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Iranian election turnout could set new record low
Iranians will go to the polls on March 1 to vote for a new parliament, which will serve for a four-year term. They will also vote for members of the Assembly of Experts, a body of clerics that is tasked with selecting a new Supreme Leader and serves a six-year term. However, given that the Islamic regime now carefully manages election outcomes to protect its grip on power, voter participation is expected to plumb new record lows. We asked Eurasia Group analyst Greg Brew to explain the significance of this week’s polls.
What is the position of parliament in the Iranian system?
Iran’s constitution delineates legislative powers to the parliament, which also oversees the budget and cabinet appointments. However, parliament’s power is constricted by Iran’s powerful executive branch, particularly the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as well as the Guardian Council, a small group of clerics and senior figures who sign off on all legislation and determine who is eligible to run for office. Given these restrictions, parliament is regarded by many Iranians as a rubber-stamp committee with little real control over government policy, a feeling that has only grown more pronounced since 2020, when elections were stage-managed by the Guardian Council to ensure hardliners dominated parliament. Authorities also carefully controlled the 2021 presidential election to ensure Ebrahim Raisi, an arch conservative with close ties to Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was elected. (The next presidential election will be in 2025, when Raisi is expected to run for reelection.)
What steps is the regime taking to control the election outcome?
As with 2020, the Guardian Council has taken a heavy hand in vetting candidates: Out of the thousands of applications, many were disqualified from running for office, including most prominent reformists and moderates. This ensures the new parliament will remain dominated by hardliners with a strong affiliation with Khamenei, the IRGC, and the conservative clerical faction.
Is the sense of public alienation toward the regime growing?
Dissatisfaction with the regime is currently very high, owing to a variety of factors that include a weak economy, high inflation, widespread corruption, and ongoing and intensifying political repression. The fact that elections are now carefully managed by authorities has produced a broad view that they are sham affairs: as a result, participation in elections has dropped from over 70% to roughly 50%. It is expected to be even lower this year, perhaps the lowest on record. While the regime likely retains the support of some of the population, most Iranians view the Islamic Republic as an illegitimate government.
So, is there a chance of unrest around the vote?
Despite this widespread dissatisfaction, the circumstances don’t seem conducive to the kind of public protest that occurred in 2022, when thousands took to the streets following the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the morality police. The force of the government crackdown in response to those protests and the ongoing efforts to suppress new displays of discontent, as well as the generally bleak outlook for political reform, means most Iranians are averse to taking to the streets. Instead, citizens will express their dissatisfaction by staying at home and not participating in elections.
How worried is the regime about its legitimacy?
The Islamic Republic has held power for more than forty years. It possesses a large and sophisticated security apparatus and a toolkit of repressive measures that it uses to suppress public dissatisfaction. It is a government has proven, time and again, that it is willing to kill its own people in large numbers in order to remain in power.
That said, the regime has reasons to be worried about its position. Its credibility on a number of important issues, from the economy to terrorism, water scarcity and inflation, is in serious question. It is defined by self-dealing, with more and more of the nation’s wealth flowing to a small elite, particularly senior officers in the IRGC. Millions of Iranians are trying to leave the country, particularly educated members of the middle class.
What are the prospects for political change in the mid-to-long term?
The regime is confident it can hold on to power. It’s fixated on a potential succession crisis, given that Khamenei is eighty-four and in poor health, and the reason for stage-managed elections has been to ensure there’s a smooth transition from the current leader to a Khamenei 2.0. That’s why reformists and moderates have been squeezed out, with even former president Hasan Rouhani denied the opportunity to run for a seat on the Assembly of Experts. There’s virtually no chance the regime permits any reforms or positive political changes, at least not until after succession.
But this policy comes with its own dangers. The Iranian public appears unwilling to resume protests for the moment, but that could change. By refusing to reform, the regime has further undermined its legitimacy, and the transition to a new, similarly conservative Supreme Leader will only harden public dissatisfaction. Iran may be quiet, but it’s a powder keg that could go off at any time.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
It’s election season in Iran
Campaigning for Iran’s legislative election officially got underway on Thursday, with over 15,000 candidates vying for a seat. But will ordinary folks bother going to the polls on March 1?
