We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
The view Thursday night from inside the Columbia University campus gate at 116th Street and Amsterdam in New York City.
From the inside out: Is Columbia’s campus crisis calming down?
Special report by Riley Callanan and Alex Kliment
Late Thursday night, the words “New Shafik email drop” rippled through the protest site known as the “Gaza Solidarity Encampment” on Columbia University’s lawns.
The protesters had been waiting to hear whether the New York Police Department was on its way, knowing that the deadline for negotiations with the administration of university President Nemat “Minouche” Shafik was rapidly approaching.
The police would not, in fact, be coming, the email said. Shortly after that news broke, student negotiators returned from talks to report that while there had not been progress on their demands to divest from Israel or give amnesty to the suspended students, they had had a small win: No new deadline to end the protests had been set. The encampment’s leaders continue to demand that Columbia’s endowment divest from any Israeli-related holdings and offer amnesty to students suspended over the protests last week.
The agreement to continue talking, disagreeing, and protesting – without divesting or policing – came in stark contrast to the images of hundreds of students and professors being arrested on several other US college campuses on Thursday.
But what seemed like a de-escalation inside the Columbia campus gates also came after an evening in which tensions were still high outside of them. As in, right outside of them.
Starting around 6:30 p.m. on Thursday, a United for Israel March drew several hundred protesters, and almost all involved were non-students. They came in part because of media and social media coverage of the harassment and attacks that several Jewish students faced last week, in the first days and nights of the pro-Palestinian encampment.
“It’s like 1939 Germany in there,” said Amber Falk, 37, as she handed out free packets of pastel-colored 4x6 inch stickers that said “F*ck Hamas” or “From the River to the Sea, TikTok is not a College Degree!”
That idea echoed comments made the day before by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who said the atmosphere for Jewish students on American college campuses recalled Nazi-era discrimination. Also on Wednesday, US House Speaker Mike Johnson came to Columbia’s campus to suggest sending in the National Guard “if these threats and intimidation are not stopped.”
“You know, if they don’t handle this, it might be time for us to form a new JDL,” said pro-Israel protester Joey M, 36, of Brooklyn, referring to a violent Jewish extremist group, originally formed to protect Jews in New York in the 1960s. “If the government can’t protect Jews, we have to,” said Joey.
Meanwhile, across campus on Broadway, a different group of non-Columbian protesters in keffiyehs and masks chanted, “There is only one solution! Intifada Revolution!”
There’s no doubt that tensions at Columbia were immensely high last week when Riley reported that “the campus is unraveling into distrust, dysfunction, and fear.” But in the days since – which have seen one round of police arrests, the closure of campus to non-students, and the encampment itself pledging to weed out external agitators – tensions have come down noticeably.
“It's much more calm now,” said David Lederer, a sophomore wearing a kippah and waving a large Israeli flag just inside the gates. If that name rings a bell, it’s because David and his twin brother Jonathan were attacked on campus last week, supercharging concerns about antisemitism on campus.
“People will still say ‘sweep the camp,’ ‘arrest all of them.’ But I'm not like that,” said Lederer. “Free speech is free speech, just don’t harass us. I feel safe walking on campus again. Even if the change is just for the media to see, I appreciate that.”
Whether this new, relative calm can hold is an open question of huge importance – the deadlock between the encampment and the university is testing the respective limits of free speech, safe spaces, and campus rules, all in the eye of a furious national storm.
Pressure from beyond the gates – which remain closed to outsiders – is still immense. At least 10 GOP lawmakers have called for Shafik’s resignation. Vice President Kamala Harris’ husband Doug Emhoff held talks with Jewish Campus leaders on Thursday. Ilhan Omar, of the “squad” faction of progressive Democrats, has visited the encampment, where her daughter was arrested last week. And adding further fuel to the fire, Hamas itself has expressed support for the student protests.
Meanwhile, as Thursday’s campus arrests elsewhere in the country threatened to inflame protests further, the basic standoff at Columbia remains unresolved.
As the Shafik email drop put it: “We have our demands; they have theirs.”
Flags from across the divide wave in the air over protests at Columbia University on Thursday, April 25, 2024.
Slogans of war
Where do we draw the line between free speech and a safe space? That’s the core question posed by the protests and the arrests raging on campuses right now over the Hamas-Israel war.
