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Viewpoint
A voter casting a ballot in front of the Philippines flag.
The Philippines will hold midterm elections on May 12, with all 317 seats in the House of Representatives, half the 24-member Senate, and various provincial, city, and municipal positions up for grabs. The winners will take office on June 30, with terms of six years for the senators and three years for all other officeholders.
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. hopes to maintain his control of Congress as he seeks to advance his legislative agenda and expand his influence at the expense of former president Rodrigo Duterte’s political faction. In July, the new Senate will hold an impeachment trial for Vice President Sara Duterte-Carpio, who is the former president’s daughter and has repeatedly clashed with Marcos.
We asked Eurasia Group expert Peter Mumford what to watch for in this weekend’s vote.
What are the most important races?
The focus is really on the 12 Senate seats up for election; the House tends to align with the sitting president regardless of its composition. Marcos’s coalition currently consists of six parties in the Senate and nine in the House. Political parties have long been weak in the Philippines, so the concept of a “majority” is very fluid, especially in the Senate, which often acts independently of the president. Officially, the Senate is broken down into “majority bloc,” “minority bloc,” and independents – but “majority” refers to those senators who support the Senate president. This maps roughly, but not precisely, onto the coalition supporting Marcos (or not). There are members of the same party in both the majority and minority blocs, for example. It is therefore easier, but more subjective, to map out the senators who support Marcos and those who do not.
So, what are the stakes in the Senate races?
There are two main implications. First, and more significant for Marcos’s agenda, is whether Marcos retains majority support in the upper house; failure to do so would make it harder to pass proposed economic legislation, including a power sector overhaul aimed at lowering high electricity prices and modest revenue-raising measures designed to trim the large budget deficit and provide more resources for social spending priorities. Second, Duterte-Carpio’s political future is at stake following her impeachment by the House earlier this year on charges of high crimes related to death threats against the president and betrayal of public trust related to alleged misuse of intelligence funds (please see more below).
What are the most important issues for voters heading into these elections?
Surveys show that cost-of-living concerns are by far the biggest issue for voters. The Philippines has been grappling with relatively high inflation in recent years, with food prices a particular concern; price rises have slowed in recent months but that has not yet translated into shifts in public opinion. According to a recent poll, 79% of Filipinos disapprove of the administration’s efforts to control inflation, with just 3% approving. After cost-of-living, voters’ main concerns are pay, corruption, crime, and poverty.
How do the candidates propose to address these concerns?
They have made generic promises about tackling poverty but offered little in terms of specific measures. Philippine elections, especially those for congress, are primarily driven by the personalities and name recognition of the candidates. Many voters will be casting their ballots on the basis of who they know and like, rather than the policy or ideological views of the candidates. It’s worth noting that six of the top 12 candidates in polls are show business personalities; another popular figure is the former boxer Manny Pacquiao, a senator who is running for reelection.
How does the feud between the Marcos and Duterte clans play into election dynamics?
The battle for influence between the country’s two most powerful political dynasties sets the backdrop for the midterms. The upcoming polls will not have an impact on how long Marcos serves as president: He is bound by a single six-year term limit and is very unlikely to be impeached or removed by a coup before his terms ends in 2028. But the outcome of the upcoming Senate poll will determine whether Duterte-Carpio is removed from office and banned from running for public office again. Duterte-Carpio is the early favorite for the 2028 presidential election and the Marcos clan likely hopes she is prevented from running, making it easier for a member of the president’s family or another ally to succeed him.
Duterte-Carpio’s Senate trial is due to begin in late July. If two-thirds (16) of the senators vote against the vice president, she will be removed from office and probably barred from holding other government offices in the future (there is some debate about whether the latter would automatically apply if she is found guilty). She needs only nine senators to vote against or abstain. In addition, the outlook is complicated by the fact that some senators counted in the “pro-Marcos” majority, as they tend to support the administration’s bills, are actually closer to the Dutertes and will likely oppose her removal. That said, the president could press allies to vote against her.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group.
US President Donald Trump returns to the White House from his New Jersey golf club to Washington, DC, on April 27, 2024.