The 2020 election saw Iran’s lowest-ever turnout of 42%, and higher ups in Tehran are worried about an even more embarrassing figure next month. The regime’s legitimacy has suffered so much, according to Eurasia Group Iran expert Greg Brew, that there’s talk of straight-up fudging the numbers, which has not been common practice until now.
But given that election authorities sidelined all but a handful of reformist politicians – not to mention the violent crackdown on protesters in the wake of Mahsa Amini’s death – many voters are likely to stay home to express their discontent.
The real question: Who will succeed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the real center of power, who’s now 84 years old? There’s no clear answer, but Brew says the establishment’s goal in these elections is “to maintain hardliner control over the key aspects of government to create as much consistency as possible, so that when a succession crisis happens it can be handled with a minimum of disruption.”Hard numbers: Pro-Russia blogger commits suicide, UK nuclear missile test fails, Biden slashes student debt, China reaches US via Mexico
16,000: Andrey Morozov, a well-known pro-Russia military blogger, reportedly committed suicide after facing backlash from Russian propagandists for his Telegram post that said 16,000 Russian troops were killed in the battle for Avdiivka in eastern Ukraine. Moscow has gone to extreme lengths to obscure the scale of Russia’s losses in the war in Ukraine, and Morozov was accused of “slandering the Russian defense ministry.” Ukraine estimates that 17,000 Russian troops were killed fighting to take Avdiivka.
2: The UK’s Trident nuclear missile misfired and crashed into the sea during a test near Florida last month, reports on Wednesday said. This was the second time in a row that a Trident missile test failed, leading to uncomfortable questions about Britain’s nuclear deterrent. But Defence Sec. Grant Shapps, who witnessed the test aboard the HMS Vanguard, attributed it to an “event-specific” anomaly and said it had “no implications for the reliability of the wider Trident missile systems and stockpiles.”
153,000: The Biden administration on Wednesday announced it’s canceling $1.2 billion in student loan debt for 153,000 people enrolled in the Saving on a Valuable Education repayment plan who have been making payments for at least a decade and borrowed $12,000 or less.
881,000: You may recall that Mexico recently overtook China as the US’ largest trade partner. But new data suggests that a big chunk of that commerce could still involve goods coming from China: In the first three quarters of last year, China sent 881,000 20-foot shipping containers full of merchandise to Mexico, up more than 30% over the previous year, hitting a record high. Experts believe some Chinese companies are skirting Trump-era tariffs by routing exports through Mexico, which has a free trade deal with the US.
Why Iran is pulling back from the brink
As Israel threatens an offensive into Rafah, its regional nemesis Iran is pulling itself away from the brink of war – and may even welcome a cease-fire in Gaza.
Since an attack by one of its Iraqi proxies killed three American servicemen in Jordan on Jan. 28, Iran has been signaling its allies in the Resistance Front to cool it and avoid actions that might prompt retaliation from Israel or the United States.
The commander of Iran’s Quds Force, the elite branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, traveled to Iraq in January and ordered Iran’s allies there to hold off on attacking US forces. The pressure from their patron in Tehran seems to have worked, at least for now: Since Feb. 4, no US troops have been targeted in militia attacks. Iran has also told its closest ally, Hezbollah, to avoid provoking Israel at a time when tensions on Israel’s border with Lebanon remain high.
While the Houthis, Iran’s ally in Yemen, have continued their attacks on commercial shipping, Iran took a notable step to protect its own assets in the Red Sea. The Iranian observation ship, the MV Behshad, widely believed to be assisting Houthi targeting, has dropped anchor near a Chinese squadron in Djibouti and isn’t actively involved in Houthi operations anymore. There’s even been tentative signs that Iran’s enrichment of uranium has slowed a little – though Iran continues to enrich at a rapid pace, it doesn’t seem as interested in building a bomb as it once was.
