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Trump's tariffs & the end of globalization
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: It is the day after 'Liberation Day,' April 2nd. I'm not sure that day is going to stick. It was good not to do on April 1st. Not only because it's April Fools, but also because you had a couple of key elections in the US, in Florida and in Wisconsin. And Trump clearly wanted to go after that because he knew that these weren't going to be super popular. And yet, this is exactly what he was promising.
He has been promising tariffs. He's been promising securing American borders, securing borders from people coming into the US illegally, also securing US borders from unfair trade practices. And that is precisely what we're seeing right now. Overnight, the United States is moving to having the highest tariffs against countries of any major economy in the world by a very long margin, and also the largest average trade tariff in over a hundred years.
This is a new era. It's a post globalization era. It's a post post-war era. It's kind of the equivalent of what the Brits did with Brexit just on a global scale. Now, why these tariffs and what's behind the percentages? Because Trump's been talking about reciprocal tariffs for a very long time, and yet these aren't reciprocal. There are no countries that have the percentage tariffs on the US that the US is now putting on them in terms of goods. So how did they do that? That's the extraordinary thing, is the calculation wasn't based on the tariffs that are imposed on US goods. Rather, it was a look at the trade deficit that the US runs against those countries and taking the percentage of what the trade deficit is and applying a tariff that would get you to parity. In other words, what reciprocal from Trump's perspective is whatever would actually bring that trade deficit into trade neutrality and then just impose half of that, which makes no sense economically whatsoever.
Why not? Well, first of all, because there are a lot of poor countries around the world that have trade deficits with the US because they can't afford American goods, and the US wants to buy commodities, for example, from those countries or low tech manufacturer like from Bangladesh. And are you angry because the Bengalis aren't capable of buying Teslas from the US or buying smartphones? And the answer is, of course not. And all that's going to be is a tax. The US government will pick up revenue and the Americans will have to pay more for inexpensive goods that the US isn't going to produce. Some cases, these are goods that the Americans not only wouldn't want to produce because the labor quality and cost is really, really low and no one's going to do that work, especially when you're closing borders and taking illegals out of the population. But also, because the US economy couldn't produce them.
I mean, your tropical fruits, I mean some of them can be in the United States, but most of them need to come from other places. Coffee beans, I mean all sorts of things that the Americans are just not going to be substitution effect producing that now are just going to be higher costs for the United States, for average Americans. And then in places where the US was not in deficit, then you're just throwing a 10% tariff against. Why? Is that about fair trade? No, that's just about the Americans wanting to ensure that there are tariffs on absolutely everyone. It reminds me of the January 6th conversation where originally Trump was talking about, "Well, maybe we've got to look more carefully at all the really violent types and we're not going to want to give them amnesty. But there are a lot of people that were treated very badly, very unfairly, and so they should have amnesty and they should be pardoned."
And as the details and the debates on who should and shouldn't get a pardon came out, Trump got sick of the debate, got sick of the nuance, and said, "I'm just giving it to everybody." And I think that's what happened with tariffs. There were debates going on with large numbers of advisors around Trump, right until the last minute and he just said, "Ah, I'm just putting tariffs on everybody." And that's what's happened. And now there will be individual deals that will be cut with a bunch of countries to try to get out of that. But the reality is that the biggest trade partners of the United States, there's no quick fix. Not with Europe, not with Mexico, not with Canada, not with China. And given that, we are clearly not only out of a US-driven globalization era... That's been gone for some time now. Globalization has been moving apace, but the US has not been driving it.
The US had been kind of standing on the sidelines and pushing their own industrial policy. But now you have the United States actively unwinding globalization. And the question will be how effective will other countries be in playing defense, in hedging, and in bringing some production, more production to the United States? Because in the near-term, you expect to see a lot of countries will try to limit the damage that's being done. And the US economy is, of course, stronger and more powerful. So that will mean that a lot of countries won't immediately do reciprocal tariffs, but will try to cut deals with the Americans. A lot of companies will try to find ways to manufacture more in the US. That's near-term.
