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Viewpoint
Supporters react during an election campaign rally for Sajith Premadasa, leader of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) party, ahead of the presidential election, in Colombo, Sri Lanka September 18, 2024.
On Sept. 21, Sri Lanka will hold its first presidential vote since the spectacular economic meltdown of 2022, when the pandemic-scarred country defaulted on its massive debts, imports dried up, and widespread shortages of basic goods developed. Images of angry protesters invading the luxurious estates of the president and prime minister appeared on television screens around the world.
Following a government shakeup, new President Ranil Wickremesinghe negotiated a bailout with the IMF that helped to stabilize the situation. He is asking voters this weekend for another five years in office to continue the work of rebuilding the economy, but the tough terms of the IMF program have undermined his support.
We asked Eurasia Group expert Rahul Bhatia what to expect from the upcoming election.
What are the main issues for voters? Is the IMF program a campaign issue?
Economic issues have naturally taken center stage in the election as Sri Lanka continues its fragile recovery. While shortages of everyday essentials such as food, fuel, and medicines have subsided, there is still widespread discontent over the increased cost of living and reduced welfare programs. The IMF bail-out mandated austerity measures such as tax hikes and subsidy cuts, which have increased hardships for many Sri Lankans.
As a result, most candidates are campaigning on promises such as cutting taxes, raising the salaries of government employees, providing subsidies for low-income groups and farmers, and lowering fuel and electricity prices. None of the frontrunners have opposed the IMF program in principle, but most have promised to renegotiate it.
How far has the economy come since the crisis of 2022?
The economy returned to modest growth in the second half of 2023, and inflation, too, has eased to normal levels from its peak of nearly 70% at the height of the crisis. Nevertheless, economic output declined by 9.5% over 2022 and 2023, and it will take time for it to return to pre-crisis levels. About one-quarter of the population still lives below the poverty line, as the economic crisis and subsequent austerity measures have disproportionately affected low and middle-income families. Overall, Sri Lanka’s economic situation remains precarious, and it will need a stable government to complete its recovery.
Who are the frontrunners in this election?
Amid a field of 38 contestants, there are four clear frontrunners: the incumbent Wickremesinghe, opposition leader Sajith Premadasa, the leftist Anura Kumara Dissanayake, and Namal Rajapaksa, scion of the Rajapaksa family that once dominated the island's politics but has been largely discredited by the economic crisis. (Then-president President Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled the country after angry protesters invaded his residence in July 2022.) This means the presidential election will effectively be a three-way contest between Wickremesinghe, Premadasa, and Dissanayake.
What are they offering?
Veteran politician Wickremesinghe is campaigning on steering the country out of its worst economic crisis in modern times. Meanwhile, Premadasa and Dissanayake have sought to exploit the unpopularity of his austerity measures and have promised to ease the burden for Sri Lankans. They have also leveled charges of corruption against Wickremesinghe.
Premadasa comes from a well-known political family, but Dissanayake was a marginal player in Sri Lankan politics until recently. His popularity has risen rapidly over the last three years on the back of the protest movement that ousted Gotabaya Rajapaksa and an effective grassroots campaign. While Premadasa enjoys the support of the country’s Tamil minority, Dissanayake has captured the imagination of the youth.
What are the challenges the next president will face keeping the recovery on track?
To retain the IMF’s support, the government will have to reach a budget surplus, which could prove challenging given the welfare measures the candidates have proposed. The next president will have to balance improving the everyday lives of Sri Lankans and reducing the country’s debt burden.
The next president will also face a parliament dominated by the Rajapaksa-led Sri Lanka People’s Front, which was elected in 2020. Premadasa and Dissanayake, in particular, would find it difficult to pass legislation without a parliamentary majority. Both would thus likely call for parliamentary elections before the end of the year as one of their first actions.
Will these elections reverberate beyond Sri Lanka’s borders?
Given Sri Lanka’s towering debt obligations with foreign creditors and strategic location in the Indian Ocean, many countries have a vested interest in the island nation’s political and economic stability. India would prefer a Premadasa or Wickremesinghe presidency, though it has indicated it would work with any of the four frontrunners. Apart from political stability, New Delhi will prioritize limiting China’s influence on the island—a concern the US and Japan share. It will also seek to bolster connectivity between India and Sri Lanka and push the next president to grant the Tamil provinces a degree of autonomy.
