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An armed PKK fighter places a weapon to be burnt during a disarming ceremony in Sulaimaniya, Iraq, July 11, 2025, in this screengrab obtained from a handout video.
What We're Watching: Kurdish militants melt away the past, Trump to shift focus away from Congress, Germany gets a taste of US-style court battles
Kurdish militants burn their own guns
In a symbolic ending to more than 40 years of rebellion against the Turkish government, fighters from the PKK — a Kurdish militia — melted a cache of weapons in a gigantic cauldron on Friday. Earlier this year jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called for disarming as part of a process expected to deliver more cultural autonomy for Kurds, who make up 20% of Turkey’s population. The move shifts attention onto the future of affiliated Kurdish militias in Syria, as well as to Turkey’s parliament, where President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is courting support from Kurdish parties as he seeks to soften term limits.
Is the White House done with legislating?
A week after signing the One Big, Beautiful Bill into law, and just six months since taking office again, US President Donald Trump is reportedly done with pushing major legislation through Congress. As he goes into campaign mode ahead of the 2026 midterms, he will instead focus on key issues like trade and immigration via executive actions, which don’t require congressional approval but are susceptible to legal challenges. However, it seems not everyone is aligned: House Speaker Mike Johnson has said he still wants to pass two further budget reconciliation packages. Which is it? More bills or no more bills?
German constitutional court clash embarrasses Chancellor Merz
Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz's government had to shelve a vote on appointing three judges to the Constitutional Court after one of them was accused – spuriously, it turned out – of plagiarism, and criticized by conservative coalition members for supporting abortion rights. Critics are likening the drama to US-style culture wars over the judiciary, and have warned it undermines the legitimacy of Germany’s top court. The debacle also reflects the fragility of Merz’s three-month-old coalition, which holds just a slim, 12 seat majority in the Bundestag.
Graphic Truth: The BRICS+ in a "G-Zero" world
The BRICS, a loose grouping of ten “emerging market” economies led by Brazil, Russia, India and China, held their 17th annual summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, this weekend. While the official readout from the summit emphasized their commitment to multilateralism, the guestlist begged to differ. Five of the 10 leaders were no-shows, including Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
While the group’s declaration took aim at tariffs increases and recent attacks against Iran, it stopped short of mentioning the US or naming President Donald Trump directly. For more, here’s GZERO writer Willis Sparks’ explainer on why the BRICS are a bad bet.
Iran was the clear loser of its war with Israel and the US. So, what happens next?
Less than a month after Iran’s stunning defeat in a brief but consequential war with Israel and the United States, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has emerged politically stronger—at least for now. But as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman notes to Ian in the latest episode of GZERO World, that boost may be short-lived unless Bibi finds a credible way to resolve the crisis in Gaza. “The people who won this war for Israel...were, for the most part, the very same people who were in the streets of Israel for nine months against Netanyahu and his judicial coup,” he says. That internal contradiction, he argues, is likely to reassert itself as the conflict continues.
Friedman warns that Netanyahu still faces the same three unappealing choices in Gaza: permanent occupation, rule by local warlords, or a phased withdrawal in partnership with an Arab-led peacekeeping force and the Palestinian Authority. If he were to choose door number three, then Bibi would win the next five elections, Friedman says. But doing so would likely require pressure from Washington. With Trump now touting his foreign policy win in Iran, Friedman believes the moment is ripe for the US to push hard for a ceasefire in Gaza.
The conversation also explores the uncertain road ahead for Iran’s leadership. In the wake of military humiliation, Friedman anticipates an internal debate over whether to double down on nuclear ambitions or seek reintegration into the international community. “All real politics in the Middle East happens the morning after the morning after,” he says. As both Israel and Iran attempt to move forward, Friedman suggests the real reckoning—for governments, publics, and the global order—may just be beginning.
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
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Members of the Basij paramilitary force hold Iranian flag, Lebanese flag, and various militia flags, during a rally commemorating International Quds Day in downtown Tehran, April 14, 2023.
Q + A: Is this the end of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance?”
As the world reacted to Israel and the US bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities last week, one group was largely silent – Iran’s network of allied militias in the Middle East.
Since the 1980s, Tehran has cultivated what it calls an “Axis of Resistance” – a network of groups closely aligned with its agenda, encompassing Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.
In a sharp contrast to the weeks after October 7th, when Hezbollah and the Houthis launched missiles at Israel in solidarity with Hamas and the Palestinian people, this time around, the militias have not joined the fray.