President Donald Trump has claimed a broad mandate to pursue sweeping changes to US institutions and policies since he took office on Jan. 20. He has sought to overhaul the federal government by closing agencies and cutting thousands of jobs, restructure the economy by throwing up a tariff wall to force companies to base more of their operations in the US, reconfigure decades-old foreign alliances, and assert expansive powers in an illegal immigration crackdown.
With a cohesive team in the White House, Republican control of Congress, and a disoriented Democratic opposition, Trump has pushed ahead rapidly on many fronts. But opinion polls in recent weeks have shown a sharp decline in public support for the president, and the courts, financial markets, and other institutions have started curbing his actions. Eurasia Group’s Clayton Allen and Noah Daponte-Smith explain their shared insights on where things are likely to go from here.
What is your assessment of the strength of Trump’s starting position? Was it a “historic mandate,” as he has said? And where does he stand today?
Trump’s popular vote win last November gave him a mandate — not the historic romp that he claimed, but a clear signal from voters that they wanted to buy what he was selling. A hundred days in, a lot of voters are suffering buyer’s remorse. It’s been a rough 100 days, almost all self-imposed: The US economy is headed for much lower growth, if not contraction; negotiations are moving slower than the expectations Trump set for the Ukraine war and Gaza; and national polling shows Trump underwater in overall approval, his handling of the economy, management of foreign policy, inflation, even immigration in some polling.
In the Silver Bulletin polling average, Trump had a 52% approval rating (with +12 net approval) on Jan. 21. His approval has since declined to 44%, with a -9 net approval.
The big question for Trump is if, or when, the negative views on the economy and general exhaustion with volatility begin to weigh on his GOP support. His approval among GOP voters is still robust in the mid-80s, but it is showing signs of weakening on the issues. A Gallup poll over the weekend, for example, found that 36% of Republicans believe that tariffs — one of the administration’s headline policies — will “end up costing the US more money than they bring in.”
What signs of Trump’s support will you be focusing on in the months ahead?
Two things – Trump’s approval ratings on the economy and his approval ratings among Republicans. Economic performance polling is a traditional source of strength for Trump, but the economy is where he has shown his sharpest and most notable decline, largely stemming from the tariff rollout. According to the Economist/YouGov survey, Trump’s net approval on the economy was -5.8% as of last week. That is lower than at any point in his first term when he reached a nadir of a net -2%. If Trump is losing support on one of his traditionally strongest issues, that suggests he will be somewhat politically weakened in the latter half of 2025 and beyond.
Trump’s approval ratings among Republicans will be another key sign to watch. The president’s ability to command an unruly Republican conference in Congress depends in large part on his unquestioned popularity within the party. So far, that has held up: He’s still above in the mid-80s% approval among Republicans. But if that dips below 80%, Trump may no longer appear the invincible figure in the party that he does today.
What do you see as the biggest risks for Trump and his ability to advance his agenda?
Recession, market blowback, and the courts. After a big sell-off in early April, markets have stabilized somewhat following Trump’s decision to pause some of his most expansive tariff measures. But with no imminent trade deals on the horizon to clarify tariff levels, one wonders how long that confidence can hold. Similarly, a recession – beginning in the second half of the year, or potentially backdated to the first – would severely disrupt his tax cuts-and-tariffs agenda.
The courts are the biggest source of procedural risk for Trump, especially on the deportation of illegal immigrants and the spending cuts made by Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency. We have already seen strong pushback from the courts in both areas. That pushback may extend to tariffs as well, with court cases in the pipeline over the legality of the emergency authorities claimed to enact them. In all these areas, the courts’ skeptical postures toward the Trump administration’s more disruptive actions will be a major source of conflict between the branches of government over the next year.
How do you think Trump will react if some of these risks materialize? Change approach? Lash out against institutional checks on his power?
Lashing out against institutional checks is more likely. A Trump who can no longer marshal the Republican congressional conference at his will probably seek to expand executive power so that he can act without Congress. Key members of the administration have already pointed in that direction. Even with Musk poised to scale back his involvement with DOGE, the administration is claiming broad powers to reshape the federal government under the so-called unitary executive theory. Similarly, pushback from the courts will likely lead Trump to further test the exact bounds of the courts’ power, as in his moves to skirt rulings related to deported immigrant Kilmar Abrego Garcia’s case. And if an economic downturn materializes, Trump will likely blame it on the policies of the Federal Reserve and its Chairman Jerome Powell.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
President Donald Trump holds an executive order about tariffs while flanked by Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick in the Oval Office on Feb. 13, 2025.
