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Chinese President Xi Jinping and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr review the honour guard during a welcome ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China January 4, 2023
Can a hotline prevent war in South China Sea?
I know when that hotline bling, that can only mean one thing: Beijing and Manila are beefing over uninhabitable rocks again. China and the Philippines have reportedly set up a bilateral hotline meant to help them avoid a deadly incident in the disputed South China Sea.
The effort to improve communications follows a particularly violentconfrontation on June 17, when Chinese sailors surrounded and boarded Filipino vessels wielding bladed weapons. One Filipino sailor lost his finger, and the fear is that should someone lose their life, Manila could activate its mutual defense treaty with the United States.
The Biden administration has struck a nuanced position, assuring Manila that it would honor the treaty fully while also attempting to signal to China that they aren’t handing out carte blanche to the Philippines. Eurasia Group’s Jeremy Chan says proactive communication after the June 17 incident has helped lower the temperature.
“Beijing interpreted the June 28 call between Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and China's Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu in particular as a clear signal that Washington does not support Manila in pushing its territorial claims too aggressively,” he said.
Being able to quickly pick up the phone and talk through future incidents is a useful pressure release valve, but longer term, the South China Sea and the shoals used to mark de facto control will remain a tension point. We are watching how it will affect US and Chinese efforts to stabilize their own relationship.
China’s foreign ministry on Thursday warned NATO not to bring “chaos” into Asia and accused the alliance of seeking security at the expense of other countries after it labeled Beijing a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war on Ukraine.
China tells NATO to butt out
China’s foreign ministry on Thursday warned NATO not to bring “chaos” into Asia and accused the alliance of seeking security at the expense of other countries after it labeled Beijing a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war on Ukraine. The foreign ministry’s comments come amid increasing cooperation between NATO and US allies in the Pacific, particularly Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.
Washington and its allies accuse China of helping Russia skirt arms controls by shipping so-called “dual use” goods that can be applied in both civilian and military contexts. In turn, China gets access to heavily discounted Russian oil and gas — a desirable asset at any time, but advantageous for China’s economy at a moment when it appears particularly shaky.
At home, however, Beijing has signaled not to expect “strong medicine” to boost the economy at next week’s upcoming Third Party Plenum, scheduled for July 15-18 behind closed doors.
These meetings are closely watched because past leaders have used them to deliver big news. Deng Xiaoping announced the earth-shaking “Opening and Reform” policy, for example, at the 1978 session.
Xi Jinping isn’t expected to announce any major policy shifts, according to experts at Eurasia Group. So we’ll be watching for language intended to boost consumer confidence battered by the roiling debt crisis, but little by way of decisive policy.FILE PHOTO: Semiconductor chips are seen on a printed circuit board in this illustration picture taken February 17, 2023.
The US-China chip stranglehold
The Biden administration has already imposed severe restrictions on semiconductor companies selling to China through export controls. But now it’s considering additional steps to maintain an edge over its rival in the East. The new measures would reportedly restrict China’s ability to access a specific chip architecture known as gate all around, or GAA. GAA is a powerful type of transistor that large chipmakers — including AMD, Intel, Nvidia, and Samsung — are planning to mass produce in the next year.
The US Commerce Department, which oversees export controls, hasn’t confirmed whether or when the rules will be finalized. But the administration has been dead set on limiting China’s access to chips they can use to train and run AI applications — an attitude that’ll only intensify as AI technology becomes more mature and more useful.
With a weak economy making retaliatory tariffs unlikely, Beijing is left with few responses other than subsidizing its domestic industry, which still lags behind the US.
The logo of Huawei's global flagship store is being displayed on the pedestrian street of Nanjing Road in the Huangpu district of Shanghai, China, on May 8, 2024. The Oriental Pearl Tower in Lujiazui is visible in the background to the left.
US revokes permission to sell chips to Huawei
The US Commerce Department revoked licenses for US chipmakers to sell to Chinese tech giant Huawei on Tuesday, in the latest pressure tactics on Beijing’s tech sector.
US firms like Intel and Qualcomm had been selling their processors to Huawei through special exemptions to sanctions meant to rein in China’s semiconductor industry. Until this week, they sold chips to power phones and computers for China’s lucrative consumer market — which was hardly a threat to US national security, says Eurasia Group Geotechnology Director Alexis Serfaty.
“It's pretty obvious that what the US wants to do is stifle Chinese technological advancement and one way of doing that is to hit Huawei directly,” he says, even at the cost of some pain to US companies.
China’s commerce ministry called it a “clear case” of economic coercion, but Eurasia Group’s Xiaomeng Lu called Beijing’s reaction “more bark than bite,” because it lacks clear ways to clap back.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, wrapping up a European trip, isn’t likely to make a big issue out of it with US President Joe Biden as the two pursue stability in US-China relations.