Hezbollah reportedly has no plans to strike Israel right now. Hamas and the Houthis have done nothing despite vowing to respond against “Zionist-American aggression.”
The relative silence this time around reflects in part how much weaker some of these groups are. Hezbollah and Hamas in particular have been decimated by Israel over the past year and a half. But it also reflects Iran’s overall diminished position in the region. Last December, Iran suffered another blow with the demise of the closely-allied Assad regime in Syria.
So where does Iran’s 'Axis of Resistance' stand today? Is this relative silence temporary or permanent? And how might all of this affect a region where Iran has until recently been a major strategic player?
To find out, we asked two experts, with somewhat clashing views. Lina Khatib, a visiting scholar at Harvard Kennedy School’s Middle East Initiative, and Renad Mansour, a senior research fellow and project director of the Iraq Initiative at Chatham House. Their responses have been lightly edited for clarity and concision.
GZERO: Are we witnessing the end of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”?
Khatib: “The whole model of Iran's presence in the region has permanently changed…the Axis of Resistance, as Iran calls it, has crumbled in terms of it being a network. What we are left with are the individual groups, each struggling for survival in the country in which it operates…Iran is now fighting Israel and the United States on its own, its proxies are unable and unwilling to help it.”
Mansour: “For the time being, Iran is overstretched and looking to survive right now internally…but the connectivity will continue to be there to some extent…what remains of the axis has transitioned into more of a horizontal, non-hierarchical network – where Iran is still important – but the different groups have also begun to take on leadership roles.”
GZERO: With Iran’s decades-long dominance now diminished, how will the balance of power shift in the Middle East?
Khatib: “What we will see is an increased importance for the Gulf countries in the Arab world, in terms of being the heart of power in the Middle East, influencing where the rest of the region will head.”
Mansour: “It's hard to see whether there will be a hegemonic force…what we're looking at moving forward is a fragmented Middle East where you have multi-alignment, where you have different sides working with each other…based on different issues, where you don't really have clear spheres of influence.”
GZERO: What does this mean for regional stability moving forward?
Khatib: “Without Iran and its proxies, there will be less sectarian tension in the region and a greater possibility for cross-country cooperation in the Middle East, and therefore increased stability…[though this still] depends on whether Israel agrees to restart the peace process regarding Israel Palestine.”
Mansour: “There's so much unexpected, so much more violence that will happen before this comes to an end…[when] the US had overwhelming force and they went to war against Iraq or Afghanistan, would they have thought that this would actually facilitate the rise of their big enemy, Iran?”
Amir Seaid Iravani premanent representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran speaks during the UN Security Council on June 24, 2025 in New York City.
Iran was hit – did the nuclear non-proliferation regime take the blow?
It’s not clear yet how much the US attack on Iran's nuclear sites this weekend set back the Islamic Republic's ability to develop atomic weapons, but experts say the airstrikes almost certainly threw a bomb into something larger: the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Since 1970, the UN-backed Non-Proliferation Treaty, known as the NPT, has been the backbone of efforts to prevent more countries from developing nuclear weapons. Nearly 200 countries have signed it – including Iran. But with the stroke of a B-2, Trump may have wrecked it.
The treaty formally recognizes the nuclear arsenals of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US. All other countries promise not to develop those weapons – though they can use nuclear power for civilian uses. They agree to inspections from the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure they aren’t secretly developing weapons, under threat of sanctions.
Since the treaty's signing, just four nations have acquired nuclear weapons. North Korea, India, and Pakistan, as well as Israel – which despite Tel Aviv’s denials is widely believed to have secretly weaponized its program in the 1960’s. None of these countries had signed the NPT, though, so the international condemnation of their development was, structurally, limited.
Overall, experts say, the treaty has been a success. “There are more countries today that had started nuclear weapons programs and decided to stop them than there are countries that have nuclear weapons,” says Matthew Bunn, professor of Energy, National Security, and Foreign Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School. “So our efforts to stop these programs succeed more often than they fail.”
However, US and Israel’s attacks on Iran disregarded the NPT mechanisms entirely, something that could raise doubts about the value of the treaty among other countries that are party to it.
“The US is seen by many countries, particularly in the Global South, as a bully that uses its military power outside of international law,” says Bunn. “That’s a problem for the US being able to negotiate what it wants in forums like the NPT.”
History suggests it may be worth having nukes. Nuclear weapons are seen as the ultimate deterrent to invasion or regime change, making them particularly sought after by countries at odds with global powers or aggressive neighbors.
