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Viewpoint
Iranians will go to the polls on March 1 to vote for a new parliament, which will serve for a four-year term. They will also vote for members of the Assembly of Experts, a body of clerics that is tasked with selecting a new Supreme Leader and serves a six-year term. However, given that the Islamic regime now carefully manages election outcomes to protect its grip on power, voter participation is expected to plumb new record lows. We asked Eurasia Group analyst Greg Brew to explain the significance of this week’s polls.
What is the position of parliament in the Iranian system?
Iran’s constitution delineates legislative powers to the parliament, which also oversees the budget and cabinet appointments. However, parliament’s power is constricted by Iran’s powerful executive branch, particularly the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as well as the Guardian Council, a small group of clerics and senior figures who sign off on all legislation and determine who is eligible to run for office. Given these restrictions, parliament is regarded by many Iranians as a rubber-stamp committee with little real control over government policy, a feeling that has only grown more pronounced since 2020, when elections were stage-managed by the Guardian Council to ensure hardliners dominated parliament. Authorities also carefully controlled the 2021 presidential election to ensure Ebrahim Raisi, an arch conservative with close ties to Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was elected. (The next presidential election will be in 2025, when Raisi is expected to run for reelection.)
What steps is the regime taking to control the election outcome?
As with 2020, the Guardian Council has taken a heavy hand in vetting candidates: Out of the thousands of applications, many were disqualified from running for office, including most prominent reformists and moderates. This ensures the new parliament will remain dominated by hardliners with a strong affiliation with Khamenei, the IRGC, and the conservative clerical faction.
Is the sense of public alienation toward the regime growing?
Dissatisfaction with the regime is currently very high, owing to a variety of factors that include a weak economy, high inflation, widespread corruption, and ongoing and intensifying political repression. The fact that elections are now carefully managed by authorities has produced a broad view that they are sham affairs: as a result, participation in elections has dropped from over 70% to roughly 50%. It is expected to be even lower this year, perhaps the lowest on record. While the regime likely retains the support of some of the population, most Iranians view the Islamic Republic as an illegitimate government.
So, is there a chance of unrest around the vote?
Despite this widespread dissatisfaction, the circumstances don’t seem conducive to the kind of public protest that occurred in 2022, when thousands took to the streets following the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the morality police. The force of the government crackdown in response to those protests and the ongoing efforts to suppress new displays of discontent, as well as the generally bleak outlook for political reform, means most Iranians are averse to taking to the streets. Instead, citizens will express their dissatisfaction by staying at home and not participating in elections.
How worried is the regime about its legitimacy?
The Islamic Republic has held power for more than forty years. It possesses a large and sophisticated security apparatus and a toolkit of repressive measures that it uses to suppress public dissatisfaction. It is a government has proven, time and again, that it is willing to kill its own people in large numbers in order to remain in power.
That said, the regime has reasons to be worried about its position. Its credibility on a number of important issues, from the economy to terrorism, water scarcity and inflation, is in serious question. It is defined by self-dealing, with more and more of the nation’s wealth flowing to a small elite, particularly senior officers in the IRGC. Millions of Iranians are trying to leave the country, particularly educated members of the middle class.
What are the prospects for political change in the mid-to-long term?
The regime is confident it can hold on to power. It’s fixated on a potential succession crisis, given that Khamenei is eighty-four and in poor health, and the reason for stage-managed elections has been to ensure there’s a smooth transition from the current leader to a Khamenei 2.0. That’s why reformists and moderates have been squeezed out, with even former president Hasan Rouhani denied the opportunity to run for a seat on the Assembly of Experts. There’s virtually no chance the regime permits any reforms or positive political changes, at least not until after succession.
But this policy comes with its own dangers. The Iranian public appears unwilling to resume protests for the moment, but that could change. By refusing to reform, the regime has further undermined its legitimacy, and the transition to a new, similarly conservative Supreme Leader will only harden public dissatisfaction. Iran may be quiet, but it’s a powder keg that could go off at any time.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
Voters in the world’s third-largest democracy will go to the polls on Wednesday to choose their next president. The popular incumbent Joko Widodo, aka Jokowi, is barred from running for reelection by term limits and has thrown his support behind three-time presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, a former military officer and the current defense minister. Thanks to this support, in addition to generous campaign promises and a slick image makeover, Prabowo, 72, appears well-positioned to join the club of septuagenarian world leaders. We asked Eurasia Group expert Peter Mumford how this came about.
