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A woman uses a phone next to a fighter of the ruling Syrian body, after members of the ruling Syrian body ousted Syria's Bashar al-Assad, in the Damascus old city, Syria, December 12, 2024.
Trump may follow Biden's line on Syria
On Saturday, not long after Syrian dictator Bashar Assad fled to Russia, Donald Trumpwrote — in all caps — that the United States should stay out of Syria: “This is not our fight,” he wrote. “Let it play out. Do not get involved.”
Trump, Vice-President-elect JD Vance, and Tulsi Gabbard, his nominee as Director of National Intelligence, are all skeptical of American military involvement in the Middle East. But experts think the next US administration will end up taking a position similar to the one taken by President Joe Biden, mostly because it is in the interest of the United States to prevent Syria from becoming a safe haven for international terrorists.
Successful rebel leader Abu Mohammad al-Golani is a former al-Qaida fighter, but he has signaled that he has no interest in transnational terrorism and has sought to give assurances to Druze, Christians, and Alawite religious minorities that the new government of Syria will respect their rights.
Secretary of State Antony Blinkenhas offered to recognize Golani’s new government if he lives up to his promises. At the same time, the US military has been carrying out airstrikes against remnants of the Islamic State terrorist group. Two congressmen have written to Blinken asking him to ease US sanctions on Syria to give the new government a chance to rebuild the economy.
Experts think that although Trump might like to wash his hands of the whole country, American interests will likely require the US government to maintain troops in Syria, at least in the short term. He ordered the withdrawal of US troops from the region during his first term and then reversed his decision when confronted by the facts on the ground.
A satellite image shows a Russian, Gorshkov-class frigate offshore in Tartus, Syria December 10, 2024.
What Russia and Iran have lost in Syria
Yesterday, we talked about why, among all the external powers involved in Syria, Turkey is probably the biggest immediate winner from the fall of Bashar Assad.
Now, we turn to the main losers. There are two, and they are big: Russia and Iran.
Both countries were huge backers of the Assad regime for decades, seeing Syria as the centerpiece of their Middle East policies. That’s why Tehran and Moscow intervened so heavily to support Assad around 2015 when his regime was on its back foot in Syria’s raging civil war.
But last week, as HTS-led militants met little resistance from Syrian government forces on the road to Damascus, both Russia and Iran decided to pull the plug. Now both are, for the time being, largely out of the picture in Syria.
Here’s what each country faces with the end of Assad.
Russia: military installations and clout
The Russian naval base at Tartus is Moscow’s only warm water port. For years, it enabled the Kremlin to project naval power into the Mediterranean and keep NATO on its toes in the region. The Russian airbase at Khmeimim, meanwhile, not only helped Moscow support military forces throughout the Middle East and Africa, but it also featured sophisticated air defenses that gave Russia a role in shaping the Israel-Syria standoff – whenever the IDF launched airstrikes against Iran-aligned targets in Syria, they had to at least be aware of Russia’s air defenses.
Now the fate of those facilities is unclear
Russia has reportedly evacuated some personnel, equipment, and weaponry, but there appears to be at least the possibility of some kind of agreement with HTS that permits Moscow to continue using the Tartus and Khmeimim facilities. As part of that, the Kremlin may seek to exploit its longstanding economic influence in Syria, as well as its potential to serve as a kind of counterbalance if the new government worries about excessive Turkish influence.
But the stakes are high. Russia will have a hard time replacing these facilities elsewhere in the region. US allies like Egypt or the Gulf states are unlikely to host Russian assets for fear of blowback from Washington. And while Russia has friends in Libya and Algeria, it would take years to construct facilities as sophisticated as what the Kremlin had in Syria.
Beyond the potential hard-power hits, Russia’s soft power has suffered too. Assad wasn’t the only embattled leader who leaned on Moscow for support in the face of severe pressure from the West. But Moscow’s inability, or unwillingness, to come to Assad’s aid in his final hours of need might raise alarm among the Maduros, Diaz Canels, Kims, and Lukashenkos of the world. The value of an alliance with Vladimir Putin just lost a few kopeks on the ruble.
