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Graphic Truth: G7 vs BRICS, who has more economic clout?
The G7 countries – the US, UK, Canada, Germany, France, Italy and Japan – will convene this weekend in Kananaskis, a rural town in the mountains of Alberta, Canada. High on the meeting’s agenda are tariffs, artificial intelligence, and international security, with special focus on Russian sanctions and Israel’s recent attacks on Iran.
While the G7 was originally formed as an informal grouping of the world’s wealthiest democracies, the BRICS – composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa – have sought to challenge their dominance of the global agenda.
Here’s a look at how the share of the global economy held by G7 and BRICS nations has evolved over time.
Can Trump and Carney reset US-Canada relations?
But it has reduced cause for panic, in part because Trump stated a commitment of the United States to the basic alliance, to the security umbrella, to defending Canada as necessary, which was something he wasn't saying over the past few months with Justin Trudeau. He clearly likes Carney more than Trudeau, which is not surprising because that bar is pretty much on the floor. And also stopped with the governor speak, which is clearly disrespectful, but did push on the 51st state issue, and how much better it would be for Canada if they were actually a part of the United States, not that he intends to take it over militarily, but rather something he's going to keep talking about.
And Carney didn't interrupt Trump when he was going on and on, talking about that, but then responded with his best line of the conversation, which is, "I've spent the last couple months going around talking to the owners of Canada, meaning the voters, the citizens of Canada, and it's never, never, never going to happen." Trump says, "Never say never," and they kind of agree to disagree on something they shouldn't be talking about to begin with. But at the end of the day, not much there. The bigger problem, of course, is that there is an incredibly important trade relationship between the US and Canada. And no, it is not true that the US doesn't do much business with Canada. In fact, Canada actually buys more from the United States than any other individual country in the world does. And if you go talk to the governors, the senators, the representatives of all of the northern states that border Canada, they can tell you just how integrated those supply chains are, how essential the Canadian economy is for them.
And some of those are blue states, some of those are red states, and it don't really matter, they all care a lot about their relationship with Canada. So, it is important. But because Trump is individually taking the right to tariff from Congress, where it legally sits, and using legally contestable national emergency clauses to enforce tariffs, impose tariffs on other countries, including those that are governed by pre-existing trade relationships, like Canada, which has a robust USMCA, US-Mexico-Canada agreement, that Trump himself helped drive, negotiate, and trumpeted as a huge win at the time, but now he is singularly undermining it. And what that means is that we are very unlikely to get to a new agreed USMCA in the coming year, despite the utility of renegotiating it with the sunset clause, and instead... look, I don't think anyone's going to run away from it, I don't think it's going to break, instead, it means that every year we're going to kick it down the road and renegotiate so that you can keep it going.
And that means that the Canadians don't feel like they have a functional multilateral trade arrangement with the US and Mexico, that also means, because the US president can change it at any moment he wishes, and also that an enormous amount of time is going to be spent in those negotiations, not just now, but every year, creating more uncertainty for those that need to want to rely on the long-term stability of that trade relationship. And here is the rub, which is that the US-Canada relationship will stay important, it'll stay robust, but it will become more transactional, where it had been built on trust and shared values, and that means the Canadians will work really hard to hedge and de-risk their relations from their most important trading partner.
About 75% of Canadian trade is with the United States right now, they rely much more on the US than the Americans rely on Canada, Trump is absolutely right about that, but they now see that as a vulnerability. And for the last 40 years, the Canadians, really since '88, '89, the Canadians have focused singularly on increasing their interdependence with the United States. They built out all of this infrastructure from the provinces, not east-west, but rather north-south. If you look at the way that rail transit, and energy infrastructure, and supply chains work in Canada, it's as if these provinces were independent republics set up to do business just with the United States, not focused on what would make sense for an independent sovereign Canada over the long term, if that relationship suddenly were ruptured.
Well, that needs to change, and that's something that you're going to see the Canadians work very strongly on over the coming years. Easier for Carney to do, because his relationships internationally are much stronger than previous Canadian prime ministers, certainly generationally, if you think about the fact that he was Central Bank governor in the UK, and that one of his best international relationships is actually with the French president, Emmanuel Macron, and others and others, I think you're going to see a very strong effort to work with the UK, to work with the Commonwealth, to work with the EU, and to help shift those trade flows over time to hedge further away from the US.