What are the main issues in the election?
Cost-of-living concerns and inequality are key themes, which Prabowo in particular is seeking to tap into with generous — but costly — spending promises such as free lunches for students. In previous contests, divisive identity politics have shaped voter preferences, but there has been less of that in this election.
Both Prabowo and former Central Java governor Ganjar Pranowo offer continuity from Jokowi’s administration albeit with some differences — Prabowo would be more nationalist and populist, Ganjar likely more business-friendly. Former Jakarta Gov. Anies Baswedan is running as the “change” or “anti-Jokowi” candidate.
That said, personalities, rather than issues or policies, tend to drive elections in Indonesia.
Is personality the reason for Prabowo’s popularity? Isn’t he a controversial former military officer?
Yes, he is. Prabowo has been accused of committing human rights abuses during his time as a special forces commander under the Suharto “New Order” dictatorship that lasted from 1967 to 1998; he was dismissed from the military but was never charged with any crimes. Prabowo was close to the former dictator and even (for a time) married to his daughter.
In the past, Prabowo has referred in broad terms to “reducing the cost of democracy” — seen by some as a euphemism for reversing the move to direct presidential elections in Indonesia or other steps in a more authoritarian direction. Prabowo’s most ardent critics fear he will return to the Suharto era with a “New Order 2.0,” but this seems unlikely and would trigger strong public pushback. The defense minister has long had a “strongman” persona that appeals to a segment of the population.
But he has taken steps to broaden his appeal, right?
Yes, he has deployed social media effectively to rebrand himself and broaden his appeal. The cat-loving, cuddly grandpa cartoons and avatar appearing on billboards and social media output are intended to moderate his previously stern and out-of-touch image. Meanwhile, social media clips of him dancing seek to dispel any concerns about his age and rumors surrounding his health.
And how significant is Jokowi’s support?
The popular president’s clear but unofficial support is probably the key factor in Prabowo’s surge in the polls. Jokowi defeated Prabowo in the presidential races of 2014 and 2019 and then made the former military officer defense minister in his second administration. Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, is Prabowo’s running mate in the current election.
Prabowo is now polling very close to the 50% support threshold needed to win the presidency in the first round of the election, but turnout will be a key watchpoint. He is popular with younger voters, who tend to turn out in smaller proportions. Anies and Ganjar trail far behind, locked in an intense battle for runner-up and a place in the potential second round. If there is a runoff, Prabowo will still be the clear favorite, regardless of whether his opponent is Ganjar or Anies.
Why is Jokowi so popular and what is his legacy?
Jokowi is unusually popular for a president who has been in power for nearly ten years. Much of this is down to his “man of the people” personality, despite concerns among his more pluralistic backers about his weakening support for democracy and good governance in recent years. He somehow retains an “outsider” appeal despite being in power for so long and in recent years joining the establishment tradition of dynasty building (as shown by the presence of his son on Prabowo’s electoral ticket).
Jokowi has failed to achieve his promised 7% economic growth rate, but Indonesia has outpaced most other emerging market countries. Jokowi has also led significant progress on infrastructure development — most notably the launch of the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Train (though not without controversy), Jakarta subway, and new tolls roads, especially on Java island — and improving the business environment (though many challenges remain). Poverty and unemployment are decreasing as well, though youth jobless rates are concerning, and inequality remains high.
What challenges will the next president face?
