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A Palestinian woman inspects a house that was destroyed after an Israeli airstrike in Rafah, April 24, 2024.
Rafah braces for Israeli invasion as famine looms
As the World Food Programme warns that Gaza is getting closer to famine by the day, US troops are set to begin constructing a floating pier off the northern coast of the enclave to increase the flow of desperately needed aid. The project is expected to be done by early May.
Meanwhile, Israel continues to lay the groundwork for an invasion of Rafah, the southern Gaza city where over a million Palestinians are sheltering. Israel has pummeled Rafah with airstrikes in recent days, and the Israeli military is gathering tanks and armored vehicles near the southern Gaza border ahead of the expected operation.
The Israeli government, which says Rafah is the last Hamas stronghold in Gaza, has rebuffed international opposition to a ground offensive. Israel also says it’s taking steps to help evacuate civilians before invading, and satellite images suggest
Months of unsuccessful efforts to secure a new truce in the war have kept the door open for a Rafah operation. On Wednesday, a top Hamas official said the militant group would lay down its arms if Israel accepted an independent Palestinian state with pre-1967 borders — but there’s virtually no chance of that happening, particularly given the current Israeli government firmly opposes Palestinian statehood.
For now, all eyes are on Rafah. “We are afraid of what will happen in Rafah. The level of alert is very high,” Ibrahim Khraishi, the Palestinian ambassador to the United Nations, said Thursday.
Why the US is sending aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here. And a Quick Take to kick off your week. A big $90 billion package that has been approved by the US House of Representatives, going through the Senate shortly after months of debate and, all of the package, all three major pieces of it, have some significant, complicated features.
First of all, the biggest piece for Ukraine, $60 billion, massive military support.
They had been in danger of losing significant more territory. This certainly shores them up. It helps the Ukrainians. It makes the Europeans panic less, but, you know, can they longer term hold on? What is the end game? The Ukrainians are, of course, running short not just of material to fight, but also air defense capabilities and, critically, people, soldiers. It's much harder for them to get people for the front lines than it is for the authoritarian, and much larger populated Russia. And so, the intention is that the Ukrainians don't fall apart, but of course, longer term, the idea that the US will continue to be able to provide 60 billion in support year after year. Certainly not true if Trump becomes president, probably not true if Biden wins a second term. What you really want to do is try to find a way to get them in a better position so that negotiations, inevitably, that need to occur with Russia, can be more productive and more constructive from the Ukrainian side, from the European side, from the NATO side. The US kick the can on this last year when the Americans, were in much better position supporting Ukraine. Now it's harder. Always is the case is that you think that things are going to get better. You don't feel like taking the political risk and as a consequence you extend and pretend. And now they're in a worse position. So I'm glad that the money came through. I'm glad the Ukrainians, are still fighting courageously and want to fight courageously. But of course, longer term, this war leads to some degree of partition where the Ukrainians are losing their land.
Israel, closest ally of the United States in the Middle East. Some 17 billion in military support for Israel, also some 9 billion in humanitarian aid in Gaza in this plan.
But, of course, increasingly, the United States does not support Israel continuing to fight against Hamas in Gaza. They want to see a lot more protection for Palestinian civilians, which the Israelis have been reluctant to put in place. They don't want to see a ground offensive into Rafah. Over a million Palestinians shelter in there. The Israelis are fully intent on continuing with that, proceeding with it. They did want to see a cease-fire that was linked directly to a hostage release. Now, increasingly, the US is talking about those two things as critical but delinked. And at the same time as the US is providing all this money, you have sanctions being placed by the United States on battalions of the Israeli Defense Forces engaged in human rights violations. This shows just how impossible this position is for President Biden to maneuver domestically, not to mention internationally. The US is overwhelmingly, the one country that is most supportive of Israel. Biden is overwhelmingly the political leader that is most supportive of Israel. But most of his constituents are not. And this is absolutely going to hurt him, even though it's a foreign policy issue and they don't usually play that heavily in recent decades in the election coming up in November. And you’ll see it, of course, across campuses all over the country, including my own at Columbia.
