We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
A Philippine flag flutters from BRP Sierra Madre, a dilapidated Philippine Navy ship that has been aground since 1999 and became a Philippine military detachment on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, part of the Spratly Islands, in the South China Sea March 29, 2014.
China and Philippines sign South China Sea deal
Manila announced Sunday it had reached a “provisional agreement” with Beijing aimed at establishing an arrangement in the South China Sea that both sides can live with — without renouncing territorial claims. The text of the deal has not yet been released.
The agreement builds off last week’s announcement of the establishment of presidential hotlines and signals a desire for de-escalation by both countries – following a serious clash on June 17. But the key word in this agreement is “provisional” as both Beijing and Manila are already showing irreconcilable differences in their positions.
China had previously told Manila it could not bring construction materials to the wreck of the Sierra Madre, a decrepit hulk deliberately beached on the South Thomas Shoal by Manila to give it de facto control. Without repairs, the ship will likely break apart soon. But Beijing claims Manila agreed to give China advanced notice and allowed inspections of shipments sent to the marines it keeps stationed there carrying food and supplies. A senior Filipino official told the Associated Press that the final deal did not require the Philippines to pre-notify the Chinese of shipments.
What to watch? A deal to cool temperatures in the South China Sea would be welcome news for all parties, including the US. “The next big test,” says Eurasia Group senior China analyst Jeremy Chan, “will be how both Manila and Beijing behave on future resupply missions, and whether either side can cede any ground.”
Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs Melanie Joly speaks during a reception honouring the visit of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat in Gatineau, Quebec, Canada October 26, 2022.
Canadian foreign minister heads to China amid tough tariff talk
Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly made a surprise visit to Beijing on Thursday as Canada and the United States are both considering new barriers to trade with China.
Canada-China relations have gone from bad to terrible since 2018, when Canada held Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou for extradition to the United States and the Chinese government responded by detaining Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. Wanzhou and the two Michaels were released in 2021, but a Canadian public inquiry into foreign interference continued to put a strain on relations. Then came the suspected Chinese spy balloon surveillance in US and Canadian airspace in 2023.
Still, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said China was open to improving relations earlier this year.
But this week, Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland said she would be talking to Canadian business and labor groups about erecting new trade barriers with China. Washington sent a similar message as Joe Biden told allies on Wednesday that he is considering taking fresh action to block Chinese chip manufacturing. Meanwhile, in Milwaukee this week, Donald Trump’s running mate, JD Vance, said China is the “biggest threat” facing the United States.
The Chinese likely want to talk to Joly about avoiding new trade barriers with Canada, since China’s economy is struggling and any new limits on exports could further slow growth. Joly will no doubt listen politely, but Canada is unlikely to jeopardize its crucial trade relationship with the United States by making any side deals with Beijing.
People walk in front of BYD Auto company and Autotorino store in Milan, Italy, March 20, 2024.
It’s about to be “Trade War Summer” in Europe!
The EU is expected to slap tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles this week, citing a months-long investigation into Beijing’s subsidies for EV manufacturers.
The move comes amid wider EU-China trade tensions over green technologies like EVs, solar panels, and batteries, where China has become a major low-cost producer whose exports often undercut those of Western competitors.
The EU says China is unfairly subsidizing producers and “dumping” goods in Europe that it can’t sell at home because of weak consumer demand.
China says it’s being unfairly punished for being too good at producing precisely the products the West claims it wants to meet its climate goals.
Experts doubt the tariffs will be big enough to dent sales. Chinese EVs are relatively cheap in the EU, starting at around $32,000.
But China could retaliate against EU industries. Chinese media say local firms want Beijing to consider EU subsidies for European brandy, dairy products, and pork.
If the Europeans try to unplug Chinese EVs, expect Beijing to clap back fast with tariffs of its own on those industries, upping the ante in a trade dispute between the world’s largest exporter (China) and the world’s largest advanced consumer market (the EU).
Two types of cicadas that resurface every 13 and 17 years, respectively, are making their rare appearance this spring.
HARD NUMBERS: Cicadas plan historic reunion, China uncorks stimulus binge, Collusion claim rocks shale, Argentina gets more IMF money, Melinda Gates walks out the door
221: Can you hear it? If you’re in the US Midwest you sure can. After 221 years, two local broods of cicadas – red-eyed, beetle-like insects that grow underground for years before emerging for a single summer of cacophonous buzzing and mating – will emerge at the same time. Brood XIII, based in Illinois, comes up every 17 years, while Brood XIX does so every 13 years. For context, the last time they were out at the same time, Illinois wasn’t even a state yet.
140 billion: As its GDP growth picks up again, the Chinese government is looking for some further stimulus, and what better way to invigorate the economic senses than $140 billion in long-dated sovereign bonds? Beijing will start selling the paper this week, putting the funds towards “modernization.” China is looking to wean itself off of an economic model that relies heavily on property investment.