Of the many complex, painful issues contributing to the tension stemming from the Oct. 7 Hamas massacre and the ongoing Israeli attacks in Gaza, dividing groups into two basic camps, pro-Israel and pro-Palestine, is only making this worse. Call it a category problem.
What do these terms, pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian, even mean? Are they helpful, or is it time to stop using them altogether?
The fundamental flaw with these terms is that they conflate support for the existence of a country with support for the government or leaders in power. For example, does pro-Israel mean support for the existence of the state of Israel, or for the policies of the current government? They are wildly different things.
Before Oct. 7, there were already massive rallies against Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, and they have only grown louder. Are the people protesting him anti-Israel? Of course not. Patriotism and partisanship are not always the same thing. The same person who supports the right of Israel to exist – and may even fight for Israel against a group like Hamas – might just as well protest the Likud government, support a two-state solution, and want a cease-fire in Gaza. Read the popular Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz and see the diverse views and critical opinions on Israeli policy.
The same is true for the Palestinian cause. Supporting a viable, safe, prosperous Palestinian state is the normative position of most governments around the world, but that does not mean supporting the murderous agenda of Hamas, which is listed as a terrorist organization in Canada and the US. Palestinians and millions of others who are deeply furious at the Israeli actions in Gaza and Netanyahu’s policies should not necessarily be equated with supporting Hamas and their eliminationist goals. Are you anti-Palestinian if you do not support Hamas? Of course not.
The same is true anywhere. No one asks if you are, say, pro-France, pro-Italy, pro-Canada, or pro-America when they are debating a specific policy. Instead, they ask if you support a particular position or action of the government in power. Reducing this to a conflict about the right to exist as a country – for Israel or Palestine – is a road to endless war. Making this, as it ought to be, about a conflict of policy and leadership – however deadly it is right now – is the path toward resolution.
With the war in Gaza raging, it is understandable that people are being forced to take a side: Are you pro-Israel or pro-Palestinian? That gives the patina of a firm moral stance, but it plays into the hands of the most radical forces on both sides who strategically want to co-opt the reasonable middle ground for their own purposes.
Among the great propaganda victories of this war are the Hamasification of the Palestinian cause on one side and the Netanyahuization of the Israeli voices on the other (and no, this is not meant to make a false equivalence between the two, but simply to describe the political dynamics).
That’s why you see, say, signs supporting Hamas on campuses and chants that celebrate Oct. 7. That’s why there is a rise in antisemitism or, on the other side, a refusal in some places to acknowledge the deaths and suffering of the people of Gaza.
The category problem supports this dynamic and undermines the rational middle ground where, for generations, there has been a genuine if fruitless effort to find a peaceful two-state solution. It is now parodied as a sinkhole of mushy naivete, offensive bothsidesism, and false equivalencies, and protesters and their slogans shout it down. But it remains the only hope.
There isn’t a lot people can do in the face of such a long-standing bloody conflict – though joining protests is certainly one thing. But perhaps adhering to the middle ground and avoiding the broad categories that help radicals on each side is a small but effective action.
You might think that the one place you’d find this middle ground would be on university campuses, where details, nuance, and debate are supposed to thrive. That’s not happening. On many campuses today, it is now impossible to distinguish between free speech and safe space.
Columbia & Yale protests: What campus protesters want
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Why hasn't the United Nations insisted on military observers in Gaza?
Well, the United Nations doesn't really insist on things. And when they do, it's usually symbolic. Like they insist that humanitarian aid needs to get into Gaza and it doesn't happen. Or they insist that, there needs to be protections for the Palestinian civilians or that the Hamas needs to let go, release all of the illegally held hostages, and it doesn't go anywhere. So you can insist all you want. Also, keep in mind the Security Council would be vetoing that sort of thing because the US has a veto and they continue to use it on most Israel-Palestine related resolutions.
What specific demands are being voiced by campus protesters at institutions such as Columbia and Yale?
Well, I mean, the demands that got these protests started, are all about divestment of the endowments of these universities away from any corporations that do business in make money with Israel. Because of the view that the Israeli war in Gaza is wrong, the student protesters called it a genocide and that they want to end that. We've seen that kind of demand in Europe across the board. Not as much in the United States, at least not to this degree. Having said that, now that you also have students that have been suspended and arrested, surely the campus protesters are also saying those things need to be unwound. We're also increasingly seeing demands for university administrators, including presidents, to resign. So, I mean, the longer this goes, the harder it is to actually, accede to these student demands. And of course, the more polarized the environment on the ground in these universities become.
