Trending Now
We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
Canada accused of being an unreliable ally in the Middle East
Canada’s Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly told the United Nations General Assembly on Monday that Ottawa supports the creation of a Palestinian state and will officially recognize such an entity “at the time most conducive to building a lasting peace and not necessarily as the last step of a negotiated process.”
For more than 70 years, Canada and the United States have been in lockstep on policy in the Middle East. But Canada has been indicating for some time that it is preparing to join countries like Spain, Norway, and Ireland in unilaterally recognizing Palestinian statehood.
Despite pressures from within the Democratic caucus, that is not the position of the Biden administration. President Joe Biden has said he believes a Palestinian state should be realized through direct negotiations between the parties, not through unilateral recognition.
An early 20th-century Canadian cabinet minister, Sir Clifford Sifton, once said the main business of Canadian foreign policy is to remain friendly with the Americans while preserving the country’s self-respect.
That friendship has been tested in recent times.
Last December, Canada voted in favor of a cease-fire in Gaza that did not condemn, or even mention, Hamas. The US voted against the resolution.
For two decades, Canada has voted against UN resolutions that it felt unfairly sought to isolate Israel. Yet in May, it abstained on one that proposed to upgrade Palestine’s rights at the UN to a level short of full membership. Again, the US was one of only nine countries that voted against it.
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has criticized his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu’s opposition to a future two-state solution – a frustration shared by the Biden administration. But Canada has gone a step further by saying that the peace process cannot indefinitely delay the creation of a Palestinian state.
Tensions were heightened in August when Joly announced new restrictions on the sale of defense equipment to Israel, suspending 30 export permits and blocking a deal to sell Quebec-made munitions to the US that were intended for Israel.
The move drew the ire of Netanyahu, who said it was unfortunate Joly took the steps she did as anti-Israel riots were taking place in Canadian cities.
It also attracted the attention of Sen. James Risch, the ranking member of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “It is disappointing to see our allies make domestic political decisions intended to hamstring our shared ally, Israel,” he wrote on X.
Graeme Thompson, a senior analyst at Eurasia Group, and a former policy analyst at Canada’s Global Affairs department, said Risch’s comments reflect a “habitual disappointment” about Canadian foreign policy in Washington.
“By now, expectations are so low that it is hard to be disappointed by anything. People have come to the conclusion that Canadian foreign policy is about grandstanding and domestic politics, rather than national interests,” he said.
Risch was one of 23 bipartisan senators who wrote to Trudeau before the prime minister traveled to Washington for NATO’s summit in July saying they were “concerned and profoundly disappointed that Canada’s most recent (military spending) projection indicated it will not reach the 2 percent commitment this decade.”
At the summit, Canada’s ambassador in Washington, Kristen Hillman, said there remains “a strong recognition that Canada is a steadfast ally in all aspects.” But that rosy view was not reflected in the comments made by US policymakers. House Speaker Mike Johnson described Canada’s promise to get to 1.76% of GDP on defense spending by 2030 as “shameful.” “Talk about riding on American coattails,” he said.
Even Biden’s extremely discreet ambassador in Ottawa, David Cohen, referred to Canada as “the outlier” in the alliance.
Eurasia Group’s Thompson agreed with Risch’s assessment that domestic politics are at the root of a shift in foreign policy that moves away from traditional support for Israel and does not view security spending as a priority.
He said the debate in the ruling Liberal Party is similar to the one playing out in the Democratic Party in the US – but is at a more advanced stage because it has the blessing of the leader, Trudeau.
He noted the base of support for the Liberals has moved from ridings with large Jewish populations in Toronto and Montreal to ridings with large Muslim populations in the suburbs of both big cities. Trudeau has tried to walk a fine line between both communities, often failing to please either of them.
His Liberals are trailing the Conservatives by around 20 points in most polls, and the opposition party leader, Pierre Poilievre, is pushing for a general election.
