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<title>us european relations — GZERO Media</title>
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<lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:42:05 +0000</lastBuildDate>
<item>
<title>Why 2028 matters for Europe</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-live/why-2028-matters-for-europe</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 15:13:33 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>gzero summit</category>
<category>GZERO Live</category>
<description>What does the rise of ethno-nationalism mean for the future of US-EU relations? At last week&apos;s GZERO Summit in London, Ian Bremmer unpacked how Trump and his potential successors&apos; embrace of this shift could reshape the transatlantic relationship in 2028 and beyond.</description>
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<media:text>Why 2028 matters for Europe | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What does the rise of ethno-nationalism mean for the future of US-EU relations? At last week's GZERO Summit in London, <strong>Ian Bremmer</strong> unpacked how <strong>Trump</strong> and his potential successors' embrace of this shift could reshape the transatlantic relationship in 2028 and beyond.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<item>
<title>As ties with the US fray, Canada looks across the Atlantic</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/as-ties-with-the-us-fray-canada-looks-across-the-atlantic</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 15:40:14 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Tasha Kheiriddin</dc:creator>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>eu membership</category>
<category>tasha kheiriddin</category>
<category>mark carney</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>france</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney attended a meeting of the European Political Community in Armenia this weekend, a first by the leader of a non-European country. He was invited to discuss common interests in trade, energy, and security. In a speech that echoed his address to the World Economic Forum in Davos two months earlier, Carney called on middle powers, including Canada and European nations, to work together in the wake of disruption of the established world order — implicitly pointing to the United States. “It’s my strong personal view that the international order will be rebuilt,” he told the crowd in Yerevan, “but it will be rebuilt out of Europe.”</description>
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<media:credit>Natalie Johnson</media:credit>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Canadian Prime Minister <strong>Mark Carney&nbsp;</strong>attended a meeting of the European Political Community in Armenia this weekend, a first by the leader of a non-European country. He was invited to discuss common interests in trade, energy, and security. In a speech that echoed his address to the World Economic Forum in Davos two months earlier, Carney called on middle powers, including Canada and European nations, to work together in the wake of disruption of the established world order — implicitly pointing to the United States. “It’s my strong personal view that the international order will be rebuilt,”<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/04/world/canada/carney-europe-trump.html"><u> he told the crowd in Yerevan,</u></a> “but it will be rebuilt out of Europe.”</p><p>Carney’s trip — and somewhat more optimistic tone — comes on the heels of suggestions by <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/article/canada-could-join-eu-says-french-foreign-minister-jean-noel-barrot/"><u>French</u></a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.youtube.com/shorts/YDMpvrydCkU"><u>Finnish</u></a> politicians that Canada should consider joining the European Union. The question<a target="_blank" href="https://macleans.ca/politics/why-canada-should-join-the-eu/"> <u>isn’t new</u></a>; it has been<a target="_blank" href="https://www.policymagazine.ca/view-from-europe-the-increasingly-convincing-case-for-canada-joining-the-eu/"> <u>cropping up</u></a> in Canadian media ever since US President <strong>Donald Trump</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.desjardins.com/content/dam/pdf/en/personal/savings-investment/economic-studies/canada-tariffs-metal-product-4-may-2026.pdf"> <u>imposed tariffs on</u></a> Canadian exports and mused about the country becoming America’s 51st state. Europe, meanwhile, is also grappling with Trump’s impact, including his promise to withdraw US troops from Germany and new tariffs on EU auto exports. Taken together, these developments are pushing Canada and the EU closer, and despite a body of water between them, are making the case for joining the union that much stronger.</p><p><strong>A lot in common.&nbsp;</strong>Canada and the EU have deep cultural, historical, and demographic ties, rooted primarily in British and French traditions. Canada’s legal system recognizes both common and civil law, derived from the French Napoleonic Code. Politically, its parliament is modeled on Britain’s Westminster system and maintains the British monarch as head of state. The country is officially bilingual, and<a target="_blank" href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=9810035501"><u> more than half&nbsp;</u></a>of its population has European ancestry.</p><p>Canada’s political and social systems are also more closely aligned with Europe than with the United States. Canada has a universal, single-payer health care system, state-subsidized childcare, pharmacare, and dental care, and<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://thehub.ca/2024/07/08/canadas-marginal-tax-rates-are-much-higher-than-u-s-with-greater-increases-across-income-levels/"> <u>imposes higher taxes</u></a> than the US. In sectors like banking, telecommunications, and agriculture, Canada mirrors Europe’s more regulated approach and limits foreign competition with domestic firms.</p><p><strong>A growing bromance with Brussels</strong>. In 2016, Canada <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="http://google.com/url?q=https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/13587_en&amp;sa=D&amp;source=docs&amp;ust=1777987791336973&amp;usg=AOvVaw1iTVKGDlop-KY52U_p23eO"><u>signed</u></a> the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), a free-trade agreement with the EU, eliminating 98% of tariffs and improving market access for goods and services between the two <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="http://parties.in/"><u>parties</u></a>. Canada’s exports to the EU <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.edc.ca/en/article/ceta-eu-uk-free-trade.html"><u>have since increased</u></a> by 57%, reaching $34 billion.</p><p>Since the start of Trump’s second term, those ties have deepened. In 2025, Ottawa and Brussels signed the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2025/06/23/canada-announces-new-strengthened-partnership-european"><u>New European Union (EU)-Canada Strategic Partnership of the Future</u></a> and a<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/eu-ue/security-defence-securite-defense.aspx?lang=eng"> <u>Security and Defense Partnership</u></a> to strengthen cooperation in trade, the digital economy, and the environment. In February of this year, Canada became the first non-European country to join the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2026/02/minister-mcguinty-advances-canadas-defence-priorities-with-allies-and-partners-in-europe.html"><u>EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative</u></a>, expanding access to European markets for Canadian defense industries.</p><p>Canada has also <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/ukraine/relations.aspx?lang=eng"><u>contributed</u></a> over $25 billion in economic, military, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since the start of the war, plus a $270 million contribution <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/carney-armenia-ukraine-funding-announcement-9.7186438"><u>announced this week</u></a>. While the assistance is a fraction of the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-states-america/eu-assistance-ukraine-us-dollars_en?s=253"><u>$223 billion</u></a> the EU has made available since 2022, it remains significant – and could boost the bloc’s overall contributions.</p><p>Should Canada join the EU, both sides could gain. Canada could secure even greater access to one of the world’s biggest economies and a strong new partnership at a moment when its longstanding relationship with its North American neighbor is under strain. For Europe, Canada offers access to commodities including natural gas and critical minerals, and another gateway to North America at a moment when ties to the US also look uncertain.</p><p><strong>But there are barriers to EU membership – and disadvantages</strong>. The first roadblock for Canada is geography, though this may not be insurmountable. While Article 49 of the EU constitution says that only “European States” can join, Turkey was deemed <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/countries/turkiye_en"><u>an eligible candidate&nbsp;</u></a>in 1997 (even though it has not yet achieved it) despite being partly in Asia. The European Parliament <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/23a2_en.htm"><u>stated</u></a> that Turkey’s case “shows that the term ‘European State’ need not be interpreted in a strictly geographical sense,” but is “subject to political assessment.” Still, all 27 member states must agree to that assessment to admit a new member — a consensus that still eludes Turkey, and even European nations like Ukraine.</p><p>Membership would require Canada to adopt the EU’s <em>acquis communautaire,&nbsp;</em>the body of EU law developed since 1957 – a process that some experts estimate could<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/2025/03/canada-eu-option/"> <u>take 10 years</u></a>. Canada would also have to adopt the EU’s strict environmental regulations, replace its supply management system with the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, contribute to the EU’s carbon emissions trading program, and apply EU tariffs to non-member states, including the US, potentially complicating trade deals with Washington.</p><p>Joining could also prove expensive. With <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualized-canada-rank-in-the-eu/"><u>the fourth-highest GDP</u></a> in the bloc after Germany, France, and Italy, Canada could become<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://nationalpost.com/opinion/first-reading-why-it-would-be-extremely-dumb-for-canada-to-join-the-eu"> <u>a net contributor</u></a> to the EU’s budget, subsidizing programs in less wealthy member states. The EU’s labor mobility rules could also prove contentious, as membership would entail freer movement of people at a time when Canada is<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.ipolitics.ca/2025/10/31/immigration-cuts-have-led-to-lower-rent-prices-slower-rise-in-unemployment-td-report/"> <u>tightening immigration levels</u></a> to lower the costs of housing and reduce unemployment levels.</p><p><strong>Where does the public sit?&nbsp;</strong>Despite these downsides — or perhaps because they are not widely understood — Canadians appear broadly supportive of closer ties with the EU. A <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://sparkadvocacy.ca/insights/2026/04/canada-in-the-eu-most-canadians-think-its-an-idea-worth-exploring"><u>survey of 4,000 people</u></a> conducted in April found that one in four Canadians supported the idea of formally joining the EU, with 58% saying it was worth considering.</p><p>As for the Europeans, a recent<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://yougov.com/en-gb/articles/54662-should-canada-be-allowed-to-join-the-european-union"> <u>YouGov study</u></a> found that a majority or plurality of adults in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain support admitting Canada. Support is highest among Germans at 55%, while Italians are the least likely at 41%, but that group still outnumbers those who oppose the idea, at 24%.</p><p>So while it’s unlikely that Canada will definitively swap Washington for Brussels, a deeper transatlantic partnership appears to be in the cards — and a popular option on both sides of the pond. What shape that takes might depend on the fate of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) this summer. Should that trade deal not be renegotiated by July 1, Canada — and Carney — will feel even greater pressure to diversify trade and shore up alliances elsewhere.</p><p><em>Tell us what you think: Should Canada try to join the EU? Send us a message with your thoughts&nbsp;</em><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Challenges facing the transatlantic relationship</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/challenges-facing-the-transatlantic-relationship</link>
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<pubDate>Sat, 14 Feb 2026 18:09:21 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>marco rubio</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>munich security conference</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>Quick Take</category>
<description>In this Quick Take from Munich, Ian Bremmer examines the state of the transatlantic alliance as the 62nd Munich Security Conference concludes.</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this Quick Take from Munich,<strong> Ian Bremmer&nbsp;</strong>examines the state of the transatlantic alliance as the 62nd Munich Security Conference concludes. He points to Secretary of State <strong>Marco Rubio</strong>’s speech, which “received a standing ovation,” but cautions that European expectations remain low.</p><p>Ian focuses on the Ukraine war, noting the pressure on Kyiv and the risk of a US-Russia deal: “Are the Europeans going to hold together if the Americans cut a deal with the Russians by themselves? People are skeptical.”</p><p>He also raises concerns about Europe’s economic and political cohesion: “Europe is 27 countries and they’re institutionally hobbled from all acting together.”</p><p>Ian concludes that while leaders understand the problems, “they have not settled on the nature of a solution,” leaving the future of transatlantic cooperation uncertain as the US continues to dominate the alliance’s agenda.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Munich Security Conference: Can Europe defend itself without the US?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/munich-security-conference-can-europe-defend-itself-without-the-us</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 12 Feb 2026 17:56:45 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>gzero media</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>us economy</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>global economy</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>munich security conference</category>
<description>At the Munich Security Conference, the mood is clear: Europe no longer assumes the United States will lead. In this Quick Take, Ian Bremmer reports from Munich, where this year’s theme, “Under Destruction,” reflects growing anxiety that the US itself is destabilizing the transatlantic alliance it once anchored.</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
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<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrdmartejax07lqy07bjzbt" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At the Munich Security Conference, the mood is clear: Europe no longer assumes the United States will lead.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer</strong> reports from Munich, where this year’s theme, “Under Destruction,” reflects growing anxiety that the US itself is destabilizing the transatlantic alliance it once anchored.</p><p>While European leaders talk openly about autonomy and de-risking from America economically and technologically, the security reality is starkly different. The United States remains overwhelmingly dominant militarily, and Europe lacks both the unity and fiscal capacity to respond independently.</p><p>As Ian puts it:</p><p>“Recognition doesn’t mean you can respond to it.”</p><p>Europe understands the G-Zero world is here. The question is whether it can act like a geopolitical power, or whether it remains constrained by fragmentation and dependence.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Greenland, tariffs, and the transatlantic relationship</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-europe/greenland-tariffs-and-the-transatlantic-relationship</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 27 Jan 2026 21:00:17 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Carl Bildt</dc:creator>
<category>greenland</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>trade</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>denmark</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>GZERO Europe</category>
<description>In this episode of GZERO Europe, Carl Bildt examines how an eventful week in Davos further strained transatlantic relations and reignited tensions over Greenland.</description>
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<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this episode of GZERO Europe, <strong>Carl Bildt&nbsp;</strong>examines how an eventful week in Davos further strained transatlantic relations and reignited tensions over Greenland.</p><p>President Trump arrived threatening new tariffs on Europe and pressing Denmark over Greenland. European leaders responded forcefully, arguing that the tariff threats would violate commitments made under the EU-US trade framework agreement in July. As Bildt notes, Europe made clear that the deal would be “dead in the water” if Washington followed through.</p><p>The confrontation quickly escalated and then abruptly cooled. Trump withdrew the tariff threats and agreed to renewed talks, but Bildt says it left lasting scars. “Substantial damage has been done to the transatlantic relationship,” he argues, adding that trust in US leadership has eroded.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Will Trump ever be satisfied?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/will-trump-ever-be-satisfied</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2026 16:43:12 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>greenland</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>denmark</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>When Donald Trump suggested early last year that the United States had set its sights on acquiring Greenland, the response from Europe was to treat the incoming president like an unconventional uncle – worthy of a chuckle and a general sentiment that this was just Trump being Trump.</description>
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<media:credit>Laurent Gillieron/Pool via REUTERS</media:credit>
<media:text>Switzerland&apos;s Federal President Guy Parmelin speaks with US President Donald Trump prior to a bilateral meeting in Congress Centre on the sideline of the 56th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, WEF, in Davos, Switzerland, Wednesday, January 21, 2026.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When Donald Trump suggested early last year that the United States had set its sights on acquiring Greenland, the response from Europe was to treat the incoming president like an unconventional uncle – worthy of a chuckle and a general sentiment that this was <em>just Trump being Trump.</em></p><p>It’s hard to blame European diplomats for their initial view. Trump spent much of the post-election, pre-inauguration period rolling out a wish list that included retaking control of the Panama Canal, removing the dividing line between the US and Canada, and renaming the Gulf of Mexico.</p><p>A year on, European leaders are no longer laughing. Trump’s ambitions for Greenland are the talk of the town this week at the World Economic Forum in Davos. In an address to the forum today, Trump said, “We need [Greenland] for strategic national security and international security. This enormous, unsecured island is actually part of North America … That’s our territory.”</p><p>Yet, even as Trump calls for negotiations to begin, Europe still appears no closer to asking the right question on Greenland. If it’s not comedy, is Trump’s goal truly about US national security? Or, and more worrying for Europe, is this really just a “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/18/trump-considering-buying-greenland"><u>large real estate deal</u></a>?”</p><p><strong>A sobering realization.&nbsp;</strong>In recent weeks, a new reality has settled across Europe. The removal of Venezuelan President <strong>Nicolás Maduro&nbsp;</strong>after months of escalation and economic threats forced Europe to sober up. If the US could extract Maduro from his own bedroom in the cover of night, what would Trump be willing to try to fulfill his Greenland aspirations?</p><p>With Europe once again forced to adapt its approach to Trump in the wake of Venezuela, it’s hoping the question that needs answering on Greenland relates to its strategic relevance to the global landscape. If this is about NATO security, then Europe is prepared to meet the challenge. Denmark and Greenland’s leaders traveled to Washington earlier this month and agreed to establish<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/15/us/politics/white-house-greenland-meeting.html"> <u>a high-level working group</u></a> to explore a common way forward on American security considerations. In recent days, various European NATO allies have sent additional military personnel to demonstrate capability and interest in defending Greenland against external threats (Russian, American or otherwise).</p><p>The quagmire for Europe, though, is that Greenland is not only (or even not really) about US national security. Trump is not (just) looking to build new military bases or send more US troops to Greenland. A defense pact between Denmark and the US, signed in 1951, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.history.com/articles/1951-agreement-that-allows-us-military-presence-in-greenland"><u>already&nbsp;</u></a>provides for that. Nor is Trump (just) looking for Europe to contribute more for its collective defense. He has already pushed them to raise their defensive commitments to 5% of their GDPs. And he is not (just) looking for enhanced access through the Arctic Circle. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea sets out a vast framework for commercial and military passage.</p><p><strong>A stark reality.&nbsp;</strong>Even as the president <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115911344443637897"><u>says&nbsp;</u></a>the US’s national security – along with the world’s – is at “stake,” the security dynamics are at best only part of the matter. And at worst, they represent a pretext for what Greenland has always been about: a large real estate deal.</p><p>Given this, the question everyone in Europe should be asking themselves is: what will satisfy Trump?</p><p>The president is a<a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-the-us-president-plays-a-trump-card-on-ukraine"> <u>predictable negotiator</u></a>. His worldview always leads him to deploy a competitive approach (I win-you lose) in which he anchors negotiations by naming a price early on. By doing so, he limits the conversation, frames reality and forces other alternatives off the table. In that sense, Greenland <em>is</em> up for grabs. Everyone is talking about Greenland because Trump has <em>put it</em> up for grabs, even if he does not ultimately succeed in acquiring it.</p><p>In response, Europe, Denmark and Greenland need to be thinking about what will feel to Trump like ownership without involving actual ownership. In Ukraine, for example, Trump has shown a genuine interest in mineral diplomacy. Despite his suggestion at Davos that US enthusiasm is not about rare earths, Greenland has proven copper, lead and zinc reserves that will intrigue him, especially at this moment when mastering the “electric stack” is so critical to 21st century geopolitics (for more on this, see Eurasia Group’s <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/risk-2-overpowered"><u>Top Risk</u></a> #2: Overpowered). In 2008, the US Geological Survey <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.usgs.gov/publications/geology-and-assessment-undiscovered-oil-and-gas-resources-east-greenland-rift-basins"><u>found&nbsp;</u></a>Greenland also appears to have significant, yet untapped petroleum reserves. The assessment found that the eastern part of the island contains roughly 31.4 billion barrels of oil and hydrocarbons. That’s considerable potential, if extractable. By comparison, the US – the world’s <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2026/01/17/why-trump-wants-venezuela-oil/88108165007/"><u>top&nbsp;</u></a>oil producer – holds nearly the same volume of proven crude reserves. Trump may find co-ownership of these potential petroleum resources – a co-branding exercise – feels a lot like the US “getting its hands” on Greenland.</p><p><strong>A historic prize.&nbsp;</strong>Europe is waking up to the gravity of Trump’s interest in Greenland. An invasion of Greenland remains a very remote-probability but high-impact event. In fact, Trump seemingly took the use of force off the table in his Davos remarks. Even still, the US administration will continue to apply a ring of pressure on the parties involved, pulling all the various economic and security levers at its disposal in a concerted effort to drive concessions from Denmark, Greenland and NATO.</p><p>While Trump was still speaking at Davos, the European Parliament <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/21/european-lawmakers-suspend-us-trade-deal-amid-greenland-tariff-tensions.html"><u>suspended&nbsp;</u></a>the approval of a trade deal the EU had reached with the US last year. European leaders are also weighing retaliatory tariffs and a <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/article/the-eu-magical-mystery-trade-weapon-other-options-donald-trump/"><u>“bazooka” option</u></a> of labeling the US behavior “economic coercion.” But these considerations signal that European leadership may still be asking (and answering) the wrong question. It’s not how to barter trade for security. The question Trump is posing is about legacy. In his most direct message to European partners, Trump told the Davos audience: “You can say yes and we will be very appreciative. Or you can say no and we will remember.”</p><p>Acquiring Greenland would represent the largest land addition to the US in its history. For the president to be satisfied, legacy looks an awful lot like a Trump version of the Louisiana Purchase – which would be one for the history books.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Why Trump is pushing to take Greenland</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/why-trump-is-pushing-to-take-greenland</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrgcakdmkes07lq2731uk1v</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 18 Jan 2026 14:52:27 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>nato</category>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>denmark</category>
<category>greenland</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<description>Ian Bremmer breaks down a sudden and serious transatlantic crisis: President Trump’s insistence that the United States must have sovereignty over Greenland.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrdlfbgdqxb07myf6gs3pud" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrdlfbgdqxb07myf6gs3pud" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ian Bremmer breaks down a sudden and serious transatlantic crisis: President Trump’s insistence that the United States must have sovereignty over Greenland.</p><p>This is not a negotiation over security guarantees, expanded US bases, or Arctic cooperation, all which Denmark and Greenland have said they would accommodate. Instead, Washington has drawn a red line: no deal unless the US owns Greenland outright. That position, reinforced by Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, has triggered threats of tariffs against European countries supporting Denmark and raised questions about America’s reliability inside NATO.</p><p>European leaders believe this push isn’t really about security or critical minerals. Ian says many see it as a legacy play driven by Trump’s ego and something Greenlanders would never vote for and Denmark will not accept. The deeper risk, Ian warns, is structural: “The more the United States unilaterally undermines the collective security trust of NATO, the stronger the argument becomes that only American territory is truly protected.”</p><p>The bigger risk is strategic: by undermining allied trust, the US strengthens the argument that only American territory receives ironclad protection. That logic may appeal in Washington, but it accelerates fragmentation inside NATO and the EU.</p><p>With Trump and European leaders heading to Davos, the question is whether diplomacy can produce a climbdown, or whether Greenland becomes the next major rupture in the global order.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>What We’re Watching: Europe meets over Ukrainian security guarantees, Central African Republic reelects old leader, Israeli foreign minister visits Somaliland</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/watching/what-were-watching-europe-meets-over-ukrainian-security-guarantees-central-african-republic-reelects-old-leader-israeli-foreign-minister-visits-somaliland</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrgbyvsmjjv07lqx2e33jze</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 06 Jan 2026 16:31:09 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Zac Weisz, Natalie Johnson</dc:creator>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>somaliland</category>
