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A member of the Syrian security forces gestures next to a vehicle at the entrance of the Druze town of Jaramana, following deadly clashes sparked by a purported recording of a Druze man cursing the Prophet Mohammad, which angered Sunni gunmen southeast of Damascus, Syria, on April 29, 2025.
HARD NUMBERS: Sectarian clashes hit Damascus, Will India attack Pakistan?, Trump eases auto-tariffs, Germany creates coalition government, Malnutrition soars in Gaza, Cuba jails top dissident again
10: At least 10 people were killed in sectarian clashes outside Damascus late Monday. The firefight erupted between pro-government Sunni fighters and gunmen belonging to the Druze minority after a Druze cleric was blamed for an audio recording that insulted the Prophet Muhammad. Containing sectarian violence is a top concern for the post-Assad government as it seeks to rebuild the war-torn country. In response to the violence and threats against the Druze minority, Israel conducted what it called a “warning operation” on Wednesday, targeting an armed group in Syria’s Damascus province.
24-36: Pakistan’s information minister claimed on Tuesday that the country has “credible intelligence” that India may launch a military strike within 24 to 36 hours. The warning follows India’s accusation that Pakistan-backed militants were responsible for an attack in Indian-administered Kashmir last week that killed 26 tourists — a charge Islamabad denies.
2: Donald Trump on Monday reduced the tariff burden on US-based car manufacturers by ensuring that the 25% levies on vehicles and parts don’t pile on top of existing duties, such as those on imported steel and aluminum. He also provided tariff rebates on foreign parts to automakers operating in the US for a two-year period, giving them more time to shift their supply chains.
84: In Germany’s parliament late Tuesday, 84% of Social Democratic Party members strongly supported the party’s proposal to join a coalition government with the Christian Democratic bloc. Friedrich Merz, leader of the center-right party that won the February election, is set to be officially appointed chancellor next week. His main priority? Reviving Germany’s struggling economy.
10,000: Roughly 10,000 cases of acute malnutrition have been registered among children in Gaza so far this year, according to a new UN report. Overall, about 60,000 children there are chronically underfed. Israel has blocked all aid deliveries to the enclave since March 2, saying that Hamas hijacks humanitarian convoys. Dozens of local and internationally run community kitchens have run out of supplies and been forced to close in recent weeks.
3: On Tuesday, after just three months of freedom, Cuban dissident Jose Daniel Ferrerwas arrested again on charges that he had violated his parole agreement. Ferrer, one of the few high-profile opponents of the island’s communist dictatorship, was released earlier this year as part of a Vatican-brokered deal. The Castro regime continues to wield significant influence in Cuba, even amid a crippling economic crisis that has driven more than a fifth of the population abroad since 2022.President Donald Trump gives a thumbs up as he returns to the White House on Feb. 22, 2025.
Opinion: 100 days of promises kept
World leaders and the global audience are trying to adjust to so much change in such little time, but the dominant thread has been the surprises hidden in plain sight throughout these last three months.
Border security & budget cuts take center stage
At home, the administration immediately got to work on commitments made on the campaign trail and in the latest Republican platform. Atop the list was a mandate to reverse “open-border” immigration policies and secure the US frontier. In its “Protecting the American People against Invasion” presidential action, one of a flurry of Day 1 executive orders, Trump established the groundwork for a multipronged policy, which has included detentions and mass deportations, designating MS-13 a foreign terrorist organization, and court battles over the protected status of Venezuelan migrants as well as birthright citizenship. The approach has had a chilling effect on immigration, with southwest land-border encounters down more than 90% year-on-year, according to the latest March data.
Trump’s other major domestic campaign priorities, deregulation and reigning in federal spending, have spawned a similar pace of action. Elon Musk’s work overseeing the Department of Government Efficiency has come to symbolize how the contours and shape of the US federal government have been redrawn. Last week’s announcement by Secretary of State Marco Rubio that his department will also be overhauled – reducing jobs, shuttering “redundant” offices, and reprioritizing departmental focus – is just the latest example of a campaign throughline to reevaluate federal government spending and structure. The news comes as local governments and populations are still adapting to the shuttering of USAID, a key lever of US soft power abroad.
On domestic policy, there have been few surprises. Trump’s 2024 campaign commitments have become Trump 2.0 administration policy. Despite efforts last fall by the Trump campaign to distance itself from Project 2025, co-author Russell Vought’s selection to lead the Office of Management and Budget was a clear and present signal to all market players of how expansively the plans currently unfolding had been laid.
