going to happen. Their trade ministers did just meet, and they've had some interesting coordinated statements. They do a lot of trade together, and they want to continue that. But the fact that the security of South Korea and Japan is overwhelmingly oriented towards the US, and they would not want to undermine that, means that they will certainly not see China as a confederate to coordinate with against the United States, not least on trade. The American response would be belligerent. So no, that's not going to happen.
Will Syria's newly formed transitional government be enough for Arab and Western leaders to lift sanctions and restore diplomatic ties?
I think they are heading in that trajectory. The question is, will it be enough to keep Syria stable and away from descending into civil war? And there, there's a huge question because this is a completely untested government, completely inexperienced, no governance background, very little background in terms of military stability, especially with all of the new members, militias that have been integrated from across a very diverse country. And a lot of internal opponents that are sitting back and waiting to fight. So I'm more worried about that than I am about international support. I think largely the international support they need is going to be there.
Why does Trump want to take Greenland?
I have no idea. Maybe somebody showed him a globe from the top and he saw how big it was, and he's like, "Oh, that'd be kind of cool to have." It's not like there's anything he needs that he can't get directly from negotiating with Denmark. Plenty of willingness to allow the US to have expanded bases, troops on the ground. Plenty of willingness from other countries in the region to do more in terms of patrolling, build more icebreakers to deal with. The Finnish President, Alex Stubb, who just went to see him golfing with him, spent seven hours over the weekend moving in that direction. But you saw from Vice President Vance, he's like, "Well, the President wants it. So of course I got to respond to that." Yeah, but they don't have any reason. And I do think that it is sufficiently blowing up in their faces on the ground in Denmark and in Greenland, that the Danes understand not to make a big deal out of this and it will eventually blow over. It is annoying to them symbolically, but it doesn't matter all that much. In that regard, we can spend a little bit less time on it. Okay, that's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
People attend a rally to protest against the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu as part of a corruption investigation in Istanbul, Turkey, on March 29, 2025.
Five days after the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, said it would no longer hold protests against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan over the arrest of its presidential candidate, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, hundreds of thousands of people flooded the streets of the capital on Saturday. Now, the CHP has vowed to continue the protests until the authorities release Imamoglu and clear him to run for the presidency.
Fall from grace. Just three weeks ago, Erdogan’s government was on a winning streak. The Assad regime — a staunch opponent — had fallen in Syria, a rebel Kurdish group had laid down their weapons, and the Turkish economy was looking relatively rosy. Now, the Turkish leader is on his back foot. Erdogan has tried to crush the rebellion, arresting thousands of protestors, but this latest protest suggests that the demonstrators are in it for the long haul. And the Turkish economy is now in retreat.
It’s strictly business. A crackdown on journalists continues, with several having been detained in recent days. Swedish reporter Joakim Medin was arrested as soon as he touched down in Turkey on Thursday for allegedly insulting the president. This followed the arrest and deportation of BBC reporter Mark Lowen earlier in the week.
Stern words. “This is more than the slow erosion of democracy. It is the deliberate dismantling of our republic’s institutional foundations,” the imprisoned Imamoglu wrote in a New York Times op-ed. The opposition leader also panned democratic governments across the globe for failing to denounce the Turkish government. “Their silence is deafening,” he wrote.
But there have been demonstrations in European cities in solidarity with the protesters in Istanbul, and many inside Turkey and around the world are wondering whether the man who has led the bicontinental country since 2003 can hang on amid the uproar.
Syria's interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa speaks during a Ministerial formation of the government of the Syrian Arab Republic, in Damascus, Syria, on March 29, 2025.
23: Syria has a new transitional Cabinet. Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa swore in his new 23-member team on Saturday, replacing caretakers who had been in those roles since former President Bashar Assad was ousted in December. While the new Cabinet is largely filled with al-Sharaa allies, it is religiously and ethnically diverse, a sign that Syria is moving forward to rebuild in the post-Assad and post-civil war era.
1: At least one person was killed amid suspected US strikes against Yemen’s Houthis on Saturday. According to the Associated Press, the Trump administration has embarked on an expanded anti-Houthi campaign in recent days, targeting ranking rebel personnel. Satellite photos also reportedly show an airstrip off Yemen that looks prepared to accept flights and B-2 bombers.
100,000: The FDA’s top vaccine official resigned on Friday after being told he could quit or be fired. Dr. Peter Marks stressed that he was worried that Robert F. Kennedy’s aggressive stance on vaccination would dangerously undermine public confidence in vaccines against common diseases such as measles, which is spreading in the US and has “killed more than 100,000 unvaccinated children last year in Africa and Asia.” An HHS spokesperson, meanwhile, said Friday that Dr. Marks didn’t belong at the FDA if he was not committed to supporting the “restoration of science to its golden standard and advocate for radical transparency.”
5-50: On Saturday, Hamas offered to release 5 hostages during the three-day Muslim holiday Eid al-Fitr, which began Sunday, to secure a 50-day ceasefire. The offer came in response to a proposal the militants received from Egypt and Qatar. Israel offered a counterproposal in coordination with Washington, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is demanding the release of 10 of the remaining 24 hostages believed to still be alive.
3: US President Donald Trump mused on Sunday that he’s not joking about finding “methods” to serve a third term, including being elected VP and then having the president resign to become president by succession. While some Trump loyalists like Steve Bannon believe a third term might be possible, constitutional experts warn there’s no “one weird trick” to bypass the 22nd Amendment, which limits presidents to two elected terms.
6: Four police officers and two suspected rebels — dubbed terrorists for their opposition to Indian rule — were reportedly killed Saturday morning in Jammu and Kashmir. Thousands of people have died in battles between rebels and Indian security forces over the past few decades, but violence has lessened in recent years.
15,000: How much will US President Donald Trump’s 25% tariffs against Canada and Mexico drive up car prices? Goldman Sachs estimates a bump of between $5,000 and $15,000 per vehicle, depending on the brand and model. But Trump told NBC News on Saturday that he “couldn’t care less” if car prices soared, maintaining that manufacturers should build their vehicles in the US.