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Palestinians inspect damage at the site of an Israeli strike on a house amid the Israel-Hamas conflict at the Nuseirat refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip on December 13, 2024.
A Gaza ceasefire within reach
This time, the hopes appear well-founded. Hamas, and its ally Hezbollah in Lebanon, have taken a beating. A number of leaders in both organizations have been killed, and with the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria, Iran has lost the ability to resupply them with new weapons.
Haggling continues over the deal’s details, but it appears a ceasefire would unfold in stages. First, Hamas would release dozens of the Israeli civilians and female soldiers it still holds hostage, and Israel would remove troops from Gaza’s cities, its coastal highway, and the corridor at Gaza’s border with Egypt. In a second phase, Hamas would release its remaining hostages, and more Israeli troops would be withdrawn from Gaza. Finally, the details of a longer term ceasefire itself would then be set.
More than 100 Israeli hostages have already been freed, either through Israeli-Hamas bargaining or Israeli rescue operations. In total, Israeli officials believe another 62 hostages are still alive and that Hamas or associated groups hold at least 30 more bodies of hostages who died. TheUnited Nations reports that more than 44,000 Palestinians have been killed since the Hamas attack on Israel that triggered the war.
Israel's next move
And secondly, the US Treasury Department has announced additional sanctions against tankers that have shut off their transponders and are helping the Iranians to illegally export significant amounts of sanction-breaking oil. Prices can go up on the back of that. An unusual thing for the Americans to do a few weeks before the election, but shows just how concerned they are about potential escalation in the region. So let me give you some context here. First point. On the one hand, the Americans have sent THAAD systems to Israel before. So it's not like there aren't any American soldiers on the ground operating in Israel. This is not such a game-changer. In fact, such a decision was made not only years ago, but also after October 7th. But it is notable that it comes a year later on the back of potential significant escalation, both in the Northern front that we're already seeing and with Iran that we might be.
Second point is that the oil prices continue to be a little bit under 80 bucks. OPEC has a lot of spare capacity they could put on the market. China continues to have pretty poor numbers in terms of demand. So this isn't likely to have the American move to hit more Iranian oil, isn't likely to have a lot of impact in terms of oil prices. But if the Americans could have stopped what is right now 1.5 million barrels of Iranian export if they could have taken that down and the Iranians are using that money to pay for the Axis of Resistance that's targeting not only Israel but targeting ships in the Middle East, targeting American and UK military assets, why did Biden wait? Why is it only being announced now? And why is it only being announced now in a way that seems to be a gimme for the Israeli Prime Minister and his government in return for not engaging in significant retaliatory escalation against the Iranians?
This is a US policy that continues to look very weak, that continues to be out of step with most of its allies at this point. You see even French President Macron saying that he doesn't want to provide any more military support for Israel. Of course, it's easy for him to say that. He doesn't provide much to begin with. If it was a significant export, I'm sure Macron wouldn't be saying that. But nonetheless, the Americans are on really one very isolated side at this point compared to the rest of the international community, whether you like the United States or you don't. And their ability to influence the Israeli government appears to be virtually zero. And that has been shown with the recent attacks by the Israeli Defense Forces against UN peacekeepers in Lebanon. And we've seen that on the back of those attacks that the United States, France, Spain, Italy, which is a strong right-wing government, but also has a thousand peacekeepers on the ground in Lebanon, all strongly condemning the Israelis for making these attacks.
But not prepared to actually do anything in response and certainly not making the Israelis feel like they need to stop. Now the Israeli perspective is these peacekeepers have not been capable of upholding Security Council resolution that required that Hezbollah pull back from the border area, a buffer zone, that they've been launching military strikes against Israel. And that also Hezbollah fighters are essentially using the presence of the peacekeepers as shields. And that they're operating not on the peacekeeper's bases but in proximity, which makes it harder for the Israelis to go after them. That certainly doesn't justify firing directly on the peacekeepers base, which has happened, and which now the IDF says a mistake. In return, the Israeli Prime Minister has called on the UN Secretary-General to withdraw the peacekeepers. I find it implausible that the Israeli Prime Minister doesn't realize that the Secretary-General has actually no authority over the peacekeepers.
They're sent there on the basis of the Security Council. So in other words, if the Israeli Prime Minister wants to make a demand, he's making it of the permanent members of the Security Council like the United States and China and France, the UK and Russia. He apparently doesn't want to make that statement. But again, the point here is the comparative impunity, and the major headlines, of course, are in the last 24 hours, around four Israeli soldiers that have been targeted and killed, as well as a large number of injuries on Israeli military bases by Hezbollah drones. Hezbollah is much more capable than Hamas has been, and there will be more significant Israeli casualties as this war continues. But most of the casualties, of course, even though it's not most of the headlines, will be among the Lebanese, among the Hezbollah fighters, and among the Lebanon civilian population, of which we've seen about 2,000 killed so far.