In the medium and long-term, there will be hedging. There will be efforts to find ways to de-risk their economies from the United States, from the uncertainty, the volatility, the high costs. And sure, you'll want to produce things in the US for US consumers, but most things are not being consumed by Americans. And that is increasingly true around the world. And therefore you wouldn't want to produce most things in the US in that environment. So you'll see more hedging of the Europeans towards other countries, including in some non-AI fields towards China. And I think you'll see that in bigger ways in the Global South who already have their principal trade partners as China anyway.
And then final point is keep in mind that the Americans are not really good at being patient. And Trump has been talking the entire way, not one of the most patient people in the world that, "Look, I mean, yeah, they're going to be costing in the near-term, and I don't care if the cost of cars go up. But long-term, this is good for Americans." And certainly near-term there's going to be a significant economic hit, not just in the stock market, but also in US GDP and also in inflation. And Americans, I suspect are going to be pretty angry about that because Americans are very short-term in orientation. It's a nature of free market capitalism, kleptocratic or not in the US and it's also the nature of the political system.
So that's where we are. A lot to think about on the back of these unprecedented policy moves. And remember, it is a marathon, not a sprint. We are only a couple months in. Trump has four full years, and a lot is going to happen over the course of that administration. And I'll be here to talk to you about it. Thanks a lot, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
What are Elon Musk's real goals with DOGE?
Elon Musk is the world’s richest man by far. He runs multiple companies, including SpaceX, Tesla, and X (formerly Twitter), with business interests all over the world. So why would the tech billionaire want to spend so much of his time focused on the complicated and often tedious work of overhauling the federal government through his Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)? On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer talks with WIRED Global Editorial Director Katie Drummond about Musk's outsize role in the Trump administration and what's really motivating his work with DOGE. Is Musk simply applying his Silicon Valley mindset to Washington, aiming to cut costs and automate bureaucracy? Or is there a more profound ideological mission driving him? Drummond and Bremmer unpack Musk’s close relationship with Trump, his political shift to the right, and why the billionaire entrepreneur has become so entrenched in the day-to-day operations of the US government.
“Everything we have seen from the way Elon Musk runs his companies, he really does believe in stripping out cost, and he believes in moving as quickly as possible,” Drummond explains, “But there is this ideological underpinning to all of this where it seems like he wants to see the United States and the world take a harder right turn.”
Watch the full episode: The rise of Elon Musk's DOGE under Trump
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).GZERO World with Ian Bremmer airs on US public television weekly - check local listings.
Will Marine Le Pen's conviction really keep her out of French politics?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. Turning to France where Marine Le Pen, who has long been the leader of the National Front, now renamed National Rally Party, and principal contender her party to win French elections in 2027, which would be an absolute turning point in French elections, as meaningful for France as Trump's second win in 2024 in the United States, has been found guilty in a criminal court in France of embezzlement charges up to $500,000 directly and millions of dollars in terms of mishandling the way European funds were being used for staffers, including her sister and her best friend and a bodyguard. Not a political case at all, actually just a criminal court. Nobody arguing that the judge is particularly politicized here. And while two of the years of the jail term's suspended, the first two years, she has to wear an ankle bracelet. So we'll probably get a video of that real soon. I'm sure it'll be fashionable, since it's France.
But the point is, this would prevent her from running in 2027. And that would mean that Bardella, who is number two essentially in that party, all of 29 years old, nowhere near as popular as Le Pen and would completely tank the ability of the National Rally to win, would become the candidate. It is too early to say that this ban is going to stand up. She has an appeals process. She can bring it to the French equivalent of the Supreme Court, a constitutional counsel, to answer what'll be called a priority question of whether her immediate five-year ban from politics before her appeals against the conviction can stand as valid. And there's a very good argument that has been made in the plaintiff's favor in recent cases that this would not stand. And that while her appeals are going on, she would still be eligible to run, and indeed, she'd be able to go through this appeals process through 2027.
So what now looks like and is being reported in the English language press as she's being thrown out of politics probably isn't going to stand. So in other words, Le Pen out for now. Le Pen probably back soon. And France, in 2027, a really significant, maybe watershed moment from where European politics are going to go. Because if you look at politics right now, you have Friedrich Merz, probably shortly after Easter going to be putting together his grand coalition government, very strongly pro-Europe, very centrist government. You have Meloni, who certainly has a good relationship with Trump, but nonetheless, very strongly pro-EU and very much wanting to act as a bridge to support the EU in using her relations in the United States to be effective in that regard. Macron same, and even Keir Starmer in the UK, post-Brexit, yes, but wanting to be seen as a European leader. Hence taking the lead with Macron in all of these Ukraine summits. That's for now.
