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Putin's strategy in Ukraine ahead of Trump's return
Putin has been warning them not to do that. They decided they were going to, the Russian response has been to formally change their nuclear doctrine so that they would be considered to be in a state of war legally against any country that allowed Ukraine to use their missiles against Russia. In other words, essentially, Russia is claiming that they're now at war with France, with the UK, with the United States. And also, the Russians used a medium range missile hypersonic nuclear capable directly against the Ukrainian target in Dnipro.
In other words, what we're seeing from Putin is, "I'm showing you what you're doing is moving towards World War III, and that's how I'm responding." Does that mean that Putin is actually escalating towards direct war with NATO allies? The answer to that is no. He wasn't doing that when he was losing the battle in Ukraine in the early months. He's certainly not doing it now that he's winning.
And he is winning. He has more troops on the front lines, including those from North Korea, those from Yemen, those that he's getting from other countries. Also, he's taking more territory on the ground in Ukraine at a faster pace now, more significant amounts of territory in Southeast Ukraine than at any point since the opening months of the war. Plus Trump is President-elect. Trump has said, "I want to end this war." And he is coming in just in a couple of months.
So what Putin is doing is not threatening World War III. He's instead showing off just how bad this Biden policy is, this existing NATO policy is. He's making it easier for Trump to pivot away and say, "I'm the peacemaker. We were heading towards World War III, this horrible escalation. I'm the guy that got the great deal done and look how brilliant I am." Putin is facilitating that.
Now, of course, to make that happen Trump still has to give Putin something that he wants. He has to give an outcome that is acceptable to Putin. And Putin's made clear, at least thus far, that he's not going to give up any territory that he has. That he's not prepared to accept that Ukraine would be able to join NATO. He's also said that Ukraine can't continue to have a functional armed forces which is something that would be completely unacceptable to Ukraine.
The devil's going to be in the details here. There clearly is an opportunity for Trump to end the war. He's promised he's going to end the war, and I think he can. I think he can create a ceasefire. The Ukrainian leadership has already made clear that they are supportive of ending the war, but they're not just going to listen. There has to be a back and forth conversation with the Americans. Seeing what it is that Trump is prepared to put forward, and whether or not the Russians are capable of accepting it, are willing to accept it. Even though it will look like a win for Russia compared to where they would've been under Biden, under Harris, or at any other point in the last couple of years.
Still, if you are Putin, there is an open question. You're taking land right now. The Ukrainians don't have the people to continue to put up a strong defense. Why wouldn't you delay this out for another three, another six months? Take more land. Try to get all the territory that you have formally annexed over the course of the war. Why not settle the war on your terms? A lot easier to do if you're winning than losing. And the question there will be to what extent Trump is willing to cause material punishment to Putin if he doesn't say yes.
And that's an open question. Trump historically has been willing to take easy wins that don't necessarily play well over the long term. Look at Afghanistan. He wanted to get the Americans out. He cut a deal with the Taliban. It was a deal that was clearly very advantageous from a military and from a governance perspective for the Taliban than it was for the United States. He cut that despite the fact that the allies were not supportive or coordinating. That undermined the US deeply. Biden then continued with that plan. And it was one of the biggest losses that the US has experienced over the last four years.
Now, that of course, was a loss that ultimately fell on Biden. This would be a loss that would ultimately fall on Trump. And so does he want to risk that? That's a very interesting question. And of course, you also have to look at Trump's staff because he can make a phone call with Zelensky and with Putin, but ultimately, it is the secretary of state, the national security advisor and others that are going to have to work out the details of that agreement. And those people, at least thus far, are not people that are oriented towards giving away the store to Putin. They're people-oriented towards mistrust of Putin, towards a hard line against the Russians, towards support of Ukraine.
I am thinking here that number one, there's a reasonably high chance that Trump can get the win that he wants, but number two, this isn't likely to be a walk in the park for the Russian president. The Europeans need to play here as well. And what will be important, there's been a few formulated conversations thus far between President-elect Trump and some of the European leaders.
They haven't gone very far, but they've also not blown up the bilateral relationships. Their ability to work with Trump advisors on Trump, and on a greater coordination of what an ultimate solution or settlement of the Russian-Ukraine war would be, will make a dramatic difference as to what extent this is sustainable. To what extent this leads to not only Ukraine that can continue to defend itself and the territory that it is left with, but also can integrate into Europe, can be politically successful as a democracy over time. And that NATO will stay strong and stay together and stay aligned with the United States because they don't have another choice. There is no autonomous European military capacity. It's either NATO sticks together or it fragments.
Those are all things that we're going to watch very carefully over the course of the next couple months. But for now, an escalatory period. And it's all performative and it's all oriented towards what happens when Trump becomes president. That's it for me, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Global leaders scramble to align with Trump
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. A lot more information about where the Trump administration is going in terms of the appointees that they're making and also, the responses that we see from leaders around the world. Maybe focus a little on the global, because if you think that Republicans who privately don't really like Trump are publicly all lining up and saying, "This is God's gift," you've seen nothing compared to what you're going to see from allies of the United States all over the world who know that they get crosswise with the president-elect at their own peril. He is a lot more powerful, and his country is a lot more powerful than their own. We've already seen that with Prime Minister Netanyahu in Israel saying that an upcoming Lebanon ceasefire would be a gift to the president-elect. We've seen Zelenskyy in Ukraine saying, "Great meetings, great phone calls."