Remaking America’s role abroad
Turning to the global stage, Trump 2.0’s America First foreign policy has not been the “Make America Great Again” isolationism of Trump 1.0. Instead, from Canada to Mexico, Greenland, and Yemen, no stone is being left unconsidered or unturned. Global expectations set by the first Trump administration that foreign policy would only play second fiddle to a brighter spotlight on the domestic agenda are being updated. Trump has begun to remake America’s role in the world in his image, sowing a geopolitical unsettling but being transparent about the administration’s intentions – as peacemakers and trade disrupters.
As a would-be peacemaker, the president had hoped to bring an efficient closure to the war in Ukraine, an ambition welcomed by those sitting in European capitals. He committed initially to ending the conflict on his first day in office but later extended the timeline to within six months. Last week’s decision by lead attaché Steve Witkoff and Rubio to pull out of peace talks in London is telling. With remaining wide gulfs between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Trump (even after their 15-minute tête-à-tête at the pope’s funeral this weekend), and likewise, between Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the US administration is quickly discovering that intractability is in the details. European leadership has yet to identify an offramp to the conflict that does not include the US administration’s stewardship.
As a quick resolution does not appear imminent, the Trump administration may soon look to quietly back out and close the door on its peace negotiation efforts. Rubio acknowledged as much over the weekend, saying that “we cannot continue … to dedicate time and resources to this effort if it is not going to come to fruition.”
Any reduction in attention on Ukraine and Europe would almost certainly coincide with a ramp-up toward the Middle East, where the administration has historically had more success (e.g. Trump 1.0’s Abraham Accords).
While being a peacemaker remains a work in progress, the president has exceeded expectations as a trade disrupter over the first 100 days. Despite Trump’s constant refrain of tariffs and a four-decade commitment to seeing the US not get “ripped off,” the markets and global leadership still held their breath for a targeted, gradual installation of levies. Instead, April 2, aka “Liberation Day,” introduced the world to one man’s concept of “kind reciprocity,” a benign phrase that has the potential to reshape the global trading system, financial markets, and international relationships.
The accompanying executive order provided for a 10% flat tariff on all trading partners, which went into effect earlier this month. The additional “discounted” reciprocal tariff rates to be imposed on certain trading partners were postponed for 90 days until July 9 for all except the People’s Republic of China. In the intervening weeks, markets have wobbled but are holding onto hope.
The dominant question now is what lies ahead for the next 100 days and beyond. As the “Liberation Day” announcements and maneuvers clarify, there will be more volatility to come. Even with the policy priorities and details beginning to be filled in, this is not the finishing line; it is merely the starting gun. Trump has 90% of the race still to run.
Still, the Trump administration will be pleased with the scorecard of promises kept thus far. It has planted seeds across the domestic and global landscape and will now step back to watch the garden grow. On trade, the ambition is 90 deals in 90 days. And with it, Trump assumes his most preferred role: dealmaker-in-chief.
Lindsay Newman is a geopolitical risk expert and columnist for GZERO.
President Donald Trump raises a fist during a ceremony where he signs two executive orders that will lead to reciprocal tariffs against other countries that charge tariffs on US goods.
Is Donald Trump’s foreign policy … working?
What’s the old line about there being decades where nothing happens and weeks where decades happen?
Quoting Vladimir Lenin may not be the wisest move in today’s America, but it’s an apt description of the (second) first 100 days of Donald Trump’s foreign policy.
In barely three months, he’s bashed America’s closest European allies, spooked NATO into worrying about its survival, taken a chainsaw to US foreign aid programs, pulled the rug out from under Ukraine, threatened to expand US territory for the first time since the 19th century, and started a global trade war that’s pushed protectionism to its highest levels since the Great Depression.
Not bad for 100 days! But is there a method to what seems – to horrified defenders of the “US-led world order” – like so much madness? “Method” is a risky word to use with a figure as famously capricious as Trump, but there are a few basic aspects of his worldview and commitment to “America First” that are consistent and worth understanding.
No new friends (also no old friends)
First, Trump believes that the world is a place where all countries are just trying to “screw” each other. This is true not only of adversaries but, especially, of allies. (Tell me you’re a New York real estate developer without telling me you’re a New York real estate developer.)
The mutual screwing occurs in an endless chain of zero-sum transactions between countries in which hard power and cold cash are all that matters. Deficits or defense umbrellas are ripoffs. Alliances based on “values” are silly. Soft power is a useless conceit, a virtue signal, a kind of “Geopolitical wokism.”