How will US aid package approval shake the dynamic of the Russia-Ukraine war?
Well, it makes it more likely that the Ukrainians can defend their front lines, at least for now. They had been losing some territory. Not a lot, but including one city. And the Russians are planning, with an additional mobilization, a new major offensive, probably end of spring, early summer. Ukrainians have a much better capability to hit back and stop the Russians from making gains there. They had been down to about 20% of the ammunition and artillery being fired against Russia, that the Russians were firing against Ukraine. This brings that back to parity through that offensive. What does this mean for 2025? Still, massive uncertainty and eventually a need to engage in negotiations with a much bigger Russia fighting an illegal war, an invasion with all these war crimes. Is that fair? No. But is that reality? Yes, absolutely. And any NATO leader you talk to privately recognizes that's where this is eventually going.
- Israel’s looming constitutional crisis: What’s the tech sector going to do about it? ›
- College campus watch: The chaos is spreading ›
- Campuses in crisis vs. Capitol Hill calm ›
- Crisis at Columbia: Protests and arrests bring chaos to campus ›
- How campus protests could influence the US presidential election - GZERO Media ›
Israel attacks Iran
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take on the latest in the Middle East crisis. And things actually looking a little bit more stable today than they have over the past couple of weeks. And that is some very welcome news.
The headlines, of course, that the Iranians have been hit by Israel, though no one is saying that Israel has admitted to doing it, in the town of Isfahan. Clearly, military targets and the Iranians trying to knock down those missiles coming over. But this was a significantly more restrained attack than what the Israelis did to kick off this crisis, which was attack an Iranian government building in Damascus and target and assassinate a senior Iranian leader. That led to the Iranian response that we saw over the weekend, which was a significant and serious one, with a few hundred missiles and drones. And now we are in the escalatory portion of the cycle.
The United States said very clearly to Israel, “We're going to help defend you no matter what. We don't want any offensive strikes against Iran. Take the win.” The fact that they said that meant that it was very, very likely that they were going to do something, but that something was going to be restrained, where if the Americans said, “Hey, just take it easy, don't do anything big,” then they’d end up doing something bigger, right? And you give them an inch, they take two inches. This is the way these things work. And it was coordinated with the United States. The US was not involved directly in the military strikes, but they knew it was coming. They had that cooperation, communication from Israel, which was important because the US had to be in position in case the Iranians decided that they were going to strike real time in response to Israel. The Americans were going to help the Israelis defend themselves yet again.
Now, the big question here is not, “Do the Iranians respond in a big way?” They don't. They've already signaled that that's not the intention. You've seen them downplaying the nature of these strikes on Iranian state media. So, this crisis, this proximate crisis between Israel and Iran is now in the rearview mirror. But going forward, what's the likelihood that we can stabilize this war, which is now well beyond just a matter of Israel versus Hamas?
One thing that makes me a little bit more positive is the fact that Bibi Netanyahu is himself in a little more secure position domestically. What do you mean, makes you more positive? Does that mean he's going to last longer? Yes. But it also means he doesn't necessarily have to go ahead with massive strikes against Hamas in Rafah, killing lots of civilians. Or eventually against Hezbollah, pushing them back so that almost 100,000 Israeli citizens can get back to the north. If he wanted to take a win and show that he now has, you know, a historical legacy of leading Israel in defending against an unprecedented strike from Iran, with strong support from the Americans, from the Brits, from the Jordanians, from the Saudis, this is the opportunity that could create Saudi normalization with Israel. This is the opportunity that could create a peace deal that the Palestinians would have some form of governance over the West Bank and Gaza together.
That's the opportunity that comes from this, precisely because Israel domestically now has a leader that doesn't have to look over his shoulder every moment. But the strong effort by Netanyahu, at least as of today, is to still go ahead with these Rafah strikes. You've got the battalions on the ground. You want to use them, you want to take out, these Hamas leaders, irrespective of the civilian cost. And that continues to be very popular among the entire population of Israel as well.
