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The new space race: Sen. Mark Kelly on China's bold ambitions, America's policy & Russian threat
Listen: On this episode of the GZERO World podcast, Ian Bremmer takes a close look at the evolving US-China space race and its implications for global security, competition, and international collaboration. He is joined by Arizona Senator Mark Kelly, a former Navy pilot and NASA astronaut who offers firsthand insights into the future of US space policy.
Kelly also sheds light on China's ambitious space goals, including lunar missions and partnerships with Russia, raising concerns about the militarization of space. He emphasizes the need for the US to counter these developments and maintain space as a peaceful domain. Kelly discusses the eventual decommissioning of the International Space Station and highlights the importance of collaboration with allies like Europe, Canada, and Japan. The episode also covers the growing role of private companies like SpaceX, which are not only shaping space exploration but also playing crucial roles in geopolitical conflicts, including the war in Ukraine, through initiatives like Starlink.
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Ian Explains: Who's winning the US-China space race?
Are we in a 21st-century space race with China? And if so, who’s winning? On Ian Explains, Ian Bremmer breaks down China’s ambitious space program, which in the last few years has sent a rover to Mars, built a space station, and returned samples from the far side of the moon–something no country has done before. By 2035, it plans to build a lunar base with Russia on the moon’s south pole. However, intelligence experts are concerned China’s activity in space is more directly tied to its military than it’s letting on. A 1967 UN treaty bans military activity on the moon but not military activity in space altogether. The final frontier could be the next battleground. Can the US space program, boosted by private space companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin, counter China’s lunar ambitions? Is this the end of the post-Soviet era of international space cooperation? Ian Bremmer breaks down the astronomical stakes of the next era of space exploration.
Look for the full episode, with an interview with former astronaut Senator Mark Kelly on GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, airing on US public television (check local listings).
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U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan meets Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China August 29, 2024.
Sullivan trip sets up Biden-Xi call
Chinese President Xi Jinping struck a conciliatory tone when he met with US national security adviser Jake Sullivan on Thursday, after three days of talks aimed at managing tensions in the US-China relationship. Sitting in the Great Hall of the People on Tiananmen Square in Beijing, Xi said, “In this changing and turbulent world, countries need solidarity and coordination … not exclusion or regress.” Their meeting was the culmination of efforts to communicate thoroughly over points of potential conflict, including Taiwan, Ukraine, and the South China Sea.
Sullivan also met with the vice chair of China’s Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia,the highest-ranking military official to have sat down with the Biden administration. Zhang accused the US of “collusion” with Taiwan, but the meeting produced an agreement to conduct more bilateral military talks, which it is hoped will help avoid surprises and escalation.
There was one topic Sullivan explicitly said was not discussed: the US election. As we wrote earlier this week, Beijing was thrown for a loop by President Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the Democratic ticket and seems to be taking a wait-and-see approach. Both sides agreed to work toward a Biden-Xi phone call in the coming weeks, and Sullivan indicated the White House is ready for a face-to-face meeting at the G20 summit in November as well.Lai Ching-te attends an inaugural ceremony as president of Taiwan in Taipei, Taiwan on May 20, 2024.
William Lai takes the reins in Taiwan
The Democratic Progressive Party’s William Lai was inaugurated as Taiwan’s 8th president on Monday. His pro-independence inclinations cause consternation across the Strait, but Beijing’s domestic position and relations with the United States make discretion the better part of valor for the moment.
Lai is expected to follow his predecessor Tsai Ying-wen’s policies closely, given he served as her VP. That means pursuing closer ties with the United States where he can, and building up deterrent capacity against a Chinese invasion without provoking Beijing — much easier said than done.
In the short term, however, China isn’t likely to cross any rubicons. The foreign ministry's response to Lai’s inauguration message was pretty tame, just an insistence that "Taiwan independence is destined to fail," because Beijing has its eye on the US relationship. Both Washington and Beijing have committedly pursued stabilization of relations over the past year and change, with some good progress to show for it. No point in risking all that to show Lai how much they dislike him (he’s well aware!), particularly with a lackluster economy to worry about as well.
