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Erdogan likely to win Turkish election
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody, Ian Bremmer here, and a Quick Take to kick off your week. Beautiful Monday morning in New York. And elections, important elections in Turkey. We've been talking about them for a while, and the first round, results are now in. Erdogan not quite at 50%, but really close. You're going to have a second round, but it's almost certain now that he is going to win. Turnout's very high, almost 90%. That seems unheard of, inconceivable for Americans or Europeans, but actually normal turnout in Turkish elections are about 85%, higher this time around because a lot was at stake. You had consolidation around a single major opposition candidate and a lot of people unhappy with the economy, but a lot of nationalism at play too.
Also, keep in mind that Erdogan has a lot of structural advantages using the judiciary to go after and even disqualify some of the candidates that he didn't like, control of the media, almost all of which is either directly state-owned or state-aligned, and some level of influence over social media. You may have seen Twitter taking some lumps over the last few days because they were demanded to remove some pro-opposition content just literally 24 hours before the first round elections. Twitter complied. And that also, of course, has an impact at the margins. But what we're going to see here is consistency, is a leader who now has been working hard to undermine the Democratic checks and balances on his rule, some significant and credible claims of corruption, and also the ability to play a balancing role geopolitically between the United States and Europe and Russia. And that's despite the fact that Turkey is a NATO member. Geopolitically, Turkey's role has been increasing as we see more fragmentation more broadly in the region.
They have managed to improve and rebuild their relations with core Gulf states, for example, they've managed to stabilize their relationship with Syria to a degree, especially a place they've had a lot of fighting on the ground, and they've also played one of the few diplomatic roles of moderation between Russia and Ukraine. Now, one of the big stories that we've seen from Turkey internationally over the past months was their willingness to veto potentially a Swedish accession into NATO. Now that this election is going to be over in two weeks, and again, I think at this point, Erdogan is basically a layup, even a slam dunk, at that point, I think that Sweden, their objections will be removed, you will have that additional accession into NATO.
But they expect in return not only some support from Sweden in terms of the way that would-be Kurdish nationalists are treated on the ground inside that country, but also they expect a reduction of sanctions from the United States, which would also allow the Turks to purchase advanced fighter jets that they want, that are aligned and interoperable with other existing systems they have as a NATO ally, but that Washington has been unwilling to provide. I expect all that's going to happen. So Erdogan is not going to become a closer friend to the West, he will continue to be the most obstreperous of NATO allies, continue to look to use geopolitics in his favor, continue to undermine Turkish democracy, erode its institutions, month after month, year after year. And as well, the Turkish economy is in a hell of a lot of trouble. But the fact is that he was still able to pick up that election.
And final point I'd make here is that we didn't see significant shenanigans in the actual vote count itself. In the early measures, early hours of the day, the opposition was coming out with results that very much favored them, and they did that despite the fact that they hadn't been confirmed yet. While the government was contesting outcomes and they waited until those outcomes were confirmed, the interesting point here is that as we saw the final results from district to district, both opposition, as well as government, basically aligned on the same outcome. And Erdogan did say that he would accept the outcome no matter what. Frankly, that's more than Trump would do in his CNN Town Hall last week. So at the end of the day, there are structural challenges with making it an unfair election, but you would say that the election was free, and that's more than a lot of people might have presumed even a few weeks ago.
Iraq War's legacy: Loss of lives, rise of ISIS, & political turmoil
On the 20th anniversary of the US-led invasion of Iraq, US Senator Tammy Duckworth and NBC's Chief Foreign Correspondent Richard Engel sit down with Ian Bremmer on GZERO World to reflect on the legacy of a war that reshaped the Middle East and continues to reverberate around the world.
Senator Duckworth, a former helicopter pilot who lost both her legs in the Iraq War and now sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee. She emphasizes the importance of honoring the promises made to veterans and the impact it has military readiness. "The cost of going to war isn't just the tanks, the guns, the helicopters, and the ammunition during the period of actual conflict," Duckworth says, "The cost of war goes on for many decades."
Engel shares his experience as a journalist in Iraq during the 2003 invasion, including the initial reception from the Iraqi people and the increasing hostility as the war dragged on. He notes that while the people are now “freer,” the country is not yet "fully functioning" or "embraced by the larger Middle East."
