We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
U.S. Representative Don Beyer (D-VA) attends a news conference in the United States Capitol about the COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act, in Washington, U.S., May 18, 2021.
Rep. Don Beyer goes back to school
Rep. Don Beyer, a 73-year-old car dealership owner-turned-politician, is not your typical grad student. A Democrat who served as Virginia’s lieutenant governor in the 1990s and an ambassador during the Obama administration before getting elected to Congress in 2015, Beyer decided to go back to school in 2022 to pursue a master’s degree in machine learning at George Mason University.
Since then, Beyer has served as vice chair of the Congressional Artificial Intelligence Caucus and introduced a bill to provide transparency into the development of so-called foundation models.
GZERO spoke with Beyer about his studies, his concerns and hopes for the technology, and whether the US will catch up to Europe in regulating AI.
GZERO: Was there a specific moment when you realized that you were unprepared for the challenge of artificial intelligence and wanted to learn more? Why did you feel you needed to take the step of actually enrolling in a master’s program to get the education you needed?
Beyer: I was interested in AI long before I knew what it was that I was interested in, and this goes back a long time, to the early 1980s. I had read and heard several compelling discussions of the topic and got interested in pattern recognition and using technology and deep learning to make sense of big data sets. Going back to school arose first from opportunity, having a good school nearby that offered the coursework to finally tackle something that had interested me for a long time. I wasn’t sure it would work, but I have no regrets at all. And then part way through my course of study, it suddenly became a much bigger topic for the country and the Congress.
How have your professors and classmates reacted to having a sitting congressman in class?
Many of my classmates are unaware, which is just fine with me. Those who know have been tolerant and kind. I am just another student.
What are you learning in your classes?
Mostly math and coding, so far.
Do you feel more prepared to legislate around AI because of this education?
Yes, much more so. Even though I’m not a fully trained computer scientist, I at least have more than a generalist’s understanding of neural networks, large databases, the predictive and generative uses of computer science, and so on.
What are you most concerned about with the rise of artificial intelligence? What are you most excited about?
The big concerns in the short run for me are deepfakes, misinformation, and economic disruptions from job displacement. But there are very exciting prospects in areas like health care, scientific research, management and workflow, productivity, and much more.
Europe just passed the AI Act. Are you optimistic that Congress can pass comprehensive AI regulations anytime soon?
Congress is more likely to take an incremental than a comprehensive approach, at least in the near term, to solve specific problems rather than attempting a large overarching regulation like what the EU did. But we are working on legislation right now with every intention to pass laws.
Anything else you want to leave us with?
Most people associate Congress with chaos, dysfunction, and partisanship, but those of us working on AI have a refreshingly cooperative and collaborative spirit. This is important to get right. Few things have greater potential to change all our lives and the lives of future generations.
AI policy formation must include voices from the global South
Marietje Schaake, International Policy Fellow, Stanford Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, and former European Parliamentarian, co-hosts GZERO AI, our new weekly video series intended to help you keep up and make sense of the latest news on the AI revolution. In this episode, she explains the need to incorporate diverse and inclusive perspectives in formulating policies and regulations for artificial intelligence. Narrowing the focus primarily to the three major policy blocs—China, the US, and Europe—would overlook crucial opportunities to address risks and concerns unique to the global South.
This is GZERO AI from Stanford's campus, where we just hosted a two-day conference on AI policy around the world. And when I say around the world, I mean truly around the world, including many voices from the Global South, from multilateral organizations like the OECD and the UN, and from the big leading AI policy blocs like the EU, the UK, the US and Japan that all have AI offices for oversight.
But what I really want to focus on is the role of people in the Global South, and how they're underrepresented in discussions about both what AI means in their local context and how they participate in debates around policy, if they do at all. Because right now, our focus is way too much on the three big policy blocks, China, the US and Europe.
Also because of course, a lot of industry is here around the corner in Silicon Valley. But I've learned so much from listening to people who focus on the African continent, where there are no less than 2000 languages. And, many questions about what AI will mean for those languages, for access for people beyond just the exploitative and attractive model, based on which large language models are trained with cheap labor from people in these developing countries, but also about how harms can be so different.
