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Chinese President Xi Jinping and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr review the honour guard during a welcome ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China January 4, 2023
Can a hotline prevent war in South China Sea?
I know when that hotline bling, that can only mean one thing: Beijing and Manila are beefing over uninhabitable rocks again. China and the Philippines have reportedly set up a bilateral hotline meant to help them avoid a deadly incident in the disputed South China Sea.
The effort to improve communications follows a particularly violentconfrontation on June 17, when Chinese sailors surrounded and boarded Filipino vessels wielding bladed weapons. One Filipino sailor lost his finger, and the fear is that should someone lose their life, Manila could activate its mutual defense treaty with the United States.
The Biden administration has struck a nuanced position, assuring Manila that it would honor the treaty fully while also attempting to signal to China that they aren’t handing out carte blanche to the Philippines. Eurasia Group’s Jeremy Chan says proactive communication after the June 17 incident has helped lower the temperature.
“Beijing interpreted the June 28 call between Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and China's Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu in particular as a clear signal that Washington does not support Manila in pushing its territorial claims too aggressively,” he said.
Being able to quickly pick up the phone and talk through future incidents is a useful pressure release valve, but longer term, the South China Sea and the shoals used to mark de facto control will remain a tension point. We are watching how it will affect US and Chinese efforts to stabilize their own relationship.
China’s foreign ministry on Thursday warned NATO not to bring “chaos” into Asia and accused the alliance of seeking security at the expense of other countries after it labeled Beijing a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war on Ukraine.
China tells NATO to butt out
China’s foreign ministry on Thursday warned NATO not to bring “chaos” into Asia and accused the alliance of seeking security at the expense of other countries after it labeled Beijing a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war on Ukraine. The foreign ministry’s comments come amid increasing cooperation between NATO and US allies in the Pacific, particularly Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.
Washington and its allies accuse China of helping Russia skirt arms controls by shipping so-called “dual use” goods that can be applied in both civilian and military contexts. In turn, China gets access to heavily discounted Russian oil and gas — a desirable asset at any time, but advantageous for China’s economy at a moment when it appears particularly shaky.
At home, however, Beijing has signaled not to expect “strong medicine” to boost the economy at next week’s upcoming Third Party Plenum, scheduled for July 15-18 behind closed doors.
These meetings are closely watched because past leaders have used them to deliver big news. Deng Xiaoping announced the earth-shaking “Opening and Reform” policy, for example, at the 1978 session.
Xi Jinping isn’t expected to announce any major policy shifts, according to experts at Eurasia Group. So we’ll be watching for language intended to boost consumer confidence battered by the roiling debt crisis, but little by way of decisive policy.Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a meeting in Ufa, Russia, July 8, 2015. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping will attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS summits.
Russian dependence on China deepens
In public, there are “no limits” to the old and dear friendship between China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin, two leaders with a common distaste for an international system dominated by Western-led political and economic institutions. But China’s economy and population were 10 times the size of Russia’s before Russia invaded Ukraine, and the mess that war has created for Putin leaves Moscow even more deeply dependent on Beijing.
That’s the clearest explanation for the failure (so far) of China and Russia to agree on a plan to build the “Power of Siberia 2” gas pipeline, a project that would deepen their economic interdependence. Aware the Ukraine war has cost Russia its European energy customers, according to a new report in the Financial Times, China is reportedly demanding a price per unit of Russian gas that’s even more steeply discounted than the price China already pays for it, which is less than half the price Europe paid before the invasion. China is also refusing to commit to purchase more than a small fraction of the pipeline’s capacity.
The two sides may one day agree on a deal to build this pipeline. But the terms of that agreement will reflect the reality that Russia’s near-term need for cash is far greater and more urgent than China’s immediate need for Russian gas.
North Macedonia's EU membership bid complicated by new nationalist government
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden, shares his perspective on European politics from Arizona, US.
What's the outcome and the likely result of the North Macedonia parliamentary election?
A new government, more nationalist, more rightists coming in. And the problem with that is that North Macedonia has made a number of concessions in order to make its EU path possible. First concessions through Greece in terms of the names and the number of concessions through France and a number of concessions through Bulgaria on minority and related issues. And the new government has got to say no to a lot of these things. And that further complicates the EU process, which is highly regrettable because the country in substance really deserves to move forward on that process.
