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American backsliding, Trump-Xi standoff, Iran bombing, and more: Your questions, answered
Collage of Ian Bremmer, Donald Trump, and other world leaders.
If you feel like you're drowning in the 24-hour news tsunami lately, you're not alone. Headlines are moving at the speed of light, massively consequential policies are being announced (then rolled back) via social media, and longstanding global alliances seem to shift with each passing day. It's hard enough just trying to keep up, let alone separate the signal from the noise.
Because a weekly long-form column often can't do justice to everything happening simultaneously across our increasingly chaotic world, I invited readers to ask their most pressing questions on all things political and geopolitical. You wanted to know about everything from the contents of Donald Trump’s heart to the risk of a Taiwan invasion to the future of the dollar and, yes, whether I'd ride Moose like a moose jockey given the opportunity.
Below is the first batch of answers, with questions lightly edited for clarity. If you have something you’d like to ask me, submit your questions here and I’ll take as many as I can in the upcoming weeks.
Let's dive in.
How well do you think the outside world truly understands the goals and motivations of the Trump administration?
Not particularly well, since it's unclear for people in the United States, too. President Trump individually concentrates so much more decision-making authority than any other president in modern US history, which is why the on-again-off-again tariff policy has been so chaotic. Past administrations have not necessarily been more transparent – Trump certainly speaks his mind constantly – but they have been far more process and consensus-driven.
Still, there is an underlying driver helping explain Trump’s actions: the use and abuse of power to bring about the president’s favored outcomes in one-on-one settings and, relatedly, to eliminate any checks on his authority domestically (vis-à-vis Congress and the courts) and internationally (multilateral frameworks, standards, commitments, treaties, agreements, etc.). That – Trump’s will to power – more than any concrete policy agenda is the unifying thread. Remember, Trump was a Democrat before he was a Republican. Ultimately, he’s driven not by ideology but by the search for maximum leverage he can use to crush opponents and score “wins.”
Are you concerned at all about the possibility of regime change in the US? On a daily basis, the Trump administration is doing stuff right out of a totalitarian playbook, and everybody seems to be folding their cards because they either don't understand the stakes or they hope it's somehow going to pass. As a scared European from a country with a totalitarian past, I personally doubt it will.
I’m less concerned than some because of the decentralized nature of America’s federal government (with many critical functions, including election administration, delegated to state and local authorities) as well as our professionalized, independent military. Trump’s authoritarian impulses also remain constrained by the president’s own lack of discipline and interest in the business of governance. This was the case during his first term and is still true now, as both Signalgate and Liberation Day made clear.
On the other hand, President Trump is far less constrained politically than last time, having consolidated control of the GOP, surrounded himself with yes men who encourage his most destructive whims, and asserted absolute power over the entire federal government. He’s also less constrained by markets/the private sector and the reelection imperative, and he faces a Democratic Party in absolute disarray.
The upshot is Trump won’t be as effective as many fear in undoing checks and balances, largely because his authoritarianism will continue to be tempered by his policymaking incompetence. But I admit that the risk of serious, structural damage to the US rule of law and democratic institutions is growing. I’m more concerned about this than I thought I’d be three months ago.
While globalization has been a boon for the US consumer, it has assisted in the relative decline of US manufacturing over the past 40 years. What policies would you recommend, if any, to (re)grow US manufacturing?
Not Trump’s present tariff policy, which will hurt rather than help US manufacturing. A majority of America’s goods imports are intermediate inputs, capital equipment, and raw materials that US manufacturers rely on to produce other goods, both for domestic consumption and for export. By making these imports more expensive, tariffs harm US producers and exporters (in addition to consumers via higher prices). Add to that the massive uncertainty about what tariff changes tomorrow may bring, and there are also no incentives for companies to build new factories in America.