Of course, the war is going to be over faster with the policies of the incoming president-elect. We're seeing all sorts of outreach from individual European leaders, Asian leaders saying, "We can't wait to find a way to work with this guy. Congratulations. Please don't tariff us. Please don't cause any problems for our country." So, I do think we're going to see a lot of wins in the near term from countries all around the world because the alternative is problematic. And when you look at the G7, the G20, NATO, it is different from last time around in a few ways. First of all, that you now have a number of countries that are ideologically aligned with Trump, and there's going to be more in the near term. I mean, Giorgia Meloni, who is the most popular of G7 leaders, assertively, is someone who sees herself much closer to Trump's worldview in terms of immigration policy, social policy, even to a degree economic policy. And that is going to make him feel much more comfortable when he's sitting at those summits. That wasn't the case first G7 Summit he attended last time around.
Canada, still Justin Trudeau, but won't be for long and soon Canada's going to be Pierre Poilievre who runs the Conservative Party and is absolutely much more aligned with Trump and be a very close friend of the US President-elect when he becomes Prime Minister of Canada. Of course, you've got the Gulf states on board with Trump. You've got the Israelis much more aligned with him than otherwise. The South Korean leader, President Yoon, a conservative, taking up golf again so that he'll be able to play with Trump effectively and wants to be the new Shinzo Abe from Asia in terms of being able to maintain stable relations. That's one reason. The second reason is that there's a lot more at stake. The world is much more dangerous. Getting Trump wrong is a lot more costly when you've got a major war going on in Europe, a major war going on in the Middle East, when the US-China relations are in a worse place, but China's under much more economic pressure at home than they were before. So getting it wrong is trouble.
And so already seeing outreach from the Chinese to the United States saying, "Look, here are some things that might be the beginnings of a deal. We could buy more US treasuries. We could maybe organize a Ukraine conference. We could buy a bunch more American goods. What do we need to do? What do we need to do?" So I'm not saying it's going to go well, but clearly there is more such orientation. And then you have the fact that Trump is more powerful at home in the United States. He has the House, he has the Senate, and he's creating far more loyalists around him as opposed to adults that are more independent in his own cabinet. Which means that if you are a foreign leader, your ability to work around Trump with other parts of the US political firmament is very constrained. And all of that implies that whatever it is that Trump decides he wants to do going forward is going to be what other leaders are going to have to engage with and align with.
There are big problems from a Trump administration coming in. He's not interested in multilateralism. He doesn't want a strong European Union. He's prepared to end the Russia-Ukraine war, even at terms that are problematic for the Ukrainians. Has very little interest in promoting rule of law or democracy internationally. In fact, one of the most interesting things about Trump and the United States for right now is that for almost half a century, the US has been trying to get the Chinese to orient more towards an American worldview. This is what the idea of responsible stakeholdership was, that China was meant to play more of a leadership role in US-led multilateral institutions, promote US-led rule of law and values on the global stage, and become more aligned with the Americans and its allies over time as it got wealthier. Turns out China hasn't done that, but America has. The United States is becoming more like China on the global stage, much more transactional in their foreign policy, indifferent to the values of other countries or the political systems and economic system of other countries on the global stage.
Certainly not interested in the global promotion of democracy or even rule of law, and rather bilateral relations between the US and other countries where the US is more powerful to get the outcomes that they want. Exactly the way that Chinese engage globally. It has been successful for China in many places because they're more powerful than most of the other countries they deal with except the Americans. They've had challenges in Southeast Asia, for example, because the US has led a more multilateral approach on things like the South China Sea. Doubt you're going to see as much of that under Trump. So a very dramatic change in how we think about the world, and we'll be watching very closely as Trump continues to fill out his cabinet and starts talking much more with global leaders on the global stage.
That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Trump's plans for policy & personnel
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. Everyone, of course, talking about the incoming Trump administration. What it's going to mean in terms of personnel and in terms of policy. The latter, more important, but informed very significantly by the former. Couple of things I would say.
First of all, on the personnel side, clearly most important point here and very different from the first administration is that loyalty matters immensely. Trump is angriest not at Democrats, angriest at people that used to work for him who have now flipped, who are calling him a fascist. Some of the worst things that have been said about Trump in the first administration came from senior people that he put in that weren't loyal. They may have been long-term establishment Republicans and adults, but now he couldn't be bothered with them in the slightest and wants them to know it.