For example, the disinformation tends to spread with WhatsApp rather than social media platforms and that voice, through generative AI. So synthetic voice is one of the most effective ways to spread disinformation. Something that's not as prominently recognized here, where there's so much focus on text content and deepfakes videos, but not so much on audio. And then, of course, we talked about elections because there are a record number of people voting this year and disinformation around elections, tends to pick up.
And AI is really a wild card in that. So I take away that we just need to have many more conversations, not so much, about AI in the Global South and tech policy there, but listening to people who are living in those communities, researching the impact of AI in the Global South, or who are pushing for fair treatment when their governments are using the latest technologies for repression, for example.
So lots of fruitful thought. And, I was very grateful that people made it all the way over here to share their perspectives with us.
Croatian Prime Minister and Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party chief Andrej Plenkovic attends an election rally in Zagreb, Croatia, April 14, 2024.
Croatia heads to the polls in contentious election
Croatians vote on Wednesday in one of the most contentious parliamentary elections that the Balkan country, an EU member, has seen in years – and Russia is at the heart of the kerfuffle.
The governing center-right Croatian Democratic Union party, or HDZ, which has held power almost continuously since Croatia’s independence in 1991, is facing a stiff challenge from a center-left coalition led by the Social Democrat Party.
The SDP is helmed by Croatian President Zoran Milanovic, an outspoken populist who has ignored court orders to step down during the campaign and has accused the HDZ of corruption. HDZ leader and Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, a bitter rival, has warned that Milanovic wants to drag Croatia into “the Russian world.”
The HDZ’s platform is largely pro-EU and pro-NATO, and it supports backing Ukraine in its fight against Russia.
Milanovic, on the other hand, has opposed providing training and weapons to Ukraine as a “deeply immoral” path to prolonging the conflict.
Polls show HDZ with a five-point lead over SDP, but economic misgivings could bolster the SDP and some other smaller parties enough to prevent HDZ from winning an outright majority, forcing a period of messy coalition building and uncertainty.FILE PHOTO: Ukrainian servicemen of the 28th Separate Mechanized Brigade fire a 120-mm mortar towards Russian troops at a frontline, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, near the town of Bakhmut, Ukraine March 15, 2024.
Ukraine’s struggles multiply on the battlefield
Ukraine’s situation on the eastern front line has “significantly worsened,” wrote the country's top military commander, Oleksandr Syrskyi, on Saturday. Kyiv fears that Moscow might be planning an assault on Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city in the north-east, as well as a major attack in late spring or summer in the regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia.
Simultaneously, the conflict is precipitatinga severe energy crisis, not just in Ukraine but across Europe. Andriy Kobolyev, former CEO of Ukraine’s Naftogaz, warned of spikes in European energy prices as Russian forces target Ukraine's energy infrastructure. “Russia is trying to wage a global energy war," Kobolyev stated, stressing the urgent need for weapons to defend energy assets. But this week, European nations rejected requests for more Patriot and SAMP/T air defense systems.
And the attacks keep coming, thanks to help from Beijing. China is reportedlysupplying Russia with crucial components for its defense equipment, enabling Moscow to ramp up production of missiles and drones. The US has asked Chinese firms to desist, but Beijing maintains it is not taking a side in the conflict, despite thecozy relationship between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin..
Zelensky, Putin, Macron
From dove to hawk: Explaining Macron’s Russia-Ukraine journey
French President Emmanuel Macron has been on quite the journey over the past two years.
In the days leading up to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine in February 2022, Macron took on the role of chief peacemaker in a bid to avert conflict. Once the war began, he cautioned against Russia’s humiliation, offered Putin countless off-ramps, and pressed Ukraine to engage in peace talks. Fast forward to today, though, and Macron has become arguably the transatlantic alliance’s leading Russia hawk, even going as far as openly discussing the prospect of deploying French troops to Ukraine’s front lines.
What caused such a remarkable transformation? French officials close to the president claim that as the facts on the ground changed, so did Macron's strategic thinking. But as my Eurasia Group colleague Mujtaba Rahman teased last week, that explanation doesn’t fully hold up. Let’s see why.
Macron's shuttle diplomacy began with the widely publicized “long-table talks” in Moscow on Feb. 7, 2022, when Putin agreed to refrain from invading Ukraine in exchange for “security guarantees.” Then, on Feb. 20, the two leaders spoke on the phone, and Macron went to sleep believing he had convinced Putin to consider peace talks with US President Joe Biden. The rest is history: Putin reneged on both promises, and on Feb. 24, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Macron’s critics dismiss those early talks as futile, arguing the president was never in a position to deter a Putin hellbent on achieving his imperial dreams (fact check: true).