But as we look forward to what politics in 2027, '28, '29 look like in Europe, we could easily see that in Germany, suddenly Alternative für Deutschland could do better. Especially if the economy is not doing well. And could force the Germans to be in a position where they would have to enter a coalition with them. In France, very much the National Rally Party and Le Pen still in contention. In the UK, the Reform Party in contention too. So the end of Trump's term for Europe and the transatlantic relationships looks radically different than the beginning of Trump's term. And today's news headlines on France are a blip, not a structural shift. Watch this space as Le Pen is still very relevant indeed. That's it from me, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
The rise of Elon Musk's DOGE under Trump
If you ask the individuals working for DOGE, if you ask Elon Musk, they're doing the right thing. They are undertaking a revolution to save the United States,” Drummond says, “If you ask any of the civil servants or the federal workers who've lost their jobs, there is a deep sense of concern, of dread that this revolutionary effort will destroy so much of what powers this country.”
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).GZERO World with Ian Bremmer airs on US public television weekly - check local listings.
Inside Elon Musk and DOGE's "revolutionary" push to reshape Washington, with WIRED's Katie Drummond
Listen: Elon Musk, the world’s richest man, made his fortune-breaking industries—space, cars, social media—and is now trying to break the government… in the name of fixing it. But what happens when Silicon Valley’s ‘move fast and break things’ ethos collides with the machinery of federal bureaucracy? On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmersits down with WIRED Global Editorial Director Katie Drummond to unpack the implications of Musk’s deepening role in the Trump administration and what’s really behind his push into politics. In a few short weeks, Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency has dramatically reshaped the government, slashing budgets, eliminating thousands of jobs, and centralizing vast amounts of government data, all in the name of efficiency. Is this a necessary shake-up or a dangerous consolidation of power? Drummond and Bremmer dig into the political motives behind DOGE, President Trump’s close relationship with Musk, and how the tech billionaire’s far-right leanings could shape the future of US policy. Can Elon's vision of innovation bring efficiency to Washington, or will it just inject more chaos into the system?
Will the Trump-Musk relationship last?
How long will President Donald Trump’s relationship with Elon Musk last? The alliance has so far defied predictions from the left (and parts of the right) that a relationship between two famously impulsive and mercurial billionaires would eventually lead to conflict. Instead, Musk is everywhere in the Trump administration—attending cabinet meetings, shaking hands with world leaders, smiling in the Oval Office. Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, has embedded itself across nearly every federal agency. In many ways, the relationship is mutually beneficial: Musk has an almost limitless checkbook to bankroll Trump’s political operations, and DOGE is helping him deliver on a campaign pledge to “shatter” the deep state. Meanwhile, Musk has become the most powerful person in Washington, not named Trump. But the president also has a history of discarding allies when they are no longer valuable and many of his close advisors have become his harshest critics. So, can the Trump-Musk alliance survive for the long haul, or is it destined to go up in flames?
Watch the upcoming episode of GZERO World with Ian Bremmer on US public television this weekend (check local listings) and at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld.
Leaked Signal chat shows Trump team's mindset
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take on the back of the full transcript of these Signal chat that's going on about the bombing of the Houthis. A few things here. First of all, are we surprised that a journalist is actually publishing what is clearly classified data? And there's no question, it's classified data. I mean, you're talking about the targets, the exact timing in advance of US military strikes, incredibly sensitive information, against people that are described as terrorists in the chat. And clearly, if that information had gotten out in advance when Jeffrey Goldberg had received it in real time, it would have put the operation at risk. It would have prevented it from going on. It would have been denounced as leaking classified information, and he would be facing some legal charges from the administration. So I don't think it's credible to say that this is not classified.