So, when I think about the next couple of weeks, I think that you're not going to get a breakthrough deal on hostages with Hamas, and that means that the fighting only stops if there's a broader agreement. And that broader agreement requires that the Israeli war cabinet is willing to stand down and not continue their war on the ground in Gaza. And in return, has a broader agreement with the Americans, with the Gulf states, and ultimately with a path forward for the Palestinians. Most people around the world would welcome, would love to see that. Getting the Israelis from here to there, especially when you are surrounded by enemies that consider you, to be, illegitimate as a country and refuse to recognize your right to exist, that makes it a lot harder. So that's where we are. But some breathing space for now. The mood in the United States, certainly better than it was at any point over the last week and a half, and that's a good thing.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Flags of Israel and Iran on broken ground.
Israel hits Iran directly – what next?
Well, now we know the answer to the question of how Israel planned to respond to Iran’s recent attack. Explosions were reported early on Friday near the northwestern Iranian city of Isfahan, in what several major outlets reported, citing US officials and local sources, as an apparent Israeli strike.
The blasts come just days after Iran launched its first-ever direct attacks on Israel, launching hundreds of missiles and drones, almost all of which were shot down by Israeli and US missile defenses. That salvo was itself seen as a response to Israel’s strike on an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus early this month.
Syria and Iraq blasts reported as well. Blasts possibly related to the strikes on Iran were also reported around the same time at sites in Iraq and Syria. Both countries are home to sizable Iranian proxy forces and intelligence units.
So much for the Passover head fake. Earlier on Thursday, US officials had suggested anonymously that Israel would wait until after the Jewish holiday of Passover, which begins Monday, to retaliate.
No nuclear sites in the crosshairs, it seems. The full extent of the Israeli attack is not yet precisely clear, but the strike doesn't appear to have targeted the Natanz nuclear facility, a major component of Iran’s controversial nuclear program, which is located about 100 miles north of Isfahan. Israel has long made clear its desire to destroy Iran’s nuclear research. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog, on Friday said there was "no damage" to Iran's nuclear sites.
Isfahan, meanwhile, is home to several military bases and airfields, which may have been the targets. Iranian officials told the New York Times that a strike hit a military air base near the city. Outside Iran, Isfahan is known chiefly for its rich history of Islamic architecture, which includes several UNESCO heritage sites.
Was this an escalation by Israel? “On the surface, it appears rather limited,” said Gregory Brew, lead Iran analyst at Eurasia Group, “beyond the symbolic significance of Israel hitting Iranian territory.”
Iran isn't blaming Israel. Tehran is claiming to have shot down several drones in the Isfahan area but is downplaying the significance of the incident and hasn't blamed Israel — instead pointing the finger at "infiltrators." Iran has not indicated any plans for retaliation, in a potential sign that it doesn't want to escalate the situation.
“It’s early,” Brew noted, “but the official regime line may be that this is not an action that requires immediate and public retaliation.”
That’s good news even in a bad situation, he says. “It would suggest that the Israeli effort to hit back without triggering further escalation has been successful.”
Iran-Israel crisis: Dangers still high with little room for diplomacy
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Does the Iran-Israel crisis offer a unique opportunity for diplomacy?
I don't think so. They certainly give an opportunity for a bunch of countries to reengage with Israel. We're seeing that with Jordan, with Saudi Arabia, and to show the Iranians that they are still considered to be the big concern as an enemy in the region, a disrupter. But that's very different from saying we're going to see a breakthrough in relations. You're not resetting deterrence. Iran is going to continue to lead the axis of resistance and provide weapons and intelligence and engage in strikes against targets across the region. Israel will still hit Iranians that are operating there. So going forward, I think the dangers are still pretty high.
Is Germany's Scholz meeting with Xi in Beijing indicating a shift in Europe-China trade tensions?
Not really. Here, the fact that Scholz has a large number of German CEOs in tow means that, yes, he's concerned that the Chinese are providing support to Russia, maybe even increasingly dual-use military support to Russia in the war in Ukraine. He's concerned about Chinese industrial policy that's undermining, the interests of Americans and Europeans economically. But ultimately he is very reliant on investment and trade with China, and he's going to continue to support that. He is not fully aligned with his government on this issue, not his advisors, not his foreign minister, and certainly not the other parties in the coalition. But it is Scholz's perspective. And as a consequence, it is going to be a pretty friendly trip.
Why is Sudan's year-long conflict gone largely unnoticed?