It’s a (multipolar) jungle out there
Second, there are various great powers in this world, and each has its own sphere of influence. The largest of these are the US and its chief rival China, but Russia is up there as well. You do not, in Trump’s view, mess with another power’s sphere of influence, and you do not waste time trying to win over countries of marginal economic or strategic value beyond your neighborhood. You put your country, to borrow a phrase Trump uses a lot, “first.”
Once you grasp that, for Trump, the world is a transactional and increasingly multipolar jungle, it actually explains a lot about his foreign policy.
It tells you why he doesn’t seem to care that much about Ukraine (he sees it as Russia’s sphere) or Taiwan (ditto for China) or why he’s OK slashing foreign aid (soft power is silly). It explains why he wants a piece of Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal (all have immense strategic and economic value within Washington’s own sphere of influence, especially if conflict is coming with other powers.) And of course, it tells you why he loves to love tariffs – a crude but effective tool for unleashing America’s immense economic power
Hard power dreams, soft power missteps
All of this is a big rupture with the longstanding idea that the US, as a hegemon, gets more than it gives by providing security, market access, or development assistance to vast parts of the world.
But taken on its own terms, is Trump’s foreign policy ... working? The evidence is mixed. Many of his objectives – restore America’s lost manufacturing capacity, confront China, and force Europe to carry its share of the defense burden – can make sense on their own. But, taken together, the overall policy is still a mess of conflicting impulses.
Trump wants to isolate and pressure China, but he’s simultaneously wrecking relations with Europe, Washington’s most natural ally against Beijing. He wants to maintain technological supremacy over China, but his immigration and education policies are scaring the world’s best minds away from America.
He wants to use tariffs to restore manufacturing – which, by definition, almost requires leaving them in place for a long time. But he also wants to use them to extract tactical concessions on trade and defense – which means not leaving them in place for a long time. Which is it?
And while he is right to force the West to confront the problems of Biden’s well-intentioned but poorly defined Ukraine policy, his pledge to end the war “within 24 hours” is already 2,376 hours overdue. Browbeating Ukraine while pleading with Vladimir Putin on social media is not exactly a foreign policy to be reckoned with.
It’s still early days to be sure. But whether the decades that have happened in these 100 days are a real revolution against the long-established order of US foreign policy, or a a tangle of disruptive but ultimately confused impulses remains to be seen.
Protecting your money in today's unpredictable market
“When things are going fine, nobody really tests the skills and talents of their financial advisor, but this is a moment where really good advice can be extraordinarily powerful,” says Margaret Franklin, CFA Institute's CEO and President.
In conversation with GZERO’s Tony Maciulis, Franklin describes the current financial climate as “maximum uncertainty,” rating it a 10 out of 10 on the risk scale. Recent unpredictable US trade policies have sent market volatility soaring, leaving many people and investors uncertain about their financial and portfolio management decisions. The usual conditions of predictability and reliability have been upended, making it more important than ever to seek guidance from a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA), Franklin recommends. She warns that the most “common destructive behavior” for a portfolio is abandoning a sensible program just when you need to stay the course.
Franklin also highlights growing concerns about “finfluencers” on platforms like TikTok and Instagram, who often lack proper qualifications and required disclosures. To address this, the CFA Institute is working to provide the public with reliable financial education and resources, helping people better understand the complexities and risks of today’s unpredictable environment.
This conversation is presented by GZERO in partnership with Microsoft from the IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington, D.C. The Global Stage series convenes global leaders for critical discussions on the geopolitical and technological trends shaping our world.
President Donald Trump at a bilateral meeting with China's President Xi Jinping during the G20 leaders summit in Osaka, Japan, on June 29, 2019.
Trump promises to be “very nice” with China – but Beijing won’t be flattered
On Wednesday, Donald Trump said he would deliver a “fair deal” with China. He also said he’d be “very nice” to the country after meeting with major retailers. CNN reports the retailers gave the president a “blunt message” about the risks of a prolonged trade war with China, warning shop shelves could “soon be empty.”
Beijing, however, denied that there are any ongoing talks and told the US it must cancel its unilateral tariffs before China will broker any negotiations.
Trump is now promising a substantial drop in tariffs on China, which currently sits at 145%, though he says he won’t drop them to zero. Meanwhile, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessentsays there won’t be a tariff reduction without a trade deal, and that it could take two or three years before the US manages to rebalance its trade with its rival, citing the past precedent of Japan, with whom it took a decade to rebalance trade volumes.