And then finally Taiwan. And this is in a sense the least controversial, because everyone on the Democratic and Republican side pretty much supports more support for Taiwan, is opposed to China. It's very easy to get lots of legislation that makes life more difficult for China. At the same time, though, the long term strategy of the United States is to make Taiwan less important, less important for the Americans in making sure that semiconductor production, moves from Taiwan to the United States, to other allies, not just a few miles off of the mainland Chinese coast, but also export controls that prevent the Chinese from getting advanced semiconductors from Taiwan as well. In other words, the big US strategy is not just arming the Taiwanese and helping them defend themselves, but also making Taiwan fundamentally less important to mainland China. and one of the main reasons that the Chinese would not be interested in attacking Taiwan long term or squeezing them hard economically long term, is because they're so indispensable to the Chinese economy. This is not going to be the case long term.
In all three of these areas, you've got the United States with friends, but they are less aligned with strategically than they are tactically. And that means that this money that we see going forward is all about kicking the can on short term gains that make sense politically for the US right now. But long term do not resolve the challenges that exist for the US with these countries.
That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Women mourn near the bodies of Palestinians killed in Israeli strikes in Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip, April 21, 2024.
Israel-Hamas: Strikes, support, and… sanctions?
Israeli air strikes on Rafah in southern Gaza this weekend killed 22 people, including 18 children. Israel has intensified its operations against Hamas in recent days, leading to speculation that it may be preparing for a ground operation in Rafah — where some 1.4 million displaced Palestinians are sheltering.
In a statement, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel “will increase the political and military pressure on Hamas ...We will land more and painful blows on Hamas — soon.”
Giving and taking. This comes as the US House of Representatives approveda $95 billion legislative package, including $9 billion in humanitarian aid, of which $2 billion is reportedly earmarked for Gaza, and $17 billion in defense aid to Israel. The Senate is expected to pass the package soon, and President Joe Biden is ready to sign it.
Simultaneously, however, the US is threatening to sanction the IDF’s Orthodox Netzah Yehuda battalion over accusations of human rights abuses in the West Bank. This would be the first time the US has considered such a move, sparking a sharp response from Israeli officials.
Netanyahu described the sanctions as “the height of absurdity and a moral low” during a time of conflict, while fellow war cabinet member Benny Gantzwarned that “imposing sanctions on the unit is a dangerous precedent and sends the wrong message to our shared enemies.”
Israel attacks Iran
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take on the latest in the Middle East crisis. And things actually looking a little bit more stable today than they have over the past couple of weeks. And that is some very welcome news.
The headlines, of course, that the Iranians have been hit by Israel, though no one is saying that Israel has admitted to doing it, in the town of Isfahan. Clearly, military targets and the Iranians trying to knock down those missiles coming over. But this was a significantly more restrained attack than what the Israelis did to kick off this crisis, which was attack an Iranian government building in Damascus and target and assassinate a senior Iranian leader. That led to the Iranian response that we saw over the weekend, which was a significant and serious one, with a few hundred missiles and drones. And now we are in the escalatory portion of the cycle.
The United States said very clearly to Israel, “We're going to help defend you no matter what. We don't want any offensive strikes against Iran. Take the win.” The fact that they said that meant that it was very, very likely that they were going to do something, but that something was going to be restrained, where if the Americans said, “Hey, just take it easy, don't do anything big,” then they’d end up doing something bigger, right? And you give them an inch, they take two inches. This is the way these things work. And it was coordinated with the United States. The US was not involved directly in the military strikes, but they knew it was coming. They had that cooperation, communication from Israel, which was important because the US had to be in position in case the Iranians decided that they were going to strike real time in response to Israel. The Americans were going to help the Israelis defend themselves yet again.
Now, the big question here is not, “Do the Iranians respond in a big way?” They don't. They've already signaled that that's not the intention. You've seen them downplaying the nature of these strikes on Iranian state media. So, this crisis, this proximate crisis between Israel and Iran is now in the rearview mirror. But going forward, what's the likelihood that we can stabilize this war, which is now well beyond just a matter of Israel versus Hamas?