The Liberals are relying on the support of the left-leaning New Democratic Party and separatist Bloc Québecois to keep them in power. Both of those parties are highly critical of Israel and strongly supportive of a Palestinian state.
A debate in the Canadian House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on the recognition of a Palestinian state last week reflected the realignment of foreign policy. The committee voted in favor of a short study, after which a recommendation to unilaterally recognize a Palestinian state will likely be made to the government. The Liberals on the committee voted alongside the NDP and the Bloc, arguing that for a two-state solution, you need two states.
The Conservative foreign affairs critic, Michael Chong, said that unilateral recognition would break with the long-standing position of the successive Canadian governments and would isolate Canada from its allies, including the US.
“To veer from that path rewards violence and authoritarianism,” he said.
The committee vote has not yet drawn a response from Washington.
That does not surprise Derek Burney, a veteran Canadian diplomat who served as Ottawa’s ambassador in Washington from 1989 to 1993.
He said Canada’s view has become inconsequential to its allies. “I’ve never seen a time when we were more irrelevant than we are now. We are nowhere on the global scene. We are nowhere in Washington because we have nothing to contribute or to support what the Americans are trying to do,” he said.
“Nobody knows what we stand for, or stand against. We don’t count. It’s a sad fact of life.”
Israeli Ambassador Danny Danon addresses journalists at UNGA on Sept. 24, 2024.
Israel’s UN ambassador says Israel “not eager” to invade Lebanon
UNITED NATIONS — Tensions in the Middle East loom heavy over the UN General Assembly in New York City this week. Escalating fighting between Israel and Hezbollah is raising concerns that an even more intense regional conflict is on the horizon amid the already devastating war in Gaza.
But Danny Danon, the Israeli ambassador to the UN, on Tuesday told reporters at UN headquarters that Israel is “not eager” to launch a ground invasion of Lebanon. Israel prefers a diplomatic solution to the hostilities, Danon said. But if that fails, the Jewish state will use “other methods to show to the other side that we mean business,” he added.
“We are determined to protect the civilians of Israel,” Danon said, adding that Israel will do whatever is necessary to return residents who’ve been evacuated from northern Israel to their homes.
Meanwhile, UN Secretary-General António Guterres on Tuesday said that Israel’s prosecution of the war in Gaza amounted to the “collective punishment” of Palestinians in the enclave.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is scheduled to address his fellow world leaders at UNGA on Friday. We’ll be watching to see how Netanyahu responds to such criticism, and whether he’ll offer any indication of Israel’s next steps in Gaza and in the fight against Hezbollah.In Washington, D.C., on September 23, 2024, President Joe Biden greets His Highness President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan of the United Arab Emirates at the White House.
Biden and Sheikh Mohammed talk AI
US President Joe Biden met with United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan on Monday to discuss artificial intelligence. In his first visit to the US in seven years, the UAE’s leader asked Biden for better access to US technology to fuel his country’s AI ambitions.
The Gulf states have a strained relationship with the US because they’re seen as playing both sides of the US-China war for AI dominance. They’re subject to export restrictions on chips, for instance, out of fears they could be a pass-through for Chinese firms.
That said, it seems that the UAE is leaning heavily toward US allegiance. In April, Microsoft announced it would invest $1.5 billion in G42, a leading artificial intelligence holding company based in Abu Dhabi. The deal was largely brokered by the Biden administration to beat back China’s influence in the UAE.
White House officials said that after the meeting, Biden directed senior officials to begin drafting a memorandum of understanding for future collaboration on artificial intelligence with the UAE.
Why Putin agreed to the US-Russia prisoner swap
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from the Adriatic Sea.
What does the biggest prisoner exchange in decades tell us about Putin?