And that's why nobody really expected, that was talking to the Trump team, that Pompeo or Haley were going to be appointed. But the fact that Trump came out immediately before even making other appointments to a cabinet and saying, "No, you two, thanks, but no thanks. You can go get on with the rest of your lives." Because he sees them as not loyal. Nikki said all sorts of horrible things about Trump, and Pompeo was feeling around with other candidates and didn't endorse until way too late. And Trump was angry about that at the time, and he holds that grudge.
So you're going to see a team that I think is much more consolidated around Trump. And that doesn't mean there won't be different constellations, groups of people that are more aligned with each other, but when Trump has something he wants done, everyone's going to run alongside him.
And I think that's true for JD Vance too. The idea that there's going to be a shadow cabinet that is run by Vance, and he's the Project 2025 guy. No, if that happens, Trump will be angry. If there's any large meeting internally, Trump wants to be the star. And he expects Vance to do his bidding and to be effective at it and to run other things that he doesn't care as much about. And that is, I think, the role that Vance will play.
Is it going to be more populist on some issues? Sure, but not necessarily on as many as you'd think. Why? Because there are going to be a lot of billionaires who are interested in their business interests, their investment interests around the Trump team. There will be CEOs. There'll be a lot of people that aren't globalists in name; they've been thoroughly repudiated, but globalists in more policy than you would think.
Now here, China policy is extremely interesting because on the one hand, Trump really wants to see higher tariffs on China and has talked about that. Robert Lighthizer, who was US trade rep for Trump last time around, very professional, very capable in that role, clearly playing a very significant role in running trade and maybe other things economically for Trump this time around. He is pushing for more jobs in the United States, more investment in the United States, decoupling from China. Very comfortable with a new Cold War between the US and China.
You know who isn't? Elon Musk. Has massive investments on the ground in China, wants a more comfortable relationship there, and has basically told the Chinese that he's very interested in helping to be an interlocutor. Kissinger is dead. And the one person who's out there that could be a conduit of information and potentially better relations between the two most powerful countries in the world is Elon. Will he be effective? A technology policy is kind of interesting because Trump first time around didn't do technology policy. Remember the CHIPS Act? That was Biden. Semiconductors, export controls, that was Biden. Wasn't something Trump was focused on. He was focused on trade, on the trade deficit, on tariffs, on those issues, intellectual property theft, those issues. Not as focused on technology. Elon will be, and he's going to want people he wants to be appointed in relevant positions in the Trump administration. So if that happens, maybe it's true that US-China relations become more functional than they otherwise might've been. But this is an untested proposition, something very interesting to watch.
A couple other places that are really important, Russia-Ukraine. Did Trump, did Trump not have a conversation already with Putin? Kremlin's saying no, that means absolutely nothing. But clearly he is very interested in pushing Zelensky, who is on the back foot militarily right now, to end this war. And the likelihood of a near-term ceasefire has gone way up because of Trump. Orbán of course, already been saying that from Hungary. Robert Fico from Slovakia wasn't saying that before Trump was elected. Now he is. Are we going to see that from Giorgia Meloni in Italy, for example, who's ideologically disposed to Trump, but has been much more anti-Russia in her policies? Watch that very, very carefully. Other countries that aren't on the front lines.
So it's going to be a lot of pressure on the Ukrainians, an opportunity for Putin, if he wants it, though he's doing well militarily, so he's going to probably drive a harder bargain on even a short-term ceasefire than he might have three months ago, six months ago. And he knows Trump wants to get this done. And then we need to see what the Europeans do. Do they hang together under a relatively strong and aligned European Union leadership, or do we start to see a real split among a whole bunch of European individual government leaders that are a lot weaker? Super interesting.
And then of course, you have the Middle East. And on the Middle East policies are even stronger than Biden's pro-Israel policies. And you've seen a lot of support for going after Iran. Might the Israelis now do that? Oil prices are low. China's not demanding much energy. Hitting the Iranians nuclear and energy capabilities wouldn't bring oil as high as they would've been 6 months ago, 12 months ago. Depends on what the Iranians do in response, how disruptive they want to be. But right now they're reaching out to everyone. The Europeans, the Iranians are reaching out to the Saudis. They just did some low level military exercises with the Saudis. This is a country that is basically saying, "We don't want a big fight. We know that we're going to lose if we have one." Easy time for Trump to press in the Middle East. Last time he was president, first place he went was Saudi Arabia, then Israel. Wouldn't surprise me at all if he does that again. Though he probably flips it this time around in terms of the order.
Okay, so much to talk about, so much to watch. I hope you find this interesting. We'll be on top of it and we'll talk to you all real soon.
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Ian Bremmer on Trump’s win
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your post-election morning. And Trump is back as president. Should not be a shock to people. Certainly, was not to us. Anyone looking at elections around the world this year has seen incumbents underperform. We saw that in the United Kingdom. We saw it across Europe in the EU parliamentary elections. As well as in Germany, in France, everywhere, Austria, you name it, Portugal, in Japan in the last couple of weeks, in India, in South Africa. Soon in Canada, as Trudeau will be forced out and very likely Conservative Party leader, Pierre Poilievre will be the next Canadian prime minister.