“They've been able to compartmentalize it whereby they can have a floor in the deterioration of the relationship and still tolerate the US doing pretty unprecedented things from a technology standpoint,” says Serfaty.
Members of Philippine Marines is pictured at BRP Sierra Madre, a dilapidated Philippine Navy ship that has been aground since 1999 and became a Philippine military detachment on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, part of the Spratly Islands, in the South China Sea March 29, 2014. Picture taken March 29, 2014.
Hard Numbers: Manila’s many protests, US views of China, Kenya floods, Germany’s baby bust, US-Russia staring contest in Niger
20: Manila filed a diplomatic protest on Thursday — its 20th in 2024 — against Chinese harassment of its vessels in the South China Sea. That’s a rate of more than one a week, as Beijing seems little deterred by US and Japanese efforts to bolster the Philippines’ military capacities.
42: A new Pew survey shows 42% of Americans consider China an “enemy,” up from 25% two years ago. The mounting mistrust is largely driven by Republicans, among whom 59% describe China as an enemy, compared to only 28% of Democrats.
188: At least 188 people in Kenya have died in floods caused by weeks of torrential rains across East Africa. Another 90 people are believed to be missing, and over 165,000 have been displaced by the natural disaster.
693,000: The number of babies born in Germany is approaching record lows, with just 693,000 bouncing bundles welcomed in 2023. The trend looks likely to continue, as the number of marriages has also dropped — to its lowest level since 1950 — and government support for childcare and parental leave is weakening in an economy that has hardly grown in four years.
1000: An extremely awkward situation is unfolding in the Sahel region ... Russian troops have been deployed to an airbase hosting US troops in Niger at a time when relations between Washington and Moscow are, let's say, not exactly cordial. The US and Russian troops aren't mingling, but it's still an unorthodox scenario. In the wake of a military coup last year, Niger has moved to cut ties with Western countries like the US and France. The US has roughly 1,000 troops in Niger, deployed there as part of counterterrorism efforts, but the country's junta now says they need to leave. This all comes as Russia moves to increase its influence across Africa. It's unclear how many Russian troops are in Niger.
TikTok logo on a phone surrounded by the American, Israeli, and Chinese flags.
The battle over TikTok’s future, explained
Last Wednesday, as part of the sweeping foreign-aid package that included much-neededfunding for Ukraine’s defense, President Joe Biden signed into law a bill requiring that TikTok’s Chinese owner, ByteDance, sell the popular video-sharing app to an American buyer within a year or face a ban in the United States.
As Iwrote a little over a year ago, I think this is a close call but the right move. TikTok is ultimately beholden to the Chinese government, an authoritarian state-capitalist regime locked in an increasingly adversarial strategic competition with the US. As intelligence agencies have warned, the platform poses a national security vulnerability because Beijing can commandeer it to surveil and manipulate Americans. No remedies or assurances to the contrary can mitigate that risk short of a Chinese divestment or an outright ban.
Most importantly, the Chinese Communist Party already bans all US social media apps under the guise of national security. TikTok itself is banned in China, where ByteDance is only allowed to operate a heavily censored version for domestic users. In my ideal world, this would be an area for US-China competition rather than confrontation. Alas, the CCP isn’t taking down its so-called Great Firewall anytime soon, so I see the US divestment/ban order as a fair and reciprocal response that will protect not only US national security but also American social media companies from their most formidable competitor.
Why now?
TikTok has long drawn political condemnation from both sides of the aisle, especially in the fractious House, where hostility to China is the only reliable area of bipartisan agreement. And yet, over the past three years, the viral Chinese social media platform survived effort after effort to bring it to heel, including a forced divestiture order in 2020 under then-President Donald Trump, a near-pass RESTRICT Act, and a struck-down ban in Montana. Through it all, its reach has continued to grow unabated.
But TikTok’s luck has just about run out. And as strange as it may sound, it had little to do with a change in the US-China relationship and everything to do with … the Gaza war.
Since Oct. 7, many Americans’ TikTok feeds have become awash in anti-Israeli and, in a lot of cases, antisemitic content. This isn’t entirely surprising – after all, by virtue of their demographics (young, non-Western, Muslim), TikTok creators and users are far more likely to hold pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli, and antisemitic views than their Instagram or X counterparts. But beyond this organic bias, there’s also reasonably suggestive evidence that TikTok’s algorithm and moderation rules have artificially suppressed pro-Israeli content and amplified pro-Palestinian and antisemitic sentiment. This is consistent with otherstudies that show ByteDance shapes the feed’s content in accordance with the Chinese Communist Party’s policy goals.
