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Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters form a human chain in front of the crowd gathered near the family home of slain Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, where the Hamas militant group prepares to hand over Israeli and Thai hostages to a Red Cross team in Khan Yunis, on January 30, 2025, as part of their third hostage-prisoner exchange..
Hamas: Then & Now
Israel hunted Yahya Sinwar — the Hamas leader and mastermind of the Oct. 7 attack — for over a year. He was hidden deep within Gaza’s shadowy tunnel networks. Surrounded by guards and shielded by hostages, he remained untouchable — until he wasn’t. In Rafah last October, Sinwar was killed not in a targeted operation but during a routine skirmish with a patrol unit. It was only after the smoke cleared that Israeli troops even realized they had taken out their No. 1 enemy.
His death marked a turning point for Hamas, and the leadership role fell to his brother, Mohammed Sinwar, the chief planner behind Gaza’s tunnel infrastructure and Hamas’ former head of logistics and manpower. Six months into his leadership, the question looms: Where does the group stand today?
Then: Under Yahya Sinwar, Hamas operated from a position of relative strength, calculating that the time was right for the group to attack Israel, believing that Iran and Hezbollah would follow suit and that the humanitarian crisis that would inevitably follow in Gaza would only benefit Hamas by spurring international backlash against Israel.
Mohammed Sinwar assumed control of the group at a time of growing weakness. The wider regional response his brother had counted on never materialized. Iran is increasingly focused on domestic stability, and Hezbollah is now badly weakened. And while Israel has faced international criticism for its actions in Gaza, it continues to receive robust military support from key allies like the United States.
Now: Eighteen months into Israel’s ground campaign in Gaza, Hamas is militarily diminished, organizationally disjointed, and politically weak. Since the breakdown of a ceasefire in March, Israeli attacks on the enclave have resumed, and the already catastrophic humanitarian crisis has only deepened amid restricted aid deliveries.
“Hamas is less cohesive than it probably has been at any point in the last decade,” says Jonathan Panikoff, director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiativeat the Atlantic Council. “There seem to be major shortages in their military arsenal.” Their only remaining leverage, he notes, is the 59 hostages still believed to be held in Gaza – of whom only around 24 are thought to be alive.
Yahya Sinwar was able to seamlessly coordinate between Hamas’ regional allies, its political arm — the Council of Five based in Doha, Qatar — and its fighters on the ground. However, under the leadership of his brother, that cohesion has broken down. Now, the Council, which would be central to any future ceasefire negotiations, is seen as “too far removed politically,” Panikoff says.
“They're not going to be able to control what happens on the ground in Gaza if there’s a disagreement between those on the ground in the strip and the Council.”
Since Hamas came to power in 2007, the group has maintained its grip by controlling access to jobs, presenting itself as the vanguard against Israeli occupation, and, of course, by having a zero-tolerance policy for dissent.
But in recent weeks, public frustration has begun to boil over. As the humanitarian crisis deepens, protests have erupted inside Gaza — most notably in early April, when hundreds of Palestinians marched through Beit Lahia in the North, demanding that Hamas relinquish control and end the war with Israel.
Still, Panikoff cautions against overstating the momentum behind the movement: “At the end of the day, it’s still Hamas that has the guns and the weapons. Even with protests, it’s hard to imagine the people of Gaza being able to mount a meaningful uprising.”
Inside Hamas, however, cracks may be forming. Panikoff notes that some within the lower ranks are ready for the war to end. “After a year and a half of fighting, weapons and ammunition are running low. Resupply from Iran is going to be harder than before. I have no doubt there are many who would prefer that Mohammed Sinwar cut a deal — release the hostages, bring Palestinian prisoners home, and move on.”
But Sinwar himself isn’t signaling that he is ready to listen to them anytime soon. While mediators from Qatar and Egypt put forward a new plan to end the conflict in Gaza last week, it hinges on Hamas relinquishing its arms and a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, something that Panikoff says “will probably never be realistic.”
“We’re stuck in this cycle, and I don’t know how you get out of it.”