Iraq and Libya gave up their nuclear weapons programs in the 1990s and early 2000s, while Ukraine surrendered its actual arsenal after the Soviet collapse. The first two were invaded by the US and NATO, while the third was invaded by Russia. Meanwhile, North Korea successfully built several bombs and has avoided regime change despite being on a war footing against the US-backed South for 75 years.
Since the attack, Iran has threatened to abandon the NPT, calling the attacks an “irreparable blow,” with lawmakers considering the possibility of pulling out on Sunday. If they leave the treaty, it raises the likelihood that more countries could follow suit, meaning the world could see more nuclear weapons development, with less international oversight.
“Countries that fear they may be on the pointy end of an American stick will be more motivated than before to seek nuclear weapons,” says Bunn.
But it's not just America’s enemies who want nukes. Many of Washington’s allies have long agreed to forego nuclear weapons because they had the protection of America’s own nuclear umbrella. But now, Bunn says, “American allies are beginning to wonder if they need their own nuclear weapons because of the US president who routinely questions whether the US should defend its allies.”
South Korea and Poland, which share borders with nuclear-armed North Korea and Russia respectively – are both asking that question. Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk is “talking seriously” about obtaining nuclear capabilities and in South Korea, polls have found that as much as 70% of the population supports having its own arsenal.
“A number of countries are saying to themselves, we've rested our entire security policy on the notion that America will always be a reliable partner. And it looks like that may not be true. Do we need nuclear weapons of our own?” says Bunn.
Canada's Prime Minister Mark Carney and U.S. President Donald Trump leave after a family photo session during the G7 Summit, in Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, June 16, 2025.
Was the G7 a success for host Canada? Let’s take a look!
The G7 meeting this week was always going to be a tricky one. Set against the backdrop of the picturesque mountains of the Kananaskis Range, the meeting also took place amid a much uglier global tableau of trade wars between the world’s largest economies, and ongoing actual wars between Russia and Ukraine, Israel and Hamas and, on the summit’s eve, Israel’s airstrikes on Iran.
All of that was in addition to other long standing agenda items like artificial intelligence, transnational crime, and climate change. And looming over the whole gathering like Mount Galatea itself: the fact that the G7 looks ever more like a G6+1 – with Donald Trump’s US at odds with most of the others on key issues.
So now that it’s over, was it a success for host country Canada and Prime Minister Mark Carney? The report card is mixed. Here are five takeaways that tell the story:
Lapel-level diplomacy: a pin-sized win
It was the lapel pin seen ‘round the world, to paraphrase former Canadian Conservative Party leader Erin O’Toole. Okay, seen ‘round Canada, at least. Arriving at the G7, Donald Trump sported a pin featuring the Canada and US flags intertwined. Although Trump was sporting a US flag pin above that, the chattering classes in Canada chose to read the hardware as a good sign that maybe the two countries are ready to go steady again after all. These days you take the wins you can get.
Trade deal pinky promise: medium-sized win with potential to upsize to large
Maybe the pin worked a little magic. After an hour-plus bilateral talk on Monday, Mark Carney announced that he and Trump had agreed to ink a trade deal within 30 days. Washington is reportedly still pressuring Canada over its dairy tariffs and digital services taxes. The president reaffirmed that he’s “a tariff person” with “a different concept” of trade from Carney, but also noted the prime minister's “more complex idea” was nonetheless “very good.”
Trump was mostly contained: big win (accomplished the near-impossible)
Avoiding any big dustup with Trump was an important goal, and that seemed to go pretty well. Despite an opening harangue from Trump about why Russia should be back in the group – Moscow was booted over its 2014 annexation of Crimea – Carney did his best, buttering up the president at a joint presser, saying “The G7 is nothing without U.S. leadership.”
It’s true that Trump left early, but it was for a good reason – to address the Israel-Iran crisis – and with no animosity. That’s an improvement from the last time Trump left a Canadian G7 meeting, splitting from at Charlevoix, Quebec in 2018 with a tweet that then-prime minister Justin Trudeau was “Very dishonest & weak.” Carney has a very different – and much better – relationship with the US president. That by itself is a W.
