We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
Viewpoint
Bharatiya Janata Party supporters hold party flags while waiting for Narendra Modi's road show during an election campaign in Guwahati, Assam, India, on April 16, 2024.
The world’s most populous country will hold elections between April 19 and 1 June for its lower house of parliament, the Lok Sabha. The 543-member chamber is India’s primary legislative body, and its composition will determine which party or coalition gets to nominate a prime minister and form the next government. Over the 44-day electoral period, nearly 970 million people will be eligible to vote, the most ever. More than 1 million polling stations will be set up, and officials will be dispatched to remote corners of the country’s vast geography to collect ballots.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, one of the world’s most popular heads of state, is expected to lead his Bharatiya Janata Party to a comfortable victory and secure a third consecutive term in office. We sat down with Eurasia Group experts Rahul Bhatia and Pramit Pal Chaudhuri to learn more about the upcoming elections.
What are the main issues for voters?
The chief concerns are inflation, particularly high food prices, and unemployment, especially among the youth. More than one-third of Indians believe they are worse off than before the pandemic-induced lockdowns, while about two-thirds say it is now harder to find a job. Though religious-political issues are also on voters' minds, they hold less weight than economic ones.
Despite apparent concerns about the economy, an overwhelming 75% of Indians approve of Modi’s leadership. He gets high marks for delivering targeted welfare schemes, upgrading the country’s infrastructure, and raising India’s international profile. He also gets credit for implementing elements of the BJP’s longstanding religious-political agenda, such as constructing a grand temple dedicated to the Hindu deity Ram and revoking the special autonomous status of the Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir region.
Modi has come under criticism for alleged anti-democratic tendencies – why is that and will this be a factor for voters?
Under Modi, press and political freedoms have suffered. Opposition parties have accused the prime minister of using government investigative agencies to harass opposition leaders and constrain their ability to contest elections. Other critics allege the government has undermined India’s secular constitution and its pluralistic values with its actions favoring the country’s Hindu majority population. While Modi's attitude toward civil liberties is not unlike that of past prime ministers who enjoyed a similar single-party majority, there are genuine concerns about democratic backsliding in India. Nevertheless, apart from a small urban elite, the average Indian voter doesn’t seem concerned.
What is the state of the opposition alliance?
Since the 2014 elections that brought Modi to power, the Indian National Congress, India’s largest opposition party, has struggled with a lack of clear leadership and an inability to craft an alternative political narrative that could capture the imagination of voters. It recently pivoted to an agenda of social and economic justice, but this strategy has not yet been tested at the ballot box.
Last July, the Congress and 25 smaller parties formed the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance, aka INDIA, a big-tent coalition to pool their vote shares and create a stronger challenger to Modi and the BJP. However, the alliance has failed to cohere, and some regional parties have defected to the BJP’s alliance. Moreover, while seat-sharing arrangements had been agreed upon in some states, key regional parties have decided to contest their strongholds on their own, defeating the alliance’s purpose. The Congress and its partners remain far behind the BJP in the polls; they are not fighting to win the upcoming elections but rather to preserve their respective geographic power bases and limit Modi’s majority.
Modi has indicated he wants an expanded parliamentary majority – what does he aim to achieve in a potential third term?
Modi has said he aims to win 370 seats in the lower house of parliament, up from 303 at present. He is seeking a strong mandate to push through legislative changes – some of which are unpopular or challenge vested interests – that he believes are necessary to bolster economic growth. He wants to simplify the tax code and advance reforms on land, labor, agriculture, education, health, and electricity – which require the support of the states. A new Modi-led government would also continue efforts to upgrade infrastructure, including roads, railways, and airports.
Separately, Modi would seek to end India’s religion-based civil laws governing marriage and other issues and subsume them into a single uniform civil code – a process that has already begun at the state level.
Is Modi expected to serve just one more term? Is there a succession plan? What legacy does he want to leave behind?
It’s anybody’s guess whether another five-year term would be the last for Modi, who is 73 years old. He wants to leave behind a legacy of cementing India’s middle-income country status, raising its international stature, and correcting what the BJP believes are institutional biases against India’s Hindu population.