First, the huge prisoner exchange, the biggest that we've seen for decades. I think it's important to note that it exposes the nature of Russia and the West, because on the one side, Putin was desperate to get back convicted killers, murderers, and failed spies. I think that was very important for him in order to perhaps improve their other sacking morale of his security and intelligence services after significant setbacks that they've been suffering over the last few years, and then I think the success of securing the release of journalists, brave journalists, and brave defenders of freedom and democracy in Russia. I think it is a good day, both for the individuals, needless to say, that have been gotten their freedom, and also for the fact that it does expose the very difference of nature between Russia and the West.
What's the European reaction to what's happening in the Middle East?
Well, deep apprehension. The fact that it's not been impossible to secure the ceasefire in Gaza means that all of the other conflicts of the risk are escalating. That is Yemen, that is now Hezbollah-Israel, that is now obviously with the killing of Hamas leader in Tehran, which is quite a daring and provocative thing, the risk of it going really bad.
Let's hope that the wiser heads in Tehran and Washington primarily prevails in the next few days, but we don't know.
A collage of Ian Bremmer with major world leaders.
Partitioned Ukraine, Hamas’s bet, Dem veepstakes, and more: Your questions, answered
It’s been at least a couple of days without a historically unprecedented event in the United States (it’s the Middle East’s turn now). No presidential assassination attempts, no “bloodless coups,” no furniture sex scandals ... Boring, I know. But it also gives me the chance to answer one more batch of your questions before going on summer break.
As always, the following may be lightly edited for clarity. If you want a chance at having your questions answered in the future, send me an email here and follow me on Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, and Threads to know when I’m doing a new AMA.
What are you reading right now?
Right now, I’m almost finished with “Never Let Me Go” by Kazuo Ishiguro. I got it when it came out in 2005, but for some reason I never got to it back then, and I gotta say I’m finding it a wonderful summer read. This is generally my favorite time of the year to get away from my day-to-day and spend time thinking about stuff that’s outside my usual wheelhouse.
Have you ever interviewed Trump?
No. I’ve interviewed plenty of core Trump supporters, including Jared Kushner, JD Vance, and Steve Bannon. But not Trump. Or Biden, for that matter. I would, though. Just say when and where, Mr. President.
How do you think Trump’s reelection would affect US-Brazil relations, with Brazilian President Lula being an avid critic of the former White House tenant and keeping an ambiguous but slightly anti-American rhetoric (reinforced by equally ambiguous and cumbersome relations with Iran, China, Russia, Cuba, etc.)?
The interesting thing about Trump is that he doesn’t really care much about your rhetoric, your values, or your allies as long as you pay him a “fair” price for whatever he thinks you’re getting out of the bilateral relationship. There was a lot more anti-American rhetoric from Kim Jong-un than from Lula in his first term, and yet Trump was more than willing to go to North Korea and try to cut a deal with him ... His foreign policy is mostly transactional. If Lula is prepared to engage on those terms, US-Brazil relations should be just fine despite the obvious policy/ideological daylight between them.
What is your explanation for Hamas’s decision to attack Israel? They knew it would be militarily impossible to win this war, yet they still attacked. Is there a rational explanation for this? Or was it merely an emotionally driven decision, for the lack of a better word?
Yes, they knew it was going to be militarily impossible to win the war, but that doesn’t mean starting it was irrational from their perspective. As Clausewitz said, after all, war is just politics by other means. It’s conceivable that Hamas set out to achieve a strategic goal far more ambitious than a tactical battlefield victory: to provoke an Israeli response so brutal that it would alienate the Jewish state’s allies, push Palestinians (and the Arab world) further into Hamas’s arms and away from moderation and the two-state solution, and ultimately undermine Israel’s long-term security and legitimacy. The death and suffering of innocent Gazans and the decimation of the organization’s command structure was an acceptable price to pay for that, as Hamas’s military leader Yahya Sinwar acknowledged (although I’m not sure Hamas’s recently assassinated political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, would agree).
