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How campus protests could influence the US presidential election
Jon Lieber, head of Eurasia Group's coverage of political and policy developments in Washington, DC, shares his perspective on US politics.
This is what we are watching in US Politics this week: Campus protests.
They're happening everywhere. Elite schools, state schools, the Northeast, the Midwest, Southern California, campus protests are a major story this week over the Israeli operation in Gaza and the Biden administration's support for it. These are leading to accusations of anti-Semitism on college campuses, and things like canceling college graduation ceremonies at several schools.
Will this be an issue of the November elections?
Really difficult to say. Everyone remembers in 1968, massive protest at the Democratic National Convention, contributing to President Nixon's message that he was the “law and order” candidate, and the Democrats didn't have control. That could easily be repeated this year if the protests continue and are sustained into August at the Democratic Convention in Chicago, where it also was in 1968. And then, if the protests continue on campus once again, when schools come back in in the fall, right before the November elections.
One thing we're watching is how Donald Trump tries to spin these things. A key campaign message that he's been pushing so far, this cycle, is that everything they're saying about him are the things they're actually doing. They thought he would get the US into a war with Iran, and now President Biden came right up to the verge of that last week. They say, “He's the chaos candidate,” and now you've got wars all over the globe, you've got campus protests, you've got a spike in crime, and you've got a massive immigration problem under President Biden.
So, that message is going to be one that Donald Trump continues to push and will definitely resonate with Republican voters and could potentially resonate with independent voters if the large-scale protests and clashes with police continue into the fall.
If North Korea and Iran hook up, will China be jealous?
Pyongyang’s Minister of External Economic Relations Yun Jong Ho became the first North Korean official to visit Iran in half a decade on Tuesday. The trip is officially about economic ties, but the US State Department said it was “incredibly concerned” about possible missile and nuclear technology cooperation.
There’s precedent: Tehran has borrowed Pyongyang’s missile designs for its own weapons and admitted to using North Korean missiles during its 1980-1988 war with Iraq. Today, North Korea has intercontinental ballistic missiles that Tehran can’t yet field.
“Given Iran's preoccupation with its strategic position, searching for increased deterrence against both Israel and the United States, the fact that it would welcome a North Korean delegation right now is significant,” said Eurasia Group Iran analyst Greg Brew. “It's also significant that this visit is taking place while Iran's national security advisor is in Moscow,” he added, noting that Russia has been the glue in ties between all three countries.
Both Iran and North Korea have shipped Moscow weapons to use in Ukraine, which Eurasia Group labeled one of its Top Risks for 2024. There’s a political benefit for North Korea on top of the aid Moscow reciprocates: attention from China. Wary of losing influence over Pyongyang, China responded to the closer Russo-Korean ties by launching its own diplomatic press, including a visit to Pyongyang from politburo member Zhao Leji this month. Pyongyang may be trying to run the same play with Tehran.
“From North Korea’s perspective, if all they have to do is bat their eyelashes at another suitor for China to roll out the diplomatic red carpet, that seems like a well they can go back to with Iran,” says Eurasia Group North Korea expert Jeremy Chan.Israel attacks Iran
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take on the latest in the Middle East crisis. And things actually looking a little bit more stable today than they have over the past couple of weeks. And that is some very welcome news.
The headlines, of course, that the Iranians have been hit by Israel, though no one is saying that Israel has admitted to doing it, in the town of Isfahan. Clearly, military targets and the Iranians trying to knock down those missiles coming over. But this was a significantly more restrained attack than what the Israelis did to kick off this crisis, which was attack an Iranian government building in Damascus and target and assassinate a senior Iranian leader. That led to the Iranian response that we saw over the weekend, which was a significant and serious one, with a few hundred missiles and drones. And now we are in the escalatory portion of the cycle.
The United States said very clearly to Israel, “We're going to help defend you no matter what. We don't want any offensive strikes against Iran. Take the win.” The fact that they said that meant that it was very, very likely that they were going to do something, but that something was going to be restrained, where if the Americans said, “Hey, just take it easy, don't do anything big,” then they’d end up doing something bigger, right? And you give them an inch, they take two inches. This is the way these things work. And it was coordinated with the United States. The US was not involved directly in the military strikes, but they knew it was coming. They had that cooperation, communication from Israel, which was important because the US had to be in position in case the Iranians decided that they were going to strike real time in response to Israel. The Americans were going to help the Israelis defend themselves yet again.
