Trending Now
We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
What We're Watching
Palestinians travel in vehicles between the northern and southern Gaza Strip along the Rashid Road on April 2, 2025.
Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahusaid Wednesday that Israel was seizing more territory in Gaza to “divide up” the besieged enclave. He spoke as Israeli forces increased the intensity of their assault on Hamas in Gaza, which resumed two weeks ago after phase one of the ceasefire agreed to in January ended.
The context: Hamas still holds 59 hostages captured during the group’s Oct. 7, 2023, attacks in southern Israel. The two sides are deadlocked on reaching a further deal: Netanyahu wants full Hamas disarmament, Israeli security control of Gaza, and the “voluntary” migration of Gazans. Hamas rejects that and says it will release the remaining hostages – 24 are believed to still be alive – only if Israel withdraws fully.
What territory is Israel taking? Netanyahu pointed specifically to a new “Morag Corridor,” which would bisect southern Gaza, cutting off the cities of Rafah and Khan Younis from each other. Since October 2023, the IDF has already occupied nearly 20% of Gazan territory, forming “buffer zones” around the edges of the enclave.
The big question: Is this a tactical move meant to heighten the pressure on Hamas to release the remaining hostages? Or is Israel planning to hold onto vast swathes of Gaza … indefinitely?Vice President JD Vance and his wife, Usha Vance, tour the US military's Pituffik Space Base in Greenland on March 28, 2025.
It’s just business, baby: The Danes send around $600 million per year to Greenland, and an unnamed official told the Washington Post that the United States is prepared to spend “a lot higher than that” to lure Greenland into America’s orbit. While the US has not shared exactly how much they are prepared to spend, JD Vance recentlyreiterated the claim that Copenhagenhad not “devoted the resources necessary … to keep the people of Greenland safe.”
But that doesn’t explain the combative approach when a US president could simply seek a bilateral meeting with Denmark to discuss opportunities to expand America’s presence in the Arctic. By forcing his territorial interests on Greenland, Donald Trump risks isolating America’s closest partners. Danish PM Mette Frederiksen in Nuuk on Wednesday told reporters, “The US shall not take over Greenland. Greenland belongs to the Greenlanders.”
What does this have to do with Russia and China? Trump and Vance have claimed that acquiring Greenland will protect the island from Russian and Chinese encroachment. But special envoy Steve WitkofftoldTucker Carlson that the US and Russia are “thinking about how to integrate” their Arctic energy policies and “share sea lanes” to send gas into Europe together, suggesting that American ownership of Greenland could foster better cooperation with Russia.
Is there art to this deal? A mix of financial incentives and political ideology is likely behind Trump’s interest in Greenland. Trump has long touted Andrew Jackson as an inspiration and mentioned “manifest destiny” in this year’s inaugural address, so his wandering eyes are to be expected. But here’s a hot take from Ian Bremmer: Maybe Trump and his team “don’t have any reason” for the proposed land grab and all of this “will eventually blow over.”Protesters demanded the ouster of South Korean President Yoon in central Seoul on March 29, 2025.
Controversy on the peninsula. The impeachment case revolves around whether Yoon unconstitutionally declared martial law on Dec. 3, a move that lasted all of six hours. The National Assembly, which is dominated by the center-left Democratic Party, impeached the center-right president 11 days after the incident on the grounds that he violated his constitutional duty (and did so with the support of a handful of lawmakers from Yoon’s own party). While many demonstrated against Yoon’s declaration of martial law, his conservative backers – a small but vocal minority – have taken to the streets in recent months to show their support for the president.
Don’t bet against Yoon’s removal from office. Six of the court’s eight justices need to vote for Yoon’s removal if he is to be removed from office, an outcome that Eurasia Group regional expert Jeremy Chan believes is more likely than not.
“Public support for Yoon’s removal remains high, and the legal merits of the case against Yoon are solid. Excusing his martial law declaration would also risk normalizing it for future leaders,” he said.