10: At least 10 new class action lawsuits allege that US shale oil producers colluded to keep crude prices up, driving up gasoline prices too. The shale oil industry, which uses advanced technologies to pull petroleum hard-to-develop shale rock formations, has boomed in the past decade, catapulting the US into the global top spot in oil production.
800 million: The IMF is set to disburse another $800 million in support for Argentina after determining that new President Javier Milei’s radical austerity reforms have helped to stabilize the economy. The eccentric Milei, a self-described “anarcho-capitalist,” has slashed spending since he was elected on promises to fix a moribund economy mired in triple-digit inflation. For a deeper look at how and why Milei is succeeding, see this Quick Take by Ian Bremmer.
12.5 billion: Philanthropist Melinda Gates, formerly married to Microsoft founder Bill, is stepping down from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, one of the largest donor organizations in the world. As part of her agreement, she will keep $12.5 billion to direct towards her own work supporting women, minority groups, and families. To date, the foundation has given out more than $75 billion in grants to development and healthcare projects. Melinda and Bill divorced in 2021.
A broken ethernet cable is seen in front of a US flag and TikTok logo.
The clock is ticking for … TikTok
President Joe Biden on Wednesday signed a law that could see TikTok banned nationwide unless its Chinese parent company, ByteDance, sells the popular app within a year. The law was motivated by national security concerns.
TikTok promptly vowed to challenge the “unconstitutional” law in court, saying it would “silence” millions of Americans – setting the stage for a battle over whether the law violates First Amendment rights.
Expect delays. Eurasia Group’s US Director Clayton Allen is skeptical that such legal challenges will be successful, but they will still likely delay “any action well into 2025, putting the onus – potentially – on a second Trump administration.”
Though Donald Trump moved to ban TiikTok while he was in office, the former president is now attacking Biden over the law and calling for “young people” to remember the move on Election Day.
Notably, Biden’s campaign says it plans to continue using TikTok to reach younger voters.
What will China do? China expects delays in the process but is likely to prohibit a sale if it comes to it, according to Eurasia Group, our parent company. Beijing is unlikely to respond with a tit-for-tat approach targeting American companies and will instead focus on building a fortress economy that’s insulated from US containment efforts.
Taiwan's Vice President Lai Ching-te, who heads the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, raises his fist after winning the presidential election in Taipei on Jan. 13, 2024.
Taiwan elects pro-independence candidate, calls Beijing’s bluff
Taiwan, one of the freest democracies in Asia, went to the polls on Saturday for a highly anticipated election with implications for both cross-strait and US-China relations.
As we told you last week, Taiwan’s presidential campaign ended up being a close race between independence-leaning candidate William Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, and Hou You-ih of the Kuomintang, aka KMT, who favors closer relations with China.
On the day, Lai came out on top with 40% of the vote, beating Hou by almost 7 percentage points. But Lai’s DPP didn’t have the same success: The party lost control in the legislature, winning 51 of 113 seats, while the KMT netted 52, and the third party, the TPP, won eight.
The defeat of China’s preferred candidate is likely to ruffle some feathers back in Beijing. China sees Taiwan as a breakaway territory and is determined to reunify, by force if necessary, but so far Lai’s remarks have not been escalatory. Also, the DPP’s loss of the legislative majority means Beijing isn’t in the worst-case scenario and might preclude the most aggressive responses.
“Chinese initial reactions are unlikely to be escalatory,” says Eurasia Group expert Ava Shen, “given that Lai's remarks on cross-strait relations after the elections were fairly measured.”
While the DPP losing seats in the legislature, Shen says, “will make it more difficult for Lai to push his domestic agenda through the legislature,” he still has room to maneuver when it comes to foreign policy, cross-strait relations, and defense.
So all eyes now turn to Lai to see how much independence rhetoric he uses in the days and weeks ahead – talk that could help determine China’s response. Any real moves against Taiwan, which is backed by Washington, could lead to a wider conflict.
Chinese Premier Li Qiang speaks at his first press conference after his appointment to the post at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing last March.
China’s charm offensive: Li Qiang works to woo back foreign investment
China suffered an outflow of foreign direct investment last year (in Q3) for the first time since records began in 1979. It was a sure sign that foreign, particularly American, firms have chosen to “friend-shore” their business, pulling money out of China.
Investors are spooked by Xi Jinping’s vague national security laws and America’s policy of encouraging a reduction of investment in China, particularly in sectors deemed strategically important like semiconductors.
This helps explain why the Chinese are back in Davos in full force for the first time since Xi addressed the World Economic Forum in 2017. A delegation led by Premier Li Qiang will send the message that China is open to the outside world.
The consensus economic growth forecast for China in 2024 is 4.6%, which is strong by most countries’ standards but a slump from last year’s 5.2% and a shadow of its former ability to top 10%. A sluggish housing market and weak consumer confidence have not helped. Still, it is the geo-political chill that appears to have persuaded Xi to try to reverse the negative sentiment, starting with his meeting with President Joe Biden at the APEC summit last November.