As for the timing, I think Hamas realized it was fast becoming irrelevant and saw a unique opportunity to change that. Irrelevant because up until Oct. 7, Israel was in the strongest opportunity diplomatic position it’d been in decades, while geopolitics were turning against the Palestinians, and even the Arab world had largely moved on from their plight. A unique opportunity because the far-right Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had taken its eye off Gaza security concerns due to domestic preoccupations of its own making, leaving the country exposed to an attack that might not have been possible otherwise.
Yuval Noah Harari suggests that democracy cannot survive without “a feeling of special love and care for your particular community [a good flavor of nationalism].” He suggests that this “is a precondition for democracy and without strong patriotic feelings ... democracy cannot survive.” If you agree, how do we get (back) to that place, and do so without descending into jingoism?
I’m not sure I agree with Yuval’s premise that “strong patriotic feelings” are essential for democracy. It’s true that as societies get larger and people feel more disconnected from each other, you need some connective glue, but lots of things can provide that. Sometimes it can be provided by something tribal or ethnic or religious identity, and frequently that becomes dangerous and exclusionary. But I don’t think patriotism is the only way to give people a sense of community. Sometimes that can be forged in a unique historical experience, such as through tremendous hardship or good times. And sometimes it can be forged by a sense of common values.
The fact that patriotism and nationalism seem to be features of most modern nation-states doesn’t mean they are necessary features. Until recently, we thought everyone had to be in the office five days a week to be productive. Then, the pandemic hit, and we found out we were wrong. I think it’s possible there are other ways to forge durable democracies with social cohesion that we’re not even aware of.
What is the best possible outcome of the war for Ukraine under current conditions? And what is the most probable outcome?
I think the best realistic outcome would be for the Ukrainians to accept a US and NATO-brokered agreement to end the fighting along the current front lines. Freezing the conflict would make it much easier for the Europeans to take the lead on funding Ukrainian reconstruction and fast-track EU membership, and for the entire West to provide Kyiv with hard security guarantees (potentially including troops). This is the best outcome because Ukraine doesn’t have the manpower to win back all its land, but it can still end up in a stronger geopolitical position than it was before the invasion without having to accept Russian sovereignty over the occupied territories.
I wouldn’t say that this is the most probable outcome, though, because there’s so much uncertainty around what Trump and Harris would do, where Congress will be, and how the Europeans would react. In many ways, I think Trump and Harris would both agree that what I just laid out is the best possible outcome. But, and this is very important, Trump would make those decisions unilaterally, whereas Harris would try to bring America’s European allies along. This would impact how hard it’d be to get to the outcome in question.
What is the path to NATO membership for Ukraine?
It requires the Americans to be willing to say it’s a good idea in a concrete way, which they haven’t been willing to do. Absent that, there’s no path. If Trump wins in November, there’s definitely no path. If Harris wins, there still may be no path.
The hard truth is that Ukraine is no closer in the process to becoming a member than when it was first invited in 2008. Back then, there were two routes the United States and NATO could’ve taken to protect Ukraine. They could’ve either made them a member right there and then, in which case Russia would’ve never invaded. Or they could’ve never invited them in the first place. But opening the door without actually providing a roadmap was the worst of all possible worlds for Ukraine. This is true of Georgia as well.
What do you expect from the incoming Mexican government?
I expect continued economic growth and development because the external environment is so favorable. US-China relations are only getting worse, driving more nearshoring and friendshoring. Mexican labor is cheaper than Chinese labor. The US economy is doing incredibly well compared to all other G7 economies. North American supply chains are completely integrated. Also, President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum and her new cabinet are more technocratic and business-friendly than AMLO. That’s positive.
On the negative side, a lot of the “reforms” that AMLO is demanding and Sheinbaum – as a strong loyalist – is pursuing, including most problematically the judicial reform, will undermine the rule of law, undermine inbound investment, and ultimately be a drag on Mexican growth.
What US foreign policy challenges do you foresee from corporate capture?
On balance, I would say that corporate capture has much more impact on domestic US policy than it does on foreign policy these days. That hasn’t always been the case. And it doesn’t mean there’s no influence at all. Certainly, part of the reason why Trump has said that he wants to reverse the Biden administration’s transition energy policies and undo its AI regulation executive order is because of the financial support he gets from fossil fuel companies and Silicon Valley firms.