Macron’s thinking, however, was – and still is – that engagement was justified despite having little chance of success. Otherwise, the Kremlin could have claimed that the West was uninterested in diplomacy and had left it with no choice but war. Trying was valuable insofar as it allowed the West to retain the moral and narrative high ground … whatever that turned out to be worth.
A few months later, in May, Macron gave a speech at the European Parliament where he called on the West not to “humiliate” Russia. This was no slip of the tongue; he reiterated the position a month later in an interview with the French media when he said that helping Putin save face was necessary “so that the day when the fighting stops we can build an exit ramp through diplomatic means.”
The statements drew ire from Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic States, outraged by calls to give in to an invader that was mercilessly shelling civilians amid then-fresh revelations of war crimes in Bucha and elsewhere.
What was Macron thinking then? At the time, the French leader believed that Russia was going to lose the war – even if at that particular moment it was winning the battle. He was under the impression that Putin knew this and was accordingly open to diplomacy. The hope was that by keeping him onside, Macron could eventually broker a peace deal that would both preserve Kyiv’s interests and pave the way for a new, more “strategic” European security architecture – one where Europe would finally take its future into its own hands and be less dependent militarily on the United States.
But that illusion would not last long.
In the weeks that followed, a series of phone calls with Putin led Macron to the realization that the Russian president had been making a fool out of him all along, hardening the president’s attitude toward Moscow. It was a rude awakening, but the facts didn’t change on him – Macron just caught up to them.
As this reality dawned, Macron’s strategic focus shifted to Eastern European countries, whose support he realized was key to keeping his dream of a “strategic Europe” alive. The problem was that France had historically had tepid relations with this part of the world, starting with Paris’ reluctance to embrace eastern enlargement after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Macron’s direct diplomacy with Putin in 2022 had only made things worse. Ties needed mending, and these countries needed convincing that the European Union could replace the United States as the guarantor of European security – especially in light of Germany’s increasingly apparent geopolitical timidity and the growing odds of a Trump 2.0 pullback from NATO scenario.
So Macron went to work. At the GLOBSEC security conference in Bratislava in June 2023, the French president called for Russia's outright “defeat” for the first time, after previously speaking only of “preventing a Russian victory.” He also apologized to Eastern European countries for “missing an opportunity” to heed their concerns about Russia’s imperial ambitions, pleaded for a European defense pillar within NATO in the face of Washington’s wavering commitment to the transatlantic alliance, and – crucially – opened the door to possible Ukrainian NATO membership.
The Bratislava remarks were made at a time when the West was cautiously optimistic that Ukraine could reprise the success of its 2022 counteroffensive. The military and political outlook has since darkened for Kyiv. And Macron has grown anxious that – far from bolstering European security, unity, and democracy – the war may end in a Russian victory, which would discredit the European Union and destroy its economy. This concern is what prompted the president to publicly weigh the possibility of deploying French and other NATO troops to Ukraine for the first time in late February, when he replied to a journalist’s question about potential Western troop deployments by saying that “nothing should be ruled out” because “Russia cannot [be allowed] to win this war.”
While French ministers have claimed that he was referring only to support troops and not frontline fighters, Macron has refused to accept that distinction. Indeed, despite earning strong rebukes from the US, Germany, and the United Kingdom, he doubled down recently when he said he would not “initiate” such an escalation but it might become necessary.
So what is Macron trying to achieve now? The first-order reasoning is that he wants to create “strategic ambiguity” – in other words, keep Putin guessing about his intentions to deter further aggression and persuade him to back off Ukraine. But the president also wants to prepare French and Western public opinion for the difficult decisions that may lie ahead in the event that such deterrence fails.
Beyond strategic considerations, there is the question of what role Macron’s ambitions have played in his rhetorical escalation. The French president is often accused of wanting to seize the “leadership” of the European Union, but with just three years remaining in office, he is probably thinking more about legacy than leadership now. And Macron's legacy stakes are certainly high. In 2017, he promised to leave France and the EU stronger than he found them. Seven years later, he faces the rising tides of far-right nationalism and the possibility that a Russian victory in Ukraine could destroy the credibility of the union.
