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Will Marine Le Pen's conviction really keep her out of French politics?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. Turning to France where Marine Le Pen, who has long been the leader of the National Front, now renamed National Rally Party, and principal contender her party to win French elections in 2027, which would be an absolute turning point in French elections, as meaningful for France as Trump's second win in 2024 in the United States, has been found guilty in a criminal court in France of embezzlement charges up to $500,000 directly and millions of dollars in terms of mishandling the way European funds were being used for staffers, including her sister and her best friend and a bodyguard. Not a political case at all, actually just a criminal court. Nobody arguing that the judge is particularly politicized here. And while two of the years of the jail term's suspended, the first two years, she has to wear an ankle bracelet. So we'll probably get a video of that real soon. I'm sure it'll be fashionable, since it's France.
But the point is, this would prevent her from running in 2027. And that would mean that Bardella, who is number two essentially in that party, all of 29 years old, nowhere near as popular as Le Pen and would completely tank the ability of the National Rally to win, would become the candidate. It is too early to say that this ban is going to stand up. She has an appeals process. She can bring it to the French equivalent of the Supreme Court, a constitutional counsel, to answer what'll be called a priority question of whether her immediate five-year ban from politics before her appeals against the conviction can stand as valid. And there's a very good argument that has been made in the plaintiff's favor in recent cases that this would not stand. And that while her appeals are going on, she would still be eligible to run, and indeed, she'd be able to go through this appeals process through 2027.
So what now looks like and is being reported in the English language press as she's being thrown out of politics probably isn't going to stand. So in other words, Le Pen out for now. Le Pen probably back soon. And France, in 2027, a really significant, maybe watershed moment from where European politics are going to go. Because if you look at politics right now, you have Friedrich Merz, probably shortly after Easter going to be putting together his grand coalition government, very strongly pro-Europe, very centrist government. You have Meloni, who certainly has a good relationship with Trump, but nonetheless, very strongly pro-EU and very much wanting to act as a bridge to support the EU in using her relations in the United States to be effective in that regard. Macron same, and even Keir Starmer in the UK, post-Brexit, yes, but wanting to be seen as a European leader. Hence taking the lead with Macron in all of these Ukraine summits. That's for now.
But as we look forward to what politics in 2027, '28, '29 look like in Europe, we could easily see that in Germany, suddenly Alternative für Deutschland could do better. Especially if the economy is not doing well. And could force the Germans to be in a position where they would have to enter a coalition with them. In France, very much the National Rally Party and Le Pen still in contention. In the UK, the Reform Party in contention too. So the end of Trump's term for Europe and the transatlantic relationships looks radically different than the beginning of Trump's term. And today's news headlines on France are a blip, not a structural shift. Watch this space as Le Pen is still very relevant indeed. That's it from me, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Leaked Signal chat shows Trump team's mindset
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take on the back of the full transcript of these Signal chat that's going on about the bombing of the Houthis. A few things here. First of all, are we surprised that a journalist is actually publishing what is clearly classified data? And there's no question, it's classified data. I mean, you're talking about the targets, the exact timing in advance of US military strikes, incredibly sensitive information, against people that are described as terrorists in the chat. And clearly, if that information had gotten out in advance when Jeffrey Goldberg had received it in real time, it would have put the operation at risk. It would have prevented it from going on. It would have been denounced as leaking classified information, and he would be facing some legal charges from the administration. So I don't think it's credible to say that this is not classified.
But since Trump and members of administration have now said that it isn't classified, there was nothing classified in it, I guess that provides legal cover since it is ultimately in the charge of the president to be able to determine, as president, whether or not something is classified. That there's nothing illegal in Goldberg and the Atlantic Magazine now taking all of that information and putting it out to the public. So is that embarrassing for the US with its allies in terms of how they're handling such a chat? The answer is of course, yes. And I expect that we're going to see a significant amount of continued focus on this topic. A lot of people are going to be asking questions about how it was that this conversation could have been had on Signal and also how it was that Goldberg could have been brought on board. But say that as it may. I mean if you are the Trump administration here, it is age-old tactic, full denial responsibility is actually of your political adversaries so blame Goldberg. Imply that maybe he tried to get on the call through nefarious ways.
It's all his fault. It's overstated. He's a fake news, no news journalist. No one should pay attention to him. He's a bad guy. I mean all of that stuff. And I was particularly bemused by Elon Musk sharing a post from the Babylon Bee saying that, "If you wanted to ensure that nobody ever saw information you'd put it on page 2 of the Atlantic." And of course, that is true for Elon, and it's true for Trump supporters. And this is why the strategy works, is because the Atlantic and the people that read the Atlantic and support the Atlantic are all considered disinformation by those that are loyal to Trump. And vice versa. Fox, and Newsmax and all of the right-wing podcasts. Those are considered fake news by people that don't support, that dislike Trump. And that allows a strategy of full denial, not engaging with the facts and blaming those that are coming after you to be successful. Now, I still think that there are interesting pieces of information here.
Perhaps the most important is that the actual policy conversation, not the details of the war fighting itself, but rather whether or not it was a good idea to be attacking the Houthis, in a big way that was potentially going to increase energy prices. And that was much less of a fight of the Americans than it would be of those in the region that are engaged in the direct proxy war with Iran or the Europeans who have a lot more directly at stake, in terms of their trade in transit. And that was a very reasonable question, and it was strongly, in other words, Vice President Vance opposed these strikes and he's the most important person. He's the most senior ranking person in this chat. Trump isn't on the chat. And he's not saying the president is wrong. He's saying, "I don't believe the president is fully informed and this clearly is not in his interest, in his policy interest."