China continues to have a sizeable economic footprint in Sri Lanka, but its influence has waned with that of the Rajapaksas. Former president and prime minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and his brother Gotabaya were close to Beijing and oversaw a range of Chinese infrastructure projects on the island, partially contributing to its debt problems (China still accounts for about half of Sri Lanka's bilateral debt). Nevertheless, Dissanayake is thought to have close ties to China, and if he becomes president, it could allow China to regain some of its influence.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group.
Viewpoint: Kishida makes way for fresh face as his party's fortunes fade in Japan
Japanese Economic Security Minister Sanae Takaichi, a front-runner in the Liberal Democratic Party leadership race.
After Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced last month that he would not seek a new three-year term as head of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, or LDP, the winner of the party’s leadership contest on Sept. 27 will replace Kishida as prime minister. Given his low approval ratings, Kishida had been under mounting pressure to step aside.
Ahead of the Sept. 12 start of the official campaign for the LDP’s leadership, we asked Eurasia Group expert David Boling to explain the significance of this contest.
Kishida won’t be running for a new term as LDP president. What happens next?
Nine candidates have announced that they’ll be running ahead of the 15-day campaign period. Because of this record number of candidates, a same-day runoff between the top two candidates is a near certainty soon after the first round of voting. LDP lawmakers and rank-and-file members will have the right to vote. But in the runoff, the votes of the lawmakers have substantially more weight.
Because the LDP controls the lower house, whoever is elected as the new party head will be approved by the parliament to become Japan’s next prime minister within days of the leadership contest. That person will form a cabinet soon after taking office and will probably call a lower house election in October or November.
Why did Kishida make this decision?
Kishida’s approval ratings have been abysmal since November. That’s when a political fundraising scandal exploded involving many LDP politicians. His average approval ratings fell well below 30% — in some polls below 20% — and have been stuck there since.
A June poll showed that only 10% of respondents wanted Kishida to continue as prime minister. Although Kishida has handled Japan’s foreign relations very well, he has also struggled to manage the economy. Inflation has not been as high in Japan as in other countries, but it has had a very negative political impact on Kishida. Even modest increases in prices cause great anxiety for the Japanese public after decades of deflation.
Do you expect this leadership change to have a big impact on policy?
Probably not. The LDP has ruled Japan for most of the post-war era and whoever is ultimately the new prime minister will hail from the party. The LDP is a center-right party and a staunch supporter of the US-Japan alliance. That will not change.
On economic policy, there could be some shift in fiscal or monetary policy, depending on who wins. But my guess is that it will not be dramatic. Japan is the land of incrementalism. Dramatic shifts in policy are not part of its DNA.
The current front-runners for the job of party leader — based on polling of LDP supporters — are former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, former Environmental Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, and current Economic Security Minister Sanae Takaichi.
How about on the next election?
A big reason why Kishida was ousted is that LDP politicians were becoming increasingly worried about the party’s prospects in the next lower house election, especially with Kishida as the face of the party.
The LDP itself now has low approval ratings, mainly owing to the political fundraising scandal. A sense of panic had started to take hold among party members that the LDP could lose a significant number of seats in the lower house election, which must occur by October 2025.
How the LDP does in that election will depend a lot on who party members choose as their next standard bearer. If they opt for a leader who represents a break from business-as-usual politics, they’ll probably do well. The opposition parties are weak and splintered, so that redounds to the LDP’s benefit, too.
But if the LDP elects a business-as-usual, old-school politician, they may suffer some losses.
Japan has a history of frequent prime minister changes – why is that?
Yes, there have been periods of rapid turnover. In particular, from 2006-2012, Japan changed prime ministers about once a year — a proverbial revolving door.
But then Shinzo Abe returned as prime minister in 2012 and was in power for a remarkably long time, until 2020. Comparatively speaking, Kishida has been a rather long-serving prime minister, at about three years. That makes him the eighth longest-serving prime minister in the post-war era.
The LDP’s long-standing parliamentary majority makes it the party most likely to produce a prime minister. Yet, the LDP’s own internal party rules – such as a vote to renew its leadership every three years – create a system that can replace prime ministers frequently.
Though forced to make these frequent leadership changes, the LDP has held onto power for most of the post-war period – why is that?
The Japanese public supports the LDP’s basic policy stances as a conservative, pro-business, pro-US alliance party. So, the LDP has been skillful at tracking the overall mood of the Japanese public.