It does seem clear, however, that the BJP will face a succession problem when Modi steps down. The polls indicate that one in three people who vote for the BJP do so because they like Modi, not the BJP. As a result, the party might want Modi to contest the next elections in 2029 and then step down after that. While Amit Shah, the home minister, seems to be Modi’s preferred successor, he would probably face a leadership challenge from Yogi Adityanath, the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, and possibly from Himanta Biswa Sarma, the chief minister of Assam.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
Viewpoint: South Korea’s president looks to legislative elections to kickstart his agenda
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol speaking at the presidential office on TV at Seoul Railroad Station in Seoul. April 1, 2024
All 300 seats in South Korea's unicameral legislature will be up for grabs in the April 10 election, offering President Yoon Suk-yeol the opportunity to kickstart his agenda if his conservative People Power Party, or PPP, can gain control of the National Assembly. The center-left Democratic Party of Korea, aka DP, currently holds a majority of the seats in the chamber and has frustrated Yoon’s efforts to advance business-friendly policies since he took office in 2022.
Nonetheless, the PPP faces long odds in flipping the chamber, according to Eurasia Group expert Jeremy Chan. We asked him to explain.
Why the poor prospects for the PPP?
The conservative party would need to gain roughly three dozen seats to recapture the National Assembly, a tall order that will be made even more challenging by Yoon’s low approval rating, which hovers below 40%. While his name will not appear on the ballot, the election is widely seen as a referendum on Yoon’s administration.
For Yoon, failing to recapture the National Assembly would effectively render him a lame duck with more than half of his term in office remaining. It would put his agenda of cuts to taxes and government spending on life support and make him the first Korean president in decades to serve an entire five-year term without ever exerting control over the legislature. Attention would promptly shift to the race to succeed Yoon in the 2027 presidential election.
What are the main issues for voters?
The state of the economy is at the top of the list, particularly sluggish growth and worrying debt levels for households and corporations. A recent rebound in Korea’s export sector — largely driven by an uptick in global demand for Korean semiconductors — has provided a bit of a tailwind to the economy, but overall sentiment remains negative. Voters are likely to hold the ruling conservative party responsible for this situation, even as the opposition in the National Assembly has watered down many of Yoon’s business-friendly reforms, which are meant to stimulate growth.
Scandals and other allegations of impropriety are another top voter concern. Many left-leaning voters find Yoon’s leadership style imperious, particularly his attacks against critical media outlets. His wife, Kim Keon-hee, is also a lightning rod for public criticism, with Yoon postponing a trip to Germany and Denmark in February to keep her out of the spotlight; if left-leaning opposition parties hold onto the National Assembly, they are likely to open an investigation into allegations that Yoon’s wife received unreported gifts and committed other misdeeds. Meanwhile, the leader of the DP, Lee Jae-myung, continues to face his own corruption investigations, which has decreased support for the main center-left opposition party.
What can this election tell us about the state of Korean politics?
Polls suggest that the election will likely be decided by a narrower margin than the last legislative election in 2020; the top two candidates in roughly 60 single-member districts are polling within the margin of error. Tempers are also running high in Korea, where political polarization has worsened in recent years. Both Yoon and Lee — the runner-up in the 2022 contest — are divisive figures, which has increased support for splinter parties, most notably the newly formed Cho Kuk Innovation Party. Korean politics have traditionally been dominated by two major political parties, but this election may be a harbinger of a more pluralistic system to come. With 30 of the 300 seats in the National Assembly to be allocated to non-major parties, chances are high that neither the PPP nor the DP will secure an outright majority.
Will the election outcome change Korea’s relations with the US, Japan, China, or North Korea?
This election will not have a significant effect on Korea’s foreign policy. Regardless of the outcome, Yoon will retain wide latitude over Korea’s external relations, including in diplomacy, security, and trade. Yoon will continue to deepen Seoul’s ties with Washington and Tokyo — he will participate in a trilateral summit with US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington in July — while relations with Beijing and Pyongyang will remain strained. The US is on the verge of overtaking China as Korea’s top export market, and Korean firms are increasingly directing their investments away from China. By the time Yoon steps down in 2027, his successor will face a remarkably different external environment than the one Yoon inherited in 2022.
If the conservative party manages to pull off an upset, how will that change the political landscape in Korea?
A conservative victory in the legislative elections — not likely but also not unthinkable — would breathe new life into Yoon’s presidency. His administration would move quickly to enact a raft of business-friendly reforms, including lowering taxes on corporations and increasing government support for small- and medium-sized enterprises.
“Strategic” industries such as semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, biotech, and AI would likely benefit from greater policy attention. And Lee would come under increasing pressure to step down as head of the DP.
