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by ian bremmer
Trump balancing a burning world on his finger.
What if Donald Trump wins in November?
With less than 50 days to go until the US election and the former president now having near-even odds of taking back the White House, governments around the world are scrambling to work out what a second Trump term could mean for US foreign policy.
One thing’s certain: For better and worse, Trump is still the same charismatic, narcissistic, impulsive, transactional leader he was four years ago (albeit a little slower). But even though Trump the person hasn’t changed since 2020, the world around him has become dramatically more dangerous.
Some will point out that as president from 2017-2021, Trump was able to score some notable foreign-policy successes, including a revitalized North American free trade agreement, the Abraham Accords, fairer cost-sharing among NATO members, and new and stronger security alliances in Asia. It’s also true that this happened amid a generally benign and peaceful international environment, at least before the COVID-19 pandemic started near the end of his term.
Two major regional wars, intensifying great-power competition with China, serious instability threatened by emboldened rogue actors like Russia and Iran, a sluggish global economy strained by structural supply chain shifts and 20-year-high interest rates, and disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence will place entirely new demands on Trump’s leadership.
The more challenging and volatile geopolitical context means the stakes are much higher than they were in 2017 when Trump first took office. Combined with the former president’s immutable traits, this suggests that a second Trump term would likely deliver significantly more extreme foreign policy outcomes than his first term, the current Biden administration, and a Kamala Harris presidency.
On China, a second Trump presidency would take a harder line toward the rivalry, after the Biden administration finally managed to halt the three-year slide in relations. This would begin with the return of Robert Lighthizer, Trump’s hawkish trade czar, and a push for much higher tariffs on Chinese imports. (Trump would also rekindle old tensions with US allies like Japan and South Korea in his zeal to extract better trade terms from them, too, driving at least some into China’s arms – or encouraging them to hedge more.)
The success of Trump’s confrontational approach would depend almost entirely on how Beijing responds. President Xi Jinping might decide his strategy of engagement and conflict management has run its course and the US can never be a reliable partner. He would accordingly retaliate symmetrically wherever possible and asymmetrically where not, leaning further into economic decoupling and taking advantage of Trump’s disdain for allies to drive a wedge between them and America. By reducing US-China interdependence and therefore the cost of going to war, this Cold War scenario would also increase the risk of direct military confrontation – be that over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or whatever else.
But there’s an alternative: Xi could decide that China’s worsening long-term economic prospects demand a more conciliatory response to Trump’s escalation and instead present him with a “grand bargain” that he could sell at home as a win. That is, after all, what Trump cares most about: not Taiwanese sovereignty, not treaty allies, not the rules-based order, not US global leadership (all of which Xi believes Trump is less committed than Biden/Harris to defending), but claiming credit for reducing the bilateral trade deficit. Whatever happens, a second Trump term would create both bigger risks and bigger opportunities in relations with China than a Harris presidency.
In the Middle East, Trump could play a stabilizing role. The Abraham Accords, probably the biggest foreign policy achievement of his first term, normalized relations between Israel and several Arab countries, sparking hope for a more stable and prosperous region. (They also exposed the indifference that Arab governments feel toward the Palestinians, whose plight was largely decoupled from the agreements.) While Hamas’ Oct. 7 terrorist attacks and the crushing Israeli response to them have put this hope – and the prospect that even Saudi Arabia might cut a breakthrough deal with Israel – on hold, Trump’s transactional nature and strong relationships with deep-pocketed Gulf leaders could revive this possibility (if a lame duck Biden doesn’t get there first…).
The flipside is that Trump’s lack of inhibition about using military force against Iran – remember his administration’s targeted assassination of Iranian defense chief Qasem Soleimani? – could also create wildcard risks, most notably inadvertent escalation from autonomous Iranian proxies or a desperate or emboldened Israeli government. But as the last several months have shown, Tehran itself has no interest in a dangerous direct war with either the US or Israel that it can’t win, particularly when a loss would destabilize the economy, jeopardize recently normalized relations with the Gulf Arabs, and precipitate a crisis at home. So even here, Trump’s risky approach is more likely than not to result in de-escalation and regional stability.
Trump has famously claimed that if elected, he will end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours by unilaterally forcing Presidents Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin to accept an immediate cease-fire on terms favorable to Russia. In the likely event that Zelensky, who he strongly dislikes, rejected his terms, he would cut off US military aid as leverage. But, to avoid appearing weak, he would ramp up aid to Ukraine if it was Putin who refused to negotiate.
While Trump’s deal would freeze Russian control over the presently occupied Ukrainian land, the fact remains that Kyiv doesn’t have the manpower to win it all back. It can, however, still end up in a stronger geopolitical position than it was before the invasion. NATO accession would be off the table under Trump, but if he was prepared to sign onto hard security guarantees for Kyiv as part of a breakthrough agreement, the onus would then be on the Europeans to fast-track EU integration and fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. The war would stabilize, and Ukraine would get about as good an outcome as it plausibly could. Absent security commitments or a cease-fire, though, Russia would continue to attempt to take more Ukrainian territory, while a desperate Ukraine would continue its drone and asymmetric warfare to retake its land.
Speaking of NATO, a second Trump term would weaken the transatlantic alliance. Despite increased defense spending across the continent (largely to the credit of Trump’s first-term threats), most European countries won’t be willing or able to meet Trump’s demands for more burden-sharing across the alliance. Whatever he may say, Trump is unlikely to unilaterally withdraw the US from NATO. But he may pull back troop deployments from member countries he believes are “ripping off” the US (whether on defense costs or bilateral trade) to get them to pay up.