The next president will inherit a relatively strong economy; the priority will be sustaining the positive momentum and further boosting growth while also addressing youth unemployment and inequality. Delivering on populist campaign promises could be a challenge, especially for Prabowo, who has offered more giveaways. Any weakening of democratic institutions — should it occur — would likely trigger social protests. Backward steps on reform or governance could weaken the country’s appeal for foreign investors and its growth trajectory. Meanwhile, balancing relations with the US and China will take careful handling, though the elections are unlikely to result in a shift away from Indonesia’s longstanding “non-aligned” foreign policy.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
Resigned to the absence of the country’s most popular politician, Pakistanis will vote in elections on Thursday to choose their next government. Imran Khan, a former cricket star and prime minister, has been convicted on charges widely seen as trumped up by Pakistan’s powerful military and barred from holding public office. Though Pakistan is officially a democratic republic, its military plays an outsized role in the country’s politics, engineering elections in favor of its preferred leaders.
We asked Eurasia Group’s Rahul Bhatia and Pramit Pal Chaudhuri to explain.
What is the reason for the crackdown on Khan and his party?
Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the military has directly ruled the country for about three decades while calling the shots from behind the scenes for most of the rest of the time. It had previously favored Khan and his populist Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party, hoping they would serve as a counterweight to Pakistan’s two traditional parties, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). These two parties had cooperated to re-establish a civilian-led democracy in the country in 2008, and the military saw them as a threat to its pre-eminence.
While the military helped secure the PTI’s victory in 2018, Khan soon fell out with his benefactors. Four years into his term, Khan was removed from office through a no-confidence motion after the military grew weary of his poor handling of the economy, foreign policy blunders, and interference in military affairs. But Khan refused to go quietly and launched a street campaign against the new government. The situation escalated in May 2023, when Khan’s arrest on corruption charges prompted his supporters to take to the streets and attack military installations across the country, including the army headquarters. This was too much for the military, and it began a systematic crackdown on Khan and his party through a campaign of extrajudicial detentions, harassment, and intimidation.
How will the crackdown affect the election and its outcome?
The military’s crackdown has left the PTI fighting for survival. More than 10,000 PTI leaders and workers have been detained since May 2023. Its leader, Khan, has been incarcerated for leaking classified information and illegally selling state gifts; he is barred from holding public office for ten years. Pakistan’s election commission has disallowed most PTI candidates from contesting the polls and stripped the party of its ballot symbol. This is particularly harmful as 40% of Pakistan’s electorate is semi-literate, making it difficult for many PTI supporters to identify their candidates.
Meanwhile, authorities have cleared the legal obstacles for Nawaz Sharif, another former prime minister who had fallen out with the military in a previous term, to run for office. His PML-N is now expected to easily secure a parliamentary majority. Though Khan is the most popular politician in Pakistan, the PTI will struggle to get more than a handful of seats in the 336-member national assembly.
What accounts for Khan’s enduring popularity?
The former captain of the Pakistani cricket team, Khan was already a popular sporting icon before he entered politics. An astute politician, he has created a cult of personality around himself by mobilizing Pakistan’s new middle class, who have become disillusioned by the country's political process and the establishment parties (PML-N and PPP). Furthermore, his message of clean governance and his criticism of the IMF, the US, and even the military resonates with many urban poor who have been badly affected by high inflation and low economic growth. His popularity has risen even further since he was removed from office and arrested.
Do you expect unrest driven by Khan’s supporters around the elections? On a similar scale to that triggered by his arrest?
It is highly unlikely that there will be widespread protests similar to those in May 2023 following the election results. Despite Khan’s popularity, that of his party seems to have fallen lately. Many voters seem resigned to the fact that the elections will be skewed against the PTI, while Sharif’s PML-N is gaining support in his native Punjab. Areas where the PTI remains popular, such as the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, north Punjab, and some northern urban areas, will probably experience some unrest. But the Pakistani security forces should be able to handle it without too much trouble.
What challenges will the next government face?
Addressing economic difficulties – nearly 40% of Pakistanis live below the poverty line and inflation is running at about 30% – will be the next government’s primary challenge. To do so it will need financial assistance. It will need to negotiate a new loan facility with the IMF. An agreement with the IMF has been made a prerequisite by Pakistan’s main external creditors – China, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar – to provide additional financial support.