<category>central african republic</category>
<category>touadera</category>
<category>africa</category>
<category>abdullahi</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>wagner group</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>What We&apos;re Watching</category>
<description>Trump’s shadow looms over Ukraine security talks in ParisUkrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is meeting European leaders and US officials today in Paris for the latest round of peace talks on Ukraine, where they will discuss how a potential ceasefire with Russia would be monitored and upheld.</description>
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<media:credit>Antonin Burat / Le Pictorium</media:credit>
<media:text>Ukraine&apos;s President Volodymyr Zelensky is received by French President Emmanuel Macron at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France, on January 6, 2026, as part of a summit of the Coalition of the Willing.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Trump’s shadow looms over Ukraine security talks in Paris</h3><p>Ukrainian President <strong>Volodymyr Zelensky</strong> is <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/06/world/europe/ukraine-talks-europe.html"><u>meeting</u></a> European leaders and US officials today in Paris for the latest round of peace talks on Ukraine, where they will discuss how a potential ceasefire with Russia would be monitored and upheld. The meeting comes just a few days after US President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> reiterated his desire for the US to take control of Greenland, a self-ruling Danish island, a move European leaders <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/06/trump-says-his-greenland-fixation-is-about-national-security-europeans-are-skeptical-00712149"><u>condemned</u></a> and said would spell trouble for the NATO alliance. With the US <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2026/01/rubio-this-is-our-hemisphere-and-president-trump-will-not-allow-our-security-to-be-threatened/"><u>preoccupied</u></a> with its own hemisphere right now, Europe may decide to take matters related to Ukrainian security guarantees into its own hands.</p><h3></h3><h3>Another African nation reelects older leader in controversial fashion</h3><p>The Central African Republic’s 68-year-old President <strong>Faustin Archange Touadéra&nbsp;</strong><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://apnews.com/article/central-african-republic-election-touadera-586cdbe64c133ff9d5251694fb43ce18"><u>cruised</u></a> to a third term in office, reportedly winning 76% of the vote. The opposition boycotted the election, citing concerns about <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q40xg3j0jo"><u>electoral fairness</u></a> and a recent referendum that removed term limits. Touadéra’s regime, which has <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://theafricacenter.org/files/galleries/SoD_Central_Africa.pdf"><u>repressed</u></a> opponents, still faces threats, principally from mostly-Muslim militant groups: in 2013, one such group ousted then-President <strong>François Bozizé</strong>, prompting the government to broker peace deals with rebel factions – some of which have since withdrawn. CAR is also facing problems with the Russian government, a traditional ally: Moscow wants the gold-rich nation to use the government-run African Corps for its security services, rather than the private mercenary group Wagner.</p><h3>Israel has strategic reasons for building Somaliland links</h3><p>A week after Israel became the first country in the world to recognize Somaliland, a region of Somalia that declared independence in 1991, Foreign Minister <strong>Gideon Sa’ar</strong> made the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-882477"><u>first diplomatic visit</u></a> earlier today to Hargesia, the de facto capital. Sa’ar met with Somaliland President <strong>Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi.&nbsp;</strong>There are strategic regions for Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, per experts, including the country’s position near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/8c33eefc-f6c1-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132"><u>nearly a third</u></a> of the world’s shipping passes. The country could also provide Israel with a potential launchpad to strike the Iran-backed Houthi rebels across the Gulf of Aden, if necessary.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Viewpoint: Trump wants a Europe more like US</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/viewpoint-trump-wants-a-europe-more-like-us</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrgbq5elr5o07my1v76ks6b</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 17 Dec 2025 16:34:53 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>trump administration</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>With the release of its National Security Strategy, the Trump administration has telegraphed how the US intends to engage with allies, and what it expects from them.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrdkn1kehj107lqnn9irznm" type="image/png" medium="image" width="1200" height="675">
<media:credit>REUTERS/Alexander Drago</media:credit>
<media:text>US President Donald Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Finland&apos;s President Alexander Stubb, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen pose for a family photo amid negotiations to end the Russian war in Ukraine, at the White House in Washington, D.C., USA, on August 18, 2025.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>– By Lindsay Newman</em></p><p>As his second term came into view, US President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> put the world on notice that the administration many had been preparing for may not be the one it would be getting. Promising a “golden age of America,” Trump laid out<a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-a-trumpian-storm-is-brewing"> <u>an ambitious agenda</u></a>. “America First” would no longer be an isolationist story, but an aspirational one. As he surveyed the globe – looking for deals and angles – his neighborhood, Europe, and anywhere in the world could face scrutiny.</p><p>Early signs were hard to miss. As president-elect, Trump<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.axios.com/2025/01/15/denmark-greenland-trump-call"> <u>suggested</u></a><u>&nbsp;</u>the US should buy Greenland, even though its leaders said it's not for sale. On his first day in office, Trump<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/expert-context-whats-going-on-with-trump-and-the-panama-canal/"> <u>said</u></a> the US should “take back” the Panama Canal, and<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/20/us/politics/trump-tariffs-executive-order.html"> <u>threatened</u></a> to tariff some of his closest allies and largest trading partners, Canada and Mexico. Beneath it all hovered a major question: What does it mean to be a friend of the United States during the second Trump administration? As the months unfolded, and the US zigzagged in its support for Ukraine, the answer grew more complicated.</p><p>Now, with the release of its<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf"> <u>National Security Strategy</u></a>, the administration has telegraphed how the US intends to engage with allies, and what it expects from them.</p><p><strong>Charting a new course</strong></p><p>When it comes to engaging with other countries, the NSS embraces “the nation-state” as the fundamental political unit of this geopolitical landscape. “Sovereignty-sapping” international institutions are out; new, transactional “burden-sharing networks” are in. Allies are expected to shoulder more responsibility, and use economic tools to align incentives.</p><p>In this landscape, of sovereign nations acting in alignment, the US will deploy a new “soft power.” Although not defined, the document suggests that soft power replaces a heavy reliance on foreign aid with trade and investment-focused relationships. This is already taking shape – from the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund Agreement and the US’ pledge of £150 billion ($204 billion) in inbound investment for the United Kingdom, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-suspends-technology-deal-with-uk-ft-says-2025-12-16/"><u>partially paused</u></a> this week over US concerns<em>&nbsp;</em>of a lack of progress by the UK.</p><p>The NSS also redraws the global map. The Western Hemisphere finds itself at the top of the list of priorities, complete with the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. By contrast, other regions, including Europe, have been given second billing.</p><p>That shift has landed hard in Europe. The<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-12-10/trump-despises-europe-we-cannot-ignore-that-anymore"> <u>narrative</u></a> that has settled is that Trump hates Europe, the US is closing shop, and the continent is on its own. This bad news comes at a moment when Europe views itself as being on the frontlines of global trends that will loom large in 2026: populism, migration pressures, untenable fiscal burdens and resource constraints. European leaders will say that they are doing the best they can amidst an adverse set of circumstances, and the existential threat of Russia that has dominated headlines for nearly four years.</p><p>Even as it holds up the weight of the world, facing as<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cn81x8py3j5o"> <u>NATO Secretary Mark Rutte said last week</u></a> “the scale of war our grandparents or great-grandparents endured,” Europe finds itself being chastised: <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/14/us/politics/vance-far-right-germany-munich-afd.html"><u>first by</u></a> Vice President <strong>JD Vance</strong> at the Munich Security Conference and now by the NSS itself. Years from now, European diplomats and government officials will recall where they were when they first heard the phrase “civilizational erasure.” It was a bell that tolled and echoed again and again, the sound of Europe losing its most trusted friend.</p><p><strong>A US prescription</strong> <strong>for Europe</strong></p><p>Like many first impressions of the Trump administration, not everything may be as it first seems. The message the US has sent to Europe is not one of abandonment, but an expectation to get with the program. The strategy’s view is that Europe’s problems run deeper than declining GDP share and security risks. According to the NSS, Europe has introduced policies that undermine political liberties and national sovereignty. Open-border migration has put governments under strain. Censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition, demographic pressures, and too much regulation have made Europe “unrecognizable.”</p><p>Yet each of these conditions should be very familiar, at least to the US audience. Trump is diagnosing Europe with the same “ailments” he claims to be treating at home. Just like the so-called “course correction” the Trump team is administering for the US, Europe needs to correct course, too.</p><p>The Trump administration’s prescription for Europe is to be more like the US. Close your borders, defend your national culture, back innovation, and encourage patriotic parties. Do that, the NSS argues, and the US will remain a committed partner – so long as it also advances US national interests. As the documents says plainly: “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe to help us successfully compete.”</p><p>The ongoing negotiations over a Ukraine peace plan are a test of how Europe will respond to America’s new posture. As the US looks to achieve an “expeditious cessation” of the conflict and to reestablish regional stability, including with Russia, Europe faces hard choices. Will it demand a central role? Will it accept Trump’s brand of transactionalism over idealism? The US has sent its message. Over to you, Europe.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>What We’re Watching: US-EU nail down the details of trade deal, IAEA sounds the alarm on Iran, China challenges Dalai Lama</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/watching/hard-numbers-russia-continues-bombarding-ukraine-uk-councils-seek-more-refugee-hotel-removals-brazils-ex-leader-accused-of-argentina-escape-plan-conservationist-charged-with-smuggling-rhino-horns-nyc</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg8x4klh3c07mytnyad8e0</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:34:49 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Riley Callanan, Zac Weisz</dc:creator>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>dalai lama</category>
<category>iran</category>
<category>nuclear weapons</category>
<category>un sanctions</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>trade deal</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>What We&apos;re Watching</category>
<description>614: For all the US efforts to end it, the Russia-Ukraine war is showing no signs of slowing down, as Moscow fired 614 drones and other missiles at its neighbor.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrdgwbzdjvi07mytaut9sts" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1200" height="600">
<media:credit>LIFEGUARD SHORTAGE!</media:credit>
<media:text>President Donald Trump meets with U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron.</media:text>
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<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrdgwbzdjvi07mytaut9sts" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>US, EU publishes fine print of the trade deal</h3><p>More details have <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/21/us/politics/eu-us-trump-trade-deal.html"><u>emerged</u></a> on the terms of the trade deal between the United States and European Union, which was first announced last month. European pharmaceuticals will now face a 15% tariff – US President <strong>Donald Trump&nbsp;</strong>had threatened a rate of “<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/us-initially-impose-small-tariff-pharma-imports-trump-says-2025-08-05/">25% or higher</a>.” There will also be 15% duties on EU automobiles, down from 27.5%, provided Brussels <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/article/us-cap-tariffs-eu-pharma-car-semiconductor-15-percent/"><u>passes legislation</u></a> to reduce its own 10% duties on car imports. The US could also cut rates on metals, up to a certain quota. In return, the EU pledged to invest heavily in American energy and AI chips, and to grant preferential market access for several US agricultural products. In a blow to wine aficionados, the EU wasn’t able to nab lower rates for its alcohol products. <em>Quel cauchemar!</em></p><h3>IAEA in the dark on Iran’s uranium</h3><p>International Atomic Energy Agency officials head to <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-21/iran-s-freeze-on-nuclear-inspections-prompts-un-us-crisis-talks?srnd=phx-politics"><u>Washington</u></a> next week amid mounting concern over Iran’s unmonitored stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium. Inspectors have been shut out since June’s US &amp; Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, leaving the agency unable to verify the fate of 409 kilograms of enriched uranium. Tehran cites radiological hazards to block access to key sites, while signaling limited cooperation elsewhere. With talks stalled and a UN sanctions deadline looming, diplomats say the IAEA’s understanding of Iran’s nuclear program is rapidly deteriorating – giving Iran an opening to potentially race to a bomb in the absence of international oversight.</p><h3>In message to Dalai Lama, Xi visits Tibet</h3><p>Not two months after the <strong>Dalai Lama&nbsp;</strong>declared that his office – and not China – would pick his successor, Chinese President <strong>Xi Jinping&nbsp;</strong>on Wednesday <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cjr19770x7lo"><u>made only his second official visit</u></a> to the autonomous, Himalayan region that his country officially annexed 60 years ago. The fact that the 72-year-old Xi went to the area, despite the health hazards of going to such high altitude, suggests he wanted to buttress his authority there – China’s leaders claim they have power over the Buddhist spiritual leader’s succession plans. His visit to Tibet led every major news bulletin in China, and also coincided with the recent announcement that China would build the world’s biggest dam there (read more on that <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/chinas-mega-dam-gambit-the-167-billion-bet-that-could-reshape-asia"><u>here</u></a>).</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>​Ian Bremmer on Trump&apos;s first 100 days</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/ian-bremmer-on-trumps-first-100-days</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg5ooelvfy07lqdpt0b7r0</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 28 Apr 2025 18:49:37 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>israel-hamas war</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>trade war</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>europe</category>
<description>The most revolutionary thing about Trump 2.0? More dysfunction, fewer results. Ian Bremmer⁩ examines President Trump’s first hundred days back in office, why America’s problems are getting bigger, and what comes next.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrdc1q9ddsz07myfhykh3ej" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:&nbsp;</strong>It is a hundred days of President Trump's second administration. How's he doing? And the answer is not so well, certainly not if you look at the polls. Worst numbers for first a hundred days of any president since they've been taking those polls. Markets, of course, down, global economy also down, so much of this self-imposed. And it's not the big-picture policy ideas. The things that Trump says he wants to do are not only popular, but they're also sensible policy: end wars, secure the border, and fair trade. Running on those three planks would work for pretty much anyone in the United States, the things that Trump is committed to, the things that previous administrations, including Biden and the promise of Harris, had not been particularly effective at. But the implementation has been abysmal. The lack of interest in policy specifics, lack of ability to effectively execute, and the dysfunction inside the Trump team/teams, economy, national security has been really challenging.</p><p>Tariffs, of course, so far have been the big problem, big internal fight on what it was that Trump should do and for what purpose. In terms of the purpose of these tariffs, you had so many ideas, and a lot of them were mutually contradictory. You're meant to raise revenue and lower taxes and reshore manufacturing and balance deficits and decouple from China and improve national security and on and on and on. These tariffs were going to be a panacea for absolutely everything, and you can't accomplish all of it. And that means that all of the fights that are going on, these countries don't know what the Trump administration actually wants. Bessent, the secretary of treasury, came in with one idea, and Peter Navarro, who initially won, came in with a second, the senior trade advisor in the White House, and Lutnick sort of had a third, and now Bessent is in charge for now, nominative.</p><p>Of course, Trump is really in charge, and Trump isn't interested in the specifics. He just wants deals. He wants wins. And he's saying, "Well, you guys, you other countries, you tell us what you're going to do. Well, it's not our job to tell you what we want, even though we're the ones that are expecting these deals to come together." And of course, it's happening with the Americans picking fights with all of these countries, literally everybody in the world simultaneously. And the impact that's going to have on the American economy is going to be dramatic. It's going to be long-lasting. It'll be, in many ways, as big as the pandemic, but completely self-imposed.</p><p>And even if deals were put together tomorrow, and they won't be, with the Europeans, with the Mexicans and Canadians, with the Chinese in particular, you'd already have a massive long-term disruption because the supply chains, the tankers, the contracts have already been severed for a period of time. And every day this goes on is a day that it's going to get worse. So that's going to lead to a lot of inflation in the United States, going to lead to a lot of bankruptcies and need for stimulus in other countries around the world, and the average voter's not going to be happy about that at all, which does help to explain why they did Liberation Day the day after elections in the US, special elections in Wisconsin and Florida and elsewhere.</p><p>Ending wars, Gaza did have a ceasefire early on, but not now. And now Trump is planning his trip to the Gulf and doesn't have Israel on the schedule, at least not yet, because there's more fighting happening between the Israeli Defense Forces and what's left of Hamas. And that fighting is not something Trump wants to see. Let's see how successful he is at bringing it to a ceasefire.</p><p>More important for everyone right now in the United States is the Russia-Ukraine War. The Americans are pushing to end that war, and Trump has had some success in getting the Ukrainians to the table because they understand that the or else is their intelligence and defense support from the US will be shut down, as it was suspended, so they're taking it very seriously. But the Russians are not because Trump has not displayed much of an or else for the Russians, hasn't said directly that if Russia refuses to do a ceasefire, that the US will provide more support for Ukraine, even though Trump advisors were saying that before he became president, has said, "Well, maybe there'll be secondary sanctions." But Trump is not making this very serious for Putin, and so Putin isn't taking it very seriously. Nobody thought he was really going to end the war in a day, but it's been a couple of months of effort, and clearly now Trump and team are losing patience and it's looking increasingly that they might walk away, which is why they're engaging with the Iranians and why, heck, Kim Jong Un probably is going to get a call at some point, right? Because Russia-Ukraine not working so well. So much for ending those wars.</p><p>And then on the border front, where Trump is having much more success in terms of policy, you don't see illegal immigrants coming into the US at anywhere close to the numbers they were under Biden or during Trump first term, and that has been a response to effective US policy. But there's also been overreach in terms of refusal to carry out the rulings of federal justices and even the Supreme Court, and that overreach is something that most Americans oppose. So even in the area where Trump is doing the best, his numbers are actually not as favorable as you might otherwise expect because of the dysfunction and because of the overreach of a more revolutionary Trump orientation.</p><p>Look, even DOGE, where I was kind of hoping in the early days that DOGE was certainly going to be effective at taking a lot of the corruption and the overspending out of the US government, but much less has been done on that front. There's been lots of claims of fraud, but very little evidence of actual fraud. There's been lots of claims that they were going to take two trillion, then one trillion, then maybe 150 billion, and now looks like less of that with Elon in charge of DOGE. And the focus that they have had has been much more politicized, much more ideological. Anything that looks like DEI or woke, let's just remove all of it and not necessarily do it with a scalpel, but more with a sledgehammer or a chainsaw, which means a lot of important programs get caught up, along with programs that no Americans should be funding.</p><p>And so overall, it's been a very challenging first hundred days. This is very much a move fast and break things approach. They are moving very fast. They are breaking a lot of things. There's not a lot of building, at least not yet. And a lot of Americans, while they feel that their government is inefficient and bloated, very few Americans want to see the government be broken further than it already is and less effective than it is, and that is so far what people are seeing. They're seeing it at home and they're seeing it internationally.</p><p>And they're not seeing a lot of restraint, even as mistakes are made, not only because Trump is never going to admit to have made any mistakes, of course that is something that you see from pretty much every president, but also, unlike most presidents, he's surrounded by people that don't tell him when he gets things wrong. And that is very different from Trump's first term, and that's a problem because you want to have people, irrespective of how loyal they are to you, you want them to be loyal first and foremost to the country. But Trump doesn't want that. He wants them loyal to him before they're loyal to the country, and that means not giving him information when he screws up because he will retaliate against them. And that's going to get you negative outcomes, I think, not just for the first a hundred days, but also for a much longer period of time in the United States and internationally. I hope I'm wrong. I certainly want to see him succeed, I want to see the country succeed, but that is not the trajectory that we are now on.</p><p>That's it for me, and I'll talk to y'all real soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Larry Summers has a few thoughts about Trump&apos;s trade war</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/podcast/gzero-world-podcast/larry-summers-few-thoughts-about-trumps-trade-war</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg4xrzlt2g07lqrriwxe1f</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Apr 2025 10:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>gzero world podcast</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>geopolitics</category>
<category>economy</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>trade war</category>
<category>politics</category>
<category>larry summers</category>
<category>gzero media</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>GZERO World with Ian Bremmer Podcast</category>