American allies in Europe and enemies in the Kremlin will each have cause to doubt the Trump administration’s Article 5 commitment to defend NATO members under attack. A leaderless, divided, and fiscally challenged Europe will be unable to act on French President Emmanuel Macron’s call to bolster its “strategic autonomy,” shore up its collective defenses, and fill the US-shaped hole. Frontline NATO states closest to Russia’s borders – Poland, the Baltics, and the Nordics – are right to worry for their national security under a second Trump presidency.
North Korea’s Kim Jong-un would be happy to welcome back Trump, the only US president willing to bargain with him … while Trump remains intrigued by the enduring prospect of a deal he believes no other US president can get: North Korean denuclearization. That’d be bad news, of course, for South Korea and President Yoon Suk Yeol, who would have little say in what Trump offers Kim in exchange. Last time around, he canceled joint military exercises, questioned the US troop presence in South Korea, and undermined Seoul’s deterrent … without coordinating with Seoul in advance. Diplomacy would not only alienate the conservative Yoon administration, but also it may not be as attractive to Pyongyang now that North Korea is receiving support from Russia, Iran, and China as a member of the “axis of rogues.”
Finally, a second Trump administration would also attempt to cut deals with Mexico on both border security and trade yet again. Trump’s abrasive rhetoric and the scheduled review of the US-Mexico-Canada trade deal in 2026 might get relations with incoming President Claudia Sheinbaum off to a contentious start, but both sides know the US has all the negotiating leverage. Ultimately, there are more than enough vested interests in both countries to find mutually beneficial compromises here, setting Trump up for easy breakthroughs.
In short, Trump’s return at a time of heightened geopolitical turbulence would be more likely to precipitate both catastrophic breakdowns and improbable breakthroughs. Do you feel lucky?
French political leaders
President Emmanuel Macron’s appointment of Michel Barnier as France’s new prime minister on Sept. 5 has put an end to two months of political deadlock and disarray triggered by the Jul. 7 parliamentary election result. But with the far right’s Marine Le Pen having emerged as kingmaker in a deeply fractured parliament, the respite for Macron, Barnier, and France could prove short-lived – and costly.
Since the founding of the Fifth Republic in 1958, France has had majority governments aligned with the president, majority governments opposed to the president (“cohabitations”), and – in the last two years – minority governments that have struggled to enact the president’s legislative agenda but have nonetheless had enough support in parliament to evade censure.
That era of broad stability is now over. Macron’s surprise election returned a hung National Assembly split into three-and-a-half ideological blocs. For the first time in 62 years, no party, bloc, or natural alliance won anywhere near the 289 out of 577 seats needed to govern comfortably or to survive censure. This means that any government that emerged was bound to be the most fragile in recent French history.
Following a brief Olympic truce, Macron finally launched negotiations to form a new government on Aug. 23. The left-wing New Popular Front insisted that it was entitled to elevate a little-known radical to the top job who’d reverse the president’s agenda and blow up France’s deficit, despite holding only one-third (193) of deputies in the assembly. Macron, who has the sole constitutional right to nominate the prime minister, refused.
Such a government, he argued correctly, would have zero chance of surviving immediate censure by Macron’s center (166 seats), the ex-Gaullist center right (47 seats), and Le Pen’s far right (142 seats). Outraged, the left took to the streets in force on Sept. 7, accusing Macron of “trampling democracy” and “staging a coup.” But it’s hard to argue with the president’s math.
And math is the main reason why Barnier was named to the post.
Yes, the 73-year-old former Brexit negotiator and veteran of the center right is a pragmatic dealmaker with an independent streak who would build a coalition of “national unity” from center right to center left. Barnier also promised to let Macron do his own thing on foreign affairs and defense, and he pledged to try to preserve the bulk of the president’s labor market and pension reforms. But he was far from Macron’s first choice. The two men had clashed in the past, and Macron exhausted several other options before finally nominating him.
Here’s the kicker, though: Unlike Macron’s first picks for the role, the former Socialist Prime Minister Bernard Cazeneuve and the center-right president of the northern French region Xavier Bertrand, Le Pen signaled that her party would not join the left in an immediate no-confidence vote against Barnier. And without her implicit blessing, no government could hope to survive contact with the National Assembly, as the left is committed to voting down candidates from the center and right.
Le Pen’s willingness to passively tolerate Barnier’s appointment suggests that, at this moment, she believes her political interests are best served by appearing to be on the side of stability rather than chaos. Moreover, she has reportedly been promised that the new government will advance her party’s policy priorities on immigration, the cost of living, and proportional representation voting – the latter a long-standing demand of the National Rally to better its chances of winning future elections.
How far will this constructive approach go? We will get a glimpse into the limits of Le Pen’s strategy when the new government is confronted with its first and toughest test in a few weeks. Facing the prospect of a destructive fiscal crisis, Barnier and his new finance minister (whoever he picks) will have to propose some way of filling a €16 billion hole in this year’s budget and introduce a deficit-cutting draft budget for 2025 by Oct. 1 to prevent punishment by the European Commission and financial markets. Both the amended 2024 budget and the draft 2025 budget will require far-right votes to pass the National Assembly.
Le Pen will then face an uncomfortable but clear choice. If she supports (or acquiesces to) draconian spending cuts, she won’t face an internal revolt, but she’ll be accused by the left and even some on the right of being a tool of the establishment. But if she precipitates the government’s collapse only weeks into her newfound kingmaker role, she’ll be blamed for plunging France into an unprecedented political and economic crisis. She will also potentially spoil her best chance to influence the country’s direction, legitimize the National Rally, and win the presidency in her fourth attempt in 2027. On balance, Le Pen will probably go the “responsible” way in this instance, choosing to edge Barnier’s government toward her preferred policies while keeping her veto powder dry for future legislative priorities.