Globalization is not principally responsible for the decline of US manufacturing over the past half-century. Productivity improvements and automation have reduced the need for manufacturing workers everywhere (even China is now seeing deindustrialization!). In fact, as a very rich country at the productivity frontier, America produces more value-added in manufacturing output today than ever before; it just takes fewer workers than it did after World War 2 to do that. That’s obviously sad for the individuals and communities that have lost jobs. In the aggregate, though, the decline in US manufacturing employment has been offset by an increase in higher-paying service-sector jobs (the average service worker gets paid more than the average manufacturing worker). If you wanted to increase manufacturing jobs, you’d have to either shift people out of those better-paying (often more comfortable) service jobs or grow the population (tough given the administration’s crackdown on immigration).
Now, there are strategic and national security reasons to protect and reshore select industries like semiconductors or batteries. But if you want to boost manufacturing in these core industries, the way to do it is through smart industrial policy: targeted subsidies, tax credits, state and local incentives, direct investments … like the Biden administration’s bipartisan CHIPS Act, which was followed by a manufacturing investment boom.
So maybe start by not undermining good programs for political reasons. Don't beat up on friends and adversaries simultaneously when what you need is to coordinate and trade more with allies. And focus on the broader ecosystem needed to foster investment and build a domestic manufacturing base. That means bolstering the scientific, research, and educational institutions that have made the US a magnet for world-class talent and innovation. Building better infrastructure to increase manufacturing productivity. And ensuring a stable, predictable business environment anchored in the rule of law.
Who blinks first, Xi or Trump? How could they de-escalate their trade tiff given their personal distaste for losing face?
Trump already has, with the unilateral exemption granted to electronic products like semiconductors and smartphones (even if it turns out to be temporary). The question is how many times he needs to blink before there's a climbdown. As they say, a wink is as good as a nod to a blind man, and at least since Covid, Xi has been convinced that China is facing a bipartisan strategy of containment from a hardline United States. Even with the latest exclusions, Trump’s tariffs are so high as to essentially amount to a trade embargo. Combine that with the concerted US efforts to crush Chinese tariff circumvention through third countries, and we’re already seeing the unmanaged decoupling of the most important geopolitical relationship in the world.
Given the deep structural mistrust between the two sides and Beijing’s political ability to “fight until the end,” I don’t see how you can put the toothpaste back in the tube. At most you can get a truce, and only as a result of a direct meeting between Xi and Trump. But Xi has little interest in negotiating directly with Trump at this stage, as it would be a sign of weakness and he doesn’t see the US president as a credible interlocutor.
In the current context, what is keeping China from invading Taiwan? What conditions are they waiting to have in place before "pulling the trigger," so to speak?
I see this scenario as extremely unlikely in the near term. Sure, Trump has basically broadcast that he doesn’t care about territorial integrity, and you could plausibly extend his treatment of Ukraine to Taiwan. But his cabinet is also full of China hawks, and if there’s one US ally every Republican in Washington wants to defend, it’s Taiwan against China. Beijing knows a full-scale invasion would risk direct war with the United States, which would be incredibly destructive to the Chinese economy at a time when they can hardly afford it.
Radical uncertainty about Trump’s response function makes Chinese leaders even more cautious than they normally would be. Beijing would rather wait to invade until the military balance more decisively favors China, its economy is on more solid footing, and the US is led by a more predictable president. But expect them to test US resolve and probe Trump’s response with incremental escalations across the board, none of which should be big enough to lead to a crisis on their own. The risk, however, is that as the US-China relationship breaks down, any accident or miscalculation could escalate into a military crisis given the lack of any conflict resolution channels.
Isn't it possible that Trump's creepy Russia obsession has to do with trying to get Russia as an ally against China?
In part, though there are plenty of other explanations (from his affinity for strongmen, transactional nature, and dislike for Vladimir Putin’s European and “woke” enemies, to his belief that the US shouldn’t waste resources on a war that isn’t core to American interests and Ukraine can’t win). At times, Trump seems more interested in cutting deals with both Putin and Xi Jinping to carve the world into spheres of influence.