<description>Listen: For a special edition of the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer sits down with former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers to get his economic assessment of President Trump&apos;s unprecedented imposition of tariffs, which has sparked an escalating trade war.</description>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Listen:</strong> For a special edition of the GZERO World Podcast, <strong>Ian Bremmer</strong> sits down with former Treasury Secretary <strong>Larry Summers</strong> to get his economic assessment of President <strong>Trump</strong>'s unprecedented imposition of tariffs, which has sparked an escalating trade war.</p><p>"I don't see this as a rational way of either pursuing the objective of strengthening US manufacturing or the objective of reducing other countries' trade barriers," Summers tells Bremmer. "This is probably the worst, most consequential, self-inflicted wound in US economic policy since the Second World War."</p><p>Summers, who was also at one point the President of Harvard University, is especially astonished by the lack of backbone that certain institutions, from universities to law firms, have shown when it comes to standing up against the Trump administration. "History will record of the United States establishment at this moment, that it allowed itself to be especially cowed...If Harvard is not prepared to speak up... it's hard to imagine who will."</p><p><em>Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on&nbsp;</em><a target="_blank" href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/id1294461271"><em>Apple Podcasts</em></a><em>,&nbsp;</em><a target="_blank" href="https://open.spotify.com/show/13QW2sLPCjVbdDE6fmJCNf"><em>Spotify</em></a><em>,&nbsp;</em><a target="_blank" href="https://www.stitcher.com/show/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer"><em>Stitcher</em></a><em>, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Trump&apos;s tariffs &amp; the end of globalization</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/trump-tariffs-and-the-end-of-globalization</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg4qyplsgo07lq9uryrl9f</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 03 Apr 2025 19:56:52 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>trade war</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>liberation day</category>
<category>europe</category>
<description>Overnight, the US moved to having the world’s highest tariffs by a long margin. Here is Ian Bremmer&apos;s Quick Take on the near and long-term fallout</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
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<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrdam4pe37507lquqtj6arq" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take</strong>: It is the day after 'Liberation Day,' April 2nd. I'm not sure that day is going to stick. It was good not to do on April 1st. Not only because it's April Fools, but also because you had a couple of key elections in the US, in Florida and in Wisconsin. And Trump clearly wanted to go after that because he knew that these weren't going to be super popular. And yet, this is exactly what he was promising.</p><p>He has been promising tariffs. He's been promising securing American borders, securing borders from people coming into the US illegally, also securing US borders from unfair trade practices. And that is precisely what we're seeing right now. Overnight, the United States is moving to having the highest tariffs against countries of any major economy in the world by a very long margin, and also the largest average trade tariff in over a hundred years.</p><p>This is a new era. It's a post globalization era. It's a post post-war era. It's kind of the equivalent of what the Brits did with Brexit just on a global scale. Now, why these tariffs and what's behind the percentages? Because Trump's been talking about reciprocal tariffs for a very long time, and yet these aren't reciprocal. There are no countries that have the percentage tariffs on the US that the US is now putting on them in terms of goods. So how did they do that? That's the extraordinary thing, is the calculation wasn't based on the tariffs that are imposed on US goods. Rather, it was a look at the trade deficit that the US runs against those countries and taking the percentage of what the trade deficit is and applying a tariff that would get you to parity. In other words, what reciprocal from Trump's perspective is whatever would actually bring that trade deficit into trade neutrality and then just impose half of that, which makes no sense economically whatsoever.</p><p>Why not? Well, first of all, because there are a lot of poor countries around the world that have trade deficits with the US because they can't afford American goods, and the US wants to buy commodities, for example, from those countries or low tech manufacturer like from Bangladesh. And are you angry because the Bengalis aren't capable of buying Teslas from the US or buying smartphones? And the answer is, of course not. And all that's going to be is a tax. The US government will pick up revenue and the Americans will have to pay more for inexpensive goods that the US isn't going to produce. Some cases, these are goods that the Americans not only wouldn't want to produce because the labor quality and cost is really, really low and no one's going to do that work, especially when you're closing borders and taking illegals out of the population. But also, because the US economy couldn't produce them.</p><p>I mean, your tropical fruits, I mean some of them can be in the United States, but most of them need to come from other places. Coffee beans, I mean all sorts of things that the Americans are just not going to be substitution effect producing that now are just going to be higher costs for the United States, for average Americans. And then in places where the US was not in deficit, then you're just throwing a 10% tariff against. Why? Is that about fair trade? No, that's just about the Americans wanting to ensure that there are tariffs on absolutely everyone. It reminds me of the January 6th conversation where originally Trump was talking about, "Well, maybe we've got to look more carefully at all the really violent types and we're not going to want to give them amnesty. But there are a lot of people that were treated very badly, very unfairly, and so they should have amnesty and they should be pardoned."</p><p>And as the details and the debates on who should and shouldn't get a pardon came out, Trump got sick of the debate, got sick of the nuance, and said, "I'm just giving it to everybody." And I think that's what happened with tariffs. There were debates going on with large numbers of advisors around Trump, right until the last minute and he just said, "Ah, I'm just putting tariffs on everybody." And that's what's happened. And now there will be individual deals that will be cut with a bunch of countries to try to get out of that. But the reality is that the biggest trade partners of the United States, there's no quick fix. Not with Europe, not with Mexico, not with Canada, not with China. And given that, we are clearly not only out of a US-driven globalization era... That's been gone for some time now. Globalization has been moving apace, but the US has not been driving it.</p><p>The US had been kind of standing on the sidelines and pushing their own industrial policy. But now you have the United States actively unwinding globalization. And the question will be how effective will other countries be in playing defense, in hedging, and in bringing some production, more production to the United States? Because in the near-term, you expect to see a lot of countries will try to limit the damage that's being done. And the US economy is, of course, stronger and more powerful. So that will mean that a lot of countries won't immediately do reciprocal tariffs, but will try to cut deals with the Americans. A lot of companies will try to find ways to manufacture more in the US. That's near-term.</p><p>In the medium and long-term, there will be hedging. There will be efforts to find ways to de-risk their economies from the United States, from the uncertainty, the volatility, the high costs. And sure, you'll want to produce things in the US for US consumers, but most things are not being consumed by Americans. And that is increasingly true around the world. And therefore you wouldn't want to produce most things in the US in that environment. So you'll see more hedging of the Europeans towards other countries, including in some non-AI fields towards China. And I think you'll see that in bigger ways in the Global South who already have their principal trade partners as China anyway.</p><p>And then final point is keep in mind that the Americans are not really good at being patient. And Trump has been talking the entire way, not one of the most patient people in the world that, "Look, I mean, yeah, they're going to be costing in the near-term, and I don't care if the cost of cars go up. But long-term, this is good for Americans." And certainly near-term there's going to be a significant economic hit, not just in the stock market, but also in US GDP and also in inflation. And Americans, I suspect are going to be pretty angry about that because Americans are very short-term in orientation. It's a nature of free market capitalism, kleptocratic or not in the US and it's also the nature of the political system.</p><p>So that's where we are. A lot to think about on the back of these unprecedented policy moves. And remember, it is a marathon, not a sprint. We are only a couple months in. Trump has four full years, and a lot is going to happen over the course of that administration. And I'll be here to talk to you about it. Thanks a lot, and I'll talk to you all real soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>How Europe might respond to Trump&apos;s tariffs</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-europe/how-europe-might-respond-to-trump-tariffs</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg4pzhl1yl07mymf99r5sn</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 03 Apr 2025 16:57:48 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Carl Bildt</dc:creator>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>carl bildt</category>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>in 60 seconds</category>
<category>trade war</category>
<category>economy</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>GZERO Europe</category>
<description>What&apos;s going to be the reaction to the Trump trade war against Europe but also against the rest of the world? Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Stockholm, Sweden.</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Carl Bildt</strong>, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Stockholm, Sweden.</p><p><strong>What's going to be the reaction to the Trump trade war against Europe but also against the rest of the world?</strong></p><p>Well, it was worse than expected. What you will hear coming out of Brussels is strong words, but also saying, "Well, let's try and see if we can mitigate, if we can negotiate, if we can have some changes in this." That's going to take some time. Not much hope that that will produce anything. But anyhow, the attempt will be made. And then I would expect fairly strong European countermeasures.</p><p>But then, I think the global impact of it is really astonishing. Key US allies and partners in Asia have been hit much harder, even harder than Europe. So, we see the US in terms of economy retreating from the world, and trying to build its own small fortress there behind its oceans. For us, Europeans, the conclusion must be to do the opposite, to reach out to the world. 87% of global imports are not in the US. Two thirds of the growth of the global economy is going to be in Asia-Pacific in the years to come. So, Europe, well, US is doing its own thing, can't do very much about that. But we must be even more strategic, offensive, forward-looking in reaching out to the rest of the world. Develop and preserve as much as we can of an open global trading system. That is the way to prosperity in the future.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Turkey&apos;s protests &amp; crackdowns complicate EU relations</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-europe/turkey-protests-crackdowns-complicate-eu-relations</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg4ovfl1vv07mytbv7r0ua</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 03 Apr 2025 11:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Carl Bildt</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>carl bildt</category>
<category>turkey</category>
<category>politics</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>signal chat</category>
<category>in 60 seconds</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>protests</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>GZERO Europe</category>
<description>Do you think the Signal controversy in the US will have an impact on the transatlantic relationship? What impact do you think the Turkish protests and instability will have on Turkish relationships with its European allies? Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Stockholm, Sweden.</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrdairje32y07lqzyyty5ka" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Carl Bildt,</strong> former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Stockholm, Sweden.</p><p><strong>Do you think the Signal controversy in the US will have an impact on the transatlantic relationship?</strong></p><p>Well, not in itself. It does betray an attitude to security issues that is somewhat too relaxed, to put it very mildly. But what does betray as well is the disdain, the resentment, the anger against Europeans that is there from the vice president, the secretary of defense, and others, and that is duly noted. And of course, something that is subject of what we have to note it. It's there. It's a fact.</p><p><strong>What impact do you think the Turkish protest and instability will have on Turkish relationships with its European allies?</strong></p><p>Well, it's certainly not going to be a good thing. We have an interest in good relationship and stable relationship with Turkey. It's a significant EU strategic actor. It's a significant economy. But of course, when we have these arrests of a prominent opposition, politicians, we have massive protests that are repressed, that we have massive violations of social media and arrests of journalists and things like that. It does complicate things to put it very mildly. We haven't seen the end of that story yet.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>The end of the transatlantic relationship as we know it</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/by-ian-bremmer/the-end-of-the-transatlantic-relationship-as-we-know-it</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg4chml0xe07myvuxyn1wt</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2025 18:55:13 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>by ian bremmer</category>
<description>Donald Trump’s second term is having considerably more impact on the global stage than his first. No American ally faces a ruder awakening than Europe, whose relationship with the United States is now fundamentally damaged.</description>
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<media:credit>Jess Frampton</media:credit>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Donald Trump’s second term is having considerably more impact on the global stage than his first. Trump may have been a largely transactional president last time around, when he was more constrained at home and faced relatively more powerful counterparts abroad. But the first two months of Trump 2.0 have shattered the illusion of continuity. No American ally faces a ruder awakening than Europe, whose relationship with the United States is now fundamentally damaged.</p><p>Core partners in Asia like Japan, South Korea, India, as well as Australia worry about being hit with tariffs and will do what they can to defuse conflict, but they also know their geostrategic position vis-à-vis China means Trump can’t afford to alienate them entirely. Accordingly, their relations with Washington should remain comparatively stable over the next four years.</p><p>America’s largest trade partners, Mexico and Canada, are facing more significant trade pressures from the Trump administration, but the imbalance of power is such that they have no credible strategy to push back. Everyone understands they’ll have to accept Trump’s terms eventually; the only question is whether capitulation comes before or after a costly fight. Riding an 85% job approval, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has enough domestic political space to yield to Trump’s demands to keep Mexico in his good graces, as she is already doing. By contrast, Canadian leaders have a political incentive to put up a bigger fight because Trump’s threats toward Canada’s economy and sovereignty have sharply inflamed nationalist sentiment north of the border in the run-up to the April 28 elections. However, I expect Ottawa will quietly fold shortly after the vote to ensure that ongoing relations with the US remain functional.</p><p>Most US allies have no choice but to absorb Trump’s demands and hope for a reset after he’s gone. But Europe is different. It possesses both the collective heft to resist Trump’s demands and the existential imperative to do so.</p><p>Three structural forces render the transatlantic rupture permanent.</p><p>First, the European Union has the trade competency and market size to punch back against the Trump administration’s aggressive tariff blitz. Unlike most other US trading partners who lack the economic leverage to go toe-to-toe against Washington and have little choice but to fold under pressure, Brussels’ defiance ensures a protracted trade war with no easy resolution.</p><p>Second, most Europeans view the Trump administration’s unilateral pursuit of rapprochement with Russia as a direct threat to their national security. While President Trump would still like to end the war in Ukraine as he promised on the campaign trail, he is prepared to do so on the Kremlin’s terms – and he’s even more interested in business deals with Moscow. He won’t be deterred by a collapse of the Ukraine peace talks, even though it’s Vladimir Putin who’s shown no interest in softening his maximalist demands. Nor will Trump care that the Europeans stridently oppose US normalization with their principal enemy. After all, the United States is protected by two oceans from Putin’s army, and Trump’s embrace of Euroskeptic movements reveals their shared aim: a fragmented and weakened Europe that is easier to dominate.</p><p>The president’s rhetoric – echoed by the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/what-trump-teams-war-plans-leak-revealed">Signal-gate</a> private texts, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s recent interview with Tucker Carlson, Vice President JD Vance’s Munich speech, and so many other pieces of evidence – makes clear that the current administration sees Europeans not as allies but as “pathetic freeloaders” who shouldn’t be “bailed out” as a matter of principle. Even if Washington begrudgingly agrees to provide them with transactional security, Europeans now realize that relying on a hostile US for survival is strategic suicide.</p><p>Which brings us to the third and final driver of the definitive US-Europe break: common values … or lack thereof. From free trade and collective security to territorial integrity and the rule of law, Europe’s foundational principles are now anathema to Trump’s America. Just look at Trump’s repeated threats to annex Greenland, to say nothing of his willingness to recognize illegally annexed Ukrainian territories as Russian and support Israel’s annexation of parts of the West Bank and Gaza. For an EU built from the ashes of World War II, it's hard to compromise with a worldview in which borders are mere suggestions and might makes right.</p><p>After years of complacency, European leaders seem to have finally gotten the message that the United States under Trump is not just an unreliable friend but an actively hostile power. They understand they need to drastically increase Europe’s sovereign military, technological, and economic capabilities – not just to survive without America but also to defend their borders, economies, and democracies against it. Whether they can muster the political mettle to act on this realization, however, is Europe’s greatest test since 1945.</p><p>Recent moves – <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/watching/germany-drops-debt-brake-passes-preliminary-agreement-to-boost-defense-infrastructure-and-climate-spending">Germany’s historic debt brake reform</a> and <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/article/european-council-summit-live-updates-eu-defense-spending-ukraine-war-military-financing/">Brussels’ fiscal and financial maneuvers to boost defense spending</a> – hint at urgency. Yet half measures won’t suffice. If Europeans <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/by-ian-bremmer/will-europe-step-up-as-america-turns-its-back-on-ukraine">refuse</a> to commit troops to guarantee Ukraine’s post-ceasefire security absent an American backstop and continue to balk at seizing Russia’s frozen assets and overriding Hungary’s veto, it will confirm my view that the bloc lacks the nerve to survive in a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/by-ian-bremmer/what-happens-when-no-ones-in-charge">jungle-ruled world</a> where Trump and Putin refuse to play by any rules.</p><p>The irony is that Europe has the resources and capacity to stand up for itself, its values, and its fellow Europeans. What’s missing is the collective courage to act like it’s 1938, not 1989. For Ukraine’s sake and its own, that needs to change.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Trump is increasingly hostile to Europe, says Zanny Minton Beddoes</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-clips/trump-increasingly-hostile-to-europe</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2025 10:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>zanny minton beddoes</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>economy</category>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>trade war</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>GZERO World Highlights</category>
<description>The Economist editor-in-chief Zanny Minton Beddoes says Trump isn’t just playing hardball with America’s European allies—he may be outright hostile, forcing them to rethink their military and economic ties to the US.</description>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As Trump’s second term unfolds, European leaders are no longer just questioning America’s reliability—they’re beginning to worry that the US is actively hostile. Economist editor-in-chief Zanny Minton Beddoes points to growing frustration across the continent, and it's not just about America's reliability on defense. Trump’s aggressive trade policies, including escalating tariffs on European goods, have compounded the rift. “You have an anger at the United States amongst its allies that is damaging,” Beddoes warns.</p><p>But beyond policy, it’s Trump’s approach to foreign relations that is sparking the greatest alarm. Beddoes argues that his White House operates with a “mafia mobster kind of foreign policy,” where allies are strong-armed rather than supported. The result? Europe is starting to hedge its bets, strengthening its own defense industries and reducing economic reliance on the U.S. If Trump continues treating allies like adversaries, they may start acting accordingly.</p><h5>Watch full episode: <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/trumps-trade-war-who-really-wins">Trump’s trade war: Who really wins?</a></h5><h5></h5><h5><a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).</h5><h5></h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode:&nbsp;</strong><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).GZERO World with Ian Bremmer airs on US public television weekly - check local listings.</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Is Europe in trouble as the US pulls away?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/is-europe-in-trouble-as-us-pulls-away</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg47dgl0il07myeqegiscl</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 24 Mar 2025 19:27:58 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>us relations</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>defense spending</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>geopolitics</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<description>Trump is reshaping America’s relationship with Europe, which has been “impacted in a permanent and structural way,” says Ian Bremmer. In this Quick Take, Ian explains what that shift means for the future of the transatlantic alliance—and for Europe.</description>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take</strong><strong>:</strong> I want to talk about the transatlantic relationship. The US relationship with Europe. Because of all of the geopolitics in the world, this is the one that I think has been impacted in a permanent and structural way in the first two months of the Trump administration. I wouldn't say that, for example, look at the Middle East and US relations with Israel, the Saudis, the Emiratis, the rest of the Gulf States, frankly, all very comfortable with Trump. If there's a significant change, I would say it's incrementally more engaged, and in terms of worldview than under the Biden administration. Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, you look at Asia relations and certainly Trump and the US on trade worrying them, making them sort of react in a more defensive posture. Seeing how much, how more quickly, they can get something to the US that will lead to trying to diffuse potential conflict there. But not radically different from the way they thought about the United States in 2017 in the first Trump term.</p><p>Mexico, Canada, Panama, here you've got countries that are facing very significant challenges from the United States, but also ultimately understand that they have no other options. Now, in Canada, that's a bigger fight because there are elections coming up at the end of April. But after those elections are over, I certainly expect that they will move quickly to try to ensure that ongoing relations are functional and stable. That's already true for the Mexican government with a president who has 85% approval, can do pretty much everything necessary to ensure that US-Mexico relations aren't dramatically impacted by everything Trump is demanding. So that's everywhere else.</p><p>But in Europe, that's just not the case. Three different reasons why the Europeans are facing a much more permanent impact. The first is on the trade side, like everybody else, and trade is well within the European Union's competency. They understand that they have leverage. If the Americans are going to hit them with significant tariffs, they're going to hit back with the same numbers. But that doesn't mean it's going to be relatively difficult and take a long time to resolve it, as opposed to places that are much weaker where they just fold quickly to the United States. Okay, fair enough. But still, that's not all that dramatically different from first term. Second point is there's a war going on in Ukraine, and the United States has made it very clear that they want to engage, to re-engage with Putin, who is Europe's principal enemy. And they're going to do that irrespective of how much the Europeans oppose it, and they're not going to take any European input in those conversations.</p><p>Trump would like a rapprochement with Russia to include a Ukrainian ceasefire. But if that doesn't happen, he is oriented towards blaming the Ukrainians for it, towards taking Kremlin talking points on Ukraine not really being a country, and then on moving to ensure that US-Russia relations are functional again. All of that is deeply concerning, is existentially concerning, particularly for a bunch of European countries that are on the front lines spending a lot more in defense, not because the Americans are telling them to, but because they're worried about Russia themselves, feel like they have to be more independent. Then finally, because Europe is the supranational political experiment that relies most on common values and rule of law, and the United States under Trump is undoing that component of the US-led order specifically.</p><p>I wouldn't necessarily say that about collective security or existing alliances and willingness to provide some sort of defense umbrella, but I would certainly say that in terms of rule of law and territorial integrity. And here, the fact that the United States no longer really cares about territorial integrity, is prepared to tell Denmark, "Hey, you're not a good ally. You're not defending Greenland. We're interested in moving forward ourselves, and we don't care how you've treated us historically. We're going to send our leaders and we're going to cut our own deal inside your territory." That's exactly the way the Germans felt when JD Vance said that he wanted to engage directly with the Alternatives für Deutschland, who the Germans consider to be a neo-Nazi party.</p><p>Everything that's core to the Europeans in their statehood and in the EU, the United States under Trump is on the other side of that, and it's increasingly conflictual. It's directly adversarial. And so I would say number one, the Europeans are aware of these problems. Number two, they're taking them late, but nonetheless finally very seriously. And so they understand that the Europeans are going to have to create an independent strategy for their own self-defense, for their national security, for their political stability, for their democracies, and they have to do that outside of the United States. In fact, they have to do that and defend themselves against the United States.</p><p>Now that reality doesn't mean they're going to be successful. And indeed, the more summits I see on Ukraine, frankly the less I have been convinced that the Europeans will be able to do enough, quick enough to really help Ukraine dramatically cut a better deal with the Russian Federation that is very uninterested in doing anything that is sustainable for the Ukrainians long term. It makes me worry that the EU longer term is not fit for purpose in an environment where the principle, the most powerful actors don't care about rule of law. The United States, China, and for Europe, Russia right on their borders. So for all of those reasons, I mean, the European markets have gone up recently. European growth expectations have gone up because the Germans and others are planning on spending a lot more, that's short-term. Long-term here. I worry that the Europeans are in an awful lot of trouble. So something we'll be focusing on very closely going forward over the coming weeks and months. I hope you all are well, and I'll talk to you all real soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Trump’s trade war: Who really wins?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/trumps-trade-war-who-really-wins</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 24 Mar 2025 10:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>economy</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>trade war</category>