And that is precisely the problem for Macron and Barnier. Even if they manage to steer France out of this budget crisis, Le Pen’s calculus could change at any moment – and it will be within her power to bring down the government whenever she pleases. All she has to do is add her party’s 142 assembly votes to the 193 held by the four-party left alliance – which is furious at Macron and will undoubtedly introduce, not to mention support, countless censure motions – to produce many more votes than the 289 needed for a majority.
Macron’s shock election has placed the fate of France’s fragile new government in the hands of his archrival. Quite the failure for a leader who had made it his life’s mission to consign Le Penism to the dustbin of history. Whether or not she ends up succeeding him in 2027, Le Pen has never been closer to the levers of power than she is today.
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Nicolas Maduro standing in front of protestors in Venezuela.
Earlier this week, the US Justice Department seized the airplane used by Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, his equivalent of Air Force One. It’s the latest signal that the Biden administration remains furious at Maduro for stealing another of his country’s elections — and that it needs some way of expressing that anger. Will this latest US move undermine Maduro’s hold on power? Don’t hold your breath.
Background: US presidents have tried for years to force Maduro, in power since 2013, to hold free and fair national elections in Venezuela. Maduro has refused because he knows he would lose any contest that isn’t rigged in his favor. In 2018’s presidential election, he manipulated the vote to a degree that made international headlines, and the US and more than 50 other countries recognized the president of the National Assembly, opposition leader Juan Guaidó, as the country’s rightful leader. It made no difference; Maduro pressed on and remained in power.
Under President Donald Trump in March 2020, the US Justice Department charged Maduro and 14 of his political allies with narco-terrorism, drug trafficking, and corruption in hopes of loosening his grip. No dice.
The Biden administration has tried a different approach. Ahead of this year’s presidential election in Venezuela, the US lifted some sanctions in hopes of persuading Maduro to change his mind — and of keeping US election-year gasoline prices down. This can charitably be called the triumph of hope over experience. In January, the US was forced to reimpose some previous sanctions after Maduro barred the country’s most popular opposition candidate, Maria Corina Machado, from running against him this year.
Machado then elevated a little-known official, Edmundo González, to run against Maduro in her place. The presidential election went ahead in July, and Maduro immediately declared victory … without releasing any voting data. Venezuela’s opposition has since published more than 80% of the information printed and collected from the country’s voting machines thus far to make the case that González soundly defeated Maduro. In response, just as he did with Guaidó in the past, Maduro now appears ready to arrest González, or at least to use the threat of arrest to force González to flee the country. To show just how much power he still commands, Maduro decreed this week that this year’s celebration of Christmas will begin on Oct. 1. Seriously.
The US and Venezuela’s neighbors, particularly Colombia, have a clear interest in restoring credibility to Venezuela’s politics, in part because both countries and the region have absorbed millions of refugees fleeing political repression or simply looking for brighter economic prospects than Venezuela’s basket-case, sanction-plagued economy can provide.
The US request that the Dominican Republic seize Maduro’s plane is just the latest example of ineffectual pressure. US Attorney General Merrick Garland has claimed the aircraft “was illegally purchased for $13 million through a shell company and smuggled out of the United States for use by Nicolás Maduro and his cronies.” A US official told CNN this week that Washington is “sending a clear message here that no one is above the law, no one is above the reach of US sanctions.”
Let’s cut the chase: Maduro will continue to resist any deal that pushes him from power. The US has reportedly offered him amnesty if he agrees to step down. Some in Congress want a return to the Trump administration’s tougher approach. A group of bipartisan lawmakers led by Sens. Jim Risch (R-ID), Rick Scott (R-FL), and Bill Cassidy (R-LA) appear ready to present the so-called “VALOR Act,” a bill co-sponsored by Democrats including Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL) and Sen. Michael Bennet (D-CO). The bill would significantly ratchet up US sanctions against Venezuela.
Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico have also tried to pressure Maduro by calling for the release of detailed voter tallies and an election audit conducted by some institution other than Venezuela’s Supreme Court, which remains fully under Maduro’s thumb.
But the Venezuelan leader still has firm backing from the country’s military and security forces, which profit from his rule. They will also again become the target of sanctions, but they’ve weathered these storms before and have had plenty of time to prepare for one of this year’s least surprising storms. In fact, Maduro has responded to pressure from the US and other governments not by offering concessions but by arresting opposition leaders and restricting access in Venezuela to social media that can be used to organize protests.
To date, the Trump get-tough approach and the Biden engagement strategy have both failed, because the US is no better able to dislodge Maduro than they were to sweep away Cuba’s Fidel Castro. Maduro, like Castro, has friends in Beijing and Moscow ready to provide diplomatic cover and just enough cash to render US leverage useless. Until there is a revolt from within Maduro’s domestic alliance of backers, clients, and enablers, the strongman will remain strong.
A collage of Ian Bremmer with major world leaders.
It’s been at least a couple of days without a historically unprecedented event in the United States (it’s the Middle East’s turn now). No presidential assassination attempts, no “bloodless coups,” no furniture sex scandals ... Boring, I know. But it also gives me the chance to answer one more batch of your questions before going on summer break.
As always, the following may be lightly edited for clarity. If you want a chance at having your questions answered in the future, send me an email here and follow me on Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, and Threads to know when I’m doing a new AMA.
What are you reading right now?
Right now, I’m almost finished with “Never Let Me Go” by Kazuo Ishiguro. I got it when it came out in 2005, but for some reason I never got to it back then, and I gotta say I’m finding it a wonderful summer read. This is generally my favorite time of the year to get away from my day-to-day and spend time thinking about stuff that’s outside my usual wheelhouse.