After trying and failing to convince TikTok CEO Shou Chew to change course, a small but motivated group of wealthy and politically connected Jewish and Israeli Americans bootstrapped a PR and lobbying campaign that ultimately managed to achieve what years of anti-China efforts couldn’t.
Congress was already primed to do something/anything on antisemitism and show support for Israel; beating up on Beijing just was the cherry on top. House Speaker Mike Johnson figured he could use the TikTok divestment provision as a sweetener to get the foreign assistance package over the line with his members, knowing the prospect of finally passing Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan aid would be enough to overcome tepid Senate opposition to the TikTok bill. (Maybe he’s effective at his job, after all?) A ban would also meet no resistance from the White House given the Biden administration’s approach to tech and investment restrictions on China, especially in an election year. It was the perfect storm for TikTok.
What’s next?
Worry not: You can keep doomscrolling on TikTok at least through Inauguration Day. The law gives ByteDance until January 19, 2025, to sell the app and allows the president to grant a one-time 90-day extension into April. In the meantime, TikTok will likely challenge the legislation in court on First Amendment grounds, which – though unlikely to succeed – will extend the timeline and almost certainly push any decision into the next presidential administration.
Ironically, TikTok’s best hope lies with Trump retaking the White House in November. Ironically, I say, because Trump was the one who first tried to ban TikTok in 2020 through an executive order that was blocked by the courts … before flip-flopping earlier this year and becoming a vocal opponent of the policy on the back of a sizable campaign contribution by major Republican donor and TikTok investor Jeff Yass. It’s not a stretch to imagine that Trump would use the threat of a divestiture order/ban as a bargaining chip in negotiations with China on other issues closer to his heart and less damaging to his wallet, eventually agreeing not to enforce it in return for concessions in areas such as trade.
Should Biden win reelection and TikTok’s legal challenges fail, it will be up to the Chinese government to decide whether to allow ByteDance to divest. As of now, Beijing’s official position is that it will prohibit the export of TikTok’s AI-powered recommendation algorithm – the platform’s core asset – to a US buyer (without which the app is practically worthless). But the issue is still being quietly debated within the Chinese system, suggesting the only decision maker who really matters, President Xi Jinping, is yet to make a final call – and may not until and unless a sale is actually forced.
Of course, even if Beijing were to sign off on a spinoff, it takes two to tango. There’s only a handful of potential American buyers who could afford theprice tag of TikTok’s US business. Former US Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin had reportedly made a bid to purchase the app with a group of investors back in March, but it remains to be seen whether he’d cough up the cash when the rubber meets the road. The most obvious candidates to snap up the company would be publicly traded tech giants that would come under immediate regulatory scrutiny over antitrust issues.
If there was no viable buyer or if China’s government refused to allow the sale, the divestiture order would effectively become a ban. In this scenario, TikTok would eventually be kicked off the US market, forcing the app’s 170 million American users to Google “how to download free VPN.” Overnight, cryptocurrency pump-and-dump schemes would lose their oomph. Real estate influencers would have to move back to their parents’ basements. Kids might have to learn to talk to each other. Chaos would no doubt ensue.
Somewhat more seriously, a ban would put a strain on an already tense US-China relationship. At the same time, given all theefforts to stabilize ties since Woodside, Beijing’s response would focus more on insulating the Chinese economy from further US tech containment efforts than on tit-for-tat retaliation against high-profile US tech companies. Not only because there’s little the Chinese can do on this front that they haven’t been doing for years, with most American social media platforms already banned from the Chinese market. But also because targeting any remaining potential targets, such as Apple or Tesla, risks dampening foreign investor sentiment at a time when China is struggling mightily to boost confidence in its economy.
At the end of the day, Xi doesn’t care much about “decadent” consumer apps such as TikTok. He’d rather worry about the commanding heights of tech and economic competition. The Chinese people writ large, however, would see a ban as yet another US attempt to constrain China’s rise.
Russia and China benefit from US infighting, says David Sanger
On GZERO World, David Sanger, Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times journalist and author of "New Cold Wars," argues that while China seeks to become the top global power by 2049, Russia, lacking such aspirations, acts as a disruptor on the international stage. Sanger also notes how both countries have an interest in fueling instability in the U.S., amplifying chaos to distract American focus from their strategic ambitions. He tells Ian Bremmer, "China wants to be the top dog by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Revolution and of Mao declaring the state. And they want to be the top dog of something worth being the top dog of. The Russians have no hope for that. So their only source of power is as a disruptor, and that's the friction between these two that may come into play."
Sanger also argues that both Russia AND China have an interest in sowing internal discord in the United States. "They have every incentive, both of them, Russia and China, to be subtle actors in the background of this coming presidential election. And that's one area where if they are not cooperating, it would pay them off considerably to coordinate."
Watch Ian Bremmer's full interview with David Sanger on GZERO World - Are we on the brink of a new cold war?