Now, the reason this is important is because in Trump's first term, I think you would have had a very similar conversation from people like Mike Pence and Mike Pompeo and others that would have been on this chat, but then they would have brought it to the president. And many, many instances in the first term of policy disagreements that then came up and said, "Mr. President. Respectfully, we think we've got additional information and we can better carry out your will by doing X, Y, and Z." And there were checks. There were internal checks on executive authority. What we see this time around is we see JD Vance, who's obviously a very smart guy saying, "I think this is a really bad idea. We shouldn't be doing it, but I'm prepared not to raise it to the president unless I have everybody around me supporting me because I can't do this by myself. I'm just going to get my head chopped off." And there's a little bit of back and forth.
And Stephen Miller, the deputy chief of staff for policy in the White House and a full-on Trump loyalist, says, "Nope, the president wants this. I'm ending the conversation." And that's the end of the conversation, and it never gets to Trump. And then they go ahead and they bomb. So whatever you think about whether this was a good or a bad decision, the challenge here is that we have a big cabinet, some of whom are very capable, some of whom are absolutely not capable. But first and foremost is not getting the best information to the president because he's extremely confident. He believes that his policies are always the right ones, and he is absolutely punishing anything that feels like disloyalty, inside or outside of his team. That's why Pompeo, for example, John Bolton, have had their security details stripped away. Even though the Iranian government has been trying to assassinate them, right? Why? Because they were disloyal to Trump. That's not why they're trying to assassinate him. That's why Trump took away their security detail and that is a very strong message to everybody that is on this chat.
And I do worry, I worry that the three most powerful men in power today around the world, all in their 70s, Trump, Putin, and Xi Jinping, are also men that are incredibly confident about the rightness of their views. That loyalty is the key to the most important currency of power that exists inside those systems. And increasingly, they're not getting good information from their own advisers. That's a dangerous place for the world to be. It's a dangerous place for the world to be heading, and that's frankly the most important thing that I took out of this chat. So that's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon, thanks.
What Trump team's war plans leak revealed
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here, and a Quick Take on this extraordinary story in The Atlantic. Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of this magazine, invited into a Signal chat, the Signal app, by the national security advisor, Michael Waltz, with all of the major national security related principles in the Trump administration, to discuss imminent attacks by the United States on the Houthis in Yemen, the single biggest war fighting that the Trump administration has been involved in the first two months of their term. A lot to think about here, a few points I think worth mentioning.
The first point, it's pretty clear this should not have happened. A discussion of this sort, classified, involving direct war preparation, should not have been happening on Signal, but clearly everyone in the conversation was aware and okay with that. So, I don't think you blame singularly Mike Waltz for the fact that he was the guy that happened to bring the outsider inadvertently in. This collective responsibility, everyone, this is the way the Trump administration is handling these sensitive national security conversations, that is what needs to be looked into and rectified going forward. Mike definitely made a mistake here, and what seems almost certainly to be the case is that he thought he was including the US trade representative, Jamieson Greer, JG, same initials as Jeffrey Goldberg - and The Atlantic editor-in-chief, and he's the only obvious person, Greer, that otherwise wasn't on this broader conversation. So, I would bet my bottom dollar that is the way this happened. And I think all the people that are calling for Mike Waltz to be fired, I certainly wouldn't let him go for that. The issue is the broader lack of operational security around war decisions and fighting.
Now, as to the actual content of the conversations, frankly, I found all of the people involved to be pretty reasonable, especially in the context of how generally unprepared President Trump himself is on matters of national security. So, the fact that Vice President JD Vance was worried about the inconsistency of going to war for something that he doesn't think is a clear and direct US interest, that the US economy would be limited in terms of the impact of it, and this isn't really an American issue in the way that Trump defines American issues and war, that strikes me as not disloyal, but indeed the reality that Vance is aware of the fact that Trump doesn't know a lot of these details. But he doesn't want to bring it to Trump individually. Why not? Because he's going to get his head handed to him if he brings bad news to Trump unless everybody is on board, and of course, everybody isn't on board. There's some reasonable discussion around that, including with the defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, and then finally Stephen Miller, deputy chief of staff and head of policy in the White House, is the one that cuts it off because, why? He's the guy that is saying, "Trump says he wants it, we're going to do it." In other words, you've got to be completely loyal to Trump, that's it. And that's exactly what we've seen from this second administration, what Trump wants, Trump gets.
Now, another interesting point here is that the Europeans are not considered allies by this group across the board. Should be clear from anybody that has seen Vance in Munich, anyone that has seen the recent interview between the US Special Envoy Witkoff and Tucker Carlson, a number of other places where that's happened. But the point is that the entire Trump cabinet is basically saying, "We shouldn't be helping the Europeans, and if we have to help the Europeans, and Lord knows we shouldn't, we have to ensure that they directly pay for American help, American assistance." This is not collective security. This is completely transactional. Also, you got a lot of that about el-Sisi in Egypt, someone that Trump has been very supportive of, and indeed the US provides more support to Egypt than any other country militarily in the world except Israel. So the last few months you would've thought that Egypt would've been an exception there. From what we've seen from the cabinet, apparently not. Certainly a concern in terms of what Egypt is and is not willing to do on the ground in Gaza for Trump. That relationship seems pretty dicey.