When the LDP lost power from 2009-2012, the ruling party at the time — the Democratic Party — did a miserable job. Many Japanese have bad memories of that time.
They remain skeptical of the opposition parties’ ability to govern, as a result. Opposition parties in Japan are not seen as ready for prime time. So, although the Japanese public may grouse about the LDP, they trust it to manage the country more than they do the opposition parties.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
People are carrying a banner with political phrases during a rally in support of Nicolas Maduro's campaign in San Cristobal, Venezuela, on July 10, 2024.
As Venezuelans prepare to head for the polls on July 28, President Nicolas Maduro is pulling out all the stops to secure a third term in office and extend the Chavismo political movement’s 25-year grip on power. Chosen by the movement’s founder Hugo Chavez to succeed him as president, Maduro first won election in 2013 and has grown steadily more authoritarian.
Though Maduro pledged the coming election would be free and fair under the terms of the Norway-brokered “Barbados Agreement,” he has already reneged on some of its key terms. The agreement represents the latest in a series of attempts by the US and Latin American and European countries to encourage greater democratic opening in Venezuela.
We asked Eurasia Group expert Risa Grais-Targow what to expect from this weekend’s vote.
Do you think Maduro will do whatever it takes to ensure he remains in office?
It’s pretty clear at this point that Maduro is going to hold this election on his own terms. We’ve seen him bar the participation of the winner of the opposition primary, Maria Corina Machado, and her chosen successor, Corina Yoris. He has also taken steps to limit both credible electoral observation, including that of the EU, and voting by opposition supporters such as Venezuelans living abroad. All of these moves represent a violation of the Barbados Agreement.
On election day, I think the regime is hoping it can rely on various measures to suppress opposition voter turnout and mobilize its own base so that it doesn’t have to resort to ballot tampering to win. But I do think it is willing to do whatever it takes. I don’t think Maduro is going anywhere.
Would an opposition candidate likely win a fair election, and if so, why?
Yes, absolutely. What we’re seeing from credible polls is that Edmundo Gonzalez, the new unified opposition candidate, has an advantage of between 20 and 30 percentage points over Maduro. Maduro has been in power for 11 years and has overseen a substantial deterioration of economic conditions, the result of government mismanagement exacerbated by US sanctions aimed at forcing democratic reforms. Though conditions are finally stabilizing, multiple years of deep economic contraction have triggered massive migration outflows. About 7 million Venezuelans are living abroad today.
What’s more, this is the first presidential election since 2013 that the main opposition forces are all participating and backing a single candidate, which is one of the reasons Gonzalez is polling so well.
What is the likelihood of protests or violence around the election?
I think some level of violence or instability related to the vote could manifest in two ways, and I would say that both of them are somewhat likely. The first would be violence on election day as part of a repertoire of measures to discourage support for the opposition that includes moving polling stations from opposition strongholds or blocking their entrances and deploying the so-called colectivos (regime-affiliated criminal groups) to attack voters.
The second is the potential for unrest after the election, assuming that Maduro claims victory. There’s been a groundswell of support for the opposition, and its voters would probably feel like the election had been stolen. That said, recent polls suggest that voter appetite to take to the streets has waned, probably because of the regime’s violent repression of previous anti-government protests.
How do you think the international community is likely to react if Maduro wins what appears to be a fraudulent election?
This would be a difficult situation for the US, the EU, and some of Maduro’s key allies in the region such as Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Colombian President Gustavo Petro. These regional leaders were trying to welcome Maduro back into the fold after the failed Juan Guaido experiment [the former head of Venezuela’s National Assembly claimed in 2019 to be the country’s legitimate president – and won recognition from many countries around the world – but then failed to consolidate his domestic support]. I would be surprised if they fully abandon Maduro and break off ties with him again.
The EU likewise has a bias toward normalization, though its electoral observation mission was uninvited by the regime, and if there is a lot of fraud, it will be forced to condemn the results. In the US, President Joe Biden’s administration also prefers normalization and engagement but will take its cues from how the opposition characterizes the elections. Regardless, I don’t see the US, at least under the Biden administration, going back to what they called the “maximum pressure” sanctions regime that we had in place up until September 2022.
What do you think the continuance of the Maduro regime means for the quality of life in Venezuela?