Smoke rises following an explosion at the Shahid Rajaee port in Bandar Abbas, Iran, on April 26, 2025.
Hard Numbers: Deadly blast hits Iranian port, Tragedy strikes Filipino festival in Vancouver, PLO’s Abbas names successor, Liberals take the lead in Oz, Houthis say US strike killed dozens
28: Twenty-eight people are dead following a powerful explosion at Iran’s Shahid Rajaee port in the central southern city of Bandar Abbas on Saturday. The blast, which is believed to be linked to containers of hazardous chemicals, injured more than 1,000 others and caused extensive damage to buildings several kilometers away from the port. Reports suggest that sodium perchlorate — used in missile fuel — may have been to blame, but Tehran denies any military connection to the blast.
9: A celebration of Filipino heritage in South Vancouver, Canada, turned tragic late Saturday when a man drove an SUV into a crowd at the Lapu Lapu Day festival, killing nine people and injuring more than 20 others. A 30-year-old man was arrested at the scene, and while an investigation is underway, authorities have said they are “confident that this incident was not an act of terrorism.” PM Mark Carney offered his condolences and delayed final-day campaigning ahead of Monday’s federal election in the wake of the tragedy — and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. expressed his sympathy and support for the victims.
170: Late last week, the Palestine Liberation Organization’s leadership created a vice presidency, with 170 of its 172 Central Council members voting in favor of a post that would open the path to a successor for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. On Saturday, Abbas, 89, nominated his close confidante, 64-year-old Hussein al-Sheikh, as VP, and the PLO’s executive committee approved it.
52: Australia’s ruling Labor Party looks set to claim victory in the May 3 election, with recent polling showing it ahead of the Liberal-National Coalition opposition, 52% to 48%, according to a Newspoll survey. The latest figures were revealed after PM Anthony Albanese shone in the final leaders’ debate on Sunday.
68: Houthi rebels in Yemen say a US airstrike on a detention center in the northwestern Saada province Sunday night killed at least 68 people, and injured another 47. The US military has not yet commented, but the news came hours after US Central Command said its forces had hit hundreds of targets following President Donald Trump’s order to ramp up the air campaign against the Houthis on March 15. The rebel group says targeting the civilian facility constitutes a “war crime.”
Trump x Khamenei nuclear duet
The US and Iran are holding nuclear talks again: What kind of song and dance is preventing a new deal? #PUPPETREGIME
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Trump tariff is starting a US-China trade war
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Are the US and China rushing into a trade war?
Absolutely. I mean, if the Americans are actually going to impose tariffs of over 100% on Chinese exports of goods, it's essentially a trade embargo. That is a decoupling, and it's an unmanaged decoupling of US-China direct trade. Still an awful lot of goods from China to get to the United States through third countries. It's not clear all those will be cut off as the US negotiates with a lot of those countries. So people in America will still be buying Chinese goods, but inflation's going to go up. There's no question. And this is going to end up hurting the Chinese even more than it hurts the United States.
With an in-person nuclear talk set for Saturday, how confident is Trump that he can rein in Iran's nuclear program?
Well, it's interesting. What Trump is saying is that Iran will not be allowed to have nuclear weapons. That's different from what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been saying, which is that they cannot have a nuclear program of any sort. Trump wants to rein the program in. He did announce that there are going to be direct talks between the US and Iran. Iran didn't quite say that. They said they're having indirect talks, but if they go well, they'll lead to direct, which is certainly a concession to the Americans. And it's interesting that Trump did that while the Israeli prime minister was in the Oval Office visiting him. Bibi thought he was coming over for tariff relief, and what he got was Trump saying that Erdogan's his bestie, that the Israelis should be really thankful they get billions from the US, the tariffs aren't going anywhere, and that there's going to be negotiations with Iran. Really interesting. I think Bibi's got to be unhappy on his flight back to Israel.
Zelensky claims Ukrainian troops have captured two Chinese nationals fighting for Russia. How does it change the dynamics of the war?
