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Ian Bremmer
Ian Bremmer is President and Founder of GZERO Media. He hosts the weekly digital and broadcast show, GZERO World, where he explains the key global stories of the moment, sits down for an in-depth conversation with the newsmakers and thought leaders shaping our world, and takes your questions. Ian is also the President and Founder of GZERO Media’s parent company, Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm. Ian earned a master’s degree and a doctorate in political science from Stanford University, where he went on to become the youngest-ever national fellow at the Hoover Institution. Although he might not admit it, Ian’s secretly jealous of his puppet’s weekly interviews with the world’s most powerful leaders.
Paraphrasing a quote often misattributed to Winston Churchill, the United States Congress finally decided to do the right thing … but not a moment too soon, and only after trying everything else first.
Last Saturday, the House of Representatives overcame months-long opposition from the far-right wing of the Republican Party and okayed a fresh military assistance package for Ukraine. Totaling nearly $61 billion, this is the largest single aid package the besieged nation will have received since the war’s onset. The bill passed the Senate on Tuesday night and was signed into law by President Joe Biden a few hours ago. Some of the newly appropriated American weapons systems and ammunition will begin flowing into Ukraine and reaching the frontline within days.
Congress had last authorized Ukraine funding in December 2022, when Democrats still controlled both chambers. Since then, further aid had been blocked by MAGA Republicans aligned with former president and presumptive GOP nominee Donald Trump. The legislative breakthrough came over the weekend when House Speaker Mike Johnson, alarmed by the intelligence briefings he’d received on the war’s outlook and the scope of Vladimir Putin’s aims (and spurred by Iran’s attack on Israel), ultimately decided to take up the bill on a bipartisan basis despite the threat of removal from within his own party. Once it was brought to the House floor, the bill sailed through 311 to 112.
The decision couldn’t have come at a more critical time for Ukraine’s defense. Congressional inaction had rendered the outgunned and outmanned Ukrainian military desperately short of the artillery and air defense ammunition it needed to fend off both Russian advances on the frontline as well as drone and missile strikes against its cities and power infrastructure. This allowed Moscow to seize more than 135 square miles of Ukrainian territory since the start of 2024, especially in the eastern Donetsk region, including most notably the strategic city of Avdiivka in February.
Indeed, up until last weekend, Ukraine was in danger of suffering a major setback later this spring or summer, when Russia is expected to conduct a major offensive in Donetsk. A territorial breakthrough there could have put Ukraine on course to lose the war as soon as 2025.
The influx of fresh American aid will have an immediate impact on the battlefield, helping the Ukrainians to close the artillery gap with Russia (10-to-1 earlier this month, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky), increasing the odds that they can hold their ground in Donetsk against Russia’s upcoming offensive, and making a return to 2023’s stalemate more likely through at least the end of the year. In that sense, US funding is a meaningful near-term stabilizer.
That said, closing the ammunition gap alone won’t be enough for Ukraine to stabilize the frontline. To do that, Kyiv also needs to address its military’s other big challenge: a manpower shortage. The hard-fought and politically unpopular but much-needed law lowering the mobilization age from 27 to 25, reducing service exemptions, and extending conscripts’ terms of service signed by Zelensky earlier this month should help – provided that new troops are properly trained and deployed. Ukraine also has to build up fortifications along the frontline and secure enough air defense systems to protect its cities and infrastructure amid strained supplies due to the Middle East war. If they manage to do all these things, the Ukrainians will be on a stronger military footing going into 2025 than they are now.
Alas, none of this will be enough for Ukraine to turn the tide of the war. The aid package will not give Kyiv any offensive capability this year, and it is likely to be the last major one the US approves in 2024 – and possibly ever if Trump wins the US election in November or Republicans take the Senate. Even if Biden wins a second term, there’s little domestic political support for America to continue to provide $60 billion a year every year until Russia runs out of men to throw at the “meat grinder” and accepts defeat.
Rather than a silver bullet or a turning point, the US aid package is a lifeline that will keep the Ukrainians in the fight for another year, buy the Europeans precious time to step up their defense-industrial production game, and strengthen Kyiv’s negotiating position so that when the time comes to accept the unacceptable yet inevitable outcome of a partitioned Ukraine, it is able to extract the best terms it possible can.