<category>zanny minton beddoes</category>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>trade</category>
<category>GZERO World with Ian Bremmer</category>
<description>Beneath America’s shifting economic and foreign policy lies a fundamental question: What happens when its closest allies can no longer trust it? The Economist&apos;s Zanny Minton Beddoes joins Ian Bremmer on GZERO World to discuss.</description>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“Who benefits from this trade war?” That’s the question that <strong>Zanny Minton Beddoes</strong> rhetorically poses midway through her interview with <strong>Ian Bremmer&nbsp;</strong>on GZERO World. And it’s the question at the heart of this episode. US President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> has a simple answer: We do. The rest of the world, though, may beg to differ. So how does Trump’s tit-for-tat tariff war threaten to reshape the global economy? And is it necessarily a bad thing if it does?</p><h5><a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).</h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode:&nbsp;</strong><a target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).GZERO World with Ian Bremmer airs on US public television weekly - check local listings.</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>If Trump&apos;s foreign policy pushes allies away, can the US go it alone?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/editors-picks/can-trump-us-succeed-without-allies</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg3j7ukynx07my2fvmf7rx</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 10 Mar 2025 17:36:55 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>ukraine aid</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>volodymyr zelensky</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>ukraine-us relations</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>Editor&apos;s Picks</category>
<description>The Trump administration’s approach to foreign policy is clear: allies and alliances are expendable, and America is stronger alone. With support for Ukraine waning and European allies sidelined, long-term damage to transatlantic relationships may be inevitable. On Quick Take, Ian Bremmer unpacks this shift and its likely consequences.</description>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. Marco Rubio heading to Saudi Arabia to talk with the Ukrainians. That's clearly the most important of a lot of moving parts geopolitically in the world right now. I say that because so much of what the Americans decide to do and not do with the Ukrainians is going to have massive impact on the transatlantic relationship, on NATO, on US-Europe relations, and on the nature of what has been the most important collective security arrangement in the world and is now experiencing crisis. It's very clear that the Ukrainians, as Trump says, lack the cards. And so the outcome is going to be determined largely by countries outside of Ukraine, not just the willingness and the capacity of the Ukrainians themselves to continue to fight. The United States, on the one hand, is pushing the Europeans to do a lot more. A lot more in terms of providing economic support, providing military support, and having a security backstop for a post-ceasefire environment that the Americans are not prepared to participate in.</p><p>Now, if all of that happens, and of course that's a big if, but certainly the Europeans are moving in that direction, then the interesting point is the Americans aren't going to determine the outcome. In the sense that the ultimate ceasefire terms will be driven not by the United States, who's basically saying, "We're washing our hands of it." But instead by the Europeans and the Ukrainians, in concert with Russia. And first of all, that's analogous to what's been happening in the Middle East. Everybody remembers that Trump said, "We're going to own Gaza and all the Palestinians are going to leave," and of course, that's not where we're heading. And the eventual outcome will be determined overwhelmingly by the countries that are prepared to spend the actual money and provide the security and figure out the politics. And that means the Arab States, that means Egypt and Jordan, it means Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and it means the potential for blocking by Israel.</p><p>That's the environment that we are increasingly going to be seeing on the ground in Ukraine. That the Europeans are going to be doing the driving. The Ukrainians are going to have to align with that and the blocking potentially by Russia. The big difference, of course, is that in the case of Ukraine, the United States is also very interested in doing a deal with Russia over the head of the Ukrainians and the Europeans. There's no equivalent in the Middle East at all. And here, the reason it's so important is because the ability of the Ukrainians to continue to engage in their willingness with the US and Europe together will determine in large part whether a deal between the US and Russia involves a ceasefire with Ukraine or doesn't. If Trump can say, "Hey, the reason we didn't get a deal and the reason they're still fighting is because Ukraine refuses to be a part of it," then a deal with Russia is actually much easier to get to by Trump. Because it involves just re-engagement diplomatically, investment by the US and Russia, joint projects, reopening of arms control conversations, and doesn't involve a Ukraine ceasefire.</p><p>Trump has said, "Not only does Ukraine not have cards, but Russia doesn't have cards." Of course, the reality is that if the Russians are willing to do the fighting for a longer period of time, and the Americans don't care and the Europeans can't stand up, then the Russians are the ones with the cards. That is where we are heading. And if the Americans are prepared to do a deal with the Russians irrespective of what happens on the ground in Ukraine, and that is being tested very much over the coming days, that's perhaps the most important outcome of what we see from the US-Ukrainian talks in Saudi Arabia, then the transatlantic relationship is in a lot more trouble than it is right now.</p><p>So I think those are the pieces that we're talking about here. It is very clear that the Americans see alliances and see allies as expendable, that it's not that important for the Americans to treat allies with respect. If they're smaller, if they're less powerful, you can do whatever you want. And we saw that with Elon Musk beating up on Poland and the Foreign Minister, Radek Sikorski, someone I've been actually friends with for a very long time, and I think that's not a smart way to conduct business. Poland's been a steadfast ally, they're spending upwards of 4% of their GDP on defense, heading towards 5% going forward. They've housed millions of Ukrainian refugees. They've done far more on the ground in Ukraine per capita than the Americans have on pretty much every front. And also, by the way, there are a lot of Polish Americans that vote, and some of them vote Republican. Far more important than the Ukrainian vote, for example, and that seems to matter too, but maybe not to Elon.</p><p>I think that these sorts of insults are unnecessary, and they damage American allies. But I think the Trump administration's perspective is as long as the US is the most powerful country in the world, that America alone is stronger than America with friends, and it's probably the area of greatest geopolitical disagreement that I have with this administration. But we will see how it plays out. I certainly agree that there will be a lot of wins that we will continue to see, because less powerful countries do not want to get into a big fight with the United States. But long-term, I think this is going to play out badly. And I particularly think that's true in the transatlantic relationship where permanent damage is being done irrespective of what happens after Trump. Anyway, a lot to talk about, a lot of moving pieces. We'll talk real soon, and that's it from me.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Is the US-Europe alliance permanently damaged?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-europe/is-us-europe-alliance-permanently-damaged</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg3e5gloy507lqwqftkyu3</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 05 Mar 2025 21:44:45 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Carl Bildt</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>jd vance</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>carl bildt</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>keir starmer</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>emmanuel macron</category>
<category>GZERO Europe</category>
<description>Is the transatlantic relationship permanently damaged by what we have seen during the last 10 days or so? Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Stockholm, Sweden.</description>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Carl Bildt</strong>, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Stockholm, Sweden.<br></p><p><strong>Is the transatlantic relationship permanently damaged by what we have seen during the last 10 days or so?</strong></p><p>Well, there is no question that the last 10 days or so have been the worst by far for the transatlantic relationship in, well, modern recorded history. You can go through all of the details if you want. It started with the shameful vote in the UN General Assembly on the same day that was three years after the war of aggression that Russia started, where the United States turned around, lined up with Russia, and with primarily a bunch of countries that you would not normally like to be seen in the company of, in order to try to defeat the Europeans, and defeat the Ukrainians, and defeat the Japanese, and defeat the Australians, defeat all of the friends who have criticized the Russians.</p><p>It was truly shameful. It was defeated, needless to say, but it left deep marks there. And then it was downhill from there, with that particular week ending with the ambush in the Oval Office, with all of the details associated with that, with sort of a childish dispute about dress codes, and respect for whatever, and total disregard for the important issues that are at stake at the moment. And to that was added, the vice president seriously insulting the allies, primarily the British and the French, and then cutting of aid to Ukraine, including intelligence cooperation, which is unheard of, unheard of when it comes to these particular issues.</p><p>So, is damage permanent? Well, one would hope that... well, hope springs eternal, that there would be a way back. But this will be remembered for a long time to come. And the reaction in Europe, well, you have to keep a straight face if you are a political leader. And they do, they hope for the best, but they're increasingly preparing for the worst. What we might be heading into is Mr. Trump, President Trump lining up with President Putin in a deal that is essentially on Russia's term over Ukraine, then trying to force Ukraine into that particular deal, a repetition of Munich 1938.</p><p>Will that work? I think it's unlikely to work because the Ukrainians are determined to stand up for their country. And they have the support of the Europeans. Czechoslovakia in 1938 didn't have much support. So, whether it will work or not is debatable, but that is the direction in which things are heading at the moment. Can this be stopped or can the trajectory of things be changed? Let's hope. There's a flurry of meetings in Europe. There will be a lot of contacts across the Atlantic. There is a strong support for Ukraine in Europe, but then deep apprehensions of where we are heading. Further four years with President Trump. After that, (possibly) four to eight years with JD Vance. Well, well, there's a lot of thinking that needs to be done on this side of the Atlantic.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Russian analyst: Let the US and Russia settle the Ukraine war</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-clips/let-us-and-russia-settle-ukraine-war</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg37pllocs07lqlaiulgbd</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 03 Mar 2025 11:15:02 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>dmitri trenin</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>volodymyr zelensky</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>GZERO World Highlights</category>
<description>On GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, former Russian colonel Dmitri Trenin argues that the fate of Ukraine should be determined primarily by the United States and Russia.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd86ydd9jb07myosqv0wf2" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd86ydd9jb07myosqv0wf2" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Who gets to decide Ukraine's future? On GZERO World with <strong>Ian Bremmer</strong>, former Russian colonel and ex-Carnegie Moscow Center director <strong>Dmitri Trenin</strong> argues that the real power players in the conflict are the United States and Russia—not Ukraine or Europe.</p><p>“There are two countries that have agency in the Ukraine conflict. One is the United States, and the other one is Russia,” he states, insisting that while Ukraine fights on the battlefield, its political decisions are dictated by Washington.</p><p>Trenin frames the war as a proxy conflict between two superpowers, arguing that any long-term peace deal must be negotiated primarily between Moscow and Washington.</p><h5></h5><h5><a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).</h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: </strong><a target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>The fight to decide Ukraine&apos;s fate</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/the-fight-to-decide-ukraine-fate</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg365fkxr507myom2evu7z</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 02 Mar 2025 11:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>volodymyr zelensky</category>
<category>baiba braže</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>latvia</category>
<category>cybersecurity</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>baltic states</category>
<category>dmitri trenin</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>undersea cables</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>GZERO World with Ian Bremmer</category>
<description>On GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže discusses Ukraine&apos;s fate and Baltic security in the face of Russian aggression. Former Russian colonel Dmitri Trenin offers a starkly different perspective from Moscow, arguing that negotiations over Ukraine should be decided primarily by the US and Russia—not Ukraine or Europe.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd84p2d9go07my6ddp5p7n" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd84p2d9go07my6ddp5p7n" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds on, the Baltic states—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania—are watching their eastern neighbor with growing concern. With cyberattacks, undersea sabotage, and military buildup along its border, Latvia is at the forefront of Europe’s efforts to counter Russian aggression. On GZERO World, Latvian Foreign Minister <strong>Baiba Braže</strong> joins<strong> Ian Bremmer</strong> in New York to discuss Ukraine's fate, the region’s security challenges, the role of NATO, and how Trump’s evolving stance on Russia could leave European in the lurch.</p><p>Also on the show, Bremmer speaks with former Russian colonel <strong>Dmitri Trenin</strong>, who offers a starkly different perspective from Moscow, arguing that negotiations over Ukraine should be decided primarily by the US and Russia—not Ukraine or Europe.</p><h5></h5><h5><a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).</h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: </strong><a target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>From the UN to the Oval Office, US-Europe relations fissure</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/watching/from-the-un-to-the-oval-office-us-europe-relations-fissure</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg2wugkwv807myjsezlefz</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 24 Feb 2025 22:42:23 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Riley Callanan</dc:creator>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>What We&apos;re Watching</category>
<description>The third anniversary of the Ukraine War came and went on Monday as the US is rapidly reorienting where it stands on the conflict. The tectonic shift was laid bare Monday in the UN General Assembly, where the US broke with European allies and opposed Ukraine’s resolution condemning Russian aggression and calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. Instead, the US put forth a rival resolution calling for an end to the conflict without laying blame on Russia for starting it. Both resolutions were adopted.</description>
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<media:credit>REUTERS/Brian Snyder</media:credit>
<media:text>U.S. President Donald Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron attend a press conference at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., February 24, 2025.</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd7p5hdze507lquj88vkgd" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The third anniversary of the Ukraine War came and went on Monday as the US is rapidly reorienting where it stands on the conflict. The tectonic shift was laid bare Monday in the UN General Assembly, where the US <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/24/world/middleeast/us-un-russia-ukraine-war.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&amp;referringSource=articleShare"><u>broke</u></a> with European allies and opposed Ukraine’s resolution condemning Russian aggression and calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. Instead, the US put forth a rival resolution calling for an end to the conflict without laying blame on Russia for starting it. Both resolutions were adopted.</p><p>Meanwhile, France’s President <strong>Emmanuel Macron&nbsp;</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/24/us/politics/trump-macron-ukraine.html"><u>met</u></a> with <strong>Donald Trump</strong> in Washington on Monday in an attempt to realign the US and Europe. During the meeting, Trump declined to label Russian President <strong>Vladimir Putin</strong> as a dictator and incorrectly claimed that the US has spent three times more than Europe to support Ukraine. He is expected to brief EU leaders today, ahead of a potential defense summit on Sunday. Macron’s takeaway: A truce could be weeks away, but “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g02y8gz10o">should</a> not be a surrender of Ukraine.” UK Prime Minister <strong>Keir Starmer</strong> is also expected to meet with Trump in Washington on Thursday to discuss Ukraine’s security.</p><p><strong>Setting the record straight on funding:&nbsp;</strong>European countries, including the EU, have collectively exceeded America’s support, providing <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2025/02/18/which-countries-provide-the-most-and-least-support-to-ukraine"><u>$138 billion</u></a> in allocated aid compared to America’s $119 billion (though America maintains a slight edge in military assistance). When factoring in additional pending commitments, Europe’s lead increases further. However, nearly 90% of EU institutional financial support consists of loans (albeit with very favorable terms), while approximately 60% of American financial aid has been delivered as outright grants.</p><p>Excluding loans, the US has given $50.9 billion in aid to Ukraine, according to economists at the University of California Berkeley – or 0.25% of the federal budget in 2024, roughly what is spent on energy and maintenance for federal buildings.</p><p><strong>Will Trump visit Moscow?&nbsp;</strong>Trump told Macron that he may visit Russia if peace negotiations succeed – which he suggested could happen within a matter of weeks. The visit would be the first for an American president in over 10 years and would be a boon for Putin on the global stage. The Russian president offered to sell rare earth minerals to the US on Monday night, including those from occupied territories in Ukraine, emphasizing his message to<strong>&nbsp;</strong>Trump that financial opportunities exist in Russia.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Defending Ukraine and Europe without the US</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/defending-ukraine-and-europe-without-us</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg2v3akwnr07mynhhz6815</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 24 Feb 2025 11:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>jd vance</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>elissa slotkin</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>volodymyr zelensky</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>GZERO World with Ian Bremmer</category>
<description>Three years into the war in Ukraine, what does the future of European security look like without the United States? That’s the question European leaders and NATO officials at this year&apos;s Munich Security Conference asked themselves after a phone call between Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and a blistering speech from Vice President JD Vance. On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer spoke with US Senator Elissa Slotkin, a former CIA analyst and Pentagon official, in Munich about Europe’s security, the war in Ukraine, and America’s role in an increasingly multipolar world.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd7n0cdzba07lq9edxz4of" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd7n0cdzba07lq9edxz4of" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Three years into the war in Ukraine, what does the future of European security look like without the United States? That’s the question European leaders and NATO officials at this year's Munich Security Conference asked themselves after announcing a 90-minute phone call between President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> and <strong>Vladimir Putin</strong> and a blistering speech from Vice President <strong>JD Vance</strong> criticizing European allies. On GZERO World, <strong>Ian Bremmer&nbsp;</strong>spoke with US Senator <strong>Elissa Slotkin</strong>, a former CIA analyst and Pentagon official, in Munich about Europe’s security, the war in Ukraine, and America’s role in an increasingly multipolar world.</p><p>Senator Slotkin warns that maintaining Ukraine’s defenses is critical, not just for beating back Russian aggression but also for sending a message to countries like China that the US will stand up when democracies are invaded. But while Slotkin believes it's important to defend US allies, she also agrees with the Trump administration’s view that Europe needs to do a lot more in maintaining its own security.</p><h5></h5><h5><a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).</h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: </strong><a target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Can Europe defend Ukraine without US support?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/ian-explains/can-europe-defend-ukraine-without-us-support</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg2trdkwje07my2hf2vce5</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 22 Feb 2025 13:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>ian explains</category>
<category>volodymyr zelensky</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<description>Can Europe go it alone in defending Ukraine? That’s the question European leaders and NATO officials across the continent are asking themselves following President Donald Trump’s 90-minute phone call with Vladimir Putin and rapid about-face in US-Russia relations. On Ian Explains, Ian Bremmer looks at European security amid the diplomatic shift in Washington.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd7kb0d8v807mylnyfsg4v" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd7kb0d8v807mylnyfsg4v" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Can Europe go it alone in defending Ukraine? That’s the question European leaders and NATO officials across the continent are asking themselves following President <strong>Donald Trump</strong>’s 90-minute phone call with <strong>Vladimir Putin</strong> and rapid about-face in US-Russia relations. On Ian Explains, <strong>Ian Bremmer&nbsp;</strong>looks at European security amid the diplomatic shift in Washington. The Trump administration has made it clear the US won’t foot the bill for Ukraine’s defense any longer and that Europe is responsible for maintaining peace in any potential ceasefire deal. But even after three years of brutal warfare in Ukraine, many European countries still fall short of NATO’s 2% GDP defense spending target, which means the continent has a lot of catching up to do before it could realistically replace the US in supporting Ukraine militarily. But could it get there? Can it be a serious geopolitical player without the US leading the way?</p><h5></h5><h5><a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).</h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: </strong><a target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Is the Europe-US rift leaving us all vulnerable?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/global-stage/munich-security-conference/europe-us-rift-leaving-us-vulnerable</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg2i5clmd907lq6nw0gvkm</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 16 Feb 2025 18:18:42 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>brad smith</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>roberta metsola</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>ai</category>
<category>munich security conference</category>
<category>science-tech</category>
<category>global stage</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>cybersecurity</category>