Well, we write about it a fair amount, but I mean, the fact that it is in a part of the world that doesn't have economic implications. So you blow up Ukraine, and Russia is in a fight, and energy prices and food and fertilizer prices go up. Major conflict in Sudan. A lot of people suffer, a lot of people die, but the rest of the world has no impact economically. Also, most of the refugees, people fleeing, fleeing to neighboring African countries, they're not coming over to Mexico, the United States or to Poland and to Germany. And that just doesn't lead to a lot of attention. Final point is that there aren't a lot of journalists on the ground from the West in Sudan. And so not a lot of people are actually covering this. So for all of those reasons, not getting a lot of attention, but we'll keep talking about it.
Iran attacks Israel
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here, and a Quick Take on a Sunday, which usually means something is not going well, and that is certainly the case in the Middle East, where you had unprecedented strikes by Iran and its proxies against Israel.
Now, on the one hand, clearly a very dangerous thing to do, on the other hand, could have been a hell of a lot worse. What do I mean by that? Well, it is not World War III. Americans warned Iran not to hit the United States, and the Iranians gave a heads-up, days in advance, through a number of actors, most importantly through Iraq. This reminds me very much of after the American servicemen and women, three were killed in Jordan, by an Iranian proxy. The Americans did not want a war to break out with the Iranians directly, waited about a week, gave a heads up through Iraq, of the kind of attack that the Americans were planning, waited four days, gave the Iranians a chance to basically prepare and get their own forces out, and warned them that if this were to happen again, there would be direct consequences, a direct strike on Iran itself.
In this case, you had the Iranian heads-up that gave the Americans and allies time to pre-position, to provide diplomatic support, both publicly and privately, to the Israelis. Send the head of CENTCOM to Israel, say that American support for Israel was ironclad, help ensure that the Israelis would be able to most effectively defend itself against the coming Iranian attack. That was, on the one hand, a really big deal by the Iranians that was meant to be a maximal display of force and a minimum likelihood of casualties. But still, there was a significant possibility of accident, that you could have a risk that would lead to a war directly between Iran and Israel. Something that the Americans desperately wanted to avoid because it would bring the US in. It would spike oil prices. It would probably mean the end of Biden's, potential of a second presidency. And it, of course, would also mean that Iran was going to get hit massively by the United States and Israel, something they wanted to avoid.
We saw hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles, many from proxies, but many from Iran itself, over 99% of which were taken down. And they were aimed solely at military targets in Israel. So again, lots of effort to try to reduce the risk but the potential that you would have had a number get through, accidentally hitting civilians or having significant military hit, that was a risk that the Iranians were prepared to take. So, it's a big deal, it’s a clear escalation, and it is certainly an effort by the Iranians to say, that if this is to happen again, that the likelihood that there will be a major war between Iran and Israel come what may, is very real. And the Iranians also said, and they said this before the missiles even hit their targets, or in the case of the vast majority of them were intercepted, said through the United Nations mission that this was directly in retaliation for the Israeli strike against an Iranian leader in Damascus, and that the matter, from Iran's perspective, should be considered closed.
In other words, no further attacks were coming. So, trying to in a sense, you know, reduce the likelihood of further escalation, in advance. And clearly, all of that kept the United States from responding directly. So, the US strategy here is do everything possible to show that you will get massive support for Israeli defense and national security in the event of an attack, any attack, but also to try to put maximum constraint on the Israeli government against a response directly against Iran, and that the Americans don't want to support Israel if they were to engage in offensive attacks against Iran at this point.
What are the Israelis going to do? I mean, the hope for the United States is that while Prime Minister Netanyahu wants to do more and suck the United States into a broader war against Iran, that he is going to be constrained from doing so. In part because he was so successful, they now have a major victory on their belt under his watch, being able to defend the Israeli people completely in response to an unprecedented Iranian attack. And there's also going to be a big distraction away from the war in Gaza. Doesn't mean that Israel suddenly loses its isolation or wins the PR war globally, I think that's certainly not going to happen, but, there's less pressure on the Israelis, on the prime minister, in terms of Gaza right now as a consequence of what Iran has done. And there's also less pressure for Netanyahu to be forced out domestically in the near, in the immediate future.
