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<title>Lindsay  Newman — GZERO Media</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/author/lindsaynewman</link>
<description>Dr Lindsay Newman is a columnist for GZERO Media. She is is an experienced geopolitical risk expert and thought leader - a storyteller of geopolitics. Most…</description>
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<lastBuildDate>Thu, 26 Feb 2026 17:04:37 +0000</lastBuildDate>
<item>
<title>The US writes its own rules</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/the-us-writes-its-own-rules</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 26 Feb 2026 17:04:37 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>middle-east</category>
<category>iran</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>israel</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>india</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>History doesn’t often repeat itself, but it does rhyme. Such appears to be the case, as the United States appears again to be readying for military action against Iran.</description>
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<media:credit>Andrew Leyden/ZUMA Press Wire</media:credit>
<media:text>President Donald Trump returned to the White House from Camp David.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>History doesn’t often repeat itself, but it does rhyme. Such appears to be the case, as the United States appears again to be readying for military action against Iran. Just as last summer when US and Iranian officials held five rounds of nuclear talks only to find a deal evasive, this month has brought a series of indirect negotiations between the sides bearing little progress.</p><p>As another <a target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg1vd95nl9o"><u>round of talks</u></a> takes place today, preparations are also well underway for non-diplomatic pathways. A second US carrier group is swiftly approaching the region, suggesting that some form of military collision with Iran is increasingly inescapable.</p><p>What fresh US strikes on Iran may mean for the Middle East remains open-ended. The consequences could be limited, or they could be far-reaching and reorient the region’s trajectory. As President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> continues to hold his cards close to the vest, his<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://rollcall.com/factbase/sotu/transcript/trump-sotu-20260224/"> <u>State of the Union remarks</u></a> were pointed, “I will never allow the world’s number one sponsor of terror – which they are by far – to have a nuclear weapon.”</p><p>Even still, one development playing out elsewhere, in the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean, has been revealing. The US has found itself in a dust-up with the United Kingdom over the use of a shared military base on the island of Diego Garcia for any forthcoming operation targeting Iran. Trump has <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/19/trump-us-chagos-islands-deal-diego-garcia-uk-starmer.html"><u>seesawed</u></a> on whether to back the UK’s transfer control of the Chagos Islands – a colonial era possession that includes Diego Garcia – to Mauritius. Last week, Trump urged UK Prime Minister <strong>Keir Starmer&nbsp;</strong>not to “give away” the Chagos Islands, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/19/trump-us-chagos-islands-deal-diego-garcia-uk-starmer.html"><u>arguing</u></a> the US may need its strategic base if talks with Iran collapse.</p><p>The back and forth is indicative of a pattern of Trump era geopolitics: <em>the US is moving forward on its own terms, with its own agenda, however it likes, whether traditional allies are on board or not.</em></p><p><strong>An association of one.</strong> Under Trump, the days of the US building a “coalition of the willing” are gone. This is not an administration that seeks support first and acts under the guise of shared responsibility. This is an administration that acts first and does not bother with seeking forgiveness later.</p><p>Last fall, the US undertook a concerted pressure campaign on Venezuela. What began as targeted strikes on alleged narcotraffickers operating in and around the Caribbean expanded into strikes in the eastern Pacific and later to oil tanker seizures off the coast of Venezuela. All the while, a ring of sanctions and tariffs tightened on Caracas’s leadership, alleged narcotraffickers and countries importing Venezuelan oil. In the early hours of Jan. 3, US military forces raided the compound of Venezuelan President <strong>Nicolás Maduro&nbsp;</strong>and extradited him to New York to face US federal charges on allegations of narco-trafficking and corruption.</p><p>No widespread reporting of the operation has indicated that the US administration conducted consultations with regional actors before moving on Maduro. This was a solo extraction mission conducted by US intelligence and military forces under the banner of US national security.</p><p>Many have pointed to the administration’s recent<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf"> <u>National Security Strategy</u></a>, as evidence of US desire for supremacy over the Western Hemisphere. In this view, the Trump administration’s actions in Venezuela – and now, efforts to squeeze the Cuban regime – reflect an intention to create a sphere of influence in its neighborhood. The US is acting autonomously within its region out of special interest.</p><p>But Trump 2.0’s foreign policy ambitions stretch beyond the Americas. From strikes in Nigeria to Syria, and now<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cy7jnvdzpr7o"> <u>a hospital boat for Greenland</u></a>, the US administration is pursuing its agenda invited, accompanied, or otherwise across the globe.</p><p><strong>Long live unilateralism.&nbsp;</strong>If there is one space where the US continues to engage in some form of multilateral dialogue, it is European security. Yet even there, one does not need to scratch too far below the surface to find that on the major issue atop Europe’s list of anxieties – Russia’s regional ambitions – the US is pursuing an America First strategy.</p><p>Two years after the US established the Ukraine Defense Contact Group under the Biden administration, Washington opted to remain an unaffiliated non-participant in the 2025 European-led Coalition of the Willing, a group of countries who’ve agreed to deploy troops to Ukraine to ensure any future peace deal.</p><p>As Europe holds conversation after conversation about how to continue funding Ukraine’s war efforts, the US is steadfast that more military aid will not be forthcoming. Instead, the White House is pursuing a course of critical-mineral agreements, bilateral talks with Ukrainian and Russian leadership, and peace negotiations that emphasize what Trump wants: a quick end to the conflict, and a deal for future economic influence and resources.</p><p>Which brings us back to Iran.</p><p>As the US undertakes the largest military build-up in the Middle East since 2003, the administration is considering its options. While Trump recently hosted Israel’s Prime Minister <strong>Benjamin Netanyahu</strong> and is reportedly speaking with a select group of regional leaders, the consultancy largely stops there.</p><p>This is something Trump’s domestic critics miss when they say he should be focusing on the affordability crisis at home and not adventurism abroad. Trump likes that he has expansive foreign policy-making authority. It is much harder to move the US economy and make eggs and milk cost less than moving a carrier group or two.</p><p>If Trump ultimately greenlights action against Iran, the decision will almost certainly rest on his administration’s calculus alone – a mix of real and perceived national security threats as well as a healthy dose of the US president’s own worldview of how the situation should unfold. Whether military escalation fits the image of Trump as a<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/remarks/2025/01/the-inaugural-address/"> <u>peacemaker and unifier</u></a> is part of that equation.</p><p>Earlier this month at the Munich Security Conference, US Secretary of State <strong>Marco Rubio</strong><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/02/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-at-the-munich-security-conference"> <u>captured</u></a> this administration’s posture to the world bluntly. “We in America have no interest in being polite and orderly caretakers of the West’s managed decline,” he said.</p><p>The message was a clear warning to European allies, framed as an opportunity: join this fight, or stand aside. Either way, the US’s engagement with the world will be on its own terms.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Will Trump ever be satisfied?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/will-trump-ever-be-satisfied</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2026 16:43:12 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>greenland</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>denmark</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>nato</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>When Donald Trump suggested early last year that the United States had set its sights on acquiring Greenland, the response from Europe was to treat the incoming president like an unconventional uncle – worthy of a chuckle and a general sentiment that this was just Trump being Trump.</description>
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<media:credit>Laurent Gillieron/Pool via REUTERS</media:credit>
<media:text>Switzerland&apos;s Federal President Guy Parmelin speaks with US President Donald Trump prior to a bilateral meeting in Congress Centre on the sideline of the 56th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, WEF, in Davos, Switzerland, Wednesday, January 21, 2026.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When Donald Trump suggested early last year that the United States had set its sights on acquiring Greenland, the response from Europe was to treat the incoming president like an unconventional uncle – worthy of a chuckle and a general sentiment that this was <em>just Trump being Trump.</em></p><p>It’s hard to blame European diplomats for their initial view. Trump spent much of the post-election, pre-inauguration period rolling out a wish list that included retaking control of the Panama Canal, removing the dividing line between the US and Canada, and renaming the Gulf of Mexico.</p><p>A year on, European leaders are no longer laughing. Trump’s ambitions for Greenland are the talk of the town this week at the World Economic Forum in Davos. In an address to the forum today, Trump said, “We need [Greenland] for strategic national security and international security. This enormous, unsecured island is actually part of North America … That’s our territory.”</p><p>Yet, even as Trump calls for negotiations to begin, Europe still appears no closer to asking the right question on Greenland. If it’s not comedy, is Trump’s goal truly about US national security? Or, and more worrying for Europe, is this really just a “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/18/trump-considering-buying-greenland"><u>large real estate deal</u></a>?”</p><p><strong>A sobering realization.&nbsp;</strong>In recent weeks, a new reality has settled across Europe. The removal of Venezuelan President <strong>Nicolás Maduro&nbsp;</strong>after months of escalation and economic threats forced Europe to sober up. If the US could extract Maduro from his own bedroom in the cover of night, what would Trump be willing to try to fulfill his Greenland aspirations?</p><p>With Europe once again forced to adapt its approach to Trump in the wake of Venezuela, it’s hoping the question that needs answering on Greenland relates to its strategic relevance to the global landscape. If this is about NATO security, then Europe is prepared to meet the challenge. Denmark and Greenland’s leaders traveled to Washington earlier this month and agreed to establish<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/15/us/politics/white-house-greenland-meeting.html"> <u>a high-level working group</u></a> to explore a common way forward on American security considerations. In recent days, various European NATO allies have sent additional military personnel to demonstrate capability and interest in defending Greenland against external threats (Russian, American or otherwise).</p><p>The quagmire for Europe, though, is that Greenland is not only (or even not really) about US national security. Trump is not (just) looking to build new military bases or send more US troops to Greenland. A defense pact between Denmark and the US, signed in 1951, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.history.com/articles/1951-agreement-that-allows-us-military-presence-in-greenland"><u>already&nbsp;</u></a>provides for that. Nor is Trump (just) looking for Europe to contribute more for its collective defense. He has already pushed them to raise their defensive commitments to 5% of their GDPs. And he is not (just) looking for enhanced access through the Arctic Circle. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea sets out a vast framework for commercial and military passage.</p><p><strong>A stark reality.&nbsp;</strong>Even as the president <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115911344443637897"><u>says&nbsp;</u></a>the US’s national security – along with the world’s – is at “stake,” the security dynamics are at best only part of the matter. And at worst, they represent a pretext for what Greenland has always been about: a large real estate deal.</p><p>Given this, the question everyone in Europe should be asking themselves is: what will satisfy Trump?</p><p>The president is a<a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-the-us-president-plays-a-trump-card-on-ukraine"> <u>predictable negotiator</u></a>. His worldview always leads him to deploy a competitive approach (I win-you lose) in which he anchors negotiations by naming a price early on. By doing so, he limits the conversation, frames reality and forces other alternatives off the table. In that sense, Greenland <em>is</em> up for grabs. Everyone is talking about Greenland because Trump has <em>put it</em> up for grabs, even if he does not ultimately succeed in acquiring it.</p><p>In response, Europe, Denmark and Greenland need to be thinking about what will feel to Trump like ownership without involving actual ownership. In Ukraine, for example, Trump has shown a genuine interest in mineral diplomacy. Despite his suggestion at Davos that US enthusiasm is not about rare earths, Greenland has proven copper, lead and zinc reserves that will intrigue him, especially at this moment when mastering the “electric stack” is so critical to 21st century geopolitics (for more on this, see Eurasia Group’s <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/risk-2-overpowered"><u>Top Risk</u></a> #2: Overpowered). In 2008, the US Geological Survey <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.usgs.gov/publications/geology-and-assessment-undiscovered-oil-and-gas-resources-east-greenland-rift-basins"><u>found&nbsp;</u></a>Greenland also appears to have significant, yet untapped petroleum reserves. The assessment found that the eastern part of the island contains roughly 31.4 billion barrels of oil and hydrocarbons. That’s considerable potential, if extractable. By comparison, the US – the world’s <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2026/01/17/why-trump-wants-venezuela-oil/88108165007/"><u>top&nbsp;</u></a>oil producer – holds nearly the same volume of proven crude reserves. Trump may find co-ownership of these potential petroleum resources – a co-branding exercise – feels a lot like the US “getting its hands” on Greenland.</p><p><strong>A historic prize.&nbsp;</strong>Europe is waking up to the gravity of Trump’s interest in Greenland. An invasion of Greenland remains a very remote-probability but high-impact event. In fact, Trump seemingly took the use of force off the table in his Davos remarks. Even still, the US administration will continue to apply a ring of pressure on the parties involved, pulling all the various economic and security levers at its disposal in a concerted effort to drive concessions from Denmark, Greenland and NATO.</p><p>While Trump was still speaking at Davos, the European Parliament <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/21/european-lawmakers-suspend-us-trade-deal-amid-greenland-tariff-tensions.html"><u>suspended&nbsp;</u></a>the approval of a trade deal the EU had reached with the US last year. European leaders are also weighing retaliatory tariffs and a <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/article/the-eu-magical-mystery-trade-weapon-other-options-donald-trump/"><u>“bazooka” option</u></a> of labeling the US behavior “economic coercion.” But these considerations signal that European leadership may still be asking (and answering) the wrong question. It’s not how to barter trade for security. The question Trump is posing is about legacy. In his most direct message to European partners, Trump told the Davos audience: “You can say yes and we will be very appreciative. Or you can say no and we will remember.”</p><p>Acquiring Greenland would represent the largest land addition to the US in its history. For the president to be satisfied, legacy looks an awful lot like a Trump version of the Louisiana Purchase – which would be one for the history books.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Viewpoint: Trump wants a Europe more like US</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/viewpoint-trump-wants-a-europe-more-like-us</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 17 Dec 2025 16:34:53 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>us european relations</category>
<category>trump administration</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>With the release of its National Security Strategy, the Trump administration has telegraphed how the US intends to engage with allies, and what it expects from them.</description>
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<media:credit>REUTERS/Alexander Drago</media:credit>
<media:text>US President Donald Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Finland&apos;s President Alexander Stubb, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen pose for a family photo amid negotiations to end the Russian war in Ukraine, at the White House in Washington, D.C., USA, on August 18, 2025.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>– By Lindsay Newman</em></p><p>As his second term came into view, US President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> put the world on notice that the administration many had been preparing for may not be the one it would be getting. Promising a “golden age of America,” Trump laid out<a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-a-trumpian-storm-is-brewing"> <u>an ambitious agenda</u></a>. “America First” would no longer be an isolationist story, but an aspirational one. As he surveyed the globe – looking for deals and angles – his neighborhood, Europe, and anywhere in the world could face scrutiny.</p><p>Early signs were hard to miss. As president-elect, Trump<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.axios.com/2025/01/15/denmark-greenland-trump-call"> <u>suggested</u></a><u>&nbsp;</u>the US should buy Greenland, even though its leaders said it's not for sale. On his first day in office, Trump<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/expert-context-whats-going-on-with-trump-and-the-panama-canal/"> <u>said</u></a> the US should “take back” the Panama Canal, and<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/20/us/politics/trump-tariffs-executive-order.html"> <u>threatened</u></a> to tariff some of his closest allies and largest trading partners, Canada and Mexico. Beneath it all hovered a major question: What does it mean to be a friend of the United States during the second Trump administration? As the months unfolded, and the US zigzagged in its support for Ukraine, the answer grew more complicated.</p><p>Now, with the release of its<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf"> <u>National Security Strategy</u></a>, the administration has telegraphed how the US intends to engage with allies, and what it expects from them.</p><p><strong>Charting a new course</strong></p><p>When it comes to engaging with other countries, the NSS embraces “the nation-state” as the fundamental political unit of this geopolitical landscape. “Sovereignty-sapping” international institutions are out; new, transactional “burden-sharing networks” are in. Allies are expected to shoulder more responsibility, and use economic tools to align incentives.</p><p>In this landscape, of sovereign nations acting in alignment, the US will deploy a new “soft power.” Although not defined, the document suggests that soft power replaces a heavy reliance on foreign aid with trade and investment-focused relationships. This is already taking shape – from the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund Agreement and the US’ pledge of £150 billion ($204 billion) in inbound investment for the United Kingdom, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-suspends-technology-deal-with-uk-ft-says-2025-12-16/"><u>partially paused</u></a> this week over US concerns<em>&nbsp;</em>of a lack of progress by the UK.</p><p>The NSS also redraws the global map. The Western Hemisphere finds itself at the top of the list of priorities, complete with the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. By contrast, other regions, including Europe, have been given second billing.</p><p>That shift has landed hard in Europe. The<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-12-10/trump-despises-europe-we-cannot-ignore-that-anymore"> <u>narrative</u></a> that has settled is that Trump hates Europe, the US is closing shop, and the continent is on its own. This bad news comes at a moment when Europe views itself as being on the frontlines of global trends that will loom large in 2026: populism, migration pressures, untenable fiscal burdens and resource constraints. European leaders will say that they are doing the best they can amidst an adverse set of circumstances, and the existential threat of Russia that has dominated headlines for nearly four years.</p><p>Even as it holds up the weight of the world, facing as<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cn81x8py3j5o"> <u>NATO Secretary Mark Rutte said last week</u></a> “the scale of war our grandparents or great-grandparents endured,” Europe finds itself being chastised: <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/14/us/politics/vance-far-right-germany-munich-afd.html"><u>first by</u></a> Vice President <strong>JD Vance</strong> at the Munich Security Conference and now by the NSS itself. Years from now, European diplomats and government officials will recall where they were when they first heard the phrase “civilizational erasure.” It was a bell that tolled and echoed again and again, the sound of Europe losing its most trusted friend.</p><p><strong>A US prescription</strong> <strong>for Europe</strong></p><p>Like many first impressions of the Trump administration, not everything may be as it first seems. The message the US has sent to Europe is not one of abandonment, but an expectation to get with the program. The strategy’s view is that Europe’s problems run deeper than declining GDP share and security risks. According to the NSS, Europe has introduced policies that undermine political liberties and national sovereignty. Open-border migration has put governments under strain. Censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition, demographic pressures, and too much regulation have made Europe “unrecognizable.”</p><p>Yet each of these conditions should be very familiar, at least to the US audience. Trump is diagnosing Europe with the same “ailments” he claims to be treating at home. Just like the so-called “course correction” the Trump team is administering for the US, Europe needs to correct course, too.</p><p>The Trump administration’s prescription for Europe is to be more like the US. Close your borders, defend your national culture, back innovation, and encourage patriotic parties. Do that, the NSS argues, and the US will remain a committed partner – so long as it also advances US national interests. As the documents says plainly: “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe to help us successfully compete.”</p><p>The ongoing negotiations over a Ukraine peace plan are a test of how Europe will respond to America’s new posture. As the US looks to achieve an “expeditious cessation” of the conflict and to reestablish regional stability, including with Russia, Europe faces hard choices. Will it demand a central role? Will it accept Trump’s brand of transactionalism over idealism? The US has sent its message. Over to you, Europe.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>A Trump Doctrine of heavy footsteps and many levers</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/a-trump-doctrine-of-heavy-footsteps-and-many-levers</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2025 16:28:04 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>america first</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>trade</category>
<category>drug cartels</category>