Today, as the war in Ukraine drags into its second year, both Duckworth and Engel share their perspectives on what lessons we can learn from Iraq and its aftermath to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.
Watch the upcoming episode of GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, featuring Senator Duckworth as well as NBC News Chief Foreign Correspondent Richard Engel, on US public television. Check local listings
Ian Explains: 20 years since the Iraq War: Lessons learned, questions raised
The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, dubbed "Operation Iraqi Freedom," began 20 years ago. The Bush Administration told the world that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction and the war would last weeks, but none of that was true.
In fact, almost nothing in the Iraq War went as planned. The US wasn't prepared for a violent insurgency that lasted years, killing thousands of US troops and hundreds of thousands of civilians. And two decades from its start, the war still casts a long shadow––the rise of ISIS, a civil war, ongoing violence and political turmoil.
With 20 years of hindsight, can we say the world is better off after the invasion of Iraq? What about Iraq itself? And what lessons can we learn to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past?
These are the questions Ian Bremmer asks US Senator Tammy Duckworth, who served in Iraq, and NBC's chief foreign correspondent, Richard Engel on GZERO World with Ian Bremmer. Watch the episode on US public television or right here: Iraq War's legacy: Loss of lives, rise of ISIS, & political turmoil
A U.S. soldier watches as a statue of Iraq's President Saddam Hussein fall in central Baghdad, Iraq, in April 2003.
Was Iraq a success or failure?
On a visit to Iraq in the spring of 2021, I was chatting with a group of Iraqi and western friends – all current or former advisors to the Iraqi, US, or UK governments – when the conversation turned to whether the 2003 US-led war to depose Saddam Hussein’s regime had been worthwhile. The dogmatism, divisiveness, and emotion that characterized the debate in the run-up to the war were still evident. For some, ending the murderous brutality and atrocities of Saddam’s rule superseded any other concern. Others were more equivocal, pointing to the corruption, violence, and misrule of the US-bequeathed, post-2003 political order and the toll it has taken on the country.
On the 20th anniversary of the war, the question of whether Iraq is better or worse off and whether the cost in coalition lives and money was worth it is, almost inevitably, being revisited. But it is a feckless one. The reality of Iraq’s experience since 2003 cannot be captured by a simplistic dichotomy; the country is — as it always was — more complicated than that.
Some things are undoubtedly better. Representative politics has been entrenched. Elections — former President George Bush’s measure of democracy and freedom — are genuine contests that are seen as important to political legitimacy. Power has been transferred peacefully across seven successive governments.
The Iraqi media is one of the freest in the Middle East, with rival viewpoints on full display, and criticism of the political elite — unthinkable and deadly in Saddam’s era — is now common. And, after a disappointing first decade and a half, there are signs of economic stirrings underpinned by oil production that is now almost 50% above immediate pre-war highs.
Still, Iraq has fallen far short of the hopes and promises of the war’s proponents. While the country never became a failed state, it has flirted with it at times, especially during the 2005-2008 civil war and at the height of the Islamic State threat, when large swathes in the northwest of the country were beyond Baghdad’s control. Iraqi society still bears the scars of ethnosectarian violence and the divisions it bred.
Development and reconstruction have been slow and stunted. Corruption is endemic, and state services are shoddy at best. Islamist Shia militias act with impunity, answering to their own leaders and increasingly dominating government and state institutions. Meanwhile, the Kurdish region, beloved by its amply rewarded and vocal cheerleaders in the West, is increasingly divided between two warlord factions running what has long amounted to personal fiefdoms.
Washington (and London) bear a lot of responsibility for the outcome. The ignorance and hubris that guided pre-conflict planning and all that followed made for an occupation that was insufficiently resourced and lacked the most basic understanding of the country (or even its language). Hunkered down and detached in the heavily protected Green Zone, the US-led endeavor rested on feet of clay from the get-go, and Washington’s aversion to state building, combined with the disbanding of the Iraqi army and evisceration of the civil service, left Iraq without the tools for effective governance and administration.