Further, if he were to try to go considerably farther than Benny Gantz wants to, and the war cabinet wants to, in a response against Iran, then Netanyahu risks that they would bolt from the war cabinet and that his government would then fall apart. That's certainly a proximate risk that contains what the Israelis are likely to do. I don't think they'll sit on their hands and do nothing. At the very least, I think there'll be more significant strikes against Iranian proxies in the coming days. And the Israelis will also continue to engage in strikes against Iranian targets as they see them, as is opportune, in proxy states going forward. This is the problem, of course, is that, even though you have averted major escalation in a very dangerous period over the weekend, the Israelis and the Iranians haven't accomplished anything to stabilize their relationship longer-term.
Israel has shown that they are capable of taking out Iranian leaders in Syria, and Iran can't defend them. Iran has no intention of suddenly leaving those proxies to fend for themselves. And further, the likelihood that Israel now gets a breakthrough agreement on hostage release by Hamas, and that leads to a ceasefire, has gone down, at least in the near-term. The other side of that is the likelihood that the Israelis proceed with at least some form of ground attack into Rafah, which the Americans have warned them not to, also has gone up.
So the Hamas war with Israel is nowhere close to ending, the likelihood of continued Palestinian civilian casualties continues to grow, and the potential for further military engagement, both vis-a-vis proxies, including the Houthis in the Red Sea, the fact that the Iranians have also boarded an Israeli linked vessel in the Red Sea and that there is no effective deterrent in place right now between Israel and Iran, despite all sorts of other actors not wanting this to expand into a broader war, that all makes the Middle East right now, more dangerous.
So, I mean, none of us know, what the next shoe is going to be to drop. But if you are looking ahead over the next, let's say, six months, a couple things I think you can say. First, it is more likely that the present Israeli government is going to be in place for longer, and that the war in Gaza is going to continue without a serious effort at stabilization, or at least not one that's consequential.
That's problematic for Biden as you look ahead to the election in November. The potential that this war expands and eventually does drag in the United States and Iran more directly, is also going up. It's not imminent but it is certainly reasonably plausible, and the guardrails on that war are becoming, they are eroding as both sides are taking shots against each other.
So, a dangerous environment. A second war that is not going the way the Americans or anyone else in the world would like it to. And that's how we're kicking off our week.
That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
- Iran launches ballistic missiles at Israel in revenge attack ›
- Islamic State group spoils efforts to blame Israel for deadly Iran blasts ›
- Israel's war in Gaza has emboldened Iran, says Karim Sadjadpour ›
- Who will Iran blame for deadly explosions near Soleimani’s grave? ›
- Biden’s Iran dilemma ›
- Will Iran attack Israel? ›
- Iran-Israel crisis: Dangers still high with little room for diplomacy - GZERO Media ›
- Israel attacks Iran - GZERO Media ›
Iranian and Israeli flags behind an hourglass.
Iran launches ballistic missiles at Israel in revenge attack
Late Saturday, Tehran launched ballistic and cruise missiles toward Israel as part of a retaliatory attack for the recent Israeli strike on Iran’s consulate in Damascus that killed top Iranian commanders.
IDF Spokesman Daniel Hagari said early Sunday that more than 200 different rockets, including drones and ballistic and cruise missiles, were launched at Israel, with Israeli defenses and partners having intercepted the vast majority. More than 100 drones were intercepted with help from Jordan, the US, and the UK.
More worrying are ballistic missiles. While Israel’s missile defense systems can target them, an attack involving both drones and missiles makes it more likely that some of the Iranian weapons could hit their targets. Medics said shrapnel from one interception injured a girl in the Negev, and Hagari said other impacts had damaged infrastructure at a military base in southern Israel.
There have been fears of an escalation of regional violence ever since Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, with flareups along the Lebanese border and attacks by Hezbollah and other Iran-backed proxies in the region.
Saturday’s move comes just days after US President Joe Biden warned that Iran was threatening a “significant attack” against Israel. At the time, he promised Washington’s “ironclad” support to Israel, and the US notably has a large number of troops in the region.
Many have feared that a direct attack by Iran could put the entire region at risk. Israel’s top diplomat, Israel Katz, warned earlier this week that “If Iran attacks from its territory, Israel will react and attack in Iran.”
But the Iranian attack may have ended just as quickly as it started. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations tweeted that Saturday’s move by Tehran was in response to the “Zionist regime’s aggression against our diplomatic premises in Damascus” and that “The matter can be deemed concluded.”
Ian Bremmer, the president of GZERO Media and Eurasia Group, says this signals that Iran is sending a “strong message that [the] attack is limited” and it's “looking to avoid war with Israel or the United States.”