<category>immigration laws</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>Ten months into the second administration of US President Donald Trump, the most pressing foreign policy puzzle is not about the Middle East, the war in Ukraine or even relations with China.</description>
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<media:credit>Credit: Anna Rose Layden/POOL via CNP</media:credit>
<media:text>United States President Donald J Trump awaits the arrival Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud at the White House in Washington, DC, USA, on November 18, 2025. Featuring: Donald J Trump Where: Washington, District of Columbia, United States When: 18 Nov 2025</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ten months into the second administration of US President <strong>Donald Trump</strong>, the most pressing foreign policy puzzle is not about the Middle East, the war in Ukraine or even relations with China. The question top of mind right now is what is going on in the Western Hemisphere, and does it reveal an emerging Trump Doctrine?</p><p>It is fair to say that Trump’s 2025 engagement with its regional neighbors was not on the market’s radar when he assumed office in January. There were, however, indicators of what was to come. In December 2024, Trump cast a spotlight on Panama, pledging to retake control over the canal to prevent the US from continuing to be “ripped off.” Trump also spoke early on about targeting regional trading partners Canada and Mexico with tariffs. In the case of Canada, these threats and musings about the possibility of a “51st state” contributed to then-Prime Minister <strong>Justin Trudeau</strong>’s resignation in January.</p><p>Trump’s longstanding commitment to curbing regional migrant flows and “executing the immigration laws” of the US offered another clue of what lay ahead. From the travel ban issued in the first week of Trump 1.0 in 2017, to appropriations for the southern border wall to dispatching US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents on the streets in 2025, Trump and his team care deeply about enforcement, who is allowed to enter the country, and who is permitted to stay in the country.</p><p>The administration’s Day 1 executive order on foreign policy built on these indicators and set forth a vision for Trump 2.0: “From this day forward, the foreign policy of the United States shall champion core American interests and always put America and American citizens first.” The “America First” isolationism of Trump’s first term was replaced with an activist, no-stone-left-uncovered approach.</p><p><strong>A neighborhood unsettled</strong></p><p>Despite transparency about its foreign policy ambitions, the way in which the current US administration has gone about pursuing its policy objectives in the Western Hemisphere – designating drug cartels as terrorist organizations, striking alleged narcotraffickers operating in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, moving an advanced aircraft carrier into waters off of Venezuela, reopening a military base in Puerto Rico, among other measures - has surprised many and rankled regional leaders and US allies.</p><p>In recent days, Colombia announced it would suspend intelligence sharing with the US after months of tension with the Trump administration. Colombia is not alone. Close allies in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have also halted intelligence sharing over the Trump administration’s tactics in the region and human rights concerns.</p><p><strong>Drawing on doctrinal ghosts</strong></p><p>To make sense of these regional developments and their fallout, analysts and watchers have called upon the Monroe Doctrine. Some have gone so far as to label the administration’s foreign policy approach the “Donroe Doctrine.”</p><p>Although pithy and appealing, the 1823 Monroe Doctrine was primarily a response to external (European) interference in Western Hemisphere affairs. Pursuant to the doctrine, the American continents would not be open to future colonization, and the US would consider any violation of this tenet to be “dangerous to our peace and safety.” It is from the Monroe Doctrine that the concept of “spheres of influence” was derived. Europe would be for Europe. Existing European colonies were also for Europe. Everything else in the Western Hemisphere was for itself, with the caveat of a “connected” and invested US standing readily by.</p><p>It would be naïve to disregard all analogies to the current landscape. The Trump administration is aware of the deep trade, economic, and security relations between countries in the region and China and Russia. In 2025, China is now South America’s top trading partner and a major regional investor. The US administration’s forthcoming National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy will both reportedly highlight the need for greater attention to the region in light of these global dynamics.</p><p>Even still, there are limits to the dispositive power of the Monroe Doctrine. The recent US overtures in the Western Hemisphere are not principally animated by the threat of external interference. Rather than the original Doctrine, the Trump administration’s strategy in the region better recalls its 1904 Roosevelt Corollary set forth by then-President <strong>Theodore Roosevelt</strong>. According to the Roosevelt Corollary, in the event of “chronic wrongdoing” or “impotence” in the Western Hemisphere it was the US’s responsibility to serve as an “international police power” for the region. The Roosevelt Corollary empowered American vast interventionism based on conditions within the Western Hemisphere itself, regardless of any external threat.</p><p><strong>The Trump Doctrine</strong></p><p>In a similar manner, the second Trump administration is also directing a message to the region. The US will not tolerate hostile neighbors, unfettered narcotics, and unregulated migration flows. And over the long term, the US intends to achieve better access to regional markets and natural resources like rare critical minerals to support US domestic markets and its economic agenda. To these ends, there will be force – “police power” - (war exercises, military buildups, targeted strikes), but the administration will also leverage all the tools in its portfolio from economic (tariffs, bailouts, aid suspensions and sanctions) to political (visa restrictions, renaming water bodies). Posting last week on social media, Secretary of War <strong>Pete Hegseth</strong> explained: “The Western Hemisphere is America’s neighborhood and we will protect it.”</p><p>This is the developing Trump Doctrine: use all available means at any time to champion core American interests, and always put America and American citizens first. As defined, in each case, by the administration. But unlike Roosevelt, who aspired to “walk softly and carry a big stick,” the Trump administration has heavy footsteps and will be pulling many levers.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Gaza got a peace deal, but Ukraine shouldn’t get its hopes up</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/gaza-got-a-peace-deal-but-ukraine-shouldnt-get-its-hopes-up</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 09 Oct 2025 16:03:29 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>It took longer than expected.</description>
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<media:text>Israel&apos;s Netanyahu meets Ukrainian President Zelensky in Jerusalem</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It took longer than expected. The president had hoped to have the Israeli hostages held in Gaza home by his inauguration. But nine months into his second administration, President<strong> Donald Trump</strong> appears to have the first phase of his deal for an end to the conflict in Israel-Gaza. If he did not usher it in himself, he played an outsized role in willing it into a reality. In the end, after all the destruction between Israel and Hamas, escalation between Israel and Iran, operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as the Houthis in Yemen, and a pivotal strike in Qatar last month, it was the <em>Trump backstop</em> – the threat of “all hell breaking loose” - that propelled negotiations forward.</p><p>The coming days, weeks, and months will be fraught with uncertainty and breath-holding in the Middle East. Even if initial commitments are met to release hostages and for Israel to pull back troops from Gaza, there are no guarantees of a reconcilable peace. But it appears more possible than at any point over the past twenty-four months that the devastating chapter of October 7th and its aftermath may soon be over.</p><p><strong>Europe take heed</strong></p><p>Across Europe, the time for introspection is only beginning. Models of the US administration’s foreign policy objectives and strategy (and of Trump) must be updated in the wake of recent developments. What will potential success in the Middle East mean for the war in Ukraine? European capitals would do well to quickly undertake scenario and contingency planning.</p><p><strong>There are two main possibilities.</strong> In the first, enlivened by progress in the Middle East, the US administration circles back again to European stakeholders. Trump campaigned in 2024 on ending the war in Ukraine on “Day 1.” Just days ahead of taking office for a second time, the incoming president extended the timeline to the first six months, perhaps in recognition of the task ahead. In his inaugural address Trump suggested: “My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier. That’s what I want to be: a peacemaker and a unifier.” An early misfiring with Ukrainian President <strong>Volodymyr Zelensky</strong> at the White House in February over a rare earths agreement was smoothed over. After Trump met with Russian President <strong>Vladimir Putin</strong> in Alaska in August, there was momentum, if not optimism, for continued communication. A potential follow-up trilateral session between Trump, Putin and Zelensky was considered for the fall. Always a shrewd observer of the man, Zelensky<a target="_blank" href="https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-to-nominate-trump-for-nobel-peace-prize-if-he-brokers-ceasefire-with-russia/"> <u>reportedly</u></a> pledged to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace prize should he broker a ceasefire with Russia.</p><p>Despite these headline making developments, a growing uneasiness in Europe has slowly taken root. Indicators of the US direction of travel vis-à-vis Ukraine, if read correctly, appear to be pointing in a discouraging direction. During the United Nations General Assembly last month,<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115255130298104593"> <u>the president posted</u></a> on Truth Social that after getting to know the economic and military situation, Ukraine could win the war against Russia and regain all of its territory. The sentiment had an immediate buoying effect for a European audience that had long (privately) suspected that territorial losses as part of any peace settlement was inevitable. The message of possible victory, however, was quickly followed with a backhanded assertion that it would be through the European Union, Europe, and NATO that Ukraine would regain territorial integrity.</p><p>And herein lies the second possibility ahead: that the US administration no longer needs a victory in Ukraine. That the US administration accepts the limits of personal diplomacy. That no trilateral summit ever materializes. That with a quick resolution beyond reach, the Trump administration looks to quietly back out and <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-100-days-of-promises-kept"><u>close the door</u></a> on its peace negotiation efforts.<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-says-impetus-peace-ukraine-after-putin-trump-summit-has-been-exhausted-2025-10-08/"> <u>According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister&nbsp;</u><strong>Sergei Ryabkov</strong></a> this week, “Anchorage's powerful momentum in favor of agreements has been largely exhausted.”</p><p><strong>Narrowing interest for Ukraine</strong></p><p>None of this is to say that the US is likely to curtail all support and overtures for Ukraine. After multiple incursions over NATO airspace by Russian drones in recent weeks, a deal for Ukraine to purchase a limited set of US Tomahawk missiles appears increasingly likely.<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/08/14/americans-views-of-trumps-decision-making-us-policy-toward-russia-ukraine-war/#is-the-u-s-providing-too-much-or-too-little-support-to-ukraine"> <u>According to polling</u></a>, Americans (including Trump’s Republican base) continue to support Ukraine and see the US as having a responsibility towards helping the country. Yet, there has also been a large decline in belief that Russia’s invasion poses a major threat to US interests. Trump is asking himself the same question. How much does Ukraine mean to the US? How much would peace in Ukraine benefit the US, and perhaps more pointedly, benefit the president?</p><p>An end to the conflict in Israel raises the specter of Saudi-Israel normalization, wider regional integration, greater market access for the US in the region and in Trump’s loftiest dreams both a Nobel Peace Prize and<a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-the-world-plays-two-truths-and-a-lie"> <u>Gaza-a-Lago</u></a>. The end of war in Ukraine looks to Trump like good business for Europe, even existential for Europe, but increasingly less so for the US. Against these shifting dynamics there is a principle coming into focus: US interests are narrowing. The administration is willing to continue to provide financial and capability resources to Ukraine, but these will not be paid for by the US.</p><p>The Trump backstop may not be coming for Europe.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>A special visit for a special relationship</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/a-special-visit-for-a-special-relationship</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2025 15:03:26 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>As US President Donald Trump travels to the United Kingdom this week, there is an unnerving sense in which the ghost of Christmas past will be greeting the potential ghost of Christmas yet to come.</description>
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<media:credit>REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque/File Photo</media:credit>
<media:text>U.S. President Donald Trump holds a letter from Britain&apos;s King Charles as he meets with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., February 27, 2025.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As US President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> travels to the United Kingdom this week, there is an unnerving sense in which the ghost of Christmas past will be greeting the potential ghost of Christmas yet to come. The former imperial power meets with the current global leader at a moment when both countries face an expanding set of domestic and global tests.</p><p>Each will be hoping this visit provides an opportunity to convey bonhomie and unity against a landscape that is anything but friendly and settled. All eyes will be on this heavily choreographed visit.</p><p><strong>It’s coronation day</strong></p><p>In February, just a month into his second term, Trump hosted UK Prime Minister<strong> Keir Starmer&nbsp;</strong>at the White House. In separate remarks following those sessions, Trump and Starmer extolled the “special relationship” between the US and UK, declaring that it remained “very special” and “true.” The leaders<a target="_blank" href="https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-press-conference-keir-starmer-united-kingdom-february-27-2025/"> <u>discussed</u></a> the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and efforts to bring peace by standing “side by side.” The most telling moment, the know-your-audience moment, came when Starmer handed Trump a letter from His Majesty King Charles. Opening it, Trump found it bestowed an invitation to Windsor Castle for a historic second state visit. The invite landed as it was intended, with Trump visibly tickled and honored.</p><p>That was February, when the return of Trump was still fresh and the UK, Europe, and the world had so many questions about the future of US engagement. Already at that moment, some of the answers were coming into view. Trump had imposed 10% tariffs on Canada and Mexico – two of the US closest trading partners - and an additional 10% tariff on imports from China. Prime Minister <strong>Justin Trudeau&nbsp;</strong>was a casualty of Trumpenomics, stepping down after it became clear there were no knots he could tie himself in that would appeal to Trump. Also, by February, the Trump administration had taken steps to dismantle the US Agency for International Development and six decades of US foreign aid policy. The retrenchment in American international funding and soft power raised alarms for food and security programs, health missions, climate and sustainability initiatives.</p><p>On security, just days after Starmer handed the King’s letter to Trump, the US president and Vice President <strong>JD Vance</strong> met with Ukrainian President <strong>Volodymyr Zelensky</strong> in the Oval Office. The televised conversation devolved from cordial to contentious over the course of 45 minutes. An anticipated deal for Ukrainian natural resources went unsigned, and Zelensky was told he held “no cards.” Within a week, the US sided with Russia on a series of United Nations resolutions marking the third anniversary of the invasion. Europe was put on notice that the US commitment to Ukraine would be elusive.</p><p><strong>We’re going to the palace</strong></p><p>Seven months on, with Trump arriving in the UK this week, those early February trendlines have only accelerated. On trade, US partners, allies, and nearly everyone else have been “liberated” and hit with individualized “reciprocal” tariffs. On foreign aid, the administration has stayed its course. Just last week the US Supreme Court granted the Department of Justice’s application allowing the administration to continue withholding billions of appropriated foreign aid funding. Inn Ukraine, the conflict appears no closer to a resolution. After innumerable conversations, a Trump-Putin summit in Alaska, and much European handwringing, Russian drones incurred Polish air space last week.</p><p>The Trump administration’s ambitions to redefine the US global footprint is a familiar proposition in the UK, which has struggled to find its footing in the aftermath of Brexit. According to policy documents like the <em>Integrated Review Refresh 2023</em>, successive British governments have<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/641d72f45155a2000c6ad5d5/11857435_NS_IR_Refresh_2023_Supply_AllPages_Revision_7_WEB_PDF.pdf"> <u>sought</u></a> to position the UK for a more active posture on the world stage<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://post.parliament.uk/geopolitics-and-global-trade-how-can-the-uk-navigate-an-increasingly-volatile-situation/"> <u>amidst increasing geopolitical volatility</u></a>. Thus far, these ambitions have borne few tangible results.</p><p>Even as their global trajectories diverge, Trump’s arrival in the UK comes at a moment of domestic precariousness for both countries. From migration pressure to untenable budgets, divisive partisanship, fluctuating political attitudes and concerns over crime, these Transatlantic partners face a long and overlapping list of maladies.</p><p><strong>The visuals are meant to be televised.</strong></p><p>Against this backdrop, ambitions will be low for Trump’s visit. Neither side is likely to wade into sensitive domestic dynamics like the recent removal of the UK ambassador to the US, or American political violence. Announcements of a nuclear energy accord and promises of UK technology investments by US AI and chip private sector leaders will be the main takeaways, but are really window dressing. What is called for is a show of allegiance, an optical win at a time when other global leaders have themselves been busy.</p><p>Collegial images of China’s<u>&nbsp;</u>President <strong>Xi Jinping</strong>, <strong>Vladimir Putin</strong>, and Indian Prime Minister<strong> Narendra Modi&nbsp;</strong>at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) earlier this month grabbed widespread attention. A slew of analysis argued that this was the<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/ng-interactive/2025/sep/06/xi-jinping-vladimir-putin-kim-jong-un-optics-new-world-order"> <u>new world order</u></a>, evidence that the powerful “rest” were joining forces against “the West.”</p><p>While it is not, in fact, the case that India, China, Russia (+ North Korea and Iran) are now locked into an exclusive alliance that will by magnetism bring others into their realm, countries are hedging their bets. With all the grandeur of a royal visit, Trump will be seeking out the spotlight and looking, once again, to rewrite the script.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Opinion: US in the driver’s seat</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/us-in-the-drivers-seat</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2025 15:18:24 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>foreign policy</category>
<category>political risk</category>
<category>trade</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>politics</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>Nearly six months into President Donald Trump’s second term, the most notable export from the United States in 2025 has been political risk</description>
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<media:credit>(Credit Image: © Jonathan Alcorn/ZUMA Press Wire)</media:credit>