So, this was an election that Harris had a significantly uphill battle. That's not usually the case with incumbents, but it is in this cycle. Why? Inflation. And yes, inflation numbers were coming down, but from a high baseline. And anyone in power is seen as responsible for that. You're vice president, you don't get to say it was somebody else. I think the numbers coming down are still from a high baseline. Those prices aren't coming down. You're still paying them. Immigration, and more recently, immigration numbers also illegally coming down, but from a high level. And the illegal immigrants in the United States are still here. And a lot of those that were in red states have also moved or were moved to blue states. And that certainly had an impact. I saw that Trump did better in New York City, my own city, than he had ever before by a large margin. He didn't win, but he got a lot. He was over 30%.
And why is that? Well, because a lot of New Yorkers aren't happy about those things, not so different from the rest of the country. And so, inflation, immigration and disinformation. Disinformation because the country is not having a single conversation about policy. It's having two very different political conversations and you are in your bubble. So, there were very, very few votes that were actually up for grabs. It was more a question of who you could get out, who you could turn out. If there's a surprise, it's that women did not turn out in droves despite the abortion issue, despite the fact that there was a woman on the ticket. And despite the fact that Trump has lots of challenges appealing to women historically. But women overall, white women turned out in favor of Trump.
He also outperformed overall with African-Americans and with Hispanics. And again, this is something that looked pretty clear in earlier polls, but the polls could easily be wrong. And the biggest poll that was wrong, of course, was that Iowa outlier, which wasn't just wrong, it was spectacularly wrong. And I don't know what they got wrong with the methodology, but there you have it. So, that is the point, Trump will be coming back. As of right now, as of I'm taping this, Kamala Harris has not yet conceded, but I have literally no doubt in my mind that she will. That is essential. It's important for the country that everyone agrees on who actually won the election.
There wasn't a lot of uncertainty around the balloting process itself. I've said that before. The US has a gold standard in terms of the way it conducts its elections. That is the case here. There was a lot more effort at disinformation, most notably all of these bomb threats that were called in, particularly in Georgia, in lower income and black polling neighborhoods, that would've hit the Dems but didn't have an impact overall on the election. We'll see whether or not that was Russia that was behind it. I don't think we have any definitive information there. But again, the level of disinformation externally from Russian, from Chinese, from Iranian sources, a nuisance and irritation.
But the problems of the US political system are overwhelmingly domestic problems of the US political system. And that will continue to be the case going forward. Internationally, of course, this is a really big deal because a Trump administration is going to look very different to other countries around the world than a Harris administration would have. I think the biggest question mark out there is for the Europeans. Trump has consistently said that he's going to end this war between Russia and Ukraine in 24 hours. Wouldn't even need to wait until he was president. So, hey, in the next few weeks, it could happen.
Zelensky, Ukrainian President immediately putting out a congratulations to Trump. What a great meeting bilaterally they just had when Zelensky was in the United States, all of that. He has no choice. It's political reality. It's what he needs to do. But when Trump says he wants to end the war, what he means, of course, is that the Ukrainians don't get to keep fighting. The Russians don't get to keep fighting. It means that where the territory lines are right now, that's where they're going to get frozen. And furthermore, that the Trump administration is not going to coordinate with the Europeans. They're going to unilaterally reach out to Zelensky and Putin, and try to dictate those terms.
Might well succeed. It is possible. Zelensky will be under massively greater pressure. But how the Europeans will play that, both with Ukraine themselves as well as inside NATO, inside the European Union. A very big question, a very big problem. Especially as the Europeans who are economically not performing well will also be facing higher tariffs from a Trump administration. Will they align with the United States as they have in the last couple of years? Will they support the United States on China or will they hedge? That's a huge question mark.
The Middle East, there's a war going on right now. Netanyahu just got rid of his Defense Minister. Fired him. He is riding high right now, riding high in terms of internal popularity compared to months ago, in terms of how his war efforts are going in killing the leadership of Hamas, both political and military, as well as major gains with Hezbollah. Netanyahu has a lot of support from Trump. They don't love each other, but they are aligned with each other. And Trump has said he would go harder against Israel's adversaries. He criticized Biden for not giving enough support to the Israelis. Will that embolden Netanyahu to try to take on Iranian nuclear facilities? That's a very interesting question we should watch carefully over the coming weeks.
And then, of course, China, which has an economy that is really underperforming. They're going to feel very defensive right now, reaching out to both people like Robert Lighthizer, who has been pushing hard for more tariffs on all Chinese exports to the US, as well as through third countries. And also reaching out to Elon Musk who's traveled to China, who has a lot of business in China, who's clearly very close to Trump, and who the Chinese will hope is someone they can facilitate an easier, softer relationship with. Will Trump support that? What will that mean for the GOP and Congress, given that you're likely to see a GOP wave across both Senate, clearly they've taken, as well as likely the House at this point. That's also an interesting question. The biggest challenge here is that the backdrop for the Trump administration incoming is a far, far more dangerous world.