A PPP-controlled National Assembly would also put wind in the sails of the government’s recently announced “Corporate Value Up Program.” The program is designed to reduce the “Korea discount” whereby domestic firms have lower valuations than peer companies in Japan and Taiwan; it promises tax credits and other incentives to firms that “value up” their stock price through increased dividend payments, share buybacks, and improvements to their corporate governance.
An Iranian man walks past campaign posters for the parliamentary election in Tehran, Iran, February 27, 2024.
Iranians will go to the polls on March 1 to vote for a new parliament, which will serve for a four-year term. They will also vote for members of the Assembly of Experts, a body of clerics that is tasked with selecting a new Supreme Leader and serves a six-year term. However, given that the Islamic regime now carefully manages election outcomes to protect its grip on power, voter participation is expected to plumb new record lows. We asked Eurasia Group analyst Greg Brew to explain the significance of this week’s polls.
What is the position of parliament in the Iranian system?
Iran’s constitution delineates legislative powers to the parliament, which also oversees the budget and cabinet appointments. However, parliament’s power is constricted by Iran’s powerful executive branch, particularly the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as well as the Guardian Council, a small group of clerics and senior figures who sign off on all legislation and determine who is eligible to run for office. Given these restrictions, parliament is regarded by many Iranians as a rubber-stamp committee with little real control over government policy, a feeling that has only grown more pronounced since 2020, when elections were stage-managed by the Guardian Council to ensure hardliners dominated parliament. Authorities also carefully controlled the 2021 presidential election to ensure Ebrahim Raisi, an arch conservative with close ties to Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was elected. (The next presidential election will be in 2025, when Raisi is expected to run for reelection.)
What steps is the regime taking to control the election outcome?
As with 2020, the Guardian Council has taken a heavy hand in vetting candidates: Out of the thousands of applications, many were disqualified from running for office, including most prominent reformists and moderates. This ensures the new parliament will remain dominated by hardliners with a strong affiliation with Khamenei, the IRGC, and the conservative clerical faction.
Is the sense of public alienation toward the regime growing?
Dissatisfaction with the regime is currently very high, owing to a variety of factors that include a weak economy, high inflation, widespread corruption, and ongoing and intensifying political repression. The fact that elections are now carefully managed by authorities has produced a broad view that they are sham affairs: as a result, participation in elections has dropped from over 70% to roughly 50%. It is expected to be even lower this year, perhaps the lowest on record. While the regime likely retains the support of some of the population, most Iranians view the Islamic Republic as an illegitimate government.
So, is there a chance of unrest around the vote?
Despite this widespread dissatisfaction, the circumstances don’t seem conducive to the kind of public protest that occurred in 2022, when thousands took to the streets following the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the morality police. The force of the government crackdown in response to those protests and the ongoing efforts to suppress new displays of discontent, as well as the generally bleak outlook for political reform, means most Iranians are averse to taking to the streets. Instead, citizens will express their dissatisfaction by staying at home and not participating in elections.
How worried is the regime about its legitimacy?
The Islamic Republic has held power for more than forty years. It possesses a large and sophisticated security apparatus and a toolkit of repressive measures that it uses to suppress public dissatisfaction. It is a government has proven, time and again, that it is willing to kill its own people in large numbers in order to remain in power.
That said, the regime has reasons to be worried about its position. Its credibility on a number of important issues, from the economy to terrorism, water scarcity and inflation, is in serious question. It is defined by self-dealing, with more and more of the nation’s wealth flowing to a small elite, particularly senior officers in the IRGC. Millions of Iranians are trying to leave the country, particularly educated members of the middle class.
What are the prospects for political change in the mid-to-long term?
The regime is confident it can hold on to power. It’s fixated on a potential succession crisis, given that Khamenei is eighty-four and in poor health, and the reason for stage-managed elections has been to ensure there’s a smooth transition from the current leader to a Khamenei 2.0. That’s why reformists and moderates have been squeezed out, with even former president Hasan Rouhani denied the opportunity to run for a seat on the Assembly of Experts. There’s virtually no chance the regime permits any reforms or positive political changes, at least not until after succession.
But this policy comes with its own dangers. The Iranian public appears unwilling to resume protests for the moment, but that could change. By refusing to reform, the regime has further undermined its legitimacy, and the transition to a new, similarly conservative Supreme Leader will only harden public dissatisfaction. Iran may be quiet, but it’s a powder keg that could go off at any time.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
Indonesia's Defence Minister and presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto is gesturing to his supporters during an election campaign rally at the Gelora Delta Stadium in Sidoarjo, East Java, Indonesia, on Feb. 9, 2024.