But in any case, it’s unrealistic to think Trump could pull off a “reverse Nixon” given Russia and China’s shared interest in a post-American international order and deep commercial, energy, and technological ties. These are not the same countries that Henry Kissinger drove a wedge between 50 years ago (nor are they likely to change anytime soon). There’s nothing that the president of a democratic United States, even one as weakly constrained and authoritarian-minded as Trump, can credibly offer Putin that remotely competes with the kind of long-term strategic alignment he shares with Xi.
In fact, a Trump-brokered ceasefire in Ukraine and/or a US normalization of relations with Russia might actually strengthen Sino-Russian ties by allowing Beijing to fully embrace its “no limits” friendship with Moscow without risking US sanctions or jeopardizing its relations with Europe.
Given Trump's historically aggressive approach towards Iran and desire to distract from the tariff disaster, how high are your odds that the US and/or Israel will bomb Iran within the next 6 weeks?
Reasonably low since Trump doesn't want a war and is fully committed to trying engagement first, despite Israeli opposition. The difference in the American and Israeli positions is interesting: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently demanded a verifiable end to Iran’s entire nuclear program, whereas Trump seems to have lowered the bar to no weaponization. This is a condition that the Iranians, who have always maintained they have no intention to build a bomb, could potentially live with given their present historical weakness. The odds of an agreement are higher than they have been in a decade.
The Israelis might try to derail the negotiation effort diplomatically and even engage in some low-level provocations to spoil the Iranians’ mood, but they won't directly launch major strikes that could blow back in their face. Publicly sabotaging Trump would be far too risky.
What is the likelihood of the dollar losing its reserve currency status?
Dollar dominance is being eroded by Trump’s unpredictability and policy mix, which have caused a loss of confidence in the US government – and, accordingly, prompted investors to reprice the safety premium commanded by dollar assets.
But losing reserve currency status? That doesn't look imminent given the lack of viable alternatives. The yuan is not, in fact, convertible; China has to resort to draconian capital controls to prevent capital flight, and the country lacks the investor protections, institutional quality, and business environment required to internationalize its currency. The euro is the currency of a still-too-fragmented economic area mired in slow growth and high debt, with shallow capital markets and no banking, fiscal, or political union, where nativist parties could well gain power in the next five years and destabilize domestic politics. And cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are highly volatile, speculative assets with zero intrinsic or legislated value (unlike, say, the dollar, which is backed by America’s current and future wealth – and by the US government’s ability to tax it).
You can’t replace something with nothing, so the dollar’s special status is safe … for now. But Trump’s destruction of America’s reputational capital will cost the country dearly in the years to come. After all, every reserve currency that came before the dollar was dominant until it wasn’t. Investors have historically wanted to hold greenbacks because America’s economic, political, and institutional fundamentals inspired trust. Lose those fundamentals and you lose that trust.
Do you find that your Boston accent helps you come across as authentic?
It’s the first time I've ever considered that. I’d like to think it’s mostly down to being honest with people and not taking myself too seriously. But sure, why not? Can’t hurt.
What is Moose's favorite toy? And was it made in China?
Presently, a squeaky watermelon (it used to be a small bouncy orange ball, but he can't see as well as he used to so he's adapted). No idea where it was made.
President Trump takes calls about his ever-changing tariffs plan. #PUPPETREGIME
Watch more PUPPET REGIME here!
Trump has deployed his most disruptive weapon yet against China. Will it work? #PUPPETREGIME
Watch more of GZERO's award-winning PUPPET REGIME series!
If you ask the individuals working for DOGE, if you ask Elon Musk, they're doing the right thing. They are undertaking a revolution to save the United States,” Drummond says, “If you ask any of the civil servants or the federal workers who've lost their jobs, there is a deep sense of concern, of dread that this revolutionary effort will destroy so much of what powers this country.”
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).GZERO World with Ian Bremmer airs on US public television weekly - check local listings.