As in other parts of his agenda, President Donald Trump has wasted no time pursuing his goal to rebalance trading relationships and revitalize US manufacturing by imposing tariffs on imports. Also, like other parts of his agenda, the tariff rollout has been chaotic, with some new measures announced, then delayed, and later reimposed.
Despite the concerns of business leaders and investors about the economic impact of these measures – which have prompted a stock market sell-off – Trump remains committed to his approach. He argues that any short-term pain will translate into long-term gain as businesses move their operations to the US and plans to announce a sweeping new round of tariffs on April 2. We asked Eurasia Group expert Nancy Wei what to expect from what Trump is billing as a “Liberation Day” from an unfair global trading system.
What measures would you highlight?
We are expecting reciprocal tariffs on countries around the world and announcements of new probes that lead to tariffs on specific product categories. Reciprocal tariffs are set in response to other countries’ trade barriers, including tariffs, taxes, and different types of non-tariff trade barriers. Another important criterion is the existence of a trade surplus with the US, seen by the Trump administration as evidence of unfair trade practices. Reciprocal tariffs apply to all goods a country exports to the US.
Which countries do you expect to be targeted?
There are three groups. The first includes trading partners with large trade surpluses with the US or that Trump has threatened to tariff for other reasons. China, Mexico, Canada, the EU, India, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia all have large trade surpluses with the US. Denmark has drawn threats of tariffs for its unwillingness to discuss transferring control of Greenland to the US, while the EU has drawn Trump’s ire for its low defense spending. We expect Trump to use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to apply tariffs on these countries immediately. After imposing 25% tariffs on Mexico and Canada on Feb. 1, Trump agreed to pause them a few days later. We expect the 25% tariff to fully take effect soon after April 2 (with a 10% carveout for Canadian energy products).
Countries in the second group (which have lower trade deficits) and in the third group (the rest of the world) will remain vulnerable to reciprocal tariffs later in the year. The risks for those in the third group will rise over time as countries in the first two groups (especially China) seek to route shipments to the US via those in the third group to avoid tariffs.
It sounds like US consumers should brace for higher prices on products from about a dozen countries after April 2. Can you give us a sense of what they export to the US?
Yes. The products affected will include autos from the EU, Mexico, Japan, and South Korea; electronics from China, Mexico, the EU, India, Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea; and consumer goods from China, Mexico, the EU, and Vietnam. That’s just a small sample.
What sort of retaliation should we expect from these countries?
Most countries in the crosshairs of Trump’s trade policies have signaled cautious responses and will seek to either negotiate concessions from the US administration or respond with carefully calibrated measures of their own. China, for example, has already responded to a first round of 10% US tariffs with retaliatory tariffs on liquefied natural gas, coal, farm machinery, and other US products. It has signaled it will respond against any additional US measures as they take effect. Mexico has indicated it will respond with measures targeted at US agricultural goods from Republican-leaning states with the aim of causing pain for producers there that will force the US to the negotiating table. The EU has said it is prepared to respond with proportionate counter-tariffs on US goods but will initially seek a negotiated settlement with Trump.
What product-specific tariffs are expected?
Trump has already announced 25% tariffs on imported automobiles, steel, and aluminum. His administration has announced a probe into trading conditions in the copper sector that is expected to result in tariffs. On April 2, he is expected to launch similar probes for several other sectors – including semiconductors, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals – that would result in tariffs by the end of this year or early next year. Trump has indicated he would like to protect the US agricultural industry from the expected retaliatory measures from US trade partners.
What will be the short- to medium-term impact of these policies?