On Wednesday, markets were up on the China expectations and news, further buoyed by Trump’s comment that he had “no intention” of firing Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell. But don’t bank on a long-term comeback or market stability. Earlier in the week, stocks were down with indices closing roughly 2.5% lighter than they started the day after Trump called Powell “Mr.Too Late” and “a major loser” as he pressed for interest rate cuts he claims will buoy the economy amid declining consumer confidence and a growing recession risk.
Workers' Party (WP) supporters wave party flags as they cheer their candidates at the nomination center ahead of the general election in Singapore, on April 23, 2025.
Singapore’s opposition hopes to make major gains as election campaign begins
Singapore kicked off a lightning-fast, nine-day campaign on Wednesday for its May 3 election. The vote promises to be the most contested since independence, as the ruling People’s Action Party sweats a strong challenge amid weak economic forecasts.
Elections in Singapore are usually dull affairs: The PAP has utterly dominated all contests since 1965, with members of the founding Lee family serving as PM for 45 years combined, and as recently as 2024. During one of its worst performances in 2020, the PAP won 89% of seats in parliament – even though it won just 61% of the vote. Such disproportionate electoral results, along with systematic repression of opposition figures, have led to accusations that Singapore is ade facto one-party state.
What’s different this time? First off, the Lion City is facing grim economic prospects. Growth projections have been revised to 0-2% for the year, down from 1-3%, and the heavily trade-dependent economy is reeling from global 10% tariffs imposed by the United States.
Secondly, the PAP’s long time in office contrasts sharply with a slate of newer candidates from the opposition Worker’s Party. PM Lawrence Wong has introduced 32 new candidates in an effort to shed the old guard image, casting off many long-serving stalwarts. A YouGov survey showed that only about 40% of voters would support the PAP if the election were held today, while a 43% plurality either don’t know or wouldn’t say who they will support.
The WP is still fighting uphill. Its leaders hope to take a third of seats in parliament, far from a majority – but perhaps enough to change the political dynamic permanently.Trump’s 4D checkers, China’s opportunity, climate hopes, and more: Your questions, answered
Welcome to another edition of my mailbag, where I attempt to make sense of our increasingly chaotic world, one reader question at a time. If you have a burning question for me before I go back to full-length columns, ask it here and I’ll answer as many as I can in next week’s newsletter.
Let’s dive in (with questions lightly edited for clarity).
Is the US currently a kleptocracy?
The United States is the most structurally kleptocratic of any advanced industrial democracy, with public policy increasingly captured by monied special interests and the rules of the marketplace determined by the highest bidder. The wealthiest Americans not only can fund political campaigns but also buy favorable regulatory and legal treatment and lobby for policies that perpetuate their economic interests. This system is two-tiered alright, but it doesn’t see red and blue – only green.
President Donald Trump is a beneficiary and an accelerant of this disease, but it long predates him. Which is why Trump faced so little pushback from the business world both times he was elected. After all, a system where the connected can buy their preferred policy outcomes is a system much of the private sector is both used to and comfortable with.
Has Trump done to brand USA what Musk did to Tesla?
He’s working on it. The long-term damage to America’s reputational capital has been incalculable (though it hasn’t been as great as the >50% in value Tesla has lost since its mid-December peak). Sometimes you have a personal relationship and someone does something that can’t be unseen. That’s what has happened particularly with Canadians and Europeans of late. I think that damage is permanent. And we are not even 100 days in …
How do other nations view America in light of Trump’s aggressive tariffs, threats, and general disdain for allies?
They all see the United States as the principal driver of geopolitical uncertainty. In the near term, most countries – especially smaller, poorer ones – will look to cut trade deals with Trump relatively quickly because the alternative, direct confrontation with the world’s sole superpower, is too costly to bear. We’re seeing that already with the Japanese, the South Koreans, and many other delegations coming to Washington to try to do everything they can to secure at least functional relations with the US.
At the same time, every country recognizes the longer-term need to hedge away and “de-risk” from the United States as much and as fast as possible to reduce their exposure to Trump-driven disruption. Even those that manage to come away with deals know the president could change his mind. After spending the last decade focusing on the dangers of having too much exposure to Beijing’s opaque, arbitrary, and personalistic decision-making, policymakers, businesses, and investors all over the world now suddenly see de-risking from the US as the more urgent priority. That’s an extraordinary shift when you stop to think about it.