Voters in the world’s third-largest democracy will go to the polls on Wednesday to choose their next president. The popular incumbent Joko Widodo, aka Jokowi, is barred from running for reelection by term limits and has thrown his support behind three-time presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, a former military officer and the current defense minister. Thanks to this support, in addition to generous campaign promises and a slick image makeover, Prabowo, 72, appears well-positioned to join the club of septuagenarian world leaders. We asked Eurasia Group expert Peter Mumford how this came about.
What are the main issues in the election?
Cost-of-living concerns and inequality are key themes, which Prabowo in particular is seeking to tap into with generous — but costly — spending promises such as free lunches for students. In previous contests, divisive identity politics have shaped voter preferences, but there has been less of that in this election.
Both Prabowo and former Central Java governor Ganjar Pranowo offer continuity from Jokowi’s administration albeit with some differences — Prabowo would be more nationalist and populist, Ganjar likely more business-friendly. Former Jakarta Gov. Anies Baswedan is running as the “change” or “anti-Jokowi” candidate.
That said, personalities, rather than issues or policies, tend to drive elections in Indonesia.
Is personality the reason for Prabowo’s popularity? Isn’t he a controversial former military officer?
Yes, he is. Prabowo has been accused of committing human rights abuses during his time as a special forces commander under the Suharto “New Order” dictatorship that lasted from 1967 to 1998; he was dismissed from the military but was never charged with any crimes. Prabowo was close to the former dictator and even (for a time) married to his daughter.
In the past, Prabowo has referred in broad terms to “reducing the cost of democracy” — seen by some as a euphemism for reversing the move to direct presidential elections in Indonesia or other steps in a more authoritarian direction. Prabowo’s most ardent critics fear he will return to the Suharto era with a “New Order 2.0,” but this seems unlikely and would trigger strong public pushback. The defense minister has long had a “strongman” persona that appeals to a segment of the population.
But he has taken steps to broaden his appeal, right?
Yes, he has deployed social media effectively to rebrand himself and broaden his appeal. The cat-loving, cuddly grandpa cartoons and avatar appearing on billboards and social media output are intended to moderate his previously stern and out-of-touch image. Meanwhile, social media clips of him dancing seek to dispel any concerns about his age and rumors surrounding his health.
And how significant is Jokowi’s support?
The popular president’s clear but unofficial support is probably the key factor in Prabowo’s surge in the polls. Jokowi defeated Prabowo in the presidential races of 2014 and 2019 and then made the former military officer defense minister in his second administration. Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, is Prabowo’s running mate in the current election.
Prabowo is now polling very close to the 50% support threshold needed to win the presidency in the first round of the election, but turnout will be a key watchpoint. He is popular with younger voters, who tend to turn out in smaller proportions. Anies and Ganjar trail far behind, locked in an intense battle for runner-up and a place in the potential second round. If there is a runoff, Prabowo will still be the clear favorite, regardless of whether his opponent is Ganjar or Anies.
Why is Jokowi so popular and what is his legacy?
Jokowi is unusually popular for a president who has been in power for nearly ten years. Much of this is down to his “man of the people” personality, despite concerns among his more pluralistic backers about his weakening support for democracy and good governance in recent years. He somehow retains an “outsider” appeal despite being in power for so long and in recent years joining the establishment tradition of dynasty building (as shown by the presence of his son on Prabowo’s electoral ticket).
Jokowi has failed to achieve his promised 7% economic growth rate, but Indonesia has outpaced most other emerging market countries. Jokowi has also led significant progress on infrastructure development — most notably the launch of the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Train (though not without controversy), Jakarta subway, and new tolls roads, especially on Java island — and improving the business environment (though many challenges remain). Poverty and unemployment are decreasing as well, though youth jobless rates are concerning, and inequality remains high.
What challenges will the next president face?
The next president will inherit a relatively strong economy; the priority will be sustaining the positive momentum and further boosting growth while also addressing youth unemployment and inequality. Delivering on populist campaign promises could be a challenge, especially for Prabowo, who has offered more giveaways. Any weakening of democratic institutions — should it occur — would likely trigger social protests. Backward steps on reform or governance could weaken the country’s appeal for foreign investors and its growth trajectory. Meanwhile, balancing relations with the US and China will take careful handling, though the elections are unlikely to result in a shift away from Indonesia’s longstanding “non-aligned” foreign policy.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
A fruit vendor waits for customers in front of campaign posters of a political party, ahead of general elections, in Karachi, Pakistan, on Feb. 1, 2024.