Have you ever interviewed Trump?
No. I’ve interviewed plenty of core Trump supporters, including Jared Kushner, JD Vance, and Steve Bannon. But not Trump. Or Biden, for that matter. I would, though. Just say when and where, Mr. President.
How do you think Trump’s reelection would affect US-Brazil relations, with Brazilian President Lula being an avid critic of the former White House tenant and keeping an ambiguous but slightly anti-American rhetoric (reinforced by equally ambiguous and cumbersome relations with Iran, China, Russia, Cuba, etc.)?
The interesting thing about Trump is that he doesn’t really care much about your rhetoric, your values, or your allies as long as you pay him a “fair” price for whatever he thinks you’re getting out of the bilateral relationship. There was a lot more anti-American rhetoric from Kim Jong-un than from Lula in his first term, and yet Trump was more than willing to go to North Korea and try to cut a deal with him ... His foreign policy is mostly transactional. If Lula is prepared to engage on those terms, US-Brazil relations should be just fine despite the obvious policy/ideological daylight between them.
What is your explanation for Hamas’s decision to attack Israel? They knew it would be militarily impossible to win this war, yet they still attacked. Is there a rational explanation for this? Or was it merely an emotionally driven decision, for the lack of a better word?
Yes, they knew it was going to be militarily impossible to win the war, but that doesn’t mean starting it was irrational from their perspective. As Clausewitz said, after all, war is just politics by other means. It’s conceivable that Hamas set out to achieve a strategic goal far more ambitious than a tactical battlefield victory: to provoke an Israeli response so brutal that it would alienate the Jewish state’s allies, push Palestinians (and the Arab world) further into Hamas’s arms and away from moderation and the two-state solution, and ultimately undermine Israel’s long-term security and legitimacy. The death and suffering of innocent Gazans and the decimation of the organization’s command structure was an acceptable price to pay for that, as Hamas’s military leader Yahya Sinwar acknowledged (although I’m not sure Hamas’s recently assassinated political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, would agree).
As for the timing, I think Hamas realized it was fast becoming irrelevant and saw a unique opportunity to change that. Irrelevant because up until Oct. 7, Israel was in the strongest opportunity diplomatic position it’d been in decades, while geopolitics were turning against the Palestinians, and even the Arab world had largely moved on from their plight. A unique opportunity because the far-right Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had taken its eye off Gaza security concerns due to domestic preoccupations of its own making, leaving the country exposed to an attack that might not have been possible otherwise.
Yuval Noah Harari suggests that democracy cannot survive without “a feeling of special love and care for your particular community [a good flavor of nationalism].” He suggests that this “is a precondition for democracy and without strong patriotic feelings ... democracy cannot survive.” If you agree, how do we get (back) to that place, and do so without descending into jingoism?
I’m not sure I agree with Yuval’s premise that “strong patriotic feelings” are essential for democracy. It’s true that as societies get larger and people feel more disconnected from each other, you need some connective glue, but lots of things can provide that. Sometimes it can be provided by something tribal or ethnic or religious identity, and frequently that becomes dangerous and exclusionary. But I don’t think patriotism is the only way to give people a sense of community. Sometimes that can be forged in a unique historical experience, such as through tremendous hardship or good times. And sometimes it can be forged by a sense of common values.
The fact that patriotism and nationalism seem to be features of most modern nation-states doesn’t mean they are necessary features. Until recently, we thought everyone had to be in the office five days a week to be productive. Then, the pandemic hit, and we found out we were wrong. I think it’s possible there are other ways to forge durable democracies with social cohesion that we’re not even aware of.
What is the best possible outcome of the war for Ukraine under current conditions? And what is the most probable outcome?
I think the best realistic outcome would be for the Ukrainians to accept a US and NATO-brokered agreement to end the fighting along the current front lines. Freezing the conflict would make it much easier for the Europeans to take the lead on funding Ukrainian reconstruction and fast-track EU membership, and for the entire West to provide Kyiv with hard security guarantees (potentially including troops). This is the best outcome because Ukraine doesn’t have the manpower to win back all its land, but it can still end up in a stronger geopolitical position than it was before the invasion without having to accept Russian sovereignty over the occupied territories.
I wouldn’t say that this is the most probable outcome, though, because there’s so much uncertainty around what Trump and Harris would do, where Congress will be, and how the Europeans would react. In many ways, I think Trump and Harris would both agree that what I just laid out is the best possible outcome. But, and this is very important, Trump would make those decisions unilaterally, whereas Harris would try to bring America’s European allies along. This would impact how hard it’d be to get to the outcome in question.
What is the path to NATO membership for Ukraine?
It requires the Americans to be willing to say it’s a good idea in a concrete way, which they haven’t been willing to do. Absent that, there’s no path. If Trump wins in November, there’s definitely no path. If Harris wins, there still may be no path.
The hard truth is that Ukraine is no closer in the process to becoming a member than when it was first invited in 2008. Back then, there were two routes the United States and NATO could’ve taken to protect Ukraine. They could’ve either made them a member right there and then, in which case Russia would’ve never invaded. Or they could’ve never invited them in the first place. But opening the door without actually providing a roadmap was the worst of all possible worlds for Ukraine. This is true of Georgia as well.
What do you expect from the incoming Mexican government?
I expect continued economic growth and development because the external environment is so favorable. US-China relations are only getting worse, driving more nearshoring and friendshoring. Mexican labor is cheaper than Chinese labor. The US economy is doing incredibly well compared to all other G7 economies. North American supply chains are completely integrated. Also, President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum and her new cabinet are more technocratic and business-friendly than AMLO. That’s positive.