But what’s interesting is that today’s landmark US foreign policies are not particularly driven by corporate interests – and indeed can run counter to them. Think of the Russia-Ukraine war, where Washington has been trying to provide a level of support to Kyiv beyond what the military-industrial complex is able to produce. Or for the best example, consider America’s hardline bipartisan policy toward China, featuring decoupling in strategic sectors despite there being huge corporate interests with massive exposure to the Chinese market.
Who of the current candidates do you think is Harris’s best choice for VP, in terms of electoral impact?
Data shows that vice presidents don’t usually matter much electorally either way. But this may turn out to be such a tight race that any decimal point could make a difference. With that in mind, I think Harris has to go for whoever can help her pick up a swing state, which is why Pennsylvania Gov. Josh Shapiro and Arizona Sen. Mark Kelly are the hands-down favorites. On balance, I think Arizona is a bit more of a stretch for Democrats so Kelly adds slightly more to the ticket. But either would be fine.
What does the rest of the world think about the upcoming US elections?
Everyone except for the most hardcore American adversaries is concerned about the state of our political system. Pretty much all US allies and neutral countries worry about what domestic division and dysfunction mean for both the consistency and the direction of US leadership on the global stage. Unsure of what the United States stands for anymore, they’re anxious about their ability to influence and hedge the impact of the outcomes that matter to them over time.
The only countries who see this as an opportunity are Russia, Iran, and North Korea – agents of chaos whom we dubbed “the axis of rogues” in this year’s Top Risks report. Even China, whose fragile economy is highly dependent on global peace and stability, does not want the US to descend into the kind of uncontrolled chaos that would leave them holding the bag.
When Paul Nitze was 54, he turned down JFK’s offer of national security advisor because he did not think the job was important enough. What are some dumb decisions you have made in this year of life?
I said that Javier Milei was going to completely fail when he took over as president of Argentina. I thought that in part because I took a lot more of his rhetoric as a complete outsider at face value than I should have, as opposed to realizing he was saying all those outrageous things in campaign mode. I also underappreciated how much the Peronists would find it necessary to cooperate with him to get something done rather than get blamed for his failure. Argentina is now doing considerably better than I expected, so that was a pretty dumb decision.
But like most dumb decisions, the most important thing is being willing to admit that you were wrong and then pivot. I’ve found this to be quite an important life skill, especially when you make a living out of actually trying to understand the world as it is.
If I wanted to join Eurasia Group, how would you advise that I go about it?
Two points. The first is that we employ only the most exceptional political analysts out there. Some of them are very experienced and have made their names globally already. Others have just come out of college or grad school but are brilliant. What they all share is a global orientation, a relentless curiosity to understand the world, and a willingness to listen to radically different perspectives and to work with others who do so, too. If you don’t have those basic qualities, don’t bother applying because (1) you most likely won’t get the job, and (2) if you somehow do, you’re neither going to like it nor be good at it.
The second point, and I wish this weren’t true, is that Eurasia Group is still a small-ish firm. We get hundreds, sometimes thousands, of applications per open position but as a company of around 250, we don’t have a large enough HR department to give every capable candidate an adequate screening. So a way to stand out is to make an impression on people in the organization who can vouch for you. Write, tweet, and – most importantly – network. Not with me (I don’t hire other than the team that directly reports to me) but with any EG analysts who are driving the analytical work in your field.
Danger alert after Hamas leader assassinated in Iran
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take on the assassination of Hamas political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran while he was attending the inauguration of the new Iranian leader, Pezeshkian. Almost certainly carried out by the Israelis. This is a big attack. It's an enormous success for the Israeli Defense Forces. It is potentially a very significant escalation in the conflict across the Middle East with a so-called Iran-led Axis of Resistance, of which Hamas, of course, is a core part. Also shows the weakness of the United States in its lack of influence over the Israeli government, over the Israeli military. So an awful lot of moving parts here.