Should the court rule in Yoon’s favor, he would return to office immediately, but if the court rules against him, as expected, South Korea must hold presidential elections within 60 days. Regardless of the ruling, Yoon still faces criminal charges for alleged treason – the one charge for which a sitting president is not immune. While the legal system may stem the criminal proceedings if he retains his presidential immunity, it is far more likely to proceed if he is removed from office.
Schools will be closed Friday, and police will be out in force in anticipation of mass protests, which are likely no matter how the court rules, says Chan.
Sea change for Seoul? If Yoon’s impeachment is formalized, acting President and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo will remain at the helm until an election takes place this spring. Opposition leader Lee Jae-myung, of the center-left, is the firm favorite to win at the polls. With a more dovish foreign policy stance, South Korea under Lee would likely seek warmer ties with China and North Korea, says Chan.
“Lee is a progressive populist who has been skeptical of the pro-US and pro-Japan tilt that South Korea’s foreign policy took under Yoon,” he said.
Trump and Khamenei staring at eachother across an Iranian flag.
The United States is ramping up its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran.
In a letter sent to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in early March, President Donald Trump gave Tehran an ultimatum: reach a new nuclear deal with the US within two months or face direct military action – “bombing the likes of which they have never seen before,” as he told NBC News’ Kristen Welker on Sunday.
The letter proposed mediation by the United Arab Emirates (whose emissaries delivered the missive in question) and expressed Trump’s preference for a diplomatic solution. “I would rather have a peace deal than the other option, but the other option will solve the problem,” the president said.
In the three weeks it took the Iranian leadership to figure out how to respond, the US turned up the temperature.
First came intense airstrikes (of Signalgate fame) against Iran’s last remaining functional ally in the region, the Houthis in Yemen, starting on March 15 and continuing to this day. Then, the US issued its first-ever sanctions against Chinese entities for buying Iranian crude oil, including a “teapot” refinery in Shandong and an import and storage terminal in Guangzhou. And in recent days, the US military deployed a fleet of B-2 stealth bombers – capable of carrying the 30,000-lb. bunker-busting bombs needed to blast through Iran’s hardened enrichment sites – to its Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, in range of both Yemen and Iran. This move was “not unrelated” to Trump’s ultimatum, according to a senior US official.
Iran finally rejected direct negotiations with the US in a formal response to Trump’s letter delivered last Thursday via Oman, its preferred mediator. President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on Sunday that although the Islamic Republic won’t speak directly with the Trump administration while maximum pressure is in place, Tehran is willing to engage with Washington indirectly through the Omanis.
Whether Trump’s two-month deadline was to strike a deal or to begin negotiations remains unclear. Either way, there’s no chance that two sides that deeply mistrust each other – especially after Trump unilaterally withdrew from the original nuclear deal in 2018 – could reach an agreement over issues as complex as Iran’s nuclear program and support for regional proxies in just a couple, or a few, months (let alone a single one).
But does that mean that Trump’s ultimatum is doomed to end in confrontation? Not necessarily. In fact, his “escalate to de-escalate” strategy could be the best hope to avoid a crisis this year.
A ticking time bomb
While US intelligence assesses that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon, it has become a threshold nuclear state with enough 60% enriched uranium to produce six nuclear weapons (if enriched to 90%) and the ability to “dash to a bomb” in about six months (though weaponizing a device would probably take it 1-2 years).
European governments have long made it clear that unless Iran reins in its enrichment activities by this summer, they will “snap back” the UN sanctions that were lifted as part of the 2015 nuclear deal before the agreement expires in October and they can no longer do so.
Iran has vowed to respond to snapback sanctions by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Given the precedent set by North Korea – whose NPT exit in 2003 was followed by ever-greater steps toward weaponization – and the already advanced state of Tehran’s nuclear program, NPT withdrawal could be the action-forcing event Israel needs to convince Trump to support a joint strike on Iran’s underground nuclear facilities.
Which means that the US and Iran were likely headed for a collision later this year even if Trump hadn’t issued his ultimatum.