Iran: a regional strategy in ruins
Whatever losses Russia has suffered, they pale next to the impact on Iran. Syria was the centerpiece of Iran’s once-powerful “Axis of Resistance” against Israel and the United States. The country was critical for Tehran’s Hezbollah proxies next door in Lebanon who got Iranian weapons and rear support via Syria while also profiting from the country’s smuggling markets and illicit narcotics industries. In addition, the Assad regime reliably bought tens of billions of dollars worth of oil that Iran couldn’t sell elsewhere because of Western sanctions.
And lastly, Syria was an extra 70,000 square miles of friendly territory between Iran and its regional arch-enemies in Israel, important for a Tehran that is perpetually worried about the prospect of Israeli strikes on its nuclear program or other military installations.
True, the new Syrian government, run for now by the supposedly reformed Sunni jihadists of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, isn’t likely to be much friendlier to Israel. And the IDF has already destroyed much of the military hardware that Assad’s regime left behind, for fear of it falling into hostile hands. But HTS views Iran and Hezbollah as arch-enemies, making it harder for Tehran to picture an HTS-led Syria as a dependable deterrent against Israel.
Take all of that together with Israel’s decapitation and defanging of Hezbollah and Hamas – Iran’s two main proxies in the region – and Tehran’s regional clout is at its lowest ebb in years.
The Iranian government has tried to put a brave face on all of this, declaring earlier this week that it would “use all its regional and international capacities to stop the crimes of the Zionist regime against Syria.”
The trouble for Iran, like Russia, is that in one fell swoop, much of those regional and international capacities now lie in ruins.
Ian Bremmer on Assad's fall
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:
A Quick Take over the weekend. Yet again, because there is entirely too much blowing up around the world. Here, I want to focus on Syria where just a few hours ago Bashar Assad, the dictator, forced out, overthrown by a large number of militarily strong opposition forces led by the radical Islamist group HTS.
A lot to talk about here. This whole thing lasted less than two weeks, and initially the Russians and the Iranians provided military support for Assad, but his complete inability of his army to fight and offer resistance, and the distraction that the Russians have, they're stretched-thin from their fighting in Ukraine, from the Iranians providing support to resistance forces that are doing very badly against Israel, particularly Hezbollah and Lebanon, meant there wasn't all that much capacity, or even that much political will, to provide support. And so, Assad has been overthrown.
By itself that's good news, in the sense that this has been an incredibly repressive regime fighting initially a war against their own people. The pro-democracy movement that came out of the Arab Spring and has led to over 500,000 Syrians dead over the last decade, over 200,000 of them civilians, and some 6 million refugees, both fleeing into neighboring Arab states but also into Europe, into Turkey, and of course in Germany, which is part of the reason that Merkel ended up leaving her terms in ignominy. That is the initial background.
And there has been a lot of support for various opposition groups in Syria, from Turkey, most notably from the UAE, from Saudi Arabia, and from the United States, while the Assad government was being supported principally by the Russians in terms of air support, some intelligence, some cyber capabilities, and from the Iranians on the ground, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. And that was largely enough through the majority of this war. The rebel groups by 2018 had retreated into the northwest, this Idlib region. And by that point, the rebels that were left were mostly led by ISIS, and that meant a common enemy on the part of the United States.
And Turkey had turned from Assad to the proximate Syrian part of the war on terror. And if that had failed, it had the potential to turn Syria and neighboring Iraq into a terrorist state. ISIS lost that battle. Assad consolidated most of Syria under his regime. And then about four years ago, Turkey and Russia brokered a ceasefire in Idlib, which was at that point under opposition control.
That brings us to today, and to HTS, which stands for Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. It's a former Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria that has since formally cut their ties with the terrorists, but they're still called a terrorist organization, labeled one by the United States and its allies in NATO. And they are the de facto leader of the armed opposition and led the now ouster of Assad. Now, they've become kind of Hezbollah-like in the sense that they're providing a lot of Syrian citizens with government services. They've managed to coordinate rebels and eliminate infighting underneath that, and they've also promised to protect Syrian Christians and Muslim Alawites and have gotten the tacit support of the Turkish Erdoğan government, who basically gave them at least a blinking yellow if not a green light to go ahead and launch this war against Assad two weeks ago.