Let's first talk about what we know. This is an enormous embarrassment. It is a security failure. It is an intelligence failure for the Iranian government. The idea that the leader, the political leader of Hamas who was there invited by the Iranian government in a secure military compound for the inauguration taken out and killed by the Israelis, enormously embarrassing. The Supreme leader has already said that there will be significant retaliation. The Iranian permanent mission in the UN said special operations in kind, which implies not military targets, but perhaps civilian government targets in Israel. This clearly has the potential to spill over into broader conflict between Iran and Israel. The one thing that would really have a regional impact, a global economic impact despite the prices of oil and also likely draw the Americans directly in. I wouldn't say that this is more likely than not to happen, but it is more likely than at any point that we've seen in the war thus far. That probably includes even when we had the attack on the Iranian leader in Syria and Damascus by the Israelis and the Iranian response with drones and missiles. That's the first point, is that now we need to watch very carefully for when and what that Iranian escalation is likely to be, and does it end there or do the Israelis continue in a spiraling tit-for-tat? Iran, of course, is not just a non-state sort of member of the Axis. It doesn't just engage in terrorism, though they fund it widely across the region and more broadly, this is a country that is close to having nuclear weapons capability. They have a very large military, they have a very significant presence across the region. They now have established diplomatic relations with most of the states across the region. Anything that they do that is escalatory has global ramification, so that's the first point.
Secondly, the fact that this is the death of the Hamas political leader. On the one hand, you now have a very significant number of leaders, military and political of Hamas that have been eliminated by Israel. So if the intention is to take out Hamas from Gaza and their ability to have sort of their existing leadership, those that ordered the terrorist attacks on October 7th, if that is the military intention of Israel, they are closer to being finished with the war in Gaza than they have been before. If the point is you have to remove Hamas as an idea, Hamas as an organization that has political support and people that are willing to take up arms to support them there, Israel is much farther than they were on October 7th, and that's a serious problem because of course, the desire of average Palestinians to avenge this strike is going up. Palestinians, not just in Gaza, but also in the West Bank and refugees in Jordan, and more broadly across the region. So likelihood that we see expanded terrorism, expanded radicalism on the back of this is also going up.
The United States, as I mentioned, was not aware, had no coordination with, no intelligence sharing with Israel in the run-up to this attack. Let's keep in mind the US did everything they could to defend Israel when the Iranians were sending drones and missiles against them. Israel is the closest ally of the United States in the Middle East. It gets more military support, more economic support and aid from the US every year than any other country, not just in the Middle East, but in the world, and yet Biden's ability, Kamala Harris's ability, Secretary of State Blinken's ability, the US Administration's ability to influence Israeli outcomes in terms of a negotiated settlement, a ceasefire, humanitarian aid, nature and scope of military operations has been exceptionally limited. This has not been coordinated military operations between the US and Israel. The Americans have been providing the arms, they've been providing the money, and the Israelis have been doing what they want, and that is a vulnerability. It's a big vulnerability for Kamala Harris, probably her most significant vulnerability when we look at the upcoming elections. Now, it is true that Harris is more supportive of the Palestinians than Biden. She's more focused on a two-state solution. She's more focused on trying to prevent further humanitarian disaster on the ground in Gaza than Biden has been. But her making that distinction while she is serving as Vice President for President Biden is exceptionally hard, and so again, I think this is going to be a problem. She's going to have to answer more questions about this on the campaign trail. She's not going to have very good answers, certainly won't have good answers as long as she's not president and Biden's not planning on stepping down.