Strange bedfellows
And yet, both Trump and Iran’s leadership would much prefer to avoid a military confrontation in the near term.
Trump’s political coalition includes both traditional Republican war hawks and “America First” isolationists who are averse to US involvement in new forever wars. Whereas cabinet officials like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth advocate for a more combative approach toward the Islamic Republic, none of these prominent national security hawks are in charge of the Iran file – Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, a Washington outsider and a restrainer, is.
Most importantly, Trump ran as a peacemaker and has repeatedly stated his preference for a deal, believing that bombing Iran could mire the US in an unpopular war that’d divert precious resources from his domestic priorities and endanger his friends in the Gulf for little political upside. The solidly MAGA Vice President JD Vance echoed this concern when, in the leaked Signal group chat, he flagged the risk to oil prices from striking the Houthis for the sake of “bailing out” the Europeans.
For its part, Iran is historically vulnerable and eager to negotiate a deal that brings sanctions relief to its battered economy. While capitulating to Trump’s demands is politically dangerous for Khamenei and would weaken the regime’s domestic position, neither he nor other hardliners would welcome a military showdown with the US and Israel.
Take it or leave it
The threat of a crisis later this year creates an opening for Trump to pressure Tehran into offering concessions that allow the US president to claim progress and avoid triggering snapback sanctions.
Last year’s effective destruction of Iran’s regional proxy network – Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria – dealt a blow to the country’s conventional deterrence and heightened the importance of its nuclear program. Iran will therefore resist making any meaningful concessions on this front. If there’s one piece of the nuclear file it could cede ground on, it’s its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, which Tehran could conceivably agree to freeze.
Where Iran could potentially offer more is in backing away from its proxies, at least temporarily. Though it doesn’t have operational control over the Houthis (unlike the decimated Hezbollah), the Islamic Republic could deprive them of the bulk of the weapons systems and intelligence they rely on to attack Red Sea shipping lanes. It could also instruct Shia militias in Iraq to refrain from targeting US troops.
The regime would find these choices politically and ideologically unpalatable. But with its so-called Axis of Resistance already in shambles and little Tehran can do to rebuild it in the near term, its strategic value is nowhere near what it was a year ago. A chance at avoiding a snapback and US bombing could accordingly be seen as a worthwhile trade.
Less for less
While a breakthrough agreement is highly unlikely to be reached before the summer (or at all), the two sides’ mutual desire to avoid escalation suggests that Trump would be receptive to the relatively minor concessions Tehran could be willing to make – the most it can conceivably offer under the circumstances.
But those concessions would need to come soon, before snapback is triggered. And even this best-case scenario wouldn’t buy Iran any sanctions relief. Instead, they’d get to kick the can on snapback sanctions and possible US military action while negotiations on a more comprehensive – and aspirational – deal are underway.
If, however, Iran’s modest concessions fall short of what Trump deems acceptable, the risk of military escalation this year will rise sharply – either when Trump’s ultimatum comes to a head or when snapback gets triggered, Iran exits the NPT, and Israel considers a strike (whether solo or joint with the US).
Iran has not yet made the decision to build a nuclear weapon. And unless it’s attacked, it remains unlikely to do so, knowing full well that any overt steps toward weaponization would invite certain, immediate, and devastating retaliation. But nothing would make the Islamic Republic dash for a bomb more than getting bombed.
After voters elected her to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, liberal candidate Judge Susan Crawford celebrates with Wisconsin Supreme Court Judge Ann Walsh Bradley at her election night headquarters in Madison, Wisconsin, on April 1, 2025.
What was all the fuss for? Republican Randy Finecruised to a 14-point victory over Democrat Josh Weil in Tuesday’s special election for Florida’s 6th Congressional District, quashing the quixotic liberal dream of flipping a seat that US President Donald Trump won by 30 points in the 2024 presidential election. Combined with Jimmy Patronis’ Tuesday triumph in Florida’s 1st District, the GOP increased their House majority to 220-213 — heady days for US Speaker Mike Johnson.