Now, the big question here is not, “Do the Iranians respond in a big way?” They don't. They've already signaled that that's not the intention. You've seen them downplaying the nature of these strikes on Iranian state media. So, this crisis, this proximate crisis between Israel and Iran is now in the rearview mirror. But going forward, what's the likelihood that we can stabilize this war, which is now well beyond just a matter of Israel versus Hamas?
One thing that makes me a little bit more positive is the fact that Bibi Netanyahu is himself in a little more secure position domestically. What do you mean, makes you more positive? Does that mean he's going to last longer? Yes. But it also means he doesn't necessarily have to go ahead with massive strikes against Hamas in Rafah, killing lots of civilians. Or eventually against Hezbollah, pushing them back so that almost 100,000 Israeli citizens can get back to the north. If he wanted to take a win and show that he now has, you know, a historical legacy of leading Israel in defending against an unprecedented strike from Iran, with strong support from the Americans, from the Brits, from the Jordanians, from the Saudis, this is the opportunity that could create Saudi normalization with Israel. This is the opportunity that could create a peace deal that the Palestinians would have some form of governance over the West Bank and Gaza together.
That's the opportunity that comes from this, precisely because Israel domestically now has a leader that doesn't have to look over his shoulder every moment. But the strong effort by Netanyahu, at least as of today, is to still go ahead with these Rafah strikes. You've got the battalions on the ground. You want to use them, you want to take out, these Hamas leaders, irrespective of the civilian cost. And that continues to be very popular among the entire population of Israel as well.
So, when I think about the next couple of weeks, I think that you're not going to get a breakthrough deal on hostages with Hamas, and that means that the fighting only stops if there's a broader agreement. And that broader agreement requires that the Israeli war cabinet is willing to stand down and not continue their war on the ground in Gaza. And in return, has a broader agreement with the Americans, with the Gulf states, and ultimately with a path forward for the Palestinians. Most people around the world would welcome, would love to see that. Getting the Israelis from here to there, especially when you are surrounded by enemies that consider you, to be, illegitimate as a country and refuse to recognize your right to exist, that makes it a lot harder. So that's where we are. But some breathing space for now. The mood in the United States, certainly better than it was at any point over the last week and a half, and that's a good thing.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Israel hits Iran directly – what next?
Well, now we know the answer to the question of how Israel planned to respond to Iran’s recent attack. Explosions were reported early on Friday near the northwestern Iranian city of Isfahan, in what several major outlets reported, citing US officials and local sources, as an apparent Israeli strike.
The blasts come just days after Iran launched its first-ever direct attacks on Israel, launching hundreds of missiles and drones, almost all of which were shot down by Israeli and US missile defenses. That salvo was itself seen as a response to Israel’s strike on an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus early this month.
Syria and Iraq blasts reported as well. Blasts possibly related to the strikes on Iran were also reported around the same time at sites in Iraq and Syria. Both countries are home to sizable Iranian proxy forces and intelligence units.
So much for the Passover head fake. Earlier on Thursday, US officials had suggested anonymously that Israel would wait until after the Jewish holiday of Passover, which begins Monday, to retaliate.
No nuclear sites in the crosshairs, it seems. The full extent of the Israeli attack is not yet precisely clear, but the strike doesn't appear to have targeted the Natanz nuclear facility, a major component of Iran’s controversial nuclear program, which is located about 100 miles north of Isfahan. Israel has long made clear its desire to destroy Iran’s nuclear research. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog, on Friday said there was "no damage" to Iran's nuclear sites.
Isfahan, meanwhile, is home to several military bases and airfields, which may have been the targets. Iranian officials told the New York Times that a strike hit a military air base near the city. Outside Iran, Isfahan is known chiefly for its rich history of Islamic architecture, which includes several UNESCO heritage sites.
Was this an escalation by Israel? “On the surface, it appears rather limited,” said Gregory Brew, lead Iran analyst at Eurasia Group, “beyond the symbolic significance of Israel hitting Iranian territory.”