Final point here, Jeffrey Goldberg deserves credit. I know that Elon in particular likes to say a lot that the public is now the media, but it turns out that well-trained journalists have standards and those standards are important. I have had my disagreements with what Goldberg has had to say. Some of his positions over the years, support for the Iraq War, for example, lots of other things, but in terms of his professionalism, as soon as he realized that he had been invited into something that was an authentic conversation about actual war plans and fighting, he got out and he told Waltz that he had been mistakenly invited. He made the public aware of what was going on without divulging any of the direct war plans or outing intelligence, active intelligence member that was part of it, all of those things, it was absolutely the right thing to do. He's now getting smeared by Hegseth, the secretary of defense, who was clearly embarrassed by his own mistake and his participation and culpability in all of this. He personally won't take responsibility as we so frequently see with our political leaders and never should have gotten confirmed, in my view and in the view of many Republican senators who weren't willing to go out publicly because of course they were fearful for their own careers. But Jeff Goldberg has done the right thing in terms of his career and I commend him for it.
That's it for me. I'll talk to y'all real soon.
Is Europe in trouble as the US pulls away?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: I want to talk about the transatlantic relationship. The US relationship with Europe. Because of all of the geopolitics in the world, this is the one that I think has been impacted in a permanent and structural way in the first two months of the Trump administration. I wouldn't say that, for example, look at the Middle East and US relations with Israel, the Saudis, the Emiratis, the rest of the Gulf States, frankly, all very comfortable with Trump. If there's a significant change, I would say it's incrementally more engaged, and in terms of worldview than under the Biden administration. Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, you look at Asia relations and certainly Trump and the US on trade worrying them, making them sort of react in a more defensive posture. Seeing how much, how more quickly, they can get something to the US that will lead to trying to diffuse potential conflict there. But not radically different from the way they thought about the United States in 2017 in the first Trump term.
Mexico, Canada, Panama, here you've got countries that are facing very significant challenges from the United States, but also ultimately understand that they have no other options. Now, in Canada, that's a bigger fight because there are elections coming up at the end of April. But after those elections are over, I certainly expect that they will move quickly to try to ensure that ongoing relations are functional and stable. That's already true for the Mexican government with a president who has 85% approval, can do pretty much everything necessary to ensure that US-Mexico relations aren't dramatically impacted by everything Trump is demanding. So that's everywhere else.
But in Europe, that's just not the case. Three different reasons why the Europeans are facing a much more permanent impact. The first is on the trade side, like everybody else, and trade is well within the European Union's competency. They understand that they have leverage. If the Americans are going to hit them with significant tariffs, they're going to hit back with the same numbers. But that doesn't mean it's going to be relatively difficult and take a long time to resolve it, as opposed to places that are much weaker where they just fold quickly to the United States. Okay, fair enough. But still, that's not all that dramatically different from first term. Second point is there's a war going on in Ukraine, and the United States has made it very clear that they want to engage, to re-engage with Putin, who is Europe's principal enemy. And they're going to do that irrespective of how much the Europeans oppose it, and they're not going to take any European input in those conversations.
Trump would like a rapprochement with Russia to include a Ukrainian ceasefire. But if that doesn't happen, he is oriented towards blaming the Ukrainians for it, towards taking Kremlin talking points on Ukraine not really being a country, and then on moving to ensure that US-Russia relations are functional again. All of that is deeply concerning, is existentially concerning, particularly for a bunch of European countries that are on the front lines spending a lot more in defense, not because the Americans are telling them to, but because they're worried about Russia themselves, feel like they have to be more independent. Then finally, because Europe is the supranational political experiment that relies most on common values and rule of law, and the United States under Trump is undoing that component of the US-led order specifically.
I wouldn't necessarily say that about collective security or existing alliances and willingness to provide some sort of defense umbrella, but I would certainly say that in terms of rule of law and territorial integrity. And here, the fact that the United States no longer really cares about territorial integrity, is prepared to tell Denmark, "Hey, you're not a good ally. You're not defending Greenland. We're interested in moving forward ourselves, and we don't care how you've treated us historically. We're going to send our leaders and we're going to cut our own deal inside your territory." That's exactly the way the Germans felt when JD Vance said that he wanted to engage directly with the Alternatives für Deutschland, who the Germans consider to be a neo-Nazi party.
Everything that's core to the Europeans in their statehood and in the EU, the United States under Trump is on the other side of that, and it's increasingly conflictual. It's directly adversarial. And so I would say number one, the Europeans are aware of these problems. Number two, they're taking them late, but nonetheless finally very seriously. And so they understand that the Europeans are going to have to create an independent strategy for their own self-defense, for their national security, for their political stability, for their democracies, and they have to do that outside of the United States. In fact, they have to do that and defend themselves against the United States.