What was the result of Xi Jinping's much celebrated tour of Europe?
Well, the tour was really restricted to France, where he had the usual talks with President Macron and I think Macron was an alliance, was an alliance had the right words concerning what China is doing in terms of supporting Ukraine, which is supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine, which is creating problems in the relationship to Europe, whether it's sorted out any of the economic issues remains to be seen. And then, of course, he went on to Serbia and to Hungary, which are much more China-friendly countries and much publicity and new agreements of different sorts. But if you to talk about the overall relationship between China and Europe, the European Union, I don't think much was changed by this particular trip.
China's President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan disembark at Orly Airport, south of Paris, on May 5, 2024.
Xi goes on (short) European tour
This week marks President Xi Jinping’s first trip to Europe in five years. The Chinese leader will only visit France, Serbia, and Hungary – three countries where he’s likely to find the friendliest ears – and meet with EU Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen to discuss trade tensions and China’s support for Russia in its war with Ukraine.
Xi, who landed in Paris on Sunday, will also have a tete-a-tete with Emanuel Macron for the second time in as many years. You’ll remember that the French president raised continental eyebrows last year with a state visit to Beijing, where he declared that Europe should not be drawn into a standoff between China and the US over Taiwan. Macron’s independent foreign policy approach left a positive impression on Beijing.
This time, the French leader is looking beyond tensions in the Taiwan Strait. He told The Economist that it’s “in our interest to get China to weigh in on the stability of the international order.” Xi seemed to agree, issuing a statement that Sino-French relations “have established a model for the international community of peaceful coexistence.”
The two will discuss trade and security, with France wanting increased access to the Chinese market for its agricultural exports and protection for intellectual property rights for the French cosmetic industry. Macron will reiterate that China should stop exporting dual-use goods that power Russia’s war in Ukraine.
But we’re not holding our breath for any positive signals on that since the Chinese leader will then visit Hungary and Serbia, two countries with close ties to Russia. Xi’s visit to Serbia will focus on deepening trade relations – and it happens to coincide with the 25th anniversary week of NATO’s fatal bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. In Hungary, Xi wants to cement his relationship with autocratic Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has stymied EU efforts to hold China to account on human rights issues.
Why the US-China relationship is more stable than you might think
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week. US Secretary of State Tony Blinken in the Middle East right now. But he just came from China, Beijing and Shanghai, and the US-China relationship is what I'm thinking about. Want to give you a state of play.
It continues to be better managed and more stable than we've seen in a long time. Now, not clear that would necessarily be the case, given the number of issues and places where we have friction between these two countries. Just over the course of the last couple weeks, you've got President Biden, putting new tariffs on Chinese steel, opening a new investigation into Chinese shipbuilding. You've got this anti TikTok policy that's coming down from US Congress. You've got $2 billion in additional military aid for Taiwan from the United States. You've also got lots of criticism from the Americans on ongoing Chinese support, dual use technologies for the Russians, allowing them to better fight the war in Ukraine.
Given all of that, is the relationship starting to become much more confrontational? And the answer is not really. It's true that the Chinese foreign minister said that the Americans need to choose between having a relationship of containment and a relationship of partnership, and it's certainly true that the Americans would rather have it both ways. They want to have partnership in areas where it suits the Americans, and containment in areas where it suits the Americans. The Americans getting away with more than that than other countries can because the US is the most powerful country in the world and ultimately the Chinese need Americans more than Americans need China. Still, there's a lot of interdependence, and there is an ability to push back. How much is China actually doing that? And the answer is there's been very little direct Chinese tit for tat, despite all of the policies I just mentioned. It is true that overnight, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that there would be resolute and forceful measures if the supplemental support for Taiwan, which is a red line for the Chinese, is signed and Taiwanese assistance from the US moves ahead, and I suspect that means we're going to see some more sanctions from China against US defense contractors.
That is largely symbolic. It is a tit for tat. But on all the other policies I've mentioned that the Americans have just brought against China, we've seen Chinese focus on making their country and their economy more resilient against American efforts to contain, but not hitting the Americans back, not calibrated, moves of sanctions or reciprocal investigations. In fact, the Chinese have been pretty stable.