One thing that makes me a little bit more positive is the fact that Bibi Netanyahu is himself in a little more secure position domestically. What do you mean, makes you more positive? Does that mean he's going to last longer? Yes. But it also means he doesn't necessarily have to go ahead with massive strikes against Hamas in Rafah, killing lots of civilians. Or eventually against Hezbollah, pushing them back so that almost 100,000 Israeli citizens can get back to the north. If he wanted to take a win and show that he now has, you know, a historical legacy of leading Israel in defending against an unprecedented strike from Iran, with strong support from the Americans, from the Brits, from the Jordanians, from the Saudis, this is the opportunity that could create Saudi normalization with Israel. This is the opportunity that could create a peace deal that the Palestinians would have some form of governance over the West Bank and Gaza together.
That's the opportunity that comes from this, precisely because Israel domestically now has a leader that doesn't have to look over his shoulder every moment. But the strong effort by Netanyahu, at least as of today, is to still go ahead with these Rafah strikes. You've got the battalions on the ground. You want to use them, you want to take out, these Hamas leaders, irrespective of the civilian cost. And that continues to be very popular among the entire population of Israel as well.
So, when I think about the next couple of weeks, I think that you're not going to get a breakthrough deal on hostages with Hamas, and that means that the fighting only stops if there's a broader agreement. And that broader agreement requires that the Israeli war cabinet is willing to stand down and not continue their war on the ground in Gaza. And in return, has a broader agreement with the Americans, with the Gulf states, and ultimately with a path forward for the Palestinians. Most people around the world would welcome, would love to see that. Getting the Israelis from here to there, especially when you are surrounded by enemies that consider you, to be, illegitimate as a country and refuse to recognize your right to exist, that makes it a lot harder. So that's where we are. But some breathing space for now. The mood in the United States, certainly better than it was at any point over the last week and a half, and that's a good thing.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Members of the Iranian Army's land force are marching in a military parade to mark the anniversary of Iran's Army Day at an Army military base in Tehran, Iran, on April 17, 2024.
When will Israel strike Iran, and will a hostage deal ever happen?
The world is waiting to see how Israel retaliates against Tehran’s recent air attacks. But, according to new reports, nothing is likely until after Passover, a holiday celebrating the liberation of Israelites from Egypt thousands of years ago. Passover begins on Monday and ends on April 30.
The news comes as Israel continues to weigh the extent and timing of any response to Iran’s drone-and-missile salvo from last weekend, with the US urging restraint for fear of igniting a wider regional war. Iran says it will respond to any Israeli strikes, and on Thursday warned it could pursue nuclear weapons if any of its nuclear facilities are targeted — a prospect that Israel and its Western allies have worked against for years.
Meanwhile, talks on a cease-fire in Gaza – a surefire way to cool things down – are at an impasse, with Qatar, an indispensable interlocutor between Israel and Hamas, now saying it will reevaluate its role in the discussions following US criticism of its ties to the group. But would Qatar really walk away entirely? Doubtful – the tiny Gulf state views its mediator role as a key means of boosting its global clout.
“Qatar is frustrated by the criticisms emerging from some American politicians,” says Sofia Meranto, a Middle East analyst at Eurasia Group. And while “Doha may try to distance itself from the talks,” she says it “is unlikely to abandon its role.”
Israeli soldiers stand next to military vehicles, near the Israel-Gaza border, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Israel, April 15, 2024.
War in Gaza rages on as all eyes turn to Israel-Iran tensions
Much of the world is waiting to see how Israel responds to Iran’s weekend attack. In the meantime, Israeli tanks reportedly rolled back into parts of northern Gaza on Tuesday, a day after the military told Palestinians not to return to that part of the enclave. According to reports, airstrikes also pummeled Rafah, the southern Gaza city that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to invade and where over a million Palestinians are sheltering.
Countries in the region are raising the alarm about a lack of focus on Gaza in the wake of Iran’s attack. Jordan's top diplomat, Ayman Safadi, said Tuesday that Netanyahu was using “his confrontation with Iran” to “draw attention away from Gaza.”
Israel has vowed to respond to the Iranian attack, but hasn’t said how it intends to do so – or when. Still, it’s locked in tit-for-tats with Iranian proxies. One example: The IDF said Tuesday that it killed a top Hezbollah commander with an airstrike in Lebanon, as drone attacks attributed to the Iran-backed militant group reportedly injured several in northern Israel.
