Trending Now
We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
Syrians living in Turkey, holding a picture of Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, celebrate after Syrian rebels announced that they have ousted President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, in Istanbul, Turkey, December 8, 2024.
Four reasons why Turkey is excited about the fall of Assad.
No one is sure what the end of the Assad regime in Syria will bring, but few in the region are happier about it than Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. For years, Erdogan, whose Islamist AKP party has governed Turkey since 2003, had sought the ouster of Assad, a secular despot backed by Shia Iran, a regional rival.
In the end, the jihadist militants of Hayat Tahrir el-Sham, or HTS, a group supported in part by Turkey, led the campaign that ended the 54 year reign of the Assads.
But why was Erdogan in particular so interested in seeing that happen?
Here are four big reasons:
- The refugee problem. Nearly 4 million Syrian refugees have arrived in Turkey since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Ankara has gotten some 9 billion Euros from the EU to support them and keep them from traveling onward to Europe, but their presence in Turkey has generated a social backlash. With Assad out of power, Erdogan sees an opportunity to send them home.
- The regional power play. The Sunni Islamist government of Erdogan has always seen Shia revolutionary Iran as a regional rival. Assad, supported by Tehran, was the keystone of Iran’s arc of regional power, enabling Iran to project power via proxy groups into neighboring Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories. With that keystone removed, the arc has fallen, and now a Turkey-friendly Sunni Islamist group is in a position to pick up the pieces in Syria. That, says Emre Peker, lead Turkey analyst at Eurasia Group, gives Ankara a chance to “engage in a massive way in the reconstruction of Syria and expand influence and clout throughout the region.”
- The Kurdish complication. For decades, Ankara has faced separatist militancy from Kurdish groups based in southeastern Turkey and is hostile to Syrian Kurdish groups that have carved out autonomous zones of their own during the Syrian civil war. The post-Assad uncertainty has already given Erdogan an opportunity to move more forcefully against the Syrian Kurds. Still, he will have to maneuver carefully in order to avoid a spat with the US, which has backed Syrian Kurds as proxies in the fight against the Islamic State. Incoming US president Donald Trump has called for “staying out of” Syria, which Erdogan would welcome, but it remains to be seen whether that plays out.
- And lastly, the domestic angle. Turkey is in the grip of a huge cost of living crisis, with inflation near 50%. “At a time when everyone is upset about inflation,” says Peker, “the Syria situation is a godsend because now Erdogan can strut his stuff and be the global leader he always wants to be, and people will love him for it in Turkey.”
What could go wrong? Lots. Much of the upside for Erdogan depends on HTS being able to establish order, bring rivals and competing factions to heel, and above all, shape a society that most Syrians will want to live in – or go back to.
But if minority groups feel threatened by HTS rule, there could be a fresh exodus of refugees. Even worse, if HTS’s attempt to hold power collapses altogether, the country could plunge back into chaos and open civil war altogether.
HTS leader Ahmed Al-Shara, aka Abu Muhammad Al-Golani, overlooks Damascus, Syria, after the overthrow of Bashar Assad on Dec. 8, 2024.
What’s next for Syria: HTS appoints PM, Kurds caught in the crossfire, Israel makes a move
HTS appoints PM for Syria’s transitional government
The Shura Council of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, has appointed Mohammed al-Bashir as interim prime minister of its proposed 18-month transitional government of Syria.
Who is Mohammed Bashir? Born in 1983 in a village in Jabal Zawiya, an area of Idlib province, Bashir graduated from Aleppo University in 2007 with a bachelor's in electrical engineering, and from Idlib University with a degree in Sharia and Law in 2021. He also worked as an engineer for a gas plant affiliated with the Syrian Gas Company. Bashir is proficient in English and has been conducting press conferences for the SSE for the past year, as well as speaking with the media during the recent HTS campaign. It is not known if he is a hardliner or more moderate in his views.
What were Bashir’s previous roles with HTS? Bashir served for a year as head of the HTS-linked Syrian Salvation Government, or SSG, in Idlib in northwestern Syria, as well as Minister of Development and Humanitarian Affairs for the SSG under his predecessor there, Ali Keda. Before that, he was the director of Islamic Education at the SSG’s Ministry of Awqaf for two and a half years. According to his SSG profile, in Idlib Bashir focused on modernizing government processes using technology, encouraging investment, strengthening the economy, and “meeting the humanitarian needs” of displaced persons.
Concern for the Kurds
Will Syria’s Kurdish minority face renewed persecution – and possibly lose its autonomy - under an HTS government? While many cheer the ouster of Bashar Assad, there is concern about how they will be treated under the new Turkish-backed regime.