You don’t have to like it. I sure don’t. That doesn’t mean it ain’t happening.
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Why hasn't the United Nations insisted on military observers in Gaza?
Well, the United Nations doesn't really insist on things. And when they do, it's usually symbolic. Like they insist that humanitarian aid needs to get into Gaza and it doesn't happen. Or they insist that, there needs to be protections for the Palestinian civilians or that the Hamas needs to let go, release all of the illegally held hostages, and it doesn't go anywhere. So you can insist all you want. Also, keep in mind the Security Council would be vetoing that sort of thing because the US has a veto and they continue to use it on most Israel-Palestine related resolutions.
What specific demands are being voiced by campus protesters at institutions such as Columbia and Yale?
Well, I mean, the demands that got these protests started, are all about divestment of the endowments of these universities away from any corporations that do business in make money with Israel. Because of the view that the Israeli war in Gaza is wrong, the student protesters called it a genocide and that they want to end that. We've seen that kind of demand in Europe across the board. Not as much in the United States, at least not to this degree. Having said that, now that you also have students that have been suspended and arrested, surely the campus protesters are also saying those things need to be unwound. We're also increasingly seeing demands for university administrators, including presidents, to resign. So, I mean, the longer this goes, the harder it is to actually, accede to these student demands. And of course, the more polarized the environment on the ground in these universities become.
How will US aid package approval shake the dynamic of the Russia-Ukraine war?
Well, it makes it more likely that the Ukrainians can defend their front lines, at least for now. They had been losing some territory. Not a lot, but including one city. And the Russians are planning, with an additional mobilization, a new major offensive, probably end of spring, early summer. Ukrainians have a much better capability to hit back and stop the Russians from making gains there. They had been down to about 20% of the ammunition and artillery being fired against Russia, that the Russians were firing against Ukraine. This brings that back to parity through that offensive. What does this mean for 2025? Still, massive uncertainty and eventually a need to engage in negotiations with a much bigger Russia fighting an illegal war, an invasion with all these war crimes. Is that fair? No. But is that reality? Yes, absolutely. And any NATO leader you talk to privately recognizes that's where this is eventually going.
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here. And a Quick Take to kick off your week. A big $90 billion package that has been approved by the US House of Representatives, going through the Senate shortly after months of debate and, all of the package, all three major pieces of it, have some significant, complicated features.
First of all, the biggest piece for Ukraine, $60 billion, massive military support.
They had been in danger of losing significant more territory. This certainly shores them up. It helps the Ukrainians. It makes the Europeans panic less, but, you know, can they longer term hold on? What is the end game? The Ukrainians are, of course, running short not just of material to fight, but also air defense capabilities and, critically, people, soldiers. It's much harder for them to get people for the front lines than it is for the authoritarian, and much larger populated Russia. And so, the intention is that the Ukrainians don't fall apart, but of course, longer term, the idea that the US will continue to be able to provide 60 billion in support year after year. Certainly not true if Trump becomes president, probably not true if Biden wins a second term. What you really want to do is try to find a way to get them in a better position so that negotiations, inevitably, that need to occur with Russia, can be more productive and more constructive from the Ukrainian side, from the European side, from the NATO side. The US kick the can on this last year when the Americans, were in much better position supporting Ukraine. Now it's harder. Always is the case is that you think that things are going to get better. You don't feel like taking the political risk and as a consequence you extend and pretend. And now they're in a worse position. So I'm glad that the money came through. I'm glad the Ukrainians, are still fighting courageously and want to fight courageously. But of course, longer term, this war leads to some degree of partition where the Ukrainians are losing their land.
Israel, closest ally of the United States in the Middle East. Some 17 billion in military support for Israel, also some 9 billion in humanitarian aid in Gaza in this plan.