Iran isn't blaming Israel. Tehran is claiming to have shot down several drones in the Isfahan area but is downplaying the significance of the incident and hasn't blamed Israel — instead pointing the finger at "infiltrators." Iran has not indicated any plans for retaliation, in a potential sign that it doesn't want to escalate the situation.
“It’s early,” Brew noted, “but the official regime line may be that this is not an action that requires immediate and public retaliation.”
That’s good news even in a bad situation, he says. “It would suggest that the Israeli effort to hit back without triggering further escalation has been successful.”
When will Israel strike Iran, and will a hostage deal ever happen?
The world is waiting to see how Israel retaliates against Tehran’s recent air attacks. But, according to new reports, nothing is likely until after Passover, a holiday celebrating the liberation of Israelites from Egypt thousands of years ago. Passover begins on Monday and ends on April 30.
The news comes as Israel continues to weigh the extent and timing of any response to Iran’s drone-and-missile salvo from last weekend, with the US urging restraint for fear of igniting a wider regional war. Iran says it will respond to any Israeli strikes, and on Thursday warned it could pursue nuclear weapons if any of its nuclear facilities are targeted — a prospect that Israel and its Western allies have worked against for years.
Meanwhile, talks on a cease-fire in Gaza – a surefire way to cool things down – are at an impasse, with Qatar, an indispensable interlocutor between Israel and Hamas, now saying it will reevaluate its role in the discussions following US criticism of its ties to the group. But would Qatar really walk away entirely? Doubtful – the tiny Gulf state views its mediator role as a key means of boosting its global clout.
“Qatar is frustrated by the criticisms emerging from some American politicians,” says Sofia Meranto, a Middle East analyst at Eurasia Group. And while “Doha may try to distance itself from the talks,” she says it “is unlikely to abandon its role.”
Iran’s attack on Israel, explained
On April 13, Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles from its own territory in its first-ever direct, attributable attack against Israel, thrusting the long-simmering shadow war between the two regional foes into the light.
This show of force reflects a dramatic shift in strategy from Tehran, which had previously relied exclusively on its proxies to target Israel. The inflection point was Israel’s bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1, which killed the senior-most Iranian military leader in Syria and was compared to an attack “on Iranian soil” – a bright red line for the Islamic Republic. So from Iran’s perspective, it was Israel that crossed the rubicon first. Last weekend’s attack was a proportional response in that view – and a measured one at that.
Does that hold up? What comes next? And what does it all mean?
Iran’s not-so-escalatory escalation
On one hand, last weekend’s attack was dangerous and provocative, posing the first serious external threat to Israel’s security since Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles at the Jewish state in 1991 and heightening the deep sense of existential insecurity Israelis have felt since Oct. 7. Had any sensitive military targets been hit or Israelis killed, we would now be looking at direct war between Iran and Israel, likely also involving the United States. Not World War III, but a major regional war.
On the other hand, the fact that we aren’t currently in that scenario means that the attack could have been a heck of a lot worse. That it wasn’t was mostly by design (the other bit was luck): Iran telegraphed its attack well in advance both publicly and through backchannels with several regional powers to minimize the damage and prevent an escalatory response. The heads-up given to the United States via Iraq and Turkey – and the use of low-altitude, slow-moving drones that could be seen coming from literally 1,000 miles away – allowed Israel and its partners ample time to pre-position their military assets and intercept nearly all Iranian projectiles (as well as get Israeli citizens into bomb shelters, out of harm’s way). As a result, of the roughly 170 drones, 120 ballistic missiles, and 30 cruise missiles that Iran launched, 99% were shot down, most before they could reach Israeli airspace. All of them were aimed at military rather than civilian targets.
The advance notice, as well as the choice of targets and weaponry, suggest that Iran deliberately calibrated the strike to limit casualties and keep a lid on potential retaliation. That’s why Iran refrained from using Hezbollah and attacking US forces throughout the region. It’s also why it announced that no further (direct) attacks would be forthcoming and it considered the matter closed as long as the Israelis took it on the chin.