As I mentioned, the economic situation has stabilized somewhat over the last couple of years. Ironically, in response to the US sanctions, Maduro has become much more pragmatic in terms of economic policy. He has allowed for a dollarization of the economy and stopped printing money, so inflation has really come down. Still, there is a deep divide between those who have access to dollars and can afford to pay for imported goods and those who don’t. So, it’s no longer the case that the shelves in stores are empty, but you have to have the money to pay for them.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group.
British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak speaks during a Conservative general election campaign event, in London, on June 24, 2024.
Upcoming elections in France and the UK appear likely to deliver historic defeats for both countries’ ruling parties in a challenging electoral cycle for incumbents around the world. The polling shows the centrist alliance led by French President Emmanuel Macron’s Rennaissance party trailing both the far-right National Rally and the left-wing New Popular Front ahead of the legislative elections on June 30 and July 7 – pointing to an extremely difficult government formation process.
Meanwhile, the UK’s ruling Conservative party's dire polling ahead of the July 4 elections has prompted speculation of an “extinction event” that renders it virtually irrelevant in the next parliament. These votes follow others in countries including South Africa and India where the incumbents performed worse than expected.
What’s going on here? Eurasia Group expert Lindsay Newman says it’s a “long-COVID story” of the pandemic’s economic aftershocks fueling a political backlash. We asked her to explain.
This year is shaping up to be a bad one for incumbents. What are the lessons from elections so far?
In a series of surprise electoral outcomes, the ruling parties in South Africa and India both lost their parliamentary majorities, while the government-backed candidate lost Senegal’s presidential election to a little-known opposition figure. The driving narrative in all three is the long-COVID story – more specifically, historically high inflation levels.
Mexico, where ruling party candidate Claudia Sheinbaum easily won the presidential election, is one country that bucked the trend. Sheinbaum benefited as the hand-picked successor of the popular President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who has advanced an agenda focused on addressing economic headwinds through job creation and wage increases.
Can you explain the long Covid effect a little more?
Following the economic dislocations of the pandemic, inflation has been elevated and persistent around the world. We have higher-for-longer cost of living pressures and unemployment rates – factors that are shaping how voters think and particularly what they think about their governments. Pocketbook issues always tend to be salient during elections, and many peoples’ pocketbooks seem especially light in the aftermath of the pandemic.
So, do you think this trend will continue this year — for example, in the outcomes of the elections in France, the UK, and the US?
That’s what the polling is telling us. The electoral reckoning with post-pandemic conditions, including the inflation shock, is a global story. The outcomes thus far in 2024 suggest this will remain a difficult cycle for incumbents. We have to expect more of the same in these upcoming elections.
Interestingly, the political backlash seems to be coming even in relatively healthy economic environments, right?
There is nuance to what we are seeing. Voters are responding to how they feel about the economic environment they find themselves in, rather than the statistics or the nuts and bolts of the economic outlook. In the case of the US, for example, the country’s economic recovery has been one of the bright spots of the post-pandemic period, yet it’s not perceived that way domestically, and surveys show that inflation, the economy, and immigration are key concerns for voters going into the fall.
There was a similar dynamic at play in India, which has one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, yet the felt experience of unemployment, rising prices, and inequities is likely behind the election results.
How worried are you about the potential for this backlash to destabilize political systems around the world? Where do we go from here?
Given the disruption and disorder we have seen over the last five to ten years, we have to expect more rather than less uncertainty ahead. This year’s voter backlash ties into another trendline I have been watching: a rising new radicalization of attitudes as well as actions. It has its roots in tectonic shifts in well-established public opinion, such as the 18.5-point average decline in support for Israel across dozens of countries registered by a January poll. Another driver is a broad political realignment away from the center and toward the poles.
The political consequences of these shifts are seen in the US in President Joe Biden’s outreach to younger and more progressive voting blocs and in Donald Trump’s appeals to his base. In Europe, nearly one-third of voters now opt for antiestablishment parties, either on the far right or far left, while in Latin America, antiestablishment candidates have secured a wave of victories in the post-pandemic period. We will get through the 2024 election cycle, but the risky times are likely to persist as these dynamics continue to ripple through the global system.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
Marine Le Pen, president of the French far-right National Rally (Rassemblement National) party parliamentary group, gestures during the party's campaign for the EU elections, in Paris, France, on June 2, 2024.