<media:text>Malibu, California, USA: A pickup truck with a President Donald Trump decal and decorated in U.S. Flags drives on Pacific Coast Highway on July 4th in Malibu, California.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nearly six months into President <strong>Donald Trump</strong>’s second term, the most notable export from the United States in 2025 has been political risk. As was evident from the earliest executive orders on<a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/america-first-policy-directive-to-the-secretary-of-state/"> <u>foreign policy</u></a> and<a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/america-first-trade-policy/"> <u>trade policy</u></a>, the administration has set for itself an ambitious, aspirational agenda. From Greenland to Iran, Ukraine and Brazil, the Trump 2.0 wish list is expansive and numerous. The world has been put on notice that<a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-a-trumpian-storm-is-brewing"> <u>nowhere will go unconsidered</u></a>.</p><p>Even still, with six months under their belt, US allies and adversaries continue to be confounded by the pace of dynamics coming their way. The influx of volatility is largely treated as an unknown variable to be built into strategic conversations and planning. An imperative to hold space for the “known unknowns” that will require navigation and policy response. The United Kingdom’s 2025 National Security Strategy released in June, for instance, labels this moment “an era of radical uncertainty” with no “stable equilibrium” in sight.</p><p>For the US administration, dysregulation is part of the end game. The intention is keeping global stakeholders on their toes, or as the White House<a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-continues-enforcement-of-reciprocal-tariffs-and-announces-new-tariff-rates/"> <u>calls it</u></a>, “Keeping America in the Driver’s Seat.”</p><p><strong>Security sphere uneasiness</strong></p><p>Without a clear sense of what lies ahead, the working global response is to brace for impact, hope the ripples emerging from the US are not directed your way, and when they are, to do the best to ride the waves. In Europe, where the memory of US Vice President <strong>JD Vance</strong>’s remarks at this year’s Munich Security Conference still brings a shudder, there is a fleeting sense of relief at surviving June’s NATO Summit unscathed. A commitment to invest 5% of annual GDP on core defense requirements and defense- and security-related spending by 2035 feels like a fair price to keep the US engaged. After a decade or so wandering through the wilderness and being chided by successive US presidents about fair dues, European capitals find themselves buoyed by a reenergized NATO alliance.</p><p>With the hurdle of the NATO Summit cleared, Europe returns its focus to another summer offensive in Ukraine. Initial optimism that a change in the US administration might provide exit ramps for the war has subsided. Trump’s own promises to bring the war to an end quickly have been frustrated by the realities of an intractable conflict and the limits of relational diplomacy. Amidst an intensifying Russian missile and drone campaign of late, Europe is not sure which messaging from Washington is noise and which is signal. Reporting that the US Defense Department would halt the delivery of air defenses and artillery to Ukraine as part of a stockpile review had a chilling effect. Trump’s subsequent critical comments of Russian President <strong>Vladimir Putin</strong> at a US Cabinet meeting, alongside plans to sell weapons bound for Ukraine to NATO allies, reduced some of Europe’s anxiety. But each time Europe thinks it is doing a two-step with Trump only to find itself facing radical uncertainty, the known unknowns leave a mark.</p><p><strong>A cresting trade tidal wave</strong></p><p>Alongside security, the other major wave rippling around the globe this summer is a trade tidal wave. Just under the wire, the Trump administration extended implementation of so-called “reciprocal tariffs” from July 9th to August 1st. According to the White House, the further pause was<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-continues-enforcement-of-reciprocal-tariffs-and-announces-new-tariff-rates/"> <u>based on</u></a> “information and recommendations from senior officials, including information on the status of trade negotiations.” Thus far, a “Liberation Day” target of 90 deals in 90 days has resulted in trade agreements with the UK and Vietnam and a temporary trade truce with China (even as it has imposed new export restrictions on rare earths).</p><p>While the Trump team will be privately disappointed by the number of deals achieved to date, it is unlikely to be discouraged. As the world looks to interpret what comes next on trade, global stakeholders would do well to hold firm to a couple of framing principles. The first is that the US administration is<a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/opinion-tariffs-bring-a-bitter-aftertaste-to-europe"> <u>ideological on trade</u></a>, and has positioned these ideals at the center of its current-term ambitions.</p><p>The second grounding principle is that the president views himself as dealmaker-in-chief. He prefers to anchor negotiations by naming a price early in the process: in this case the Liberation Day reciprocal tariff rates. The anchoring position may not be where negotiations land, but it has the effect of shifting perspectives and forcing behavioral change. Europe’s 2025 NATO defensive spend commitments provide Trump with proof that this approach (plus patience) works. Likewise, Canadian Prime Minister <strong>Mark Carney</strong>’s rescission of a digital services tax (DST), disfavored by the US administration, is another data point for Trump’s negotiating strategy. Canada, for its part, is being repaid for its cooperation with a renewed threat of 35% tariffs on US imports.</p><p>Given all its levers of power, the US administration has taken to a tariff-letter-writing campaign. South Korea, Brazil, Philippines, Malaysia and a dozen or so others have been the recipients of letters notifying them of US willingness to continue its trading relationship but on new terms. What gets overlooked by too narrow a focus on the latest trade threats, and viral memes suggesting “Trump always chickens out,” is that against the wider perspective the US administration has already succeeded. Whether Brazil is hit with 50% tariffs over Trump’s displeasure with former Brazilian President <strong>Jair Bolsonaro</strong>’s<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/13/kevin-hassett-brazil-tariffs-00450411"> <u>legal investigations</u></a>, whether Japan’s government falls over the precariousness that the threatened 25% tariffs have wrought, whether copper imports face 50% duties now and pharmaceuticals 200% in a year’s time or not; trade is at the top of everyone’s priorities.</p><p>The Trump administration has set a target of a new Golden Age for the American people. Through adopting an elusive approach to security expectations and defensive support, unsettling the global trade infrastructure, exporting risk, the president makes clear the US will be driving the agenda. Everyone else is sitting in the passenger seat.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Opinion: 100 days of promises kept</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-100-days-of-promises-kept</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg5q8hlvkn07lqkxs0dt2d</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 29 Apr 2025 17:06:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>trade</category>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>100 days</category>
<category>white house</category>
<category>lindsay newman</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>This week marks 100 days of the second Trump administration. Against a political timekeeping system of late that has been measured by the shelf life of lettuce (British Prime Minister Liz Truss’ seven weeks in office) and “Scaramuccis” (Anthony Scaramucci’s 10 days as White House communications director during Trump 1.0), the first 100 days of this administration feels like an anomaly.</description>
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<media:credit>REUTERS/Craig Hudson</media:credit>
<media:text>President Donald Trump gives a thumbs up as he returns to the White House on Feb. 22, 2025.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This week marks 100 days of the second Trump administration. Against a political timekeeping system of late that has been measured by the shelf life of lettuce (British Prime Minister <strong>Liz Truss’</strong> seven weeks in office) and “Scaramuccis” (Anthony Scaramucci’s 10 days as White House communications director under Trump 1.0), the first 100 days of this administration feels like an anomaly. More has been set in motion in just over three months than other US administrations have sought to accomplish in full terms. Trump 2.0 is the dog-years presidency – every day brings seven days’ worth of developments.</p><p>World leaders and the global audience are trying to adjust to so much change in such little time, but the dominant thread has been the surprises hidden in plain sight throughout these last three months.</p><h3>Border security &amp; budget cuts take center stage</h3><p>At home, the administration immediately got to work on commitments made on the campaign trail and in the latest <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://rncplatform.donaldjtrump.com/?_gl=1*1fq6u0t*_gcl_au*MTkwNDAzNDE3MC4xNzQxMTY4MDQw&amp;_ga=2.16248945.69103131.1745482626-828744511.1741168040"><u>Republican platform</u></a>. Atop the list was a mandate to reverse “open-border” immigration policies and secure the US frontier. In its “Protecting the American People against Invasion” <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/protecting-the-american-people-against-invasion/"><u>presidential action</u></a>, one of a flurry of Day 1 executive orders, Trump established the groundwork for a multipronged policy, which has included detentions and mass deportations, designating MS-13 a foreign terrorist organization, and court battles over the protected status of Venezuelan migrants as well as birthright citizenship. The approach has had a chilling effect on immigration, with <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-land-border-encounters"><u>southwest land-border encounters</u></a> down more than 90% year-on-year, according to the latest March data.</p><p>Trump’s other major domestic campaign priorities, deregulation and reigning in federal spending, have spawned a similar pace of action. <strong>Elon Musk’s</strong> work overseeing the Department of Government Efficiency has come to symbolize how the contours and shape of the US federal government have been redrawn. Last week’s <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.state.gov/building-an-america-first-state-department/"><u>announcement</u></a> by Secretary of State <strong>Marco Rubio</strong> that his department will also be overhauled – reducing jobs, shuttering “redundant” offices, and reprioritizing departmental focus – is just the latest example of a campaign throughline to reevaluate federal government spending and structure. The news comes as local governments and populations are still adapting to the shuttering of USAID, a key lever of US soft power abroad.</p><p>On domestic policy, there have been few surprises. Trump’s 2024 campaign commitments have become Trump 2.0 administration policy. Despite efforts last fall by the Trump campaign to distance itself from Project 2025, co-author <strong>Russell Vought’s</strong> selection to lead the Office of Management and Budget was a clear and present signal to all market players of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/will-project-2025-become-trumps-2-0-playbook">how expansively the plans&nbsp;</a>currently unfolding had been laid.</p><h3>Remaking America’s role abroad</h3><p>Turning to the global stage, Trump 2.0’s America First foreign policy has not been the “Make America Great Again” isolationism of Trump 1.0. Instead, from Canada to Mexico, Greenland, and Yemen, no stone is being left unconsidered or unturned. Global expectations set by the first Trump administration that foreign policy would only play second fiddle to a brighter spotlight on the domestic agenda are being updated. Trump has begun to <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/all-of-trumps-horses-and-all-of-trumps-men"><u>remake America’s role in the world in his image</u></a>, sowing a geopolitical unsettling but being transparent about the administration’s intentions – as peacemakers and trade disrupters.</p><p><strong>As a would-be peacemaker, the president had hoped to bring an efficient closure to the war in Ukraine, an ambition welcomed by those sitting in European capitals.</strong> He committed initially to ending the conflict on his first day in office but later extended the timeline to within six months. Last week’s decision by lead attaché <strong>Steve Witkoff</strong> and Rubio to pull out of peace talks in London is telling. With remaining wide gulfs between Ukrainian President <strong>Volodymyr Zelensky</strong> and Trump (even after their 15-minute tête-à-tête at the pope’s funeral this weekend), and likewise, between Zelensky and Russian President <strong>Vladimir Putin</strong>, the US administration is quickly discovering that intractability is in the details. European leadership has yet to identify an offramp to the conflict that does not include the US administration’s stewardship.</p><p>As a quick resolution does not appear imminent, the Trump administration may soon look to quietly back out and close the door on its peace negotiation efforts. Rubio acknowledged as much over the weekend, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DbgER3rJ_54"><u>saying</u></a> that “we cannot continue … to dedicate time and resources to this effort if it is not going to come to fruition.”</p><p>Any reduction in attention on Ukraine and Europe would almost certainly coincide with a ramp-up toward the Middle East, where the administration has historically had more success (e.g. Trump 1.0’s Abraham Accords).</p><p>While being a peacemaker remains a work in progress, the president has exceeded expectations as a trade disrupter over the first 100 days. Despite Trump’s constant refrain of tariffs and a four-decade commitment to seeing the US not get “ripped off,” the markets and global leadership still <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/opinion-searching-for-signals-on-liberation-day"><u>held their breath</u></a> for a targeted, gradual installation of levies. Instead, April 2, aka “Liberation Day,” introduced the world to one man’s concept of “kind reciprocity,” a benign phrase that has the potential to reshape the global trading system, financial markets, and international relationships.</p><p>The accompanying executive order provided for a 10% flat tariff on all trading partners, which went into effect earlier this month. The additional “discounted” reciprocal tariff rates to be imposed on certain trading partners were postponed for 90 days until July 9 for all except the People’s Republic of China. In the intervening weeks, markets have wobbled but are holding onto hope.</p><p>The dominant question now is what lies ahead for the next 100 days and beyond. As the “Liberation Day” announcements and maneuvers clarify, there will be more volatility to come. Even with the policy priorities and details beginning to be filled in, this is not the finishing line; it is merely the starting gun. Trump has 90% of the race still to run.</p><p>Still, the Trump administration will be pleased with the scorecard of promises kept thus far. It has planted seeds across the domestic and global landscape and will now step back to watch the garden grow. On trade, the ambition is 90 deals in 90 days. And with it, Trump assumes his most preferred role: dealmaker-in-chief.</p><p><em>Lindsay Newman is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Opinion: Searching for signals on ‘Liberation Day’</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/opinion-searching-for-signals-on-liberation-day</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg4li3l1n307mykg86kwm5</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2025 18:45:19 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>pete hegseth</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>us allies</category>
<category>signal chat</category>
<category>liberation day</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>Details of a group chat between senior administration officials that leaked last week – the so-called Houthi PC small group – provide allies, adversaries, and watchers with revealing insights into the administration’s foreign policy blueprint. Lindsay Newman explores the takeaways.</description>
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<media:credit>REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque</media:credit>
<media:text>President Donald Trump speaks from the Oval Office flanked by Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick on the day he signed executive orders for reciprocal tariffs, Feb. 13, 2025.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Now in its third month, Trump 2.0 has sustained a breakneck pace. In recent days, the administration announced 25% tariffs on automobiles, conceived of secondary tariffs for nations buying oil from Venezuela (and potentially Russia and Iran), and reiterated its interest in “getting” Greenland.</p><p>Market participants have held their breath for Wednesday – “Liberation Day” – as the administration is set to unveil global tariffs, the lynchpin of its <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/opinion-tariffs-bring-a-bitter-aftertaste-to-europe"><u>America First trade policy</u></a>.</p><p>As the zone has flooded, predicting the current administration’s next moves has become an Olympic-level sport. Details of a group chat between senior administration officials that leaked last week – the so-called Houthi PC small group – provide allies, adversaries, and watchers with revealing insights into the administration’s foreign policy blueprint.</p><h3>Reestablishing deterrence</h3><p>While campaigning, President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> was fond of saying that no wars broke out during his presidency and that the conflicts in Ukraine and Israel-Gaza would never have happened if he had been president. In the run-up to his inauguration, Trump promised to end the war in Ukraine on his first day in office (later extended to within six months). On Gaza, Trump posted on social media that Hamas would have “all hell to pay” if they did not release Israeli hostages before he was sworn in.</p><p>Whether the administration was prepared to back up these threats with action hung as a giant question mark. During his first term, Trump largely avoided large-scale security operations. The major exception was the January 2020 assassination of Qasem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force. This time, the risk of threatening “all hell” is that to establish credibility, you may have to administer “all hell.”</p><p>On March 15, the US military began conducting a series of air strikes on Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen – the operation at the heart of the group chat.</p><p>Exchanges in the chat tell us this use of force was strategic by design.<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2025/03/signal-group-chat-attack-plans-hegseth-goldberg/682176/"> <u>According to the transcript</u></a>, after Vice President <strong>JD Vance</strong> shared concerns about conducting the attacks, Secretary of Defense <strong>Pete Hegseth</strong> countered, “We are prepared to execute, and if I had final go or no go vote, I believe we should. This is not about the Houthis. I see it as two things: 1) Restoring Freedom of Navigation, a core national interest; and 2) Reestablish deterrence, which Biden cratered.” The message is clear: <em>this is not about the Houthis</em>; this is about the Trump 2.0 administration telegraphing its willingness to carry out “all hell.” The<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-puts-its-stealthiest-big-bombers-in-range-of-iran-and-yemen-43497ce0"> <u>US has reportedly</u></a> deployed B-2 bombers and cargo planes to the region as a further indicator of the administration’s apparent willingness to conduct additional strikes.</p><h3>A ledger of allies</h3><p>Hegseth’s remarks also reveal another principle of the Trump 2.0 foreign policy: Isolationism is dead, long live America First. During the first Trump administration, there was a sense that the president’s focus on rebuilding manufacturing jobs and tightening immigration meant that the US was taking its ball and going home. Now, Trump and his team are scanning the horizon, looking for angles, and from Greenland to Canada to Venezuela and Yemen,<a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-a-trumpian-storm-is-brewing"> <u>no stone is being left uncovered</u></a>.</p><p>Since Oct. 7, 2023, Houthi militants have targeted shipping assets traversing the Red Sea, depressing trade through the channel and setting off a global rerouting of trade. Trump ordered the sea lanes reopened. As laid out in the group chat, the administration sees it as the US's role and a core national interest to restore freedom of navigation. In fact, according to Hegseth, “VP: I fully share your loathing of European free-loading. It’s PATHETIC. But [US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz] is correct, we are the only ones on the planet (on our side of the ledger) who can do this. Nobody else even close.”</p><p>Much has been made of the anti-Europe tone of the conversation. Anyone sitting in European capitals will certainly be disappointed by the language and accompanying content that the US will be looking to Europe to foot its security bill. But anyone sitting in European capitals hopefully already knows to expect this. That Trump (like President <strong>Barack Obama</strong> before him and President <strong>Joe Biden</strong> after him) wants to see Europe pay more for its collective defense is not new or news. What should, however, buoy Europe is that the US still counts itself on the same side of the ledger as its Western allies <em>and</em> that it feels a responsibility – a unique responsibility – toward them. This is not a case of the US pulling up the drawbridge. This is a US administration taking aim and looking for others to help settle the bill.</p><p>There can be no doubt that following the daily turns of the US administration can leave the rest of the world gasping for air. In his second term, Trump’s true north is legacy – perhaps even a<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8bq69K-uKYM"> <u>third term</u></a>. Through a relentless drive on tariffs, secondary tariffs, sanctions, export controls, and other measures, he is further aligning national security and economic security toward an ambition of bringing revenue and investment back to the US. This is a years-long project, beginning on Liberation Day, and no three-month period can definitively judge its outcome. The administration initiated the Houthi operation to backstop its economic policy prong with a hard-power policy prong. Going forward, when threats of a “bad situation” or of bombing Iran are made unless a deal is struck, they will carry weight.</p><p>Still, Trump hopes that his “proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier.” The US is not leaving the world alone, for better or for worse.</p><p><em>Lindsay Newman is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Opinion: Tariffs bring a bitter aftertaste to Europe</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/opinion-tariffs-bring-a-bitter-aftertaste-to-europe</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg3wahlq7s07lq0ln23ln0</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 17 Mar 2025 18:33:38 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>politics</category>
<category>champagne</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>european union</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>economy</category>
<category>whiskey</category>
<category>countertariffs</category>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>European leaders caught between the rock of needing Donald Trump to help bring an end to the war in Ukraine (while they aim to beef up collective defense) and the hard place of fearing economic contraction from US tariffs are quickly realizing that nobody is having fun anymore.</description>
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<media:credit>REUTERS/Stephanie Lecocq</media:credit>
<media:text>Bottles of Champagne are seen on display for sale in a wine shop in Paris, France, on March 13, 2025.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The party ended abruptly last week, and the last bottle of European champagne may have popped.</p><p>After President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> imposed 25% tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports, US allies quickly announced countermeasures. This included a European Union plan to introduce 50% tariffs on US whiskey. Further accelerating any impending trade war, Trump responded by threatening a 200% tariff on all EU wines, champagnes, and alcoholic products. In the words of former President <strong>Thomas Jefferson</strong> as interpreted by <strong>Lin-Manuel Miranda</strong> in “Hamilton,” “Look, when Britain taxed our tea, we got frisky. Imagine what gon’ happen when you try to tax our whiskey.”</p><p>European leaders caught between the rock of needing Trump to help bring an end to the war in Ukraine (while they aim to beef up collective defense) and the hard place of fearing economic contraction from US tariffs are quickly realizing that nobody is having fun anymore.</p><h3>Lessons of a tariff man</h3><p>As Europe and others look to rebound from the latest round of the Trump administration’s trade offensive, a few misguided lessons are being drawn. The first is about Trump’s attachment to tariffs and protectionist trade policy. Many headlines in recent weeks have propelled a narrative of the Trump “whipsaw” or the view that the administration quickly U-turns on trade policy. Examples like the retreat on Colombia or the initial deferral for Canada and Mexico are frequently cited as evidence of the tendency toward reversals. What these perspectives underappreciate, however, is both how longstanding Trump’s regard for tariffs has been, and how fundamental the administration sees it to its broader policy objectives. The concession-reprieve cycle is the noise, while economic security as national security is the signal.</p><p>Trump’s zest for tariffs dates back to the 1980s and was <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/us/politics/china-trade-donald-trump.html"><u>widely written about</u></a> during his first administration. Now, this four-decade history seems to have been overtaken by disorientation and incredulity. In an interview given in 1989, Trump reportedly said “America is being ripped off … We’re a debtor nation, and we have to tax, we have to tariff, we have to protect this country.” Taking to social media last week, Trump echoed these sentiments, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114155282989654298"><u>posting</u></a>, “The US doesn’t have Free Trade. We have ‘Stupid Trade.’ The Entire World is RIPPING US OFF!!.” In short, there is <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-the-us-president-plays-a-trump-card-on-ukraine"><u>no new Donald Trump</u></a>.</p><p>But it is not just that Trump may be ideological about tariffs; it is also that he and his team have placed these beliefs at the center of their second-term ambitions. <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/america-first-trade-policy/"><u>In a Day 1 presidential action</u></a>, the administration announced that “Americans benefit from and deserve an America First trade policy.” For the Trump administration, “America First trade” means promoting investment and productivity, enhancing US industrial and technological advantages, and defending economic and national security to benefit American workers. Each of these objectives will be backed up by efforts to address unfair and unbalanced trade – tariffs and other measures – and wider economic security considerations, including reviews and investigations, with special attention given to economic and trade relations with the People’s Republic of China. The administration has laid it all out by executive action. When Trump orders the <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-the-yellow-brick-road-to-a-golden-age"><u>creation of an External Revenue Service</u></a> to collect tariffs, duties, and other foreign trade-related revenues, he plans to collect the money.</p><h3>Missed connections</h3><p>The other lesson that should be gleaned from what has unfolded in recent weeks between the US and its allies, particularly in Europe, is about a mismatch in intentions. Trump and his trade team believe that protectionist policies will restructure the global trade system in favor of US industrial and manufacturing strength. Imposing tariffs across the board on steel and aluminum is aimed at reigniting the US metals industry, whether this comes to fruition will take years to assess.</p><p>When Europe responds to industrial tariffs by targeting goods with only limited substitutability like US whiskey, the goal is to find a pain point and apply leverage. The downside of such an approach, however, is exactly what analysts, the financial market, and those targeted by US tariffs have lobbed at Trump: It will be domestic consumers that are most hurt. Will Europeans turn to the United Kingdom to replace American whiskey with Scotch? Perhaps. But the UK is no longer in the EU anyway. France, Germany, and others seem unlikely to invest in their own domestic distilling for near-term gain. Instead, Europeans will be left to pay a heftier price for whiskey or go without. Likewise, Trump’s proposed countermeasures on European champagne put US consumers in an analogous position. The US domestic wine market may be robust, but champagne can only be made in Champagne, France.</p><p>As the potential domestic impact ratchets up, US allies will likely discover that retaliation leaves a bitter aftertaste, especially for the Transatlantic relationship. This is the forcing function of tariffs that the Trump administration is hoping to see.</p><p>US presidents who came before Trump like <strong>William McKinley</strong> and <strong>Herbert Hoover</strong> found that the best tariff intentions do not always turn out as planned, instead bringing domestic price increases and economic downturns. In the current interconnected world where supply chains are truly global, the historical experience may not directly apply. Still, there is a real risk that it might. The question is, when the music stops, who is left with a seat and a glass of bubbly?</p><p><em>Lindsay Newman is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Opinion: The US president plays a Trump card on Ukraine</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-the-us-president-plays-a-trump-card-on-ukraine</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg38bhloef07lqa942cd2k</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 03 Mar 2025 21:11:41 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>politics</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>European leaders are forced to confront the reality of President Donald Trump’s “transactional” and competitive negotiation style, which prioritizes US interests above traditional alliances.</description>