Incidentally, this is exactly the same playbook the US used to respond to the Iranian proxy attacks that killed three American servicemembers in Jordan at the end of January. The Biden administration didn’t want to start a shooting war with Iran (for obvious reasons), so they waited four days to hit back and gave a heads-up to Tehran via Iraq so the Iranians could get their forces out of the area, while cautioning them that next time there would be direct consequences and no such forewarning.
In both cases, if the US and Iran had wanted to seriously escalate, they could have. But the goal wasn’t to escalate – it was to reset the bar on deterrence and relieve domestic pressure in response to a provocation while preventing damage that would bring the conflict into a wide-scale regional war.
None of this means that this was an easy balance for Tehran to strike (no pun intended) in practice. Despite all the calibration and telegraphing that went into the attack, it was still a risky gamble, with lots of room for accidents and miscalculation. Some drones or missiles could have evaded defenses and found their targets. Israeli soldiers or civilians could have died. The US would have treated a successful Iranian strike on Israeli soil as an attack on itself and responded accordingly. The risk of a shooting war with America was not zero, and the Iranians were willing to live with that.
What will Israel do next?
The ball is now in Israel’s court. Israel needs to respond somehow to signal that this type of attack won’t be tolerated in the future, but it is up to war cabinet members Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and opposition leader Benny Gantz to decide exactly when, where, and how to strike back, weighing the benefits of retaliation against the risk of provoking further escalation and alienating Israel’s allies.
Domestic views are currently split between revenge and restraint. The far right is pushing for a strong, immediate, and direct strike on Iranian soil that would likely require US cooperation but that Washington wants nothing to do with, as it would compel Tehran to counterattack and dramatically expand the conflict. Netanyahu wouldn’t mind a war with Iran that draws the US in and extends his time in office, but Gantz and Gallant prefer a more calibrated and strategic response that the US can get behind – one that allows Israel to build a strong anti-Iran alliance and maintain robust US defense support without precipitating a regionwide conflict.
For its part, the Biden administration is working overtime to persuade the Israeli government to opt for a more muted response. Here, the critical role the US played in helping Israel counter the Iranian attack will probably give it enough leverage to succeed where it has previously failed in Gaza.
My bet is that the Israelis will give in to US influence, take the win, and refrain from an escalatory response at this time – meaning no major direct strikes on Iranian territory (for now at least). Of course, that doesn’t mean they’ll sit on their hands. At a minimum, they will hit Iranian proxies and Iranian assets outside Iran. They might even carry out covert and non-kinetic attacks within Iran, such as cyber or sabotage, on an opportunistic basis. These are the kinds of responses that Tehran will be willing to absorb without derailing the current de-escalatory path.
The danger: I could be wrong and the Israelis could overreact as they have consistently since Oct. 7, choosing to directly and overtly strike the Iranian homeland or take out high-value IRGC targets against America’s advice and their own best interests. Such actions would likely cross the Islamic Republic’s red lines and trigger an immediate escalatory response that could quickly spiral into a major war.
What it means
Even assuming cooler heads prevail in Jerusalem and Iran-Israel tensions stay in a de-escalatory phase, last weekend’s attack will have long-lasting implications.
First, Netanyahu’s domestic standing has improved on the back of Israel’s successful defense against an unprecedented Iranian threat in a united front with the US and other allies. This increases the embattled prime minister’s political breathing room and will prolong his time in office. Classic Bibi.
Second, the attack has pushed the war in Gaza off the front pages, as international focus has shifted toward averting regional war and away from the humanitarian crisis in the Strip. As a result, there is less pressure for Israel to compromise with Hamas on a cease-fire deal. At the same time, an Israeli ground operation in Rafah has become more likely, as the Biden administration is now principally focused on getting Israel to limit its escalation against Iran. The biggest losers, as always, will be Palestinian civilians.
Third, the attack is a political liability for US President Joe Biden, who will pay the price for any further escalation of the conflict but now lacks domestic political space to publicly criticize Israel’s actions and can only offer “ironclad” support going forward. Biden’s best hope going into the November election is to dissuade Netanyahu from expanding the conflict, lest he be blamed for presiding over yet another major war. But if he pushes too far in trying to constrain Israel, he’ll be blamed for abandoning a key US ally most voters still support (despite Gaza). Damned if he does, damned if he doesn’t.