Resetting relations with India: a win for some a capitulation for others
Mark Carney caught a lot of flack, including protests, for inviting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the G7 meeting in the hopes of resetting Canada’s relationship with India. It was a bold move considering Canada’s intelligence agency warned just last Friday that India actively interferes in Canada’s political affairs and was involved in the 2023 murder of a Sikh Canadian in British Columbia. Nonetheless, the countries agreed to restore full diplomatic relations, including naming high commissioners, and talked about “opportunities to deepen engagement in areas such as technology, the digital transition, food security, and critical minerals.”
Working together as a group: low-hanging fruit, but little progress on the hard questions
The latter hours of the meeting produced several joint statements: members agreed on a series of measures to adopt and support artificial intelligence and quantum technologies. They also agreed to develop a critical minerals action plan, to adopt a wildfire charter, to counter migrant smuggling, and to condemn transnational repression.
But they couldn’t agree on a statement about Russia and Ukraine because of American efforts to soften the language, and had little to say on the Israel-Iran conflict beyond calling for de-escalation and re-affirming that the Iranian government mustn’t develop nuclear weapons.
Final verdict: beautiful setting, middling progress, no disasters. Overall, a qualified win for Carney, but only if he can keep the momentum up in areas that matter to Canadians.
Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Trump’s coming decision to hit Iran, explained
Israel’s war plan has led directly to this juncture (though Trump’s own decision to tear up the 2015 nuclear agreement in 2018 arguably paved the way). The culmination of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decades-long crusade to neutralize Iran’s nuclear threat to the Jewish state, ‘Operation Rising Lion’ began early on June 13 with Hollywood-worthy sabotage to disable Iranian air defenses, followed by the largest airstrikes on Iranian territory since the 1980-88 conflict with Iraq.
The Israel Defense Forces have since methodically destroyed significant portions of Iran’s missile launchpads, drone factories, and above-ground nuclear facilities. They have decimated its military leadership. They have gone after its domestic energy production and industrial capacity. On June 16, the IDF announced it achieved full air supremacy over Tehran, meaning Israeli planes can now fly over Iran’s capital without getting shot down – an extraordinary statement of facts on the ground.
Iran has been unable to mount much of an effective response. It has fired hundreds of missiles and drones against Israeli population centers, but very few projectiles (under 5 percent) have penetrated Israel’s layered defenses. Though these barrages have caused damage to mostly residential buildings and killed scores of Israeli civilians, as Tehran’s ballistic stockpile has started to dwindle, each wave has been smaller than the last. Israel’s advantage is only set to grow the longer the war goes on.
Yet the Israeli campaign has a hole. Despite severe damage inflicted upon Iranian capabilities and escalation dominance, Israel cannot achieve its chief war aim on its own: destroying Iran’s nuclear program. The partial degradation of the Natanz, Isfahan, and Parchin nuclear facilities, along with the assassination of 14 of Tehran’s top nuclear scientists, have set it back by months. But crucially, the Fordow enrichment plant, which sits more than 300ft beneath earth and reinforced concrete, remains out of Israel’s reach. Only the US Air Force’s Massive Ordnance Penetrators, or bunker-buster bombs, can “finish the job.”
Israel can and will continue to hammer at Iran’s other nuclear, missile, and military infrastructure for weeks (if not months), but a war that ends with Fordow guarantees that Tehran retains the means to redouble its efforts to acquire a bomb once the smoke clears. Israel’s only path to victory therefore runs through President Trump.
Early on, Trump drew a clear red line: American forces would stay out unless Iran escalated directly against American interests, such as by attacking US military bases or interfering with shipping through the strategic chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz. The president ran as a peacemaker, promising to end foreign wars and keep US troops out of them. To his credit, he has tried – he just hasn’t been very effective at it. Even after sanctioning Israel’s June 13 operation, he still insisted the US had nothing to do with it and urged the Iranians to return to the negotiating table, despite being frustrated at their continued refusal to compromise.
But over the last few days, signs have emerged that the president’s position has shifted. On June 15, Trump said “it’s possible we could get involved.” The day after, on Monday, he issued a cryptic warning to Tehran’s 10 million residents to “immediately evacuate” the city. And on Tuesday, he implicitly threatened to assassinate Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and called for Iran’s “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” (all caps assuredly not mine).
In tandem, the Trump administration and the MAGA media apparatus started laying the political groundwork for a one-off US strike, making the case to the isolationist wing of the GOP that one-off airstrikes – as opposed to boots on the ground and long-term occupation – to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons are not only consistent with the president’s “America First” approach, but necessary to achieve his “peace through strength” vision. Even Vice President JD Vance, a vocal critic of US military intervention in the Middle East and the cabinet’s leading isolationist, echoed the new party line.