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<media:credit>REUTERS/Marco Bello</media:credit>
<media:text>Playing cards depicting President Donald Trump on display in West Palm Beach, Florida, late last year.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On the 2016 campaign trail, Democratic presidential candidate <strong>Hillary Clinton</strong> was fond of repeating the truism: When someone shows you who they are, believe them. In a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nbcnews.com/video/clinton-on-trump-when-someone-shows-you-who-they-are-believe-them-746006083672"><u>particular clip</u></a> from August 2016, Clinton underscored her assessment of then-adversary and Republican presidential candidate <strong>Donald Trump</strong> by saying, “There is no new Donald Trump.”</p><p>Europe has been forced to confront this lesson once again in recent weeks. As the Trump 2.0 administration unveiled its foreign policy priorities, European leaders initially adopted a wait-and-see approach. They even held their breath for a window of opportunity around Ukraine. When Trump adjusted his ambitions to allow for a six-month timeframe to reach an agreement, after promising repeatedly on the campaign trail to end the war on his first day in office, European capitals felt buoyed that he was perhaps pursuing pragmatism.</p><p>All their cautious confidence has now left the room – only to be replaced by a rolling panic.</p><p>A period marked by Vice President <strong>JD Vance</strong> chastising Europe at the Munich Security Conference, high-level meetings between US and Russian delegations in Saudi Arabia, and Trump declaring Ukrainian President <strong>Volodymyr Zelensky</strong> a “dictator” on Truth Social has riled European allies and left them looking for solid ground. A televised White House meeting between Zelensky and Trump on Friday devolved from cordial to transparently contentious in just 45 minutes.</p><p>With no apparent points of leverage, <strong>Vladimir Putin</strong> has managed to bring the US significantly closer to Russia’s preferred position. At this weekend’s summit in London, European leaders were forced to face a familiar and devastating fact: Even an isolated Russia is capable of strategically shifting the conversation as long as Putin leads. No amount of economic pain, coordinated sanctions, or falling of Syria’s Assad regime has changed this.</p><p>A set of votes at the United Nations last week measured just how much things have changed. Three years ago, a March 2022 UN General Assembly resolution deploring Russian aggression against Ukraine in violation of the UN Charter was overwhelmingly adopted. The US joined 141 others in favor, while Russia found itself in the company of only four states. Last week, in an about-face, the US sided with Russia (and against its European allies) in two resolutions to mark the third anniversary of the conflict.</p><p>These votes reflect not only the gulf that has opened across the Atlantic; they also raise questions about the geopolitical landscape moving forward. After the March 2022 resolution, analysts began speaking fervently of a Global North-South world order. Russia and its near partners (those who stood against) – Belarus, North Korea, and Syria – and its sympathizers (the abstainers) – South Africa, China, India, and Bolivia against the US and Europe. Now, a question with long-term implications is emerging: How entrenched will the US pivot on Russia-Ukraine prove to be, and what does it mean for the future world order?</p><p>In the near term, European leaders are wrestling with how to manage the US president. Projects such as<a target="_blank" href="https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/understanding-different-negotiation-styles/"> <u>Harvard Law School’s Program on Negotiation</u></a> categorize business negotiation styles from collaborative (I win – you win) on one end of the spectrum to avoidant (I lose – you lose) on the other. Negotiations are frequently circumstance-dependent, meaning that adopting a flexible approach responsive to the business at hand – and one’s adversary – is often advantageous.</p><p>Trump is, however, a predictable negotiator. His worldview always leads him to adopt a competitive (I win – you lose) approach in which he<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.pon.harvard.edu/tag/anchoring-in-negotiation/#:~:text=Anchoring%20in%20a%20negotiation%20involves"> <u>anchors a negotiation</u></a> by “naming a price” early in the process, effectively bounding subsequent rounds. This is what is meant when his foreign policy is described as “transactional.”</p><p>With Colombia, for example, Trump threatened 25% tariffs that would escalate to 50% if it did not accept migrant flights. There was no win in these “negotiations.” Colombian President <strong>Gustavo Petro</strong> gave Trump what he wanted, and Trump backed off. Canada and Mexico were left in similar positions after Trump announced 25% tariffs. Each quickly made concessions to give Trump the win and reduce the economic pain at home. Both now face the hard news that their compromises were not enough, and levies are set to go ahead this week after the brief reprieve.</p><p>European allies would do well to remember that there is no new Trump. And there is evidence that some European leaders are beginning to update their model of him, accordingly. As part of a joint press conference last week held with Trump, French President <strong>Emmanuel Macron</strong> indicated that he and Europe were ready to help guarantee Ukraine’s security by sending troops to Ukraine. Not to be outdone, UK Prime Minister <strong>Keir Starmer</strong> preempted his own visit to the White House by announcing that British troops would also be available when needed.</p><p>Zelensky, who had a front line to Trump during his first administration, is also keenly aware of who he is. Anticipating a Trump 2.0 presidency, Zelensky’s team <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.cfr.org/event/transition-2025-series-future-us-russia-relations"><u>purportedly</u></a> devised the idea for the US-Ukraine mineral deal, which the two were meant to sign in Washington on Friday.</p><p>In the closing minutes of their fruitless meeting,<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ajxSWocbye8"> <u>Trump warned</u></a> Zelensky, “You’ve got to be more thankful because, let me tell you, you don’t have the cards. With us, you have the cards, but without us, you don’t have any cards.”</p><p>Trump prefers to hold all the cards, shuffle them at will, and throw down a new hand to the world’s surprise. Yet, even when the substance shifts – as it has dramatically over the last weeks in Europe – the process remains the same: Trump will be looking for the win.</p><p><em>Lindsay Newman is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Opinion: The world plays Two Truths and a Lie</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-the-world-plays-two-truths-and-a-lie</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg27n1kugw07myqhp7x9qk</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 10 Feb 2025 20:56:59 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>politics</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>truth social</category>
<category>gaza</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>foreign aid</category>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>In the game “Two Truths and a Lie,” a player discloses three statements, each of which seems both plausible and unexpected. Over his first month in office, President Donald Trump has presented a range of policy prospects as possible. He has also undertaken a wide number of presidential actions. Together, these measures have shifted the global context, leaving partners and rivals to orient to a vastly changing reality and wonder how seriously they should take him.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd6l51d7ya07myq2l9fdvm" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1179" height="676">
<media:credit>REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein</media:credit>
<media:text>President Donald Trump before the Super Bowl.</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd6l51d7ya07myq2l9fdvm" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the game “Two Truths and a Lie,” a player discloses three statements, each of which seems both plausible and unexpected. Participants rely on their shared understanding to identify which of the options presented as truths are true, and which is a fabrication. The game’s entertainment comes from imagining each declaration as true, no matter how outlandish.</p><p>Over his first month in office, President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> has presented a range of policy prospects as possible. He has also undertaken a wide number of presidential actions. Together, these measures have shifted the global context, leaving partners and rivals to orient to a vastly changing reality and wonder how seriously they should take him.</p><h3>Trade dissonance</h3><p>Despite campaigning on US trade imbalances and promising to impose global tariffs, many doggedly doubted Trump’s intentions as president. When he suggested on Truth Social last December that his administration would introduce 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico by Feb. 1, with a 10% additional tariff for China, the market held its breath. A common refrain of wait and see made the rounds. Colombia’s near-miss in late January when Trump threatened to escalate tariffs if the country did not accept military deportation flights sparked concern but felt further afield.</p><p>The mixed response to Trump’s tariff threats belies a cognitive dissonance that surrounds him and his administration. But there’s one thing anyone who’s followed Trump’s political career over the last decade should know: to believe him when he tells us what he <em>intends</em> to do. When he offers up an idea in a press conference, lists it on a webpage as a promise to be kept, posts about it on Truth Social, repeats it hundreds of times on the campaign trail, puts <a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/america-first-trade-policy/"><u>policy</u></a> in place around it as president, and establishes a new governmental agency (the External Revenue Service) to execute, it is a pretty safe bet he plans to impose the tariffs.</p><p>On Feb. 1, the Trump administration formally announced tariffs on Canada and Mexico, with an additional 10% tariff on imports from China. When both Canadian and Mexican leadership reached out to Trump with commitments on border safety and curbing the flow of illegal drugs, the president agreed to a 30-day tariff reprieve. China offered no such concessions, and now the two are locked in a potentially accelerating dance of trade threats and investigations. With incoming levies on steel and aluminum, the Trump administration has already shown that it plans to rely over and over on pulling the tariff lever to further its trade agenda. This is the truth.</p><h3>Foreign aid dismantling</h3><p>As the new administration pursued its trade plan ambitions, details of another policy shift emerged: the apparent unwinding of the US Agency for International Development. The sudden reversal in 60 years of US foreign aid policy caught many working in the agency off-guard and sent ripples across the development community. Global headlines highlighted impacts on health missions, sustainability and climate initiatives, and frontline staff in Ukraine. Long a foundational component of American soft power, a US retrenchment on foreign aid likely opens the door for other global participants like China to step through.</p><p>Even with the fallout tally still being counted, the USAID decision was a foreseeable reaction to developing facts on the ground. Trump signed <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/reevaluating-and-realigning-united-states-foreign-aid/"><u>an executive order</u></a> on his first day in office “reevaluating and realigning US foreign aid.” According to the order, “The United States foreign aid industry and bureaucracy are not aligned with American interests and in many cases antithetical to American values.” Trump immediately implemented a 90-day pause in US foreign development assistance. Likewise, in his capacity as head of the new Department of Government Efficiency, <strong>Elon Musk</strong> has persistently targeted USAID as a “<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1886102414194835755"><u>criminal organization</u></a>” and “<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/feb/03/elon-musk-says-usaid-is-beyond-repair-and-he-is-working-to-shut-it-down"><u>beyond repair</u></a>.”</p><p>Drowned out by attention on some of the administration’s more headline-grabbing maneuvers like an end to “Birthright Citizenship” and an extended pause on the TikTok ban, the impact on US foreign aid was initially overlooked. But the underlying context was there. This is another truth.</p><h3>Middle East dismay</h3><p>Trump saved the boldest declaration of his young administration for the arena of US hard power. Last week, Trump proposed an alternative trajectory for the Middle East: He repeatedly called for Egypt, Jordan, and others to accept millions of Palestinians from Gaza. At a <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/full-text-trump-and-netanyahus-explosive-news-conference"><u>press conference</u></a> following meetings with Israeli Prime Minister <strong>Bibi Netanyahu</strong>, Trump took it a step further, suggesting that “The US will take over the Gaza Strip, and we will do a job with it too.”</p><p>Trump’s plan to “own” Gaza and convert it into the “Riviera of the Middle East” stunned the global audience. While Trump’s plans struck like lightning, they were not without prior seeding. <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-gaza-riviera-echoes-kushner-waterfront-property-dreams-2025-02-05/"><u>According to reports</u></a>, a thread of redeveloping Gaza has been woven at times throughout the Trump presidential campaign, including by the president’s son-in-law <strong>Jared Kushner</strong> early last year. In response, voices ranging from the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia <strong>Mohammed bin Salman</strong> to the French foreign ministry raised deep concerns. Even still, as farfetched as Trump’s Gaza ambitions may seem, they provide a barometer of how far the current administration is willing to push the envelope. A fabrication, for now, but with designs on converting some kernel – “a concept of a plan” – into reality.</p><p>In describing the “historic proposal” for the US to take over Gaza, White House Press Secretary <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZ-I5_uW_Q0"><strong>Karoline Leavitt</strong><u> explained</u></a> that “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”</p><p>Through a breakneck pace of policy change and action, the Trump administration has demonstrated a willingness to rethink the “same thing.” Everyone else is left to calibrate to the new dynamics, pondering if it just might all turn out to be truths.</p><p><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/lindsayrsnewman"><em>Lindsay Newman</em></a><em> is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Opinion: The yellow brick road to a Golden Age</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-the-yellow-brick-road-to-a-golden-age</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg1in1lirq07lqunx14bi0</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 27 Jan 2025 21:22:27 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>tariffs</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>white house</category>
<category>latin america-caribbean</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>colombia</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>Within his record-breaking number of executive actions, Donald Trump has begun to lay out a roadmap for the “Golden Age” of America he intends to deliver.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd5hutdt4o07lqfxse67gt" type="image/png" medium="image" width="1200" height="675">
<media:credit>Luisa Vieira</media:credit>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd5hutdt4o07lqfxse67gt" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A week into the second Trump administration, the conviction held by many that the world was more prepared for <strong>Donald Trump</strong> in the US presidency has quickly faded. This weekend’s flare-up between Trump and Colombian President <strong>Gustavo Petro</strong> over tariff threats for deportation flights further strained any remaining optimism. In its place is a stark reality: Trump is back with a bang.</p><p>Trump launched an opening salvo – a campaign not of military might but of the pen. Dozens of executive orders and presidential actions have papered the field, overwhelming and scrambling forecasts of a much hoped-for manageable Trump 2.0.</p><p>Within his record-breaking number of executive actions, Trump has begun to lay out a roadmap for the “Golden Age” of America he intends to deliver.</p><h3>Setting the stage</h3><p>Trump held the (virtual) spotlight late last week at the World Economic Forum’s annual sessions in Davos, Switzerland, an emerald city showcasing the world’s who’s who. With the global community eager to hear him contextualize his plans, Trump featured a highlight reel of his young administration’s greatest hits including negotiating the ceasefire in Israel-Gaza, saying, “We have accomplished more in less than four days … than other administrations have accomplished in four years. And we are just getting started.”</p><p>Many of the headlines relating to these early accomplishments have been devoted to the set of Trump executive orders with clear and specific implications. The decision, for instance, to pardon or commute sentences for certain offenses relating to Jan. 6, 2021, sent ripples through the domestic political environment. As did his order to instruct the attorney general not to take action to enforce the so-called TikTok ban for 75 days. A move by a federal judge in Washington state to place a nationwide temporary restraining order on Trump’s Day 1 “Birthright Citizenship” executive order previews the court challenges ahead for the president’s targeted initiatives.</p><h3>A Trump 2.0 blueprint</h3><p>Yet, there is a second set of presidential actions with broader impact that deserve deeper scrutiny. In these, Trump and his team have been more open-ended, memorializing their ambitions across trade and economic policy, national security, and foreign policy for the months and years ahead.</p><p>On trade, there was initial relief abroad when Trump did not impose blanket tariffs on Day 1. Instead, he issued a wide-ranging action laying out an “America First Trade Policy,” which includes an instruction to the Department of Commerce, Treasury, and United States Trade Representative to undertake a host of investigations and reviews to address unfair and unbalanced trade. This includes the creation of an External Revenue Service to collect tariffs, duties, and other foreign trade-related revenues. Paraphrasing former vice-presidential candidate <strong>Tim Walz</strong> during the 2024 campaign – you don’t create a new governmental organization if you don’t plan on collecting the tariffs. Alluding to these plans in his Davos remarks, Trump suggested that if firms do not make their product in America – which is their “prerogative” – they will have to pay some tariff.</p><p>In addition to the spat with Colombia, Trump has threatened to impose 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico on Feb. 1. Trump’s near-term focus on his northern and southern borders is almost certainly to apply pressure for concessions on immigration but also ahead of forthcoming renegotiations of the USMCA agreement. And while Europe may escape the first round unscathed, it would do well to pay attention. If Trump can impose tariffs on US allies close to home, he can easily do the same across the Atlantic, where he will be looking for leverage on US LNG sales, European automotive manufacturing, NATO defense spending, and his emerging dream of bringing Greenland into the US fold.</p><p>On foreign policy, Trump has set for himself<a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-a-trumpian-storm-is-brewing"> <u>an aspiration agenda</u></a>. Gone are the days of isolationism, now replaced by eyes that roam from Canada to the Panama Canal and the “Gulf of America.” In his inaugural address, Trump suggested that the US is a nation “more ambitious than any other.” In a directive to the Secretary of State, Trump codifies this expansionist vision: “From this day forward, the foreign policy of the United States shall champion core American interests and always put America and American citizens first.” To that end, the administration placed an immediate 90-day hold on all new US foreign development assistance pending review and consistency with US foreign policy. A consequential development for US relationships and soft power worldwide.</p><p>As the conversations across Europe and the world shift from an election post-mortem to looking forward, the focus has narrowed to an essential question: What kind of America are we in for, and where do we go from here? With a flurry of activity since taking office, Trump has cast aside (misguided) expectations of restraint. His government will be busy on many fronts laying a path toward a golden age.</p><p><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/lindsayrsnewman"><em>Lindsay Newman</em></a><em> is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Opinion: A Trumpian storm is brewing</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-a-trumpian-storm-is-brewing</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg0vkokq4u07myeaq5g94t</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 14 Jan 2025 19:45:50 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>views on america</category>
<category>white house</category>
<category>politics</category>
<category>washington</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>In just under a week, Donald Trump will be inaugurated as the 47th president of the United States. These final days of Biden’s administration mark the very end of the calm before the storm.</description>
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<media:credit>ALLISON ROBBERT/Pool via REUTERS</media:credit>