But, of course, increasingly, the United States does not support Israel continuing to fight against Hamas in Gaza. They want to see a lot more protection for Palestinian civilians, which the Israelis have been reluctant to put in place. They don't want to see a ground offensive into Rafah. Over a million Palestinians shelter in there. The Israelis are fully intent on continuing with that, proceeding with it. They did want to see a cease-fire that was linked directly to a hostage release. Now, increasingly, the US is talking about those two things as critical but delinked. And at the same time as the US is providing all this money, you have sanctions being placed by the United States on battalions of the Israeli Defense Forces engaged in human rights violations. This shows just how impossible this position is for President Biden to maneuver domestically, not to mention internationally. The US is overwhelmingly, the one country that is most supportive of Israel. Biden is overwhelmingly the political leader that is most supportive of Israel. But most of his constituents are not. And this is absolutely going to hurt him, even though it's a foreign policy issue and they don't usually play that heavily in recent decades in the election coming up in November. And you’ll see it, of course, across campuses all over the country, including my own at Columbia.
And then finally Taiwan. And this is in a sense the least controversial, because everyone on the Democratic and Republican side pretty much supports more support for Taiwan, is opposed to China. It's very easy to get lots of legislation that makes life more difficult for China. At the same time, though, the long term strategy of the United States is to make Taiwan less important, less important for the Americans in making sure that semiconductor production, moves from Taiwan to the United States, to other allies, not just a few miles off of the mainland Chinese coast, but also export controls that prevent the Chinese from getting advanced semiconductors from Taiwan as well. In other words, the big US strategy is not just arming the Taiwanese and helping them defend themselves, but also making Taiwan fundamentally less important to mainland China. and one of the main reasons that the Chinese would not be interested in attacking Taiwan long term or squeezing them hard economically long term, is because they're so indispensable to the Chinese economy. This is not going to be the case long term.
In all three of these areas, you've got the United States with friends, but they are less aligned with strategically than they are tactically. And that means that this money that we see going forward is all about kicking the can on short term gains that make sense politically for the US right now. But long term do not resolve the challenges that exist for the US with these countries.
That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take on the latest in the Middle East crisis. And things actually looking a little bit more stable today than they have over the past couple of weeks. And that is some very welcome news.
The headlines, of course, that the Iranians have been hit by Israel, though no one is saying that Israel has admitted to doing it, in the town of Isfahan. Clearly, military targets and the Iranians trying to knock down those missiles coming over. But this was a significantly more restrained attack than what the Israelis did to kick off this crisis, which was attack an Iranian government building in Damascus and target and assassinate a senior Iranian leader. That led to the Iranian response that we saw over the weekend, which was a significant and serious one, with a few hundred missiles and drones. And now we are in the escalatory portion of the cycle.
The United States said very clearly to Israel, “We're going to help defend you no matter what. We don't want any offensive strikes against Iran. Take the win.” The fact that they said that meant that it was very, very likely that they were going to do something, but that something was going to be restrained, where if the Americans said, “Hey, just take it easy, don't do anything big,” then they’d end up doing something bigger, right? And you give them an inch, they take two inches. This is the way these things work. And it was coordinated with the United States. The US was not involved directly in the military strikes, but they knew it was coming. They had that cooperation, communication from Israel, which was important because the US had to be in position in case the Iranians decided that they were going to strike real time in response to Israel. The Americans were going to help the Israelis defend themselves yet again.
Now, the big question here is not, “Do the Iranians respond in a big way?” They don't. They've already signaled that that's not the intention. You've seen them downplaying the nature of these strikes on Iranian state media. So, this crisis, this proximate crisis between Israel and Iran is now in the rearview mirror. But going forward, what's the likelihood that we can stabilize this war, which is now well beyond just a matter of Israel versus Hamas?
One thing that makes me a little bit more positive is the fact that Bibi Netanyahu is himself in a little more secure position domestically. What do you mean, makes you more positive? Does that mean he's going to last longer? Yes. But it also means he doesn't necessarily have to go ahead with massive strikes against Hamas in Rafah, killing lots of civilians. Or eventually against Hezbollah, pushing them back so that almost 100,000 Israeli citizens can get back to the north. If he wanted to take a win and show that he now has, you know, a historical legacy of leading Israel in defending against an unprecedented strike from Iran, with strong support from the Americans, from the Brits, from the Jordanians, from the Saudis, this is the opportunity that could create Saudi normalization with Israel. This is the opportunity that could create a peace deal that the Palestinians would have some form of governance over the West Bank and Gaza together.