Not at all. It does reflect the fact that Ukraine is under an awful lot of pressure and is trying to do anything they can to stay in the headlines, stay relevant, keep the Americans engaged and focused. I'm not surprised that there are two Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine. Doesn't mean they were sent by the Chinese PLA. I mean, there are American nationals that have been fighting for the Ukrainians and it's not because they're sort of involved with NATO or sent by the US government. So I really don't think there's any there, but important enough for you to ask question. That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
President Donald Trump speaks during a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office on April 7, 2025. REUTERS/Kevin Mohatt
US-Iran talks to be held this weekend
On Monday, President Donald Trump said that the US has been engaged in “direct” talks with Iran over its nuclear program and said that a meeting with “very high-level” officials is set for this Saturday. That would be a sharp break from previous US-Iran talks, which have occurred mostly through intermediaries.
But Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi denied the “direct” aspect of these talks,confirming that the US and Iranian negotiators will meet in Oman on Saturday, but that they would remain in separate rooms as Omani diplomats carry messages back and forth.
Whatever the format, Trump made it clear that he expects progress. “If the talks aren’t successful with Iran, I think Iran is going to be in great danger,” he warned. “And I hate to say it, great danger, because they can’t have a nuclear weapon. You know, it’s not a complicated formula. Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. That’s all there is.”
While a breakthrough this weekend is unlikely, the talks suggest that both sides see an advantage in finding out whether a deal with the other side is possible.
There are other hopeful signs of a deal. In response to warnings from US officials of looming air attacks by American forces, the leaders of four of the largest Iran-backed militia groups operating in Iraq told Reuters on Monday that they were prepared to surrender their weapons to Iraqi government authorities. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has reportedly met with militia commanders and urged them to disarm, according to Iraqi state officials who requested anonymity.
The militia commanders also said that the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, their prime supplier of weapons and money, had agreed to let local group leaders inside Iraq decide how best to respond to Trump’s threats.
Though these militia moves are more likely a tactical retreat than a true surrender, any move to disarm would give the Trump administration a notable foreign-policy victory without an attack. The so-called Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a group of about 10 heavily-armed Shia militias with a total of 50,000 fighters and access to heavy weapons, including long-range missiles, has attacked both Israeli and US military targets in the past.
Trump and Khamenei staring at eachother across an Iranian flag.
Will Trump’s Iran strategy actually prevent war?
The United States is ramping up its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran.
In a letter sent to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in early March, President Donald Trump gave Tehran an ultimatum: reach a new nuclear deal with the US within two months or face direct military action – “bombing the likes of which they have never seen before,” as he told NBC News’ Kristen Welker on Sunday.
The letter proposed mediation by the United Arab Emirates (whose emissaries delivered the missive in question) and expressed Trump’s preference for a diplomatic solution. “I would rather have a peace deal than the other option, but the other option will solve the problem,” the president said.
In the three weeks it took the Iranian leadership to figure out how to respond, the US turned up the temperature.
First came intense airstrikes (of Signalgate fame) against Iran’s last remaining functional ally in the region, the Houthis in Yemen, starting on March 15 and continuing to this day. Then, the US issued its first-ever sanctions against Chinese entities for buying Iranian crude oil, including a “teapot” refinery in Shandong and an import and storage terminal in Guangzhou. And in recent days, the US military deployed a fleet of B-2 stealth bombers – capable of carrying the 30,000-lb. bunker-busting bombs needed to blast through Iran’s hardened enrichment sites – to its Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, in range of both Yemen and Iran. This move was “not unrelated” to Trump’s ultimatum, according to a senior US official.
Iran finally rejected direct negotiations with the US in a formal response to Trump’s letter delivered last Thursday via Oman, its preferred mediator. President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on Sunday that although the Islamic Republic won’t speak directly with the Trump administration while maximum pressure is in place, Tehran is willing to engage with Washington indirectly through the Omanis.