But since Trump and members of administration have now said that it isn't classified, there was nothing classified in it, I guess that provides legal cover since it is ultimately in the charge of the president to be able to determine, as president, whether or not something is classified. That there's nothing illegal in Goldberg and the Atlantic Magazine now taking all of that information and putting it out to the public. So is that embarrassing for the US with its allies in terms of how they're handling such a chat? The answer is of course, yes. And I expect that we're going to see a significant amount of continued focus on this topic. A lot of people are going to be asking questions about how it was that this conversation could have been had on Signal and also how it was that Goldberg could have been brought on board. But say that as it may. I mean if you are the Trump administration here, it is age-old tactic, full denial responsibility is actually of your political adversaries so blame Goldberg. Imply that maybe he tried to get on the call through nefarious ways.
It's all his fault. It's overstated. He's a fake news, no news journalist. No one should pay attention to him. He's a bad guy. I mean all of that stuff. And I was particularly bemused by Elon Musk sharing a post from the Babylon Bee saying that, "If you wanted to ensure that nobody ever saw information you'd put it on page 2 of the Atlantic." And of course, that is true for Elon, and it's true for Trump supporters. And this is why the strategy works, is because the Atlantic and the people that read the Atlantic and support the Atlantic are all considered disinformation by those that are loyal to Trump. And vice versa. Fox, and Newsmax and all of the right-wing podcasts. Those are considered fake news by people that don't support, that dislike Trump. And that allows a strategy of full denial, not engaging with the facts and blaming those that are coming after you to be successful. Now, I still think that there are interesting pieces of information here.
Perhaps the most important is that the actual policy conversation, not the details of the war fighting itself, but rather whether or not it was a good idea to be attacking the Houthis, in a big way that was potentially going to increase energy prices. And that was much less of a fight of the Americans than it would be of those in the region that are engaged in the direct proxy war with Iran or the Europeans who have a lot more directly at stake, in terms of their trade in transit. And that was a very reasonable question, and it was strongly, in other words, Vice President Vance opposed these strikes and he's the most important person. He's the most senior ranking person in this chat. Trump isn't on the chat. And he's not saying the president is wrong. He's saying, "I don't believe the president is fully informed and this clearly is not in his interest, in his policy interest."
Now, the reason this is important is because in Trump's first term, I think you would have had a very similar conversation from people like Mike Pence and Mike Pompeo and others that would have been on this chat, but then they would have brought it to the president. And many, many instances in the first term of policy disagreements that then came up and said, "Mr. President. Respectfully, we think we've got additional information and we can better carry out your will by doing X, Y, and Z." And there were checks. There were internal checks on executive authority. What we see this time around is we see JD Vance, who's obviously a very smart guy saying, "I think this is a really bad idea. We shouldn't be doing it, but I'm prepared not to raise it to the president unless I have everybody around me supporting me because I can't do this by myself. I'm just going to get my head chopped off." And there's a little bit of back and forth.
And Stephen Miller, the deputy chief of staff for policy in the White House and a full-on Trump loyalist, says, "Nope, the president wants this. I'm ending the conversation." And that's the end of the conversation, and it never gets to Trump. And then they go ahead and they bomb. So whatever you think about whether this was a good or a bad decision, the challenge here is that we have a big cabinet, some of whom are very capable, some of whom are absolutely not capable. But first and foremost is not getting the best information to the president because he's extremely confident. He believes that his policies are always the right ones, and he is absolutely punishing anything that feels like disloyalty, inside or outside of his team. That's why Pompeo, for example, John Bolton, have had their security details stripped away. Even though the Iranian government has been trying to assassinate them, right? Why? Because they were disloyal to Trump. That's not why they're trying to assassinate him. That's why Trump took away their security detail and that is a very strong message to everybody that is on this chat.
And I do worry, I worry that the three most powerful men in power today around the world, all in their 70s, Trump, Putin, and Xi Jinping, are also men that are incredibly confident about the rightness of their views. That loyalty is the key to the most important currency of power that exists inside those systems. And increasingly, they're not getting good information from their own advisers. That's a dangerous place for the world to be. It's a dangerous place for the world to be heading, and that's frankly the most important thing that I took out of this chat. So that's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon, thanks.
The end of the transatlantic relationship as we know it
Donald Trump’s second term is having considerably more impact on the global stage than his first. Trump may have been a largely transactional president last time around, when he was more constrained at home and faced relatively more powerful counterparts abroad. But the first two months of Trump 2.0 have shattered the illusion of continuity. No American ally faces a ruder awakening than Europe, whose relationship with the United States is now fundamentally damaged.