Now that reality doesn't mean they're going to be successful. And indeed, the more summits I see on Ukraine, frankly the less I have been convinced that the Europeans will be able to do enough, quick enough to really help Ukraine dramatically cut a better deal with the Russian Federation that is very uninterested in doing anything that is sustainable for the Ukrainians long term. It makes me worry that the EU longer term is not fit for purpose in an environment where the principle, the most powerful actors don't care about rule of law. The United States, China, and for Europe, Russia right on their borders. So for all of those reasons, I mean, the European markets have gone up recently. European growth expectations have gone up because the Germans and others are planning on spending a lot more, that's short-term. Long-term here. I worry that the Europeans are in an awful lot of trouble. So something we'll be focusing on very closely going forward over the coming weeks and months. I hope you all are well, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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What will Trump offer Putin in Ukraine ceasefire talks?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. Tomorrow is the call between President Trump and President Putin. The most important geopolitical discussion I would argue that we have seen so far of the Trump administration. Look, what we've had so far has been a move towards a ceasefire. Trump beating up on the Ukrainians, on President Zelensky in particular, which is comparatively easy to do. They are in a much weaker position. That's particularly easy to do if you don't feel like you need to be in lockstep with NATO allies, with the Europeans, with the Canadians. And as a consequence, Trump, off-again and now on-again relationship with the Ukrainian president, has now gotten Ukraine to agree to a one-month ceasefire with no preconditions. And that's definitely progress. And the Europeans are all on board and supportive of that.
That is closer to a ceasefire than Biden certainly ever got the Ukrainians. And though I would argue, it has certainly caused a lot of concern among US allies of whether or not the Americans can be counted on long-term. In the near term, it makes it easier and more likely to get to an end of the war than we were a month ago. And frankly, I think we would've been better off if Biden had been more willing to push Zelensky and push the European allies, and show that American power recognized that Ukraine was weakening in their position, vis-a-vis Russia and that the war was only leading to more expense and more lives being lost on both sides. And so, pushing for a shorter-term ceasefire was an important thing to do.
They weren't willing to expend much political capital. They certainly weren't willing to upset people, and as a consequence, we didn't get there. That's the good news is that we now have Zelensky in a position with everybody on board on the Western side, that a ceasefire should be agreed to, and nothing else needs to be discussed. That, of course, is not the Putin position. And now a much harder point, a much more challenging point, and open to question, is to what degree is Trump when push comes to shove, prepared to hurt Putin. Because of the earlier call that the two men had, 90 minutes long, and then the follow-up conversation in Riyadh between the cabinet members of both countries, that was easy.
That was, "Hey, Biden wouldn't talk to you. I'm willing to talk to you. Let's talk broadly about things we might be able to do together. We can talk about investment. We can talk about strategy. We can talk about the Arctic. We can talk about arms control. And yes, we can talk about Ukraine." And nothing was being forced for the Russians to agree with. This was all upside, especially because it was just a bilateral conversation. The Ukrainians weren't involved. The Europeans were involved. It's exactly the format that Putin wants to support. But now we have the Ukrainians saying they'll support a one-month ceasefire with no preconditions. What about Russia?
Because if Russia comes out of this phone call with Trump and says, "That's it, there's no pathway. I refuse to accept what you're putting forward." Well, then either Trump looks really weak for having gotten the Ukrainians to the table but not the Russians' table, isn't prepared to do anything about it. Or he has to actually follow through with some level of strikes, sanctions, economic strikes against Putin and further support to Ukraine, which is not, of course, at all where Trump wants to be. That will escalate the fighting. It won't lead the fighting to an end. So, what really matters here is how much is Trump prepared to offer to Putin when he drives a harder bargain than Zelensky was driving. And how much is Trump prepared to give away?
And I mean, from Putin's perspective, he wants to test that proposition. Ideally, for Putin, Putin gets enough that Trump says yes, and that Ukraine says no and ruins the conversation, and Ukraine is blamed for not wanting peace. And then the Americans and the Russians can go forth and build their own broader engagement, bilaterally over the heads of the Europeans, and the Ukrainians are the problem and the Europeans are stuffed. That is Putin's ideal outcome, but it's not clear he can get to that ideal outcome. Because if he pushes Trump too hard and it blows up, then suddenly he's angry, he's embarrassed. And he's also much more powerful than the Russians, and he's willing to talk to the Europeans in that environment. It's exactly what the Russians don't want.
If you're Putin, you push, but you also don't want this conversation to blow up. So, you want to see how much you get for Trump, but you also want to get to yes. And so, really, the question is not how much Putin ends up giving up. It's really about whether or not Trump makes it easy on Putin. And there are lots of reasons to believe that he will. So far, he has been willing proactively to say that Ukraine should never join NATO. Well, that wasn't a part of the one-month ceasefire that the Ukrainians agreed to, but it might be a requirement for Putin. Trump throws that out. Does that then blow up the Ukrainian conversation?
Trump has also said that Ukraine's not going to get all of their land, but he hasn't made that a condition of the one-month ceasefire. Does Putin require that? Does Trump say yes? It's a fairly easy give for Trump, except it's not been coordinated with the Ukrainians. Are the Ukrainians prepared to accept that? By the way, that would be the minimum table stakes that I think Putin would demand since Trump has effectively already given them away. Now, he could go much harder than that. He's also talked about wanting formal recognition over some of the territories that Russia presently occupies.
Might the United States directly be willing to recognize that territory? Ukraine wouldn't have to, but the United States would. I think that's a bad idea in a first-phase agreement, where the Russians can come right back and start fighting at the end of 30 days. But it's possible that Trump would be willing to give it away. Putin has said that he refuses to allow a 30-day ceasefire to be an opportunity for the Ukrainians to reconsolidate their military, which is facing pretty much a lot of hardship right now. They don't have as much artillery, they don't have as much ammunition, and they've also been bleeding recruits.