Two major wars going on. US, China relations in a more challenging place, though better than they were a year ago. Lots and lots of seriously moving and dangerous pieces geopolitically. And so, in that regard, definitely you would expect that Trump is going to get some wins because he will be the president of the most powerful country in the world. And therefore what he says, countries will listen to more than they would other people when they disagree. But the potential for things to go wrong, if that happens, they'll go much more badly wrong than they did or would have in his first administration.
So, that's where we are. And there's a lot to talk about. Certainly, everything geopolitical is going to be much more uncertain and volatile in the coming months. And I expect to be focused on it closely and chatting with you about it as we go through. That's it for me, and I hope everyone's doing well. Breathe. Very important for people to breathe and I'll talk to you real soon.
Ian Bremmer on the 2024 US election ahead
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your US election week. I'd say happy Election Day, but it seems more a matter of stress and anxiety for most Americans I know. And frankly for most non-Americans I know that are watching it. And in many ways this is really not the election that we want to be having. Not because there's a problem with the electoral process itself, though you wouldn't know that from watching people online. There have been a lot of studies and audits on non-citizens voting, for example, which has gotten a huge amount of attention in Congress recently and on Twitter recently. And virtually no non-citizens are ever on rolls or vote. There was recently a Georgia audit, did a full audit of 8 million people registered and 20 of them, 20, were non-citizens.
You've never had an election remotely swing ... Of illegal voters going to the polls. There are no cyber issues because you're not allowed to vote online. That would be one of the most vulnerable parts of a US election if that wasn't the case. You can track your mail, your vote if you are voting by mail, as I did for example. In almost every state, just in a few non-swing states is it not possible to track exactly the state of your vote. I mean, in many, many ways, this is the kind of an election that you want to have, but people don't believe in it. And by people, I mean Americans and I mean Americans across the political spectrum. And I think there are lots of reasons for that. Why not?
Well one is because $10 billion has been spent on it, $3.5 billion on the presidential election itself. Over 1 billion in Pennsylvania and only a few states matter because this isn't about every vote counting equally. It's an electoral college where only votes in states that could actually swing one way or the other will determine the outcome. And so a lot of people feel like their vote doesn't matter, feel like it's an enormous money suck in spend, and that people that have that influence are the ones that are going to end up mattering and getting the policies that they want and capturing the system so they don't really believe in their democracy.
Then secondly, one of the candidates shouldn't be running. I feel strongly about this. It's only because impeachment no longer functions as a check on executive power that Trump is able to run right now. And he certainly doesn't believe in a free and fair outcome unless he wins. And I think that should be table stakes for an election that both people that are running have to be prepared to accept the outcome no matter what happens. Certainly, I would accept the outcome. I did in 2016 when Trump won and I considered him my president. And I did in 2020 when Biden won and I considered him my president too. And it doesn't really matter if I like the outcome or not. The point is that's what an election is all about. But increasingly, not in the United States and certainly not this time around. And that is a very big concern.
I am worried about the state of America's political institutions, not about the state of democracy everywhere around the world. I don't think this is a problem, a structural problem in most democracies. I think Canada is just fine. The UK and Germany and Japan and South Korea and Australia and New Zealand, plenty of democracies around the world that function well. The United States, we are watching these institutions erode real time. The legitimacy that American citizens hold for their elections, for their executive, for Congress, even for their court system, the Supreme Court, certainly for the media. Basically for anyone and any institution that is in a position of a authority and power, increasingly the belief that American citizens have in those institutions is eroding.
And that has led to a long, particularly divisive electoral cycle where Americans might as well exist in two different planets in terms of what they do and don't believe about the candidates and about the vote. And I think it's a real problem. I think that's been true for the coverage that we've seen over the past week. Some of you may have seen me go after so many of the media institutions for saying that Trump had announced that he wanted Liz Cheney killed or executed at a firing squad, which he didn't say and which was complete crap. It was garbage. And this was a major headline for two days across the mainstream media. And if you think mainstream media is bad, social media is even worse. The amount of active disinformation, lying, fake news that's being algorithmically promoted, including particularly by Elon Musk, the owner of Twitter, X, which is where a lot of people get their political information. And don't even get me started on citizen journalism, which is even more biased than actual journalism, just without any of the expertise.
And as a consequence of that, almost everyone I know today believes some things about politics that are clearly not true. Now, I am not going to tell you who to vote for. I'm not going to make an endorsement. I think that, you, the voters get to make up your mind for yourself. I will tell you who I voted for. I voted for Kamala Harris. This probably does not surprise people. I am not a Democrat. I have never been a member of any political party and certainly pre-Trump, I have voted for Democrats and Republicans and I continue to vote for people on the basis of who I think they are as candidates. But I am unprepared to accept someone that is unwilling to accept a democratic process, the outcome of a free and fair election. I am convinced, completely convinced that whether Harris wins or loses, she will accept the outcome. I'm completely convinced of that. And I am also convinced that if Trump loses, he will not accept the outcome.