Granted, de-risking from the US is a tall order given America’s asymmetric power advantages and the global embeddedness of so many of the things it provides – defense, advanced technologies, finance – that are hard to substitute (read: to break free from). But many US allies see no choice but to start seriously looking for alternatives. We’re already seeing the European Union and Latin America speed up their conversations to fast-track approval of the EU-Mercosur trade deal. Trump-aligned India is likewise moving to improve its trade relations with the EU, the United Kingdom, Australia, and others. Canada is trying to engage much more closely with the Europeans. Even Vietnam, which has long harbored deep mistrust of China, signed 45 new economic cooperation agreements with Beijing days after Trump trade czar Peter Navarro rebuffed its offer to lower its tariffs on US goods to zero.
Can China capitalize on Trump’s global trade war to peel off US allies?
Xi Jinping just wrapped up a Southeast Asian charm offensive to try to do exactly that. For the first time since the Vietnam War, most Vietnamese are now more well-disposed toward China than the US. That’s not true everywhere (e.g., the Philippines is still about 80% pro-American), but the trend line is clear. China sees the moment as a historic opportunity to move economically closer to many countries and portray itself as a champion of globalization and a force for stability.
But that doesn’t necessarily mean America’s loss will be China’s gain everywhere. The Europeans don’t suddenly trust the Chinese more just because they now trust the Americans less. They still have big issues with Chinese dumping, overcapacity exports (especially in the auto industry), data surveillance, and other beggar-thy-neighbor practices that have not gone away. Europe’s de-risking will be less about tilting to China and more about strengthening its own capabilities and hedging with pretty much everybody else. Plus, as I mentioned above, while Trump has worked hard to alienate US allies, America remains the only game in town for most Western countries in many strategic sectors and critical networks. Going cold turkey is unthinkable.
If everyone thinks tariffs are a bad idea even for the American economy, why is Trump persisting? Do you see a way the US can win on this?
As much as I’d like to believe so, I just can't see any way the US comes out ahead on this. Myself and others have written extensively about why the tariffs (and the massive ongoing uncertainty surrounding US policy) are an economic lose-lose, not only for America’s trade partners but for American consumers and businesses, and not just in the short term but also in the long run. Rather than boost domestic manufacturing, they will accelerate the country’s deindustrialization. And if the administration had really intended to use the tariffs as a cudgel to forge a united front against China (as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and others have claimed), it wouldn’t have slapped punishing duties on friendly countries already inclined to join this alliance before asking for their help. I’m afraid there’s no “4D chess” strategy or master plan.
It’d be one thing if the Trump team were only picking this one fight. But it’s going to be much harder to convince the world not to hedge away from the United States when at the same time as they’re hitting everyone with tariffs, they’re also picking all sorts of fights on other fronts. They are directly and indirectly threatening other countries’ sovereignty and territoriality, whether it’s Greenland and Denmark, Panama, Canada, or Ukraine. They are exporting algorithms and disinformation that undermine democracies around the world. They are destroying the transatlantic alliance. They are aligning with Russia over longstanding allies at the United Nations and the G7. They are driving away foreign tourists and international students. And they’re picking fights domestically, trying to weaken checks and balances, undermine the rule of law, and erode state capacity in ways that will make the US a worse place to live, invest, and do business.
I'd love to be proven wrong, but this policy set looks hands down like the most extraordinary geopolitical own goal I’ve ever witnessed.
Is it possible that Trump is purposely upsetting the economy in an effort to lower interest rates, reduce the US government’s debt servicing costs, and shrink the federal deficit?
Nope. That’s another one of those 4D chess stories flying around, and it’s nonsense. It’s true that a tariff-and-uncertainty-induced US recession can make existing US government debt (and mortgages, car loans, credit card debt, etc.) cheaper to refinance by bringing down long-term interest rates. But if long rates decline because the real economy has deteriorated to the point where the Fed has to cut short-term rates to boost aggregate demand, the money saved on debt interest payments probably will be offset by the lower tax revenue collected and the higher unemployment benefits paid out during the recession. The overall deficit will likely be higher than if said recession hadn’t been engineered in the first place – destroying trillions in economic value and hurting millions of real Americans in the process.
And all this assumes that long rates will in fact go down when the US enters a tariff-and-uncertainty-induced recession, which financial markets are currently telling us is not guaranteed in light of growing inflation and default risks. Thus far, Trump’s stagflationary policy mix and erratic policymaking style have made the world’s safe-haven assets relatively less attractive, prompted investors to sell US bonds, and caused long rates to rise rather than fall.