And the costs of that will be significant, the impact of the trade rupture in the near term will be a major recession in Canada imminently, and a mild recession in the United States imminently as well, but over the long term, my view is no one benefits from that.
So, that's the main takeaway, a little less theatric maybe than the internet, apologies for that, but it is the way I see it, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Indian paramilitary soldiers patrol along a road in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, on April 29, 2025.
India and Pakistan inch toward a major clash
Nerves are fraught throughout Pakistan after authorities said Wednesday they have “credible intelligence” that India plans to launch military strikes on its soil by Friday, fueling fears of an outright clash between the two nuclear-armed archrivals. Troops from both sides have been exchanging fire in the disputed territory of Kashmir since a terrorist attack in the Indian-controlled section killed 26 civilians last Tuesday. Both China and the US are calling for restraint.
Tensions are spiraling rapidly. India closed its airspace to Pakistan on Wednesday and ordered nearly all Pakistani citizens to leave the country last week. Pakistan – while denying any involvement in the attacks – also canceled visas last week for most Indian citizens in retaliation. The scenes of rapid flight evoked painful memories of the 1947 Partition when Hindus in Pakistan and Muslims in India fled bloody ethnic massacres in the newly formed nations.
How bad could it get? The two countries have had two major wars, in 1965 and 1971, both of which India won, in the latter case quite decisively. In the ensuing decades, however, India has utterly outstripped Pakistan economically, militarily, and diplomatically, which means that Islamabad’s chances of prevailing in a conventional confrontation are very slim.
The balance of power shifted nonetheless when Pakistan began developing nuclear weapons in 1972 to match the India program begun in 1967. This has prevented a full-scale attack ever since. When the two sides went to war in 1999, hostilities lasted just over two months and were geographically limited to the Himalayas. If New Delhi should be foolish enough to existentially threaten its neighbor, it raises the grim – albeit unlikely – prospect of a nuclear exchange.
We’re watching for a limited engagement, but we’re far from sanguine about the risks.
Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Manet (not pictured) at the Peace Palace in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, April 17, 2025.
China warns world against harmful US trade deals
Chinese President Xi Jinping launched a tour of Southeast Asia this month, visiting key trade partners and calling for an “open and cooperative international environment” that rejects “tariff abuse.” But given the reliance of countries like Vietnam and Cambodia on US markets, Beijing may need more than words.
What comes next: Major players are kicking off talks with the US, with Japan starting last week and South Korea meant to commence within days, and Vice President JD Vancemeeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi on Monday.
Keep your eye on smaller players: Kenyan President William Ruto arrives in Beijing Tuesday, as his burgeoning economy faces strain from US aid clawbacks. For economies in the developing world like his, taking Beijing’s side might be the best hedge available.Afghan Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, pictured here at the anniversary event of the departure of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, in Kabul, Afghanistan, on April 28, 2022.
US-Taliban relations thaw amid race for Afghanistan’s mineral riches
The Trump administration has dropped multimillion-dollar bounties on senior Afghan officials from the Haqqani network, a militant faction that carried out some of the deadliest attacks on American troops but has now positioned itself as a moderate wing within the Taliban government.
The “largely symbolic” move this week came days after the US sent its first major diplomatic mission to Kabul since the Taliban took power in 2021, securing the release of an American citizen detained for the past two years.
While the bounties have been lifted, the men, including Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, remain on the US list of “specially designated global terrorists.”
Thawing relations: While few countries formally recognize the Taliban’s government, a handful – including India, Turkey, and Tajikistan – have established limited ties with Kabul.
China was the first country to formally welcome a Taliban diplomat as the official Afghanistan ambassador last year. In the highest-profile state visit yet, Uzbekistan last summer sent its prime minister to Kabul. Last month, Japan received a delegation from the Taliban for the first time.