A new IMF agreement will require the government to undertake difficult economic overhauls, including tax hikes, privatizations of state-owned companies, and reforms to its financial and power sectors. While a government led by Sharif may be able to carry this agenda to a degree, given how the election is being engineered in his favor, he may lack the political capital to see it through or handle any street protests that may follow. Overall, while a newly elected government will bring more stability to Pakistan, questions over its legitimacy will undermine its ability to govern.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group
The world will be watching when Taiwanese voters head to the polls on Jan. 13 to choose their next president. The first in a series of elections with global ramifications in 2024, Taiwan’s vote will be a flashpoint in the tense US-China relationship. China regards Taiwan as a breakaway territory and has vowed to unify with it, by force if necessary. Taiwan has the backing of the US, which would feel pressured to come to the island’s defense in the event of a conflict with China.
The election is shaping up into a close contest between the independence-leaning candidate William Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, and Hou You-ih of the Kuomintang, aka KMT, who favors closer relations with China.
We asked Eurasia Group expert Ava Shen what to watch for.
What is the state of play of the race?
The DPP’s Lai remains the front-runner and has held a consistent lead in this election cycle, but his lead has been narrowing. According to the latest polling data available from Jan. 1-2, he is about five points ahead of the KMT’s Hou, who started gaining ground in late November. Winning the party’s official nomination, with Jaw Shaw-kong chosen as his running mate, has helped Hou consolidate the support of the KMT base. The end to efforts to broker a presidential joint ticket with Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party, or TPP, has also helped.
This momentum gives the KMT a lot of confidence in its ability to mobilize a last-minute surge in support, possibly thanks to strategic voting by TPP supporters who don’t want another DPP administration. Lai remains favored to win, but it’s going to be close. It’s also noteworthy that Lai, if he wins, would probably do so with less than 50% of the vote. That marks a shift from the elections of 2016 and 2020 when current President Tsai Ing-wen comfortably cleared that threshold.
What would a Lai victory mean for relations with China?
Beijing would probably have an immediate negative reaction. It has signaled multiple times that it is deeply wary of Lai, who has a history of comments in favor of full independence for Taiwan, a red line for China. It would respond in two ways. First, it would probably reduce the number of Taiwanese products that are subject to preferential tariff rates under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, the cross-strait trade agreement signed in 2010. In a warning shot to Taiwan’s voters, it excluded 12 Taiwanese products from the agreement in mid-December.
Second, China would likely intensify what it has already been doing in the military sphere. If Beijing judges any of Lai’s post-election remarks to be provocative, it will consider flying larger numbers of fighter jets over the Taiwan Strait, deploying more coast guard or naval vessels, and possibly moving those military assets closer to Taiwan’s main island. It could enter for the first time Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone.
But Lai has moderated his rhetoric recently, hasn’t he?
Yes. He has indicated on the campaign trail that he would maintain the status quo and continue the approach that Tsai has taken to cross-strait relations. Still, from Beijing’s perspective, this is not enough. It does not like Tsai’s cross-strait policies but believes she has exercised restraint in managing tensions. It views Lai as more reckless.
Nonetheless, as I said, Lai is not likely to win by a large margin, and his party will probably lose its majority in the legislature. This is important to Beijing because it sends a signal that the DPP doesn’t have complete control over the island’s politics and that not everyone supports independence. That gives Beijing some hope that the idea of unification is not dead.
So, we think tensions are likely to rise in the event of a Lai victory, but it won’t be a catastrophic situation.
And what would a Hou victory mean for cross-strait relations?
If Hou wins, there is less of a risk of Beijing increasing the pressure against Taipei in the short term. However, there is a risk it will resume aggressive tactics over the long term if Hou doesn’t agree to upgrade cross-strait ties economically and politically. China wants to move toward more regular contact between government officials on both sides and take steps toward unification.
Hou has said he wants to start with more cultural and economic engagement, and if things go well, gradually progress to more political exchange, something that Taiwanese society broadly opposes. So, he's saying he wants to put off the political engagement that Beijing is seeking, and the question is, how long is Beijing going to patiently wait?
What’s at stake for the US in this election?
The US’s official stance is that it has no preferred candidate, and I think it has been consistent in maintaining this approach even in private interactions with Taiwan counterparts. The bilateral relationship is robust, and all three of the main Taiwanese parties are committed to close US ties.