Will Trump succeed in brokering a ceasefire in Ukraine like he promised on the campaign trail?
Only if he’s willing to effectively use both carrots and sticks on Russia and Ukraine alike. So far he hasn’t, deploying mostly sticks (suspending military aid and intelligence sharing) to force the Ukrainians to come to terms and principally only carrots (the promise of sanctions nonenforcement and relief, and even full normalization of relations) to get the Russians to back off their maximalist demands.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said last week the administration is giving the talks “a matter of days” to make progress or else they’ll walk away from the peace effort altogether. The problem is that Vladimir Putin continues to be uninterested in a durable ceasefire, at least not unless the so-called “root causes” of the conflict are addressed through a permanent settlement. He started this war to change the facts on the ground and is convinced he still has what it takes to win it. What’s more, he’s betting that if he can keep slow rolling the peace talks and convince Trump that it was Kyiv’s intransigence that tanked them, Russia could plausibly get a US rapprochement while it continues to wage war against a Ukraine deprived of US assistance. I’m not a betting man, but at this point, it’s a reasonable wager for Putin to make.
What do you expect from incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz?
Less capacity to spend and lead than many people hope, despite having managed to pass a historic fiscal package through the Bundestag lifting the country’s “debt brake” for defense spending and creating a 500 billion euro special fund for infrastructure investments. The incoming coalition is serious but relatively unpopular and divided, facing a stronger-than-ever far-right Alternative for Germany leading the opposition in the new parliament.
This political weakness, combined with the sheer scale of the challenges it faces, will water down the government’s ambitions. Germany is undergoing a severe, decade-long economic crisis. Merz will be under considerable pressure to jumpstart growth quickly amid global trade wars and under tight budget conditions. Just a few weeks ago, he was well-disposed to take on a European leadership role. Now that talk is no longer cheap, his constraints and risk tolerance will change. And if the Germans won’t step up, who in Europe can?
Is climate action possible in a disintegrating world? Have the odds of avoiding catastrophic climate change worsened in the past three months?
I’m more optimistic here. We’ve already broken the back of the most catastrophic climate change scenarios. Economic self-interest – not ideology or idealism – is driving the clean energy revolution as technological innovation and steep learning curves have dramatically reduced the price tag of clean power technologies, making them the cheapest and most profitable option in a lot of markets regardless of politics. Deep-red Texas and Florida lead the US in solar and wind power deployment. China is set to hit its emissions peak several years ahead of schedule. Europe sees renewables as an energy security imperative. Emerging markets from India to Indonesia and Pakistan are eager to develop using cheaper and cleaner domestic energy sources than high-volatility, dirty imported fuels.
I don’t want to be glib. The planet is still heating up faster than we’d like, and the present state of geopolitics – from Trump’s “drill, baby, drill” to the G-Zero vacuum of global climate leadership – will slow the pace of decarbonization. With every fraction of a degree of warming causing bigger and more frequent disasters, lower growth, and more deaths, that’s not good news. But for every environmental regulation repealed, clean energy policy revoked, fossil fuel project approved, and international commitment abandoned, there’s another, much more structural force pulling even harder in the opposite direction. As my colleagues and I put it in Eurasia Group’s 2025 Top Risks report, the global energy transition “has reached escape velocity.”
Would you ride Moose like a jockey if given the opportunity?
I’d train him with a well-disposed toddler first. That would be must-see television. Any volunteers?
Global economic outlook: Is a recession already here?
“We’re heading toward a substantial U.S. recession,” said Robert Kahn, Eurasia Group’s Managing Director, Global Macro. “We may even be in one now.”
That notion challenges the official economic outlook released this week by the International Monetary Fund, which was more cautious in its assessment. However, it more closely mirrors what experts are saying in the halls at the IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings currently underway in Washington, D.C.
In a conversation with GZERO’s Tony Maciulis, Kahn explained the state of the global economy before President Donald Trump’s April 2 “Liberation Day” and where things stand now. Unlike past crises triggered by external shocks, this one, he argues, is driven by the U.S. administration’s abrupt and sweeping trade policy changes, alongside tension between the White House and the Federal Reserve. These factors make the downturn both unpredictable and unprecedented.
“We don’t have a model for this,” Kahn said. “There’s no course I took in school that’s directly relevant to what we’re living with.”