<media:text>President-elect Donald Trump speaks during a meeting with House Republicans at the Hyatt Regency hotel in Washington, DC, on Nov. 13, 2024.</media:text>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd4j39cqwp07myhtkujnv3" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In just under a week, <strong>Donald Trump</strong> will be inaugurated as the 47th president of the United States. These final days of Biden’s administration mark the very end of the calm before the storm.</p><p>For months on the campaign trail and in a crescendo last week at a press conference at Mar-a-Lago, Trump has made promises to American voters. On foreign policy, this list includes everything from ending the war in Ukraine within six months of taking office and imposing “all hell” if the Israeli hostages are not released before Inauguration Day (with a ceasefire deal coming into view) to his more recent discussions about taking control of the Panama Canal.</p><p>In anticipation of Trump’s return, the world has been <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-the-world-prepares-its-go-bags"><u>packing their go-bags</u></a> and considering how best to prepare. The Trump administration the world has been preparing for, however, may not be the one it gets. It is becoming increasingly clear how distinctly different Trump’s current worldview is than what came before him – including what he envisioned during his first term.</p><h3>Differing tactics</h3><p>Unlike the administration of <strong>Joe Biden</strong>, which leaned heavily on consensus building, non-binding partnerships like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and negotiations ad infinitum, Trump’s tactics have always been different. The businessman-president trades in grievances. He looks for the points of disparity and deploys (largely economic) tools like tariffs and sanctions to bring his “adversaries” closer to his preferred position – and to advance what he sees as America’s best interests. During his first term, for instance, Trump <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/07/us/politics/trump-tariffs-mexico.html"><u>walked back a threat</u></a> to impose tariffs on Mexico’s goods only after its government agreed to a deal stemming the flow of migrants along the southwestern border.</p><p>From his post-election personnel decisions, policy proposals, and posts on Truth Social, it seems clear Trump will continue to deploy these tactics in his second term. But what is also emerging is a Trump foreign policy agenda that’s radically different from Trump 1.0. Then “America First” focused on immigration, bringing jobs and manufacturing home, with a significant focus on reorienting global supply chains. With the exception of the January 2020 assassination of <strong>Qasem Soleimani</strong>, Trump largely avoided telegraphed security operations.</p><h3>An aspirational agenda</h3><p>Now, Trump has seemingly set his sights on a much more ambitious set of priorities. In 2025, Trump is speaking of the dawn of “the golden age of America.” Making America Great Again looks less like an isolationist story and more like a no-stone-uncovered one. As Trump scans the horizon looking for the angles, he has put his neighborhood, Europe, and the world on notice that almost nowhere will go unconsidered.</p><p>To the North, Trump’s December announcement that he would impose 25% tariffs on Canada set off a chain reaction that ultimately led to an already-fragile Prime Minister <strong>Justin Trudeau’s</strong> resignation. Trump’s repeated barbs about Canada becoming the 51st US state and musings about removing the “artificial line” separating the two countries have continued to destabilize the political landscape. Canadian officials are <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/canada-could-impose-tariffs-on-u-s-steel-orange-juice-in-response-to-trump-threat-1.7169470"><u>reportedly drawing up their own list</u></a> of American products to tariff should Trump make a move. To the South, Mexico has also been forced to respond to Trump's tariff and border vows. After he suggested renaming the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America, President <strong>Claudia Sheinbaum</strong> went tit-for-tat with Trump proposing to call the US, America Mexicana.</p><p>Across the Atlantic Ocean, headline-grabbing claims about acquiring Greenland initially generated chuckles in Europe. His threat to tariff Denmark at a very high level to open the door for negotiations over Greenland is Trump 1.0. His articulated vision of needing Greenland for national security purposes (and ultimately access to the Arctic’s resources) while refusing to rule out the use of military coercion are hallmarks of the emerging new Trump foreign policy.</p><p>In Trump 2.0, anywhere is up for grabs (a real estate deal), and economic tools of national security will be backed up by more traditional force posturing. The lesson of the moment appears to be that the best countries can hope for is to stay out of Trump’s crosshairs. America’s EU allies, for their part, have responded by taking Trump’s ideas increasingly seriously. German Chancellor <strong>Olaf Scholz</strong> and France’s Foreign Minister <strong>Jean-Noël Barrot&nbsp;</strong><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/1dfd3f77-b07b-4d23-bd14-e4e8027250f0"><u>issued reminders</u></a> of the inviolability of European borders, but European capitals are rattled.</p><p>In his news conference last week, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-press-conference-mar-a-lago-january-7-2025/"><u>Trump speculated</u></a> that “since we won the election the whole perception of the whole world is different.” It is not just the case that the US and its voters may see themselves differently since Trump’s reelection, but the world has somehow been changed by it.</p><p>Still, according to Trump, “big problems remain that need to be settled.” The president-elect has spent the post-election period throwing up dozens of foreign policy trial balloons to clarify how he would like to see these problems settled. As the clock winds down to his inauguration, Trump’s more grandiose foreign policy vision may soon move many targets into the eye of the storm.</p><p><em>Lindsay Newman is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Opinion: Roll over and play Trump</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-roll-over-and-play-trump</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrg0687lexb07lqy5qh24cr</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 23 Dec 2024 21:15:55 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>geopolitics</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>trump administration</category>
<category>economy</category>
<category>politics</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>lindsay newman</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>While the second season will not officially launch until Jan. 20, 2025, the Donald Trump show has already come to town.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd3f9ycp4907my59xmb65u" type="image/jpeg" medium="image" width="1200" height="675">
<media:credit>REUTERS/Tom Brenner</media:credit>
<media:text>U.S. President Donald Trump poses with Vice President Mike Pence, first lady Melania Trump and Conan, the U.S. military dog that participated in and was injured in the U.S. raid in Syria that killed ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, while standing with the dog&apos;s military handler on the colonnade of the West Wing of the White House in Washington, U.S., November 25, 2019.</media:text>
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<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd3f9ycp4907my59xmb65u" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>While the second season will not officially launch until Jan. 20, 2025, the <strong>Donald Trump&nbsp;</strong>show has already come to town. Look no further than Trump’s remarks this weekend at his first major post-election rally where he declared it the start of America’s “Golden Age.”</p><p>President <strong>Joe Biden’s</strong> final months in office may go down as the lamest of lame ducks. His administration’s post-election priority to bring peace to the Middle East has landed where so many other such endeavors have – in a pile of hopes and dreams. Instead, with <strong>Bashar Assad’s</strong> regime collapse in Syria, the conflagration has spread, taking on a seismic significance that is likely to lead to the vast reordering of the region, if it has not already begun.</p><p><strong>A new norm</strong></p><p>Biden’s presidency, once seen as a restoration from the Trump aberration, now appears more like the last gasp of the (post-)Cold Warriors. Trump is less of a deviation and more of a new norm. His protectionism and adoption of industrial policy are on the rise, reopening the settled debate around globalization. His emphasis on NATO members contributing more to their own collective security has also been internalized across European capitals and in Brussels. Populism and migration anxiety, each key Trump talking points, are pervasive trends.</p><p>With the dawning realization that the US will not be <em>returning&nbsp;</em>to a familiar role as the world’s superpower, global government and business leaders are considering what it will take to be Trump’s best friend.</p><p><strong>Europe grapples for purchase</strong></p><p>Europe received a major clue late last week when Trump took to social media to demand the European Union “make up their tremendous deficit with the US by the large scale purchases of our oil and gas.” Luckily for Europe, Trump’s message dovetails nicely with plans<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.ft.com/content/9e485614-0080-4a09-8fcb-2df6c3d932a5"> <u>its leadership had reportedly already</u></a> been developing to purchase more American LNG. Not only would doing so further reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian energy, but it offers a blueprint to avoid falling afoul of a costly trade war with its closest ally.</p><p>Also at play for Europe is how to maneuver around Ukraine. Six months ago, when Trump repeatedly suggested on the campaign trail that he would end the war in Ukraine on day one, it was generally met with a shrug and an eye roll. How could Trump unlock a resolution to a war that started on Feb. 24, 2022, but had roots going back decades?</p><p>And yet, sitting just months ahead of the third anniversary and with Ukrainian President <strong>Volodymyr Zelensky’s</strong> newfound willingness to negotiate, it seems more likely than at any previous time in this hot conflict that a deal may be possible. Perhaps the understanding that Trump would make good on promises to curb US support and the depth of the about-face in US policy Ukraine will soon encounter has clarified the stakes. How well Trump can apply pressure on Russia’s <strong>Vladimir Putin</strong> remains an open question, but<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lbfZi4gaE1s"> <u>Putin’s statements</u></a> that he is ready for “negotiations and compromise” are telling.</p><p><strong>Trump’s neighbors look to keep pace</strong></p><p>Elsewhere, the question of how to operate in a world that is already Trump’s dominated Canadian politics in late December. A fragile government suffered a further corporal blow that may soon lead to its collapse after Prime Minister <strong>Justin Trudeau</strong> sought to shuffle Finance Minister <strong>Chrystia Freeland</strong>’s cabinet position.</p><p>Rather than go along with it, Freeland resigned,<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/cafreeland/status/1868659332285702167/photo/1"> <u>citing</u></a> the need for a “true Team Canada response” to the incoming US administration’s “economic nationalism.” Freeland’s departure reflects not only Canada’s precarious frontline position to Trump’s agenda but also speaks to a wider geopolitical truth: resist the realities at one’s peril. Freeland put it in the plainest terms: “how we deal with the threat our country currently faces will define us for a generation, and perhaps longer.” These are not times for denying the signs flashing 25% incoming tariffs and America First. This is the moment for adapting to what Trump has clearly and repeatedly articulated as the direction of travel for US foreign policy.</p><p><strong>Global business heeds the call</strong></p><p>Across the business world, recognition of the unfolding realities has quickly taken hold. Sizeable financial commitments are being offered up to the next administration even before its first official day in office. Various multinationals with US headquarters have made donations to Trump’s inauguration committee. The list of donors includes global firms (many of them tech firms) that faced scrutiny during the Trump 1.0 administration. Not to be outdone, one international firm<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/softbank-ceo-announce-100-bln-investment-us-during-visit-trump-cnbc-reports-2024-12-16/"> <u>committed to $100 billion</u></a> investment alongside the creation of 100,000 new US jobs. Bold pledges for bolder times, such support from the international business community aligns directly with a number of Trump’s<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://rncplatform.donaldjtrump.com/?_gl=1*2z40t8*_gcl_au*MTA1OTU4Nzg1OS4xNzMzMzI5Mzk3&amp;_ga=2.226121049.2117038531.1734688458-1165572899.1724927278"> <u>platform positions</u></a> from “Build[ing] the greatest economy in history” to “Protect[ing] American workers and farmers from unfair trade.”</p><p>Trump is on a winning streak, and he has not yet taken a single step into the White House as the 47th president.</p><p>From Washington to Wall Street, the effects of the “Trump trade” are already in motion. Around the world too, both leaders in government and business are hoping to find themselves on his “nice list” in the year ahead.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Opinion: The world prepares its go bags</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/opinion-the-world-prepares-its-go-bags</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfzg3oklka07myvehyjtzl</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 09 Dec 2024 18:04:01 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>france</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>war</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>In addition to multiple ongoing conflicts, a year of electoral instability, and pandemic hangovers, the return of Donald Trump as the US president injects further unpredictability into the geopolitics.</description>
<media:content url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd27szdcdj07lqbwpxvp7v" type="image/png" medium="image" width="1200" height="675">
<media:credit>Jess Frampton</media:credit>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrd27szdcdj07lqbwpxvp7v" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The abundance of volatility in the global system since at least the start of the pandemic has meant that we should expect more geopolitical risk rather than less. Now, in addition to multiple ongoing conflicts, a year of electoral instability, and pandemic hangovers, the return of <strong>Donald Trump</strong> as the US president injects further unpredictability into this landscape.</p><p>Already since his reelection, an unusual set of waves have crested. In South Korea – a key US ally – the declaration of martial law last week stunned the domestic and international audience. After widespread protests broke out, President <strong>Yoon Suk Yeol</strong> issued a quick (but not immediate) retraction with more fallout yet to come. Elsewhere, in France, Prime Minister <strong>Michel Barnier</strong> lost a no-confidence vote after parliamentary budget talks stalled. The measure reveals the fractures and radicalized forces that continue to plague one of Europe’s leading economies. And in Syria, Islamist militants turned Aleppo and Damascus into a hot zone once again – raising tensions in an already active neighborhood – before spectacularly overthrowing <strong>Bashar Assad’s</strong> government on Saturday.</p><p>Trump is, of course, not responsible for any of these developments. But the world is on edge. His posts in recent weeks on Truth Social have done little to assuage the anxieties and instead serve as kerosene to various burning fires. Trump roiled markets in late November when he <a target="_blank" href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/113546215051155542"><u>announced plans</u></a> to impose 25% tariffs on all products coming into the US from Mexico and Canada with an additional 10% tariff on Chinese goods. The market remarkably found the news surprising despite Trump’s avowal throughout his 2024 election campaign that he would again rely on the tariff lever as president.</p><p>More recently, Trump <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/113584730902816413"><u>posted</u></a> to warn that if the hostages held by Hamas are not released before his inauguration there will be “ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East.” Trump’s commitment to “hit harder” those responsible at a historic level strikes a distinctly different tone than the one regional actors have become accustomed to with <strong>Joe Biden</strong>’s administration.</p><p>In response to the preexisting condition of volatility and the forthcoming infusion of Trumpredictability, the world is preparing “go bags” for the year(s) ahead. For both global political leaders and private sector firms, this preparation involves kicking the tires on current strategy, stress testing supply chains and sourcing, evaluating budget plans, and checking in with the man himself.</p><p>After Trump’s tariff threats, Canadian Prime Minister <strong>Justin Trudeau</strong> flew immediately to Mar-a-Lago to assess the damage. In<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cy8787nxl7do"> <u>remarks afterward</u></a>, Trudeau said it was an “excellent conversation” and that he “look[ed] forward to the work we can do together, again.” In his own posts, Trump said the two had discussed many important topics that would require the US and Canada to work together, including trade, illegal drugs, and energy. In the days that followed, Trump posted a photo of himself staring out at snow-capped mountains with the Canadian flag at his side – after jokingly saying the country could become America’s 51st state. It was a reminder to Trudeau that one dinner will not resolve everything.</p><p>European leaders, meanwhile, are debating a lot more defensive spending for the journey ahead. At early December meetings of NATO foreign ministers, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_231006.htm?selectedLocale=en"><u>Secretary-General&nbsp;</u><strong>Mark Rutte</strong><u> thanked Trump</u></a> for getting NATO territory allies to the 2% defensive spend target, calling it the “Trump push.” Rutte went on to say that – and not just because of Trump – he now believes strongly the 2% is not enough for long-term deterrence. German Foreign Minister <strong>Annalena Baerbock&nbsp;</strong><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/natos-2-military-spending-target-no-longer-sufficient-german-foreign-minister-says/3391023"><u>similarly called on NATO</u></a> to make big investments in European security beyond the standard 2% defensive target.</p><p>In Ukraine, President <strong>Volodymyr Zelensky</strong> has seemingly demonstrated a new willingness to consider negotiations as a Trump return looms. After repeatedly vowing to continue the fight, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-zelenskyy-troops-nato-9bf883670879e2a398fe1a7ebfb71ddb"><u>Zelensky indicated this week</u></a> he would be open to Western troops deploying in Ukraine as a security guarantee and step toward NATO membership to halt the war with Russia. The shift comes <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/653495/half-ukrainians-quick-negotiated-end-war.aspx">as polls suggest</a> that Ukrainians are increasingly inclined toward a negotiated solution, but also after months of Trump campaign pledges to swiftly drive settlement and end the war. With Assad’s toppling in Syria, having long been propped up by Russia, Putin will be recalculating his own ambitions in Ukraine in real time in the coming weeks.</p><p>Unsurprisingly, Trump is not immune to the effect he is having on global behavior. He <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/news/2dc59d28-a03f-45db-8edb-e339e0fd618a">launched a site</a> to track the “Promises Kept,” which tallies “securing our border,” “working towards international peace,” and “propelling economic growth” among his pre-inauguration successes.</p><p>The world at the close of 2024 stands on the precipice, awaiting the impact that another Trump presidency will bring. Trump 2.0 will be all-encompassing. His administration will pursue policies that reshape the global economy and international trade patterns. It will target ongoing fault lines and new challengers. And there will be unpredictability. Global leaders of all stripes are counting on being kept on their toes. <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/29/would-you-survive-72-hours-germany-and-the-nordic-countries-prepare-citizens-for-possible-war">Some across Europe</a> have even begun ramping up crisis capabilities for citizens with initiatives advising on stockpiling and bunker building. They have six weeks to pack their bags.</p><p><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/lindsayrsnewman"><em>Lindsay Newman</em></a><em> is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>All of Trump’s horses and all of Trump’s men</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/all-of-trumps-horses-and-all-of-trumps-men</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfyn5nkj4l07myfnvgiays</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 18 Nov 2024 21:27:37 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>cabinet</category>
<category>indo-pacific</category>
<category>us politics</category>
<category>stephen miller</category>
<category>pete hegseth</category>
<category>robert kennedy jr</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>With world leaders descending upon Brazil this week for the annual G20 summit, the specter of Donald Trump’s return looms all around.</description>
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<media:credit>REUTERS/Carlos Barria/File Photo/File Photo</media:credit>