Who are the Kurds? Syria’s 2.5 million Kurds, primarily Sunni Muslims, comprise about 15% of Syria’s population. A third live in the Taurus Mountains near Aleppo, another third along the Turkish border in the Jazirah, around 10% near Jarabulus northeast of Aleppo with the remainder residing on the outskirts of Damascus. The Kurds were nomadic until the end of the Ottoman Empire when their population was divided across several nation-states. The Syrian government began stripping the Kurds of their Syrian nationality in 1962 and has conducted a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing designed to erase their culture and identity.
In neighboring Turkey, Kurds comprise about 18% of the population and have been severely oppressed by successive governments, including the current administration of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Armed resistance by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party has resulted in over 40,000 deaths since the 1980s.
What is the Kurds’ geopolitical significance? The US supported the Kurds – and relied on them – in its fight against the Islamic State in the 2010s, and according to senior government officials, will continue to do so under the new regime. However, since the defeat of ISIS in 2019, the diminished US presence left many Kurds at the mercy of Turkish troops. Now, Turkey has announced that it will be reopening its border with Syria, to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees. An estimated 3 million refugees are currently living in Turkey – and facilitating their return could also provide an opportunity for Erdogan to eliminate the Kurdish presence on the border.
Israel’s buffer raises Egypt’s ire
On Sunday, Israel seized Syrian land near the Golan Heights, citing security concerns as Assad’s forces vacate the area and the new HTS government takes shape. Israel claims that its 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement with Syria is no longer in force with Assad’s ouster, creating a power vacuum in the area. Israel has sent tanks over the border into the buffer zone with Syria, calling the move temporary, limited, and aimed at ensuring Israel’s security. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the move is necessary and that Israel “will not allow any hostile force to establish itself on our border.”
What is Egypt saying? In response, Egypt has denounced the move as an opportunistic land grab, accusing Israel of exploiting the situation “to occupy more Syrian territories” and calling on the UN Security Council to take “a firm position towards the Israeli aggression on Syria.”
Egypt considers Israel’s control over the Golan Heights, which it captured from Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War, an occupation. Israel annexed the Heights in 1981, a move that has only been recognized by the US.
Rebel forces seized Mengh Airbase and the city of Tel Rifaat in the Aleppo countryside on December 1, 2024, following clashes with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian regime forces.
Syrian rebels clash with Kurds as Assad’s backers spring into action
In case anyone has forgotten just how complicated Syria’s civil war always was, the recent drama around Aleppo escalated on Monday as the Syrian National Army, a group backed by Turkey, attacked US-backed Kurdish groups near the city.
Meanwhile, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, the formerly al-Qaida-linked Islamist group at the forefront of the recent rebel offensive in Aleppo, has reportedly ordered Kurdish militias to leave the area altogether and go eastward to Rojava, a de facto autonomous Kurdish area in northeastern Syria.
Aren’t the Kurds against the Assad regime, too? Yes, but that’s not the beef. HTS works with the Turkish proxies and relies on Ankara for political support in high-level negotiations to end the war. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is angling for an advantageous position on the war’s aftermath and said his “greatest wish” was “for the instability that has been going on for 13 years to end.”
For Turkey, that means both weakening Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and cutting the Kurds down to size, as it has long-standing problems with Kurdish separatists at home.
Don’t forget, Turkey is also a US ally — a NATO member, in fact — so urging its proxies to fight US proxies in a theatre where Russian forces also actively operate causes headaches in Washington. Russian warplanes bombed rebel-held areas of Aleppo on Monday, not far from where Turkish F-16s shot down a Russian Su-24 that strayed over the border in 2015. Quite an explosive position for a lame-duck US president.
Speaking of proxies… Iran-backed militias crossed into Syria from Iraq to help shore up Assad’s counterattack as well. Assad will be glad for that help as the Lebanon-based Iranian proxy group Hezbollah, once a major pillar of support for Assad’s regime, said Monday it would not deploy fighters to Syria right now. The group is still regrouping after getting mauled by Israel and is warily watching as last week’s ceasefire in that conflict appears to be breaking down already.
Where is the US in all this? Washington had reportedly held talks before the Aleppo offensive with the UAE about lifting sanctions on Syria in exchange for Assad distancing himself from Iran and Russia. That seems unlikely now that Assad’s back is against the wall and he needs all the help he can get. Beyond milquetoast calls for de-escalation, Washington has thus far kept its cards close to its vest.