We are projecting that average US tariff levels will probably rise this year to levels not seen since the 1940s. The resulting price increases for consumers, retaliatory measures against US firms, and general climate of uncertainty are likely to reduce the level of US economic output by 1.5% over the next year or two and cause a 1.5 percentage point increase in inflation. However, economic models are not well-equipped to estimate the impact of mass tariff hikes. We think it could be much greater in an extreme scenario, on the order of a 3% reduction in economic output and a 3 percentage point increase in inflation.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group.
Representation of the $Trump meme coin together with Bitcoin and crypto coins, seen in this photo illustration.
Though once a crypto skeptic, President Donald Trump has become an enthusiastic supporter of the industry. His media company began investing in crypto several years ago, and on the campaign trail, he pledged to reverse Joe Biden’s administration's tough regulatory approach toward this asset class. He also proposed creating a national Bitcoin stockpile, which would include the Bitcoin seized in law enforcement actions.
Trump’s recent announcement of a “strategic crypto reserve” showed his continued commitment to this idea, as well as his indifference to perceptions of conflicts of interest. Crypto-friendly investors are influential in the new administration, and Trump himself launched a crypto meme coin shortly before taking office.
We asked Eurasia Group expert Babak Minovi how a “strategic crypto reserve” would work.
What do you think the reserve’s purpose would be?
The name implies it would be similar to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, the 400 million barrels of crude oil the US holds in reserve to supply the country in the event of a disruption. This reserve has also been occasionally used to smooth out the price of oil, most recently with sales in 2020 and 2021 to help moderate post-pandemic price increases. Yet is unclear that crypto is a similarly strategic asset for the US.
Countries also hold other types of assets – usually gold and so-called hard currencies (currencies such as the US dollar that serve as a stable store of value) – for use during times of economic or financial crisis. The US dollar’s status as a global reserve currency allows the US to hold much smaller foreign exchange reserves than the size of its economy would indicate. The US currently has about $1 trillion in reserves, including about $750 billion in gold. In comparison, China has reserves of about $3.2 trillion.
Although speculative assets such as stocks or crypto are generally not included in reserves, allocating some of the US’s reserves to crypto could also be a policy objective of the administration.
What would the reserve mean for the crypto industry?
Given that crypto trading volumes have been around $0.5 trillion a day, it is highly unlikely that any reserve buying envisioned under existing norms would be of sufficient magnitude to affect crypto prices. However, the US Treasury's stamp of approval on crypto as a reserve asset would probably affect market sentiment positively, especially in the short term, by convincing more conservative investors to allocate to the asset class.
There is also the possibility that the US's entry into the crypto reserve bloc could encourage other countries to add crypto assets to their government coffers. El Salvador is another country that has allocated some of its reserves to crypto (though the practice has prompted stern warnings from the International Monetary Fund).
Do you think this is a feasible proposal that is likely to go ahead?
It's hard to say that anything is not feasible these days, given some of the administration’s unexpected early actions, but the wisdom of such a move is questionable. The current downward trend in crypto prices is not outside of historical norms, and its value could sink much more. The relative opacity of the crypto market could also leave these assets more vulnerable to bad actor manipulation, potentially causing ripple effects in financial markets.
Why do you think Trump is advancing this idea and is so bullish on crypto generally?
Though Trump was once dismissive of crypto – he said in 2019 that Bitcoin “was based on thin air” – he later shifted his stance. His deregulatory instincts probably played a role in this shift, as did the influence of people in his orbit. Close advisers such as Elon Musk, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent – plus some family members – are crypto bulls. Trump’s media company has been dabbling in crypto investments for some time, and his recent experience with the $TRUMP meme coin probably reinforced the idea of crypto’s money-making potential in the president’s mind.
The Biden administration, conversely, took a tough regulatory stance toward crypto – why do you think that is?
In a way, regulators’ concerns with crypto mirror those about any other tradeable asset. Regulators need to be able to establish ownership and price and make sure that investors aren’t swindled by false claims and fraud. The existing regulatory systems have been put in place to ensure the strength and stability of the system for stocks, bonds, foreign exchange, and commodities. A desire to extend that umbrella to crypto – a relatively new asset class – explains most of the tough stance of the previous administration.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
Chinese national flags flutter near Tian'anmen Square ahead of China's annual sessions of its top legislature and political advisory body, known as the "Two Sessions," on March 3, 2025, in Beijing.