It's also a problem because Biden's ability, given his own age, his frailty to make strong statements, to be out there every day to be driving US foreign policy in this crisis is open to question. I think there are a lot of people, not just Republicans that are going to raise questions if God forbid this escalates and looks like it is turning into a war between Israel and Iran. Is Biden capable of leading the country in a situation of true emergency? And I think there are a lot of good reasons to say the answer to that is no. And I mean, if it were up to me, I'd say that he actually does need to step down because that's important, but I also think it's incredibly unlikely that's going to happen, and that's the reality that we face.
More broadly, I don't think this is going to break the Abraham Accords. I think even though the Arab states are quite angry about the fact that this has happened, I don't see, for example, the Emiratis, the Bahrainis, others from maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia continues to want to do a lot with Israel on the national security side, but you will not see them opening diplomatic relations until this present Israeli government is gone.
I also didn't even mention the fact that, of course, there was also strikes on Beirut, the Lebanese capitol just a day ago, that assassinated a significant military leader of Hezbollah. Nominally ultimately responsible for the rocket strikes that killed some 11 Israeli citizens in the occupied territory of the Golan. That on the one hand, definitely shows that Israel has exceptional intelligence and the ability to take these leaders out in a way that they have not for Hamas military leadership in Gaza. If you are Hezbollah and you're thinking about opening a broader war against Israel, that kind of reality quick response is going to give you pause.
The fact that the Israelis said that's it, that is all they're doing in response to those rocket attacks, I think makes it more likely that the Lebanon front is stable, and certainly the oil markets have reflected that. That's very different than what we are seeing, what we are likely to see as a result of this assassination in the Iranian capital. So an awful lot going on. A very dangerous environment, a political cycle that isn't opportune to responding to it, and lots more to talk about over the coming days and weeks I'm sure.
That's it for me, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
UNRWA funding cuts threaten Lebanon's Palestinian refugees
GZERO went inside the Shatila Camp in Beirut, one of Lebanon’s largest Palestinian refugee camps, to better understand what the loss of UNRWA funding would mean for the people who call it home—the teachers, doctors, and local government workers who rely on UNRWA to provide basic services, like education, healthcare, and clean water to residents. The agency says it has enough funds to last through June, but it will need to make some tough choices after that.
“The reason UNRWA still exists after 75 years is because there is no political solution,” says Dorothee Klaus, URWA’s Lebanon director, “It is time to find a solution for Palestinian refugees to live in dignity like everybody else.
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
Displaced Palestinian woman Mai Anseir stands with children at a school where they shelter as they prepare to flee Rafah after Israeli forces launched a ground and air operation in the eastern part of the southern Gaza City, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, in Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip May 13, 2024.
Hard Numbers: Waves of Palestinians displaced, Deadly cartel violence in Mexico, Fatal riots in New Caledonia, Biden sanctions Nicaragua, Israeli soldiers killed by friendly fire
500,000: Over half a million people have been displaced in Gaza by recent Israeli military operations in Rafah and the northern part of the enclave, according to the UN. As the Israel-Hamas war rages on, over a million people in Gaza are on the verge of starvation, and a “full-blown famine” is occurring in the north.
11: Recent clashes between rival cartels in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas have killed at least 11 people, with two nuns and a teenager reportedly among the dead. The Sinaloa cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel are fighting for control of the area.
4: At least four people are dead due to riots over electoral reform in New Caledonia, a Pacific island and French overseas territory. France declared a state of emergency over the situation, which grants authorities more power to ban gatherings and restrict movement.
250: The Biden administration on Wednesday imposed sanctions on Nicaraguan companies and visa restrictions on 250 people, accusing President Daniel Ortega’s government of “profiting off of irregular migration” to the US. Officials say the Nicaraguan government is exploiting migrants trying to reach the US by selling visas that require them to leave the country within 96 hours. Biden’s move aims to reduce the flow of migrants to the US — an issue that he continues to face pressure over with an election looming.
5: Five Israeli soldiers were killed in a friendly fire incident in northern Gaza on Wednesday, Israel’s military said today. The Israel Defense Forces have opened an investigation into the incident, which involved tank cross-fire in the town of Jabalia. Seven others were injured.