Now, having said all of that, the likelihood that they're going to run as a secular government, Syria, seems unlikely to me. This is, we're going from Assad to what is probably going to be a radical Islamist government that'll be repressive and that'll be deeply challenging. And so I don't think that is in any way, at least at this point, something that we can call a transition that's good news or that we shouldn't feel anxiety about. But what is clear is that the Iranians and Russians have lost. So the axis of resistance is not looking like much of an axis and it's not putting up very much resistance. The Russians, Putin has said nothing about this. He's not made a public statement, and that's not surprising. Frequently when he is surprised and he faces sudden embarrassing losses, he doesn't say anything about it to his people. And if you look at Russian state media, they've been talking about France, and South Korea, and Trump, and all those things, but almost no coverage of Syria, where the Russians have lost an ally and they've lost a military base that's important to them in Tartus and they've not been able to put up much of a fight.
Now, the good news there is that if you're Putin, you should be more cognizant of the fact that there are major costs of continuing to fight an incredibly bloody war in Ukraine where you're making some gains, territorially, but you're losing huge numbers of Russian citizens. And so if Trump is coming in and says he wants to cut a deal, Putin should be more incented to do that. There's also good news on the Iranian front in the sense that Syria falling means that they no longer have a corridor to provide military support for Hezbollah. And that means that the two-month ceasefire, which has been announced by the Israelis and by the Lebanese government, is more likely to hold.
Now, if you put those two things together, kind of interesting. Looks more likely that Trump gets inaugurated, and he is indeed able to announce that the temporary ceasefire becomes a permanent end of the war between Israel and Hezbollah, and that he's able to negotiate a ceasefire between the Russians and Ukrainians that does not give up the store to Putin. The former is an easier bet than the latter, but both of them certainly look more likely on the back of Assad being ousted.
The bad news? More challenges, more humanitarian degradation for the Syrian people on the ground. Could easily see another million refugees on the back of the fighting that we've had, depending on what happens with governance going forward. There are very few hospitals that are presently functioning. There is very limited humanitarian aid on the ground, that's necessary in very short order. And it's hard to say that fighting isn't going to break out amongst the various factions that have held together in fighting a common enemy, if that's going to lead to coherent governance going forward, it depends so much on what happens when HTS becomes not the leader of a rebel group but suddenly is responsible for governance on the ground in Syria. And your guess is as good as anyone as to what is going to happen there.
So, that is the best I can tell where we are right now. It's a fascinating issue and a temporary expansion of the war in the Middle East, but hopefully one that we can see bringing a little bit of stability to some other conflicts that are happening in the region and more broadly. That's it for me, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
- Podcast: Syria, The Rise and Fallout of the House of Assad with Sam Dagher ›
- Syrian rebels reignite war, make advances in Aleppo ›
- Once frozen out, Bashar Assad is back in ›
- Do strikes on Syria signal a bolder Netanyahu? ›
- The Graphic Truth: How a decade of war has crushed Syria ›
- Tragedy upon tragedy in war-torn Syria ›
President-elect Donald Trump attends a campaign event, in Allentown, Pennsylvania, U.S., October 29, 2024.
Trump threatens military intervention in the Middle East over Israeli hostages
On Monday, President-elect Donald Trumpposted on social media that “if the [Israeli] hostages are not released prior to January 20, 2025, the date that I proudly assume Office as President of the United States, there will be ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East.”
Quite a threat to issue to an entire region, particularly given Americans’ skepticism of foreign involvement in overseas conflicts. But it’s a low-probability, high-risk sort of scenario, given that Trump did not specify who he would attack or how.
Meanwhile, at least 97 hostages or their remains are still in Gaza, and the Israeli military believes at least 35 of that group are dead. Hamas is also believed to be holding two corpses of Israeli soldiers killed a decade ago, and two living Israelis captured in 2014 and 2015.
While Trump’s threat is unlikely to lead to imminent hostage releases, we’ll be watching for any movement.
Syrian rebel forces take Aleppo
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take:
Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take, post-run, on a Sunday because the news does not wait for us to get back from our extended Thanksgiving weekend.
I want to talk about a new front in the Middle East war that has just opened up in Syria, a country that is far from stable and not really a country, really a patchwork of different controls in the best of times. But now we have active war fighting, a new front opening up with lots of territory being taken from Bashar al-Assad, his dictatorial regime from Syria Rebels, particularly a group called HTS, which is the most powerful of the military opposition groups in the country. They have swept, in a matter of hours, through the country, taking over Aleppo, the major city, and moving towards Hama. There is lots of humanitarian concern here. Not a surprise. You don't have hospitals functioning in Aleppo. You've got all sorts, thousands and thousands of people fleeing and nowhere obvious to go.