Is Trump willing to say, "Okay, for 30 days, I'm going to re-suspend aid to the Ukrainians?" I could see him doing that. But I can't see Trump saying that the Europeans are going to re-suspend aid to Ukraine over those 30 days. And certainly, I don't see the Europeans agreeing to that by themselves. And well, would Russia agree to a deal that doesn't have the Europeans in that environment? Might the Americans re-suspend intelligence aid to Ukraine over those 30 days? In principle, maybe you don't need that. If there's no fighting going on, maybe the intelligence isn't such a problem. So, that could be an easier give for Trump to offer that Zelensky wouldn't have a problem with.
And then there are broader issues of, for example, the Americans withdrawing forward troop deployments that are presently rotating in the Baltic states. For example, something that would make it feel that the United States is no longer as much of a threat with NATO to Russia, a give to the Russians. Finally, you could imagine the United States being willing to take some sanctions off. This is undermining the common position with the Europeans but is less of a direct problem for Zelensky than saying you don't get NATO or saying that you're not going to get to keep your land as a codified piece of a deal with the Russians.
My view is that the 30-day period, Trump should maintain a fairly hard line because he's maintained a hard line with the Ukrainians and it's been effective. And the US is ultimately in a stronger position than the Russians are. But Trump has also made it clear that he really, really, really wants to get to yes, and that a lot of these things don't matter very much for him. So, he's essentially put Putin in a stronger position than he really is. And this is why it's so interesting that Trump always likes to use these analogies with the cards. He said, "The Ukrainians don't have the cards, and the Russians don't really have the cards." And yet, as someone who plays poker, we all know that frequently people that don't have cards win.
And the reason they win is because they play better than you do. And so, what we're going to see tomorrow is the degree to which Putin, who doesn't have the cards that Trump has, is nonetheless a more effective poker player. And I am concerned, at least somewhat concerned, that Putin's poker skills are actually better, more effective than Trump's are. Even though if both sides were to actually have to show their cards right now, we'd see that the Americans would win quite easily. And the Americans with the Europeans would win overwhelmingly, and yet that's not the way these hands are being played right now.
So, anyway, we'll see where it goes tomorrow. I'm sure I'll give you a quick response after we get that news. But that's where I think we are. I suspect Putin's going to come out of this happier than he should have any right to be and that the Americans will give away more than they should. But hopefully, not by a dramatic margin and that that will make it more likely that we still get to this one-month ceasefire. But we'll see tomorrow, and I'll talk about it then. Be good.
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Can Europe broker a Ukraine ceasefire?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. The big news, everything around Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and Europe. The Europeans now with the ball in their court, a big summit, a coalition of the willing in London this week. And Zelensky very warmly embraced, quite literally, by UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and by everyone in attendance. It was very different visuals, very different takeaways than the meeting between Zelensky, Trump, and Vance in the Oval Office, which couldn't have gone much worse if everyone tried.
Where we are right now, certainly this coalition of the willing had everyone that mattered in Europe. I mean, not the countries, not the leaders that have been skeptical, that have been more aligned with the Russians, or more, say, in a minimal position, like the Hungarians, like the Slovaks, but everybody else was there. So, you've got the Brits, you've got the French, you've got the Italians, and the Germans. You also have EU leadership, Ursula von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas, and also you have all of the frontline leaders that have the most at stake from a national security perspective: the Nordics, the Balts, the Poles. You even have Canada, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who doesn't spend very much on defense, but nonetheless going there to show he's aligned with the Ukrainians, whether or not the Americans, who the Canadians rely on completely economically, are not.
Does it matter? Does it matter? If you're asking does it matter in the sense that can the Europeans go it alone without the Americans? I'm still skeptical, though they're putting a lot more on the table now than they were a week ago, and they should have been doing that years ago. And that's going to remain a very big question, and I'm probably going to remain pretty skeptical. But very interesting that the Europeans do now have a level of ownership. Remember that Trump, both when he was running for president and once he became president, said that the United States was going to end this war, that he, Trump, would be responsible for the ceasefire, that he's going to do it himself with the Ukrainians, with the Russians, he could do it in 24 hours. That's obviously an exaggeration, but nonetheless, even as he realized it was going to take longer, he was the dominant actor. That's now changed. Keir Starmer has now told Trump that the Europeans, this coalition of the willing, is coming up with a ceasefire plan, and they are going to present it to the United States, and Trump is expecting it.
So for now, the Europeans don't just have a seat at the table, but they actually are in the driver's seat, in terms of the ceasefire on the back of the Ukrainian-US relationship having functionally blown up, and the Americans saying they're not going to do anything particularly more for the Ukrainians. They're not even prepared to sign the critical minerals deal that Zelensky now says he is prepared to sign. But if the Europeans are the ones that are going to be coughing up the money and providing the troops, then certainly they're the ones that are responsible for the terms of the ceasefire.
Now, that's interesting. And we're hearing certainly that there's going to be a lot more engagement, that potentially Starmer, Macron, and Zelensky will all three come together to the White House to meet Trump maybe later this week, maybe next week. Certainly Zelensky should not be attending meetings like that by himself anymore, I think he understands that, the Europeans understand that as well.
What they should do now, the Europeans, is present a UN Security Council resolution with the plan once Trump has seen it and is prepared to move forward. A simple thing, deciding nothing, just saying that the Security Council supports the path to peace as outlined from the UK summit. This will force Russian amendments, which the UK and France will veto, and then Russia will be forced to veto the resolution. And that's useful in a couple of different ways. First of all, it costs the French and the UK nothing, and they win a fair amount. The news will be all about how their Russian veto was used for the first time since 1989, and it places the Americans on the same side as the Europeans on the ceasefire issue, which is what the Europeans, the Ukrainians desperately need, and frankly, the Democrats and the Republicans in Congress as well.