Worse still, US post-war policy quickly fell prey to domestic political imperatives and the growing popular disaffection with the occupation at home, leaving the imperial timetable at odds with, and largely dismissive of, conditions on the ground in Iraq.
But the most corrosive aspect of US policy was the ethnosectarian political system it enshrined, dominated by a narrow coterie of identity-based parties that have ruled ever since. Bereft of any real understanding of Iraq or its society, and impatient for signs of “progress,” Washington officials took their cue from their nominal allies in the pre-war Iraqi opposition, turning a blind eye to their failings, and never quite realizing — or at least acknowledging — that, beyond ousting Saddam, their agendas were not the same.
Occupation on the cheap and on the run was never going to establish the foundations for the stable, prosperous Iraq that proponents of the war envisaged, but the kleptocratic, militia-dominated state that has emerged 20 years later is not wholly Washington’s fault.
The zenith of US imperial power, when its ambassadors chose governments, dictated laws, and forced through constitutions, is a distant memory. If the US built the exclusive political fortress that was and remains the Green Zone, the factions that it empowered have manned the ramparts to ensure their exclusive access and control would never be challenged. Power and privilege are what matters to this parasitic elite, not freedom and democracy, and they have taken full advantage of what they inherited to that end.
Iraq’s ethnosectarian factions have fractured over time, and newer faces and groups have come to the fore, but the underlying players and the political equation have remained largely unaltered. The current prime minister, Mohammed Shi’a Sudani, is the first since 2003 not to have been in exile, but most major party leaders such as Nouri al-Maliki, Hadi al-Amiri, Masoud Barzani, or Ammar Hakim are either remnants of the former opposition or their offspring.
Elections determine the relative balance of power among the main players, but successive Iraqi coalition governments have been broad affairs, no matter who leads them, allowing the oligarchy to protect their exclusive power while feeding from the trough. Political opposition, even within the protected confines of the elite, is still regarded as an existential threat. Meanwhile, the real opposition to the corrupt system is brutally repressed, as the government’s deadly response to the 2019-2020 demonstrations starkly illustrated.
Change in the near term is unlikely. Every new Iraqi government talks about reform, but the preservation of the system will remain the number one priority for Iraq’s leaders and their various regional and international benefactors. After over 40 years of war, sanctions, deprivation, and domestic violence, the majority of the population is exhausted, increasingly detached from politics, and largely resigned to the state of affairs.
There are pockets of opposition activism on the “Iraqi street,” especially in the Shia-majority center and south, the heartland of real power in Iraq. But it is disorganized, unfunded, and largely powerless relative to the leviathan that is the US-bequeathed Iraqi state. Good men do not last long in Iraq, either neutralized or co-opted, and the seeds of systemic change are few and far between.
Maybe this was always the most likely outcome. The flourishing liberal democracy that US neo-conservatives imagined would catalyze regional change was never in the cards. A poor vegetable vendor in Tunisia did more to bring about a democratic revolution in the Middle East than the US adventure in Iraq ever did, and the eventual outcome was greater authoritarianism across the region.
Thus, Iraq will likely remain a mismanaged, kleptocratic, violent, and underdeveloped state governed by a political elite that is consumed with self-interest and sustained by oil revenue, the force of arms, and regional and international powers that see the country through the narrow focus of their national security priorities.
Not the worst outcome that could have been imagined in 2003 or since, but certainly less than the Iraqi people deserve.
Raad Alkadiri is the managing director of Energy, Climate & Resources for Eurasia Group. He served as assistant private secretary to the UK Special Representative in Iraq from 2003-2004.
- Iraq War's legacy: Loss of lives, rise of ISIS, & political turmoil - GZERO Media ›
- 20 years since the Iraq War: Lessons learned, questions raised | Ian Bremmer explains - GZERO Media ›
- Iraq then and now: Reflections from NBC's Richard Engel - GZERO Media ›
- From combat pilot to Senator: Tammy Duckworth's reflections on the Iraq War - GZERO Media ›
- From Iraq to Ukraine: Reflections on "wars of choice" - GZERO Media ›
- Podcast: The costs of invading Iraq: Sen. Tammy Duckworth & Richard Engel assess war's lasting effects, 20 years later - GZERO Media ›
Women rising up against Iran's regime: journalist and activist Masih Alinejad
Iran is facing the biggest uprising Iran since the so-called "Green Movement" in 2009.