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
- Are we on the brink of a new cold war? ›
- The next era of global superpower competition: a conversation with the New York Times' David Sanger ›
- What China and Russia share ›
- Trump: I would encourage Russia to attack 'delinquent' NATO allies ›
- The threat of foreign interference to the US election ›
- Who would Putin vote for? ›
- It’s election interference season — always ›
Why the US-China relationship is more stable than you might think
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week. US Secretary of State Tony Blinken in the Middle East right now. But he just came from China, Beijing and Shanghai, and the US-China relationship is what I'm thinking about. Want to give you a state of play.
It continues to be better managed and more stable than we've seen in a long time. Now, not clear that would necessarily be the case, given the number of issues and places where we have friction between these two countries. Just over the course of the last couple weeks, you've got President Biden, putting new tariffs on Chinese steel, opening a new investigation into Chinese shipbuilding. You've got this anti TikTok policy that's coming down from US Congress. You've got $2 billion in additional military aid for Taiwan from the United States. You've also got lots of criticism from the Americans on ongoing Chinese support, dual use technologies for the Russians, allowing them to better fight the war in Ukraine.
Given all of that, is the relationship starting to become much more confrontational? And the answer is not really. It's true that the Chinese foreign minister said that the Americans need to choose between having a relationship of containment and a relationship of partnership, and it's certainly true that the Americans would rather have it both ways. They want to have partnership in areas where it suits the Americans, and containment in areas where it suits the Americans. The Americans getting away with more than that than other countries can because the US is the most powerful country in the world and ultimately the Chinese need Americans more than Americans need China. Still, there's a lot of interdependence, and there is an ability to push back. How much is China actually doing that? And the answer is there's been very little direct Chinese tit for tat, despite all of the policies I just mentioned. It is true that overnight, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that there would be resolute and forceful measures if the supplemental support for Taiwan, which is a red line for the Chinese, is signed and Taiwanese assistance from the US moves ahead, and I suspect that means we're going to see some more sanctions from China against US defense contractors.
That is largely symbolic. It is a tit for tat. But on all the other policies I've mentioned that the Americans have just brought against China, we've seen Chinese focus on making their country and their economy more resilient against American efforts to contain, but not hitting the Americans back, not calibrated, moves of sanctions or reciprocal investigations. In fact, the Chinese have been pretty stable.
Also. We saw that Xi Jinping still met with Secretary of State Blinken directly, a meeting that would be very easy for the Chinese government to take down, and historically certainly wouldn't have been present if there had been a lot of tension in the relationship. They chose not to do that. And in fact, Blinken went to a record store, you know, he plays guitar and sings, and he's into music. And the coverage from the Chinese state media of that trip was very humanizing, was very friendly, frankly, better coverage of a US secretary of state than I've seen at any point since Xi Jinping has been in power. That's something it's very easy for the Chinese government to put their thumb on the scale if they want to show that they're unhappy with where the US relationship is. I think about Obama and the town hall, that he wanted to put together and the Chinese unwilling to give him the kind of coverage that the Americans at the time had wanted. You know, this is a lesser official from the US and is still getting, frankly, tremendous treatment from the Chinese government. I think that matters a lot.
Having said all of that, this is a relationship that is becoming more challenging to manage. And that's true because in the United States, whether you're Democrat or Republican, one of the very few things you can agree on in foreign policy is that there is a benefit in going after China. So the policy from the US is not just about Biden making decisions himself, but it's also about members of Congress. It's about governors. It's about the media. All of whom are taking their own shots. And they're not coordinated. Where from China, if Xi Jinping wants it, everyone basically rose in the same direction. Now, there are lots of American corporations and banks that are sending their CEOs, making trips with China right now. And there's much more people to people engagement between the two countries, something that Chinese officials are strongly focused on.
There's a lot more communication and cooperation on things like climate, as well as in response to America's fentanyl crisis, where the Chinese are shutting down the labs, the companies that have been exporting the precursor chemicals. Those things matter. They are engaged. There's also a lot of willingness of the United States, at the highest level, to provide more information to China, just on what the Americans are seeing happening around a confrontation in the Middle East that China would like to see a cease-fire for, so would the Americans at this point. And also, the Chinese don't have a lot of high level diplomats and a lot of ability to collect information that the Americans do. And when high level Americans are talking to their Chinese counterparts about the Middle East, the Chinese are very much in taking notes mode and appreciating that they're getting that information from the US.
So overall, I continue to see a lot of high level engagement that is very constructive. But coming against a relationship that has virtually no trust and where the baseline of conflict is going to pop up in a lot of different ways and a lot of different places around the world. Over time it's going to be harder to maintain that stable floor on US-China relations. But for now, I think we're likely to continue to see it, at least until elections in November.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.