Erdogan likely to win Turkish election
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody, Ian Bremmer here, and a Quick Take to kick off your week. Beautiful Monday morning in New York. And elections, important elections in Turkey. We've been talking about them for a while, and the first round, results are now in. Erdogan not quite at 50%, but really close. You're going to have a second round, but it's almost certain now that he is going to win. Turnout's very high, almost 90%. That seems unheard of, inconceivable for Americans or Europeans, but actually normal turnout in Turkish elections are about 85%, higher this time around because a lot was at stake. You had consolidation around a single major opposition candidate and a lot of people unhappy with the economy, but a lot of nationalism at play too.
Also, keep in mind that Erdogan has a lot of structural advantages using the judiciary to go after and even disqualify some of the candidates that he didn't like, control of the media, almost all of which is either directly state-owned or state-aligned, and some level of influence over social media. You may have seen Twitter taking some lumps over the last few days because they were demanded to remove some pro-opposition content just literally 24 hours before the first round elections. Twitter complied. And that also, of course, has an impact at the margins. But what we're going to see here is consistency, is a leader who now has been working hard to undermine the Democratic checks and balances on his rule, some significant and credible claims of corruption, and also the ability to play a balancing role geopolitically between the United States and Europe and Russia. And that's despite the fact that Turkey is a NATO member. Geopolitically, Turkey's role has been increasing as we see more fragmentation more broadly in the region.
They have managed to improve and rebuild their relations with core Gulf states, for example, they've managed to stabilize their relationship with Syria to a degree, especially a place they've had a lot of fighting on the ground, and they've also played one of the few diplomatic roles of moderation between Russia and Ukraine. Now, one of the big stories that we've seen from Turkey internationally over the past months was their willingness to veto potentially a Swedish accession into NATO. Now that this election is going to be over in two weeks, and again, I think at this point, Erdogan is basically a layup, even a slam dunk, at that point, I think that Sweden, their objections will be removed, you will have that additional accession into NATO.
But they expect in return not only some support from Sweden in terms of the way that would-be Kurdish nationalists are treated on the ground inside that country, but also they expect a reduction of sanctions from the United States, which would also allow the Turks to purchase advanced fighter jets that they want, that are aligned and interoperable with other existing systems they have as a NATO ally, but that Washington has been unwilling to provide. I expect all that's going to happen. So Erdogan is not going to become a closer friend to the West, he will continue to be the most obstreperous of NATO allies, continue to look to use geopolitics in his favor, continue to undermine Turkish democracy, erode its institutions, month after month, year after year. And as well, the Turkish economy is in a hell of a lot of trouble. But the fact is that he was still able to pick up that election.
And final point I'd make here is that we didn't see significant shenanigans in the actual vote count itself. In the early measures, early hours of the day, the opposition was coming out with results that very much favored them, and they did that despite the fact that they hadn't been confirmed yet. While the government was contesting outcomes and they waited until those outcomes were confirmed, the interesting point here is that as we saw the final results from district to district, both opposition, as well as government, basically aligned on the same outcome. And Erdogan did say that he would accept the outcome no matter what. Frankly, that's more than Trump would do in his CNN Town Hall last week. So at the end of the day, there are structural challenges with making it an unfair election, but you would say that the election was free, and that's more than a lot of people might have presumed even a few weeks ago.
Iraq 20 Years Later
On the 20th anniversary of the US-led invasion of Iraq, US Senator Tammy Duckworth and NBC's Chief Foreign Correspondent Richard Engel sit down with Ian Bremmer on GZERO World to reflect on the legacy of a war that reshaped the Middle East and continues to reverberate around the world.
Senator Duckworth, a former helicopter pilot who lost both her legs in the Iraq War and now sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee. She emphasizes the importance of honoring the promises made to veterans and the impact it has military readiness. "The cost of going to war isn't just the tanks, the guns, the helicopters, and the ammunition during the period of actual conflict," Duckworth says, "The cost of war goes on for many decades."
Engel shares his experience as a journalist in Iraq during the 2003 invasion, including the initial reception from the Iraqi people and the increasing hostility as the war dragged on. He notes that while the people are now “freer,” the country is not yet "fully functioning" or "embraced by the larger Middle East."
Today, as the war in Ukraine drags into its second year, both Duckworth and Engel share their perspectives on what lessons we can learn from Iraq and its aftermath to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.
Watch the upcoming episode of GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, featuring Senator Duckworth as well as NBC News Chief Foreign Correspondent Richard Engel, on US public television. Check local listings
Ian Explains: 20 years since the Iraq War: Lessons learned, questions raised
The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, dubbed "Operation Iraqi Freedom," began 20 years ago. The Bush Administration told the world that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction and the war would last weeks, but none of that was true.