<description>As the tense and politically charged 2025 Munich Security Conference draws to a close, GZERO’s Global Stage series presents a conversation about strained relationships between the US and Europe, Ukraine&apos;s path ahead, and rising threats in cyberspace.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd72esdyu307lqof4eiacz" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd72esdyu307lqof4eiacz" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the tense and politically charged 2025 Munich Security Conference draws to a close, GZERO’s <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/global-stage/">Global Stage</a> series presents a conversation about strained relationships between the US and Europe, Ukraine's path ahead, and rising threats in cyberspace.</p><p>This provocative panel discussion was moderated by <strong>David Sanger</strong>, a White House and National Security Correspondent for The New York Times. It features GZERO and Eurasia Group Founder and President <strong>Ian Bremmer</strong>, Microsoft’s Vice Chair and President <strong>Brad Smith</strong>, European Parliament President <strong>Roberta Metsola</strong>, and former US Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technologies <strong>Anne Neuberger.</strong></p><p>The group gathered atop the Hotel Bayerischer Hof, home to the Munich Security Conference for six decades, at a critical time for Europe and the world. Following a stunning and controversial speech from US Vice President J.D. Vance and concern about the next steps on the road to a potential ceasefire in Ukraine, our Global Stage program broke down key takeaways from the 61st MSC. It illuminated the threat landscape online as cyber-attacks escalate globally.</p><h5>This livestream discussion is part of the <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/global-stage/">Global Stage</a> series at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, presented by GZERO in partnership with Microsoft.</h5>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Trump wants to be the one to end the Ukraine war, but at what cost?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-clips/trump-wants-to-be-the-one-to-end-the-ukraine-war-but-at-what-cost</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfz20llbaq07lqm3dw7y68</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 27 Nov 2024 12:30:02 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>european union</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>us election</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>david sanger</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>GZERO World Highlights</category>
<description>Trump is headed back to the White House and is determined to follow through on his campaign promise: bring an end to the war in Ukraine. But at what cost?</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd1lxccmz307mytsuvotuo" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd1lxccmz307mytsuvotuo" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Donald Trump may not have returned to the White House yet, but he's already eyeing some early foreign policy wins. Chief among them is the war in Ukraine. On the latest episode of GZERO World with <strong>Ian Bremmer</strong>, New York Times national security correspondent <strong>David Sanger&nbsp;</strong>outlines just how keen Trump is to make a deal with Kyiv and Moscow.</p><p>Watch the full episode: <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/trump-foreign-policy-in-a-maga-maga-world"><strong>Trump foreign policy in a MAGA, MAGA world</strong></a></p><h5><a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).</h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: </strong><a target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Trump foreign policy in a MAGA, MAGA world</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/trump-foreign-policy-in-a-maga-maga-world</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfywhzlav607lqe6wn1p79</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 25 Nov 2024 11:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>david sanger</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>maga</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>middle east war</category>
<category>us election</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>GZERO World with Ian Bremmer</category>
<description>As Trump prepares to return to the White House, his foreign policy picks are already showing just how radically his presidency could reshape geopolitics. New York Times Correspondent David Sanger joins Ian Bremmer on GZERO World to discuss what a Trump 2.0 foreign policy could look like for some of today&apos;s key geopolitical flashpoints.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd1dfqcmsh07myu7ztqa8v" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd1dfqcmsh07myu7ztqa8v" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As <strong>Trump</strong> prepares to return to the White House, his foreign policy picks are already showing just how radically his presidency could reshape geopolitics. New York Times Correspondent <strong>David Sanger</strong> joins <strong>Ian Bremmer&nbsp;</strong>on GZERO World to discuss just what a Trump 2.0 foreign policy could look like for some of the key geopolitical flashpoints today. From the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East to the increasingly strained US-China relationship, the only thing we can say for sure is that the Trump sequel will look far different from the original.</p><p>And that uncertainty, Sanger tells Bremmer, is why Trump won the election. "If you voted for Donald Trump in the 2024 election, it was probably with a thought that these institutions need to be blown up." One of the biggest questions, however, is just how Trump will approach the Ukraine war, and if he'll follow through on his campaign pledge to end the conflict in "24 hours." "Trump would love to come in as the man who ended the Ukraine war" Sanger says, "But the only way I can imagine in my limited way for how you do that in 24 hours is you have a call of Vladimir Putin and you say, Vlad, what do you need?"</p><h5><a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/">GZERO World with Ian Bremmer,</a> the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).</h5><p><strong>New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: </strong><a target="_blank" href="http://www.youtube.com/@GZEROMedia"><strong>subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel&nbsp;</strong></a><strong>and turn on notifications (🔔).</strong></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Global leaders scramble to align with Trump</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/global-leaders-scramble-to-align-with-trump</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfym6hkj1r07myo5af08fy</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 18 Nov 2024 20:37:40 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>ukraine-us relations</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>benjamin netanyahu</category>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>politics</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>us election</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>us israel relations</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<description>Ian Bremmer&apos;s Quick Take: From China to Canada, the world is gearing up for significant strategic shifts under Donald Trump&apos;s administration. According to Ian Bremmer, countries are eager to avoid crosswires with the US. In this Quick Take, Ian explains how these geopolitical moves are unfolding.</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>- YouTube</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:&nbsp;</strong>A Quick Take to kick off your week. A lot more information about where the Trump administration is going in terms of the appointees that they're making and also, the responses that we see from leaders around the world. Maybe focus a little on the global, because if you think that Republicans who privately don't really like Trump are publicly all lining up and saying, "This is God's gift," you've seen nothing compared to what you're going to see from allies of the United States all over the world who know that they get crosswise with the president-elect at their own peril. He is a lot more powerful, and his country is a lot more powerful than their own. We've already seen that with Prime Minister Netanyahu in Israel saying that an upcoming Lebanon ceasefire would be a gift to the president-elect. We've seen Zelenskyy in Ukraine saying, "Great meetings, great phone calls."</p><p>Of course, the war is going to be over faster with the policies of the incoming president-elect. We're seeing all sorts of outreach from individual European leaders, Asian leaders saying, "We can't wait to find a way to work with this guy. Congratulations. Please don't tariff us. Please don't cause any problems for our country." So, I do think we're going to see a lot of wins in the near term from countries all around the world because the alternative is problematic. And when you look at the G7, the G20, NATO, it is different from last time around in a few ways. First of all, that you now have a number of countries that are ideologically aligned with Trump, and there's going to be more in the near term. I mean, Giorgia Meloni, who is the most popular of G7 leaders, assertively, is someone who sees herself much closer to Trump's worldview in terms of immigration policy, social policy, even to a degree economic policy. And that is going to make him feel much more comfortable when he's sitting at those summits. That wasn't the case first G7 Summit he attended last time around.</p><p>Canada, still Justin Trudeau, but won't be for long and soon Canada's going to be Pierre Poilievre who runs the Conservative Party and is absolutely much more aligned with Trump and be a very close friend of the US President-elect when he becomes Prime Minister of Canada. Of course, you've got the Gulf states on board with Trump. You've got the Israelis much more aligned with him than otherwise. The South Korean leader, President Yoon, a conservative, taking up golf again so that he'll be able to play with Trump effectively and wants to be the new Shinzo Abe from Asia in terms of being able to maintain stable relations. That's one reason. The second reason is that there's a lot more at stake. The world is much more dangerous. Getting Trump wrong is a lot more costly when you've got a major war going on in Europe, a major war going on in the Middle East, when the US-China relations are in a worse place, but China's under much more economic pressure at home than they were before. So getting it wrong is trouble.</p><p>And so already seeing outreach from the Chinese to the United States saying, "Look, here are some things that might be the beginnings of a deal. We could buy more US treasuries. We could maybe organize a Ukraine conference. We could buy a bunch more American goods. What do we need to do? What do we need to do?" So I'm not saying it's going to go well, but clearly there is more such orientation. And then you have the fact that Trump is more powerful at home in the United States. He has the House, he has the Senate, and he's creating far more loyalists around him as opposed to adults that are more independent in his own cabinet. Which means that if you are a foreign leader, your ability to work around Trump with other parts of the US political firmament is very constrained. And all of that implies that whatever it is that Trump decides he wants to do going forward is going to be what other leaders are going to have to engage with and align with.</p><p>There are big problems from a Trump administration coming in. He's not interested in multilateralism. He doesn't want a strong European Union. He's prepared to end the Russia-Ukraine war, even at terms that are problematic for the Ukrainians. Has very little interest in promoting rule of law or democracy internationally. In fact, one of the most interesting things about Trump and the United States for right now is that for almost half a century, the US has been trying to get the Chinese to orient more towards an American worldview. This is what the idea of responsible stakeholdership was, that China was meant to play more of a leadership role in US-led multilateral institutions, promote US-led rule of law and values on the global stage, and become more aligned with the Americans and its allies over time as it got wealthier. Turns out China hasn't done that, but America has. The United States is becoming more like China on the global stage, much more transactional in their foreign policy, indifferent to the values of other countries or the political systems and economic system of other countries on the global stage.</p><p>Certainly not interested in the global promotion of democracy or even rule of law, and rather bilateral relations between the US and other countries where the US is more powerful to get the outcomes that they want. Exactly the way that Chinese engage globally. It has been successful for China in many places because they're more powerful than most of the other countries they deal with except the Americans. They've had challenges in Southeast Asia, for example, because the US has led a more multilateral approach on things like the South China Sea. Doubt you're going to see as much of that under Trump. So a very dramatic change in how we think about the world, and we'll be watching very closely as Trump continues to fill out his cabinet and starts talking much more with global leaders on the global stage.</p><p>That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Will Biden meet Zelensky at the NATO summit in Vilnius?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/will-biden-meet-zelensky-at-the-nato-summit-in-vilnius</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfb6zuj3ra07lqahnwg0f8</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 09 Jul 2023 22:50:35 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Carlos Santamaria</dc:creator>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>volodymyr zelensky</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>Ukraine&apos;s president says he won&apos;t attend the summit if there&apos;s no progress toward joining the alliance.</description>
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<media:credit>REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque</media:credit>
<media:text>US President Joe Biden disembarks Air Force One as he visits Stansted Airport in the UK.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On Sunday, US President Joe Biden kicked off a <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-journeys-europe-ahead-nato-summit/story?id=100782862">five-day trip to Europe</a>. His first stop is the UK, where he will meet with King Charles III for the first time since the British monarch’s coronation, as well as PM Rishi Sunak. But the most important leg of Biden's European tour will be July 11-12 in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius for the 74th NATO Summit, where the controversial question of whether Ukraine could (or should) ever join the alliance looms large.</p><p>Before departing, the US president made the controversial decision to <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/biden-to-supply-cluster-munitions-to-ukraine">supply Kyiv with deadly cluster bomb munitions</a>. Washington says the move was necessary because the Ukrainians are running low on ammo, even though the weapons are banned in many countries because they tend to kill or maim large numbers of civilians. Still, it's unlikely this will hamper Biden's efforts to shore up NATO unity on economic and military support for Ukraine. The bigger question is: Will Ukraine be given a path to membership?</p><p><a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/poland-bulks-up-to-defeat-history">Poland</a> and the Baltic states, the alliance’s biggest Russia hawks, want NATO to offer Kyiv a pathway to membership — something that was vaguely promised as far back as 2008. But the US and Germany think that Ukraine isn’t ready yet, politically or militarily, and are worried that welcoming Ukraine would eventually drag the alliance into a direct conflict with Russia. Biden prefers something more like an <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20230708_11/">“Israel” model</a> in which its Western backers help arm Ukraine to the teeth, but not formally accept it into NATO.</p><p>President Volodymyr Zelensky has been invited to the summit, but he is threatening to snub it if there's no progress toward Ukraine joining the club.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Where the US is gaining and losing influence</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/where-the-us-is-gaining-and-losing-influence</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrf80pliw8e07lqre00pzxy</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 17 Apr 2023 20:35:48 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff, Ian Bremmer</dc:creator>
<category>china</category>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>us-china relations</category>
<category>globalization</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>usmca</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>trans-pacific partnership</category>
<category>american exceptionalism</category>
<description>Ian Bremmer&apos;s Quick Take: I thought I would talk a bit about where US relations are with other countries in the world. I got a question from someone over the weekend that said, &quot;Are there any countries where the United States actually has better relations today than they did ten years ago?&quot; I think this reflects that the world feels like it&apos;s heading in a difficult direction, with America losing influence. And it&apos;s mixed, right?</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>Where the US is gaining &amp; losing influence | Quick Take | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrbqnqca17307myudik59sw" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:</strong> Hi everybody, Ian Bremmer here and a happy Monday from Vancouver. I'm here for the TED Conference. I've never done the main TED conference before, believe it or not, but giving a speech tomorrow and so came in a little early to meet some of all of these crazed public intellectuals and see what they have to say about the world. Should be kind of interesting, kind of fun.</p><p>But thought I would talk a bit about where US relations are with other countries in the world. I got a question from someone over the weekend that said, "Are there any countries where the United States actually has better relations today than they did ten years ago?" And I think this reflects, this wasn't an anti-Biden or pro-Trump sensibility, it's more the world feels like it's heading in a difficult direction, America losing influence. How do we think about that?</p><p>And it's mixed, right? It's mixed. It's very clear that China is much more commercially and economically powerful than it has been at any point in modern times. And it's also more willing to use its diplomatic leadership as well as the consistency of a single president, Xi Jinping, for eleven plus years now and going on however long he's alive. And so that I think makes people, especially that grew up in a time of more consistent global leadership from the United States, more discomforted or more excited, depending on their background. I think that also the United States is more, and we're looking it's some more divided, there are a lot of questions of why the United States would want to be the world's policeman, would try to drive global trade agreements when people inside the United States don't feel it necessarily benefits them. But the outcomes are a little more varied than that story would give you as a headline.</p><p>So for example, it is pretty clear that there's a lot of architecture being built by the United States with its allies in Asia. It's true that the US didn't get the Trans-Pacific Partnership done, and that was Obama's alleged pivot to Asia, never really happened. But now when you look at the Quad, you look at AUKUS, you look at the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and you look at the CHIPS 4. And then you look at all of the alignment of countries that rely on the United States, particularly for national security in Asia and the backlash that you see from a China that is increasingly dominant militarily in some Asian security conflicts and Asian security areas. And as a consequence you have Japan, South Korea, improving their relations with each other and with the United States, you have the Australians much more aligned. You have New Zealand joining AUKUS as a non-NATO nuclear member and much more hawkish towards China than they would've been even two years ago, nevermind ten.</p><p>The Philippines pivoting into that direction, Indonesia concerned. So there are some countries that are really dominated by China and Asia. I'm thinking about Laos, Cambodia. But those aren't the countries with geopolitical heft. And for the rest they're more aligned with the United States. In Europe, you'd certainly say that most Europeans are more aligned with the US and yes, you'd probably even say that about France. Now, again, not necessarily Macron-Biden or Macron-Trump, given the personalities of all involved, but the fact that the French have voted along with every other EU country for ten rounds of sanctions against the Russians and to invite Ukraine into the EU and are decoupling their economies from Russia. That is a level of very significant alignment that we weren't seeing over the last five or ten years. And some countries in Europe may not like it, may be discomforted, but they don't necessarily have good alternatives.</p><p>And then Mexico and Canada where a level of economic integration, political integration and security integration with the US is just overwhelming. So those are all places where I see the relationship with the US as either as strong or getting stronger, getting more aligned, at least for the present and not really mattering hugely just on leadership, also mattering structurally with what's happening in the world. Then you have the Middle East and you have emerging markets around the world. You have the so-called Global South, and that's where I think the US is really and rapidly getting displaced, particularly in the Middle East where the US is not as focused on fossil fuels from there. And where the security relationship has been more challenged, Congress less interested in allowing the most advanced weapons to go to some of these countries. Some focus on human rights and just less engagement given how much more the Asian and the European environments are just sucking up all the airspace for the US diplomatically.</p><p>So there, I think China is displacing the United States in influence and countries in the Middle East are feeling like they need to do everything themselves. In terms of the Global South, also lots of countries that feel a level of hypocrisy from the United States, don't feel aligned, feel that the revealed preferences of US policy are really not supporting what these countries need. Whether it's in response to the pandemic or response to big inflation or response to the Russian invasion. Anything else, climate change, thinking that their relationship with the US is becoming less important. And meanwhile, globalization is less of a benefit for them as Americans focus more on nearshoring and on providing jobs for Americans in the middle and working classes. And this will even speed up with AI developments. Finally, and most dangerously, rogue states, North Korea, Russia, Iran, these are countries that have relations which are not just badly broken with the US but increasingly dangerous.</p><p>These are countries willing to be hostile and take risks with their relations with the US and allies. And China, which is not a rogue state, but is a country where there is zero trust between them and the US. And the relationship is at its worst it's been in decades. So if you were to put all of that together and say which world is more stable, definitely not where we are today. Is global power at largely shifting towards the US, away from the US or pari-passu, staying the same? I'd say it's very mixed, but slightly away from the US if you add all of those things up. Still, lots of areas where the Americans have a lot of power, but also a lot of areas where the world and its geopolitical balance is shifting far faster than the Americans and its allies can effectively respond to it.</p><p>So that's a little bit of the big picture for me. Seems like the thing one to talk about at TED. We'll do more of that tomorrow and I hope everyone's doing well. Talk to you soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Can the US keep Europe together?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/can-the-us-keep-europe-together</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrf6atyiqsi07lqt10mpzkr</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 20 Feb 2023 21:46:17 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Gabrielle Debinski</dc:creator>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>eastern europe</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>nato unity</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>Over the past year, there’s been much attention on how a united Europe has served as a crucial punitive force against Russia. But as the war lingers, anxiety is growing about whether deviating interests within Europe could, over time, splinter its war response.</description>
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<media:credit>Reuters</media:credit>
<media:text>U.S. President Joe Biden walks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy during an unannounced visit, in Kyiv, Ukraine.</media:text>
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<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrbnkghaivl07lqotujd2w0" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Just days out from the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, US President Joe Biden is making a splash in Europe. After a <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=27614a7261&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">surprise stop</a> in Kyiv on Monday, Biden is now in Poland, where he is expected to give a formal address at the Royal Castle gardens in Warsaw on the global state of democracy. He's also set to meet a group of nine eastern European leaders.<br></p><p>Biden’s trip comes amid growing fears in the region of both an imminent military escalation in Ukraine and concern for how long European cohesion on supporting Kyiv will last. This view was reinforced when Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki recently <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=96062b6d58&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">said</a>: “We must admit that it will be a big challenge to keep the EU member countries enthusiastic.”</p><p>Over the past year, there’s been much attention on how a united Europe has served as a crucial punitive force against Russia. But as the war lingers, anxiety is growing about whether deviating interests within Europe could, over time, splinter its war response.</p><p><strong>First, what are the differing views within the European camp?&nbsp;</strong>Post-Soviet states, like the three Baltic nations, as well as fearful neighbors – like the Scandinavian and Balkan countries – have adopted a hawkish Russia stance. They know what it’s like to live under the fist of an oppressive Soviet state or to be bullied by an expansionist Russia. Crucially, Poland, which has emerged as an anchor for Eastern European unity, recalls all too well how the country was carved up in 1939 between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Fearful of Russia's imperialist aspirations, Warsaw has been channeling its fears by <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=ec8fdad287&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">upping its defense budget.</a></p><p><strong>But the view is very different from much of Central and Western Europe</strong> — particularly Germany, which, in the post-Cold War years intertwined its economy with Russia’s. The same is true for other EU countries, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=7dd1cc51f8&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">including</a> Italy and Austria. This economic interdependence has at times slowed some states from adopting the same full-throttled anti-Russia stance as those who feel more directly threatened by Moscow.</p><p>“There are many cleavages between Eastern European countries, the Baltic states, and Western European countries,” says <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=4e6c8e9f4d&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">Engjellushe Morina</a>, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Eastern Europeans and Baltics have different expectations of European unity because they live right next door to Russia.”</p><p>As the war in Ukraine metastasizes, there’s increasing fear among Eastern European states that the rest of Europe, reeling from inflation and other domestic crises (the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=a88c7e8891&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">French right now&nbsp;</a>… <em>ils sont malheureux!</em>), will lose patience with the West’s maximum pressure campaign.</p><p>But this would appear to counter a dominant view that Eastern Europe’s clout has grown since the war broke out: “Our voice is now louder and more heard,” Romania’s foreign minister <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=057f4514d0&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">said</a> recently. What’s more, some analysts have credited the bloc’s powerful advocacy with having <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=038abd28c3&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">pushed</a> the Biden administration – followed by European heavyweights – to give Ukraine heavier military equipment.</p><p><strong>A divided East.&nbsp;</strong>But while Eastern European leaders may have played a more prominent role in leading the charge in recent months – compared, for instance, to 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea – varying priorities impede the bloc from presenting a united front.</p><p>Consider that <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=ee8315296f&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">Poland</a>, for its part, abhors the Kremlin and has taken in more Ukrainian <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=f03d18621b&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">refugees</a> than any other country, while Hungary’s PM Viktor Orban, long <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=07ac427912&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">cozy with Moscow</a>, said this week that he would not break ties with Russia. Serbia is closely aligned with the Kremlin and has not joined NATO, choosing to maintain a neutral defense posture, while Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia are NATO members. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=dd15640519&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">warned</a> that Bosnia and Herzegovina and <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=172061a47b&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">Moldova</a> are vulnerable to Russian interference.</p><p><strong>Another limiting factor is that the Eastern Europeans don’t have the goods.&nbsp;</strong>Estonian PM Kaja Kallas <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=57d4517859&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">acknowledged</a> this recently when she said, “it’s very easy for me to say … ‘Of course, give fighter jets [to Ukraine] but — I don’t have them.” Likewise, while Poland has <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=b4d63f2869&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">called for</a> NATO members to send Kyiv fighter jets, it said that its stockpiles are limited and it needs Washington to lead the way. And even when they do have the goods, Europe's eastern flank often can’t send them to third parties without getting the go-ahead from the heavyweights that produced them. This dynamic was highlighted in recent months when Ukraine pushed for the US, the UK, and Germany to send advanced <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&amp;id=0dff34de45&amp;e=5c2c4c0008">battle tanks</a>, paving the way for other European allies to do the same.</p><p><strong>America's job.&nbsp;</strong>As the war passes the one-year mark, the endurance of a united Europe on Ukraine will continue to depend on how well the US can keep the group in check. Why? Because no Europeans seem up to the task.</p><p>“There are no European leaders to maintain this unity,” Morina says, adding, “we don‘t see any powerful European countries like France or Germany taking the lead.”</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>US protectionism could trigger &quot;war of subsidies&quot; with Europe</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-europe/us-protectionism-could-trigger-war-of-subsidies-with-europe</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrf5b8ihuws07myuk4dc4hh</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 18 Jan 2023 15:38:35 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>davos</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>trade</category>