With the region already on edge and the estimated death toll in Gaza at over 33,000, Israel is being urged to show restraint against Iran. If Israel avoids escalating with Iran, analysts suggest this could see the US ease up on its opposition to a ground offensive in Rafah — but such an operation would also likely tank the possibility of a cease-fire anytime soon.
For now, Iran and Israel are in a “de-escalatory phase,” tweeted Eurasia Group and GZERO Media President Ian Bremmer, but Tehran will continue to support its proxies, and Israel isn’t going to stop the war in Gaza “or targeting Iranian military leaders [who are] supporting proxies.”
Iran attacks Israel
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here, and a Quick Take on a Sunday, which usually means something is not going well, and that is certainly the case in the Middle East, where you had unprecedented strikes by Iran and its proxies against Israel.
Now, on the one hand, clearly a very dangerous thing to do, on the other hand, could have been a hell of a lot worse. What do I mean by that? Well, it is not World War III. Americans warned Iran not to hit the United States, and the Iranians gave a heads-up, days in advance, through a number of actors, most importantly through Iraq. This reminds me very much of after the American servicemen and women, three were killed in Jordan, by an Iranian proxy. The Americans did not want a war to break out with the Iranians directly, waited about a week, gave a heads up through Iraq, of the kind of attack that the Americans were planning, waited four days, gave the Iranians a chance to basically prepare and get their own forces out, and warned them that if this were to happen again, there would be direct consequences, a direct strike on Iran itself.
In this case, you had the Iranian heads-up that gave the Americans and allies time to pre-position, to provide diplomatic support, both publicly and privately, to the Israelis. Send the head of CENTCOM to Israel, say that American support for Israel was ironclad, help ensure that the Israelis would be able to most effectively defend itself against the coming Iranian attack. That was, on the one hand, a really big deal by the Iranians that was meant to be a maximal display of force and a minimum likelihood of casualties. But still, there was a significant possibility of accident, that you could have a risk that would lead to a war directly between Iran and Israel. Something that the Americans desperately wanted to avoid because it would bring the US in. It would spike oil prices. It would probably mean the end of Biden's, potential of a second presidency. And it, of course, would also mean that Iran was going to get hit massively by the United States and Israel, something they wanted to avoid.
We saw hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles, many from proxies, but many from Iran itself, over 99% of which were taken down. And they were aimed solely at military targets in Israel. So again, lots of effort to try to reduce the risk but the potential that you would have had a number get through, accidentally hitting civilians or having significant military hit, that was a risk that the Iranians were prepared to take. So, it's a big deal, it’s a clear escalation, and it is certainly an effort by the Iranians to say, that if this is to happen again, that the likelihood that there will be a major war between Iran and Israel come what may, is very real. And the Iranians also said, and they said this before the missiles even hit their targets, or in the case of the vast majority of them were intercepted, said through the United Nations mission that this was directly in retaliation for the Israeli strike against an Iranian leader in Damascus, and that the matter, from Iran's perspective, should be considered closed.
In other words, no further attacks were coming. So, trying to in a sense, you know, reduce the likelihood of further escalation, in advance. And clearly, all of that kept the United States from responding directly. So, the US strategy here is do everything possible to show that you will get massive support for Israeli defense and national security in the event of an attack, any attack, but also to try to put maximum constraint on the Israeli government against a response directly against Iran, and that the Americans don't want to support Israel if they were to engage in offensive attacks against Iran at this point.
What are the Israelis going to do? I mean, the hope for the United States is that while Prime Minister Netanyahu wants to do more and suck the United States into a broader war against Iran, that he is going to be constrained from doing so. In part because he was so successful, they now have a major victory on their belt under his watch, being able to defend the Israeli people completely in response to an unprecedented Iranian attack. And there's also going to be a big distraction away from the war in Gaza. Doesn't mean that Israel suddenly loses its isolation or wins the PR war globally, I think that's certainly not going to happen, but, there's less pressure on the Israelis, on the prime minister, in terms of Gaza right now as a consequence of what Iran has done. And there's also less pressure for Netanyahu to be forced out domestically in the near, in the immediate future.