Iran continues to talk tough, but actions speak louder than words. And for the moment at least, those actions seem geared toward keeping the Middle East conflict from spreading any further than it already has.
Though it’s hard to know for sure what’s going on inside the head of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, my bet is Iran’s moves are down to self-preservation and risk management. As is often the case, the leadership of the Islamic Republic is worried first and foremost about its own survival. While it’s made some gains from the crisis so far, Iran is now trying to avoid a bigger fight that could endanger its regional position and put more pressure on its own shaky domestic security.
Iran is winning – and wants to keep it that way
When Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, Iran stood to benefit from its proxy sowing chaos.
The horrific attack pulled Israel into a domestic security crisis and bogged the Israel Defense Forces down in a war in Gaza from which it has yet to emerge. Iran is confident that Hamas will survive this war–battered, perhaps, but still present. Israel, on the other hand, will emerge badly damaged diplomatically and morally (if not also economically and militarily).
Iran is also happy to see progress on Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia delayed or scuttled since the grand bargain was clearly aimed at containing the spread of Iran’s regional influence. For their part, Iran’s diplomats have loudly denounced Israel’s operations in Gaza and tried to leverage the crisis into closer ties to other Middle Eastern states. Meanwhile, its Resistance Front coalition has proven it can coordinate on grand strategy like never before. Iran’s allies have launched hundreds of attacks to signal solidarity with Hamas, and the Houthis have effectively closed the Red Sea to Western shipping.
On balance, then, Iran has been coming out ahead in this war.
But that balance could change if the conflict expands further. Iran talks tough, and its regional allies have grown bolder, but a conventional military conflict with Israel would not go its way – apart from its impressive array of ballistic missiles, most of Iran’s military is built upon Cold War-era hardware. Iran is well aware of the Israeli threat to Hezbollah, Iran’s largest and strongest ally. Should war break out along Israel’s northern border, Iran would feel obligated to step in and support its ally, risking more of its forces in a knock-down fight with Israel.
The same holds true for a fight with the United States. Iran wants to get the US out of Iraq and Syria and has backed a variety of militias and proxies to support that goal. These groups are chomping at the bit, but Iran – or, more specifically, Supreme Leader Khamenei – has always favored “strategic patience” and has been waiting things out, confident that gradual pressure will force the US out in time, without the need for a big, bloody fight.
Iran’s leaders are eager to keep the war from coming home
Tehran is wary of the conflict expanding due to the impact it would have on the home front. With the memory of the 2022 protest wave still fresh, the regime is anxious to keep a lid on domestic violence and instability, especially as a succession crisis could happen at any moment – after all, Khamenei is 84 years old, in poor health, and lacks a clear successor.
That doesn’t mean it has avoided the escalating crisis, which has grown in new and unexpected ways. A massive terrorist attack in Kerman in early January revealed gaps in the regime’s security apparatus, prompting it to lash out against its neighbors – including Pakistan, which it bombarded with missiles (Tehran and Islamabad made up quickly, fortunate given that Pakistan is a nuclear power). Public concern over security was further heightened following the deaths of US servicemen in Jordan. Iran’s media was filled with reports of impending US direct air strikes against Iran, Khamenei called an emergency meeting of the Supreme National Security Council, and the national air defense system was put on high alert. On Feb. 14, twin explosions shut down the nation’s largest pipeline, shutting off gas to millions. Reports confirmed that Israel was probably behind the attack.
Faced with the threat of escalation, Iran has pulled back
Faced with a potential escalation cascade, Iran’s response has been to pull back – a little, if not entirely – to avoid getting entangled in a bloody fight that could have consequences for its own domestic stability.
And it’s gotten some help from an unexpected corner: The United States, also anxious to avoid a bigger fight, has been working to contain the crisis. Following the attack in Jordan, President Joe Biden signaled that there would be US retaliation but waited a week to strike back, giving Iran plenty of time to withdraw its forces from Syria. Other US strikes – including a drone attack on an Iraqi militia commander in Baghdad and a cyberattack against the MV Behshad – have stayed within the escalatory threshold.