Resigned to the absence of the country’s most popular politician, Pakistanis will vote in elections on Thursday to choose their next government. Imran Khan, a former cricket star and prime minister, has been convicted on charges widely seen as trumped up by Pakistan’s powerful military and barred from holding public office. Though Pakistan is officially a democratic republic, its military plays an outsized role in the country’s politics, engineering elections in favor of its preferred leaders.
We asked Eurasia Group’s Rahul Bhatia and Pramit Pal Chaudhuri to explain.
What is the reason for the crackdown on Khan and his party?
Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the military has directly ruled the country for about three decades while calling the shots from behind the scenes for most of the rest of the time. It had previously favored Khan and his populist Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party, hoping they would serve as a counterweight to Pakistan’s two traditional parties, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). These two parties had cooperated to re-establish a civilian-led democracy in the country in 2008, and the military saw them as a threat to its pre-eminence.
While the military helped secure the PTI’s victory in 2018, Khan soon fell out with his benefactors. Four years into his term, Khan was removed from office through a no-confidence motion after the military grew weary of his poor handling of the economy, foreign policy blunders, and interference in military affairs. But Khan refused to go quietly and launched a street campaign against the new government. The situation escalated in May 2023, when Khan’s arrest on corruption charges prompted his supporters to take to the streets and attack military installations across the country, including the army headquarters. This was too much for the military, and it began a systematic crackdown on Khan and his party through a campaign of extrajudicial detentions, harassment, and intimidation.
How will the crackdown affect the election and its outcome?
The military’s crackdown has left the PTI fighting for survival. More than 10,000 PTI leaders and workers have been detained since May 2023. Its leader, Khan, has been incarcerated for leaking classified information and illegally selling state gifts; he is barred from holding public office for ten years. Pakistan’s election commission has disallowed most PTI candidates from contesting the polls and stripped the party of its ballot symbol. This is particularly harmful as 40% of Pakistan’s electorate is semi-literate, making it difficult for many PTI supporters to identify their candidates.
Meanwhile, authorities have cleared the legal obstacles for Nawaz Sharif, another former prime minister who had fallen out with the military in a previous term, to run for office. His PML-N is now expected to easily secure a parliamentary majority. Though Khan is the most popular politician in Pakistan, the PTI will struggle to get more than a handful of seats in the 336-member national assembly.
What accounts for Khan’s enduring popularity?
The former captain of the Pakistani cricket team, Khan was already a popular sporting icon before he entered politics. An astute politician, he has created a cult of personality around himself by mobilizing Pakistan’s new middle class, who have become disillusioned by the country's political process and the establishment parties (PML-N and PPP). Furthermore, his message of clean governance and his criticism of the IMF, the US, and even the military resonates with many urban poor who have been badly affected by high inflation and low economic growth. His popularity has risen even further since he was removed from office and arrested.
Do you expect unrest driven by Khan’s supporters around the elections? On a similar scale to that triggered by his arrest?
It is highly unlikely that there will be widespread protests similar to those in May 2023 following the election results. Despite Khan’s popularity, that of his party seems to have fallen lately. Many voters seem resigned to the fact that the elections will be skewed against the PTI, while Sharif’s PML-N is gaining support in his native Punjab. Areas where the PTI remains popular, such as the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, north Punjab, and some northern urban areas, will probably experience some unrest. But the Pakistani security forces should be able to handle it without too much trouble.
What challenges will the next government face?
Addressing economic difficulties – nearly 40% of Pakistanis live below the poverty line and inflation is running at about 30% – will be the next government’s primary challenge. To do so it will need financial assistance. It will need to negotiate a new loan facility with the IMF. An agreement with the IMF has been made a prerequisite by Pakistan’s main external creditors – China, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar – to provide additional financial support.
A new IMF agreement will require the government to undertake difficult economic overhauls, including tax hikes, privatizations of state-owned companies, and reforms to its financial and power sectors. While a government led by Sharif may be able to carry this agenda to a degree, given how the election is being engineered in his favor, he may lack the political capital to see it through or handle any street protests that may follow. Overall, while a newly elected government will bring more stability to Pakistan, questions over its legitimacy will undermine its ability to govern.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group
Supporters of Lai Ching-te, Taiwan's vice president and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's presidential candidate attend, a campaign event in New Taipei City, Taiwan, on Jan. 6, 2024.