In fact, almost nothing in the Iraq War went as planned. The US wasn't prepared for a violent insurgency that lasted years, killing thousands of US troops and hundreds of thousands of civilians. And two decades from its start, the war still casts a long shadow––the rise of ISIS, a civil war, ongoing violence and political turmoil.
With 20 years of hindsight, can we say the world is better off after the invasion of Iraq? What about Iraq itself? And what lessons can we learn to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past?
These are the questions Ian Bremmer asks US Senator Tammy Duckworth, who served in Iraq, and NBC's chief foreign correspondent, Richard Engel on GZERO World with Ian Bremmer. Watch the episode on US public television or right here: Iraq War's legacy: Loss of lives, rise of ISIS, & political turmoil
A U.S. soldier watches as a statue of Iraq's President Saddam Hussein fall in central Baghdad, Iraq, in April 2003.
Was Iraq a success or failure?
On a visit to Iraq in the spring of 2021, I was chatting with a group of Iraqi and western friends – all current or former advisors to the Iraqi, US, or UK governments – when the conversation turned to whether the 2003 US-led war to depose Saddam Hussein’s regime had been worthwhile. The dogmatism, divisiveness, and emotion that characterized the debate in the run-up to the war were still evident. For some, ending the murderous brutality and atrocities of Saddam’s rule superseded any other concern. Others were more equivocal, pointing to the corruption, violence, and misrule of the US-bequeathed, post-2003 political order and the toll it has taken on the country.
On the 20th anniversary of the war, the question of whether Iraq is better or worse off and whether the cost in coalition lives and money was worth it is, almost inevitably, being revisited. But it is a feckless one. The reality of Iraq’s experience since 2003 cannot be captured by a simplistic dichotomy; the country is — as it always was — more complicated than that.
Some things are undoubtedly better. Representative politics has been entrenched. Elections — former President George Bush’s measure of democracy and freedom — are genuine contests that are seen as important to political legitimacy. Power has been transferred peacefully across seven successive governments.
The Iraqi media is one of the freest in the Middle East, with rival viewpoints on full display, and criticism of the political elite — unthinkable and deadly in Saddam’s era — is now common. And, after a disappointing first decade and a half, there are signs of economic stirrings underpinned by oil production that is now almost 50% above immediate pre-war highs.
Still, Iraq has fallen far short of the hopes and promises of the war’s proponents. While the country never became a failed state, it has flirted with it at times, especially during the 2005-2008 civil war and at the height of the Islamic State threat, when large swathes in the northwest of the country were beyond Baghdad’s control. Iraqi society still bears the scars of ethnosectarian violence and the divisions it bred.
Development and reconstruction have been slow and stunted. Corruption is endemic, and state services are shoddy at best. Islamist Shia militias act with impunity, answering to their own leaders and increasingly dominating government and state institutions. Meanwhile, the Kurdish region, beloved by its amply rewarded and vocal cheerleaders in the West, is increasingly divided between two warlord factions running what has long amounted to personal fiefdoms.
Washington (and London) bear a lot of responsibility for the outcome. The ignorance and hubris that guided pre-conflict planning and all that followed made for an occupation that was insufficiently resourced and lacked the most basic understanding of the country (or even its language). Hunkered down and detached in the heavily protected Green Zone, the US-led endeavor rested on feet of clay from the get-go, and Washington’s aversion to state building, combined with the disbanding of the Iraqi army and evisceration of the civil service, left Iraq without the tools for effective governance and administration.
Worse still, US post-war policy quickly fell prey to domestic political imperatives and the growing popular disaffection with the occupation at home, leaving the imperial timetable at odds with, and largely dismissive of, conditions on the ground in Iraq.
But the most corrosive aspect of US policy was the ethnosectarian political system it enshrined, dominated by a narrow coterie of identity-based parties that have ruled ever since. Bereft of any real understanding of Iraq or its society, and impatient for signs of “progress,” Washington officials took their cue from their nominal allies in the pre-war Iraqi opposition, turning a blind eye to their failings, and never quite realizing — or at least acknowledging — that, beyond ousting Saddam, their agendas were not the same.
Occupation on the cheap and on the run was never going to establish the foundations for the stable, prosperous Iraq that proponents of the war envisaged, but the kleptocratic, militia-dominated state that has emerged 20 years later is not wholly Washington’s fault.
The zenith of US imperial power, when its ambassadors chose governments, dictated laws, and forced through constitutions, is a distant memory. If the US built the exclusive political fortress that was and remains the Green Zone, the factions that it empowered have manned the ramparts to ensure their exclusive access and control would never be challenged. Power and privilege are what matters to this parasitic elite, not freedom and democracy, and they have taken full advantage of what they inherited to that end.