The UK and France can then show Trump that they indeed don't need to be invited to the table, because they're at the table, they have the ceasefire plan and they're the ones that are driving it. Now, having a ceasefire plan is different from being able to implement the ceasefire and support the Ukrainians, and that is where there's still an awful lot that still needs to be accomplished.
Specifically the one piece of good news, surprising news, is that the Germans are now talking about 800 billion Euro package, outside of their debt break, that would support defense spending and infrastructure spending. They weren't talking about anything remotely like this even a few days ago. It would have to be done well before the end of the month because when the new chancellor comes in, then you are going to have the far left and the far right with the ability to block any constitutional majority. They don't have that capacity now, which means the debt break can be overridden by a vote in the Bundestag. That's really important, and would lead to German leadership in helping to finance this war.
You also have the 300 billion Euros that are frozen, the Russian sovereign assets that are mostly in the hands of the Europeans, the Belgians, as it turns out, and some others as opposed to the Americans, the Japanese. So, that could also be used to support Ukraine to buy more weapons, also to build up Ukraine's military industrial complex. In other words, while this situation is difficult and urgent, I would not yet say that it has fallen apart for the Ukrainians or the Europeans. They are still, as it were, in the game.
Now, the big question overlooking all of this is the United States and Russia, because they still want to do a deal, and that deal is not mostly about Ukraine, that deal mostly is about rapprochement between the United States and Russia over the heads of their NATO allies. This is what Trump is interested in, this is what Putin is interested. And frankly, it's a little easier to do that deal if you don't have a ceasefire, because the Russians don't really want one, than it is to do that deal if a ceasefire is a part of it. That's what has to be watched very carefully because of course, Trump and Putin are talking about where they're going to meet in person, Saudi Arabia maybe in May, Trump would even be willing to go to Moscow. This could include things like the United States taking unilateral sanctions off of Russia while the Europeans would still have them on. Could lead to a lot of business, a much bigger critical minerals deal than the one that was going to be signed between the Americans and the Ukrainians, and now, at least, is off the table.
Also note that the US Defense Department has at least temporarily suspended offensive cyberattacks against the Russians, which is quite something, again, in the context of nothing having been agreed to between the Americans and the Russians, but clearly Trump much more willing to be on Putin's good side right now than he is with Zelensky. So ultimately, that is a very big challenge for the Europeans, but they will be in far better shape if they're able to move on the ceasefire in the near-term, which looks likely, and on support for Ukraine in the medium-term, which looks like more of a challenge.
So, that's it for now. I'll talk to you all real soon.
What Trump-Zelensky fallout means for Ukraine war
President Trump has said that he is not on the Ukrainian side. He's neutral, he's on the side of peace. He's a peacemaker. He just wants to end the war, and that does not mean supporting Ukraine going forward. In fact, because he felt offended by Zelensky, who was not adequately deferential to the American president or the vice president, he said, basically, I'm cutting off support. I am allowing you, by continuing to support you, I'm allowing you to believe you have leverage you don't have. You should accept peace on my terms, and so I'll cut you off and then we'll see how well you can fight.
This is obviously a disaster for Zelensky who was intemperate in my view, in his remarks, absolutely. If you are coming to the United States, and yes, he has expressed thanks to the Americans many, many times on many, many occasions, but he was not well prepared to handle President Trump's ego, which is enormous, which is fragile, and he expects that everyone has to know who's number two and has to stand down when he stands up. And Zelensky did not do that. They ended up talking over each other and Trump got angry, took it personally, and basically threw him out of the White House, canceled the press conference and said, "I'm not supporting you anymore."
I think this relationship is now inexorably broken. I think it's inconceivable that Zelensky will be able to sit down with Trump in the near-term and fix the relationship. Lindsey Graham, who is perhaps Trump's closest confidant among serious senators, said that Zelensky has to either resign or he has to have someone else running point with the United States. I think that's a good read of the situation. Not that I think that Zelensky should resign, but that if you want to engage with the Americans, he's not going to be able to do it himself. Of course, that also happens to be a core demand of Putin, that Zelensky is not the one that engages directly in conversations. Putin won't talk to him, considers him illegitimate. So that's now becoming a talking point that Trump can directly align with, and I suspect he will in the near-term, after already calling for elections in a second phase after a ceasefire. Again, a core Russia demand.
What's going to happen here? Well, first of all, the big question is what are the Europeans going to do? And I use that word intentionally. What are they going to do, not what are they going to say? We all know what they're going to say. They're going to say that they're incredibly supportive of Ukraine, and I saw that from the Poles, and the Germans, and I saw it from the Belgians, and the Dutch, and I saw it from the French, and the Spaniards, I even saw it from Luxembourg, and those expressions of support mean just about as much from Luxembourg as they do from the Germans, unless they stand up and provide far more willingness to give the Ukrainians more financial support for their military, and also provide boots on the ground that are not contingent on a direct American backstop. They have been unwilling to do that for three years, and I suspect they will still be unwilling to do that. And absent that European support and ability to get the Americans back to the table, I think is extremely low. If the Europeans were to take a leadership role and show that they could do it without the Americans or with nominal American participation, then I think it's much more plausible that Trump, irrespective of what just happened with Zelensky, says, "I'm the only one that can get you to the table. I was the only one that made the Europeans lead, and so now, yeah, I'm back, I'm back now because this is the right conditions for peace for the American taxpayers." But of course, what Trump wants to do is end the war, and he now has been given a bigger opportunity to end the war by being able to throw Zelensky under the bus.