Nearly 400 million people across the 27 countries of the EU will be eligible to vote from June 6-9 for members of the European Parliament. These representatives will serve a five-year term and be charged with passing and amending EU legislation. But their first order of business will be to elect the president of the European Commission, the EU’s executive body. They will vote on a candidate proposed by the European Council, which comprises the EU heads of state or government, based on the parliamentary election results.
Amid intensifying economic concerns and longstanding fears of migration, far-right parties are expected to expand their parliamentary representation. We asked Eurasia Group experts Anna-Carina Hamker and Mujtaba Rahman why that is and what this strong showing could mean for EU policy and politics over the next five years.
What issues are shaping voter preferences?
Unsurprisingly, there is some variation across member states. According to recent Eurobarometer polling, security concerns are greater in eastern European countries that are closer to the war in Ukraine, whereas climate change and the economy top the list of concerns elsewhere. But broadly speaking, the economic situation, public health, the fight against poverty and social exclusion, and defense and security are key issues in most European countries.
Far-right parties appear poised for strong gains – why is that?
Amid sluggish economic growth and high inflation, policies to mitigate climate change and favor agricultural imports from Ukraine have prompted a public backlash to which established conservative and socialist parties have been slow to respond. The discontent spilled out into the streets earlier this year in a series of protests by farmers and truckers. Sensing an opening, far-right parties threw their support behind the protests and have seen their popularity soar.
A more structural factor of support for these parties is concern over migration, which really started to gain traction with the large flows of refugees fleeing the war in Syria in 2014. European countries have long histories of receiving migration but lack steering mechanisms such as functioning integration policies. Center-left and center-right parties have ignored the issue for decades, resulting in high levels of integration failure in European societies.
How big do you expect these gains to be, and what will be their impact on EU policy?
Far-right parties will likely expand their representation from less than 20% of seats to about 25%. Overall, that will not materially affect policymaking on key issues such as Ukraine, competitiveness, and enlargement over the next five years, which was already going to be difficult. But it will have an impact on the EU’s environmental agenda and its stance on migration. Far-right parties have already helped drive an overhaul of the bloc’s migration framework and dilute some aspects of the green agenda.
The next commission will have to tackle the next big phase of the green transition, which will involve more politically costly measures for households and firms to achieve net zero by 2050. Ad-hoc cooperation between centrist and right-wing groups on these issues will likely delay or dilute some of these measures. Nonetheless, it is unlikely to derail the EU's climate ambitions overall, as all the major party groups and the vast majority of national governments remain committed to meeting both the 2030 and 2050 goals.
What will be the consequences of these gains for domestic politics in prominent member states?
A strong result for the far right would likely have the biggest impact in France, where polling suggests that Marine Le Pen’s National Rally party will outperform President Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance Party. That would increase the odds of a successful censure motion against the government in parliament that would trigger early parliamentary elections. If Le Pen’s formation were to win half the seats in those elections (which is unlikely), that would force Macron to appoint her or someone else from her party as prime minister.
Meanwhile, a strong showing for Alternative for Germany would further fuel the debate about migration and give the party a boost ahead of important elections in three eastern German states in September and general elections next year. Similarly, a strong showing for Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers party would reinforce its standing within the ruling coalition. Moreover, there is speculation that Meloni could offer her support for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s bid for another term in exchange for a weighty portfolio in the next commission and policy concessions that would help Meloni’s domestic agenda.
What are the biggest policy challenges EU institutions will face in their next mandate?
Providing diplomatic, military, and financial support for Ukraine will remain a top priority for the EU, especially considering expectations of a weaker US commitment. A potential return to the White House by Donald Trump would create new difficulties for EU institutions, particularly on trade, as Trump would likely increase tariffs on European goods. Trade relations with China will also deteriorate as Brussels rolls out tariffs on electric vehicles and considers additional steps—and Beijing prepares retaliatory measures. Beyond these immediate challenges, Brussels faces the difficult task of doing more for its security by enacting more robust defense policies. Enlargement will be another important issue. Finding ways to shoulder the financial burden of welcoming new countries and tackling potential trade distortions that would affect some member states more than others will be among the priorities.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
Bharatiya Janata Party supporters hold party flags while waiting for Narendra Modi's road show during an election campaign in Guwahati, Assam, India, on April 16, 2024.