Also. We saw that Xi Jinping still met with Secretary of State Blinken directly, a meeting that would be very easy for the Chinese government to take down, and historically certainly wouldn't have been present if there had been a lot of tension in the relationship. They chose not to do that. And in fact, Blinken went to a record store, you know, he plays guitar and sings, and he's into music. And the coverage from the Chinese state media of that trip was very humanizing, was very friendly, frankly, better coverage of a US secretary of state than I've seen at any point since Xi Jinping has been in power. That's something it's very easy for the Chinese government to put their thumb on the scale if they want to show that they're unhappy with where the US relationship is. I think about Obama and the town hall, that he wanted to put together and the Chinese unwilling to give him the kind of coverage that the Americans at the time had wanted. You know, this is a lesser official from the US and is still getting, frankly, tremendous treatment from the Chinese government. I think that matters a lot.
Having said all of that, this is a relationship that is becoming more challenging to manage. And that's true because in the United States, whether you're Democrat or Republican, one of the very few things you can agree on in foreign policy is that there is a benefit in going after China. So the policy from the US is not just about Biden making decisions himself, but it's also about members of Congress. It's about governors. It's about the media. All of whom are taking their own shots. And they're not coordinated. Where from China, if Xi Jinping wants it, everyone basically rose in the same direction. Now, there are lots of American corporations and banks that are sending their CEOs, making trips with China right now. And there's much more people to people engagement between the two countries, something that Chinese officials are strongly focused on.
There's a lot more communication and cooperation on things like climate, as well as in response to America's fentanyl crisis, where the Chinese are shutting down the labs, the companies that have been exporting the precursor chemicals. Those things matter. They are engaged. There's also a lot of willingness of the United States, at the highest level, to provide more information to China, just on what the Americans are seeing happening around a confrontation in the Middle East that China would like to see a cease-fire for, so would the Americans at this point. And also, the Chinese don't have a lot of high level diplomats and a lot of ability to collect information that the Americans do. And when high level Americans are talking to their Chinese counterparts about the Middle East, the Chinese are very much in taking notes mode and appreciating that they're getting that information from the US.
So overall, I continue to see a lot of high level engagement that is very constructive. But coming against a relationship that has virtually no trust and where the baseline of conflict is going to pop up in a lot of different ways and a lot of different places around the world. Over time it's going to be harder to maintain that stable floor on US-China relations. But for now, I think we're likely to continue to see it, at least until elections in November.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Xi Jinping's solution to his "Taiwan problem"
"Xi has made it clear he plans to go solve the Taiwan problem while he's still in office." That's New York Times national security correspondent and New Cold Wars author David Sanger on why China's leader is setting his sights on the slender island off its eastern coast. Xi Jinping has made no secret of his belief that Taiwan belongs to China and that it is a national security imperative to bring it under Chinese sovereignty. But it's also an American national security imperative to prevent Xi from doing so, says Sanger. That's because the small island nation still manufactures the vast majority of the critical semiconductor microchips that power our modern world in both China and the United States.
"What Biden has done here in the semiconductor field of trying to choke the Chinese of the most advanced chips, but also the equipment to make those chips while trying to build up here, is the right step." At the same time, however, the Biden administration's push to manufacture more chips in the United States may also imperil the "silicon shield" that currently protects Taiwan from its Chinese neighbor. Nevertheless, Sanger argues that it's not just an industrial imperative for the United States to become self-sufficient in this area. It's a national defense imperative one as well."For our long-term security, it is much more important to build those [semiconductor factories] fabs than it is to build those aircraft carriers."
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
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US TikTok ban: China’s complaints are a double standard
Beijing blocks US technology companies like Facebook, Google, and X from operating in China. So why is the Chinese government so upset over the proposed TikTok ban in Congress? US Ambassador to China Nick Burns discussed China’s double standard when it comes to foreign tech firms on GZERO World with Ian Bremmer. The US has been pushing for TikTok’s Chinese parent company, ByteDance, to sell the app’s US operation, and millions of nationalist netizens on Chinese social media are decrying it as another example of the US limiting China’s global rise.
Burns says the idea that American firms could operate in China by following Chinese data and national security laws isn’t a convincing argument because a wide swath of US tech has been blocked for years, and China’s “Great Firewall” was set up to insulate Chinese people from the rest of the world. China’s rationale for US tech companies’ absence in China, he says, is fundamentally anti-democratic.
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
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