<media:text>FILE PHOTO: Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Republican presidential candidate and former U.S. President Donald Trump greet each other at a campaign event sponsored by conservative group Turning Point USA, in Duluth, Georgia, U.S., October 23, 2024.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With world leaders descending upon Brazil this week for the annual G20 summit, the specter of <strong>Donald Trump’s&nbsp;</strong>return looms all around. The summit, along with this month’s COP29 climate summit, bookend the Biden interregnum - a period that opened with a deadly global pandemic and saw the start of two wars.</p><p>As we now know, foreign policy did not determine the 2024 election outcome. The pivotal question voters wrestled with was the one Trump<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-speech-campaign-rally-new-york-madison-square-garden-october-27-2024/"> <u>put to them</u></a>: “Are you better off now than you were four years ago?” A majority of voters across the electoral map answered this question in the negative. Despite the hyper-polarized political moment, and all the fault lines in US politics – gender, generational, racial, party identification – it was the economic one that proved most salient.</p><p>Yet, when Trump is inaugurated in January, he will take the helm of the United States at a moment of vast geopolitical uncertainty. By Trump’s own assessment, the world is on the brink of World War III. In<a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/video/gzero-world-with-ian-bremmer/why-the-world-isnt-fair-yuval-noah-harari"> <u>an interview</u></a> earlier this year, <strong>Yuval Noah Hariri</strong> suggested that WWIII may have already started with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and “we just don’t know it yet.” Certainly, reports of North Korean troop deployment to the Russia-Ukraine war theater do little to assuage these fears. Nor does US President J<strong>oe Biden’s&nbsp;</strong>late-in-the-game policy shift this weekend to allow Ukraine to deploy US-provided, long-range missiles to strike inside Russian territory.</p><p>Since his resolute victory two weeks ago, Trump has made quick work assembling the team he wants around him for the challenges ahead. It is a team of loyalists and Trump-world insiders (many Washington outsiders)<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/platform"> <u>tasked with</u></a> preventing World War III, restoring peace in Europe and the Middle East, and putting the world together again.</p><p>With his cabinet and leadership selections, Trump makes clear that direction will come from the very top. Appointees will be expected to execute the president’s agenda. The pick of veteran and television host <strong>Pete Hegseth</strong> to lead the Department of Defense is perhaps the clearest indicator of the model to come.</p><p>With Europe deeply on edge about whether the US will remain steadfastly committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Ukraine, and Europe’s common defense, Hegseth’s bureaucratic inexperience offers little clarity or comfort. Known more for his television work and pardon advocacy than any particular security policy position, Hegseth’s promotion to American dignitary has left Europe scratching its collective head. It signals to European leaders that Trump’s transactional, unpredictable approach will dictate the next four years.</p><p>Elsewhere, in the Indo-Pacific, a giant question mark hangs over how the second Trump administration plans to engage with a host of partnerships and plans initiated by Biden. Outgoing Defense Secretary <strong>Lloyd Austin</strong> met with his counterparts in Australia and Japan this weekend for a Trilateral Defense Ministers’ Meeting. In a <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3967118/australia-japan-united-states-trilateral-defense-ministers-meeting-november-202/"><u>joint statement&nbsp;</u></a>following the session, the leaders affirmed the longevity and enduring commitment of the partnership.</p><p>With the US-China relationship <em>the&nbsp;</em>essential quandary of our times, will Hegseth (and Trump) remain committed to these relationships? What happens to AUKUS, the trilateral partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the US that’s viewed by Australians as so critical to their security? What about the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with members of the same group plus India? Each of these pillars is viewed by Biden as foundational for the region’s geopolitics, and yet incoming Trump personnel have provided scant details of their plans.</p><p>While much is being made of Trump’s flashier picks – <strong>Elon Musk&nbsp;</strong>and <strong>Vivek Ramaswamy</strong> to lead a newly formed Department of Government Efficiency – it is the repeat performers who telegraph Trump’s policy priorities. As he said every day on the campaign trail, these are immigration, trade, and the economy.</p><p>The return of former Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director <strong>Thomas Homan</strong>, now as “border czar,” coupled with <strong>Stephen Miller</strong> as Trump’s deputy chief of staff, confirm Trump 2.0 will be ideologically tough and swift-acting on immigration. Trump<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/trump-472-executive-actions-immigration-during-presidency"> <u>implemented 472 executive orders</u></a> on immigration during his first term. Homan and Miller will be hard at work over the next few months readying actions for Trump’s signature on his first day back in the Oval Office.</p><p>On trade, everyone overseas is on pins and needles over Trump’s tariff threats. European political leaders and business executives are kept up at night worrying over whether Trump will seek to impose a universal tariff of 10-20% on imported goods, and, if so, under what authority. Against this backdrop, the reported return of former US Trade Representative <strong>Robert Lighthizer</strong> to an expanded “trade czar” role is being closely watched. Both Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act will be relevant channels for Trump’s tariff ambitions. Having Lighthizer by his side provides the president with a dedicated co-pilot.</p><p>Finally, that Trump has seemingly taken the most time to land on his picks to lead the Treasury and Commerce departments is unsurprising. Trump’s election, his mandate, and his plans both at home and abroad in his next term each depend on his administration’s ability to execute its economic vision. Trump’s tax extensions, corporate tax cuts, and economic tools of national security like tariffs and sanctions, must also take action on the pivotal question Trump asked voters in November – they must feel better in four years than they do today.</p><p>The pace of Trump’s appointment decisions is evidence that he is ready to get to work. The sooner he can roll back Biden’s initiatives and implement the policies he has been discussing again and again over the last four years, the sooner he can remake the US and America’s role in the world in his image.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>What to expect when the US is expecting</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/what-to-expect-when-the-us-is-expecting</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfxzn0l7l107lqhe848lcs</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 05 Nov 2024 15:06:53 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>us election</category>
<category>election day</category>
<category>2024 presidential election</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>elections 2024</category>
<category>lindsay newman</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>For the US and other countries with elected leaders, Tuesday’s election represents a referendum on the future of democracy. Will it come away battered, or will it remain intact?</description>
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<media:credit>USA Today Network via Reuters</media:credit>
<media:text>Aubrey and Taylor Endicott cast their votes while their children, from left, Sterling, 5, Adelaide, 3, and Lincoln, 7, wait patiently under the voting tables at Shawnee Heights Middle School on Tuesday, Nov. 5, 2024.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In making her final pitch to American voters before 75,000 attendees on the National Mall, Vice President <strong>Kamala Harris</strong> closed by declaring: “The United States of America is the greatest idea humanity ever devised.” While undoubtedly hyperbolic, Harris’ remarks point to the heart of what is at stake in the US election: For the US and other countries with elected leaders, Tuesday’s election represents a referendum on the future of democracy. Will it come away battered, or will it remain intact?<br></p><p>Harris hopes American voters place system over self – rights over kitchen table issues. Only with hindsight will her campaign find out whether this was a winning strategy.</p><p>Still, one of Europe’s most frequently repeated questions about the US election is whether we will see a repeat of Jan. 6, 2021. Watching Americans climb their Capitol building shocked the international audience. While observers abroad may not fully agree with Harris’ declaration, seeing the fissures in the US democratic system laid bare that Wednesday in January shifted perceptions of what was possible in America. If the US could come under attack from within, where next? If the US could not uphold its democratic promise, who could?</p><p>Although many Americans have hoped to tuck aside the storming of the US Capitol as a 2020 election “one-off,” the sentiment of that day has lingered. Former President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> and his running mate, Sen. <strong>JD Vance</strong>, routinely claim that the 2020 election was stolen and that Trump never lost. At a Pennsylvania rally over the weekend, Trump lamented that he “shouldn’t have left” office in 2020. Three years after the Jan. 6 riot, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2024/01/02/jan-6-poll-post-trump/"><u>polling</u></a> found that roughly two-thirds of Republicans still did not believe President <strong>Joe Biden</strong> was legitimately elected, a proportion that has grown since 2021.</p><p>According to the <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/ensure-every-american-can-vote/vote-suppression/myth-voter-fraud"><u>Brennan Center for Justice</u></a>, “extensive research reveals that fraud is very rare, voter impersonation is virtually nonexistent, and many instances of alleged fraud are, in fact, mistakes by voters or administrators.”</p><p>Yet, at his final major rally at Madison Square Garden, Trump warned his supporters, “We must defeat Kamala Harris and stop her radical left agenda with a landslide that is too big to rig.”</p><p>This leaving open the door to the risk of fraud, a stolen election, and “a rig” – whether valid or not – makes clear that should Trump lose when all the votes are counted, he will not go quietly. Nor will his supporters.</p><p>Trump is right to point out that the margin of victory this week will be pivotal for what happens next. Democracy is a system in which <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/electoral-violence-comes-out-of-the-shadows"><u>groups lose elections and accept the election results</u></a>. Losers consent to being losers in any given election because they believe they will have the opportunity to participate in the next cycle. Losers withdraw this consent, however, when they come to believe that the institutional framework will not allow them to become winners – the system is rigged against them.</p><p>With the 2020 election still so salient, Trump and his supporters are primed to interpret any small loss in today’s election as evidence of the big rig. A narrow margin of victory that delivers Harris 270 electoral college votes likely represents the most volatile outcome of today’s election. For those forces unleashed in 2020 and still itching for a fight, a small Harris victory – perceived by them as improbable – is an easy mark. A wide margin of victory for Harris presents its own potential for criticism, especially as both aggregate national and swing state polling have consistently been so close. But should Harris pull off a meaningful polling surprise, it may suck the air out of the fraud argument and deflate the Trump world.</p><p>Given that Trump is not currently president and does not hold the reins of office, a replay of Jan. 6 is remote, but a flood of legal cases and calls for recounts is certain. Disturbances at courthouses and state government buildings should also be expected. Challenges within Congress around vote certification, especially should Republicans retain the House and regain the Senate, will be set in motion. And where there is disaffection, as there is in this post-pandemic, hyper-polarized political moment in the US, political violence cannot be ruled out.</p><p>We are in for a wild finish. What happens between today and the full results, and between the full results and Inauguration Day, Jan. 20, 2025, will be fluid. Many ideas are at stake, not the least of which is the foundational idea of democracy itself. As the US votes, the world holds its breath.</p><p><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/lindsayrsnewman"><em>L</em></a><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/lindsayrsnewman"><em>indsay Newman</em></a><em> is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p><p>editshare</p><p>trending_up</p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>A US president above all?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/a-us-president-above-all</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfx666kbjs07myst80dpok</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 21 Oct 2024 19:43:02 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>politics</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>Since leaping onto the main stage in late July, Harris has been dogged by questions about her foreign policy experience and potential priorities.</description>
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<media:credit>REUTERS/Dustin Chambers</media:credit>
<media:text>Democratic presidential nominee U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris reacts as she speaks during a campaign event in Atlanta, Georgia, U.S., October 19, 2024.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is a rippling sentiment across Europe that the United States – and therefore the world – faces a “sliding doors” political moment. Will the US soon be led by a familiar face waving a banner of “America First” isolationism, or will it be led by a relatively untested candidate who will likely bring more of the same liberal internationalism long-touted by the Democratic Party?</p><p>When asked last week while speaking at Chatham House to fill in the gaps of a <strong>Kamala Harris</strong> presidency, Speaker Emerita <strong>Nancy Pelosi</strong> responded: “You are talking about one person, but we’re talking about our country.” And yet, whoever is selected to serve as the 47th US president, this one person, will place the US on a trajectory for the latter half of this decade, and at a pivotal moment in geopolitical history.</p><p>Since leaping onto the main stage in late July, Harris has been dogged by questions about her foreign policy experience and potential priorities. From her convention speech to debate performance to a strategically timed Fox News interview, Harris has sought to differentiate herself from <strong>Joe Biden’s</strong> presidency while still giving a nod to longstanding Democratic policy positions.</p><p>Without more meat on the bone being offered by her campaign, watchers from abroad are left scratching their heads about whether Harris is “turning the page,” as she likes to say, or if they will find themselves reading from the same recognizable book of democracy promotion, multilateral cooperation, international institutions, and free markets.</p><p>The Democratic playbook has been a work in progress since <strong>Donald Trump’s</strong> first presidency, swapping out free trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership for industrial policy and economic tools of national security. Even still, there are clear throughlines from President <strong>Barack Obama’s</strong> “don’t do stupid stuff” foreign policy to Biden’s “small yards and high fences” approach to what Harris has thus far laid out on the campaign trail. The possibility of policy continuity under Harris provides US allies with a semblance of predictability that feels reassuring.</p><p>And for those looking for further insight, Pelosi cautioned: “I know that [Harris] will be well-advised, that there are strong voices for America’s role in the world to keep the world safe. To keep the world democratic.” The risk, though, is that a Harris administration not defined by any one person, and perhaps not even Harris herself, comes to resemble a return to the Washington<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/defense-blob"> <u>blob</u></a> mentality at a time when<a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/the-world-is-knocking-on-the-door"> <u>innovation in foreign policy</u></a> may be needed most.</p><p>Where a Harris administration offers the prospect of leadership-by-committee, a Trump presidency is almost certain to be a more exclusive affair. Perhaps even a party of (for) one. During his first run for office, Trump put American firms on notice that he would be watching their behavior closely – pursuing his corporate antagonists over claims of tax evasion, monopolistic activity, and offshoring US jobs. During 2024’s campaign, he has again explicitly targeted companies planning to move their manufacturing facilities abroad – naming and shaming them. Trump’s repeated talking points on the campaign trail of going after his opponents – the so-called “<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/15/us/politics/trump-opponents-enemy-within.html"><u>enemy from within</u></a>,” lay bare how personal a second presidential term would be for him.</p><p>On foreign policy, recent suggestions that Trump has been in communication with Russian President <strong>Vladimir Putin</strong> since leaving the White House in 2021 are telling. Although the former president denies any such engagement with Putin, he has said it would be “a smart thing” to do. Trump is convinced that, with another term in office, he would be able to broker a quick end to the war in Ukraine, thanks in part to his relationship with Putin, and perhaps also the Middle East (a near quagmire) because he can get Israel’s President <strong>Benjamin Netanyahu</strong> on the phone.</p><p>A US foreign policy strategy centered around Trump's personal influence and negotiation style would have significant implications. It could cue everything from sudden withdrawals from international institutions and US partnerships, as with the Paris Climate Agreement and TPP during his first term, and sharp reprisals for perceived slights like the threat of automotive tariffs on European allies to withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over unfair burden sharing. Having witnessed this volatility during Trump 1.0, US partners across Europe and the Indo-Pacific await a Trump sequel on pins and needles.</p><p>The 2024 Republican Party platform positions Trump as the “Champion of the American People,” rescuing them from “our” politicians who have sold jobs and livelihoods overseas. This year’s Democratic Party platform, crafted before Harris entered the race, strikes a very different tone. It speaks of standing together for America as the US faces an inflection point.</p><p>American voters must soon decide between the distinct leadership styles of Trump and Harris – a choice of a central, dominant figure in decision-making vs. one focused on consensus-building – amid a host of domestic and global challenges.</p><p><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/lindsayrsnewman"><em>L</em></a><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/lindsayrsnewman"><em>indsay Newman</em></a><em> is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>The world is knocking on the door</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/the-world-is-knocking-on-the-door</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfw2xxkzd807lqlwi9iod9</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 30 Sep 2024 16:12:04 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>us election</category>
<category>foreign policy</category>
<category>us foreign policy</category>
<category>kamala harris</category>
<category>elections 2024</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>When the next US president assumes office on Jan. 20, 2025, they will likely encounter a geopolitical landscape with wars in the Middle East, Ukraine, and Sudan, the threat of a nuclear Iran, US-China tech and space races flaring, and a host of other global challenges, from climate and inequities to radicalization. Yet, no one knows what the incoming US leadership will do about the tests ahead.</description>
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<media:credit>Christian Offenberg via Reuters</media:credit>
<media:text>The White House in Washington, DC.</media:text>
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<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcwartd5ku07lqjcbzqjdt" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It has already been a dangerous week for the world. After months of trading aerial attacks, Israel’s northern border with Lebanon has shifted from a watchpoint to the brink of a ground invasion and wider regional conflict.</p><p>As Gov. <strong>Tim Walz</strong> and Sen.<strong> JD Vance&nbsp;</strong>take the debate stage tonight for the only vice presidential debate of this election season, everyone from global leaders to young people is asking: What will the next US president do with the world they are inheriting?</p><p>In his final remarks before last week’s United Nations General Assembly, President <strong>Joe Biden</strong> sought to remind the international audience of his 40-year political career. Biden’s speech framed the Afghanistan withdrawal as much-needed, the global coalition in support of Ukraine a resounding success, and new partnerships like the Quad as pillars for the US’s future.</p><p>Despite the personal highlight reel, Biden’s global legacy hangs in the balance. After dropping his reelection bid, it was widely reported that Biden viewed ending the war in Gaza as the top priority for the remainder of his term. Months of negotiations and tireless trips to the region by US Secretary of State <strong>Antony Blinken</strong>, the Central Intelligence Agency’s Director <strong>Bill Burns,</strong> and others have translated into almost no tangible progress on a May 2024 US cease-fire proposal. Senior US officials<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-hamas-deal-unlikely-before-end-of-bidens-term-u-s-officials-say-efc21510"> <u>acknowledged</u></a> earlier this month that a deal is neither imminent nor likely.</p><p>Instead, a second front along Israel’s north has gone from warm to blazing hot. This weekend’s assassination of longstanding Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-did-not-have-advanced-warning-israeli-strike-beirut-pentagon-says-2024-09-27/"><u>reportedly</u></a> without US awareness) followed by targeted Israeli strikes against Iran’s “axis of resistance” in both Syria and Yemen have sent shockwaves through the region.</p><p>When the next US president assumes office on Jan. 20, 2025, they will likely encounter a geopolitical landscape with wars in the Middle East, Ukraine, and Sudan, the threat of a nuclear Iran, US-China tech and space races flaring, and a host of other global challenges, from climate and inequities to radicalization. As we saw with last week’s UNGA, global engagement and interconnectivity may be at an all-time high. Yet, no one knows what the incoming US leadership will do about the tests ahead.</p><p>In speaking last week with leaders of the next generation across Europe and Africa as part of an election-related conversation for<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/academy/common-futures-conversations"> <u>Chatham House’s Common Futures Conversations</u></a><em>&nbsp;</em>project, the desire for clarity from the US is clear. There is anxiety that US voters will not reject former President <strong>Donald Trump’s</strong> America First brand of isolationism in November. Trump worried Europe earlier this year when he claimed he would encourage Russia to do whatever it wanted with any NATO member not paying their fair share of defense. Likewise, his plans to impose blanket tariffs of 20% on all imports, including those manufactured by US allies and partners, are ringing the alarm that American friendship may not be what it once was.</p><p>Alternatively, if American voters reject Trumpism, a status quo foreign policy strategy under Vice President <strong>Kamala Harris</strong> is also considered unsatisfactory. There is a sense that more unfulfilled rhetoric of democratic resilience and values will not move the needle for the next generation. There’s a nagging concern that even under a Harris administration the US may be turning inward,<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://kamalaharris.com/issues/"> <u>focusing on</u></a> “American workers, innovation, and industry.” What will this mean for the future of development aid and foreign investment across Africa and elsewhere?</p><p>Instead, these young voices are hoping for new solutions – and innovation – in US foreign policy that acknowledge the attitude and norm shifts they are experiencing as well as the technological change and saturated information environment around them.</p><p>There are two camps about this moment in US geopolitical history. One side draws a trendline from Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and over-reliance on tariffs and sanctions to the Biden administration’s “<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/04/27/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-renewing-american-economic-leadership-at-the-brookings-institution/"><u>small yard and high fence</u></a>” as the start of the US retrenchment from global leadership.<a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/history-has-its-eyes-on-us"> <u>Another side</u></a> says the US remains the most important actor in every room it enters and will continue to set the global agenda.</p><p>We may only know in hindsight if this decade turned out to be a turning point. For now, it seems clear that the world is still knocking on the door of the White House, asking for a glimpse of the blueprint ahead.</p><p><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/lindsayrsnewman"><em>Lindsay Newman</em></a><em> is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>US election leaps into the unknown</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/us-election-leaps-into-the-unknown</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfvb3xkx5z07lqoczkmq3y</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 16 Sep 2024 19:04:17 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>elections 2024</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>2024 presidential election</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>kamala harris</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>Last week’s presidential debate between Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump marked the final scheduled milestone before Election Day on Nov. 5. It also bookended a summer of surprises that began with President Joe Biden’s disastrous debate performance against Trump on June 27.</description>
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<media:credit>Jeremy Hogan/SOPA Images via Reuters</media:credit>