<category>carl bildt</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>global economy</category>
<category>us protectionism</category>
<category>ukraine aid</category>
<category>military</category>
<category>GZERO Europe</category>
<description>What&apos;s happening in Davos from the European point of view? Carl Bildt reporting from the 2023 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrblueq9nzm07myo0usdwrh" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>Will Europe Respond to US Protectionism With a &quot;War of Subsidies&quot;? | Europe In :60 | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Carl Bildt reporting from the 2023 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.</p><p><strong>What's happening in Davos from the European point of view?</strong></p><p>I think there are two issues that are discussed quite broadly.</p><p>The one is what's going to be the European response, their response, to what's happening in the US with these massive subsidies and slight protectionist tendencies of evolving industrial policy? Is there going to be a European response of the same sort? There's a danger there, in my opinion, of a war of subsidies across the Atlantic that is going to be to the detriment of both the US and the European economies over time. But that's the big issue.</p><p>The second issue is, of course, whether it will be possible to fundamentally step-up military support for Ukraine. The issue of delivering of tanks is very much in the forefront of the public debate, be that in Germany or elsewhere. But it's also obvious that they need more effective air defense systems, and they need better financial support in order to sustain the functionability of the Ukrainian state during the very difficult year that lies ahead.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Putin aims to draw Belarus into Ukraine war</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-europe/putin-aims-to-draw-belarus-into-ukraine-war</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrf4hb7il9i07lqjf4brqpq</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 19 Dec 2022 16:37:56 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>kyiv</category>
<category>belarus</category>
<category>alexander lukashenko</category>
<category>energy diplomacy</category>
<category>minsk</category>
<category>electric vehicles</category>
<category>carl bildt</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>in 60 seconds</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>GZERO Europe</category>
<description>What&apos;s the mood in the transatlantic relationship? What is Mr. Putin doing in Minsk, in Belarus these days? Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden, shares his perspective on European politics.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrbkeuga9gf07lqtgski0qn" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1280" height="720">
<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>Status of Transatlantic Relationship | Europe In :60 | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden, shares his perspective on European politics.</p><p><strong>What's the mood in the transatlantic relationship?</strong></p><p>Well, not bad. Certainly not, but not as good as it should be. There's been or there is a substantial European irritation with a very high level of subsidies that is given to industries in the US, excluding European deliveries of electric vehicles and energy investments and things like that. And that is causing a somewhat of a mini crisis that I hope will be resolved in the next few months. Let's hope for the best.</p><p><strong>What is Mr. Putin doing in Minsk, in Belarus these days?</strong></p><p>Well, it's fairly obvious that he's trying to press Belarus and Lukashenko in a far more active role in his aggression against Ukraine. He is now looking medium- and long-term at that particular war. He's probably going to make another go for Kyiv when his new army mobilized hundred thousands of people, when his new army is ready, that he needs Belarus on board. That's in all probability, the meaning of his visit to Minsk today<em>.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Can Macron woo Biden?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/can-macron-woo-biden</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrf3yftijws07lqip4gogfb</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 01 Dec 2022 00:09:50 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Gabrielle Debinski</dc:creator>
<category>emmanuel macron</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>aukus</category>
<category>us-france relations</category>
<category>state dinner</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>French President Emmanuel Macron is in Washington, DC, for an official state visit, the first world leader given that honor since President Joe Biden moved into the White House nearly two years ago. Behind the scenes, the two leaders will have to hash out a series of thorny issues.</description>
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<media:credit>Luisa Vieira</media:credit>
<media:text>US President Joe Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>French President Emmanuel Macron is in Washington, DC, for an official state visit, the first world leader given that honor since President Joe Biden moved into the White House nearly two years ago.<br></p><p>Marked by military processions and fancy dinner parties, a state visit is essentially the greatest expression of “friendship” between two countries.</p><p>Biden and Macron, both known for public displays of affection, will surely go to great lengths to demonstrate that US-French relations are warmer than ever. But behind the scenes, the two leaders will have to hash out a series of thorny issues.</p><p><strong>Macron’s already winning.&nbsp;</strong>While Macron is hoping to secure certain material gains, the invitation itself is likely already deemed a win by the French president, who has long <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/euro-diplomatic-sweepstakes">been trying</a> to carve out his place as the de facto leader of Europe.</p><p>To be sure, the competition isn’t stiff: The leader of a degraded Britain was hardly going to get the star treatment from the White House – nor was German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Angela Merkel’s <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/20/world/europe/olaf-scholz-germany-mahmoud-abbas.html">wildly underwhelming</a> successor.</p><p><strong>What’s on the agenda?</strong></p><p><strong>Relatively straightforward: Reaffirming the transatlantic alliance and a coordinated Ukraine policy</strong></p><p>The US and France have come a long way since Sept. 2021, when Macron briefly withdrew his ambassador from Washington after the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/sep/16/what-is-the-aukus-alliance-and-what-are-its-implications">AUKUS debacle</a>, where the US froze Paris out of a crucial Asia Pacific security pact with Australia and the UK.</p><p>But since then, the US and France – leading the broader European Union – have exhibited a resilient partnership in an effort to isolate Russia and bolster Ukraine. Despite some divergent economic and strategic interests, the EU and US agreed early on to hit the Kremlin with coordinated coercive economic measures, while also presenting a united front on the diplomatic stage. Indeed, Biden and Macron will want to highlight this unity for Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin watching at home.</p><p>However, Biden and Macron have at times seemed to offer conflicting visions of an eventual endgame in Ukraine. While Paris previously <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/10/13/ukraine-war-come-back-to-the-negotiating-table-macron-tells-putin">called for dialogue</a> with Russia to end the war, Biden has mostly reiterated Kyiv’s view that a settlement will only be reached once Russia withdraws from <em>all&nbsp;</em>Ukrainian territory.</p><p>Still, what leaders say in public is often very different from admissions made behind closed doors, and this multi-day summit will give Biden and Macron an opportunity to talk candidly about their views of a lingering conflict that has sent the global economy into a tailspin.</p><p><strong>What’s harder to fix?</strong></p><p><strong>Made in America vs. Buy European</strong></p><p>The EU – and France in particular – has made no secret of the fact that it abhors the <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/can-bidens-ira-work-irl">Inflation Reduction Act,</a> a key component of Biden’s legislative agenda that includes tax breaks for Americans who purchase electric vehicles made from parts manufactured only in North America. Decrying America’s protectionist policies, which he says discriminate against Europe’s robust auto industry, Macron has called for subsidy loopholes for the EU resembling those given to Mexico and Canada.</p><p>But Clayton Allen, a US expert at Eurasia Group, says that remains a pipe dream. “There is no room to extend the same exceptions granted to Mexico and Canada without new legislation,” Allen says, adding that “there is no appetite to pass that legislation in the lame duck [session],” or to do so in the next Congress.</p><p>Biden, for his part, “has no real wiggle room on the provisions of the IRA itself,” Allen adds.</p><p>Indeed, this sticking point has caused Paris to push its own “Buy European” agenda – a move aggressively <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-robert-habeck-joe-biden-economy-outlines-buy-european-as-riposte-in-us-trade-dispute/?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&amp;utm_campaign=34dad095e8-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2022_11_30_04_05&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_10959edeb5-34dad095e8-[LIST_EMAIL_ID]">backed</a> by Berlin – with Macron calling for Europe to pass its own subsidy package to safeguard key industries.</p><p>Still, both Macron and Biden will be keen to stave off a transatlantic trade standoff that could deepen the global financial crisis. Rather, Macron will be trying to feel out how the US might respond to reciprocal protectionist measures.</p><p><strong>Energy wars.</strong> While energy-dependent Europe is bearing the brunt of Western efforts to transition away from Russian energy exports, the US has in fact <em>benefited&nbsp;</em>from the global energy flux. Indeed, in the first half of 2022, the US <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=53159">surpassed</a> Qatar and Australia to become the number one exporter of liquified natural gas, in large part due to the EU and UK having <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenroberts/2022/10/08/us-lng-exports-to-france-croatia-poland-up-more-than-1000/?sh=605dd28c61bd">boosted</a> their LNG imports to offset dwindling supplies from Russian pipelines.</p><p>With the EU feeling the pain, Macron has called on the Biden administration to pressure US gas companies to lower prices. The White House, for its part, says that its options are limited, noting that increased LNG prices are largely a result of the US Federal Reserve’s efforts to tackle inflation, which have made US exports more expensive for <em>everyone.&nbsp;</em>In reality, there’s little the Biden administration can do: High global demand for LNG is pushing prices up, including domestically. Indeed, some US lawmakers have even called for export limits on US LNG, but the Biden administration isn’t going for it.</p><p>Still, Macron isn’t buying it and accuses the White House of a <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-21/macron-accuses-us-of-trade-double-standard-amid-energy-crunch">“double standard”</a> on energy and trade policy.</p><p><strong>France and the US:&nbsp;</strong><strong>et maintenant?</strong></p><p>Despite all the tough talk, European – and French – “political preferences will be to maintain transatlantic unity over the Ukraine war and avoid a trade spat with the US,” says Mujtaba Rahman, Europe Managing Director at Eurasia Group. Indeed, Uncle Sam seems to be in a strong bargaining position.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Wolfgang Ischinger: Ukraine made German foreign policy go &quot;out the window&quot;</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/global-stage/world-economic-forum/wolfgang-ischinger-ukraine-made-german-foreign-policy-go-out-the-window</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrey611i3fr07lqwmgct5bn</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 26 May 2022 20:17:08 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>nato</category>
<category>germany</category>
<category>foreign policy</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>gzero world</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>global stage</category>
<category>davos</category>
<category>munich security conference</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>wolfgang ischinger</category>
<category>World Economic Forum</category>
<description>For Wolfgang Ischinger, former chair of the Munich Security Conference, the state of transatlantic relations is in good shape right now, although whether we&apos;ll have the stamina to stay on course is uncertain. In a Global Stage interview with Ian Bremmer, he seems more worried about American war fatigue than the Europeans — although the EU has Viktor Orbán and it&apos;s hard for Germany to cut off Russian gas. One lesson Ischinger has learned from the current crisis is that Europe must have America&apos;s back on China, especially with Taiwan. And he calls German Chancellor Olaf Scholz&apos;s recent foreign policy U-turns as &quot;going out the window.&quot;</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>Ukraine Made German Foreign Policy Go “Out the Window” | Global Stage | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For Wolfgang Ischinger, former chair of the Munich Security Conference, the state of transatlantic relations is in good shape right now, although whether we'll have the stamina to stay on course is uncertain. In a Global Stage interview with Ian Bremmer, he seems more worried about American war fatigue than the Europeans — although the EU has Viktor Orbán and it's hard for Germany to cut off Russian gas. One lesson Ischinger has learned from the current crisis is that Europe must have America's back on China, especially with Taiwan. And he calls German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's recent foreign policy U-turns as "going out the window."</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:&nbsp;</strong>With my friend Wolfgang Ischinger here at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Wolfgang, so state of transatlantic relations today, from the Davos perspective, what do you think?</p><p><strong>Wolfgang Ischinger:&nbsp;</strong>Good shape. Better than at any time in recent memory. If we had had a Davos a year ago, we would've been talking about the debacle of Afghanistan, et cetera. We're in good shape now. NATO is essentially on track, the European Union has surprisingly not fallen apart. I think my only concern is if it is correct to assume that this war in Ukraine will drag on for not weeks but months, are we going to be in good shape three, six, nine months down the road? That's my concern. Are we going to have the stamina to stay on course?</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:&nbsp;</strong>Now, question; to the extent that war fatigue is starting to set in over time, and again, I think most people presume this is not ending any time soon.</p><p><strong>Wolfgang Ischinger:&nbsp;</strong>Exactly.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:&nbsp;</strong>Does it come first from the Europeans or from the Americans? And why?</p><p><strong>Wolfgang Ischinger:&nbsp;</strong>Well, let's talk about America for a moment. You guys have elections coming up, midterm elections, and I'm not so certain that the average American voter is going to like the idea of paying higher gas prices and spending more money on foreign expeditions, etc., etc. So I'm worried a little bit about the American commitment longer term. In Europe, I think at the moment we're in good shape, but of course we have these outliers. We have Viktor Orbán.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:</strong> Hungary.</p><p><strong>Wolfgang Ischinger:&nbsp;</strong>We have Hungary, and we have a couple of other partners that have specific interests. Germany has its own problem with gas. I wish I could say in six weeks or in 12 weeks, we're going to be able to cut gas imports from Russia. It's hard to do. It's hard to do, and I feel sorry for those in my own government who have to respond to this urgent question from our Ukrainian partners. When are you going to stop financing the Russian war of aggression by continuing to buy this stuff? But then again, it's not going to help if Germany cuts gas imports now. With the obvious, obvious consequence of a significant recession, then of course the commitment by the German wider public for our Ukrainian determination will surely shrink. And whose interest would we serve with that? So this is really a dilemma.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:&nbsp;</strong>And the Americans and the Europeans have had diversion perspectives for a while on Russia that are now aligning. They've also had some diversion perspectives on China for a while.</p><p><strong>Wolfgang Ischinger:</strong> Yes. Yeah.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:</strong> Are they now aligning?</p><p><strong>Wolfgang Ischinger:&nbsp;</strong>I think there's one lesson we are learning, we Europeans. We cannot ignore that the US is looking at a huge problem, potential problem with China, with the Taiwan issue, etc. And we cannot possibly leave the United States alone in that. In other words, we need to understand that even though this is many thousands of miles away, it is in our interest to get involved. Maybe not militarily, we don't have the capacities militarily, but certainly politically, and we need much closer coordination between Washington, and Brussels, and Berlin and Paris on China.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:&nbsp;</strong>And Olaf Scholz so far, when you saw that initial speech he gave, the turning point speech he gave, did it reflect for you a new strategic vision for Germany? Is this a new generation for Germany in politics or is it more modest than that?</p><p><strong>Wolfgang Ischinger:&nbsp;</strong>No. It was a major decision. Look, essential elements of established German foreign policy went up the chimney.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:&nbsp;</strong>We'd say out the window.</p><p><strong>Wolfgang Ischinger:</strong> Out the window.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:</strong> But that sounds more definitive, if it's up the chimney.</p><p><strong>Wolfgang Ischinger:&nbsp;</strong>Out the window. The idea which about which we had been preaching for many years, the future partnership with Russia; out the window, no longer possible. The idea of a security order for all of Europe, with Russia included; out the window. In other words for no country has this Russian attack against Ukraine produced more sharp cuts and the need for total revision of our foreign policy. The problem for Olaf Scholz is not that he gave the wrong speech. The problem for him is that it's not so clear that all of his followers in his own party agree with his speech-</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:</strong> Social democrats.</p><p><strong>Wolfgang Ischinger:</strong> And with the consequences of spending a hundred billion extra on defense, and on meeting the 2% defense goal going forward, etc. So, he has to fight this internal political fight, not against the opposition, which supports him, but against his own party.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:&nbsp;</strong>The Americans have been saying for a long time, how come the Europeans aren't sacrificing the Germans? The Europeans are sacrificing more this time around. There's no question.</p><p><strong>Wolfgang Ischinger:</strong> Yes. Absolutely.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>What We&apos;re Watching: US-EU gas deal, Putin&apos;s ruble ruse, China-India meeting</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/what-we-re-watching-western-unity-putin-boosts-ruble-china-india-meeting</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrew8i4h4iw07myo1b8e06q</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 24 Mar 2022 21:38:37 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Carlos Santamaria, Gabrielle Debinski</dc:creator>
<category>olaf scholz</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>india</category>
<category>ruble</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>china-india relations</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>NATO united but Europe less so on Russia, Putin&apos;s ruble ruse, China/India patching things up</description>
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<media:credit>REUTERS/Wolfgang Rattay</media:credit>
<media:text>Biden speaks to Scholz during an EU leaders summit in Brussels.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>EU signs US gas deal amid Biden's European trip</h3><p>US President Joe Biden kicked off his meetings in <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/biden-goes-to-europe-to-talk-ukraine-will-it-make-a-difference">Europe</a> on Thursday with a few <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-biden-business-g-7-summit-9f6705e72533496f513c3540881d348e">big salvos</a>. Ship more weapons and humanitarian aid to the Ukrainians? Check. Welcome 100,000 Ukrainian refugees to the US? Check. Zoom with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky? Of course. Biden also said Russia <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/world/europe/biden-russia-g20.html">should be booted</a> from the G20, a grouping of the world's largest economies, ahead of a summit later this year in Indonesia.</p><p>The G-7 countries and the EU leveled new sanctions on Thursday against more than 400 Russians, including members of the Russian legislature. But the allies still aren't giving Zelensky what he really wants: a NATO-enforced <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/should-the-west-say-no-to-a-no-fly-zone">no-fly zone</a> to let civilians escape Russian attacks.</p><p>On Friday, the US and EU announced a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60871601">major new gas</a> deal that will see the US provide the EU with at least 15 billion additional cubic meters of liquified natural gas — last year it provided 22 billion cubic meters — by the end of 2022. The move is the latest bid to help reduce Europe's reliance on Russian gas. European leaders have shown little appetite for following the American example of banning Russian oil and gas outright, which German Chancellor Olaf Scholz <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/c95634ad-e01a-4af5-b7e8-4616618b7431">warned</a> would trigger a recession on a continent heavily dependent on Russian fossil fuels. Vladimir Putin, who knows this, recently hatched a cunning plan to cash in on his immense energy leverage over the EU ...</p><h3>Putin's ruble ruse</h3><p>With the ruble at <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/the-graphic-truth-ukraine-war-hits-ruble-hard">historic lows</a> and energy prices soaring over Western sanctions against Russia, Putin has found his own way to weaponize the financial system: he <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/what-were-watching-war-spillovers-biden-bolstering-allies-modis-free-trade-rethink-russian-defection">wants</a> countries that backed anti-Russia sanctions to pay for Russian commodities in rubles. Why? First, he’s <a target="_blank" href="https://fortune.com/2022/03/24/putin-russia-natural-gas-europe-imports-pay-in-rubles-sanctions/">throwing</a> the sanctions weapon right back at the West and artificially increasing demand for Russia's currency to prop up the ruble. Second, the Russian central bank desperately needs to exchange more rubles for hard currency to avoid <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/zelensky-takes-center-stage">defaulting</a> on its sovereign debt. Third, a stronger ruble will help mitigate the impact of sanctions on ordinary Russians, whose cost of living has <a target="_blank" href="https://au.news.yahoo.com/russias-cost-living-soars-more-060908102.html">jumped</a> 14% in recent weeks. Putin hopes Europeans are hungry enough for Russian oil and natural gas that they will ultimately cough up rubles. But to do so, Moscow's European customers would have to open accounts in the few Russian banks that haven't been sanctioned. And that's risky business ... because those banks could next.</p><h3>Will China and India make up?</h3><p>China’s foreign minister is visiting India on Friday for the highest-level bilateral talks between the two Asian powers since dozens of their soldiers were killed in clashes in <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/whats-going-on-between-india-and-china">contested territory</a> in the western Himalayas two years ago. Wang Yi, Beijing’s top diplomat, is meeting his Indian counterpart to discuss the war in Ukraine and related energy and food shortages. Beijing and <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/indias-fence-sitting-on-ukraine-hurts-its-chances-of-becoming-global-leader">Delhi</a> — both chummy with Moscow, but for different reasons — have so far refused to condemn Russia’s offensive in Ukraine. The topic of Nepal will also likely be on the agenda. India and China have long vied for influence in the landlocked Himalayan country and are likely unhappy that Kathmandu is trying to reduce its reliance on them in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-war-why-nepal-chose-to-go-against-russia/a-61234019">favor of a tilt</a> toward Washington. China has been trying to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202203/1255159.shtml?id=11">improve&nbsp;</a><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202203/1255159.shtml?id=11">relations</a> with longtime rival India for some time. Less clear, however, is how India — part of the Quad alliance aimed at limiting Beijing’s influence in the Indo-Pacific — feels about getting cozier with Beijing. Things got off to a shaky start with India rebuking <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/24/india-rebukes-china-fm-over-kashmir-remarks-before-expected-visit">China over its remarks</a> about the contested Kashmir region.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Biden goes to Europe to talk Ukraine. Will it make a difference?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/biden-goes-to-europe-to-talk-ukraine-will-it-make-a-difference</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrew50hhxey07lqgxak3o43</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 22 Mar 2022 23:33:00 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Gabrielle Debinski</dc:creator>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>The test is on this week for US President Joe Biden as he heads to Europe to shore up allied resolve against Russia’s assault on Ukraine. Biden likely hopes he can rally European countries to put further pressure on Moscow and force the Kremlin to make some concessions. Can he pull it off?</description>
