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How Trump fails, nuclearization, geopolitics on AI, and more: Your questions, answered
This is the third and last mailbag of the spring season. Check out the previous two here and here. I will resume the newsletter’s regularly scheduled programming next week, but I hope you’ve found this detour from long-form columns valuable and that I’ve covered some of the things that might have been on your mind.
Here we go (as always, questions lightly edited for clarity).
Gun to your head, what Democrat stands the best chance of becoming president in 2028?
Given how much the country – and the world – will change in the next couple of years, I suspect it'll be someone that nobody has on their shortlist right now. Or did you put money on “The Apprentice” host changing the course of history back in 2013?
School taught us the Founding Fathers created a government of checks and balances, yet I don't see Congress stepping in to curb a dictator-type president. Why?
The system of checks and balances the framers designed in 1787 is resilient, but it has never been failproof. After all, the Constitution is a piece of paper – it isn’t self-enforcing. Ben Franklin’s “a republic, if you can keep it” shows the Founding Fathers recognized as much. One of the things the system needs to work is vigorous conflict between the branches. In other words, elected officials (looking at you, lawmakers) need to be willing to put duty to their office and their country above loyalty to their party.
But the modern American political system, with nationalized parties facing nationalized interests, nationalized polarization, and nationalized partisan media, has no ambition “to counteract ambition” as James Madison intended. This is especially true in Donald Trump’s GOP, which is cowed by the president’s political hold over the Republican voter base and media ecosystem. There’s also a big collective action problem – no one wants to be the first to stick their neck out, at least not until the crisis gets “big enough” to merit losing their jobs.
Given that virtually all of Trump’s actions are via executive orders and, therefore, can be overturned by the next administration, how big of a long-term effect do you think he will have?
Quite big. He’s setting precedents with the destruction of democratic norms, politicization of institutions, erosion of the rule of law, and expansion of executive authority that the next president will be able to build on if they so choose. As my colleagues and I flagged in this year’s Top Risk #2, Rule of Don, “Once precedents are broken by one party, the other tends to follow suit more easily.”
And let’s keep in mind there’s a decent chance the next president is someone Trump effectively anoints, which – presuming he’s still around after 2028 – could mean he’d still have a lot of direct influence. This assumes that free and fair elections are not materially disrupted through the weaponization of the “power ministries” (Justice Department, FBI, IRS). It’s far from my base case given state and local administration of elections, but still, a fatter tail risk than I’m comfortable with.
What’s the most likely way Trump can fail?
After hubris comes nemesis. The pattern is relatively familiar: Trump overplays his hand by picking more and bigger fights than he can win, gets kicked in the head by reality, and is either forced to backtrack or suffers a decline in the polls that threatens to splinter off Republicans in Congress and constrains his ability to implement his agenda.
Whether it’s China responding forcefully to the tariffs, markets revolting against attacks on Fed chair Jay Powell, or Harvard defending its academic independence, we’re already seeing meaningful snapback functions limiting the president. Not from traditional institutions, the courts, or multilateral treaties, but from powerful forces domestically and internationally that are refusing to take it on the chin. When you want to live by the law of the jungle and claim the title of apex predator, you have to win the big fights.
Will Trump’s dramatic “you are on your own” security messaging drive more countries to acquire their own nuclear weapons?
Absolutely, it’s a rational thing to consider in a G-Zero world. I doubt any of them will go nuclear over the next four years, but America’s unreliability already has a number of US allies and partners searching for alternatives to the US umbrella. Germany is likely to work out some form of nuclear-sharing with France and the United Kingdom, whose umbrella could extend across Europe and cover Poland as well. The Poles are also openly contemplating developing independent capabilities. South Korea and Japan are more likely to get their own nukes as a deterrent to Chinese aggression. The big open question is the Middle East, where Saudi Arabia (and maybe Turkey?) could also go down this path if Iran negotiations fail. Bottom line, we’re headed for an era of nuclear proliferation.
What did you think the G-Zero meant? Vibes? Papers? Essays?
How should Canada manage the small but important risk of invasion from the US?
By continuing to make clear that the threat is unacceptable – a view shared by a large majority of Americans, too. As Canadians just did by electing Mark Carney as prime minister, something that was unthinkable only a couple of months ago when his Liberal Party was dead in the water. That should tell Trump (who, by the way, had already ruled out direct military intervention) everything he needs to know about Canadians’ reaction function to foreign aggression.