To be sure, the crisis is nowhere near over, and escalatory risks remain very much present. The Houthis continue to lob missiles at passing ships, and they have been upping their game to include drone submarines that are tougher to detect. The Iraqi militias may have stopped their attacks on US forces, but there’s no guarantee the pause will last. Tehran has proven it has influence over these groups and can issue orders to them, but it lacks control. If a Houthi missile hits a US warship, there’s not much Tehran can do to prevent a US retaliation and a spiraling conflict.
But Iran preferring restraint to escalation is still welcome news for a region – and a world – that could use some.
Friendly fire signals Houthis are shooting blind in the Red Sea
On Monday, Yemen’s Houthi rebels fired ballistic missiles at a ship bound for Iran, the militia’s main supporter. Would the Houthis really target their patrons in Tehran?
Almost certainly not. There’s no evidence to suggest a rupture between Iran and the Houthis, who have been attacking ships in the Red Sea in hopes of increasing global pressure on Israel to stop its assault on Gaza.
Rather, according to Eurasia Group’s Iran Expert Gregory Brew, the attack shows that the Houthis may be simply taking a different tack. “Houthi attacks may become more indiscriminate,” says Brew, “hitting ships they don’t intend to hit, or targeting ones with more sensitive cargoes.”
Firing blind(er). Iran recently relocated the surveillance ship that provides intelligence to the Houthis to Djibouti to avoid US attacks, limiting the Houthis ability to identify suitable targets and making it more likely that missiles will be mistakenly fired in the future.
Less precision in Houthi strikes will only further aggravate concerns about security in the Red Sea, a major global shipping chokepoint. See our recent Graphic Truth on the goods and commodities most affected by the Red Sea crisis.
US-Iran tensions complicate Biden's Middle East strategy
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week. We are still very much focused on the Middle East. That is the top priority. Tony Blinken, Secretary of State, for his fifth trip to the Gulf since October 7th, those horrible terrorist attacks, Ukraine very far down the priority list compared to the engagement the Middle East is presently getting. It certainly feels that way. But that's what we're focusing on.
And the big issue is the American military response to that nightmare scenario that came to pass when US servicemen and women, dozens injured, three killed in Iranian proxy attacks on the Jordan-Syria border. The United States had to respond militarily, did respond militarily, but they also did not want to precipitate an Iranian war with the United States. So they tried to have their way on both sides of the equation and probably end up getting nothing that they want. What do I mean by that? Well, the United States did attack direct Iranian military assets, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps military capabilities on the ground in Syria and Iraq, but also telegraphed that very clearly, very publicly, for about five days before they started the attacks, which meant that proxy leaders and most importantly, Iranian leaders were able to get out of Dodge and potentially protect the most sensitive equipment information from those US strikes.
That meant that the Americans got to show that they would take significant military action, but also did not precipitate an Iranian military response. We aren't going to see war right now between the US and Iran, but we also aren't going to see deterrence by the Iranian proxies or by the Iranians in continuing to engage in strikes in civilian tanker traffic through the Red Sea or against Americans on the ground in the region.
Now, if it doesn't resolve any of that conflict that continues to get worse, what does it resolve? Well, it continues to give the Americans a little bit of time, maybe to get a temporary cease-fire in Gaza. That's really where the effort is right now, particularly being engaged with Qatar in coordinating with the Israelis and with Hamas. The hope is that in the next week or two, you get a month of committed cease-fire from the Israelis and you get large numbers of remaining hostages being held by Hamas released to Israel.