Finally, Israeli and Iranian deterrence has eroded as both sides have crossed each other’s red lines, dropped long-standing strategic restraint policies, and raised the threshold for future responses. Iran has no plans to stop supporting its proxies in the region, and Israel has no plans to stop targeting said proxies (including Hamas in Gaza). So while Israel and Iran may have narrowly avoided major war over the weekend, the likelihood that further tit-for-tat strikes spiral into a broader regional war is increasing. The longer-term trajectory of this conflict is still expansionary. Sorry about that.
War in Gaza rages on as all eyes turn to Israel-Iran tensions
Much of the world is waiting to see how Israel responds to Iran’s weekend attack. In the meantime, Israeli tanks reportedly rolled back into parts of northern Gaza on Tuesday, a day after the military told Palestinians not to return to that part of the enclave. According to reports, airstrikes also pummeled Rafah, the southern Gaza city that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to invade and where over a million Palestinians are sheltering.
Countries in the region are raising the alarm about a lack of focus on Gaza in the wake of Iran’s attack. Jordan's top diplomat, Ayman Safadi, said Tuesday that Netanyahu was using “his confrontation with Iran” to “draw attention away from Gaza.”
Israel has vowed to respond to the Iranian attack, but hasn’t said how it intends to do so – or when. Still, it’s locked in tit-for-tats with Iranian proxies. One example: The IDF said Tuesday that it killed a top Hezbollah commander with an airstrike in Lebanon, as drone attacks attributed to the Iran-backed militant group reportedly injured several in northern Israel.
With the region already on edge and the estimated death toll in Gaza at over 33,000, Israel is being urged to show restraint against Iran. If Israel avoids escalating with Iran, analysts suggest this could see the US ease up on its opposition to a ground offensive in Rafah — but such an operation would also likely tank the possibility of a cease-fire anytime soon.
For now, Iran and Israel are in a “de-escalatory phase,” tweeted Eurasia Group and GZERO Media President Ian Bremmer, but Tehran will continue to support its proxies, and Israel isn’t going to stop the war in Gaza “or targeting Iranian military leaders [who are] supporting proxies.”
Iran-Israel crisis: Dangers still high with little room for diplomacy
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Does the Iran-Israel crisis offer a unique opportunity for diplomacy?
I don't think so. They certainly give an opportunity for a bunch of countries to reengage with Israel. We're seeing that with Jordan, with Saudi Arabia, and to show the Iranians that they are still considered to be the big concern as an enemy in the region, a disrupter. But that's very different from saying we're going to see a breakthrough in relations. You're not resetting deterrence. Iran is going to continue to lead the axis of resistance and provide weapons and intelligence and engage in strikes against targets across the region. Israel will still hit Iranians that are operating there. So going forward, I think the dangers are still pretty high.
Is Germany's Scholz meeting with Xi in Beijing indicating a shift in Europe-China trade tensions?
Not really. Here, the fact that Scholz has a large number of German CEOs in tow means that, yes, he's concerned that the Chinese are providing support to Russia, maybe even increasingly dual-use military support to Russia in the war in Ukraine. He's concerned about Chinese industrial policy that's undermining, the interests of Americans and Europeans economically. But ultimately he is very reliant on investment and trade with China, and he's going to continue to support that. He is not fully aligned with his government on this issue, not his advisors, not his foreign minister, and certainly not the other parties in the coalition. But it is Scholz's perspective. And as a consequence, it is going to be a pretty friendly trip.
Why is Sudan's year-long conflict gone largely unnoticed?
Well, we write about it a fair amount, but I mean, the fact that it is in a part of the world that doesn't have economic implications. So you blow up Ukraine, and Russia is in a fight, and energy prices and food and fertilizer prices go up. Major conflict in Sudan. A lot of people suffer, a lot of people die, but the rest of the world has no impact economically. Also, most of the refugees, people fleeing, fleeing to neighboring African countries, they're not coming over to Mexico, the United States or to Poland and to Germany. And that just doesn't lead to a lot of attention. Final point is that there aren't a lot of journalists on the ground from the West in Sudan. And so not a lot of people are actually covering this. So for all of those reasons, not getting a lot of attention, but we'll keep talking about it.