Core partners in Asia like Japan, South Korea, India, as well as Australia worry about being hit with tariffs and will do what they can to defuse conflict, but they also know their geostrategic position vis-à-vis China means Trump can’t afford to alienate them entirely. Accordingly, their relations with Washington should remain comparatively stable over the next four years.
America’s largest trade partners, Mexico and Canada, are facing more significant trade pressures from the Trump administration, but the imbalance of power is such that they have no credible strategy to push back. Everyone understands they’ll have to accept Trump’s terms eventually; the only question is whether capitulation comes before or after a costly fight. Riding an 85% job approval, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has enough domestic political space to yield to Trump’s demands to keep Mexico in his good graces, as she is already doing. By contrast, Canadian leaders have a political incentive to put up a bigger fight because Trump’s threats toward Canada’s economy and sovereignty have sharply inflamed nationalist sentiment north of the border in the run-up to the April 28 elections. However, I expect Ottawa will quietly fold shortly after the vote to ensure that ongoing relations with the US remain functional.
Most US allies have no choice but to absorb Trump’s demands and hope for a reset after he’s gone. But Europe is different. It possesses both the collective heft to resist Trump’s demands and the existential imperative to do so.
Three structural forces render the transatlantic rupture permanent.
First, the European Union has the trade competency and market size to punch back against the Trump administration’s aggressive tariff blitz. Unlike most other US trading partners who lack the economic leverage to go toe-to-toe against Washington and have little choice but to fold under pressure, Brussels’ defiance ensures a protracted trade war with no easy resolution.
Second, most Europeans view the Trump administration’s unilateral pursuit of rapprochement with Russia as a direct threat to their national security. While President Trump would still like to end the war in Ukraine as he promised on the campaign trail, he is prepared to do so on the Kremlin’s terms – and he’s even more interested in business deals with Moscow. He won’t be deterred by a collapse of the Ukraine peace talks, even though it’s Vladimir Putin who’s shown no interest in softening his maximalist demands. Nor will Trump care that the Europeans stridently oppose US normalization with their principal enemy. After all, the United States is protected by two oceans from Putin’s army, and Trump’s embrace of Euroskeptic movements reveals their shared aim: a fragmented and weakened Europe that is easier to dominate.
The president’s rhetoric – echoed by the Signal-gate private texts, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s recent interview with Tucker Carlson, Vice President JD Vance’s Munich speech, and so many other pieces of evidence – makes clear that the current administration sees Europeans not as allies but as “pathetic freeloaders” who shouldn’t be “bailed out” as a matter of principle. Even if Washington begrudgingly agrees to provide them with transactional security, Europeans now realize that relying on a hostile US for survival is strategic suicide.
Which brings us to the third and final driver of the definitive US-Europe break: common values … or lack thereof. From free trade and collective security to territorial integrity and the rule of law, Europe’s foundational principles are now anathema to Trump’s America. Just look at Trump’s repeated threats to annex Greenland, to say nothing of his willingness to recognize illegally annexed Ukrainian territories as Russian and support Israel’s annexation of parts of the West Bank and Gaza. For an EU built from the ashes of World War II, it's hard to compromise with a worldview in which borders are mere suggestions and might makes right.
After years of complacency, European leaders seem to have finally gotten the message that the United States under Trump is not just an unreliable friend but an actively hostile power. They understand they need to drastically increase Europe’s sovereign military, technological, and economic capabilities – not just to survive without America but also to defend their borders, economies, and democracies against it. Whether they can muster the political mettle to act on this realization, however, is Europe’s greatest test since 1945.
Recent moves – Germany’s historic debt brake reform and Brussels’ fiscal and financial maneuvers to boost defense spending – hint at urgency. Yet half measures won’t suffice. If Europeans refuse to commit troops to guarantee Ukraine’s post-ceasefire security absent an American backstop and continue to balk at seizing Russia’s frozen assets and overriding Hungary’s veto, it will confirm my view that the bloc lacks the nerve to survive in a jungle-ruled world where Trump and Putin refuse to play by any rules.
The irony is that Europe has the resources and capacity to stand up for itself, its values, and its fellow Europeans. What’s missing is the collective courage to act like it’s 1938, not 1989. For Ukraine’s sake and its own, that needs to change.