The world’s most populous country will hold elections between April 19 and 1 June for its lower house of parliament, the Lok Sabha. The 543-member chamber is India’s primary legislative body, and its composition will determine which party or coalition gets to nominate a prime minister and form the next government. Over the 44-day electoral period, nearly 970 million people will be eligible to vote, the most ever. More than 1 million polling stations will be set up, and officials will be dispatched to remote corners of the country’s vast geography to collect ballots.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, one of the world’s most popular heads of state, is expected to lead his Bharatiya Janata Party to a comfortable victory and secure a third consecutive term in office. We sat down with Eurasia Group experts Rahul Bhatia and Pramit Pal Chaudhuri to learn more about the upcoming elections.
What are the main issues for voters?
The chief concerns are inflation, particularly high food prices, and unemployment, especially among the youth. More than one-third of Indians believe they are worse off than before the pandemic-induced lockdowns, while about two-thirds say it is now harder to find a job. Though religious-political issues are also on voters' minds, they hold less weight than economic ones.
Despite apparent concerns about the economy, an overwhelming 75% of Indians approve of Modi’s leadership. He gets high marks for delivering targeted welfare schemes, upgrading the country’s infrastructure, and raising India’s international profile. He also gets credit for implementing elements of the BJP’s longstanding religious-political agenda, such as constructing a grand temple dedicated to the Hindu deity Ram and revoking the special autonomous status of the Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir region.
Modi has come under criticism for alleged anti-democratic tendencies – why is that and will this be a factor for voters?
Under Modi, press and political freedoms have suffered. Opposition parties have accused the prime minister of using government investigative agencies to harass opposition leaders and constrain their ability to contest elections. Other critics allege the government has undermined India’s secular constitution and its pluralistic values with its actions favoring the country’s Hindu majority population. While Modi's attitude toward civil liberties is not unlike that of past prime ministers who enjoyed a similar single-party majority, there are genuine concerns about democratic backsliding in India. Nevertheless, apart from a small urban elite, the average Indian voter doesn’t seem concerned.
What is the state of the opposition alliance?
Since the 2014 elections that brought Modi to power, the Indian National Congress, India’s largest opposition party, has struggled with a lack of clear leadership and an inability to craft an alternative political narrative that could capture the imagination of voters. It recently pivoted to an agenda of social and economic justice, but this strategy has not yet been tested at the ballot box.
Last July, the Congress and 25 smaller parties formed the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance, aka INDIA, a big-tent coalition to pool their vote shares and create a stronger challenger to Modi and the BJP. However, the alliance has failed to cohere, and some regional parties have defected to the BJP’s alliance. Moreover, while seat-sharing arrangements had been agreed upon in some states, key regional parties have decided to contest their strongholds on their own, defeating the alliance’s purpose. The Congress and its partners remain far behind the BJP in the polls; they are not fighting to win the upcoming elections but rather to preserve their respective geographic power bases and limit Modi’s majority.
Modi has indicated he wants an expanded parliamentary majority – what does he aim to achieve in a potential third term?
Modi has said he aims to win 370 seats in the lower house of parliament, up from 303 at present. He is seeking a strong mandate to push through legislative changes – some of which are unpopular or challenge vested interests – that he believes are necessary to bolster economic growth. He wants to simplify the tax code and advance reforms on land, labor, agriculture, education, health, and electricity – which require the support of the states. A new Modi-led government would also continue efforts to upgrade infrastructure, including roads, railways, and airports.
Separately, Modi would seek to end India’s religion-based civil laws governing marriage and other issues and subsume them into a single uniform civil code – a process that has already begun at the state level.
Is Modi expected to serve just one more term? Is there a succession plan? What legacy does he want to leave behind?
It’s anybody’s guess whether another five-year term would be the last for Modi, who is 73 years old. He wants to leave behind a legacy of cementing India’s middle-income country status, raising its international stature, and correcting what the BJP believes are institutional biases against India’s Hindu population.
It does seem clear, however, that the BJP will face a succession problem when Modi steps down. The polls indicate that one in three people who vote for the BJP do so because they like Modi, not the BJP. As a result, the party might want Modi to contest the next elections in 2029 and then step down after that. While Amit Shah, the home minister, seems to be Modi’s preferred successor, he would probably face a leadership challenge from Yogi Adityanath, the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, and possibly from Himanta Biswa Sarma, the chief minister of Assam.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
Viewpoint: South Korea’s president looks to legislative elections to kickstart his agenda
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol speaking at the presidential office on TV at Seoul Railroad Station in Seoul. April 1, 2024
All 300 seats in South Korea's unicameral legislature will be up for grabs in the April 10 election, offering President Yoon Suk-yeol the opportunity to kickstart his agenda if his conservative People Power Party, or PPP, can gain control of the National Assembly. The center-left Democratic Party of Korea, aka DP, currently holds a majority of the seats in the chamber and has frustrated Yoon’s efforts to advance business-friendly policies since he took office in 2022.