Whether Trump’s two-month deadline was to strike a deal or to begin negotiations remains unclear. Either way, there’s no chance that two sides that deeply mistrust each other – especially after Trump unilaterally withdrew from the original nuclear deal in 2018 – could reach an agreement over issues as complex as Iran’s nuclear program and support for regional proxies in just a couple, or a few, months (let alone a single one).
But does that mean that Trump’s ultimatum is doomed to end in confrontation? Not necessarily. In fact, his “escalate to de-escalate” strategy could be the best hope to avoid a crisis this year.
A ticking time bomb
While US intelligence assesses that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon, it has become a threshold nuclear state with enough 60% enriched uranium to produce six nuclear weapons (if enriched to 90%) and the ability to “dash to a bomb” in about six months (though weaponizing a device would probably take it 1-2 years).
European governments have long made it clear that unless Iran reins in its enrichment activities by this summer, they will “snap back” the UN sanctions that were lifted as part of the 2015 nuclear deal before the agreement expires in October and they can no longer do so.
Iran has vowed to respond to snapback sanctions by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Given the precedent set by North Korea – whose NPT exit in 2003 was followed by ever-greater steps toward weaponization – and the already advanced state of Tehran’s nuclear program, NPT withdrawal could be the action-forcing event Israel needs to convince Trump to support a joint strike on Iran’s underground nuclear facilities.
Which means that the US and Iran were likely headed for a collision later this year even if Trump hadn’t issued his ultimatum.
Strange bedfellows
And yet, both Trump and Iran’s leadership would much prefer to avoid a military confrontation in the near term.
Trump’s political coalition includes both traditional Republican war hawks and “America First” isolationists who are averse to US involvement in new forever wars. Whereas cabinet officials like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth advocate for a more combative approach toward the Islamic Republic, none of these prominent national security hawks are in charge of the Iran file – Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, a Washington outsider and a restrainer, is.
Most importantly, Trump ran as a peacemaker and has repeatedly stated his preference for a deal, believing that bombing Iran could mire the US in an unpopular war that’d divert precious resources from his domestic priorities and endanger his friends in the Gulf for little political upside. The solidly MAGA Vice President JD Vance echoed this concern when, in the leaked Signal group chat, he flagged the risk to oil prices from striking the Houthis for the sake of “bailing out” the Europeans.
For its part, Iran is historically vulnerable and eager to negotiate a deal that brings sanctions relief to its battered economy. While capitulating to Trump’s demands is politically dangerous for Khamenei and would weaken the regime’s domestic position, neither he nor other hardliners would welcome a military showdown with the US and Israel.
Take it or leave it
The threat of a crisis later this year creates an opening for Trump to pressure Tehran into offering concessions that allow the US president to claim progress and avoid triggering snapback sanctions.
Last year’s effective destruction of Iran’s regional proxy network – Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria – dealt a blow to the country’s conventional deterrence and heightened the importance of its nuclear program. Iran will therefore resist making any meaningful concessions on this front. If there’s one piece of the nuclear file it could cede ground on, it’s its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, which Tehran could conceivably agree to freeze.
Where Iran could potentially offer more is in backing away from its proxies, at least temporarily. Though it doesn’t have operational control over the Houthis (unlike the decimated Hezbollah), the Islamic Republic could deprive them of the bulk of the weapons systems and intelligence they rely on to attack Red Sea shipping lanes. It could also instruct Shia militias in Iraq to refrain from targeting US troops.
The regime would find these choices politically and ideologically unpalatable. But with its so-called Axis of Resistance already in shambles and little Tehran can do to rebuild it in the near term, its strategic value is nowhere near what it was a year ago. A chance at avoiding a snapback and US bombing could accordingly be seen as a worthwhile trade.
Less for less
While a breakthrough agreement is highly unlikely to be reached before the summer (or at all), the two sides’ mutual desire to avoid escalation suggests that Trump would be receptive to the relatively minor concessions Tehran could be willing to make – the most it can conceivably offer under the circumstances.
But those concessions would need to come soon, before snapback is triggered. And even this best-case scenario wouldn’t buy Iran any sanctions relief. Instead, they’d get to kick the can on snapback sanctions and possible US military action while negotiations on a more comprehensive – and aspirational – deal are underway.