A sluggish economy and new headwinds created by Donald Trump’s return to the White House will be prominent themes when the nearly 3,000 delegates of China’s National People’s Congress, or NPC, convene in Beijing starting Wednesday. The legislative session will run for about seven days (time not fixed) in parallel with that of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, or CPPCC. The so-called Two Sessions represent China’s biggest annual political gathering and provide insight into the leadership’s priorities for the year ahead.
We asked Eurasia Group expert Lauren Gloudeman what to watch out for.
What are the NPC and CPPCC?
The NPC is China’s highest governmental organ and national legislature. It usually convenes just once a year to advance legislation and approve national policy plans; the smaller Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress meets more often to continue the body’s legislative work. The CPPCC unites about 2,000 representatives of different social and political groups, giving them the opportunity to make their views known to the country’s leadership. Its role is more symbolic than anything else.
How does the NPC fit into China’s broader governance framework?
On the one hand, you have organs of government such as the NPC and the State Council, which implements legislation passed by the NPC and supervises the bureaucracy. On the other hand, you have the Chinese Communist Party, with its decision-making bodies such as Politburo and the Central Committee. The relationship between the government and the party has changed over time. Xi Jinping – general secretary of the party and president of the Chinese state – has made it a priority to assert the party’s authority over the government. Li Qiang, the party’s No. 2 official is premier of the State Council; Zhao Leji, the party’s No. 3 official, heads the NPC.
Are the Two Sessions’ proceedings open to the public?
The first couple of days will be open-door sessions of public speeches, reports, and press conferences. Li will present his so-called government work report. Like the US president’s state-of-the-union speech, the work report reviews the achievements of the past year and identifies key tasks ahead for the government. It usually sets economic targets. In addition, Xi will give remarks and the Ministry of Finance will give a budget report. Then there will be several days of closed-door sessions, during which not much information will emerge. At the end, different ministries will follow up with press conferences about their plans to advance policies discussed at the NPC.
What do you expect will be the main topics of discussion?
One major topic will be what to do about weak consumer spending, which has been a challenge for years now – especially since the COVID-19 lockdowns, when some people couldn’t leave their homes for months. Nonetheless, we’re not expecting a sea change in the policy approach to stimulating spending. More likely is an expansion of existing trade-in programs that offer subsidies for consumers to trade in their old EVs, household appliances, and other consumer goods for new ones.
What else would you highlight?
On a related note, officials will discuss measures to promote private enterprises. One of the reasons consumer spending is weak is that so many businesses struggled during the pandemic and continue to struggle, which has affected hiring. Authorities aggravated these problems in the private sector with an aggressive regulatory campaign against major companies they thought were insufficiently aligned with the party’s national development strategy. Now they are trying to repair the damage. Xi met last week with the leaders of 20 or 30 companies to reassure them that the government cares about stabilizing the private sector, and the NPC is expected to discuss a so-called private economy law. This measure could, for example, codify into law that private companies have equal rights and status with state-owned companies and offer guarantees of payment for private companies doing business with local governments.
How do you expect tensions with the Trump administration – which has slapped new tariffs on China and threatened more – to play into the NPC discussions?
The NPC is not an event that reacts to or is calibrated around recent events. That said, since Trump took office, we’ve been seeing the party’s high-level talking points acknowledging “external uncertainty” – which is code for Trump-related risks. Its response has been to make it clear to the country that it is committed to increasing support for the domestic economy to boost confidence. I expect these themes to be prominent at the Two Sessions.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
Ten thousand protesters gather in front of Duesseldorf Central Station to march against the AfD's upcoming afternoon rally in Duesseldorf, Germany, on Feb. 15, 2025.
Amid a deep economic crisis and renewed migration concerns, the far-right party Alternative for Germany, or AfD, is poised to double its vote share in this weekend’s general elections. As a series of random attacks by Middle Eastern or Afghan migrants have increased the appeal of the party’s harsh anti-migration stance, its gains have caught the eye of officials in US President Donald Trump’s administration. In highly unusual interventions, presidential adviser Elon Musk has urged Germans to “move past” the guilt associated with World War II and vote for the extremist AfD, while Vice President JD Vance criticized the refusal of mainstream political leaders to work with the party.