And that for me is foundational, irrespective of what I think about their policies on other things. In part because I think the presidency is constrained, and in part because I think at this point American institutions are increasingly vulnerable. So in other words, I think those things matter. Look, I clearly would make a lot more money under Trump. First time around, Trump reduced corporate taxes, he reduced taxes on the wealthy, he reduced regulatory restrictions in lots of ways. I mean, private equity firms did really well and real estate companies. And as someone who started my own company and has built it up globally, Trump is great from a financial perspective. I don't care. Also, he's great for political risk. I mean, there's more international uncertainty and volatility. And so my firm, Eurasia Group that is focused on that would do better in that environment. I don't care. That is not the point.
I consider Trump to be the most unfit person for office I have ever encountered with political ambitions. I felt that way when he was a Democrat. I feel that way now that he is a Republican. I don't think the party affiliation matters. He certainly isn't ideological. It's just about him. And for me, that is a serious, serious problem. But whatever you do, you can agree with me, you can disagree with me. As you would know, I don't mind if you disagree with me. It's not a problem. It's not fundamental. Doesn't mean you can't be my friend, certainly doesn't mean you can't follow me. But whatever you do, if you're in the United States and you're a citizen, do not opt out of the process. Our ancestors, my grandmother, grandfathers, did everything they could to get to this country. Heck, historically, some of them, many of them committed unspeakable atrocities to clear the land of the folks that were actually living here before.
Do not dishonor all of that by thinking that you don't need to put in any work, that it doesn't matter. There's a lot of things that are broken about the US political system, but none that are so broken that we can give up ... And none that you can wash your hands of it and say, "There's nothing I can do. My voice doesn't matter. I'm giving up. I'm not putting in any work."
And the most limited amount of work that you can possibly put in is voting. And I think that voting with your heart and with your head is the absolute minimum obligation that we all have as citizens. I am proud and patriotic to exercise mine as I always do. And you should be yours too. And again, you heard who I'm voting for. You can tell me who you're voting for if you want or you cannot. Again, it's a secret ballot and this is a free country. And the important thing is that you speak your mind and when you agree or disagree, you tell people that too. So happy Election Day, for what it's worth, I'm sure this too shall pass and I'll talk to you all on the other side. Take care.
A global leadership void and ongoing wars
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody, Ian Bremmer here, and a Quick Take to kick off your week. I am here in Tokyo, Japan. Just got back from Beijing. Being in this part of the world has me thinking a little bit about the state of our world and leadership, or should I say, the lack thereof. Those of you following me know I talk about a G-zero world, not a G-7, not a G-20, a place where we lack global leadership, and that has been so clear, thinking about the wars that continue, between Israel and Palestine, and now Lebanon, and more broadly in the Middle East, and between Russia and Ukraine, and increasingly NATO in Europe.
I think about the fact that all over the world, everyone wants these wars to be over. They're causing enormous amounts of suffering, displacement of human beings, massive war crimes, but they persist. It's worth thinking about what that means in terms of leadership because when we talk about the Middle East, and Israel-Palestine in particular, the United States is the most powerful ally of Israel, overwhelmingly in terms of its political and diplomatic support, its economic support, technological support, its military aid and training and intelligence. And yet, over the last year, the United States has had virtually no influence in the ability to contain, constrain, or end this war, irrespective of all the suffering.
You can complain about the United States on that with good reason, but then you look at Russia-Ukraine, and you see that over the last three years, China's been, by far, the most powerful friend and supporter of Russia, massive amounts of trade only expanding and dual-use technologies and diplomatic support. Yet, despite that, China has been unwilling to use any influence on Russia to try to bring the war to the end.
Now, to be clear, both the United States and China say all the right things. In Beijing, I was hearing from the leaders that they're friends with the Ukrainians and they maintain stable relations, and of course they want the war over, and they respect Ukrainian territorial integrity. And of course, the Americans support a two-state solution for the Palestinians and want to ensure that they get humanitarian aid and want to see a ceasefire happen, but I mean, the revealed preferences of both of these countries is their willingness to do anything about it is virtually zero. The Chinese don't care about the Ukrainians ultimately. That's what we're learning over the last few years. The Americans don't care about the Palestinians ultimately. That's what we've learned over the last year.
Absent leadership from the two most powerful countries in the world, where do you think we're going to get geopolitically? The answer is, to a much more dangerous place. That's the concern. I don't see that changing, particularly whether we have a Harris or a Trump presidency. I don't see that changing whether we have a Xi or a Xi presidency in China. It's not like they're making any real choices going forward. But look, maybe I'll be surprised. And certainly, it would be nice if no matter who wins, this was a topic of conversation between the Americans and the Chinese. That, "Hey, China. If you'd be willing to do a little bit more with Russia, we'd be willing to do a little bit more with Israel." I mean, frankly, at the end of the day, that's the kind of horse-trading I think we could really use diplomatically. Right now, that's a conversation that hasn't happened yet, but maybe it will.
That's it for me, and I'll talk to y'all real soon.