On the negative side, a lot of the “reforms” that AMLO is demanding and Sheinbaum – as a strong loyalist – is pursuing, including most problematically the judicial reform, will undermine the rule of law, undermine inbound investment, and ultimately be a drag on Mexican growth.
What US foreign policy challenges do you foresee from corporate capture?
On balance, I would say that corporate capture has much more impact on domestic US policy than it does on foreign policy these days. That hasn’t always been the case. And it doesn’t mean there’s no influence at all. Certainly, part of the reason why Trump has said that he wants to reverse the Biden administration’s transition energy policies and undo its AI regulation executive order is because of the financial support he gets from fossil fuel companies and Silicon Valley firms.
But what’s interesting is that today’s landmark US foreign policies are not particularly driven by corporate interests – and indeed can run counter to them. Think of the Russia-Ukraine war, where Washington has been trying to provide a level of support to Kyiv beyond what the military-industrial complex is able to produce. Or for the best example, consider America’s hardline bipartisan policy toward China, featuring decoupling in strategic sectors despite there being huge corporate interests with massive exposure to the Chinese market.
Who of the current candidates do you think is Harris’s best choice for VP, in terms of electoral impact?
Data shows that vice presidents don’t usually matter much electorally either way. But this may turn out to be such a tight race that any decimal point could make a difference. With that in mind, I think Harris has to go for whoever can help her pick up a swing state, which is why Pennsylvania Gov. Josh Shapiro and Arizona Sen. Mark Kelly are the hands-down favorites. On balance, I think Arizona is a bit more of a stretch for Democrats so Kelly adds slightly more to the ticket. But either would be fine.
What does the rest of the world think about the upcoming US elections?
Everyone except for the most hardcore American adversaries is concerned about the state of our political system. Pretty much all US allies and neutral countries worry about what domestic division and dysfunction mean for both the consistency and the direction of US leadership on the global stage. Unsure of what the United States stands for anymore, they’re anxious about their ability to influence and hedge the impact of the outcomes that matter to them over time.
The only countries who see this as an opportunity are Russia, Iran, and North Korea – agents of chaos whom we dubbed “the axis of rogues” in this year’s Top Risks report. Even China, whose fragile economy is highly dependent on global peace and stability, does not want the US to descend into the kind of uncontrolled chaos that would leave them holding the bag.
When Paul Nitze was 54, he turned down JFK’s offer of national security advisor because he did not think the job was important enough. What are some dumb decisions you have made in this year of life?
I said that Javier Milei was going to completely fail when he took over as president of Argentina. I thought that in part because I took a lot more of his rhetoric as a complete outsider at face value than I should have, as opposed to realizing he was saying all those outrageous things in campaign mode. I also underappreciated how much the Peronists would find it necessary to cooperate with him to get something done rather than get blamed for his failure. Argentina is now doing considerably better than I expected, so that was a pretty dumb decision.
But like most dumb decisions, the most important thing is being willing to admit that you were wrong and then pivot. I’ve found this to be quite an important life skill, especially when you make a living out of actually trying to understand the world as it is.
If I wanted to join Eurasia Group, how would you advise that I go about it?
Two points. The first is that we employ only the most exceptional political analysts out there. Some of them are very experienced and have made their names globally already. Others have just come out of college or grad school but are brilliant. What they all share is a global orientation, a relentless curiosity to understand the world, and a willingness to listen to radically different perspectives and to work with others who do so, too. If you don’t have those basic qualities, don’t bother applying because (1) you most likely won’t get the job, and (2) if you somehow do, you’re neither going to like it nor be good at it.
The second point, and I wish this weren’t true, is that Eurasia Group is still a small-ish firm. We get hundreds, sometimes thousands, of applications per open position but as a company of around 250, we don’t have a large enough HR department to give every capable candidate an adequate screening. So a way to stand out is to make an impression on people in the organization who can vouch for you. Write, tweet, and – most importantly – network. Not with me (I don’t hire other than the team that directly reports to me) but with any EG analysts who are driving the analytical work in your field.
I have little doubt that President Joe Biden’s belated but essential decision to bow out of the 2024 presidential election on Sunday will go down in history as a patriotic act.
Following his infamous debate performance on June 27, an overwhelming majority of Americans – including two-thirds of Democrats – came to the conclusion that the president was no longer physically and mentally fit to serve another four-year term in office. As things stood last Saturday, Donald Trump – fresh off a failed assassination attempt and a triumphant Republican convention – looked set to retake the White House and likely control both houses of Congress, with little an ailing Biden could do to turn things around.
By finally agreeing to step down when his term ends in January, Biden jolted the race 100 days out and gave his party a fighting chance to protect the country – and the world – from what he sees as the existential threat of an unrestrained Trump. Only he had the power to do that, and when push came to shove (and there was plenty of shoving), he met the moment. It was a fitting capstone to a lifetime of public service.
This is what leadership looks like. Contrary to what many are claiming, there was nothing inevitable about Biden’s decision to withdraw. Yes, he was under immense pressure from his party and the media to step down. Yes, all evidence pointed toward near-certain disaster in November if he stayed on. Yes, his legacy was on the line. And yet … he still had a choice. His exit was not preordained. No one forced his hand – in fact, no one could force his hand. It was entirely up to Joe Biden, and Joe Biden alone, to do the right thing. This couldn’t have been easy – if it was, everyone would do it. And we know for a fact that not everyone would’ve made the same choice – least of all Trump, a man who is constitutionally incapable of putting party and country above himself.