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<media:credit>Annie Gugliotta</media:credit>
<media:text>US President Joe Biden</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Wars can make or break political careers. They present opportunities for leaders to show off their statesman bonafides, or alternatively, to flounder.<br></p><p>The test is on this week for US President Joe Biden as he heads to Europe to shore up allied resolve against Russia’s assault on Ukraine. Biden likely hopes he can rally European countries to put further pressure on Moscow and force the Kremlin to make some concessions. Can he pull it off?</p><p><strong>Biden on tour.&nbsp;</strong>On Wednesday, Biden flies to Brussels, where he’ll meet with NATO members and European leaders Thursday. He’ll say all the right things about the transatlantic relationship and America’s enduring commitment to European security interests.</p><p>Biden will then fly to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/mar/21/joe-biden-visit-poland-ukraine-crisis">Warsaw,</a> where he’ll <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/21/biden-to-visit-poland-meet-pm-duda-to-discuss-ukraine">meet</a> President Andrzej Duda as a show of solidarity amid the ballooning Ukrainian refugee crisis spilling over into Eastern Europe. Poland, which shares a 300-mile border with Ukraine, has <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/the-graphic-truth-where-ukrainian-refugees-are-going">absorbed</a> roughly 2 million Ukrainian refugees thus far, and Polish society is already feeling the pinch of this massive <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/20/poland-schools-ukraine-refugees/">absorption effort</a>.</p><p>The leaders of Poland, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic visited Kyiv last week, and former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-19-22/h_c275ef7ba57402d3ca65bd64c3409089">said</a> recently that Biden should make the trip to Ukraine in a show of support. But the White House has said there is no plan for Biden to visit Ukraine.</p><p>“This is a country at war,” US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield has said. “I can’t imagine that [a Biden visit to Kyiv] would be on the table.” But US presidents have <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.wearethemighty.com/popular/27-times-the-commander-in-chief-visited-combat-zones/">visited war zones</a> many times, and a Biden touchdown in Kyiv would send a powerful message to Ukrainians, and the Kremlin.</p><p><strong>Heavy on symbolism, light on action.&nbsp;</strong>Washington and Brussels have already rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s requests to establish a <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/should-the-west-say-no-to-a-no-fly-zone">no-fly zone</a> over Ukraine because Moscow would likely see it as an act of war. They’ve also <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/08/poland-mig-29-jets-us-ukraine">balked at requests</a> to provide Soviet-era fighter jets to Kyiv, claiming that this would bring NATO members into direct conflict with Moscow.</p><p>Still, transatlantic allies will be under pressure to announce<em> something&nbsp;</em>after this week’s summit. Washington has tried recently to get Turkey, a NATO member, to transfer the sophisticated Russian-made S-400 missile system to Ukraine, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-suggested-turkey-transfer-russian-made-missile-system-ukraine-sources-2022-03-19/">according to Reuters</a>. But such a move would infuriate the Kremlin, and Ankara, which shares a maritime border with Kyiv and Moscow in the Black Sea, knows that it would be playing with fire.</p><p>But the West still has plenty of other options up its sleeves to inflict further pain on the Kremlin. Crucially, the EU is discussing measures targeting Russia’s energy exports, says Edoardo Saravelle, a former energy and economics researcher at the Center for a New American Security. “Biden’s presence could help build a consensus on Europe’s next step on energy. Much will depend on building so-called ‘sanctions resilience,’ that is, ensuring that Europe has the resources and support to weather potential economic collateral damage from additional sanctions on Russia,” Saravelle says.</p><p>Indeed, the United States and Europe could also announce new ways to tighten financial sanctions and target more high-profile Russians. “Given the high-profile nature of the trip and the general trend of transatlantic coordination in sanctions actions since the invasion,” Saravelle says, “it seems likely that some sanctions announcement will come from President Biden’s travel, even if short of the strongest energy measures.”</p><p><strong>What else is on the agenda?&nbsp;</strong>The alliance might also try to establish a blueprint for easing – or lifting – crippling <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/22968949/russia-sanctions-swift-economy-mcdonalds">economic sanctions</a> on Russia. Though Brussels and Washington have been in lockstep in recent weeks, it still isn’t clear what Western preconditions are for loosening the chokehold on Russia’s economy.</p><p>What’s more, the Biden administration says that Russia is <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.voanews.com/a/biden-russia-may-use-cyberattacks-chemical-weapons-/6495562.html?utm_source=dailybrief&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=DailyBrief2022Mar22&amp;utm_term=DailyNewsBrief">preparing</a> to use chemical weapons on Ukrainian civilians and to launch cyberattacks on American infrastructure. Haunted by the ghost of Syria’s past, will Biden establish a “red line” requiring Western military intervention?</p><p><strong>The China equation.&nbsp;</strong>Amid reports that Vladimir Putin has called on Beijing to supply Moscow with weapons and economic support, President Biden <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/18/politics/biden-xi-call-russia-ukraine-importance/index.html">held a long call</a> with his Chinese counterpart last Friday in which he tried to dissuade President Xi Jinping from rescuing Moscow. Indeed, ahead of an upcoming EU-China virtual summit on April 1, Biden <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-21/eu-set-to-line-up-with-biden-to-warn-china-against-helping-putin?srnd=premium">wants to make sure</a> that the EU and US speak with a single voice when navigating relations with Beijing.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Biden&apos;s Europe trip to show strengthened alliance against Russia</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/ask-ian/bidens-europe-trip-to-show-strengthened-alliance-against-russia</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 22 Mar 2022 18:40:45 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>europe</category>
<category>in 60 seconds</category>
<category>xi jinping</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>poland</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>alexei navalny</category>
<category>ask ian</category>
<description>What do you expect to come from Biden&apos;s trip to Europe? Why was Putin critic, Alexei Navalny, sentenced to nine more years in prison? Will China&apos;s worst passenger jet crash in years derail President Xi&apos;s re-election? Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>Unity From All Europeans to Come From Biden’s Trip to Europe | World In :60 | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What do you expect to come from Biden's trip to Europe? Why was Putin critic, Alexei Navalny, sentenced to nine more years in prison? Will China's worst passenger jet crash in years derail President Xi's re-election? Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.</p><p><strong>First, what do I expect to come from Biden's trip to Europe?</strong></p><p>I expect to see a hell of a lot of unity from all of the Europeans. He's going to Poland. Of coursethe Polish government has... they've got 2 million refugees already from Ukraine sitting in Poland. And they're also among the most assertive in terms of more sanctions against the Russians. Particularly like cutting off energy, for example. I think Biden's going to try to bridge that up with the Europeans and wants to be seen as a strong ally that's leading this process. I expect it's going to be one of his better trips so far. There's no question, because there is so much alignment on the Russia issue.</p><p><strong>Why was Putin critic, Alexei Navalny, sentenced to nine more years in prison?</strong></p><p>I guess I'm surprised it wasn't longer, frankly. I mean, he is sitting in a penal camp outside of Moscow. The Russian government is already getting hit left, right, and center for Ukraine. Not a lot of people are talking about Navalny, though I am right now. This has been the leading opposition member in Russia, who very courageously got on a plane and flew back to Russia, knowing he was clearly going to be arrested and probably tortured. And the Russians just don't care. It is impunity. That's what we're seeing from the Russians. We're going to see from the Russians and there's very little to be done for Navalny right now, except to talk about him and think about him, because of what he's doing for the Russian people and for all of us really.</p><p><strong>Will China's worst passenger jet crash in years derail President Xi's re-election?</strong></p><p>Who writes this stuff. It's not like people are voting for President Xi. I mean, it's a dictatorship. And he does have strong support from the population. But leaving that aside, the big challenges for Xi Jinping right now are more about zero-Covid and whether or not his policy is going to be a serious, serious disruption for the average people on the ground in China. As well as just how badly his friendship with President Putin is likely to play out and will that lead to backlash against China. My friend, Kevin Rudd, the former Australian prime minister, and more importantly, one of the top China watchers out there, actually thinks that if the Russia issue goes badly, that Xi Jinping could be close to a coin flip for getting his third term. I was shocked. I mean, I think there's a risk, but I was surprised he thought it was that high. Something to be watching going forward.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>European &amp; US leaders resolute as threat of Ukraine war grows</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-europe/european-us-leaders-resolute-as-threat-of-ukraine-war-grows</link>
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<pubDate>Sat, 19 Feb 2022 17:11:58 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>carl bildt</category>
<category>in 60 seconds</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>volodymyr zelensky</category>
<category>munich security conference</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>kamala harris</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>GZERO Europe</category>
<description>Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden, is joined by Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media, to provide perspective on the Ukraine crisis at the Munich Security Conference.</description>
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<media:credit>youtu.be</media:credit>
<media:text>Ukraine War Threat Looms As European &amp; US Leaders Show Unity In Munich | Europe In :60 | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden, is joined by Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media, to provide perspective on the Ukraine crisis at the Munich Security Conference.</p><p><strong>Carl Bildt:&nbsp;</strong>This is the most dramatic conference that I think every one of us has experienced. I mean, there seems to be significant probability of war breaking out in Europe within days. We have the Ukraine president, we'll see if he will come during the day, but we have an assortment of European leaders and vice president of the United States. And everyone is discussing, can anything more be done to prevent war? And what really do we do if it breaks out?</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:&nbsp;</strong>And it's kind of funny. The theme of the conference this year is helplessness. And when I flew in, I'm like, "That's a horrible theme for the conference." But actually, as it plays out, it's starting to feel a little bit more on target.</p><p><strong>Carl Bildt:&nbsp;</strong>Yeah. But a lot of sort of resolute speeches here, a lot of cohesion among Europeans, across the Atlantic. If war breaks out, the world will change.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:</strong> It will. I think, and I'm quite surprised that Zelenskyy is not staying in Kyiv. I hope he brings an extra suitcase or two. But I mean, there is no question. The one good piece of news is that I've never seen the NATO Alliance this cohesive, frankly, in terms of the way that they're responding to this challenge.</p><p><strong>Carl Bildt:</strong> And the same applies to Europeans.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:</strong> Absolutely.</p><p><strong>Carl Bildt:&nbsp;</strong>Where there have always been significant divisions on how you deal with Russia. And some have taken a more benevolent view of Russia. But what might happen is, of course, that Mr. Putin is going to confirm some of the darkest predictions of where Russia is heading.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:&nbsp;</strong>But if there is a silver lining in all this is that the Swedish-American partnership, as you see, remains resolute as ever.</p><p><strong>Carl Bildt:&nbsp;</strong>Well, so far.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:&nbsp;</strong>Well, I mean, you know?</p><p><strong>Carl Bildt:&nbsp;</strong>Yeah. Can't get everything.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:&nbsp;</strong>I mean, we've had a bunch of breakfasts. Let's put it that way.</p><p><strong>Carl Bildt:</strong> Too, too true.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:</strong> Yeah.</p><p><strong>Carl Bildt:</strong> Okay.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:&nbsp;</strong>Very good.</p><p><strong>Carl Bildt:</strong> Off from Munich.</p><p><strong>Ian Bremmer:</strong> Off from Munich.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Europe and US plan harsh measures if Russia takes action against Ukraine</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-europe/europe-and-us-plan-harsh-measures-if-russia-takes-action-against-ukraine</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 01 Feb 2022 12:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>nato</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>russia ukraine war</category>
<category>in 60 seconds</category>
<category>carl bildt</category>
<category>vladimir putin</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>russia sanctions</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>GZERO Europe</category>
<description>Are Europe and the US really aligned when it comes to reckoning what the Russians might be up to towards Ukraine? Are we aligned across the Atlantic? Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden, shares his perspective from Europe this week from Brussels.</description>
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<media:text>Europe &amp; US Plan Harsh Measures if Russia Takes Action Against Ukraine | Europe In :60 | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden, shares his perspective from Europe this week from Brussels.</p><p><strong>Are Europe and the US really aligned when it comes to reckoning what the Russians might be up to towards Ukraine?</strong></p><p>Well, first, we don't really for certain know what Russia is up to. The military preparations for an invasion are there. There's no question about that. But exactly how he wants to handle this politically is somewhat uncertain. He has made demands. He's put down the gauntlet against the West in a way that is absolutely extraordinary. So exactly how this will end, we don't know.</p><p><strong>Are we aligned across the Atlantic?</strong></p><p>I think we are. There are always some people on this side, in Europe, who have some doubts about some of the measures, but I'm quite certain that if there is an invasion, if there's a major military operation of some sort, a military aggression of any sort against Ukraine, there will be unity, and you will see fairly harsh measures or very harsh measures imposed on Russia with highly detrimental effect to development of the Russian economy for years to come.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>The US and EU further talks on technology governance</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/cyber-in-60/the-us-and-eu-further-talks-on-technology-governance</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvreqnrehfw407lqp3os61lz</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 01 Oct 2021 11:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>marietje schaake</category>
<category>tech regulation</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>technology</category>
<category>ai</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>data privacy</category>
<category>trade and technology council</category>
<category>cybersecurity</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>semiconductors</category>
<category>data governance</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>cyberspace</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>trade</category>
<category>european commission</category>
<category>Cyber in 60 Seconds</category>
<description>The Trade and Technology Council brought together high-level US &amp; EU officials in a long-anticipated meeting to reach conclusions about a shared governance agenda for tech-related issues like AI, data, semiconductors, and foreign direct investments. Marietje Schaake, International Policy Director at Stanford&apos;s Cyber Policy Center, Eurasia Group senior advisor and former MEP, shares her insights.</description>
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<media:text>The US and EU Further Trade and Technology Talks | Cyber In :60 | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Marietje Schaake, International Policy Director at Stanford's Cyber Policy Center, Eurasia Group senior advisor and former MEP, discusses trends in big tech, privacy protection and cyberspace:</p><p>Hello, and welcome to the new Cyber In 60 Seconds. My name is Marietje Schaake, and you're finding me at the Democracy Forum in Athens. So, from my hotel room, I'm looking back at the Trade and Technology Council that took place in Pittsburgh this week.</p><p>For those who missed it, this gathering brought together high-level officials from the Biden administration and the European Commission. It was a long-anticipated meeting that was supposed to reach conclusions about a shared governance agenda for tech-related issues like AI, data, semiconductors, and foreign direct investments. But the Trade and Technology Council was also expected and hoped to mark a new start after very difficult years across the Atlantic. I think we all remember the years when President Trump was still in the White House. And thankfully, the August fallout and French anger did not end up pouring cold water over the events. Although, the general sentiment in Europe that the honeymoon weeks are over is widely shared.</p><p>The conclusions of the Trade and Technology Council actually read more like an agreement on the agenda for the next couple of years, rather than tangible actions and conclusions. Tony Gardner, the former US Ambassador to the EU actually remarked that reading them, he figured the fact that the meeting took place at all was a result to mark. But with low expectations, the only way seems up, and there is work being planned in no less than 10 working groups, focusing on green tech standards and SMEs.</p><p>And developments that I'm going to watch are trade rules such as sharing information on dual-use export controls, but also FDI screening. The coordination on semiconductors, despite respective programs to develop domestic industries. Data governance, including access for academics. But without the privacy, because that issue is negotiated separately. And then of course, the question of aligning and governing AI in line with democratic values and respect for human rights. Between now and the next meeting, it will be interesting to watch how the tensions between the EU, the US, and China may unfold and whether the EU and the US will converge as part of a larger democratic alliance, but also which domestic legislative initiatives may go on and unfold that could actually impact the agenda of the next Trade and Technology Council in a year.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Do Euro warriors need Captain America?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/do-euro-warriors-need-captain-america</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvreqnljhfv807lqvw1td5js</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 30 Sep 2021 21:52:34 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Willis Sparks</dc:creator>
<category>nato</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>strategic autonomy</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>Should Europe continue to rely on the US for its defense and military strategy? Or is it time for a declaration of independence?</description>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Should Europe depend on the United States for its defense, as it has done since the end of World War II? Or do changing times demand that Europe develop an independent military capability? In other words, does Europe need "strategic autonomy?"<br></p><p>This debate, which began in the Cold War's early days, is now heating up again across Europe.</p><p><strong>What is "strategic autonomy"?</strong> It's the ability to exert military power abroad without help. For that, you need more than just lots of troops willing and able to fight. (EU countries in NATO already have <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/f14c3e59-30bb-4686-8ba3-18ff860647e7?emailId=6152e7ae87fd250004616cb8&amp;segmentId=13b7e341-ed02-2b53-e8c0-d9cb59be8b3b">1.26 million troops</a> in service.) You also need the equipment and trained personnel to move large numbers of your soldiers and all their equipment by air or sea to sometimes far-flung places. You need state-of-the-art air defense systems. You need seamless communication to ensure your forces are working in harmony. From the founding of NATO in 1949 until today, Europe has relied on the US military to provide these things.</p><p><strong>Who wants Europe to have this power?&nbsp;</strong>France is the EU's loudest hawk. It's the one European country with an ability (even if it's limited) to project power outside Europe. Even before then-president Charles de Gaulle pulled France <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://otan.delegfrance.org/Archive-Letter-from-President-Charles-de-Gaulle-to-President-Lyndon-Johnson-on">out of NATO's command structure</a> in 1966, French officials have called for a European foreign and defense policy that's independent of Washington. (France rejoined in 2009.) It's needed, they say, to properly defend European (cynics would say French) interests in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.</p><p><strong>Why might other Europeans start to like this idea?</strong> The end of the Cold War removed the Soviet threat to Western Europe, easing fears that American muscle might be needed to defend the continent itself. And since then, US presidents have given Europeans ample reason to doubt that Washington is a dependable ally. Let us count the ways:</p><ul><li>George W. Bush invaded Iraq despite strong European objections.</li></ul><ul><li>Barack Obama dithered on the Arab Spring and Syrian civil war, both of which proved crucial for Europe in the form of a migrant crisis in 2015-16.</li></ul><ul><li>Donald Trump questioned the value of US alliances in general and NATO in particular.</li></ul><ul><li>President Joe Biden is now the latest US leader to emphasize the need to focus more on China and less on Europe and the Middle East. The <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/what-s-macron-s-game-plan?utm_source=eurasia+group+signal&amp;utm_campaign=ad04f1da90-email_campaign_2021_09_23_11_04&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_e605619869-ad04f1da90-134306173">dustup with France</a> over the newly announced security pact with Australia and the UK is the latest example. <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.npr.org/2021/08/16/1028132837/anger-and-consternation-from-europeans-watching-afghanistan-fall-to-the-taliban">European anger</a> that Biden botched the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan hasn't helped.</li></ul><ul><li>Europeans know they have no idea where US politics is headed next.</li></ul><p><strong>Why hasn't Europe embraced "strategic autonomy" already? There are several reasons:</strong></p><ul><li>Defense is expensive. Most European countries are still happy to have Americans help pay for it.</li></ul><ul><li>Many Eastern Europeans, mindful of Russian aggression against Ukraine, still fear the Kremlin and want the military superpower to back their security.</li></ul><ul><li>Germany, Europe's lead economy, remains deeply reluctant to send its soldiers into combat missions abroad or to accept the costs and risks likely to follow French-led interventions in other regions.</li></ul><p><strong>So, does this debate have a future?&nbsp;</strong>Probably, because the world is changing in ways that favor greater European strategic independence over time. The UK, a longtime defender of strong transatlantic defense ties, has left the EU. China's continued rise will intensify pre-existing US and European differences over how to respond. The possibility that Trump — or someone with a similarly transactional view of alliances — could come back to the White House means Europeans can't ever be totally confident in US commitments.</p><p>All these realities will bolster the arguments of those who want a more militarily robust Europe, one that can eventually become a more equal partner with the US and follow a more independent path.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Looking ahead to a post-Merkel Europe</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/looking-ahead-to-a-post-merkel-europe</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvreqichhfeg07lqdwesnng0</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 27 Sep 2021 20:33:04 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>germany</category>