Mineral riches: Washington estimates that Afghanistan sits atop at least $1 trillion in mineral wealth, including copper, cobalt, and lithium, in addition to gems such as emeralds, rubies, and sapphires. Last year, Beijing stepped up efforts to help the Taliban tap what could be the world’s second biggest deposit of copper. Washington may now want to keep China from seizing a monopoly like the one it has over minerals in places such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Why neither the US nor China is the world’s strongest country
What is the strongest country in the world? Parag Khanna, bestselling author and CEO of the data analytics company AlphaGeo, argues that the answer isn’t as obvious as the United States or China.
Many indices rank nations based on GDP, military strength, population, or freedom. Khanna and his team have created a new one that includes all those factors and more. The goal is to provide investors, academics, and even digital nomads a clearer sense of how safe, resilient, and stable a nation is.
Khanna calls it the Periodic Table of States, and ranks nearly 200 countries on key factors like “strength,” which is a measure of might, wealth, and resources, alongside “stateness,” a geopolitical term referring to authority and governance.
Which country came out on top? Switzerland. Germany was a close second. And the US and China didn’t make the top 5.
GZERO’s Tony Maciulis spoke to Khanna about the table, why democracy doesn’t necessarily mean stability, and where the US is heading politically in the era of President Trump 2.0.
Graphic Truth: The North American gun divide
Gun ownership rates have been rising in both the US and Canada, despite the two countries having drastically different firearms regulations. In the US, there are some federal protections, such as mandatory background checks for firearm purchases from licensed dealers, and restrictions on machine gun and suppressor ownership, as well as rules barring convicted felons and the mentally ill from owning guns. But the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms, coupled with lax gun laws in some states, and a cultural emphasis on personal protection, has enabled gun ownership to become widespread.
In Canada, however, guns are primarily viewed as tools for hunting or for sport, and ownership is subject to strict regulations, including certified coursework and background checks. Moreover, nearly 200 types of assault-style firearms are banned. As a result, the US far surpasses Canada in personal firearm ownership. There are 120 guns per 100 people in the US – yes, more than one per person – compared to 35 per 100 people in Canada.
But guns in the two countries are also deeply connected. Relaxed restrictions on buying firearms in many states along the US-Canada border have fueled a surge in illegal gun smuggling into Canada. From 2022-24, Canadian border security saw a 44% increase in firearms illegally entering from the US. The issue is under renewed scrutiny as the Trump administration imposes tariffs on Canada, pressuring it to curb fentanyl trafficking. Many Canadians argue that the illegal flow of US firearms poses an equally serious threat to public safety.
Can Europe broker a Ukraine ceasefire?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. The big news, everything around Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and Europe. The Europeans now with the ball in their court, a big summit, a coalition of the willing in London this week. And Zelensky very warmly embraced, quite literally, by UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and by everyone in attendance. It was very different visuals, very different takeaways than the meeting between Zelensky, Trump, and Vance in the Oval Office, which couldn't have gone much worse if everyone tried.
Where we are right now, certainly this coalition of the willing had everyone that mattered in Europe. I mean, not the countries, not the leaders that have been skeptical, that have been more aligned with the Russians, or more, say, in a minimal position, like the Hungarians, like the Slovaks, but everybody else was there. So, you've got the Brits, you've got the French, you've got the Italians, and the Germans. You also have EU leadership, Ursula von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas, and also you have all of the frontline leaders that have the most at stake from a national security perspective: the Nordics, the Balts, the Poles. You even have Canada, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who doesn't spend very much on defense, but nonetheless going there to show he's aligned with the Ukrainians, whether or not the Americans, who the Canadians rely on completely economically, are not.
Does it matter? Does it matter? If you're asking does it matter in the sense that can the Europeans go it alone without the Americans? I'm still skeptical, though they're putting a lot more on the table now than they were a week ago, and they should have been doing that years ago. And that's going to remain a very big question, and I'm probably going to remain pretty skeptical. But very interesting that the Europeans do now have a level of ownership. Remember that Trump, both when he was running for president and once he became president, said that the United States was going to end this war, that he, Trump, would be responsible for the ceasefire, that he's going to do it himself with the Ukrainians, with the Russians, he could do it in 24 hours. That's obviously an exaggeration, but nonetheless, even as he realized it was going to take longer, he was the dominant actor. That's now changed. Keir Starmer has now told Trump that the Europeans, this coalition of the willing, is coming up with a ceasefire plan, and they are going to present it to the United States, and Trump is expecting it.