Eurasia Group expert Jan Techau says the AfD has no path to government at present, but its increasing strength is transforming German politics. We sat down with him to learn more.
What are the main issues in these elections?
Two issues stand out. The first is the economy. With terms like “de-industrialization” being bandied around, this is no cyclical adjustment but a profound economic crisis caused by a decline in productivity, high energy prices, and high taxation. Every single party has acknowledged this, even the ones that don’t typically run on economic platforms. The second is migration, which had faded into the background a little, but has been revived in the last couple of months by a series of horrific incidents. In the last one, a rejected Afghan asylum seeker, who, for whatever reason still had a residence permit, drove a car into a crowd.
The war in Ukraine also preoccupies voters, but to a lesser extent at present. The issue is expected to gain prominence during the government formation talks after the elections, especially given US President Donald Trump’s recent outreach to Russia’s Vladimir Putin to start ceasefire talks.
What has been the impact of Vance’s and Musk’s interventions in favor of the AfD?
The AfD’s strong polling is mainly the result of the recent attacks that have stoked concerns over uncontrolled migration, not these interventions by external players. Still, their comments help the AfD by normalizing it and giving it more visibility and air time. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference sent a clear signal to the foreign policy establishment assembled there: The new US government seeks friendship with far-right nationalists in Europe and considers them its real allies. This has not yet translated into better polling for the AfD but has clearly strengthened its confidence.
How do you expect the AfD to perform in the elections?
The party appears on track to win 21% or 22% of the vote, doubling its share from the last elections and finishing second behind the center-right Christian Democrats, or CDU, which is polling at about 30%. The AfD won’t be able to enter government given the aversion of mainstream parties to working with it, but it will lead the opposition, allowing it to partially set the agenda from the political fringes. The AfD’s strategy will be to adopt an obstructionist stance to make the government look bad and improve the party’s position even further ahead of the 2029 elections.
The CDU recently took a risk by accepting AdF support for a proposed bill of harsh migration measures, which was rejected by parliament. Does that mean the gambit failed?
I think it's too early to make a final judgment on whether this move was strategically successful. The aim was to create more space for centrist parties to advance stricter migration policies without being accused of pandering to the far right. What we can say is that the move has not affected the CDU’s comfortable lead in the polls despite the harsh criticism received from other mainstream parties. So, we’ll see if the next government, which the CDU is expected to lead, can advance stricter migration policies. It's interesting to note that the Christian Democrats are one of the few center-right parties that remain competitive in Europe. In most other countries they have been eclipsed by formations advocating more radical policies on migration. CDU leader Friedrich Merz is trying to avoid this fate.
So, do you expect the CDU to rule in coalition with other parties, and if so, what does that mean for governance?
Yes, we expect the CDU to form a coalition with the Social Democrats and, if necessary, another party as well. Single-party majorities or minority governments are very uncommon in the German system. Of course, coalition means compromise, which could lead to an indecisive reform agenda that is not sufficient to address the issues we see at the moment. But maybe this time will be different and the mainstream parties can rise to the occasion. They know that the AfD is waiting in the wings and eager to capitalize on any governmental dysfunction in the 2029 elections.
When will we get some indication about the cohesion and strength of the next government?
The post-election coalition talks that will start shortly after the elections will give us an idea about what the next government wants to do and what – beyond the parties’ campaign rhetoric – is really possible. The war in Ukraine will also start to have an impact at this point, as the new government will have to contemplate the policy implications of Trump’s push to broker a cease-fire and get European countries to assume more responsibility for Ukraine’s security. The German mindset is very domestically focused, and the government will very likely be faced early on with requests to shoulder a massive new military exposure.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
Viewpoint: With his reelection bid, Ecuador’s Noboa seeks more time to bring violence under control
Supporters hold cardboard cutouts of Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, days before the Ecuadorian presidential election, in Guayaquil, Ecuador, on Feb. 4, 2025.