This should not be an enormous surprise in the sense that HTS has been agitating the Turkish government who support them to march on Aleppo for months. And in the same way that the Iranians had been green-lighting support for all of their proxies across the region to engage in strikes against the United States, against Israel, against shipping, all of that, Turkey did not want to do that. They didn't want to back and offensive. They were pretty split on it. The hawks inside Erdogan's government in Turkey, like the idea in order to expand opposition, put more pressure on a side, facilitate the return of more Syrian refugees from Turkey back into Syria, and also strengthen Erdogan's hand in bringing Assad back to the negotiating table for a normalization of ties under Turkey's terms. But a lot of people inside Turkey were saying that Russia would carpet bomb Turkish-backed forces and Turkish forces on the ground in Syria, of which there are thousands, which would humiliate Erdogan and cause broader tension with Russia that could well have major economic implications. We've seen that before, and this is a time when Turkey doesn't really want to afford that. They're trying to rebuild their economy from what has been a lot of damage.
It looks like now Ankara has given the go ahead to these militants in Syria, in part because the geopolitics of the region is changing. The Russians, of course, are themselves very distracted, not just with an ongoing war in Ukraine, which has been happening for three years now, but specifically because they've got two months to take as much land as possible, put the Ukrainians in the worst possible position before Trump is president and says he wants to end that war. So in other words, everything they have, they're really now putting into that fight against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the Iranian-supported proxies across the region are getting utterly hammered, as we've seen from the United States, and more importantly from Israel and the successful war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. So in that regard, the changing of the geopolitics has really given the upper hands of the hawks in Turkey to tell HTS, "Go for it. This is an opportunity, unique time to improve your position." Still, they're not fully backing the offensive. They're not backing it directly militarily, nor are they fully backing it diplomatically as they did, for example, with the Free Syrian Army, the FSA, with number of cross border operations in Northern Syria in the past decade.
Now, Russia has been humiliated on the ground. These Syrian troops in Aleppo folded and ran away immediately. The Russians have sacked senior soldiers in charge of operations on the ground, and it looks like they are preparing to send troops into Syria directly in the next 24 to 48 hours to shore up Assad. There's a lot of land that HTS would have to take before they were a direct threat to regime. Hard to imagine they're going to be able to overthrow him. Also, the Iranians are providing support. We already see that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Core, aligned militias across the region, are saying they will enter Syria to engage in the fight against HTS in favor of the Assad regime. I expect you'll see significant numbers of actual IRGC advisors showing up as well.
So it doesn't look like this is the end of Assad, and frankly, it's hard to imagine that Turkey itself even wants to have Assad out because filling the void completely left by a weakened Iran would be challenging for Turkey and would also lead to more conflict with the Russians, rather, who importantly have a military base, a port in Tartus that is very important for them having influence in the Mediterranean. Rather, Turkey is trying to use this space to try to shape regional events to their benefits. It's very positive what's happened so far in the last 48 hours for Turkey. It weakens Assad, makes him more open to a bad deal with Turkey than he has been before, and further, HTS is also moving farther away from Turkey's border, which is a good thing because Ankara doesn't have full control over them. Again, like Iran with its proxies, a lot of weapons, a lot of diplomatic support, but that's very different from operational control on the ground. And I expect that Erdogan sees this as an opportunity for Trump where he says, "We'll, cut a deal with you. You, Trump, get to exit Syria." Still with American troops on the ground there, yet one more place you can say that the Americans don't need to be, don't need to fight and have an America First policy and one more war that you get to formally not be a part of. And we, Turkey will make sure that there's no ISIS-affiliated organizations on the ground, that the region is more stable, that Iranian influences curtailed, and the Shia crescent is severed."
So if it works, one stone, lots of birds for Erdogan. The danger of course is that it doesn't work and that the war expands and that we end up with Russia versus Turkey in a proxy war that can become direct between the two. Wouldn't be the first time that we've seen that kind of confrontation. That'd be a lot more problematic. But at this point, the one thing I can say is that this is much more about the proxies fighting in a vacuum with a changing geopolitical balance than it is about the likelihood that Assad is about to be out. He wasn't out when Obama said, "Assad must go." He's not likely to be out right now.
Okay, that's it for me. We'll keep following this and I'll talk to you all real soon.