And that's what Vance is doing. That's what Elon is doing. That's what all of Trump's supporters on social media are doing. They're saying, "This guy, he's corrupt, he's a dictator, he's a bad guy, he shows no respect to the American president, and why should we support him? Well, the reason you should support him is because he's not a bad guy. It's because he was democratically elected and for three years, he has courageously led his people to defend their country. That's all. To defend their country against an invading force. When the Iraqis invaded Kuwait illegally, the Americans stood up, slapped down Saddam Hussein directly, not indirectly, directly involved in that fighting, to stand for the principle of territorial integrity. And that wasn't even a democracy. That was just a country that yeah, had some oil, but that the United States did not want the rest of the world to think that it would just stand back and stand by while their own country was eaten to shreds by a neighboring more powerful country. That is not where the Americans are today.
Today the Americans are supporting a UN resolution with the Russians, the North Koreans, Belarus, Syria, Sudan, Iran, and Israel, and a few micro states against democracies of the world, saying that territorial integrity is not what's critical. What's critical is just ending the war no matter what. That principle is being thrown out. And the Europeans fundamentally disagree with this. The Europeans feel like there is a gun to their head from the east with the Russians as a direct national security threat, and now a gun to the head from the west, a country that does not support core values of collective security, of rule of law, and of territorial integrity. And that means that the Europeans have to now get their act together immediately or else.
Zelensky is someone who, when the Americans offered to get him out of the country, because he was going to be overrun by the invading Russians, he said, "No, I'm not leaving my country," in a way that the Afghan leadership fled immediately, "No, I'm staying and I'm going to defend my country with my fellow Ukrainians." And that was an extraordinary moment and he has been facing down a much more powerful force, at a threat to his life and his family's lives. He's been on the front lines many, many times. He's not getting much sleep. He's under incredible pressure. And does it all take away from the fact that he talked back to the American president? No, obviously, no. You have to be better capable of representing your country by knowing who you're dealing with when you're coming in to see the US president. But I want to be clear that Zelensky has absolutely nothing to apologize for because the fact is that he is an example of the kind of humanity we need to help ensure that we have peace and stability around the world, someone that will stand up to injustice. And that, from an American president who because he was born of wealth and privilege, faked an injury to avoid military service, I think speaks volumes about what has happened to the United States.
The values that the Americans stand for presently on the global stage are values of power. They are the most powerful, get to write their rules, get to determine the outcomes. And that is true for Putin, it's true for Israel, it's true for the United States, and it's not true for the Ukrainians. It's not true for the Palestinians. It's not true for the Danes, or the Panamanians, or the Mexicans, or the Canadians. And what the Europeans have to now figure out is, are they prepared to be courageous? Are they prepared to step up, even though they're not in the most powerful position? Are they willing to do after three years, after frankly, 11 years since the Russians invaded Ukraine, the first time they've stood back, they've stood by, they haven't stood up for their fellow Europeans. They've allowed the Americans to do the heavy lifting, and now they have a president that is not willing to do that and frankly doesn't agree with them anymore, doesn't agree with their values, doesn't care about shared values, only cares about power.
And so, this is not a question for the Ukrainians. We know where the Ukrainians stand. They stand up. This is not a question for the Americans. We know where the Americans stand. They stand for themselves. This is a question for the Europeans. Are the Europeans willing to stand up for themselves, for their principles, for their values, and for fellow Europeans? And I fear the answer is no. I fear the answer is no. Analytically everything we've seen for the last three years is that they're going to talk a really good game and they're not going to do very much. But we shall see and we shall see very soon because this is the future of the West, this is the future of democracy, and it sure as hell is the future of the Ukrainians.
So that's it for me. I hope you all well and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Why the US-Ukraine minerals deal changed
What is this going to matter? What changes here? Well, a couple of points. First of all is it's a win, and we shouldn't be surprised. Back at the beginning of January, in our top risks, one of the things that we suggested was that Trump was going to get a lot more wins than a lot of his opponents believed, because he is the most powerful leader in the world. He's in a very strong position and he's willing to use that power against both adversaries and nominal friends. And a lot of people are scared of him, and so they give him what he wants. And that is what we are seeing here, especially for the Ukrainians who are in as weak a position as pretty much anyone that Trump is pushing around right now. So, he gets to say, "Look at this deal. Biden was giving away all of this American aid, and now I'm going and getting money back."
Now, that's not a great look in the sense that other countries around the world look at the United States and say, "We can't trust you guys because you change your mind every administration." So, if one president says that this is going to happen, and the next can just rip it up, and that's every four years or less, then why should we engage in a deal with you? Whether it's the Paris Climate Accord, or the World Health Organization, or the Iranian nuclear deal, the JCPOA, or it is aid to Ukraine that suddenly is not aid to Ukraine anymore. Now, Trump was saying that the United States has given $500 billion in aid to Ukraine, which is vastly more than the Europeans, and all of the European money is loans. That is of course wildly exaggerated, meaning not true, but there is a kernel of truth in it. So it's worth unpacking.