Ecuadorians will head to the polls on Feb. 9 to choose their next president against a backdrop of spiraling violence similar to that of the last presidential election in 2023. That was an early vote called by then-President Guillermo Lasso in an attempt to avoid impeachment. Daniel Noboa, the fresh-faced son of a banana magnate, achieved an upset victory, assumed the presidency, and launched an aggressive crackdown against the drug trafficking gangs terrorizing the country.
Less than two years later, the 38-year-old president is asking for a full term in office (four years) in this weekend’s regularly scheduled election. Noboa says he wants to finish what he started, and his clear lead in the polls suggests that voters are inclined to give him the opportunity. We sat down with Eurasia Group expert Risa Grais-Targow to learn more about the upcoming election.
What are voters’ biggest concerns?
The main issue by far is security, followed by economic concerns. There was a crisis of electricity outages toward the end of last year, but that has been abated by recent rains (the country is heavily dependent on hydropower) and fallen lower on the list of voter concerns. However, there has been a renewed deterioration of the security situation, and the start of this year has been one of the most violent ever.
What is driving this violence? Are political candidates being targeted, as in 2023?
No high-profile candidates have been targeted this time (presidential hopeful Fernando Villavicencio was shot and killed in 2023), but some local officials have been killed and there may be a political motive behind the latest wave of violence. Noboa has really made the fight against organized crime a pillar of his presidency. When he took office in January 2024, he declared a state of emergency, brought the military out onto the streets, and took control of the country’s prisons, which had been a hotbed of criminal activity. So criminal groups may be intensifying their battles for control of drug-transit routes partly in the hope that the resulting uptick in violence will lead voters to conclude the president’s approach is not working.
Is it working? Given these still high levels of violence under Noboa, why is he leading in the polls?
Noboa’s policies initially brought a dramatic decline in homicide rates and other violence. Since then, it’s possible that criminal groups found ways to work around them. Still, levels of violence are lower than at their late 2023 peak. More broadly, voters support Noboa’s policies and believe that he is doing the right thing or trying to do the right thing. They think he needs more time. He's only been in office for just over a year, so I think voters are still, at this juncture, willing to give him the benefit of the doubt.
Are there other reasons for this high level of support for Noboa?
I think that he is still viewed by voters as a bit of an outsider, someone who is shaking up Ecuadorian politics. He came out of nowhere in 2023 to win the election. He's very young and still kind of feels like a fresh face. The other thing he has going for him is that his main opponent, Luisa Gonzalez, is not a strong candidate with a clear message on the issues voters care about. She represents the correismo movement launched by former president Rafael Correa, which has a very loyal base but also is strongly disliked by some parts of the electorate.
What has happened to correismo? It used to be a dominant force in Ecuadorian politics, but its fortunes seem to have declined in the last couple of elections.
The movement has struggled to come up with a compelling forward-looking campaign message, focusing more on attacking Noboa and peddling nostalgia about conditions during Correa’s time in office (2007-2017). Moreover, the country’s security crisis has focused attention on decisions Correa made such as expelling the US military from the base in Manta. Similarly, the country’s current reliance on hydropower and shaky electricity grid stems from decisions made under Correa, including his flagship Chinese-built Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric dam, which has major structural problems.
At the same time, Noboa’s young National Democratic Action party seems to be consolidating its position. What is the significance of this?
Ecuadorian politics seems to be consolidating around two main parties, National Democratic Action and Correismo, which marks a departure from its typical fragmentation. This can be a stabilizing force for a country with a long history of political instability and volatility.
What are some things Ecuador’s next president could do to address the country’s problems?
Noboa wants to amend the constitution to allow foreign military bases in Ecuador, reversing the policy instituted by Correa. The country is doing battle with multinational criminal organizations – the groups in Ecuador report, for example, to Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel – so having foreign military and intelligence assistance is potentially a big deal. This is a popular idea locally but will need to be put to a public referendum. In terms of electricity supply, Noboa has been changing regulations to stimulate investment in new generation capacity, and I think if he is elected to a new four-year term, that could help get some of these projects moving. Finally, under the terms of the country’s financial support package from the IMF, the next president will have to raise tax revenue and cut back on fuel subsidies. The latter is a particularly challenging issue that has prompted mass public protests in the past.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor, Eurasia Group