How long will President Donald Trump’s relationship with Elon Musk last? The alliance has so far defied predictions from the left (and parts of the right) that a relationship between two famously impulsive and mercurial billionaires would eventually lead to conflict. Instead, Musk is everywhere in the Trump administration—attending cabinet meetings, shaking hands with world leaders, smiling in the Oval Office. Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, has embedded itself across nearly every federal agency. In many ways, the relationship is mutually beneficial: Musk has an almost limitless checkbook to bankroll Trump’s political operations, and DOGE is helping him deliver on a campaign pledge to “shatter” the deep state. Meanwhile, Musk has become the most powerful person in Washington, not named Trump. But the president also has a history of discarding allies when they are no longer valuable and many of his close advisors have become his harshest critics. So, can the Trump-Musk alliance survive for the long haul, or is it destined to go up in flames?
Watch the upcoming episode of GZERO World with Ian Bremmer on US public television this weekend (check local listings) and at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld.
Trump in front of a downward trending graph and economic indicators.
For someone who campaigned on lowering grocery prices on day one and rode widespread economic discontent to the White House, Donald Trump sure seems bent on pursuing policies that will increase that discontent.
If you don’t believe me, take it from the president himself, who refused to rule out a recession last Sunday and acknowledged that his sweeping tariff plans would cause “a little disturbance.” But, he added, “we are okay with that.”
Are we okay with that, though?
From Trump pump to Trump dump
Trump’s election victory unleashed “animal spirits” as many business leaders and investors hoped he’d follow through on his campaign promises to cut red tape and lower taxes while ignoring the more disruptive planks of his economic platform: tariff hikes and immigration restrictions. Surely much of it was posturing and bluffing, they thought, and Trump’s more extreme impulses would be checked by market-friendly advisers like Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. In the worst-case scenario, they assumed Trump would course correct when confronted with sliding stock prices or signs of economic cracks.
Slowly but surely, they are starting to realize they got it wrong. Trump meant what he said and is less bound by constraints than during his first term. (I hate to say I told you so, but it wouldn’t have taken them so long to figure this out if they subscribed to this newsletter.)
The S&P500 has dropped by 8% over the last month (so far) as the president’s promised “golden age” of growth collided with the chaotic reality of Trumponomics. American equities are not only lower than they were before Trump’s inauguration but have erased all gains since he became the odds-on favorite to win the race in October. This represents the worst stock market performance in a president’s first 50 days since Barack Obama took office in the midst of the global financial crisis.
But it’s not just Wall Street that’s souring on Trump’s plans. Consumers, small businesses, and CEOs alike are all reporting sharp declines in confidence, largely due to record uncertainty about tariffs. Manufacturing activity is slowing, retail sales and construction spending are falling, and businesses of all kinds are paring back their investment plans as threats to the US outlook mount.
Inflation expectations are on the rise, with 60% of Americans believing Trump isn’t doing enough to bring down inflation and 68% fearing that his tariffs will lead to higher prices. Most Americans think the economy is on the wrong track and disapprove of the president’s handling of it. No wonder Trump’s net approval has taken a quick hit, his honeymoon ending faster than any other president’s save one: Trump 1.0.
It's the economic uncertainty, stupid
Businesses and investors have reason to worry.
In his first six weeks in office, Trump has made it clear that he is dead serious about building a “tariff wall” around America, not as a negotiating tool but to reshape global trade flows. The US effective tariff rate is set to rise to its highest level since the 1940s by the end of the year, raising prices for American consumers and businesses and slowing down growth. Trump has virtually closed the southern border and ramped up the pace of deportations, which will constrain the labor supply and lead to higher prices and lower growth. He has threatened to eliminate government subsidies, contracts, and grants that businesses, universities, and other organizations rely on. And he has empowered Elon Musk’s chaotic effort to purge, downsize, and capture the administrative state, threatening the delivery of critical public services, amplifying these macroeconomic shocks, and destroying US state capacity.