Did Biden come to his decision reluctantly, and only after weeks spent in anger and denial? No doubt. It’s hard enough for anyone to voluntarily give up power, but it’s even harder for a person with Biden’s life history who’s also coming to terms with his own mortality. Should he have withdrawn much sooner? Absolutely – I never thought he should have run for reelection in the first place, and I said so publicly many times. Will this delay end up costing Democrats the election? It’s possible, though we may never know.
But we shouldn’t forget the “better” in “better late than never.” What matters most is that he finally got there. Biden could’ve held on until the bitter end, consequences be damned. Instead, he chose to put America first. It was a decision worthy of a leader. Not a winner, but a leader. He deserves credit for it – as does the Democratic Party, which has shown itself to be a much healthier and more functional institution than anyone thought. Can anyone seriously imagine today’s GOP launching a coordinated pressure campaign to depose Trump, even though so many Republicans privately criticize him as unfit and believe him to be an electoral drag?
It gives me a little hope in a country where politicians don’t often do the right thing, and where political parties all too easily bend to the will of their leaders even when it becomes clear they serve only themselves.
Harris or bust. Shortly after announcing his withdrawal, Biden endorsed Vice President Kamala Harris for the nomination. The entire Democratic establishment – with the notable exception of Barack Obama – quickly followed suit and rallied behind her. Within 24 hours, Harris had been endorsed by every viable potential challenger as well as an overwhelming majority of Democratic governors, members of Congress, and state party chairs. By Monday evening, her campaign had raised $150 million from major donors and $81 million from small donors, and she had secured more than enough pledged delegates to become the party’s presumptive nominee.
Although an ostensibly competitive and democratically legitimate nomination process would have ultimately benefitted Democrats by ensuring the winner had what it takes to take on Trump and appeal to a broad swath of voters, the speed with which the party coalesced around Harris ensures next month’s convention in Chicago will be little more than a coronation ceremony. With only 54 delegates currently undecided and a minimum of 300 needed for any would-be nominee to compete, it’s impossible to imagine a challenger not named Marianne Williamson or Dean Phillips emerging.
And that’s … not a disaster for the Democrats. Harris may not have been the best possible candidate Democrats could’ve put forward a year (or four) ago, but she was the most viable candidate to replace Biden, unite the party, and avoid a down-ballot bloodbath at this late stage.
What can be, unburdened by what has been? The question now is not whether there was a better Democratic candidate than Harris, but whether Harris can beat Trump. And on that front, the jury is still out. We simply don’t have enough recent polling data on this matchup yet to get a decent idea of where things stand today.
Here’s what we do know: This is an incredibly tough environment for an incumbent’s successor, with a majority of voters telling pollsters they are unhappy with the state of the country. And Harris is no Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, or Ronald Reagan – a generational talent with the charisma and vision to work political miracles. So she starts as the underdog accordingly. But off the bat, she has dramatically better odds than Biden because she solves the president’s biggest electability challenge: his age. And she has more upside than Trump, who remains a historically unpopular candidate with a hard ceiling of 45% of national support. By contrast, nearly 10% of Americans don’t even have an opinion of her yet, so she has room to define herself.
Can Harris break above Trump’s ceiling? She’s neither a proven national candidate nor a distinguished campaigner, having fizzled out before reaching the Iowa caucus during the 2020 presidential primaries. She has plenty of weaknesses for Republicans to exploit, including unpopular Biden administration policies (notably on the border) for which voters may blame her. And there’s a chance she could lose more older, white, and moderate working-class voters relative to Biden than she picks up young, nonwhite, and progressive ones.
But at 59, Harris is able to string together full sentences, give cogent stump speeches, campaign vigorously, and effectively deliver the abortion and democracy messages that worked well for Democrats in 2022. She can also play offense on Trump’s age – he’s 78 – and mental fitness, now an exclusively Republican liability that 50% of all voters found disqualifying in the former president nary a week ago.
How this will all net out in November, no one knows yet. Think about all that’s happened in the last two weeks, and imagine all that could change in the next 100 days. That’s an eternity in US politics – certainly longer than entire general election campaigns normally take in most other democracies.
All we can say for sure is Biden has given the Democrats a fighting chance and made the election both more competitive and more uncertain than it was a week ago.
Republican presidential candidate and former U.S. President Donald Trump gestures with a bloodied face as multiple shots rang out during a campaign rally at the Butler Farm Show in Butler, Pennsylvania, U.S., July 13, 2024.
The United States came within a hair’s breadth of serious civil instability last weekend when former President Donald Trump narrowly survived assassination at a campaign rally near Butler, PA. The attempt on Trump’s life, which killed one audience member and critically injured two others, marked the first time in over four decades that a sitting or former US president was shot at.
While the worst-case scenario was thankfully avoided, the attack was no one-off, both coming at and adding to one of the most volatile times in modern American history. As I warned in Eurasia Group’s Top Risk #1 for 2024, “The United States vs. itself,” extreme levels of polarization, record-low trust in democratic institutions, algorithmically boosted disinformation, and foreign and domestic weaponization of outrage has made political violence in the United States “nearly inevitable.”
Something like this was bound to happen sooner or later. Too many Americans across the spectrum have been primed to see their political rivals as mortal enemies out to destroy US democracy in every election. A national survey last year found that roughly 75% of Americans believe that US democracy is at risk in November (although they disagree on which side of the aisle the threat comes from), and 25% agree that patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save the country. Add to that the mental health and drug-use crises plaguing our society and the fact that the US has more (and deadlier) guns per capita than any other country in the world save Yemen (which is having a civil war), and the only surprise is that something like this didn’t happen sooner.
To be clear, we still don’t know what caused 20-year-old gunman Thomas Matthew Crooks to shoot Trump, and we may never find out. He could’ve been a severely ill man with easy access to a weapon and no agenda other than to commit suicide by cop in the highest profile way possible. But regardless of whether Saturday’s assassination attempt was politically motivated, nothing changes the fact that the United States is a country ripe for political violence.