So for now, the Europeans don't just have a seat at the table, but they actually are in the driver's seat, in terms of the ceasefire on the back of the Ukrainian-US relationship having functionally blown up, and the Americans saying they're not going to do anything particularly more for the Ukrainians. They're not even prepared to sign the critical minerals deal that Zelensky now says he is prepared to sign. But if the Europeans are the ones that are going to be coughing up the money and providing the troops, then certainly they're the ones that are responsible for the terms of the ceasefire.
Now, that's interesting. And we're hearing certainly that there's going to be a lot more engagement, that potentially Starmer, Macron, and Zelensky will all three come together to the White House to meet Trump maybe later this week, maybe next week. Certainly Zelensky should not be attending meetings like that by himself anymore, I think he understands that, the Europeans understand that as well.
What they should do now, the Europeans, is present a UN Security Council resolution with the plan once Trump has seen it and is prepared to move forward. A simple thing, deciding nothing, just saying that the Security Council supports the path to peace as outlined from the UK summit. This will force Russian amendments, which the UK and France will veto, and then Russia will be forced to veto the resolution. And that's useful in a couple of different ways. First of all, it costs the French and the UK nothing, and they win a fair amount. The news will be all about how their Russian veto was used for the first time since 1989, and it places the Americans on the same side as the Europeans on the ceasefire issue, which is what the Europeans, the Ukrainians desperately need, and frankly, the Democrats and the Republicans in Congress as well.
The UK and France can then show Trump that they indeed don't need to be invited to the table, because they're at the table, they have the ceasefire plan and they're the ones that are driving it. Now, having a ceasefire plan is different from being able to implement the ceasefire and support the Ukrainians, and that is where there's still an awful lot that still needs to be accomplished.
Specifically the one piece of good news, surprising news, is that the Germans are now talking about 800 billion Euro package, outside of their debt break, that would support defense spending and infrastructure spending. They weren't talking about anything remotely like this even a few days ago. It would have to be done well before the end of the month because when the new chancellor comes in, then you are going to have the far left and the far right with the ability to block any constitutional majority. They don't have that capacity now, which means the debt break can be overridden by a vote in the Bundestag. That's really important, and would lead to German leadership in helping to finance this war.
You also have the 300 billion Euros that are frozen, the Russian sovereign assets that are mostly in the hands of the Europeans, the Belgians, as it turns out, and some others as opposed to the Americans, the Japanese. So, that could also be used to support Ukraine to buy more weapons, also to build up Ukraine's military industrial complex. In other words, while this situation is difficult and urgent, I would not yet say that it has fallen apart for the Ukrainians or the Europeans. They are still, as it were, in the game.
Now, the big question overlooking all of this is the United States and Russia, because they still want to do a deal, and that deal is not mostly about Ukraine, that deal mostly is about rapprochement between the United States and Russia over the heads of their NATO allies. This is what Trump is interested in, this is what Putin is interested. And frankly, it's a little easier to do that deal if you don't have a ceasefire, because the Russians don't really want one, than it is to do that deal if a ceasefire is a part of it. That's what has to be watched very carefully because of course, Trump and Putin are talking about where they're going to meet in person, Saudi Arabia maybe in May, Trump would even be willing to go to Moscow. This could include things like the United States taking unilateral sanctions off of Russia while the Europeans would still have them on. Could lead to a lot of business, a much bigger critical minerals deal than the one that was going to be signed between the Americans and the Ukrainians, and now, at least, is off the table.
Also note that the US Defense Department has at least temporarily suspended offensive cyberattacks against the Russians, which is quite something, again, in the context of nothing having been agreed to between the Americans and the Russians, but clearly Trump much more willing to be on Putin's good side right now than he is with Zelensky. So ultimately, that is a very big challenge for the Europeans, but they will be in far better shape if they're able to move on the ceasefire in the near-term, which looks likely, and on support for Ukraine in the medium-term, which looks like more of a challenge.
So, that's it for now. I'll talk to you all real soon.