Iraq’s ethnosectarian factions have fractured over time, and newer faces and groups have come to the fore, but the underlying players and the political equation have remained largely unaltered. The current prime minister, Mohammed Shi’a Sudani, is the first since 2003 not to have been in exile, but most major party leaders such as Nouri al-Maliki, Hadi al-Amiri, Masoud Barzani, or Ammar Hakim are either remnants of the former opposition or their offspring.
Elections determine the relative balance of power among the main players, but successive Iraqi coalition governments have been broad affairs, no matter who leads them, allowing the oligarchy to protect their exclusive power while feeding from the trough. Political opposition, even within the protected confines of the elite, is still regarded as an existential threat. Meanwhile, the real opposition to the corrupt system is brutally repressed, as the government’s deadly response to the 2019-2020 demonstrations starkly illustrated.
Change in the near term is unlikely. Every new Iraqi government talks about reform, but the preservation of the system will remain the number one priority for Iraq’s leaders and their various regional and international benefactors. After over 40 years of war, sanctions, deprivation, and domestic violence, the majority of the population is exhausted, increasingly detached from politics, and largely resigned to the state of affairs.
There are pockets of opposition activism on the “Iraqi street,” especially in the Shia-majority center and south, the heartland of real power in Iraq. But it is disorganized, unfunded, and largely powerless relative to the leviathan that is the US-bequeathed Iraqi state. Good men do not last long in Iraq, either neutralized or co-opted, and the seeds of systemic change are few and far between.
Maybe this was always the most likely outcome. The flourishing liberal democracy that US neo-conservatives imagined would catalyze regional change was never in the cards. A poor vegetable vendor in Tunisia did more to bring about a democratic revolution in the Middle East than the US adventure in Iraq ever did, and the eventual outcome was greater authoritarianism across the region.
Thus, Iraq will likely remain a mismanaged, kleptocratic, violent, and underdeveloped state governed by a political elite that is consumed with self-interest and sustained by oil revenue, the force of arms, and regional and international powers that see the country through the narrow focus of their national security priorities.
Not the worst outcome that could have been imagined in 2003 or since, but certainly less than the Iraqi people deserve.
Raad Alkadiri is the managing director of Energy, Climate & Resources for Eurasia Group. He served as assistant private secretary to the UK Special Representative in Iraq from 2003-2004.
- Iraq War's legacy: Loss of lives, rise of ISIS, & political turmoil - GZERO Media ›
- 20 years since the Iraq War: Lessons learned, questions raised | Ian Bremmer explains - GZERO Media ›
- Iraq then and now: Reflections from NBC's Richard Engel - GZERO Media ›
- From combat pilot to Senator: Tammy Duckworth's reflections on the Iraq War - GZERO Media ›
- From Iraq to Ukraine: Reflections on "wars of choice" - GZERO Media ›
- Podcast: The costs of invading Iraq: Sen. Tammy Duckworth & Richard Engel assess war's lasting effects, 20 years later - GZERO Media ›
Women rising up against Iran's regime: journalist and activist Masih Alinejad
Iran is facing the biggest uprising Iran since the so-called "Green Movement" in 2009.
The rallying cry began after a young woman, Mahsa Amini, died after being beaten by cops for not wearing her headscarf properly. Since then, more than 14,000 people have been arrested, at least 326 killed, and one executed.
On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer speaks to Iranian journalist and activist Masih Alinejad, a sworn enemy of the Supreme Leader; it's widely believed that Iranian spies have tried to kidnap and assassinate her in New York.
From Alinejad's perspective, for the first time in Iran's history, people are setting aside long-held sectarian divisions — including toward minority Kurd and coming together to protest the regime.
And many even cheered the national soccer team's elimination at the World Cup because some players were seen as puppets of the regime.
She has a clear message to the West: If you want to help, don't go back to the 2015 nuclear deal and let Iranians bring about regime change on their own.
This interview was featured in a GZERO World episode: "Iran v. the Islamic Republic: Fighting Iran’s gender apartheid regime" on December 12, 2022.
- Why Iran’s protests are different this time ›
- What We’re Watching: 40 days of protest in Iran, Franco-German tensions, good grain news ›
- Great Satan on the pitch, big troubles at home — Iran's World Cup dilemma ›
- GZERO celebrates International Women's Day - GZERO Media ›
- At the Paris Peace Forum, grassroots activists highlight urgent issues - GZERO Media ›