The rallying cry began after a young woman, Mahsa Amini, died after being beaten by cops for not wearing her headscarf properly. Since then, more than 14,000 people have been arrested, at least 326 killed, and one executed.
On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer speaks to Iranian journalist and activist Masih Alinejad, a sworn enemy of the Supreme Leader; it's widely believed that Iranian spies have tried to kidnap and assassinate her in New York.
From Alinejad's perspective, for the first time in Iran's history, people are setting aside long-held sectarian divisions — including toward minority Kurd and coming together to protest the regime.
And many even cheered the national soccer team's elimination at the World Cup because some players were seen as puppets of the regime.
She has a clear message to the West: If you want to help, don't go back to the 2015 nuclear deal and let Iranians bring about regime change on their own.
This interview was featured in a GZERO World episode: "Iran v. the Islamic Republic: Fighting Iran’s gender apartheid regime" on December 12, 2022.
- Why Iran’s protests are different this time ›
- What We’re Watching: 40 days of protest in Iran, Franco-German tensions, good grain news ›
- Great Satan on the pitch, big troubles at home — Iran's World Cup dilemma ›
- GZERO celebrates International Women's Day - GZERO Media ›
- At the Paris Peace Forum, grassroots activists highlight urgent issues - GZERO Media ›
How the Iranian regime’s brutality is backfiring
Iran's crackdown on the ongoing women-led protests against the regime has been fierce — but uneven. Protestors in the Kurdish region, for instance, have faced brutal, and frequently fatal backlash from the government.
Yet the people have come out everywhere.
Why? "The more that they kill, the more people get angry to take back to the streets," Iranian activist and journalist Masih Alinejad tells Ian Bremmer on GZERO World.
And the unity, she adds, is scaring the regime. For the first time in Iran's history, Alinejad says, people are setting aside long-held sectarian divisions — including toward minority Kurd and coming together to protest this regime.
Watch the GZERO World episode: Iran v. the Islamic Republic: Fighting Iran’s gender apartheid regime
Iran v. the Islamic Republic: Fighting Iran’s gender apartheid regime
Woman, life, freedom. Those three words have filled the streets of Iran since the ongoing women-led protests against the regime, the biggest since 2009, began last September.
How did Iranian women get here? How has the theocracy responded so far? And what might come next?
On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer speaks to Iranian journalist and activist Masih Alinejad, a sworn enemy of the Supreme Leader; it's widely believed that Iranian spies have tried to kidnap and assassinate her here in New York.
From Alinejad's perspective, the regime is afraid like never before because the protests have achieved unity among Iranians for the first time. And many even cheered the national soccer team's elimination at the World Cup because some players were seen as puppets of the regime.
Her message to the West: If you want to help, don't go back to the 2015 nuclear deal and let Iranians bring about regime change on their own.
- Iran nuclear deal is dead ›
- Great Satan on the pitch, big troubles at home — Iran's World Cup dilemma ›
- What We're Watching: Iran protests spread, Putin mobilizes, NY sues Trumps, China faces slow growth ›
- Why Iran’s protests are different this time ›
- Podcast: After Mahsa Amini: Iran’s fight for freedom, with Masih Alinejad ›
Podcast: After Mahsa Amini: Iran’s fight for freedom, with Masih Alinejad
Listen: Iran is being rocked by its most significant protests since the Green Movement of 2009. Since September, hundreds of thousands of young and mostly female demonstrators have filled the streets of nearly every major city from Tehran to Tabriz, many discarding their headscarves at great personal risk to protest draconian societal rules and restrictions. The backlash from security forces has been brutal, though (except in the Kurdish region) the government has yet to send in the Revolutionary Guard.
Iranian-American journalist and activist Masih Alinejad joins Ian Bremmer on the GZERO World podcast to discuss. Where will these protests lead, and what are the geopolitical implications for the region, and for the West? Alinejad shares her views on the unprecedented unity among the Iranian protesters, her personal experience being targeted by the Iranian government even after moving to the United States, and why the Iranian men's World Cup team does not deserve sympathy.