Macron realizes that his ambition of a more “strategic Europe” is a long-term project requiring strong backing from the United Kingdom and Germany. But he is also aware that Berlin is unwilling to face up to this new geostrategic landscape in which cheap Russian gas and unconditional US protection are no longer guaranteed. He is therefore hoping that his “boots on the ground” rhetoric can force Europe to confront existential questions about the continent’s security destiny that leaders like German Chancellor Olaf Scholz would prefer to avoid.
Whether his new position ultimately helps or hurts Ukraine remains to be seen. It’s also unclear whether the French leader will finally put his money where his mouth is. After all, France has been a laggard when it comes to arming Ukraine. But one thing is for sure – the Russia dove of 2022 is now one of the West’s most implacable hawks. Putin no longer has an open line to Emmanuel Macron.
Employees work at a grain store in Russia's southern city of Stavropol on Feb. 2, 2011.
EU mulls plan to disarm Russia’s 'food weapon'
European leaders have long been reluctant to restrict the purchase of Russian agricultural products for fear the decision would raise global food prices and provoke anger in developing countries over food inflation and scarcity. But global food prices fell in January to their lowest level in three years. As a result, Europe now imports much more Russian grain than before the invasion of Ukraine.
That might be about to change. The EU is reportedly debating a plan to slap heavy tariffs on grain, oil seeds, and derivative products imported from Russia and its invasion ally Belarus. The move won’t have a big impact on Russia’s broader economy, but it will please European farmers who face less competition, and the move has real symbolic value for European leaders anxious to cut remaining EU economic ties to the Kremlin.
There are three important elements of the emerging deal. First, the tariffs won’t produce hardship for European consumers. The EU is already a net exporter of cereals, and prices now stand at four-year lows.
Second, to limit the risk of a big jump in global food prices, the plan will allow Russian grain to travel through Europe to Africa and Asia.
Third, the EU will impose tariffs, the highest level allowed under WTO rules, rather than sanctions to avoid the need for unanimous support from all EU capitals.
Putin wins another classic Soviet election
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden, shares his perspective on European politics from Stockholm.
To the surprise of absolutely no one, it's been announced that Vladimir Putin has won the presidential election with a record support and a record turnout. It was, by all standards, a Soviet election. With all of the restrictions that you could think of and the real result, well, it wasn't very much to choose between.
And all of the opposition was outlawed. There was a five year prison sentence of any activities that sort of disturb the election campaign in any sort of way in the view of the authorities. The only thing that should be added is that the activity by the Navalny organization saying, come at noon on Sunday, you stand in the queue and demonstrate by that that you are an opposition. That seems to have been very long queues in the large Russian cities not to speak about at the Russian embassies abroad.
So Soviet style election, but there are still some people in Russia holding the hope out for a better future some point in the time.
A volcanic eruption takes place, near Grindavik, Iceland, March 16, 2024, in this handout picture obtained by Reuters.
Hard Numbers: Icelandic volcano erupts, India sets election date, EU aids Egyptian economy, South Sudan schools close amid extreme heat
40: Just 40 minutes after authorities received indications of an eruption late Saturday, lava shot from a huge fissure on the Reykjanes Peninsula near Grindavik and the famed Blue Lagoon. The fourth — and probably biggest — eruption to have hit here since December nearly took services by surprise. The town and resort were both evacuated shortly after the eruption.
960 million: The largest-ever democratic exercise is set to begin on April 19 with a whopping 960 million voters participating in India’s parliamentary elections. Indians will head to the polls for seven electoral phases through June 1, with the count set to take place on June 4. Populist Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party is expected to secure another five years at the helm of an increasingly religiously divided India — but one that is also tipped to become the third-largest world economy by 2027. For GZERO’s guide to world elections in 2024, click here.
7.4 billion: The EU has agreed to send Cairo a funding package of €7.4 billion ($8.06 billion) between now and 2027 to help stabilize Egypt’s economy and wean it off Russian gas. The Egyptian economy has been hard hit by recent economic crises – most notably, the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza, which is impacting tourism and shipping in the Suez Canal.
113: Children in South Sudan are unable to attend school starting today, owing to an extreme heat wave that could raise the mercury as high as 113 degrees Fahrenheit. All schools have been ordered to shut down, and parents are being advised to keep kids indoors with the scorching temps set to last for up to two weeks.