That said, President Joe Biden’s administration likely recognizes that a Lai victory has the potential to jeopardize the recent stabilization of the fraught US-China relationship if it provokes an aggressive Chinese response, putting the US under pressure to offer a gesture of support. As Eurasia Group noted in its Top Risks 2024 report, Lai is one of a handful of “dangerous friends,” a group of friendly world leaders who may draw the US into expanded conflicts this year.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel will visit Beijing on Dec. 7 for in-person meetings with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang. The two sides want to show a commitment to dialog at a time when their relations are coming under mounting strain, as underscored by the recent opening of an EU probe into unfair Chinese competition in the electric vehicle sector.
Similar to last month’s meeting between Xi and US President Joe Biden, this week’s EU-China summit is not expected to produce any major breakthroughs. To find out more, we spoke with Emre Peker, a director for Eurasia Group’s Europe practice, and Anna Ashton, a director for the China practice.
Why is this meeting happening now?
Emre Peker: The last time Xi and the EU’s top two officials met in person was in 2019 in Beijing, before the pandemic struck. They have met virtually a couple of times since. This week’s in-person gathering is meant to showcase Brussels and Beijing’s willingness to maintain a healthy dialog despite their growing differences.
Anna Ashton: Both sides have sought increased engagement since Beijing began lifting its strict COVID policies toward the end of 2022. The EU-China trade and investment relationship is crucial for both. Other issues of common concern include climate change, global health, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
What does the EU want to achieve at the summit?
Peker: Among other issues, the EU wants to address growing imbalances in its economic relations with China as well as the war in Ukraine. A key priority is to highlight the EU’s willingness to take measures to protect itself against Chinese industrial subsidies and overcapacity, which are contributing to a record-high trade deficit with China. Brussels will also seek greater Chinese collaboration on enforcing sanctions against Russia by presenting a list of Chinese companies that will be targeted for penalties unless Beijing helps halt the trans-shipment of dual-use goods. Lastly, the EU will seek to convince Beijing that Europe’s stance on China is distinct from that of the US, particularly on economic matters, to obtain more cooperation and avert escalating tensions.
What does China want?
Ashton: Protecting trade and investment ties with the EU has grown more important for Beijing given the economic headwinds it faces at home. Moreover, Chinese authorities worry about the EU’s drift toward China policies resembling those of the US and want to hammer out a distinct and more cooperative path for China-EU relations. But progress is likely to be limited given their differences on a range of issues. These include the flood of Chinese EVs entering the EU; EU steps to bolster export controls on dual-use goods — particularly tech products — and consider outbound investment screening; the obstacles faced by European companies to doing business in China; and European accusations of Chinese circumvention of sanctions on Russia.
What are the best-case outcomes we can expect?
Peker: On the economic front, a best-case outcome would be an agreement from Beijing to immediately remove trade barriers for certain EU products (such as medical devices and infant formula) and take steps that would facilitate greater market access and investment opportunities for European companies generally. On the diplomatic front, China would proactively collaborate in enforcing sanctions on Russia and commit to more diplomatic engagement on Ukraine’s 10-point peace plan.
Ashton: China’s ties with the EU are strained, but not as fraught as those with the US, so theoretically there is potential for deliverables that equal or surpass those of the Biden-Xi summit, where the two sides agreed to cooperate on bilateral irritants such as fentanyl precursors and military-to-military dialogue. China could offer narrow concessions on market access, but given the limited receptiveness shown to EU trade and investment concerns, does not appear likely to offer broad concessions. Though China and the EU continue to harbor sharply different views about the causes of the war in Ukraine and essential terms for its resolution, Beijing could signal a willingness to participate in future rounds of talks.
How do you expect EU-China relations to evolve over the medium term?
Peker: Given the expectation that the summit will not deliver any major breakthroughs, the EU will likely continue to harden its stance against China, raising the risk of Chinese commercial retaliation. The EU will not likely be able to convince Beijing of its autonomy from the US on China policies, hurting EU ambitions to establish more constructive engagement with China. Therefore, the EU is likely to seek open communication channels and stable commercial ties in the medium term, while trying to reduce dependencies on China in the long run.