<category>politics</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>angela merkel</category>
<category>italy</category>
<category>mario draghi</category>
<category>elections</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>emmanuel macron</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>olaf scholz</category>
<category>france</category>
<category>european leadership</category>
<description>Ian Bremmer&apos;s Quick Take: Thought I&apos;d talk a little bit about Germany and Europe. We just had elections in Germany. In Germany, what we&apos;re seeing is strong support for centrism. This is a government that will be weaker because the leadership will be weaker. And because whether or not it&apos;s Olaf Scholz or Armin Laschet, and we won&apos;t know that for several weeks as the coalition building occurs, even though Scholz is most likely, either one of them with a three-party coalition will be much weaker on the European and the global stage than Merkel has been.</description>
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<media:text>Ian Bremmer: Looking Ahead to a Post-Merkel Europe | Quick Take | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:</strong></p><p>Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here. Happy week to all of you and thought I'd talk a little bit about Germany and Europe. Because of course, we just had elections in Germany, 16 years of Angela Merkel's rule coming to an end - by far the strongest leader that Germany has seen post-war, Europe has seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union. And indeed in many ways, the world has seen in the 21st century. Xi Jinping, of course, runs a much bigger country and has consolidated much more power, but in terms of the free world, it's been Angela Merkel.</p><p>Now what we see from the election is a population that's generally content, not because Merkel's party did so well. In fact, they didn't. The CDU only came in second with 24% of the vote. The Social Democrats actually won it, almost 26% of the vote. But as frequently we see in Germany, it's broad coalitions. The interesting thing though, and the reason I say the Germans generally happy is because it's a centrist vote. It is a pro-establishment party's vote. The extreme parties on the right and the left actually loss support, particularly the Alternatives for Deutschland, the Euro skeptic, EU skeptic, anti-migrants, much more overtly nationalist party, actually lost about three points. They're down to about 10% now. And that's a big deal because in the story in the world and democracies over the past decade has been populism growing, anti-establishment sentiment growing, people believing that the countries, their governments don't really represent them, don't reflect their interests well. And as a consequence, they want to break things. Certainly, we're experiencing that in the United States. We're seeing it in Brazil to a degree. It's happening even in a place like Canada and the UK and France, but not in Germany.</p><p>In Germany, what we're seeing is strong support for centrism. This is a government that will be weaker because the leadership will be weaker. And because whether or not it's Olaf Scholz or Armin Laschet, and we won't know that for several weeks as the coalition building occurs, even though Scholz is most likely, either one of them with a three-party coalition will be much weaker on the European and the global stage than Merkel has been.</p><p>The takeaway is a lot of political continuity and stability in Germany, but weaker German leadership internationally. What does that mean? Well, for Europe, I mean, France of course, Macron has a very strong interest in being seen as the leader of Europe, but his interests are not aligned with a lot of the other Europeans. You saw that with the announcement of the recent US-UK-Australia, defense pact. France wants to be an Indo-Pacific power while the Americans increasingly aren't comfortable with him having that role and the EU doesn't really want to play along.</p><p>From the EU position, from the position of almost all the other countries inside Europe, not the UK, but the UK isn't in Europe anymore, they see the Indo-Pac region as an area of commercial interest, of industrial interest, of technology interest, markets, but absolutely not one where they want to play from a security perspective. And so the French government is trying to push the EU to develop this strategy. And he doesn't have a lot of support. He's trying to get them to develop a independent European defense capability, but most of the Europeans are perfectly happy being in NATO and they don't want to spend more on defense, even when the Americans tell them to for the preexisting group, they certainly don't want to do it for a new questionably effectiveness of an on its own EU force. They don't want to take leadership on the security side. So for all of those reasons, the French won't be as powerful.</p><p>The Italians have a great government. Super Mario, Mario Draghi, who is running a sort of technocratic government with almost all the parties in the country supporting him. It means lots of reforms in a time of surplus. It's fantastic for Italy for a couple of years, but it's Italy and it won't last long. And when it goes away, you'll have another succession of weak governments and weak prime ministers and it's a smaller economy than Germany and France. And their levels of diplomacy internationally are much lower than those of either of the other two countries.</p><p>So what that really tells you is individual European governments are going to matter less, which would be a problem for Europe if there wasn't an EU super structure, but there is. So what really is happening is the EU is going to matter more. Brussels is going to matter more in areas of their competence, on the environment, on trade, on tax policy, on technology, data, privacy. We're going to be all spending more time in Brussels.</p><p>That's my view. The restaurants suck. It's not a very interesting city. I'm sorry. It's a nice place, but we are going to be spending more time there. I certainly am. Anyway, that's it for me. Hope everyone's doing well. Be good. Talk to you soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>The US-EU honeymoon is over</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/quick-take/the-us-eu-honeymoon-is-over</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvreqbmzhewe07lq5q1muabl</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 20 Sep 2021 20:30:08 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>aukus</category>
<category>france</category>
<category>us-france relations</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>australia</category>
<category>australia-pacific</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>ian bremmer</category>
<category>g7</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>indo-pacific</category>
<category>quick take</category>
<category>united kingdom</category>
<category>g20</category>
<description>Ian Bremmer&apos;s Quick Take: You have seen the fallout from the US announcement of this new defense pact with the Australians and the United Kingdom called AUKUS. And of course, the Chinese are not enormously happy about this, because it is a military plan to put more American material in their backyard. But the more interesting and salient point for the headlines is that the French government was absolutely incensed. So, what&apos;s going on here? Why are the allies having such difficulty?</description>
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<media:text>Ian Bremmer: The US-EU Honeymoon is Over | Quick Take | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:</strong></p><p>Hi everybody. Happy Monday. Ian Bremmer here with your Quick Take. Plenty going on between the United States and its allies. You have seen the fallout from the US announcement of this new defense pact with the Australians and the United Kingdom called AUKUS. That's great, always like USMCA, we take the acronyms, and we try to find a way to make it comprehensible. And of course, the Chinese are not enormously happy about this, because it is a military plan to put more American material in their backyard. And the day after the Chinese announced formerly that they wanted to apply to the CPTPP, which is the major trade deal that the Americans initially were the architect of and then under Obama said, "No, we can't get it done." And then Trump pulled out. That's unfortunate and long-standing and not surprising. And China won't be able to get in, in all likelihood, because it's a heavy lift, even though Vietnam did make it, but state capitalism and TPP doesn't really work very well together.</p><p>But the more interesting and salient point for the headlines is that the French government was absolutely incensed. So, what's going on here? Why are the allies having such difficulty?</p><p>One obvious point that I've heard directly from Paris is that the French government disliked and mistrusted Trump a lot more, but it's precisely because their expectations with Biden were higher, that they wanted to send a much more sharp and direct message. Under Trump, the ambassador never was recalled from the United States. I mean, certainly the relationship in many ways was dysfunctional. In part, the French were walking on eggshells when there was summitry because they just didn't know what Trump might actually do. And in part it was more strategic misalignment. So, you saw the French trying to lead an anti-Trump group in the EU on trade, which is certainly not where the French are today, vis-à-vis the United States.</p><p>But they were very surprised. They had had ongoing meetings with the United States specifically on defense coordination in the Pacific. Most of the EU has very little interest in the Pacific. The French are more interested on the national security side. Some of that's competitive. After the US and Russia, the French are the third-largest arms exporter in the world. So, it matters to their GDP, their bottom line, but also, they have territories in the Pacific. They're actually the closest neighbor to Australia in a couple of directions. The island of Réunion, for example, is part of France. So, unlike say Germany, the French really do see the Indo-Pacific as a place that is important to them. And the Americans had been asking/telling the French that they wanted more coordination and more support, particularly against China on the national security side, through NATO, through the EU, on trade, on export restrictions, on cyber, as well as on military support.</p><p>And indeed, the French had been doing joint patrols with the Americans and the Australians. So, they were particularly angry that they were cut out, both economically as well as an ally. And I would argue the latter is more important to them than the former. I mean, the deal itself was some 60 billion euros, which is major, but only about eight billion of those euros were going to be spent in France itself. Most of it was in Australia and elsewhere. And also, the French had been playing hardball on the negotiation of the contract. The contract was already agreed, but they wanted lots of European contractors, subcontractors to be involved in the deal, and that was unacceptable to the Australians as well as the Americans. So, there were difficulties in the contract, but the Americans and the Australians didn't just shift the contract. They also announced a new defense pact that was the US, Australia, and the United Kingdom. And France was no part of it.</p><p>France only learned of it afterwards. Indeed, France had a suspicion that things were going badly. They found out a week and a half ago that several Australian Cabinet ministers were in Washington negotiating with the Americans. The French didn't get a heads-up, which is unusual given the Defense Minister and given the fact that there was coordination on lots of other issues there. So, the French immediately get in touch with the Americans on the day and ask for phone calls, both with state and with defense. At the secretary level, they hear nothing back. In fact, they hear nothing back until Wednesday when the deal is announced in the Australian press. So, in other words, the French actually found out not only that they lost their submarine contract, but also that there was a new defense pact and France wasn't going to be a part of it.</p><p>That was really ... I mean, particularly Macron, who I mean his level of ego didn't seem perhaps to drive so many headlines when Trump was around for four years, but absent that, very clear that embarrassing Macron is something he takes very, very personally. So as a consequence, the ambassadors from the US and Australia were pulled. From the UK, not pulled, interestingly, and in part that's because they weren't as directly involved in the deal, and also because the relationship is itself so broken. A bit like Trump, but also what one French diplomat said is, "Look, if the dinner's horrible, you don't complain to the dishwasher. You complain to the chef." A particularly French way of describing their level of pique with just what is going on right now.</p><p>I do think it's very clear that the honeymoon between the United States and the Europeans is over. It's one thing for Trump's "America First", which most of the Europeans saw as an unusual and exception to the rule in the United States, but they didn't think it was a more structural shift. Now it's becoming more clear that a greater level of unilateralism, a greater focus on internal American affairs is baseline for what they should expect, irrespective of how experienced the diplomatic hands are, how oriented they may be, the domestic constraints are more significant and the relative level of indifference of how American allies respond if they're not seen as providing something transactionally important to the United States.</p><p>The US, of course, is much more powerful. So, to a greater degree, it can get away with that. And I've also heard from French leaders in the past couple of days that they certainly intend, they want to still work with the Americans on Indo-Pacific strategy. They want to still be seen as an ally. They don't want to throw NATO away, but this is going to make it harder to coordinate on a bunch of issues. And certainly, the G20 coming up in Rome is going to be much more publicly dysfunctional than the G7 was in Cornwall.</p><p>So that's a little bit for me. That's kind of a deep dive into the politics behind AUKUS. And I do expect that the French ambassador, at least to Washington, and probably to Canberra, will be quietly back in relatively short order, let's say weeks, not months, but the damage will last for longer. That's it for me. Talk to you all soon.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>US-EU tensions aren&apos;t just a Trump problem</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/us-eu-tensions-aren-t-just-a-trump-problem</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrepubdhdfz07lqjx8tc3i3</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 01 Sep 2021 21:05:46 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Gabrielle Debinski</dc:creator>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>us allies</category>
<category>foreign policy for the middle class</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>us-eu travel</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>The EU has advised member states to restrict travel from the US because of America&apos;s rising COVID infection rate. While that may be true, it could also be a retaliatory move: Brussels is furious that the Biden administration has refused to allow most Europeans to enter the country for 18 months. What does this development tell us about the current state of US-EU relations?</description>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>"Many European diplomats are already infatuated with Biden," a US-based analyst <a target="_blank" href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/06/transatlantic-relations-after-biden-s-first-100-days-pub-84472">wrote&nbsp;</a>in May about the so-called revival of the transatlantic relationship. Well, that assessment seems to have aged as well as an overripe banana.<br></p><p>This week, the EU <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/eu-travel-restrictions-intl-hnk/index.html">advised</a> member states to restrict travel from the US because of America's rising COVID infection rate. While that may be true, it could also be, at least in part, a retaliatory move: <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/EUAmbUS/status/1432828880797249536">Brussels</a> is furious that the Biden administration has refused to allow most Europeans to enter the country for 18 months, despite the bloc now having vaccinated more adults than the US.</p><p>Indeed, this tiff between Brussels and Washington is just the latest development amid ebbing relations between the two.</p><p><strong>A leader the world respects?&nbsp;</strong>Since moving into the White House, Biden has portrayed himself as the anti-Trump: reliable, sincere and a loyal ally. Where his predecessor made a habit of berating and belittling allies, Biden has <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/joe-biden-donald-trump-new-campaign-ad-world-leaders-2019-12">said</a> "we need a leader the world respects," vowing to bolster bruised relations, particularly in Europe.</p><p>Yet, while Biden talks a nice game, many of his policies over the past seven months have in fact further irked some European allies, who say that the US president's <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-07/what-is-biden-s-foreign-policy-for-the-middle-class">"foreign policy for the middle class"</a> — focused primarily on domestic issues like infrastructure and containing COVID — does not feel materially different from Trump's <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://time.com/4309786/read-donald-trumps-america-first-foreign-policy-speech/">"America First"&nbsp;</a>approach.</p><p>This was certainly the dominant view in big European capitals in recent weeks, as the US embarked on a go-it-alone approach in <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-reacts-bidens-afghanistan-withdrawal/">Afghanistan</a>. Allies with skin in the game complained of being left in the lurch as the US pursued a unilateral evacuation plan. Germany and the UK, two of the biggest <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/the-graphic-truth-whose-troops-are-still-in-afghanistan">contributors&nbsp;</a>to the NATO mission there, were particularly incensed, with the UK parliament issuing what some called an <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-the-papers-58264267">"unprecedented rebuke"</a> of a US president.</p><p><strong>What's Biden's game plan?</strong> Biden's short-term agenda is domestically focused, and one that he hopes will help the Democrats win midterm elections next year and keep control of the US Congress. Ending "forever wars," a view <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/23/politics/polls-afghanistan-biden/index.html">popular&nbsp;</a>with US voters, is part of that agenda.</p><p>But in failing to consult with allies on <em>how</em> and <em>when</em> to pull out, Biden took a big gamble because now he needs his European partners to make progress on other key issues like climate change, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/article/joe-biden-data-transfers-privacy-shield-eu-transatlantic/">data sharing,&nbsp;</a>and China. (To date, Biden has found little support in pushing back hard against China from the EU, which, broadly speaking, has pursued<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2233"> engagement with Beijing.</a>)</p><p>Indeed, getting the Europeans on side might get tougher. For instance, it could be harder for the US to continue <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/article/us-and-japan-g7-block-deal-on-coal/">dragging its feet&nbsp;</a>on climate change if Germany goes greener under a left-leaning government after next month's election. Similarly, France's President Emmanuel Macron has long been pushing the EU to pursue a defense policy <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/macron-says-european-defense-autonomy-nato-membership-are-compatible-2021-06-18/">independent</a> from the US, which is only going to be an easier sell after the Afghanistan debacle.</p><p><strong>Are COVID restrictions the new steel tariffs?&nbsp;</strong>Like with the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-55132425">US-China rivalry,&nbsp;</a>which devolved into tit-for-tat shenanigans, perhaps the EU is enforcing new COVID restrictions to get back at Washington. But Brussels is unlikely to do anything to <em>really</em> punish the Americans, because it needs the US — badly.</p><p>The US is the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/united-states/">EU's largest</a> trade and investment partner by a long shot, with more than 164,000 EU companies relying on exports to the US. The EU also depends on America's military might: "It would take decades for Europe to build up its conventional and nuclear military forces to compensate for what the United States and NATO currently contribute to the continent's security," Germany's defense minister <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-eu-defence-anne/europe-still-needs-u-s-nato-for-security-german-defence-minister-idUSKBN27X13J">said recently</a>, pointing to the fact that the US accounts for 100 percent of NATO's missile defense capabilities, while much of Europe's own military hardware is in bad shape.</p><p><strong>"Being likeable is not the same as being a good ally,"&nbsp;</strong>Edward Luce writes in the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/bfe24854-3bf2-4ada-b3a2-778b4707c31f"><em>Financial Times.&nbsp;</em></a>Biden is certainly testing the limits of that approach. But will it backfire? Given the EU's reliance on the US, probably not.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Europe in &quot;shock &amp; disbelief&quot; over US withdrawal from Afghanistan</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-europe/europe-in-shock-disbelief-over-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrepiuohcmu07lqw8a8awln</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 19 Aug 2021 15:45:42 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>europe</category>
<category>us allies</category>
<category>carl bildt</category>
<category>in 60 seconds</category>
<category>afghanistan</category>
<category>refugees</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>afghanistan withdrawal</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>GZERO Europe</category>
<description>What has been the European reaction to US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and rapid Taliban takeover, without coordinating with allies? Are EU nations prepared to accept Afghan refugees? Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden, shares his perspective from Europe.</description>
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<media:text>Europe in “Shock &amp; Disbelief” Over US Withdrawal From Afghanistan | Europe In :60 | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden, shares his perspective from Europe:</p><p><strong>What has been the European reaction to what's happening in Afghanistan?</strong></p><p>Well, I think shock and disbelief is the appropriate expression for it. Shock and disbelief over the Americans just cutting out running, although you might argue that we should have seen it coming. And then, of course, a lot of long-term questions that will play out over time. Can the United States be relied upon, right or wrong? That question is going to linger for quite some time.</p><p><strong>Are the EU nations prepared to accept Afghan refugees?</strong></p><p>Well, the priority at the moment must of course be those that have worked for our forces, our development efforts, our embassies, and to get them out. As otherwise, Europe already has a substantial number, as a matter-of-fact Afghans are the number one nation when it comes to regular migration. Last year our figures for 2020 was 34,000 coming in. There are nearly 150,000 of them in Germany, there are 30,000 in Sweden. This is to compare with single digit thousand numbers in the US. So there will be an enormous effort to try to help displaced refugees in the region, and then the somewhat more managed global handling of the refugee issue will be called for.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>European travel to US still not allowed, EU asks why</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-europe/european-travel-to-us-still-not-allowed-eu-asks-why</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 11 Aug 2021 22:04:27 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>in 60 seconds</category>
<category>travel</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>carl bildt</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>us-eu travel</category>
<category>covid-19 vaccine</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>lockdown</category>
<category>international travel</category>
<category>us vaccine rollout</category>
<category>covid-19</category>
<category>GZERO Europe</category>
<description>What&apos;s the issue of traveling between the US and Europe? Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden, shares his perspective from Europe.</description>
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<media:text>Europeans Irritated That Travel to US Still Not Allowed | Europe In :60 | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden, shares his perspective from Europe:</p><p><strong>What's the issue of traveling between the US and Europe?</strong></p><p>Well, that's a subject of irritation at the moment because Europe has opened up to American visitors, but America is still closed. And this, in spite of the fact that if you look at vaccination rates, they are higher in Europe, in the EU today, than they are in the US. So, if they send an alignment between Washington and Brussels on these issues in the next few weeks, there's a risk of the Europeans saying, "Well, if you've got to stop us, we're going to stop you." And I'm not quite certain that would be a good development.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Merkel&apos;s White House visit will have symbolism and substance</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-europe/merkels-white-house-visit-will-have-symbolism-and-substance</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 15 Jul 2021 11:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>GZERO Staff</dc:creator>
<category>european union</category>
<category>united kingdom</category>
<category>carl bildt</category>
<category>us allies</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>angela merkel</category>
<category>covid-19</category>
<category>science-tech</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>us-german relations</category>
<category>delta variant</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>germany</category>
<category>covid-19 variants</category>
<category>in 60 seconds</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>pandemic</category>
<category>GZERO Europe</category>
<description>Why is the United Kingdom opening up and what&apos;s happening in the rest of Europe? What&apos;s going to be an outcome of the Angela Merkel visit in the White House? Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden, shares his perspective from Europe.</description>
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<media:text>TITLE PLACEHOLDER | Europe In :60 | GZERO Media</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden, shares his perspective from Europe:</p><p><strong>Why is the United Kingdom opening up and what's happening in the rest of Europe?</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, my personal view is that there's an element of complacency in Europe and elsewhere. The Delta variant is spreading rather fast. We'll see an increase in infections in a number of countries. Remains to be seen how this will be handled.</p><p><strong>What's going to be an outcome of the Angela Merkel visit in the White House?</strong></p><p>Well, to some extent, it's a farewell visit. But I think there's going to be a lot of substance because the policies advocating and personified, to a certain extent by Angela Merkel, are going to be the policies that are going to be dominating Europe in the years ahead. Be that Russia, be that China, be that transatlantic relationship. So, symbolism certainly, but a lot of substance as well.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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