<media:text>Vice President Kamala Harris speaks on TV during a debate with her opponent, former President Donald Trump, on Sept. 10, 2024.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Last week’s presidential debate between Vice President <strong>Kamala Harris</strong> and former President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> marked the final scheduled milestone before Election Day on Nov. 5. It also bookended a summer of surprises that began with President <strong>Joe Biden’s</strong> disastrous debate performance against Trump on June 27.<br></p><p>With no additional tests on the calendar after Trump quelled the possibility of a follow-up debate, and as the race enters its closing stages, both campaigns should be asking themselves what more they must do to win in November.</p><p>For Trump, the answer may be very little. Since the start of 2024, Trump’s <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/favorability/donald-trump/">favorability</a> rating has hovered consistently around 43%. His polling averages have maintained a narrow bandwidth of roughly 45-47%. Over the same period, Trump defeated a primary pool of Republican presidential hopefuls, became the first former president to be <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/no-one-above-the-law">convicted of a crime</a> (sentencing on 34 felony convictions will be after the election), faced an attempt on his life at a campaign rally, selected a largely <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/favorability/jd-vance/">unfavorable</a> running mate in Sen.<strong> JD Vance</strong>, and saw his long-preferred opponent replaced with an untested female candidate. An incident this weekend at the Trump International Golf Club in West Palm Beach is being investigated as a second assassination attempt against Trump.</p><p>In economic terms, sentiment and intentions around Trump appear to be rigidly inelastic. Should Trump continue along this course, which would seem to allow for quite a wide margin of behavior and developments, it is already fairly clear where he will land in November. As in both 2016 and 2020, Trump is likely to secure approximately 46% of the popular vote. The election in 2016, of course, brought Trump to power. The election in 2020 saw him removed from the White House.</p><p>Continuing with the analogy, Harris’ prospects are much more subject to “price sensitivity.” Harris’ potential ceiling of support is a meaningful known unknown. When she entered the race in July, only 37% had a <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/favorability/kamala-harris/">favorable</a> view of the VP, who had played a largely behind-the-scenes role in the Biden administration and had not caught fire during her presidential run in 2020. By mid-September, Harris’ favorability is at 46% and climbing. The nearly 10% swing in popularity suggests she may not yet have reached her favorability peak.</p><p>On voting intentions, much was made earlier this month of a <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/08/upshot/trump-harris-poll-analysis.html">poll</a> that found Trump leading Harris by a single percentage point. A widely circulated interpretation of the poll was that, after a remarkable run in August, Harris had reached an inevitable campaign skid. Yet, over the period polled, Trump continued to absorb votes from <strong>Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s</strong> suspended campaign that, at its peak, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianbushard/2024/07/09/rfk-jr-support-hits-10-in-polls-as-biden-age-concerns-mount-though-hes-still-not-on-these-state-ballots/">pulled in 10%</a> of the votes. With <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/president/general/2024/trump-vs-harris">aggregate polling</a> placing Harris ahead of Trump in national averages, she may be outpacing him in voter support.</p><p>Still, given the particularities of the US electoral college system, to win the election in November Harris must not only secure enough votes, but she must secure enough votes in the <em>right places</em>. Conventional wisdom holds that to clinch this geographic vote allocation, Harris will need to lead Trump in national averages by multiple percentage points going into Election Day (perhaps even upwards of four percentage points). <strong>Hillary Clinton</strong> learned this the hard way in 2016 when she won the popular vote but not the Oval Office. Biden made sure he remembered Clinton’s lesson in 2020.</p><p>Harris’ campaign strategy since entering the race appears to be an appetizer of generic Democratic policy and a main course of <a href="https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/democrats-are-running-a-campaign-built-on-vibes">good vibes</a>. To translate this recipe into further polling gains, Democrats must execute a coordinated ground operation, leveraging the uptick in campaign volunteers since Harris became the party’s nominee. Harris’ campaign must also remain hyper-focused on undecided voters across key swing states like Arizona, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Her intentional reference to 800,000 Polish Americans living in Pennsylvania during the debate exchange on Russia reflects an awareness that this election will come down to just a few thousand voters across a handful of swing states.</p><p>And in a year that saw <strong>George Clooney</strong> effectively end Biden’s candidacy, the power of <strong>Taylor Swift’s</strong> post-debate endorsement of Harris cannot be discounted. Turning out voters is the task at hand, and Swift’s support has already <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/taylor-swift-endorsement-harris-vote-b2611246.html">reportedly</a> led hundreds of thousands to consider casting their votes.</p><p>This has been a noisy election season. After primaries, conventions, assassination attempts, a candidate swap, and two consequential presidential debates, both campaigns have nothing left to do but head for the finish line. With Trump’s favorability and polling essentially known, the signal that’s emerging is: This is Harris’ race to win.</p><p><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/lindsayrsnewman"><em>Lindsay Newman</em></a><em> is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em><br></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Foreign policy tests lurk within the US election</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/foreign-policy-tests-lurk-within-the-us-election</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfuleukuv207lqw8rmozfo</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 02 Sep 2024 22:54:18 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>kamala harris</category>
<category>russia</category>
<category>ukraine</category>
<category>politics</category>
<category>china</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>By all accounts, the 47th president of the United States will have plenty on the domestic to-do list once they assume office on Jan. 20, 2025.</description>
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<media:credit>Brendan McDermid/REUTERS</media:credit>
<media:text>Supporters hold placards as Democratic presidential nominee and US Vice President Kamala Harris visits North Western High School in Detroit, Mich., on Sept. 2, 2024.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By all accounts, the 47th president of the United States will have plenty on the domestic to-do list once they assume office on Jan. 20, 2025. The US continues to navigate a post-COVID hangover with inflation hovering higher than before the pandemic and a long-expected interest rate reduction remaining just beyond reach.</p><p>In the latest indicator of economic health, the<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.bls.gov/ces/notices/2024/2024-preliminary-benchmark-revision.htm"> <u>US Bureau of Labor Statistics</u></a> revised downward its estimate of jobs created for the year ending in March 2024 to the tune of 818,000. These numbers matter to US voters, who are feeling it in their pocketbooks. Measures of<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://news.gallup.com/610757/2024-presidential-election-center.aspx"> <u>economic confidence</u></a> have fallen through 2024, even as inflation, pricing pressures, and the economy continue to be top issues for voters.</p><h3>Will isolationism win?</h3><p>Yet, if the last four years have taught us anything, it is that developments abroad and the demands on US foreign policy are never dormant. Given the stakes, global leadership has been tracking former President <strong>Donald Trump’s</strong> words closely over the last year. Now, with Vice President <strong>Kamala Harris’</strong> historically late entrance into the race, the world is left wondering if isolationism will win in November, or if something else (but what <em>is it</em>?) may drive the US approach to the world over the next four years.</p><p>Trump has never been one to shy away from the headlines. Earlier this year, he sent ripples across Europe when he claimed he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” to any NATO member not paying their fair share on defense. Given prior reports that Trump contemplated pulling the US from NATO during his first administration, this warning focused the minds and dominated conversations across European security circles. His VP running-mate selection of Sen. <strong>JD Vance</strong>, an opponent of US security guarantees, has more recently exacerbated those concerns.</p><p>From promises to ending the war in Ukraine upon taking office by negotiating on favorable terms with Russia to a<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/platform"> <u>policy platform</u></a> that includes “building a great iron dome missile defense shield over our entire country,” Trump’s America First brand of foreign policy has become synonymous with a go-it-alone, pull-up-the-drawbridge isolationism.</p><p>With unresolved conflicts remaining (Ukraine, Israel, Sudan) and potential stressors lurking (South China Sea, the wider Middle East region, the Arctic), many allies and adversaries of the US await a Trump 2.0 with apprehension. President <strong>Joe Biden’s</strong> exit and Harris’ stepping into the 2024 campaign have represented a potential reprieve for these anxieties.</p><h3>Glimpses of Harris’ vision begin to seep through</h3><p>Despite plenty of reporting on the alternative, relatively little is known about what a Harris foreign policy agenda would look like. In her nomination acceptance speech at last month’s Democratic National Convention, Harris spoke at length about the US’ global role and the need to be “steadfast in advancing our security and values abroad.”</p><p>She touched on the range of ongoing territorial tensions – from China and Russia-Ukraine to the Middle East – as well as borderless challenges like artificial intelligence and space. In a particularly insightful, behind-the-scenes moment, Harris described meeting with President <strong>Volodymyr Zelensky</strong> five days before Russia attacked Ukraine to warn him of the planned invasion.</p><p>While conventional wisdom suggests that Harris represents a policy continuity story for Democrats, there are early indications that as president she would chart her own course. In her DNC speech, Harris sought to associate herself with the Biden administration’s perceived successes (the global coalition for Ukraine), distance herself from its missteps (the Afghanistan withdrawal), and introduce daylight where she has apparent conviction. The clearest evidence of that daylight thus far has been on Israel, where Harris has projected a sense that she holds multiple difficult truths in parallel. In her first sit-down interview since accepting the nomination, Harris revealed little more of her plan for resolving the conflict, saying only that a deal must get done.</p><p>Perhaps the biggest indicator to follow is personal, or personnel. It has long been believed that current national security advisor Jake Sullivan would not stay on through a second Biden administration. With Harris being guided by a separate set of policy strategists, including her national security advisor <strong>Philip Gordon</strong>, the major architects of Biden’s foreign policy – Biden himself, Sullivan, Sec. of State <strong>Antony Blinken</strong> and Sec. of Defense <strong>Lloyd Austin</strong> – may all be out of the Situation Room.</p><p>Greater understanding of both Harris’ foreign and domestic policy priorities will be filled in over the coming weeks, including with the first Harris-Trump debate currently set for Sept. 10. Given Trump’s warm embrace of isolationism, there is a growing sense abroad that only a Harris presidency stands between the world as it is and a very different – and more precarious – geopolitical trajectory.</p><p><a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://x.com/lindsayrsnewman"><em>Lindsay Newman</em></a><em> is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Democrats are running a campaign built on vibes</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/democrats-are-running-a-campaign-built-on-vibes</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrftyamk1kw07myomlia0vr</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 19 Aug 2024 20:58:04 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>democrats</category>
<category>kamala harris</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>republicans</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>democratic party platform</category>
<category>elections 2024</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>Dems chose not to update their party platform despite switching the name atop their ticket from Joe Biden to Kamala Harris. Instead, they stuck with a version approved in mid-July – from before Biden dropped out of the race. The platform frames a battle between “opportunity and optimism” versus “revenge and retribution,” laying bare a fundamental difference between the 2024 Democratic and Republican campaigns: one is about atmospherics, and the other is deeply personal.</description>
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<media:credit>REUTERS/Mike Blake</media:credit>
<media:text>Attendees walk past a sign at the United Center ahead of the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Illinois, on Aug. 19, 2024.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In standard practice and just days ahead of the party’s Democratic National Convention, Democrats released their 2024 policy platform over the weekend. The rest of the race, however, has been anything but typical.<br></p><p>In the latest twist, Democrats chose not to update their party platform despite the name atop the ticket switching from <strong>Joe Biden</strong> to <strong>Kamala Harris</strong>. Instead, they opted to stick with a version approved in mid-July – from before Biden dropped out of the race. The platform frames a battle between “opportunity and optimism” versus “revenge and retribution,” laying bare a fundamental difference between the 2024 Democratic and Republican campaigns: one is about atmospherics, and the other is deeply personal.</p><p>In the month that Harris has sat atop the ticket, she has overseen a near-total change in the campaign narrative. Until July 21, 2024, Biden and former President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> had spent months locked in a protracted and bleak conversation about who was the bigger threat to democracy. Was age the more significant concern? How would the US manage a president with felony convictions? For months, US voters sat on the sidelines of a slow walk to a repeat of the 2020 election, which a meaningful proportion of<a target="_blank" href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/04/24/in-tight-presidential-race-voters-are-broadly-critical-of-both-biden-and-trump/"> those polled</a> did not want.</p><p>With Biden’s exit from the race in July and the surprisingly seamless convergence around Harris, the storyline has shifted from a rerun to a “new way forward,” to take one of the vice president’s campaign taglines. And as the 2024 party platform reflects, for Dems, this way forward need not be connected to one politician or another.</p><p>Despite the newfound support for Harris – her campaign raised a reported $200 million during her first week as the candidate – this is not yet the Harris Democratic party. Harris is a conduit for Democrats who were searching for a lifeline out of a crisis and a path to preserve their November ambitions. If the policy platform is not updated to any specific Harris policy viewpoint, that’s not seen as a hindrance. If her vision of an “opportunity economy” is<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.axios.com/2024/08/19/kamala-harris-inflation-economic-policy-proposals"> questioned by economists</a>, it deserves only a bit of hand-wringing. While a Harris presidency would likely move policy in impactful ways, what is driving the moment for Democrats is unity behind defeating Trump.</p><p>This campaign tactic or strategy is paying dividends. Harris now leads Trump in head-to-head polling and across key swing states, including Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. For the first time in the 2024 race,<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://globalstrategygroup.app.box.com/s/k8otlzvi1vo0hu187vhaig40y6uhykxx"> the latest monthly polling</a> shows that more voters trust Harris to handle the economy than Trump. These poll results came in even before Harris had the opportunity to present her economic plan last Friday in North Carolina, where she homed in on tackling price gouging, housing insecurity, and rising tax bills.</p><p>In stark contrast, the Republican Party is synonymous with Trump. The party’s policy objectives are intertwined with Trump’s political agenda. The 2024 Republican platform, rife with capitalization and exclamation points, promises to seal the border, end the weaponization of government against the American people, and turn the US into a manufacturing superpower. Each is a key Trump view. As a sign of how far the campaign needle has moved, Trump’s allies are now urging him to return to the more disciplined, issue-based messaging he managed earlier in the 2024 campaign. The risk is that as Democrats go conceptual, Trump becomes too personalized and personal.</p><p>All of this will be on display at this week’s DNC in the Windy City, where a who’s who of Democratic heavyweights and orators – including both Obamas and Clintons – have assembled. Harris will take the stage on Thursday, the final night, to deliver an address under the aspirational theme “For our Future.”</p><p>Just as the race approaches the post-Labor Day homestretch, the world is watching as Democrats inject something into the campaign that has been missing over the long election slog: energy. The party convention represents a key test of both how well Harris can hold the party together, including around fault-line issues like the Israel-Gaza conflict, and whether Democrats can sustain the good vibes over the final push of the campaign season.</p><p><a target="_blank" href="https://x.com/lindsayrsnewman"><em>Lindsay Newman</em></a><em> is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p><p><a rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/novembers-election-is-so-close-and-yet-so-far?xrs=RebelMouse_fb&amp;ts=1722371306"></a></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>November’s election is so close and yet so far</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/novembers-election-is-so-close-and-yet-so-far</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfsxhhkpxx07lq2ixkji1q</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jul 2024 17:27:56 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>biden puppet</category>
<category>white house</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>2024 presidential election</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>kamala harris</category>
<category>elections 2024</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>Come Nov. 5, will the anti-incumbency, anti-establishment sentiment circling the globe prove decisive? Does age – first Biden’s but potentially now Trump’s – matter? Is the existential threat to US democracy the single and most animating force for voters? Did Harris’s entrance come too late?</description>
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<media:credit>Nathan Howard/Pool via REUTERS</media:credit>
<media:text>Vice President Kamala Harris attends the opening of a pop-up ice cream shop &quot;Smize &amp; Dream&quot; owned by Tyra Banks, in Washington, US, on July 19, 2024.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If the last two weeks of the US election campaign have demonstrated anything, it is that history is unfolding rapidly and in every direction. With news that President <strong>Joe Biden</strong> would step out of the race for reelection, Democrats faced a moment without parallel. The task at hand was to identify a new candidate quickly, aim for unity, and sprint first to the Democratic National Convention beginning Aug. 19 and then to the election finish line on Nov. 5.</p><p>For the US election apparatus, it likely feels like an impossible challenge under urgent, abridged circumstances. For those watching from abroad, the duration of the US presidential election cycle – beginning immediately after the mid-term elections and spanning nearly two years – has always been a bit of a headscratcher. The United Kingdom completed snap elections earlier this month that lasted six weeks from start to finish. Even President <strong>Emmanuel Macron’s</strong> decision to surprise Europe with elections in France held the country in suspense for just under a month. The lengthening of the US election timeline across modern presidential history, alongside the ballooning of campaign financing, may feel foundational to democracy. But seen through a comparative lens, these dynamics are idiosyncratically American.<br></p><p>Amid this major test of the US political system, Vice President <strong>Kamala Harris</strong> has enjoyed a storybook start to her presidential campaign. Just over a week in, she could not have written it up better if she tried. With Senate Majority Leader <strong>Chuck Schumer</strong>, House Minority Leader <strong>Hakeem Jeffries,&nbsp;</strong>and President <strong>Barack&nbsp;</strong>and<strong> Michelle Obama</strong> all endorsing her this past week, Harris saw the last of the dominoes fall in her favor. She can check the first benchmark, party unity, off her to-do list.</p><p>Harris’s campaign has seen a stunning inflow of donations that have reportedly broken historical records. Her early campaign messaging of fighting for America’s future, and the imagery of Harris as prosecutor versus the perpetrator, former President <strong>Donald Trump</strong>, is resonating. Latest head-to-head polling puts Harris and Trump at a virtual statistical tie, offering an ingredient for the Democratic campaign that Biden could not seem to bring: <em>belief</em>. Harris has Democrats believing she can expand the umbrella of potential constituencies and deliver a wider Democratic coalition in November. Harris even conquered social media with Charli XCX labeling her “brat,” which will perhaps prove to be the 2024 version of former <strong>Obama’s</strong> 2008 one-word mantra of “Hope.”</p><p>Leaders and watchers from abroad who have been wringing their hands for months over prospects of a Trump 2.0 find themselves taking a crash course on Harris. Without absolute clarity about what a Harris presidency would look like, the safe bet is that she will represent a policy continuity story for the Democrats. Foreign policy is particularly a “black box.” Unlike Biden, Harris is not known for her foreign policy experience. Having made fewer than two dozen trips abroad during her vice presidency, Harris was never assigned a foreign policy “patch” as VP and served more as a surrogate for high-level conferences and meetings like the Munich Security Conference.</p><p>Across the aisle, Trump is also waking up to the full reality of Harris’s candidacy. His plan to run down the clock to November by appealing to his base now faces alarm bells. Where his address at the Republican National Convention and selection of Sen. <strong>JD Vance</strong> as his running mate seemed like obvious tactics in the pre-Harris world, the risk is that Trump has narrowed his pathway to victory in November. He must now decide whether and how to get out of the trap he laid for himself, a position he most certainly will reject in favor of rallying cries around election integrity, fraud, and a rigged system.</p><p>Given all that is at play, it is hard to know which election narrative ultimately rings truest on Nov. 5. Will the anti-incumbency, anti-establishment sentiment circling the globe prove decisive? Does age – first Biden’s but potentially now Trump’s – matter? Is the existential threat to US democracy the single and most animating force for voters? Did Harris’s entrance come too late for a political system used to knock-down-drag-out campaign fights? And will there be blood? Whichever trend proves most salient, the summer of 2024 reset the race. The election countdown starts now.</p><p><em>Dr. Lindsay Newman is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Electoral violence comes out of the shadows</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/electoral-violence-comes-out-of-the-shadows</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfs7m7jvwa07myt7x6ah5g</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 15 Jul 2024 21:50:40 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>2024 presidential election</category>
<category>radicalization</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>elections 2024</category>
<category>political violence</category>
<category>assassination</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>us politics</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>The brazen assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump this weekend has pulled from the shadows an inevitable implication of the country’s polarization: the risk of political violence. In this consequential US election year, with questions of institutional legitimacy hanging in the air, misinformation flooding social media, and worries about the fitness of at least one of the candidates, we have now been alerted to how real the threat of violence is for the months ahead.</description>
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<media:credit>REUTERS/Brendan McDermid/File Photo</media:credit>