American democracy is in crisis. The United States is still the most powerful country on the planet. Its economy and military remain the envy of the world, as do its technology companies and research universities. But the US is also the only major democracy in the world whose political system is in serious crisis. Elsewhere, elections are taking place normally and peacefully. Here, not so much. When I was a kid, we were the “shining city on a hill.” Most Americans no longer believe that their democracy is healthy or functional. No one around the world looks at America anymore and thinks, “I want my political system to work like that.” US allies are deeply troubled by this, and US adversaries see a generational opportunity.
Trump’s front-runner status gets a shot in the arm. The picture of a bloodied Trump defiantly raising his fist and yelling “Fight! Fight! Fight!” as Secret Service agents tried to hold him down and an American flag waved behind him will be the defining image of the presidential race. The attack solidifies Trump’s already strong grip on the Republican Party and cult status among the MAGA faithful while taking media focus off President Joe Biden’s issues and reducing internal Democratic pressure on him to drop out, making it less likely that he cedes the nomination to someone with a better chance of defeating Trump.
At the same time, Trump’s extraordinary physical response to being shot draws a more powerful contrast with Biden’s age and frailty than any debate performance or press conference could, making Trump marginally likelier to beat him in November. To top things off, the attempt makes it harder for Democrats to campaign on Trump as a threat to democracy without being accused of inciting violence against the former president. This neutralizes one of their most effective attack lines and further depresses Biden’s reelection odds. If I didn’t think Trump was the odds-on favorite before, I sure do now.
Trump has an opportunity to unite the country. As the victim of the assassination attempt and our likely next president, Trump is in a unique position to rally the entire nation together. Maybe, just maybe, could this be the moment when Trump decides to take the high road and finally Becomes President™ before he’s even elected? Don’t bet on it.
Unfortunately, nothing about his history suggests that he will do that. In fact, every impulse and instinct moves him in the exact opposite direction – to make this about his grievances against his political enemies, about dividing us vs. them, about getting retribution, about winning. That’s just who he is: a winner, not a leader. Someone who will do absolutely everything he can to get to the finish line first, no matter who he knocks down along the way. It’s how he made his billions, how he became famous, and how he became president.
Would a man who believes he has been wrongly persecuted, impeached, indicted, convicted, and nearly killed by his political enemies let them get away with it for the sake of the country? Or would he use all the tools at his disposal to do what he does best: win? I would love Trump to prove me wrong … but his selection of Ohio Sen. JD Vance – who on Saturday accused the Biden campaign of inciting the assassination attempt – as his VP pick and his latest rhetoric suggest he won’t.
Could any good come from this tragedy? Is the crisis big enough to shake us out of our complacency?I’m also skeptical. The weaponization of dangerous and divisive rhetoric has become too profitable and politically useful, and there are not enough people in positions of power who are willing to sacrifice their own ambitions, careers, and pocketbooks for the public good. This latter point speaks to a greater sickness afflicting the US: We are becoming a nation of winners but not of leaders. Trump is its purest, most unbridled expression, but the rot runs much deeper than him.
In this environment, I expect that the response to the near assassination will look less like the unifying, rally-around-the-flag response to 9/11 and more like the divisive and politicized response to Jan. 6, tearing the country further apart and presaging more, rather than less, violence and social instability to come. It’s going to get worse before it gets better.Incumbents in trouble, Putin’s bet, Conservative Canada, and more: Your questions, answered
Another heat wave, another mailbag.
Thank you to all who’ve sent questions. The response to last week’s edition was overwhelmingly positive, so please keep ‘em coming. If you want a chance to have your questions answered, shoot me an email here or follow me on Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, and Threads, and look out for future AMAs. The only questions that are off-limits are boring ones.
Looking at the elections in France, the UK, and the US, would you agree that 2024 might be shaping up to be the year of anti-incumbents?
Funny you should ask – my latest Quick Take tackles that exact question. Long story short: Yes, this is a deeply challenging time to be an incumbent, and the massively underrated reason why is that people all over the world are still reeling from the aftereffects of the pandemic.
There are, of course, plenty of local and idiosyncratic reasons why the French, the Brits, the Indians, the South Africans, and so many others were unhappy with their leadership. But the one thing incumbents everywhere had in common is voters blamed them for all the unprecedented disruption they’ve experienced since COVID-19, from lockdowns and vaccine mandates to supply chain disruptions, inflation, migration, and crime. In this environment, if the Republican candidate in the United States was anyone other than the historically unpopular Donald Trump, we’d be looking at a GOP landslide – and that’s against anyone that the Democrats put up, let alone a debate/age-diminished Joe Biden.
What US election result is Putin hoping for?
Putin clearly prefers Trump – a more transactional president who admires strongmen, shuns traditional US allies, and believes “common values” are irrelevant to international relations. Trump dislikes Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and has expressed a desire to engage with Putin directly and unilaterally to end the war on terms more favorable to Russia. Putin also benefits from more chaos in the US political system and stands to benefit from a contested US election outcome that turns Americans more inward, against each other, and away from international leadership in diplomatic, economic, and – especially – security matters.
If Trump is elected and turns his back on Ukraine, how likely is it that Western Europe will crank up its own war machine and get the job done?
They’ll certainly try to do more. That’s especially true of NATO’s frontline states: Poland, the Baltics, and the Nordics. But France, one of Europe’s leading proponents of common defense capabilities and support for Ukraine under President Emmanuel Macron, may not be in a position to do more given the result of its recent parliamentary election. Germany, the continent’s largest economy, may be reluctant to lean in given the fiscal troubles facing the government’s weak and fractious coalition. And some other countries like Viktor Orban’s Hungary and Robert Fico’s Slovakia will align themselves more with Trump, dividing what has hitherto been a strongly unified Europe on the issue.