Further, if he were to try to go considerably farther than Benny Gantz wants to, and the war cabinet wants to, in a response against Iran, then Netanyahu risks that they would bolt from the war cabinet and that his government would then fall apart. That's certainly a proximate risk that contains what the Israelis are likely to do. I don't think they'll sit on their hands and do nothing. At the very least, I think there'll be more significant strikes against Iranian proxies in the coming days. And the Israelis will also continue to engage in strikes against Iranian targets as they see them, as is opportune, in proxy states going forward. This is the problem, of course, is that, even though you have averted major escalation in a very dangerous period over the weekend, the Israelis and the Iranians haven't accomplished anything to stabilize their relationship longer-term.
Israel has shown that they are capable of taking out Iranian leaders in Syria, and Iran can't defend them. Iran has no intention of suddenly leaving those proxies to fend for themselves. And further, the likelihood that Israel now gets a breakthrough agreement on hostage release by Hamas, and that leads to a ceasefire, has gone down, at least in the near-term. The other side of that is the likelihood that the Israelis proceed with at least some form of ground attack into Rafah, which the Americans have warned them not to, also has gone up.
So the Hamas war with Israel is nowhere close to ending, the likelihood of continued Palestinian civilian casualties continues to grow, and the potential for further military engagement, both vis-a-vis proxies, including the Houthis in the Red Sea, the fact that the Iranians have also boarded an Israeli linked vessel in the Red Sea and that there is no effective deterrent in place right now between Israel and Iran, despite all sorts of other actors not wanting this to expand into a broader war, that all makes the Middle East right now, more dangerous.
So, I mean, none of us know, what the next shoe is going to be to drop. But if you are looking ahead over the next, let's say, six months, a couple things I think you can say. First, it is more likely that the present Israeli government is going to be in place for longer, and that the war in Gaza is going to continue without a serious effort at stabilization, or at least not one that's consequential.
That's problematic for Biden as you look ahead to the election in November. The potential that this war expands and eventually does drag in the United States and Iran more directly, is also going up. It's not imminent but it is certainly reasonably plausible, and the guardrails on that war are becoming, they are eroding as both sides are taking shots against each other.
So, a dangerous environment. A second war that is not going the way the Americans or anyone else in the world would like it to. And that's how we're kicking off our week.
That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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A demonstrator during a protest against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government and to call for the release of hostages kidnapped by Hamas from Gaza, in Tel Aviv, Israel, April 6, 2024.
Does Hamas have the Israeli hostages?
Cease-fire negotiations between Israel and Hamas seemingly took a bad turn on Wednesday. In recent days, the US presented a plan calling for a six-week cease-fire, during which Hamas would release 40 Israeli hostages in exchange for 900 Palestinian prisoners currently in Israeli jails. But Hamas reportedly rejected the proposal and planned to present its own path for ending the war.
Then, late Wednesday, more alarming news broke with Hamas reportedly telling negotiators it doesn’t have 40 hostages who meet the criteria for the initial phase of a proposed temporary cease-fire in Gaza.
Where are the remaining hostages, and how many are still alive? Roughly 250 people were taken hostage when Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and killed roughly 1,200 people. Dozens were released during a temporary truce in November.
According to Israel, 133 hostages remain in captivity — though 36 are confirmed dead. Other militant groups, like Palestinian Islamic Jihad, are thought to be holding some hostages. Whether Hamas knows where they are — and whether it can convince such groups to hand them over — is one of the big issues looming over the truce negotiations.
The hostages are Hamas’ primary bargaining chip in the talks that have dragged on for weeks. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is under intense pressure from the families to bring them home.
If Hamas can’t locate them, truce talks will likely remain at an impasse. And if many or most hostages are dead, it could give Bibi incentive to take an even more brutal approach to a war that’s already estimated to have killed more than 33,000 Palestinians — including more than 13,000 children.
Netanyahu has repeatedly said he aims to destroy Hamas, though this is widely viewed as unachievable. Meanwhile, President Joe Biden says Bibi’s approach to the war has been a “mistake,” in yet another sign that the US is losing patience with the Israeli leader.
We’ll be watching for news on the fate of the hostages and how it will impact Israel’s approach to the war.