That's the opportunity that comes from this, precisely because Israel domestically now has a leader that doesn't have to look over his shoulder every moment. But the strong effort by Netanyahu, at least as of today, is to still go ahead with these Rafah strikes. You've got the battalions on the ground. You want to use them, you want to take out, these Hamas leaders, irrespective of the civilian cost. And that continues to be very popular among the entire population of Israel as well.
So, when I think about the next couple of weeks, I think that you're not going to get a breakthrough deal on hostages with Hamas, and that means that the fighting only stops if there's a broader agreement. And that broader agreement requires that the Israeli war cabinet is willing to stand down and not continue their war on the ground in Gaza. And in return, has a broader agreement with the Americans, with the Gulf states, and ultimately with a path forward for the Palestinians. Most people around the world would welcome, would love to see that. Getting the Israelis from here to there, especially when you are surrounded by enemies that consider you, to be, illegitimate as a country and refuse to recognize your right to exist, that makes it a lot harder. So that's where we are. But some breathing space for now. The mood in the United States, certainly better than it was at any point over the last week and a half, and that's a good thing.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Leaders of Israel and Iran in front of fighter jets.
On April 13, Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles from its own territory in its first-ever direct, attributable attack against Israel, thrusting the long-simmering shadow war between the two regional foes into the light.
This show of force reflects a dramatic shift in strategy from Tehran, which had previously relied exclusively on its proxies to target Israel. The inflection point was Israel’s bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1, which killed the senior-most Iranian military leader in Syria and was compared to an attack “on Iranian soil” – a bright red line for the Islamic Republic. So from Iran’s perspective, it was Israel that crossed the rubicon first. Last weekend’s attack was a proportional response in that view – and a measured one at that.
Does that hold up? What comes next? And what does it all mean?
Iran’s not-so-escalatory escalation
On one hand, last weekend’s attack was dangerous and provocative, posing the first serious external threat to Israel’s security since Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles at the Jewish state in 1991 and heightening the deep sense of existential insecurity Israelis have felt since Oct. 7. Had any sensitive military targets been hit or Israelis killed, we would now be looking at direct war between Iran and Israel, likely also involving the United States. Not World War III, but a major regional war.
On the other hand, the fact that we aren’t currently in that scenario means that the attack could have been a heck of a lot worse. That it wasn’t was mostly by design (the other bit was luck): Iran telegraphed its attack well in advance both publicly and through backchannels with several regional powers to minimize the damage and prevent an escalatory response. The heads-up given to the United States via Iraq and Turkey – and the use of low-altitude, slow-moving drones that could be seen coming from literally 1,000 miles away – allowed Israel and its partners ample time to pre-position their military assets and intercept nearly all Iranian projectiles (as well as get Israeli citizens into bomb shelters, out of harm’s way). As a result, of the roughly 170 drones, 120 ballistic missiles, and 30 cruise missiles that Iran launched, 99% were shot down, most before they could reach Israeli airspace. All of them were aimed at military rather than civilian targets.
The advance notice, as well as the choice of targets and weaponry, suggest that Iran deliberately calibrated the strike to limit casualties and keep a lid on potential retaliation. That’s why Iran refrained from using Hezbollah and attacking US forces throughout the region. It’s also why it announced that no further (direct) attacks would be forthcoming and it considered the matter closed as long as the Israelis took it on the chin.
Incidentally, this is exactly the same playbook the US used to respond to the Iranian proxy attacks that killed three American servicemembers in Jordan at the end of January. The Biden administration didn’t want to start a shooting war with Iran (for obvious reasons), so they waited four days to hit back and gave a heads-up to Tehran via Iraq so the Iranians could get their forces out of the area, while cautioning them that next time there would be direct consequences and no such forewarning.
In both cases, if the US and Iran had wanted to seriously escalate, they could have. But the goal wasn’t to escalate – it was to reset the bar on deterrence and relieve domestic pressure in response to a provocation while preventing damage that would bring the conflict into a wide-scale regional war.