Taiwan's Vice President Lai Ching-te, who heads the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, raises his fist after winning the presidential election in Taipei on Jan. 13, 2024.
Taiwan elects pro-independence candidate, calls Beijing’s bluff
Taiwan, one of the freest democracies in Asia, went to the polls on Saturday for a highly anticipated election with implications for both cross-strait and US-China relations.
As we told you last week, Taiwan’s presidential campaign ended up being a close race between independence-leaning candidate William Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, and Hou You-ih of the Kuomintang, aka KMT, who favors closer relations with China.
On the day, Lai came out on top with 40% of the vote, beating Hou by almost 7 percentage points. But Lai’s DPP didn’t have the same success: The party lost control in the legislature, winning 51 of 113 seats, while the KMT netted 52, and the third party, the TPP, won eight.
The defeat of China’s preferred candidate is likely to ruffle some feathers back in Beijing. China sees Taiwan as a breakaway territory and is determined to reunify, by force if necessary, but so far Lai’s remarks have not been escalatory. Also, the DPP’s loss of the legislative majority means Beijing isn’t in the worst-case scenario and might preclude the most aggressive responses.
“Chinese initial reactions are unlikely to be escalatory,” says Eurasia Group expert Ava Shen, “given that Lai's remarks on cross-strait relations after the elections were fairly measured.”
While the DPP losing seats in the legislature, Shen says, “will make it more difficult for Lai to push his domestic agenda through the legislature,” he still has room to maneuver when it comes to foreign policy, cross-strait relations, and defense.
So all eyes now turn to Lai to see how much independence rhetoric he uses in the days and weeks ahead – talk that could help determine China’s response. Any real moves against Taiwan, which is backed by Washington, could lead to a wider conflict.
Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister James Marape and Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanes
Did Papua New Guinea just pick a side?
The Australian government on Thursday signed a security pact with its nearest neighbor, Papua New Guinea (aka PNG) that strengthens its – and America’s – position as a primary security partner in a region where China’s influence is rising.
The agreement was finalized six months later than initially scheduled, primarily because PNG harbored reservations about being perceived as favoring one side over another. During this delay, China actively sought PNG's participation in a comprehensive security pact involving nine other Pacific Island nations, though the initiative eventually collapsed. Despite having entered into a defense agreement with the United States in May, PNG asserts that it remains impartial and has not aligned itself with any particular side.
PNG is a diverse developing nation in a strategically important part of the South Pacific. Australia’s push for the agreement came after the neighboring Solomon Islands struck a security pact with China last year, sending shockwaves through the Pacific and raising fears of a Chinese naval base being established there.
While specifics about the Australia-Papua New Guinea deal have not yet been published, both nations said they achieved their goals. Amid rising US-China tensions, Pacific Island nations are a geostrategic chessboard. The security pact is a win for the US, and also a signal that PNG and its neighbors will be increasingly pressured to take sides.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the Republic of India during Modi’s Official State Visit to Washington DC.
India and the US talk China
In 2018, the two countries launched the “2+2 Dialogue” to boost defense cooperation and align policy objectives in the Indo-Pacific. India is still reeling from a skirmish in June 2020 — along the 2167-mile unmarked and disputed Himalayan border it shares with China — during which India’s military performed poorly and 20 of its soldiers died. Relations between the two nuclear-armed countries have since soured, giving the US and India a common cause in deterring Chinese aggression.
China has taken the US and India from distant allies to close partners — with the two conducting joint military exercises, working to strengthen the Indo-Pacific Quad alliance, and hosting each other for glitzy state visits. The US has even shown a willingness to overlook India’s human rights transgressions and prioritized deepening ties over Canada’s calls for the US to respond to India allegedly killing a Sikh community leader on Canadian soil.