<media:text>Republican presidential candidate and former US President Donald Trump is assisted by the Secret Service after gunfire rang out during a campaign rally at the Butler Farm Show in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The brazen assassination attempt on former President <strong>Donald Trump</strong> this weekend has pulled from the shadows an inevitable implication of the country’s polarization: the risk of political violence. In this consequential US election year, with questions of institutional legitimacy hanging in the air, misinformation flooding social media, and worries about the fitness of at least one of the candidates, we have now been alerted to how real the threat of violence is for the months ahead.<br></p><p>Elections offer voters an opportunity to express something fundamental about what they expect from their government. This is at least the theoretical underpinning for conducting elections. But in each election, losers also have a responsibility. At its core, democracy is a system in which groups lose elections. Votes are held, results are counted and respected, and turnovers take place. Losers consent to being losers in any given election cycle because they believe they will have the opportunity to be winners in the future.</p><p>If, however, the institutional framework does not allow losers to become winners later, the system’s legitimacy erodes. Losers may withdraw their consent and pursue alternative strategies to access power. Sometimes this leads to boycotting elections, but sometimes the strategy is the use of force.</p><p>When winners repeatedly win and losers repeatedly lose, or if winners are <em>perceived</em> to repeatedly win and losers to lose, ballots may be replaced by bullets. In fact, according to data from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset, in more than 4,000 global elections between 1945 and 2020, just under 19% of them involved significant violence. Nearly one in five elections over the past 75 years turned violent. Already in this pivotal election year, we have seen violence in the run-up to elections in Senegal, Pakistan, South Africa, Mexico (at historic rates), and France.</p><p>In the US, grievances that have been stoked around the legitimacy of the system and how well it is serving voters, travel through the existing fault lines in American politics – particularly political party identification – activating them further. It is now a near-truism that there is little common ground between the two political sides, and the gap is widening.<a target="_blank" href="https://uchicagopolitics.opalstacked.com/uploads/homepage/Polarization-Poll.pdf"> <u>Survey data</u></a> from 2022 and 2023 has repeatedly found that a wide swath of the US population believes the system is rigged, and as much as a quarter of those polled agreed that it may soon be time to take up arms against the government. In 2021, these realities culminated in the Jan. 6 storming of the US Capitol. In 2024, this blueprint heightens the likelihood of civil unrest and violence across the US in the lead-up to and, depending on the outcome, after the election.</p><p>The name <strong>Thomas Matthew Crooks</strong> will now go down in the annals of US history alongside John Hinckley Jr. and Lee Harvey Oswald. While very little is currently known about what motivated Crooks’ attempt, lone-offender terrorism has become all too common. It speaks to a broader thread of radicalization that has emerged from US polarization – as political parties no longer speak to the same set of facts and individuals find themselves moving towards the extremes.</p><p>“Lone actors are difficult to detect and disrupt because of their lack of affiliation,” according to the<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf"> <u>2024 US Intelligence Community’s Annual Threat Assessment</u></a>. “While these violent extremists tend to leverage simple attack methods, they can have devastating, outsized consequences.”</p><p>Yet it would be a mistake to focus too narrowly on Crooks’ character or political affiliation in attempting to make sense of the current US political climate. The polarization, the movement to the poles, the rising radicalization – are not just left (including ecological or animal-rights extremism, anarchists) or right (including racially or ethnically motivated extremism) problems. They are brewing on both sides of the aisle, especially as the center has become hollowed out.</p><p>When Trump was reported to have shouted “Fight” after being pierced by a bullet on Saturday, he was being heard. His message resonated with those who want to see him be returned to the White House in November, and those who just as desperately want to see him lose.</p><p>Security will be stepped up at rallies, this week’s Republican National Convention, August’s Democratic National Convention, and across all campaign stops. But as grievances grow, as fight talk and candidate fitness persist, so too will the shadow of political violence.</p><p><em>Lindsay Newman is the practice head of Global Macro, Geopolitics for Eurasia Group and is based in London. She writes the Views on America column for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Will Biden get caught up in the anti-incumbency trend?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/will-biden-get-caught-up-in-the-anti-incumbency-trend</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfrkv9kl7b07lq4dkbubwj</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 01 Jul 2024 19:15:23 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>incumbency</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>asia</category>
<category>us election</category>
<category>india</category>
<category>elections 2024</category>
<category>europe</category>
<category>presidential election</category>
<category>france</category>
<category>2024 presidential election</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>A major question being asked from abroad this week is what recent global election results tell us about November’s US race. Will US politics get swept up by the anti-incumbent, anti-establishment sentiment seen elsewhere across 2024’s election cycle, eroding the longstanding US norm that current officeholders tend to be hard to displace? And what does this all mean for the particular contest between President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump? Eurasia Group&apos;s Dr. Lindsay Newman weighs in.</description>
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<media:credit>Annie Gugliotta</media:credit>
</media:content>
<media:thumbnail url="https://us-west-2.graphassets.com/cmrcgvnh6064507n8hhitfmjj/cmvrcoc7vcutg07lqfz0iozn1" />
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A major question being asked from abroad this week is what recent global election results tell us about November’s US race. Will US politics get swept up by the anti-incumbent, anti-establishment sentiment seen elsewhere across 2024’s election cycle, eroding the longstanding US norm that current officeholders tend to be hard to displace? And what does this all mean for the particular contest between President <strong>Joe Biden</strong> and former President <strong>Donald Trump</strong>, jumpstarted by last week’s debate?<br></p><p>Already this year, incumbents in South Africa and India saw their majorities stricken, and Senegal’s elections brought an outsider to power. Still, Mexico’s election of Morena’s <strong>Claudia Sheinbaum</strong> pointed in a different direction. With this week’s elections in France, as well as the vote in the United Kingdom that’s almost certain to spell the end of Conservative Party rule, something fundamental appears to be shifting in incumbency politics with relevant signposts for November’s US election.</p><p>It seems clear that the emerging narrative from the current election cycle is a long-COVID story. Persistent inflation, higher-for-longer interest rates, cost-of-living pressures, and elevated unemployment rates are driving voting behavior. Global voters are finding their pocketbooks lighter than before the pandemic, regardless of what their politicians or treasury department statistics may tell them. In 2024, perception has become reality, and this spells peril for incumbents.</p><p>The post-pandemic reckoning around the economic recovery that is taking place this election season may be driving voters away from the center and toward the extremes. One headline from last month's EU Parliament elections was that the center held, and yet, viewed from another perspective, the rise of the right-wing cannot be overlooked. Call it pragmatism, tactical populism, whatever you like — further-right and further-left political parties and politicians are finding themselves inside governments from Italy to Argentina. These movements have now set their sights on France, the UK, and the US.</p><p>When UK Prime Minister <strong>Rishi Sunak</strong> called a snap election for July 4, it felt like an inauspicious date to have chosen for what is likely to be “independence” from 14 years of Tory party rule. That’s a stunning duration of time that masks a declining trajectory since 2021, with roots likely in 2016’s Brexit referendum. Sunak’s snap call has awoken <strong>Nigel Farage</strong> and the right-wing Reform UK party, which according <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/united-kingdom/"><u>to the latest polling</u></a>, is a stone’s throw from overtaking the Tories for a second-place finish. This means that as Labour readies for a win, the most dominant political party for nearly a decade and a half faces an extinction-level political event.</p><p>While the party system in the US may be on a stronger footing than the UK this election cycle, parallels for the US election can still be drawn. It has long been said that US politics is polarized and that left-right fault lines are increasingly deep, allowing for fewer points of convergence.<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/"> <u>According to polling conducted 10 years ago</u></a>, the share of Americans expressing consistently conservative or consistently liberal viewpoints doubled in two decades. The 2014 story was not only a polarization story, but also a partisan one. Ten years ago, people felt more conservative (or liberal) and more intensely identified as Republican (or Democrat) than in the past. Jumping forward to today, it is a near-truism that there is little common ground between the two political sides, and the gap is widening. According to the American National Election Studies’<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://electionstudies.org/data-tools/anes-guide/anes-guide.html?chart=affective_polarization_parties"> <u>latest data</u></a>, affective polarization has accelerated over the last decade. Today, only 21% of Democrats report positive feelings for Republicans, and only 18% of Republicans report positive feelings for their Democratic counterparts.</p><p>As a consequence of these trends, President <strong>Joe Biden</strong> has tried moving further to the left on certain issues to address the risk of “uncommitted” voters as well as younger and more progressive voting blocs. On the other side, former President <strong>Donald Trump</strong>, rather than seeking to appeal to more moderate voters, is sticking with messages about an (economic) “blood bath” that appeal to his base. In a sign of the times, <a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/reuters-ipsos-core-political-survey-presidential-approval-tracker-may-2024"><u>polling</u></a> in May found that “political extremism and threats to democracy” trails only the economy as the most important problem facing the country ahead of November’s elections. And in troubling news for Biden’s reelection camp, voters tend to trust Trump – at least on the economy – more than the president.</p><p>Politics may be cyclical. But cycles can be generational. With roughly half of the world’s population taking to the polls this year, who will be leading and what policies they set at home will have consequences beyond borders and for years to come. The post-pandemic reckoning taking place across India, South Africa, and Mexico is building momentum that hits Europe this week. By November, the US may find itself caught up in this global tide, driving disaffected voters from the familiar middle ground and toward the poles, bringing potentially bad news for today’s incumbents.</p><p><em>Lindsay Newman is the practice head of Global Macro, Geopolitics for Eurasia Group and is based in London. She writes the Views on America column for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>History has its eyes on US</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/history-has-its-eyes-on-us</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfqw59kj8h07lq0ja860dz</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2024 16:52:49 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>us election</category>
<category>g7</category>
<category>2024 presidential election</category>
<category>elections 2024</category>
<category>joe biden</category>
<category>News</category>
<description>In the (re)run-up to another Trump-Biden election season, all eyes are again on US voters and the choice they have set before themselves. Tariffs and trade policy are up for grabs, while the energy and regulatory environment face “sliding doors,” and diplomatic and multilateral engagement find themselves on different courses.</description>
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<media:credit>Ari Winkelman</media:credit>
</media:content>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the run-up to the 2020 election, Europe was preoccupied with the future of the transatlantic relationship. In London, almost every conversation among think tanks, civil society, and diplomatic circles eventually came around to the so-called special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, just then wrestling with its Brexit bet.<br></p><p>There was plenty of hand-wringing about whether Donald Trump would be reelected in 2020. The frequently heard view across the pond was that Europeans could forgive Americans for electing Trump for the first time in 2016 – <em>for they knew not what they did</em>. But to return him to office, without the guise of plausible deniability, would mean something else entirely.</p><p>Europe would have been put on notice that US voters had accepted the “America First” embrace. The US was going home, and Europe might need to go it alone.</p><p>As we find ourselves in the (re)run-up to another Trump-Biden election season, all eyes are again on US voters and the choice they have set before themselves in November. Tariffs and trade policy are up for grabs, the energy and regulatory environment face “sliding doors,” and diplomatic and multilateral engagement find themselves on differential courses – on display last week at the annual G7 Summit where Biden sought in his final pre-election summit to keep the wartime band together with new US measures to intensify pressure on Russia and a transatlantic pledge to leverage Russia’s immobilized assets for Ukraine funding.</p><p>It is all too clear that geopolitics is at stake this fall.</p><p><strong>What if the 2020 election vantage point from abroad got it wrong?</strong></p><p>What if, despite the US rethinking its global role, we are still in the age of US primacy after all? Over the past four years, the US may have unwittingly made this case.</p><p>During the pandemic, US pharmaceutical firms – in concert with global researchers – delivered groundbreaking vaccines to save lives. Across the security sphere, the US has led its European partners on a renaissance of NATO, charting the course on both the sanctions to constrain Russia and the military expenditures to bolster Ukraine. Earlier this spring, when further US funding came into doubt, Ukraine and Europe faced a protracted scare. Elsewhere in the Middle East, the US has demonstrated that without any boots on the ground and with untiring diplomatic efforts bearing only partial fruit, it remains a pivotal player in any room. Iran’s attack on Israel on April 13, which saw nearly all of its 300-plus missiles shot down by a US-led coalition supporting Israel, is prime evidence.</p><p>And despite years of hard- versus soft-landing debates, the United States remains the world’s largest economy. In recent years, the Biden administration has been busy trying a new industrial policy on for size, a model now being replicated elsewhere. Meanwhile, the US Federal Reserve has set the global template and pace on fiscal policy.</p><p>The US dollar remains dominant, even as Russia and others that face a widening web of US-led sanctions and tools of economic security have continued to study currency alternatives. According to the Fed’s latest available data (2022), the US dollar represents 58% of global official foreign exchange reserves compared with the next best Euro at 21%. The dollar was involved in roughly 88% of global foreign exchange transactions in April 2022, a figure that has been stable for 20 years.</p><p>According to polling conducted across Europe, Canada, and the United States in 2023 by the German Marshall Fund in its <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2023-09/TT2023_digital-3.pdf">Transatlantic Trends series</a>, 64% of respondents viewed the US as the most influential actor in global affairs (including 62% of Europeans). Lest we overlook it, the same polling found that only 14% viewed China as the most influential global actor.</p><p>Looking across the ocean, the view from Europe looks significantly less lonesome than it did on the cusp of 2020. This might be because Trump did not win in 2020, or it might be that the US is more structurally entrenched in the global system than domestic partisan politics suggests. Will a Biden 2.0 mean the status quo on transatlantic support for Ukraine? Would a Trump 2.0 see the administration drive Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table and pursue a deal that leaves Europe out in the cold? Will Trump’s transactional foreign policy present a sharp test for Europe with more bilateral relationships than multilateral engagement?</p><p>Either way, November’s election and its aftermath will begin to answer these questions.</p><p><em>Lindsay Newman is the practice head of Global Macro, Geopolitics for Eurasia Group and is based in London. She writes the Views on America column for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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<title>No one above the law?</title>
<link>https://www.gzeromedia.com/news/analysis/no-one-above-the-law</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">cmvrfq61ckh4n07lqxzlb8bij</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 03 Jun 2024 16:58:44 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Lindsay  Newman</dc:creator>
<category>trump indictment</category>
<category>donald trump</category>
<category>united states</category>
<category>canada</category>
<category>us election</category>
<category>elections 2024</category>
<category>2024 presidential election</category>
<category>us politics</category>
<category>Analysis</category>
<description>What will former President Donald Trump’s conviction really mean? Dr. Lindsay Newman, head of Global Macro, Geopolitics for Eurasia Group, weighs in with her debut column for GZERO, Views on America.</description>
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<media:credit>JUSTIN LANE/Pool via REUTERS</media:credit>
<media:text>Former US President Donald Trump leaves the courthouse after a jury found him guilty of all 34 felony counts in his criminal trial at the New York State Supreme Court on May 30, 2024.</media:text>
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Speaking at a campaign rally in Iowa in December 2016, then-candidate <strong>Donald Trump</strong> speculated, “I could stand in the middle of 5th Avenue and shoot somebody and I wouldn’t lose voters.”<br></p><p>Among the many Trump remarks that jolted the news cycle over the past eight years, this one springs to mind in the aftermath of Trump’s conviction in New York state court on 34 felonies relating to falsified business records.</p><p>As is clear from the counts, this is purely a paper crime, as no violence was alleged to have been committed. Still, observers from abroad are left to wonder if the verdict will be just another dynamic of US politics that Trump normalizes – and whether a candidate convicted of felonies could now become the American president.</p><h3>No constitutional safety breaks</h3><p>Nothing in the US Constitution precludes Trump from running for president. While each charge carries a maximum of four years in prison, the case will now get tied up in appeals likely to be decided after the election.</p><p>According to the current consensus among legal experts, should the convictions stand, any sentencing (scheduled for 11 July) is likely to be weighted more toward fines than prison time. Barring additional unforeseen circumstances, Trump will become the Republican nominee for the US presidency this summer.</p><p>This raises the question: What does Trump’s conviction really mean? Is this just a tale full of sound and fury but ultimately signifying nothing?</p><h3>Biden’s strategy is key</h3><p>Much now depends on President <strong>Joe Biden</strong>. This election season has been a bruising one for the current administration, and it is just getting started. Headlines have been filled with news of the ongoing Israel-Gaza conflict and domestic campus protest movements – neither of which are gaining Biden votes.</p><p>According to<a target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/democratic-divide-gaza-war-campus-protests-hurting-biden-reutersipsos-poll-finds-2024-05-16/#:~:text=Overall,%20just%2034%%20of%20registered,independents%20and%2022%%20of%20Republicans."> polling</a> from May, only 34% of registered voters approve of Biden’s approach to the war in Israel. And on inflation and the economy, the top issues among voters, Biden’s outlook is equally grim.</p><p>On these leading issues,<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/most-americans-say-economy-and-inflation-are-most-important-issues-determining-who-they-will-support-for-president-in-november"> polling</a> from late May finds that voters trust Trump more than the current president by a double-digit margin. For Trump’s conviction to matter in November, for it to have a half-life beyond the next few weeks, the Biden campaign needs to refocus the attention and capitalize on the potential tailwind offered by the New York conviction by making the election a referendum on Trump and not, as it currently is, a referendum on Biden.</p><h3>A tight race with few persuadable voters</h3><p>Otherwise, November’s election will be run amid calcified partisan politics in America. The election will turn on a handful of swing states – Arizona, Michigan, Georgia, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin – where there are just a small number of undecided voters.</p><p>According to recent<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://poll.qu.edu/poll-release?releaseid=3898"> polling</a>, those leaning toward Trump are particularly unlikely to change their minds. Even<a rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/trump-guilty-verdict-makes-minimal-impact-public-opinion#:~:text=Half%20(49%)%20say%20Trump,Trump%20should%20end%20his%20campaign."> post-verdict polling</a> has found Republican voters to be “sticky,” with only 16% saying that Trump should end his campaign as a result of the conviction.</p><p>Voters standing in the middle may be more flexible, but this election will not just turn on the independents in the center. The greater risk is voters disaffected by a rerun of 2020 stay home – or seek to undermine the electoral process and its results by resorting to political violence. We will likely look back to May 30, 2024, in the election post-mortem, to assess whether the New York conviction moved the needle with these voters.</p><h3>Trump’s exclusive cohort</h3><p>And for those observing from abroad and scratching their heads, with a sense of “how can this all be?” it feels only appropriate to point out that Trump, already in a rare group as a state leader, now joins an even rarified, more exclusive cohort – the convicted former leaders club.</p><p>From Malaysia’s <strong>Najib Razak</strong> to South Africa’s <strong>Jacob Zuma</strong>, and Argentina’s <strong>Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner</strong>, the world is populated by former leaders who fell afoul of the law mostly on financial or corruption charges. This is also something Europe knows a bit about with former French President <strong>Jacques Chirac</strong> convicted of corruption in 2011 (four years after he left office) and the specter of the oft-charged, former Italian Prime Minister <strong>Silvio Berlusconi</strong> still hanging over Italy.</p><p>Trump will be hoping that his prospects look like another fellow traveler along this path – current Brazilian President <strong>Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva</strong>. Lula saw his corruption charges related to the massive Operation Lava Jato annulled in 2021, paving the way for his reelection in 2022.</p><p>With a staggering $52.8 million of funding coming through the door in the 24 hours post-verdict, including a third sent through by first-time donors, Trump may be feeling like he lost on Thursday but will win on Tuesday, Nov. 5.</p><p><em>Lindsay Newman is the practice head of Global Macro, Geopolitics for Eurasia Group and is based in London. She writes the Views on America column for GZERO.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
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