Ashton: Beijing is unlikely to shift the EU away from its assessment that China has become an economic competitor. Therefore, China will continue its efforts to drive a wedge between the EU’s and the US’s approaches to relations with China, but its success in this regard will largely be determined by the politics of EU member states and the policies of the next administration in Washington.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
What are data flows and why are they important?
Technology firms gather a lot of information on our daily online activities such as whether we like a Facebook post, someone else likes our Facebook post, or how much time we spend browsing websites for a new pair of shoes. They use that information to improve their services, to give us recommended posts or websites based on our preferences.
The internet is designed as a seamless web, so your data can flow around the world. So a US or Chinese internet company with operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand might choose to have a single data center for Southeast Asia in one of those countries that collects data from all three. That is the most cost-effective and secure set-up.
However, there has been a trend, especially among developing countries, to establish so-called data localization requirements that prohibit the transfer of their citizens’ data to another country.
Why is that?
There are multiple arguments given, but I think the main driver is economic. Countries increasingly see data as a new resource to exploit. They believe that a data center set up within their borders will be a source of new jobs and investment.
But they often dress up the requirements as being about law enforcement or national security, saying that if law enforcement needs access to their citizens’ data, it needs to be close by for easy access, which technically is not really the case.
How do restrictions on data flows affect companies and consumers?
Data localization rules can function as a type of trade barrier. Smaller companies might not be able to afford the investment of building a data center in a new market. Even larger companies might decide it doesn’t make economic sense to do so and decide to steer clear of a market with that requirement.
Ultimately, the consumer and digital inclusiveness will suffer. The classic example is the consumer in Africa, where people have come to rely on phone-based payment services. So if a small country in Africa imposes a data localization requirement, Apple Pay and other providers might opt to suspend operations there, depriving users of their services.
Why did the USTR reverse its position on this issue?
It's purely political. Lawmakers such as Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) who have been advocating tougher regulation on big technology firms have been pressing USTR to abandon attempts to enshrine protections for e-commerce in international trade agreements. They argue that making binding commitments to foreign governments limits the space for domestic policy debate on big tech.
Similarly, labor groups and associations of domestically focused manufacturers such as the Coalition for a Prosperous America have opposed US attempts to push for free data flows because they fear that whatever foreign governments ask for in return may hurt workers and companies in the US.
What has been the reaction to this move by USTR?
Anti-trade US lawmakers and advocates are obviously very happy. Warren responded by saying that USTR had rejected the efforts by big tech lobbyists to use trade deals to thwart regulation.
But the reversal of a longstanding US position came as a shock to other members of Congress, the US business community, and several countries that have been key US partners on digital trade priorities. A long list of tech and non-tech business groups issued statements and sent letters condemning the action.
So, what happens next?
The e-commerce discussions track at the WTO will continue but is not likely to achieve much, at least in the near term. The US reversal on data flows will probably affect the positions of other countries, including some that had moved away from data localization requirements. India, for example, recently significantly revised its policies to allow most data to freely transfer across borders. In the aftermath of the US reversal, reports in Indian media suggested India might follow suit.
Meanwhile, US protests over the USTR move prompted the White House to convene an interagency process with the National Security Council, State Department, and Commerce Department to discuss the issue. USTR is coming under some pressure to change its position on data flows at the WTO, or at least moderate it, but it’s not clear whether that’s really possible. Consultations may continue for some time and fail to reach any conclusion.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.
Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping are preparing for talks next week to stabilize relations between their two countries and prevent a dangerous flare-up of hostilities over Taiwan. The meeting represents the culmination of months of preparatory work by lower-level officials and is expected to take place on Nov. 14 or Nov. 15 on the sidelines of the APEC leaders’ summit in San Francisco.
At a time when wars are raging in Europe and the Middle East, any step toward reducing tensions between the world’s two leading military and economic powers will be welcomed. But given the fundamental differences between the US and China, how much can we really expect from next week’s meeting? We asked Anna Ashton, a director for Eurasia Group’s China practice, and Clayton Allen, a director for the United States practice.