The meetings are expected to solidify ongoing deals for the US and American companies to produce engines for Indian fighter jets and supply MQ-9 predator drones. , and build semiconductor manufacturing.In blow to China, US secures closer partnership with Vietnam
On his way back from the G20 meeting in India, US President Joe Biden will stop off in Vietnam on Sept. 10 to seal an agreement to deepen US ties with the Southeast Asian country. The two former enemies will upgrade their bilateral relationship from a “comprehensive partnership” to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” the highest level in Vietnam’s diplomatic hierarchy. This new top-tier diplomatic status places the US on par with China, Russia, India, and South Korea.
The change may pave the way for weapons sales and closer maritime cooperation. But possibly even more important at a time of intense US-China competition is the symbolism of Vietnam, a Chinese neighbor and fellow communist country, moving closer to the US. We asked Eurasia Group expert Peter Mumford to explain the motivations behind the deal for both sides.
For Vietnam, what is the importance of its relationship with the US?
Vietnam has long had very complicated relations with China, its giant northern neighbor. The two have close (and deepening) economic ties. Yet the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979 and ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea have fueled widespread anti-China sentiment among Vietnam’s population. Strengthening relations with the US, Japan, and other players are crucial to Hanoi’s geopolitical hedging strategy as well its (unsuccessful, so far) attempts to reduce its economic dependence on China.
In addition, Vietnam has long seen its ally Russia as a counterbalance to China, but Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has made it a less reliable partner and, more importantly, pushed it closer to Beijing. This increases the need for Vietnam to find other ways to hedge its China risk. Yet Hanoi will not move as far toward the US as some in Washington might hope – it will always seek to balance relations with the US and China.
How does Vietnam fit into the US’s strategy toward China and Asia more broadly?
Vietnam’s complex relationship with China as well as its popularity as a destination for firms from the US and other countries moving production out of China have made it increasingly important to Washington. The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy identifies Vietnam as one of the “leading regional partners” with which it wishes to deepen relations. Kurt Campbell, the US National Security Council’s coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, has referred to India and Vietnam as the two key “swing states” that will define the future of Asia.
While the focus on strengthening relations with Vietnam is not new in Washington, these efforts were undermined during Donald Trump’s administration by its greater focus on reducing the growing bilateral trade deficit, which included accusing Hanoi of currency manipulation. The US still has some trade-related concerns – including the likely rerouting of Chinese exports to the US via Vietnam – but Biden’s team is more focused on improving bilateral relations.
How does China view the deepening US-Vietnam ties?
Beijing will be concerned to see its southern neighbor granting Washington an upgrade in ties; in a sign of ruffled feathers, China dispatched Liu Jianchao, a senior official, to Hanoi this week where he met with Vietnam’s leader General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. It’s important to note, however, that China’s own actions – that is, its increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea – contributed to this decision by Vietnam. This marks another self-inflicted wound for Beijing, alongside pushing the Philippines back into Washington’s orbit after a period of strained relations. Nevertheless, Hanoi will be wary of antagonizing Beijing and likely will agree to upgrade relations with several other countries as well (Australia, Singapore, and Indonesia) to dilute the impact of doing so with the US.
Biden’s trip to Vietnam follows his decision to skip the ASEAN summit earlier in the week – what does that say about the US’s strategy toward Southeast Asia?
Biden’s absence from the summit in Jakarta, Indonesia, exacerbated grumblings that the region appears to be a low priority for Washington. Yet it’s probably an indication that Washington sees investing in bilateral relations with key Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam as likely to deliver greater geopolitical returns than working with ASEAN as a bloc. (In this regard, Indonesia President Joko Widodo may take Biden’s absence as something of a personal slight, although he hosted the US president for the G20 Summit in Bali last year). In the Indo-Pacific more broadly, the US is focused on wooing India while reinforcing alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, and promoting the Quad grouping of the US, Japan, India, and Australia.
That said, the US was still represented at the US-ASEAN Summit and East Asia Summit at a very senior level with the attendance of Vice President Kamala Harris. Arguably this is on a par with China’s representation: President Xi Jinping rarely attends the China-ASEAN Summit or East Asia Summit, usually delegating these to the premier instead, as occurred again this year.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group