None of this means that this was an easy balance for Tehran to strike (no pun intended) in practice. Despite all the calibration and telegraphing that went into the attack, it was still a risky gamble, with lots of room for accidents and miscalculation. Some drones or missiles could have evaded defenses and found their targets. Israeli soldiers or civilians could have died. The US would have treated a successful Iranian strike on Israeli soil as an attack on itself and responded accordingly. The risk of a shooting war with America was not zero, and the Iranians were willing to live with that.
What will Israel do next?
The ball is now in Israel’s court. Israel needs to respond somehow to signal that this type of attack won’t be tolerated in the future, but it is up to war cabinet members Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and opposition leader Benny Gantz to decide exactly when, where, and how to strike back, weighing the benefits of retaliation against the risk of provoking further escalation and alienating Israel’s allies.
Domestic views are currently split between revenge and restraint. The far right is pushing for a strong, immediate, and direct strike on Iranian soil that would likely require US cooperation but that Washington wants nothing to do with, as it would compel Tehran to counterattack and dramatically expand the conflict. Netanyahu wouldn’t mind a war with Iran that draws the US in and extends his time in office, but Gantz and Gallant prefer a more calibrated and strategic response that the US can get behind – one that allows Israel to build a strong anti-Iran alliance and maintain robust US defense support without precipitating a regionwide conflict.
For its part, the Biden administration is working overtime to persuade the Israeli government to opt for a more muted response. Here, the critical role the US played in helping Israel counter the Iranian attack will probably give it enough leverage to succeed where it has previously failed in Gaza.
My bet is that the Israelis will give in to US influence, take the win, and refrain from an escalatory response at this time – meaning no major direct strikes on Iranian territory (for now at least). Of course, that doesn’t mean they’ll sit on their hands. At a minimum, they will hit Iranian proxies and Iranian assets outside Iran. They might even carry out covert and non-kinetic attacks within Iran, such as cyber or sabotage, on an opportunistic basis. These are the kinds of responses that Tehran will be willing to absorb without derailing the current de-escalatory path.
The danger: I could be wrong and the Israelis could overreact as they have consistently since Oct. 7, choosing to directly and overtly strike the Iranian homeland or take out high-value IRGC targets against America’s advice and their own best interests. Such actions would likely cross the Islamic Republic’s red lines and trigger an immediate escalatory response that could quickly spiral into a major war.
What it means
Even assuming cooler heads prevail in Jerusalem and Iran-Israel tensions stay in a de-escalatory phase, last weekend’s attack will have long-lasting implications.
First, Netanyahu’s domestic standing has improved on the back of Israel’s successful defense against an unprecedented Iranian threat in a united front with the US and other allies. This increases the embattled prime minister’s political breathing room and will prolong his time in office. Classic Bibi.
Second, the attack has pushed the war in Gaza off the front pages, as international focus has shifted toward averting regional war and away from the humanitarian crisis in the Strip. As a result, there is less pressure for Israel to compromise with Hamas on a cease-fire deal. At the same time, an Israeli ground operation in Rafah has become more likely, as the Biden administration is now principally focused on getting Israel to limit its escalation against Iran. The biggest losers, as always, will be Palestinian civilians.
Third, the attack is a political liability for US President Joe Biden, who will pay the price for any further escalation of the conflict but now lacks domestic political space to publicly criticize Israel’s actions and can only offer “ironclad” support going forward. Biden’s best hope going into the November election is to dissuade Netanyahu from expanding the conflict, lest he be blamed for presiding over yet another major war. But if he pushes too far in trying to constrain Israel, he’ll be blamed for abandoning a key US ally most voters still support (despite Gaza). Damned if he does, damned if he doesn’t.
Finally, Israeli and Iranian deterrence has eroded as both sides have crossed each other’s red lines, dropped long-standing strategic restraint policies, and raised the threshold for future responses. Iran has no plans to stop supporting its proxies in the region, and Israel has no plans to stop targeting said proxies (including Hamas in Gaza). So while Israel and Iran may have narrowly avoided major war over the weekend, the likelihood that further tit-for-tat strikes spiral into a broader regional war is increasing. The longer-term trajectory of this conflict is still expansionary. Sorry about that.
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Does the Iran-Israel crisis offer a unique opportunity for diplomacy?