Israel's next move
And secondly, the US Treasury Department has announced additional sanctions against tankers that have shut off their transponders and are helping the Iranians to illegally export significant amounts of sanction-breaking oil. Prices can go up on the back of that. An unusual thing for the Americans to do a few weeks before the election, but shows just how concerned they are about potential escalation in the region. So let me give you some context here. First point. On the one hand, the Americans have sent THAAD systems to Israel before. So it's not like there aren't any American soldiers on the ground operating in Israel. This is not such a game-changer. In fact, such a decision was made not only years ago, but also after October 7th. But it is notable that it comes a year later on the back of potential significant escalation, both in the Northern front that we're already seeing and with Iran that we might be.
Second point is that the oil prices continue to be a little bit under 80 bucks. OPEC has a lot of spare capacity they could put on the market. China continues to have pretty poor numbers in terms of demand. So this isn't likely to have the American move to hit more Iranian oil, isn't likely to have a lot of impact in terms of oil prices. But if the Americans could have stopped what is right now 1.5 million barrels of Iranian export if they could have taken that down and the Iranians are using that money to pay for the Axis of Resistance that's targeting not only Israel but targeting ships in the Middle East, targeting American and UK military assets, why did Biden wait? Why is it only being announced now? And why is it only being announced now in a way that seems to be a gimme for the Israeli Prime Minister and his government in return for not engaging in significant retaliatory escalation against the Iranians?
This is a US policy that continues to look very weak, that continues to be out of step with most of its allies at this point. You see even French President Macron saying that he doesn't want to provide any more military support for Israel. Of course, it's easy for him to say that. He doesn't provide much to begin with. If it was a significant export, I'm sure Macron wouldn't be saying that. But nonetheless, the Americans are on really one very isolated side at this point compared to the rest of the international community, whether you like the United States or you don't. And their ability to influence the Israeli government appears to be virtually zero. And that has been shown with the recent attacks by the Israeli Defense Forces against UN peacekeepers in Lebanon. And we've seen that on the back of those attacks that the United States, France, Spain, Italy, which is a strong right-wing government, but also has a thousand peacekeepers on the ground in Lebanon, all strongly condemning the Israelis for making these attacks.
But not prepared to actually do anything in response and certainly not making the Israelis feel like they need to stop. Now the Israeli perspective is these peacekeepers have not been capable of upholding Security Council resolution that required that Hezbollah pull back from the border area, a buffer zone, that they've been launching military strikes against Israel. And that also Hezbollah fighters are essentially using the presence of the peacekeepers as shields. And that they're operating not on the peacekeeper's bases but in proximity, which makes it harder for the Israelis to go after them. That certainly doesn't justify firing directly on the peacekeepers base, which has happened, and which now the IDF says a mistake. In return, the Israeli Prime Minister has called on the UN Secretary-General to withdraw the peacekeepers. I find it implausible that the Israeli Prime Minister doesn't realize that the Secretary-General has actually no authority over the peacekeepers.
They're sent there on the basis of the Security Council. So in other words, if the Israeli Prime Minister wants to make a demand, he's making it of the permanent members of the Security Council like the United States and China and France, the UK and Russia. He apparently doesn't want to make that statement. But again, the point here is the comparative impunity, and the major headlines, of course, are in the last 24 hours, around four Israeli soldiers that have been targeted and killed, as well as a large number of injuries on Israeli military bases by Hezbollah drones. Hezbollah is much more capable than Hamas has been, and there will be more significant Israeli casualties as this war continues. But most of the casualties, of course, even though it's not most of the headlines, will be among the Lebanese, among the Hezbollah fighters, and among the Lebanon civilian population, of which we've seen about 2,000 killed so far.
And that is because the military dominance in the region, again, both offense and defense and intelligence and surveillance, is overwhelmingly in the hands of Israel. So if there's going to be significant escalation in the war going forward, that escalation will be decided overwhelmingly by the Israeli government. And so that's what is particularly interesting to watch over the coming weeks. I am not expecting very much against Iran, frankly. The fact that the Israelis have already waited for a couple of weeks takes a lot of the urgency out of that. The fact that the Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has said, "It will be the time of our choosing and what we do, they'll know that it was us, but they won't know how we did it," implies something that is a much more targeted attack than lots and lots of bombs raining down against, you know, sort of a nuclear facility or against oil production.
It would not surprise me if it was a high-level assassination, for example, against the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the IRGC. Especially because we already saw that when the Trump administration assassinated Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian response was virtually nothing. So there's precedent for that, and the Iranians have very little at this point that they can do that wouldn't hurt them a hell of a lot more than they can hurt Israel or Israel's allies. So that's where we are right now. A war that continues to escalate with a lot of suffering on the back of it. An incredibly ineffective US policy in the region, and everybody else pretty much sitting on the sidelines.