The Americans have provided a little over $110 billion, mostly in aid, 90% of that has been directly aid to the Ukrainians so far. Though, that money doesn't go directly to Ukraine. It goes primarily to American corporations, contractors, who get the money, who do the job, who make profit on it, and who service Ukraine. So, it's not as if there's a lot of corruption in Ukraine on the back of American aid because the money isn't going directly to Ukraine. The Europeans have given more money, more like €135 billion as opposed to the $110 that the US has given. The EU has a larger population, so per capita, it's not all that different. A lot of that European money, about 60% is not aid, it's actually loans in some form, though loans on exceptionally favorable terms to the Ukrainians. So, the fact that there is more aid that is going to Ukraine from Europe that has to be repaid is actually true.
And when Macron pushed back against Trump on that, he pushed back in a favorable way to Macron, shocking, but didn't also tell the full story. Part of the reason why nobody believes anything that politicians say these days, and one of the reasons I don't want to be a politician. Okay, leave that aside. So, Zelensky comes to the US, he does a deal, is he doing a colonial deal? No, another exaggeration. Trump was saying that Zelensky and the Ukrainians have no leverage, they have no cards. That's why he doesn't need to talk to him anymore. Well, if that's the case, then why is it the United States significantly altered the terms of the deal from a week ago, when Zelensky said no, to yesterday when Zelensky said yes? Before the $500 billion was all supposed to pay for previous aid, that term is out of this general agreement.
Also, the idea the Americans would've full control of the investment vehicle, that full control is no longer in these terms of the agreement. So, the terms have been substantially altered, and the reason for that is because Zelensky, of course, does have leverage. Most Republicans in Congress, House and Senate, support Zelensky a lot more than they support Putin, and they've not been happy about the idea that Trump has been flipping to a Russia relationship as opposed to support for Ukraine. Most Americans, including Republican voters, trust Zelensky more than they trust Putin, and they aren't, it's not the thing they're voting on, but they're not super happy about that. And of course, the Europeans themselves very upset about the idea that the Americans would suddenly break from that alliance. Does this matter to Trump? It doesn't matter immensely, but it isn't zero, because if it was zero, then he wouldn't have changed his deal one iota.
It's not because he's getting soft, it's because he recognizes that the other party has leverage. Now, what are the Europeans going to do? French president came to the United States yesterday, it was a reasonably productive conversation, but it didn't lead to any commitment of the US for security guarantees to Ukraine. Neither does the deal that the Ukrainians are signing ensure security guarantees. It does buy a little time. It does show that the US is going to continue to engage with Ukraine, and have some equities on the ground, and maybe continue to provide some weapons, some armaments going forward, some of the so-called strategic enablers, like help with targeting and intelligence, while the Americans are engaging with the Russians, directly and bilaterally, to try to structure a engagement, a re-engagement, of those two countries. I think that Trump is maintaining a lot of optionality for himself here.
If it turns out that the Europeans are going to spend a lot more on defense over the coming weeks and make those commitments, a lot more to the Ukrainians and make those commitments, and be willing to stand troops on the ground, a lot of them on the ground in Ukraine in a post-ceasefire environment, then Trump can pivot, say, "Look at all the things the Europeans are doing that Biden could never have gotten them to do, and now I'm willing to engage because the Europeans are actually picking up their fair share. Because the Ukrainians are going to give the Americans their fair share for doing all this work, it's not on the back of the American taxpayers.”
But if they don't, and frankly, I think it's more likely than not that the Europeans aren't able to get their act together in such a dramatic way in such a short period of time, then Trump hasn't really lost anything. He's engaging in this deal with the Russians, the Ukrainians have a deal with the US, the US doesn't have to put any money into if they don't feel like it, and this re-engagement with Russia precedes a pace that Trump wants. So, that is I think where we are heading right now. I'm not expecting much from the UK Prime Minister, Keir Starmer's visit to the US, he has a much more difficult and let's say distant and cool relationship with the US president than Macron does, and he doesn't have an awful lot to offer directly, though, they're going to step up their defense spending to maybe get to 2.5% over the coming years. Still nowhere close to what Trump wants or demands.
Final thing I would mention is that all of these conversations are happening in the context of the United States that has spent enormous amounts and wasted enormous amounts on national security and on wars over the past decades. I think it is worth asking, in an alternative history, if after Soviet collapsed, what would the world have looked like if the US had decided to disband NATO, didn't need it anymore because it was the end of history? What would've happened if the United States had gone down to 2%, or 2.5% of defense spend of GDP, and spent that money primarily on focus on Asia, together with American allies in Asia, like Japan, like Australia, like South Korea? What would've happened if the United States had not engaged in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and spent trillions of dollars as a consequence?
Would the world be better off without NATO? Would the world be better off without those wars? And I think the answer is at least worth considering, and while I am not at all comfortable with the United States continually going back on its commitments to allies, continuing ripping up its commitments, because I think that undermines US power, and I'm not comfortable with throwing the allies under the bus, who have fought with the United States side by side, shoulder by shoulder in Afghanistan, and then telling them you're basically on your own in Ukraine.
I'm not comfortable with any of that because I think the alliances matter, but I understand that a lot of Americans are very happy to rip up these arrangements because for the last three plus decades, the US has made huge mistakes by over-supporting and over-funding national security and defense. And as a consequence of that, I think this is a discussion that is way overdue, and a lot of things are going to be broken because we didn't have those conversations in a more rational, civilized, and engaged manner. So, it's worth talking about that too. Look, that's it for me, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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