At the Paris Peace Forum, war and conflicts were topics du jour
Just days after Donald Trump's decisive victory in the US presidential election, leaders from around the world gathered in Paris for the annual Peace Forum. With so much uncertainty about the future of America's global commitments, from climate financing to funding for Ukraine, the vibe is anything but peaceful. Now in its seventh year, the Paris Peace Forum brings together a global network of government, nonprofit, and private-sector leaders to tackle the biggest issues of our time.
But on that stage, it's been looking more like curtains for true cooperation. The theme this year is "Wanted: A Functioning Global Order." What makes the current world order so dysfunctional? And a new era of regional wars is making those problems worse. This year's Global Peace Index reported the highest levels of armed conflict since the end of World War II, at a time when geopolitical competition threatens diplomatic efforts for peace. There was no shortage of critical issues for leaders to address here in Paris, but top of mind for Europe was the ongoing war in Ukraine and what Donald Trump's victory in the US election might mean for American support next year.
Watch the full GZERO World episode: Trump foreign policy in a MAGA, MAGA world
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- The 2024 Paris Peace Forum faces a dysfunctional global order ›
US President Joe Biden delivers remarks in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington after Israel and Lebanon accepted a ceasefire deal on Nov. 26, 2024.
Israel agrees to Lebanon ceasefire, Biden confirms
The Israeli Security Cabinet has approved a ceasefire for Lebanon, President Joe Bidenannounced on Tuesday, welcoming the opportunity to start reestablishing peace in the Middle East. “Under the deal reached today, effective at 4 a.m. tomorrow local time, the fighting across the Lebanese-Israeli border will end,” Biden said.
While earlier reports suggested the US-brokered agreement would involve a 60-day transition period to pave the way toward a more lasting peace, Biden emphasized that the truce is meant to be permanent. “What is left of Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations will not be allowed — I emphasize, will not be allowed — to threaten the security of Israel again,” he said.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had urged approval of the deal, and it was passed “with a majority of 10 ministers in favor and one opposed,” his office said just before Biden announced the news.
The Israeli leader said it was the right time for a ceasefire because it would isolate Hamas, give Israel’s military space to regroup and resupply, and allow the Jewish state to focus more on the threat from Iran.
In the hours leading up to Netanyahu’s announcement on Tuesday, Israel continued to pound Lebanon with airstrikes. But 13 months of fighting ended early Wednesday as the ceasefire took hold, and thousands of displaced Lebanese civilians have begun returning to their homes in the South.
The US pushed hard for the agreement and while the Biden administration is taking credit, the deal could provide a boost for Donald Trump as he enters the White House in January. Trump — who has a close relationship with Bibi — has promised to bring peace to the region, and his administration will soon be on deck with efforts for a more permanent peace between Israel and Hezbollah, and perhaps a resolution for Gaza and the remaining hostages.
In the meantime, we’ll be watching to see if the truce holds as the region remains on edge with the war in Gaza raging on amid rising tensions between Israel and Iran.
Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian meets with Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, in Doha, Qatar, on Oct. 2, 2024.
Qatar suspends Hamas-Israel mediation efforts
The Gulf Arab emirate announced this weekend it would stop mediating efforts to broker a cease-fire and hostage release deal between Hamas and Israel until “the parties show their willingness and seriousness to end the brutal war.”
For months, talks have failed, despite efforts by the US, Qatar, and Egypt. Hamas demands a permanent cease-fire and complete withdrawal of Israeli troops in exchange for the release of the remaining hostages, while Israel, which has sworn to destroy Hamas, insists on only a temporary truce and the right to occupy the enclave indefinitely.
Relatedly, reports suggested the Qataris, under US pressure, have asked Hamas political leaders to leave the kingdom, where they have enjoyed a safe haven for more than a decade.
Qatar, a US ally, has long served as a channel for talks with Hamas and other groups listed as terror organizations by the West.
Whether Qatar’s gambit will revive productive talks remains to be seen, but with Benjamin Netanyahu now comfortably awaiting the return of his close ally Donald Trump to the White House, it may put more pressure on Hamas than on the Israelis.
While the group could relocate elsewhere, there are no viable options that would offer channels to the West as direct as Qatar’s. Meanwhile, Trump, who has promised to “end” the conflict, has reportedly spoken with Netanyahu at least three times since the election alone.
For a broader look at how Trump 2.0 might shake up US foreign policy, including on the Middle East, see our recent report here.