Nonetheless, the PPP faces long odds in flipping the chamber, according to Eurasia Group expert Jeremy Chan. We asked him to explain.
Why the poor prospects for the PPP?
The conservative party would need to gain roughly three dozen seats to recapture the National Assembly, a tall order that will be made even more challenging by Yoon’s low approval rating, which hovers below 40%. While his name will not appear on the ballot, the election is widely seen as a referendum on Yoon’s administration.
For Yoon, failing to recapture the National Assembly would effectively render him a lame duck with more than half of his term in office remaining. It would put his agenda of cuts to taxes and government spending on life support and make him the first Korean president in decades to serve an entire five-year term without ever exerting control over the legislature. Attention would promptly shift to the race to succeed Yoon in the 2027 presidential election.
What are the main issues for voters?
The state of the economy is at the top of the list, particularly sluggish growth and worrying debt levels for households and corporations. A recent rebound in Korea’s export sector — largely driven by an uptick in global demand for Korean semiconductors — has provided a bit of a tailwind to the economy, but overall sentiment remains negative. Voters are likely to hold the ruling conservative party responsible for this situation, even as the opposition in the National Assembly has watered down many of Yoon’s business-friendly reforms, which are meant to stimulate growth.
Scandals and other allegations of impropriety are another top voter concern. Many left-leaning voters find Yoon’s leadership style imperious, particularly his attacks against critical media outlets. His wife, Kim Keon-hee, is also a lightning rod for public criticism, with Yoon postponing a trip to Germany and Denmark in February to keep her out of the spotlight; if left-leaning opposition parties hold onto the National Assembly, they are likely to open an investigation into allegations that Yoon’s wife received unreported gifts and committed other misdeeds. Meanwhile, the leader of the DP, Lee Jae-myung, continues to face his own corruption investigations, which has decreased support for the main center-left opposition party.
What can this election tell us about the state of Korean politics?
Polls suggest that the election will likely be decided by a narrower margin than the last legislative election in 2020; the top two candidates in roughly 60 single-member districts are polling within the margin of error. Tempers are also running high in Korea, where political polarization has worsened in recent years. Both Yoon and Lee — the runner-up in the 2022 contest — are divisive figures, which has increased support for splinter parties, most notably the newly formed Cho Kuk Innovation Party. Korean politics have traditionally been dominated by two major political parties, but this election may be a harbinger of a more pluralistic system to come. With 30 of the 300 seats in the National Assembly to be allocated to non-major parties, chances are high that neither the PPP nor the DP will secure an outright majority.
Will the election outcome change Korea’s relations with the US, Japan, China, or North Korea?
This election will not have a significant effect on Korea’s foreign policy. Regardless of the outcome, Yoon will retain wide latitude over Korea’s external relations, including in diplomacy, security, and trade. Yoon will continue to deepen Seoul’s ties with Washington and Tokyo — he will participate in a trilateral summit with US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington in July — while relations with Beijing and Pyongyang will remain strained. The US is on the verge of overtaking China as Korea’s top export market, and Korean firms are increasingly directing their investments away from China. By the time Yoon steps down in 2027, his successor will face a remarkably different external environment than the one Yoon inherited in 2022.
If the conservative party manages to pull off an upset, how will that change the political landscape in Korea?
A conservative victory in the legislative elections — not likely but also not unthinkable — would breathe new life into Yoon’s presidency. His administration would move quickly to enact a raft of business-friendly reforms, including lowering taxes on corporations and increasing government support for small- and medium-sized enterprises.
“Strategic” industries such as semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, biotech, and AI would likely benefit from greater policy attention. And Lee would come under increasing pressure to step down as head of the DP.
A PPP-controlled National Assembly would also put wind in the sails of the government’s recently announced “Corporate Value Up Program.” The program is designed to reduce the “Korea discount” whereby domestic firms have lower valuations than peer companies in Japan and Taiwan; it promises tax credits and other incentives to firms that “value up” their stock price through increased dividend payments, share buybacks, and improvements to their corporate governance.