The Fine print. Republicans will be relieved that Fine pulled through, but the margin of his victory may worry them. Fine’s supporters outspent pro-Weil groups on ads by a four-to-one ratio, amid concerns that the seat could be in play. Yet the Democrat still cut the victory margin in half, compared to where it was just five months ago. In the 1st District, Patronis also won by just 14 points — a paltry showing in an area that more closely resembles Alabama than parts of Florida.
Musk misfires. Despite plowing $25 million into the race, Elon Musk couldn’t help conservative candidate Brad Schimel over the line in the Wisconsin Supreme Court election yesterday, as liberal candidate Susan Crawford cruised to a 10-point victory. The result ensures that liberals maintain their 4-3 majority on the court with a suite of court hearings upcoming on abortion access, district maps, and collective bargaining.
“There is an unelected billionaire who should not and will not have a greater voice than the working people of Wisconsin,” former Vice President Kamala Harris said last night, a pointed remark against Musk.
The Tesla CEO wasn’t the only one who spent big on the race, as Crawford’s campaign committee raised $17 million as of March 17 and helped to make it the most expensive judicial election in US history. The greater concern for Musk isn’t the loss of cash — he has plenty left in the bank — but rather the political repercussions. Crawford and her supporters relentlessly attacked Trump’s right-hand man in their ads, and the bet paid off. Republicans’ private grumblings about the tech entrepreneur might just start to get louder.President Donald Trump, seen here on the South Lawn of the White House in February, is set to unveil his "Liberation Day" tariffs.
T-Day has arrived. On Wednesday afternoon, Donald Trump’s reciprocal tariffs on US trade partners will take effect immediately after a Rose Garden announcement.
The devil’s in the detail: Trump has reportedly settled on the main aspects of the plan, and has been talking over the fine print with his top advisers. The administration has reportedly weighed a few different options for the overall scheme, including imposing different tariff rates on each trading partner, targeting specific countries, or enforcing a blanket tariff — possibly as high as 20%.
The pros and cons: By building a tariff fortress around the world’s biggest economy, Trump is fulfilling a campaign pledge while also seeking revenue to offset tax cuts. US steelmakers and other domestic manufacturing have supported the targeted use of tariffs, citing unfair import competition, but have come out against blanket tariffs or tariffs on Canada – which particularly hurts the auto industry.
Meanwhile, Wall Street fears it could trigger a recession and slow global growth as small businesses and consumers may face rising prices as imports become more expensive. The Yale Budget Lab projects the policy will equate to a 13-point hike in the US effective tariff rate, raising prices by 1.7-2.1% and lowering real GDP growth by 0.6-1.0 percentage point in 2025.
“Markets are bracing for a seismic shift as Trump’s global reciprocal tariffs loom,” says Eurasia Group trade and global supply chain expert Nancy Wei. “The mix of rising inflation and slowing industrial activity signals a precarious balance, with businesses scrambling to front-load inventory and mitigate pricing uncertainty.”
“With demand weakening and costs climbing, companies are navigating an increasingly challenging economic landscape.”
For more insights from Nancy Wei, check out our Viewpoint about “Liberation Day” here.President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaks during a briefing, Kyiv, Ukraine, on March 28, 2025.
But speculation is growing thatZelensky may be changing his mind. Ukraine’s president could promise elections in return for a ceasefire from Putin and move ahead with a national vote as early as this summer. Ukrainian officials have dismissed a recent report fromThe Economist that plans are under active consideration in Kyiv, and the man considered Zelensky’s strongest potential rival, former commander of Ukraine's army and now Ukraine’s ambassador in London, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, has refused to comment.
But a recent poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that 69% of Ukrainians say they trust Zelensky, a small rise from the previous month. With Ukraine’s future uncertain as Russia continues to push for new battlefield gains, Zelensky might be as popular now as he’s likely to get.
If elections were held and Zelensky won, the Ukrainian president’s credibility would be strengthened both inside and outside Ukraine, pushing the focus of peace negotiations back onto the Kremlin’s intransigence.