Economists say that FDI only accounts for 3% of total investment but is important to China because it brings international best practices to domestic markets and enhances competition.
Li will be hoping that he can make up for lost Western dollars by persuading large Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and the UAE to help reverse the FDI downturn.
Supporters of Lai Ching-te, Taiwan's vice president and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's presidential candidate attend, a campaign event in New Taipei City, Taiwan, on Jan. 6, 2024.
Taiwan holds first big election of 2024
The world will be watching when Taiwanese voters head to the polls on Jan. 13 to choose their next president. The first in a series of elections with global ramifications in 2024, Taiwan’s vote will be a flashpoint in the tense US-China relationship. China regards Taiwan as a breakaway territory and has vowed to unify with it, by force if necessary. Taiwan has the backing of the US, which would feel pressured to come to the island’s defense in the event of a conflict with China.
The election is shaping up into a close contest between the independence-leaning candidate William Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, and Hou You-ih of the Kuomintang, aka KMT, who favors closer relations with China.
We asked Eurasia Group expert Ava Shen what to watch for.
What is the state of play of the race?
The DPP’s Lai remains the front-runner and has held a consistent lead in this election cycle, but his lead has been narrowing. According to the latest polling data available from Jan. 1-2, he is about five points ahead of the KMT’s Hou, who started gaining ground in late November. Winning the party’s official nomination, with Jaw Shaw-kong chosen as his running mate, has helped Hou consolidate the support of the KMT base. The end to efforts to broker a presidential joint ticket with Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party, or TPP, has also helped.
This momentum gives the KMT a lot of confidence in its ability to mobilize a last-minute surge in support, possibly thanks to strategic voting by TPP supporters who don’t want another DPP administration. Lai remains favored to win, but it’s going to be close. It’s also noteworthy that Lai, if he wins, would probably do so with less than 50% of the vote. That marks a shift from the elections of 2016 and 2020 when current President Tsai Ing-wen comfortably cleared that threshold.
What would a Lai victory mean for relations with China?
Beijing would probably have an immediate negative reaction. It has signaled multiple times that it is deeply wary of Lai, who has a history of comments in favor of full independence for Taiwan, a red line for China. It would respond in two ways. First, it would probably reduce the number of Taiwanese products that are subject to preferential tariff rates under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, the cross-strait trade agreement signed in 2010. In a warning shot to Taiwan’s voters, it excluded 12 Taiwanese products from the agreement in mid-December.
Second, China would likely intensify what it has already been doing in the military sphere. If Beijing judges any of Lai’s post-election remarks to be provocative, it will consider flying larger numbers of fighter jets over the Taiwan Strait, deploying more coast guard or naval vessels, and possibly moving those military assets closer to Taiwan’s main island. It could enter for the first time Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone.
But Lai has moderated his rhetoric recently, hasn’t he?
Yes. He has indicated on the campaign trail that he would maintain the status quo and continue the approach that Tsai has taken to cross-strait relations. Still, from Beijing’s perspective, this is not enough. It does not like Tsai’s cross-strait policies but believes she has exercised restraint in managing tensions. It views Lai as more reckless.
Nonetheless, as I said, Lai is not likely to win by a large margin, and his party will probably lose its majority in the legislature. This is important to Beijing because it sends a signal that the DPP doesn’t have complete control over the island’s politics and that not everyone supports independence. That gives Beijing some hope that the idea of unification is not dead.
So, we think tensions are likely to rise in the event of a Lai victory, but it won’t be a catastrophic situation.
And what would a Hou victory mean for cross-strait relations?
If Hou wins, there is less of a risk of Beijing increasing the pressure against Taipei in the short term. However, there is a risk it will resume aggressive tactics over the long term if Hou doesn’t agree to upgrade cross-strait ties economically and politically. China wants to move toward more regular contact between government officials on both sides and take steps toward unification.
Hou has said he wants to start with more cultural and economic engagement, and if things go well, gradually progress to more political exchange, something that Taiwanese society broadly opposes. So, he's saying he wants to put off the political engagement that Beijing is seeking, and the question is, how long is Beijing going to patiently wait?
What’s at stake for the US in this election?
The US’s official stance is that it has no preferred candidate, and I think it has been consistent in maintaining this approach even in private interactions with Taiwan counterparts. The bilateral relationship is robust, and all three of the main Taiwanese parties are committed to close US ties.
That said, President Joe Biden’s administration likely recognizes that a Lai victory has the potential to jeopardize the recent stabilization of the fraught US-China relationship if it provokes an aggressive Chinese response, putting the US under pressure to offer a gesture of support. As Eurasia Group noted in its Top Risks 2024 report, Lai is one of a handful of “dangerous friends,” a group of friendly world leaders who may draw the US into expanded conflicts this year.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group