And yet, these first-order consequences of Trump’s policies are not the core reason why traders and boardrooms are freaking out about the outlook for the US economy. Don’t get me wrong, businesses prefer good policies to bad policies. But they can adapt to bad policies. You know what they can’t adapt to? Policies that can turn on a dime based on the president’s whims.
Maybe you agree with Trump that “trade wars are good and easy to win,” or perhaps you believe his policies will cause short-term pain but be worth it in the long run. But whatever you may think of the merits of his agenda, there’s no denying that the constant uncertainty he brings to the table is terrible for business.
Every business decision is a bet about the future. The one non-negotiable before making any investment is a bare minimum of predictability. When the rules of the game can change any day (and when they’re no longer applied impartially), the rational choice is to put off costly long-term investment plans – even if the possible payoffs are high.
That’s why the extreme policy arbitrariness, volatility, and uncertainty that characterizes Trump 2.0 – best exemplified by his on-again, off-again, on-again tariffs – is the ultimate economic dampener. Even if Trump walks back some tariffs or implements his pro-growth promises, uncertainty – by some metrics already higher than it was during the pandemic, the 2008 financial crisis, and 9/11 – will remain near all-time highs for the foreseeable future, discouraging investment, hiring, and consumption, and raising prices. Its chilling effect will compound the direct impact of the administration’s implemented tariffs, deportations, federal layoffs, and so on. As I warned in Eurasia Group’s Top Risks report, “in the long run this will risk undermining the predictability and performance of the world’s most dynamic economy, preeminent investment destination, and issuer of the global reserve currency.”
No more Trump put?
Trump seems to have no intention of backing off his plans or moderating his “move fast and break things” approach, even in the face of economic dislocation. “Markets are going to go up and they’re going to go down, but, you know what, we have to rebuild our country,” he said at the White House yesterday.
This contrasts sharply with his first term, when Trump considered the stock market a barometer of success. Back then, investors and business leaders knew they could count on the “Trump put” – the president’s tendency to curtail his most economically harmful policies when faced with financial turmoil. Now, Trump is openly saying he doesn’t care that investors believe his agenda could cause a recession and raise prices – because it might, and he’s convinced the sacrifice will be worth it for the greater good. “Will there be some pain?” he asked in February. “Maybe (and maybe not!) But we will make America great again, and it will all be worth the price that must be paid.”
So the Trump put either doesn’t exist anymore, or the threshold is significantly higher than it used to be. This makes sense when you consider the president doesn’t have to (read: can’t) run for reelection again. After being twice impeached, convicted, nearly assassinated, and taken for dead politically, the 78-year-old Trump is in a rush to cement his legacy before his “enemies” get another chance to take him down.
True, most presidents – even lame ducks – would consider avoiding a crippling economic meltdown, scoring a decent result in the midterms, and handing the reins to a same-party successor essential to a good legacy. But Trump is no ordinary president. He does not, for example, care much about the Republican Party (after all, he hasn't been a member for long). What he does care about is his own image. In that sense, he is still constrained by public opinion – or rather, his perception of it.
The key question is whether there’s anyone around him who can speak truth to power to a man who has famously little patience for being told he’s wrong. As I wrote in Eurasia Group’s Top Risks report:
Not only does the president-elect have unified government and consolidated control of the Republican Party, but he is building a more personally loyal and ideologically aligned administration than last time. His team will come into office ready to implement – rather than thwart – Trump’s agenda.
If his first 50 days are any indication, the US economy may be in for a lot more trouble until reality pierces his bubble … if it ever does. The beatings will continue until morale improves.
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. Marco Rubio heading to Saudi Arabia to talk with the Ukrainians. That's clearly the most important of a lot of moving parts geopolitically in the world right now. I say that because so much of what the Americans decide to do and not do with the Ukrainians is going to have massive impact on the transatlantic relationship, on NATO, on US-Europe relations, and on the nature of what has been the most important collective security arrangement in the world and is now experiencing crisis. It's very clear that the Ukrainians, as Trump says, lack the cards. And so the outcome is going to be determined largely by countries outside of Ukraine, not just the willingness and the capacity of the Ukrainians themselves to continue to fight. The United States, on the one hand, is pushing the Europeans to do a lot more. A lot more in terms of providing economic support, providing military support, and having a security backstop for a post-ceasefire environment that the Americans are not prepared to participate in.