Now, Prime Minister Netanyahu and the war cabinet are nowhere close to succeeding in their war on the ground against Hamas. And that means they have months minimum before they're willing to think about wrapping up that conflict, irrespective of all the international pressure. So what does a month accomplish? While the hope is that a month accomplishes movement towards a Saudi-Israel peace deal where the Americans would proactively recognize a Palestinian state together with the UK and others. The Israeli war cabinet would outline the potential for such a political recognition while security would be provided by somebody else. Don't have to have your own security forces to have your own state, and nobody says that's a requirement. Would it be provided by the Israelis? Well, that wouldn't be acceptable, though. They could have a buffer zone perhaps, would need to be worked out with the Gulf allies, with Egypt, with Jordan. Can that be done in a month? In terms of sticking the landing, that's about the highest degree of difficulty you'd see in gymnastics. And certainly I would take the under in terms of expectations of a peace deal here.
But does Biden feel like he has any better alternatives at this point? And the answer to that is no. Meanwhile, he's being squeezed by the Republicans at home who are pushing for more aid for Israel, not linked to anything. And he's getting squeezed by the progressives that are his own Democratic supporters that are more aligned towards the Palestinians than they are Israel. This is feeling like a no win situation for Biden. And so if he can get a cease-fire and get a few weeks, engage diplomatically, see what shakes loose. Still at the end of the day, there are far more actors around this war, both in Gaza and also more broadly in the Middle East, that are interested in finding ways not to have a lasting cease fire than to see a peace agreement work out. That's true certainly for Hamas. It's true certainly for Netanyahu. It's also true for the Iranian government and the so-called axis of resistance.
And for all of those reasons, I fear that we are still heading for further escalation as opposed to a window that would end this war. Really tough for Biden in an election year, really tough for those in the Middle East living with this at any time.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
US strikes back after deadly drone attack
Nearly a week after a drone attack killed three American service members at a small US base in Jordan, the US responded late Friday by launching strikes against more than 85 targets in Syria and Iraq. The Pentagon blames the Iran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq for the deadly drone attack.
The strikes hit command and intel centers and storage facilities affiliated with the Quds Force, a unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and local Iran-supported militias.
Tehran condemned the US strikes, calling them a “strategic error.” Baghdad said the attacks killed at least 16 people, including civilians. Syria, meanwhile, criticized the US and said the attacks would “fuel conflict in the Middle East in a very dangerous way.” The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a Britain-based watchdog, said the strikes in Syria had killed 23 pro-Iran fighters, but no civilians.
The strikes came hours after President Joe Biden, first lady Dr. Jill Biden, and US Defense Sec. Lloyd Austin attended the return of the remains of the three slain US soldiers — Sgt. Breonna Alexsondria Moffett, Sgt. William Jerome Rivers, and Sgt. Kennedy Ladon Sanders — at Dover Air Force Base on Friday.
Biden had threatened to deliver a “tiered response” over time, so these strikes are expected to be just the first salvo of a broader campaign. We’ll be watching for Washington's next moves — and for any signs of escalation in the form of responses from Iran, Iraq, or Syria.
The US is being coy about how it will handle Iran
Defense Sec. Lloyd Austin on Thursday signaled that the US was on the verge of retaliating against Iran-backed militias over the deaths of three service members in Jordan. But the Pentagon chief also repeatedly emphasized that Washington will aim to avoid taking actions that could raise the already feverish temperature in the region amid the Israel-Hamas war.
Still, many questions remain about when and how the US will respond – including whether it will directly target Iranian assets or personnel, as some reporting suggests.
What’s the holdup? The US is seemingly not eager to take hasty actions that could risk sparking a wider war. “There are ways to manage this so it doesn’t spiral out of control, and that’s been our focus,” Austin said Thursday.
The US could also be giving Iran and its proxies time to pull commanders from areas likely to be targeted. If the Biden administration wants to avoid a war, it would make sense to abstain from killing people of high importance to Tehran. But Austin dodged a question on whether the US was “telegraphing about strikes,” and underscored that Washington has “not described what our response is going to be.”
So, what do we know? The Biden administration says its response will occur in phases. Whatever happens next, it won’t be a one-off.
We also know that Iran, like the US, is not interested in going to war. But it’s also warned that it will respond to any US attacks.
It seems that we should brace ourselves for a series of tit-for-tat hits in which both sides attempt to save face while stopping short of any moves that could set the entire region on fire – figuratively and literally.