I don't think so. They certainly give an opportunity for a bunch of countries to reengage with Israel. We're seeing that with Jordan, with Saudi Arabia, and to show the Iranians that they are still considered to be the big concern as an enemy in the region, a disrupter. But that's very different from saying we're going to see a breakthrough in relations. You're not resetting deterrence. Iran is going to continue to lead the axis of resistance and provide weapons and intelligence and engage in strikes against targets across the region. Israel will still hit Iranians that are operating there. So going forward, I think the dangers are still pretty high.
Is Germany's Scholz meeting with Xi in Beijing indicating a shift in Europe-China trade tensions?
Not really. Here, the fact that Scholz has a large number of German CEOs in tow means that, yes, he's concerned that the Chinese are providing support to Russia, maybe even increasingly dual-use military support to Russia in the war in Ukraine. He's concerned about Chinese industrial policy that's undermining, the interests of Americans and Europeans economically. But ultimately he is very reliant on investment and trade with China, and he's going to continue to support that. He is not fully aligned with his government on this issue, not his advisors, not his foreign minister, and certainly not the other parties in the coalition. But it is Scholz's perspective. And as a consequence, it is going to be a pretty friendly trip.
Why is Sudan's year-long conflict gone largely unnoticed?
Well, we write about it a fair amount, but I mean, the fact that it is in a part of the world that doesn't have economic implications. So you blow up Ukraine, and Russia is in a fight, and energy prices and food and fertilizer prices go up. Major conflict in Sudan. A lot of people suffer, a lot of people die, but the rest of the world has no impact economically. Also, most of the refugees, people fleeing, fleeing to neighboring African countries, they're not coming over to Mexico, the United States or to Poland and to Germany. And that just doesn't lead to a lot of attention. Final point is that there aren't a lot of journalists on the ground from the West in Sudan. And so not a lot of people are actually covering this. So for all of those reasons, not getting a lot of attention, but we'll keep talking about it.
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here, and a Quick Take on a Sunday, which usually means something is not going well, and that is certainly the case in the Middle East, where you had unprecedented strikes by Iran and its proxies against Israel.
Now, on the one hand, clearly a very dangerous thing to do, on the other hand, could have been a hell of a lot worse. What do I mean by that? Well, it is not World War III. Americans warned Iran not to hit the United States, and the Iranians gave a heads-up, days in advance, through a number of actors, most importantly through Iraq. This reminds me very much of after the American servicemen and women, three were killed in Jordan, by an Iranian proxy. The Americans did not want a war to break out with the Iranians directly, waited about a week, gave a heads up through Iraq, of the kind of attack that the Americans were planning, waited four days, gave the Iranians a chance to basically prepare and get their own forces out, and warned them that if this were to happen again, there would be direct consequences, a direct strike on Iran itself.
In this case, you had the Iranian heads-up that gave the Americans and allies time to pre-position, to provide diplomatic support, both publicly and privately, to the Israelis. Send the head of CENTCOM to Israel, say that American support for Israel was ironclad, help ensure that the Israelis would be able to most effectively defend itself against the coming Iranian attack. That was, on the one hand, a really big deal by the Iranians that was meant to be a maximal display of force and a minimum likelihood of casualties. But still, there was a significant possibility of accident, that you could have a risk that would lead to a war directly between Iran and Israel. Something that the Americans desperately wanted to avoid because it would bring the US in. It would spike oil prices. It would probably mean the end of Biden's, potential of a second presidency. And it, of course, would also mean that Iran was going to get hit massively by the United States and Israel, something they wanted to avoid.
We saw hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles, many from proxies, but many from Iran itself, over 99% of which were taken down. And they were aimed solely at military targets in Israel. So again, lots of effort to try to reduce the risk but the potential that you would have had a number get through, accidentally hitting civilians or having significant military hit, that was a risk that the Iranians were prepared to take. So, it's a big deal, it’s a clear escalation, and it is certainly an effort by the Iranians to say, that if this is to happen again, that the likelihood that there will be a major war between Iran and Israel come what may, is very real. And the Iranians also said, and they said this before the missiles even hit their targets, or in the case of the vast majority of them were intercepted, said through the United Nations mission that this was directly in retaliation for the Israeli strike against an Iranian leader in Damascus, and that the matter, from Iran's perspective, should be considered closed.