Now, if all of that happens, and of course that's a big if, but certainly the Europeans are moving in that direction, then the interesting point is the Americans aren't going to determine the outcome. In the sense that the ultimate ceasefire terms will be driven not by the United States, who's basically saying, "We're washing our hands of it." But instead by the Europeans and the Ukrainians, in concert with Russia. And first of all, that's analogous to what's been happening in the Middle East. Everybody remembers that Trump said, "We're going to own Gaza and all the Palestinians are going to leave," and of course, that's not where we're heading. And the eventual outcome will be determined overwhelmingly by the countries that are prepared to spend the actual money and provide the security and figure out the politics. And that means the Arab States, that means Egypt and Jordan, it means Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and it means the potential for blocking by Israel.
That's the environment that we are increasingly going to be seeing on the ground in Ukraine. That the Europeans are going to be doing the driving. The Ukrainians are going to have to align with that and the blocking potentially by Russia. The big difference, of course, is that in the case of Ukraine, the United States is also very interested in doing a deal with Russia over the head of the Ukrainians and the Europeans. There's no equivalent in the Middle East at all. And here, the reason it's so important is because the ability of the Ukrainians to continue to engage in their willingness with the US and Europe together will determine in large part whether a deal between the US and Russia involves a ceasefire with Ukraine or doesn't. If Trump can say, "Hey, the reason we didn't get a deal and the reason they're still fighting is because Ukraine refuses to be a part of it," then a deal with Russia is actually much easier to get to by Trump. Because it involves just re-engagement diplomatically, investment by the US and Russia, joint projects, reopening of arms control conversations, and doesn't involve a Ukraine ceasefire.
Trump has said, "Not only does Ukraine not have cards, but Russia doesn't have cards." Of course, the reality is that if the Russians are willing to do the fighting for a longer period of time, and the Americans don't care and the Europeans can't stand up, then the Russians are the ones with the cards. That is where we are heading. And if the Americans are prepared to do a deal with the Russians irrespective of what happens on the ground in Ukraine, and that is being tested very much over the coming days, that's perhaps the most important outcome of what we see from the US-Ukrainian talks in Saudi Arabia, then the transatlantic relationship is in a lot more trouble than it is right now.
So I think those are the pieces that we're talking about here. It is very clear that the Americans see alliances and see allies as expendable, that it's not that important for the Americans to treat allies with respect. If they're smaller, if they're less powerful, you can do whatever you want. And we saw that with Elon Musk beating up on Poland and the Foreign Minister, Radek Sikorski, someone I've been actually friends with for a very long time, and I think that's not a smart way to conduct business. Poland's been a steadfast ally, they're spending upwards of 4% of their GDP on defense, heading towards 5% going forward. They've housed millions of Ukrainian refugees. They've done far more on the ground in Ukraine per capita than the Americans have on pretty much every front. And also, by the way, there are a lot of Polish Americans that vote, and some of them vote Republican. Far more important than the Ukrainian vote, for example, and that seems to matter too, but maybe not to Elon.
I think that these sorts of insults are unnecessary, and they damage American allies. But I think the Trump administration's perspective is as long as the US is the most powerful country in the world, that America alone is stronger than America with friends, and it's probably the area of greatest geopolitical disagreement that I have with this administration. But we will see how it plays out. I certainly agree that there will be a lot of wins that we will continue to see, because less powerful countries do not want to get into a big fight with the United States. But long-term, I think this is going to play out badly. And I particularly think that's true in the transatlantic relationship where permanent damage is being done irrespective of what happens after Trump. Anyway, a lot to talk about, a lot of moving pieces. We'll talk real soon, and that's it from me.