If, however, Iran’s modest concessions fall short of what Trump deems acceptable, the risk of military escalation this year will rise sharply – either when Trump’s ultimatum comes to a head or when snapback gets triggered, Iran exits the NPT, and Israel considers a strike (whether solo or joint with the US).
Iran has not yet made the decision to build a nuclear weapon. And unless it’s attacked, it remains unlikely to do so, knowing full well that any overt steps toward weaponization would invite certain, immediate, and devastating retaliation. But nothing would make the Islamic Republic dash for a bomb more than getting bombed.
People walk by as a painter repaints an anti-US mural in Tehran, Iran, on Saturday, March 29, 2025.
Trump warns he’ll bomb Iran over lack of nuclear deal
On Sunday, US President Donald Trump issued a stark warning to Iran, threatening to bomb the country and impose secondary tariffs if Tehran fails to reach a new agreement on its nuclear program. In a telephone interview with NBC News, Trump stated, “If they don’t make a deal, there will be bombing. It will be bombing the likes of which they have never seen before.”
Trump’s threat follows Iran’s rejection of direct negotiations with Washington, which the US President had offered in a letter sent to Tehran on March 12. On Sunday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated, “We responded to the US president’s letter via Oman and rejected the option of direct talks, but we are open to indirect negotiations.”
What’s Trump’s goal? The US administration’s renewed “maximum pressure” campaign seeks to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions and regional influence through economic damage, and it has sent the rial tumbling. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for civilian purposes, something the US rejects, and a recent report from the International Atomic Energy Agency found that Iran has ramped up its manufacturing of near weapons-grade uranium.
Why Trump won’t break the Putin-Xi alliance
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Does Trump's relationship with Putin isolate or concern China?
I wouldn't say so. I think that Putin and Xi Jinping have one of the stronger relationships on the global stage today. I think they've met something like 81 times bilaterally since the two have been in power. They're both leaders for life, they run dictatorships, and they support each other all the time at the United Nations. There's a lot of technology and trade, and China needs to buy Russian energy. The Americans certainly don't. So, for lots of reasons, this relationship is much more stable and strong than anything that Trump is likely to build with Putin. Especially because Trump is a one more term president, 78 years old, with checks and balances in the US, even if they're getting weaker, they exist. That's not true in Russia. It's not true in China. So, I don't think Beijing is very worried about that.
What does the resignation of Iran's Vice President Zarif signal about tensions in the country?
Well, given the fact that the finance minister was also just impeached this weekend, also a would-be reformist, a moderate, in the context of the Iranian political spectrum, it means the supreme leader and the conservatives do not trust these guys to engage with the Americans or the West. It's a harder line Iranian policy as they move towards greater levels of stockpiling, of enriched uranium, and as their military strategy has fallen apart for the region. If anyone is going to talk to the Americans, and if anyone is going to try to forestall attacks from Israel, and maybe by the US as well, it's not going to be the people that got the original Iranian nuclear deal done, the JCPOA. So, that's what it looks like in reform. Nascent under a lot of trouble. The Iranian president under a lot of pressure right now at home.
What's next for the Israel-Hamas ceasefire as the first phase comes to an end?
Well, I think what everyone is waiting for is the Egypt deal, which is being penned and is being sent over in advance of an Arab League summit to Trump in the coming hours, if not day. Originally, it was a few hundred pages long. The Saudis told the Egyptians, "Maybe you want to have an executive summary that's a little glossier for Trump? He's not reading a couple hundred pages." That's been worked on all weekend. And it certainly isn't the Americans owning Gaza. It certainly isn't the Palestinians being forced out or all voluntarily leaving. Whether or not Trump is prepared to sign off on that, or at least allow it to go forward and not veto it, as long as it hits that hurdle, I think you'll have pretty much all of the Arab states signing off on it in the Arab summit. That's where we are right now, and I'll talk to you all real soon.