Why is this meeting happening now?
Anna Ashton: When the two presidents met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali last November, it was clear they intended to take further steps to stabilize ties. The next one was meant to be a visit to China by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in February to prepare the way for another meeting between the two heads of state. But the discovery of a Chinese surveillance balloon over the US unexpectedly disrupted those plans. For Xi, the APEC summit – a gathering of the heads of state of 21 Asia-Pacific countries – represents a good opportunity to resume the dialog with his US counterpart. It will allow him (and also Biden) to demonstrate to other Asia-Pacific nations that they are managing bilateral relations responsibly. However, if diplomacy had not picked up in recent months, Xi might have opted to send another senior official in his stead.
Clayton Allen: The US push for diplomacy over the summer – which involved the visits of several cabinet officials to China and the creation of working groups to coordinate policies on various issues – was always intended to lead to higher-level engagement. The APEC summit offered a relatively low-stakes option for a meeting to move forward if sufficient diplomatic progress had been made. Put simply, both leaders already wanted to attend the summit, meaning a sideline meeting could be arranged more easily than a meeting in Washington or Beijing. More broadly, this meeting is happening because both sides see benefit in using a high-level meeting to confirm at least some of the progress made this summer in stabilizing the relationship.
What does Xi want from meeting?
Ashton: Xi is hoping to reassure China's neighbors that China is a responsible stakeholder in the region, a responsible power. His willingness to meet face-to-face with Biden in a US venue is an important signal. But the bilateral relationship remains fundamentally one between peer competitors – even adversaries. The room for tangible cooperation remains limited. Xi's expectations are likely modest.
What does Biden want?
Allen: Biden wants some reciprocal diplomatic effort from China, specifically the resumption of military-to-military communication, which China suspended in protest over Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last August when she was speaker of the US House of Representatives. (China considers such visits to what it views as a breakaway territory an affront to its sovereignty.) This, alongside the multiple working group and staff-level engagement frameworks announced since early August, would bring US-China relations back to roughly the same level they were at before Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. It would also create enough goodwill to avert a potential collapse in relations ahead of Taiwan’s January presidential election.
What are the best-case outcomes?
Ashton: Events on the calendar in 2024 could prove enormously disruptive to any progress made this year. Xi will likely use this opportunity to underscore China's top concerns with US policies. He will remind Biden of the importance Beijing attaches to Taiwan's eventual reunification with the mainland, stressing the damage that would be done to bilateral ties if the US moved away from its longstanding One China policy. He will also likely reiterate China's objections to the breadth of US tech restrictions. It is also possible that China will agree to take steps in support of US efforts to end the fentanyl epidemic. The best-case scenario is that the meeting helps to mitigate the potential for volatility in 2024.
Allen: The resumption of military-to-military communication, formalization of the working groups announced since August, and commitments to additional high-level meetings. Additional commitments from China to leverage its influence with the Global South in talks about the Ukraine crisis and efforts to contain the hostilities in the Middle East would be significant positive outcomes.
What are the next watchpoints for the bilateral relationship after this meeting?
Ashton: Taiwan's presidential election on Jan. 13. The candidate most likely to win based on current polling is Lai Ching-te, a member of the Democratic Progressive Party who draws support from Taiwan's most dedicated independence activists. That brings us to a second watchpoint in May, when Taiwan’s next president will be inaugurated. During the interim, between January and May, China will likely seek to dissuade the incoming president from adopting a more assertive independence agenda by conducting military maneuvers in the region. The final major watchpoint is the US presidential election in November. The lead-up to the vote is likely to feature heated rhetoric on China from both Republicans and Democrats.
Allen: Additional staff-level meetings. Leader-level meetings are essential to advancing efforts at stabilizing the relationship, but staff-level meetings are where the detailed work will happen. Historically, the US-China relationship has improved in the lead-up to leader-level meetings but declined soon after they have finished; staff-level engagement may mitigate some of this (potential) decline.
Edited by Jonathan House, senior editor at Eurasia Group.