How October 7th changed Israel and the Middle East
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. It is October 7th, and that means one year since Hamas perpetrated the worst terrorist attacks since 9/11. Almost 1,200 Israelis dead, mostly civilians, and still a hundred plus held hostage from that day a year ago. Not much progress on that latter front or on a ceasefire. Not much progress in the region since then. What it did do, of course, on October 7th, is it outraged and unified what had been a very divided Israeli population, divided with massive internal demonstrations on domestic political issues. And suddenly the only issue that mattered was responding to, redressing those attacks, whether you're on the left or the right in Israel and being able to defend the Israeli homeland and get the hostages back.
On the former, they've certainly been effective, hitting back as hard as possible. We've seen that Hamas today is a shell of what it was on October 7th a year ago. The leadership mostly dead. The weapons caches mostly destroyed. The tunnels mostly sealed. Hezbollah, the most powerful non-state military actor in the world, has been damaged critically, and they started rocket attacks against Israel a day after the October 7th terrorist attacks. Israel has now opened up a second front, really the primary front now in the war, and after a couple of weeks of that war, Hezbollah's leadership is dead. Their communication capacity was critically destroyed. The war is ongoing but is certainly not going well for Hezbollah. On the one hand, you've seen a major escalation from the rockets and the bombing happening in Gaza to a ground war across the entirety of that territory now to Lebanon and with significant shots fired missiles and the rest military operations with Iran's other proxies, the Houthis and Yemen, Shia militants in Syria and Iraq, and of course involving Iran itself.
On the other hand, the capacity of these proxy organizations to escalate in return is now far, far less capable, far less serious. Hamas cannot threaten Israel the way they could on October 7th. Hezbollah certainly far, far diminished in their ability to escalate even if they want to. Two big questions are remaining. First, Iran. They are a country that still has all sorts of capabilities to escalate if they wish, possibly not effectively against Israel itself, but against the West, against the world. If they wanted to, they could completely disrupt oil tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and as a consequence, ensure that much of the oil that comes out of the Middle East, not just Iran's one and a half million barrels a day of export but from the Gulf states is stuck in place. And that would mean oil prices towards $150, even in a depressed demand environment as we see now, and a global recession.
So Iran's capacity, if they want to escalate, is far, far greater than that of Hezbollah or Hamas or anyone else in the region. And they have shown themselves to be quite risk-averse in response to Israeli strikes against Iranian leaders across the region, military leaders, and also against Hamas leadership in Tehran. And that was true back in April, and that was true back a week ago. But still, we are awaiting what is almost certainly going to be an Israeli response, a military response, against Iran for the 180 ballistic missiles that they launched against Israel with no fatalities in Israel. One in the West Bank of a Palestinian, but nonetheless, certainly could have caused a lot of people to be killed. And we will see if that the Israeli response leads to further Iranian escalation. I am at this point hopeful, and I would even say optimistic, that it does not, but optimism feels like exactly the wrong word to describe any of this in the region.
Then the second big question remaining is about the devastation on the ground. In Gaza, for the last year, a million and a half Palestinians are now living on the back of humanitarian aid of on average 125-ish trucks coming in a day. That's compared to 800 to 1000 on average before October 7th. As well as all of those tunnels which have now been sealed, they brought a lot of arms and illicit goods in. They also brought things like food, luxury food stuffs, and other things that you could buy on the gray market in Gaza. Those are closed, and there's no Gaza economy. There's no local Gaza agriculture right now. So the 1.5 million Palestinians are living in an absolutely unimaginable condition on single-digit percentage calories, many of them, in terms of consumption from what they would have been living on before October 7th.
Then you have the West Bank, which has been indirectly involved in the fighting. There's been a lot of skirmishing, a lot of shooting, a lot of people getting killed. And then also Israeli settlers and the IDF taking and securing more land from the Palestinians there. Then of course, in Lebanon in the last two weeks, you have over a million Lebanese who have been displaced from that fighting. Far more will be displaced in all likelihood in the coming weeks. All of this from a humanitarian perspective unacceptable by any yardstick. The United States seen by most of the world as complicit in watching it and not providing the either restraint on Israel or the humanitarian support effectively to help ensure that the suffering is reduced. And of course, this is going to cause hatred and radicalization for generations. And antisemitism was already way too high and on an upswing before October 7th, certainly only greater in this environment a year later.
And of course, with all of this, we don't know what's going to happen with upcoming elections. Kamala Harris came out on "60 Minutes" and described the United States as the best friend of the Israeli people around the world, refused to say whether or not the US was an ally of Prime Minister Netanyahu himself. A very strained relationship between the United States and the Israeli Prime Minister today. While former President Trump came out publicly in the last few days and said that the Israeli government, the Israeli military, should actively take out Iran's nuclear capabilities. So frankly, I would say between Harris and Trump, their policies, their orientation specifically on the Middle East and the Israeli wars in Gaza, in Lebanon, and the fighting we're seeing with Iran, probably the biggest difference on foreign policy between those two candidates would be on this issue. And we will find out in a month plus who is going to lead the United States, but utterly critical as we think about the future of this conflict in the region.
So that is where we are a year after the October 7th terrorist attacks, and now very deep in expanding war that is affecting much of the region. And I will continue to talk about it and follow it for you. So I hope everyone's going well, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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