In other words, no further attacks were coming. So, trying to in a sense, you know, reduce the likelihood of further escalation, in advance. And clearly, all of that kept the United States from responding directly. So, the US strategy here is do everything possible to show that you will get massive support for Israeli defense and national security in the event of an attack, any attack, but also to try to put maximum constraint on the Israeli government against a response directly against Iran, and that the Americans don't want to support Israel if they were to engage in offensive attacks against Iran at this point.
What are the Israelis going to do? I mean, the hope for the United States is that while Prime Minister Netanyahu wants to do more and suck the United States into a broader war against Iran, that he is going to be constrained from doing so. In part because he was so successful, they now have a major victory on their belt under his watch, being able to defend the Israeli people completely in response to an unprecedented Iranian attack. And there's also going to be a big distraction away from the war in Gaza. Doesn't mean that Israel suddenly loses its isolation or wins the PR war globally, I think that's certainly not going to happen, but, there's less pressure on the Israelis, on the prime minister, in terms of Gaza right now as a consequence of what Iran has done. And there's also less pressure for Netanyahu to be forced out domestically in the near, in the immediate future.
Further, if he were to try to go considerably farther than Benny Gantz wants to, and the war cabinet wants to, in a response against Iran, then Netanyahu risks that they would bolt from the war cabinet and that his government would then fall apart. That's certainly a proximate risk that contains what the Israelis are likely to do. I don't think they'll sit on their hands and do nothing. At the very least, I think there'll be more significant strikes against Iranian proxies in the coming days. And the Israelis will also continue to engage in strikes against Iranian targets as they see them, as is opportune, in proxy states going forward. This is the problem, of course, is that, even though you have averted major escalation in a very dangerous period over the weekend, the Israelis and the Iranians haven't accomplished anything to stabilize their relationship longer-term.
Israel has shown that they are capable of taking out Iranian leaders in Syria, and Iran can't defend them. Iran has no intention of suddenly leaving those proxies to fend for themselves. And further, the likelihood that Israel now gets a breakthrough agreement on hostage release by Hamas, and that leads to a ceasefire, has gone down, at least in the near-term. The other side of that is the likelihood that the Israelis proceed with at least some form of ground attack into Rafah, which the Americans have warned them not to, also has gone up.
So the Hamas war with Israel is nowhere close to ending, the likelihood of continued Palestinian civilian casualties continues to grow, and the potential for further military engagement, both vis-a-vis proxies, including the Houthis in the Red Sea, the fact that the Iranians have also boarded an Israeli linked vessel in the Red Sea and that there is no effective deterrent in place right now between Israel and Iran, despite all sorts of other actors not wanting this to expand into a broader war, that all makes the Middle East right now, more dangerous.
So, I mean, none of us know, what the next shoe is going to be to drop. But if you are looking ahead over the next, let's say, six months, a couple things I think you can say. First, it is more likely that the present Israeli government is going to be in place for longer, and that the war in Gaza is going to continue without a serious effort at stabilization, or at least not one that's consequential.
That's problematic for Biden as you look ahead to the election in November. The potential that this war expands and eventually does drag in the United States and Iran more directly, is also going up. It's not imminent but it is certainly reasonably plausible, and the guardrails on that war are becoming, they are eroding as both sides are taking shots against each other.
So, a dangerous environment. A second war that is not going the way the Americans or anyone else in the world would like it to. And that's how we're kicking off our week.
That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
On Ian Explains, Ian Bremmer breaks down how Xi Jinping is turning China inwards at a time when it can’t afford to close itself off. Since assuming the presidency in 2012, Xi has consolidated power within the Communist Party to become China’s most dominant ruler since Chairman Mao Zedong. Under Xi’s watch, China has rolled back democratic rights in Hong Kong, implemented crackdowns on the powerful tech, finance, and real estate sectors, restricted English in schools, and even expanded the definition of espionage so broadly that basic interactions with foreigners are viewed as suspect.
President Xi’s nationalist vision has become so dominant that it's written into the Constitution and official history of the People’s Republic. But will that vision make China hostile to the very ideas that fueled its economic transformation in the first place?