Where do you see breaking points for the Russian and Ukrainian people in this war?
It’s much closer for Ukraine. Kyiv is running low on valuable young men who can be mobilized, trained, and sent to the front to fight. Ukrainian support for the war has eroded accordingly. That matters more than it would if the same were happening in Russia because Ukraine remains a democracy, however imperfect.
A little over a year after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s aborted coup, I don’t see any near-term breaking points for the Russian people. Though large-scale casualties are certainly making the war less popular among the population at large, the Kremlin is able to sustain its “meat grinder” campaign by drawing from a pool of disenfranchised convicts, ethnic minorities, and mercenaries. Not that “ordinary” Russians are substantially more enfranchised …
What will it take for the Chinese to give up on Putin? What can America do to hasten the process?
There’s no reason for them to do so. After all, India – a key strategic partner of the United States and the West more broadly – has also significantly increased its trade with Russia, with no adverse consequences for Delhi. If the US were to start imposing significant secondary sanctions on Chinese companies or banks over expanded dual-use exports to Russia, that’d probably get Beijing to reduce its exposure to the Kremlin’s war machine at the margins. But there’s nothing the US is likely to do in the near future (under Biden or Trump) that could completely break the China-Russia relationship.
How would a Trump presidency strengthen China?
Trump and Biden have similar China policies. The biggest difference is the extent of tariffs Trump is prepared to impose, which would have a more significant negative impact on both the Chinese and the US economy (unless Beijing was prepared to cut a significant and unexpected deal). China’s biggest strategic opportunity in that environment would be to divide and conquer: Exploit concerns from US allies that find themselves constrained or undermined by a more unilateralist Trump administration to improve its relations with them and potentially drive a wedge between them and the Americans.
What’s the biggest geopolitical risk in the world today?
The biggest risk is still “the United States vs. itself”: A presidential election in the world’s most divided and dysfunctional advanced industrial democracy that will do untold damage to America’s social fabric, political institutions, and international standing no matter who wins. Have a look at the full list of Top 10 Risks we put out in January. I really wish they weren’t standing up as well as they are …
How do the leaders of other countries feel about a potential Conservative government coming to power in Canada?
At the risk of sounding harsh, most world leaders aren’t thinking about Canada at all – and for good reason. The stakes of the country’s upcoming election may feel existential to my liberal friends up north who are about to lose power after nine years in office, but the reality is that Canada’s democracy isn’t in crisis like America’s is.
Despite his right-wing populist rhetoric, when it comes to policy substance, Conservative leader and likely next prime minister Pierre Poilievre is closer to Mitch McConnell’s brand of Koch-friendly conservatism than to the nativist, authoritarian, protectionist Trumpism that ruffles feathers in foreign capitals. Sure, a Conservative government will lead to closer alignment with the US in a Trump administration, but either way it would remain a very friendly and stable relationship. It will also lower taxes, lean more strongly into energy and related infrastructure development, and promote other pro-business policies. Critically, agree or disagree with his rather conventional platform, Poilievre has done nothing to suggest he’d undermine the legitimacy of Canada’s democracy. Must be nice, eh?
Do you think the AfD will win the next German election?
No. Despite the party’s meteoric decade-long rise, Germany’s coalition politics are designed to deliver centrist outcomes at the national level, and the Alternative for Germany is still seen as way too radical, Nazi-coded, and incompetent. But it’s certainly plausible that they’ll eventually be part of a government. After all, most of the structural elements that made the AfD a force are still in place: unchecked migration, a weak economy, deep discontent in Germany’s east, and plenty of space to the right of the decidedly moderate and pro-European Christian Democratic Union, aka CDU, for them to exploit.
Can RFK Jr. win?
Win … back his reputation? It’s hard to say. He’s better known now and seems to have a fair number of committed online fans (I say “seems to” because I can’t be sure how many are real vs. bots). I could see him selling merchandise, writing a book, and going on the public speaking circuit. If you’re earnestly asking about the 2024 election, I’d say he has a better chance of winning the lottery than he does of carrying a single state.
Does either of the major US parties have a realistic plan to bring down the deficit?
No. Both presidential candidates’ platforms and track records show little concern for fiscal deficits or pro-cyclical government spending (though Trump added more to the national debt in his first term than Biden has). This is not ideal at a time when interest rates are high and debt servicing costs are rising as a share of the federal budget.
I'm not saying that all deficit spending is bad or equally bad. When we look at companies, we always consider both sides of the balance sheet: liabilities and assets. The same should be true for sovereigns. That’s why I generally support deficit spending that can reasonably be expected to lead to asymmetric increases in the nation’s long-term asset base (e.g., any positive-return investment in education, health care, infrastructure, decarbonization, etc.). Trillions of dollars on failed wars … not so much.
The circumstances and timing matter greatly, too. Fiscal stimulus – even of the not-so-productive variety – is the right thing to do during recessions, when aggregate demand needs a kick in the ass, interest rates are low, and the spending pays for itself many times over with growth. Conversely, the right time for the government to tighten its belt is during the boom … now.
How big a business is Eurasia Group? Is it relatively large, medium, or small/boutique compared to its peers?
We’re almost 250 employees – pretty small for an organization that helps people understand the world. Our principal competitive challenge is employing enough senior leadership to take on all the new opportunities we’re lucky to have. We have a lot of talent, but it’s a big world out there, and it’s not getting any less challenging.