The world will be watching when Taiwanese voters head to the polls on Jan. 13 to choose their next president. The first in a series of elections with global ramifications in 2024, Taiwan’s vote will be a flashpoint in the tense US-China relationship. China regards Taiwan as a breakaway territory and has vowed to unify with it, by force if necessary. Taiwan has the backing of the US, which would feel pressured to come to the island’s defense in the event of a conflict with China.
The election is shaping up into a close contest between the independence-leaning candidate William Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, and Hou You-ih of the Kuomintang, aka KMT, who favors closer relations with China.
We asked Eurasia Group expert Ava Shen what to watch for.
What is the state of play of the race?
The DPP’s Lai remains the front-runner and has held a consistent lead in this election cycle, but his lead has been narrowing. According to the latest polling data available from Jan. 1-2, he is about five points ahead of the KMT’s Hou, who started gaining ground in late November. Winning the party’s official nomination, with Jaw Shaw-kong chosen as his running mate, has helped Hou consolidate the support of the KMT base. The end to efforts to broker a presidential joint ticket with Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party, or TPP, has also helped.
This momentum gives the KMT a lot of confidence in its ability to mobilize a last-minute surge in support, possibly thanks to strategic voting by TPP supporters who don’t want another DPP administration. Lai remains favored to win, but it’s going to be close. It’s also noteworthy that Lai, if he wins, would probably do so with less than 50% of the vote. That marks a shift from the elections of 2016 and 2020 when current President Tsai Ing-wen comfortably cleared that threshold.
What would a Lai victory mean for relations with China?
Beijing would probably have an immediate negative reaction. It has signaled multiple times that it is deeply wary of Lai, who has a history of comments in favor of full independence for Taiwan, a red line for China. It would respond in two ways. First, it would probably reduce the number of Taiwanese products that are subject to preferential tariff rates under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, the cross-strait trade agreement signed in 2010. In a warning shot to Taiwan’s voters, it excluded 12 Taiwanese products from the agreement in mid-December.
Second, China would likely intensify what it has already been doing in the military sphere. If Beijing judges any of Lai’s post-election remarks to be provocative, it will consider flying larger numbers of fighter jets over the Taiwan Strait, deploying more coast guard or naval vessels, and possibly moving those military assets closer to Taiwan’s main island. It could enter for the first time Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone.
But Lai has moderated his rhetoric recently, hasn’t he?
Yes. He has indicated on the campaign trail that he would maintain the status quo and continue the approach that Tsai has taken to cross-strait relations. Still, from Beijing’s perspective, this is not enough. It does not like Tsai’s cross-strait policies but believes she has exercised restraint in managing tensions. It views Lai as more reckless.
Nonetheless, as I said, Lai is not likely to win by a large margin, and his party will probably lose its majority in the legislature. This is important to Beijing because it sends a signal that the DPP doesn’t have complete control over the island’s politics and that not everyone supports independence. That gives Beijing some hope that the idea of unification is not dead.
So, we think tensions are likely to rise in the event of a Lai victory, but it won’t be a catastrophic situation.
And what would a Hou victory mean for cross-strait relations?
If Hou wins, there is less of a risk of Beijing increasing the pressure against Taipei in the short term. However, there is a risk it will resume aggressive tactics over the long term if Hou doesn’t agree to upgrade cross-strait ties economically and politically. China wants to move toward more regular contact between government officials on both sides and take steps toward unification.
Hou has said he wants to start with more cultural and economic engagement, and if things go well, gradually progress to more political exchange, something that Taiwanese society broadly opposes. So, he's saying he wants to put off the political engagement that Beijing is seeking, and the question is, how long is Beijing going to patiently wait?
What’s at stake for the US in this election?
The US’s official stance is that it has no preferred candidate, and I think it has been consistent in maintaining this approach even in private interactions with Taiwan counterparts. The bilateral relationship is robust, and all three of the main Taiwanese parties are committed to close US ties.