Can American power be used to stop the bloodshed in Gaza and broker any kind of durable Israeli-Palestinian peace? Should it?
Should it? Of course. Can it? Not in any way that seems politically plausible. After all, Trump is even more pro-Israel than Biden was, and that was a high bar to clear already after what we saw last year. He doesn’t care about the well-being of the Palestinian population. And beyond Biden and Trump, most American voters don’t care enough about foreign lives to change their leaders’ calculus.
Absent heavy political pressure from Washington that isn’t coming, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has little reason to ease the pressure on Gaza, let alone to enter a broader peace process that could end his political career and maybe even land him in prison. Not only does he need to keep the far-right faction of his coalition onside, but most Israeli citizens now support the continuation of the fighting … and no longer support a two-state solution.
How do you think it will end between Ukraine and Russia? Will the Ukrainians be able to get their lands back?
Ukraine will be de facto partitioned, as we said in last year’s Top Risks report. That may be uncontroversial now, but it wasn’t a popular call to make in January 2024, when most of the West (to say nothing of the Ukrainians) was still demanding that Ukraine get all its land back. It wasn’t going to happen then, and it isn’t going to happen now. That would still be true if Kamala Harris had won the US presidency. Even Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledges that Ukraine is militarily incapable of retaking all its territory, while Russia won’t agree to a voluntary return. The question is how much each side will lose – and how much leverage each will gain – by the time they decide enough’s enough. That time just hasn’t arrived yet.
How do you think AI will impact geopolitics by 2040?
I expect we will not recognize our geopolitical order. International relations presume a state-based system with major powers cooperating and competing in the diplomatic, economic, and security realms. Artificial intelligence will blow that premise out of the water. As the digital realm becomes the dominant geopolitical arena, we will shift to a hybrid order where technology companies and governments compete for influence.
States will either completely integrate AI into their systems of governance and decision-making or they’ll be left behind by non-state actors that are growing increasingly sovereign not just in the digital space but in society, the economy, and national security. Closed political systems will have an evolutionary advantage, as power will lie with whoever controls the most data. Open systems will increasingly move toward more centralization, lest they become marginalized in global influence.
In the long run, would you bet against the US? Is it still the land of opportunity?
I’d bet against all national governments in the long run. They are too slow-moving to adapt to what’s coming. Many people living in today’s United States may well continue to thrive in this future. But it will increasingly be up to us – not governments – to make ourselves fit for purpose.
If 75% of the world’s economy and 95% of the world’s population keep globalizing, especially its fastest-growing parts, is it accurate to talk about deglobalization?
No, you’re right, the world as a whole is not deglobalizing. Certainly not digitally, less so once the AI revolution goes truly global. But it is accurate to talk about the United States actively deglobalizing and the US-China relationship decoupling. Both of which have massive structural, long-term implications.
How can we return to a state where facts are less strongly disputed? Can social media ever recover from having become a manipulation-friendly propaganda machine?
Two small but useful, pro-social ideas to start. First, only verify actual people, not bots. Second, make platforms legally responsible for the content created and shared by large accounts that they algorithmically promote. The goal is not to constrain free speech – which, to be clear, should be protected according to our constitution and laws – but to weaken the present incentives to intentionally engineer and maximize outrage and anger to drive user engagement at the expense of our societies and democracies.
Why should I care so much about what’s going on in the world? It feels like it’s more of a headache than anything else. I am doing nothing with all the information that I absorb except complain, get angry, stand in disbelief, and of course, enjoy a lot of memes. But it weighs on me, and sometimes I wonder what the point is.
Because it involves your fellow humans. They’re just like you, only slightly more irritating. And they’re all we have. They’re worth caring about, even if you, your family, and your friends are all doing just fine. Because those people suffering in lands near and far could be you, your family, or your friends. That they aren’t is just an accident, luck of the draw. As John Donne wrote, “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.” If you hear a bell tolling … it may well be tolling for you, my friend.
With all of the chaos unfolding in the US, do you ever wish that you were back in Antarctica?
Not in the slightest. It’s way too cold, and there’s nothing much interesting happening there. Though the whole no Wi-Fi thing would be occasionally welcome.
Does Moose profit from your use of his name, image, and likeness? If not, can I offer him some pro bono legal assistance?
Moose is in it for the art, not the money. Plus, he’s family. He gets two, sometimes three, meals a day – even on days when his content doesn’t perform very well.