Trump has reportedly not made up his mind yet. He said today that it’s not “too late” for Iran to avoid a US attack if it agrees to give up its nuclear program. But as Israel and Iran exchange blows for the seventh day, the president could give the go-ahead to strike any second now. The retaliatory threat to US forces in Iraq should give him pause; two dozen ballistic missiles or sustained short-range rocket fire could overwhelm the air defenses shielding American bases in close proximity to Iran. A single successful barrage causing American fatalities could trap the United States in another open-ended quagmire. Ultimately, though, the perceived upside – encouraged by Netanyahu – of going down in history as the guy who eliminated the Iranian nuclear threat is likely to prove too tempting to pass up on. The US military has already deployed enough air and naval assets to the region to enable a strike and defend against potential retaliation.
Despite last-ditch efforts from both sides to avert a direct clash, Tehran looks unlikely to capitulate; Khamenei swore as much today. The leadership’s priority is regime survival, with domestic enrichment viewed as a cornerstone of the regime’s long-term survival strategy – the ultimate insurance policy against a Libya-style overthrow. Surrendering the nuclear program under threat of US bombardment would sacrifice long-term deterrence and legitimacy for the sake of short-term respite – a “poisoned chalice” even more bitter than Khamenei’s predecessor Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1988 decision to accept a ceasefire with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. While devastating, enduring the loss of Fordow would at least allow the regime to live to fight another day and perhaps even rebuild the nuclear program in secret once the dust settles.
With Iranian capitulation all but ruled out and no other clear off-ramp for Trump to walk back his ultimatum, the likely outcome is a US strike on Fordow in the coming days. Tehran would face growing pressure to retaliate against US bases, Gulf energy infrastructure, and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz (through which 20% of the global oil supply flows) to restore deterrence and maintain credibility at home. But, fire and brimstone rhetoric notwithstanding, a weakened regime in survival mode will probably (read: hopefully) refrain from purposefully broadening the conflict further, especially in ways that would force it to fight a three-front war against Israel, the US, and the Gulf Arab states. Iran might opt to harass oil shipping and local export facilities instead, possibly leaning on its proxies, while stopping short of measures that invite major retaliation. Trump, for his part, shows little appetite to indulge Netanyahu’s regime-change fantasies.
The greater danger lies in the fog of war. Israeli decapitation strikes have fractured Iran’s chain of command; even if the consensus among the decision-makers is to proceed cautiously, a rogue Revolutionary Guard faction might decide to take matters into its own hands and shoot at US barracks, or a wayward missile could hit an oil tanker and blow $120-a-barrel crude into the global economy. The longer the conflict runs, the higher the odds of unintended escalation. And if it’s backed into a corner, such as via overt Israeli or American attempts to induce regime change (no matter how likely to fail and/or backfire), Iran can always decide to raise the stakes, retaliation risks be damned.
President Trump could well still pull back from the brink. Just hours ago, he said to reporters at the White House, “I may do it, I may not do it." The option for the United States to take out Fordow won’t go away in a month or six. At this point in time, it will unnecessarily put American troops at risk, and it won’t result in regime change. In fact, it’s more likely to rally Iranians around the flag, empower hardliners, accelerate clandestine nuclear activities, and create pressure for prolonged American involvement. It would be smarter to allow Israel to continue degrading Iranian nuclear, missile, and military capabilities while setting back its nuclear program many months further.
But evidence suggests Trump is about to pull the trigger. When he does, headlines will hail an American-Israeli triumph. The true picture will be more mixed: Iran’s nuclear program shattered but not permanently destroyed, its regime weakened but not dead; the United States deeper in a conflict it vowed to avoid; and Israel confronting a mortal enemy whose resolve to acquire nuclear arms will only intensify. The Middle East will be 16 centrifuge cascades weaker but no closer to peace.
Graphic Truth: G7 vs BRICS, who has more economic clout?
The G7 countries – the US, UK, Canada, Germany, France, Italy and Japan – will convene this weekend in Kananaskis, a rural town in the mountains of Alberta, Canada. High on the meeting’s agenda are tariffs, artificial intelligence, and international security, with special focus on Russian sanctions and Israel’s recent attacks on Iran.
While the G7 was originally formed as an informal grouping of the world’s wealthiest democracies, the BRICS – composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa – have sought to challenge their dominance of the global agenda.
Here’s a look at how the share of the global economy held by G7 and BRICS nations has evolved over time.