That said, President Joe Biden’s administration likely recognizes that a Lai victory has the potential to jeopardize the recent stabilization of the fraught US-China relationship if it provokes an aggressive Chinese response, putting the US under pressure to offer a gesture of support. As Eurasia Group noted in its Top Risks 2024 report, Lai is one of a handful of “dangerous friends,” a group of friendly world leaders who may draw the US into expanded conflicts this year.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
Flags of the European Union and China are seen in this multiple-exposure illustration.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel will visit Beijing on Dec. 7 for in-person meetings with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang. The two sides want to show a commitment to dialog at a time when their relations are coming under mounting strain, as underscored by the recent opening of an EU probe into unfair Chinese competition in the electric vehicle sector.
Similar to last month’s meeting between Xi and US President Joe Biden, this week’s EU-China summit is not expected to produce any major breakthroughs. To find out more, we spoke with Emre Peker, a director for Eurasia Group’s Europe practice, and Anna Ashton, a director for the China practice.
Why is this meeting happening now?
Emre Peker: The last time Xi and the EU’s top two officials met in person was in 2019 in Beijing, before the pandemic struck. They have met virtually a couple of times since. This week’s in-person gathering is meant to showcase Brussels and Beijing’s willingness to maintain a healthy dialog despite their growing differences.
Anna Ashton: Both sides have sought increased engagement since Beijing began lifting its strict COVID policies toward the end of 2022. The EU-China trade and investment relationship is crucial for both. Other issues of common concern include climate change, global health, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
What does the EU want to achieve at the summit?
Peker: Among other issues, the EU wants to address growing imbalances in its economic relations with China as well as the war in Ukraine. A key priority is to highlight the EU’s willingness to take measures to protect itself against Chinese industrial subsidies and overcapacity, which are contributing to a record-high trade deficit with China. Brussels will also seek greater Chinese collaboration on enforcing sanctions against Russia by presenting a list of Chinese companies that will be targeted for penalties unless Beijing helps halt the trans-shipment of dual-use goods. Lastly, the EU will seek to convince Beijing that Europe’s stance on China is distinct from that of the US, particularly on economic matters, to obtain more cooperation and avert escalating tensions.
What does China want?
Ashton: Protecting trade and investment ties with the EU has grown more important for Beijing given the economic headwinds it faces at home. Moreover, Chinese authorities worry about the EU’s drift toward China policies resembling those of the US and want to hammer out a distinct and more cooperative path for China-EU relations. But progress is likely to be limited given their differences on a range of issues. These include the flood of Chinese EVs entering the EU; EU steps to bolster export controls on dual-use goods — particularly tech products — and consider outbound investment screening; the obstacles faced by European companies to doing business in China; and European accusations of Chinese circumvention of sanctions on Russia.
What are the best-case outcomes we can expect?
Peker: On the economic front, a best-case outcome would be an agreement from Beijing to immediately remove trade barriers for certain EU products (such as medical devices and infant formula) and take steps that would facilitate greater market access and investment opportunities for European companies generally. On the diplomatic front, China would proactively collaborate in enforcing sanctions on Russia and commit to more diplomatic engagement on Ukraine’s 10-point peace plan.
Ashton: China’s ties with the EU are strained, but not as fraught as those with the US, so theoretically there is potential for deliverables that equal or surpass those of the Biden-Xi summit, where the two sides agreed to cooperate on bilateral irritants such as fentanyl precursors and military-to-military dialogue. China could offer narrow concessions on market access, but given the limited receptiveness shown to EU trade and investment concerns, does not appear likely to offer broad concessions. Though China and the EU continue to harbor sharply different views about the causes of the war in Ukraine and essential terms for its resolution, Beijing could signal a willingness to participate in future rounds of talks.
How do you expect EU-China relations to evolve over the medium term?
Peker: Given the expectation that the summit will not deliver any major breakthroughs, the EU will likely continue to harden its stance against China, raising the risk of Chinese commercial retaliation. The EU will not likely be able to convince Beijing of its autonomy from the US on China policies, hurting EU ambitions to establish more constructive engagement with China. Therefore, the EU is likely to seek open communication channels and stable commercial ties in the medium term, while trying to reduce dependencies on China in the long run.
Ashton: Beijing is unlikely to shift the EU away from its assessment that China has become an economic competitor. Therefore, China will continue its efforts to drive a wedge between the EU’s and the US’s approaches to relations with China, but its success in this regard will largely be determined by the politics of EU member states and the policies of the next administration in Washington.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
Latest
Viewpoint: India gears up for biggest elections ever
Iranian election turnout could set new record low
Pakistan holds elections without Imran Khan
Taiwan holds first big election of 2024