And that is because the military dominance in the region, again, both offense and defense and intelligence and surveillance, is overwhelmingly in the hands of Israel. So if there's going to be significant escalation in the war going forward, that escalation will be decided overwhelmingly by the Israeli government. And so that's what is particularly interesting to watch over the coming weeks. I am not expecting very much against Iran, frankly. The fact that the Israelis have already waited for a couple of weeks takes a lot of the urgency out of that. The fact that the Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has said, "It will be the time of our choosing and what we do, they'll know that it was us, but they won't know how we did it," implies something that is a much more targeted attack than lots and lots of bombs raining down against, you know, sort of a nuclear facility or against oil production.
It would not surprise me if it was a high-level assassination, for example, against the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the IRGC. Especially because we already saw that when the Trump administration assassinated Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian response was virtually nothing. So there's precedent for that, and the Iranians have very little at this point that they can do that wouldn't hurt them a hell of a lot more than they can hurt Israel or Israel's allies. So that's where we are right now. A war that continues to escalate with a lot of suffering on the back of it. An incredibly ineffective US policy in the region, and everybody else pretty much sitting on the sidelines.
Europe's biggest concerns about Middle East, one year after Oct. 7
What's the situation of Europe one year after the October 7th attack against Israel? What's the main takeaway from the visit of the new NATO Secretary General to Kyiv? Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Lisbon, Portugal.
What's the situation of Europe one year after the October 7th attack against Israel?
Well, I think deep apprehension is the best way of summing it up. Fears that we will see a further escalation of the conflict. Could be further problems in Gaza, could be further problems in West Bank. But perhaps particular now the situation of Lebanon, where there's the risk that we will see a further meltdown by the way of Lebanon. And we already have a million people on the move inside Lebanon. We have perhaps 100,000 people who are trying to flee from Lebanon into Syria. Mind you, there was a million and a half fleeing from Syria into Lebanon a couple of years ago. And the fear that we will see any refugee flow coming out of that area into Europe with all of the problems that would entail. So, deep apprehension on that situation.
What's the main takeaway from the visit of the new NATO Secretary General to Kyiv?
I think it was important for Mark Rutte to go to Kiev as the first thing he did really as the new Secretary General of NATO in order to make very clear his personal commitment to Ukraine, and the fact that he would put that at the top of his list of priorities, much in the same way as outgoing Secretary Jens Stoltenberg has done during the last few years. So, that was an important signal in itself.
How October 7th changed Israel and the Middle East
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. It is October 7th, and that means one year since Hamas perpetrated the worst terrorist attacks since 9/11. Almost 1,200 Israelis dead, mostly civilians, and still a hundred plus held hostage from that day a year ago. Not much progress on that latter front or on a ceasefire. Not much progress in the region since then. What it did do, of course, on October 7th, is it outraged and unified what had been a very divided Israeli population, divided with massive internal demonstrations on domestic political issues. And suddenly the only issue that mattered was responding to, redressing those attacks, whether you're on the left or the right in Israel and being able to defend the Israeli homeland and get the hostages back.
On the former, they've certainly been effective, hitting back as hard as possible. We've seen that Hamas today is a shell of what it was on October 7th a year ago. The leadership mostly dead. The weapons caches mostly destroyed. The tunnels mostly sealed. Hezbollah, the most powerful non-state military actor in the world, has been damaged critically, and they started rocket attacks against Israel a day after the October 7th terrorist attacks. Israel has now opened up a second front, really the primary front now in the war, and after a couple of weeks of that war, Hezbollah's leadership is dead. Their communication capacity was critically destroyed. The war is ongoing but is certainly not going well for Hezbollah. On the one hand, you've seen a major escalation from the rockets and the bombing happening in Gaza to a ground war across the entirety of that territory now to Lebanon and with significant shots fired missiles and the rest military operations with Iran's other proxies, the Houthis and Yemen, Shia militants in Syria and Iraq, and of course involving Iran itself.
On the other hand, the capacity of these proxy organizations to escalate in return is now far, far less capable, far less serious. Hamas cannot threaten Israel the way they could on October 7th. Hezbollah certainly far, far diminished in their ability to escalate even if they want to. Two big questions are remaining. First, Iran. They are a country that still has all sorts of capabilities to escalate if they wish, possibly not effectively against Israel itself, but against the West, against the world. If they wanted to, they could completely disrupt oil tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and as a consequence, ensure that much of the oil that comes out of the Middle East, not just Iran's one and a half million barrels a day of export but from the Gulf states is stuck in place. And that would mean oil prices towards $150, even in a depressed demand environment as we see now, and a global recession.
So Iran's capacity, if they want to escalate, is far, far greater than that of Hezbollah or Hamas or anyone else in the region. And they have shown themselves to be quite risk-averse in response to Israeli strikes against Iranian leaders across the region, military leaders, and also against Hamas leadership in Tehran. And that was true back in April, and that was true back a week ago. But still, we are awaiting what is almost certainly going to be an Israeli response, a military response, against Iran for the 180 ballistic missiles that they launched against Israel with no fatalities in Israel. One in the West Bank of a Palestinian, but nonetheless, certainly could have caused a lot of people to be killed. And we will see if that the Israeli response leads to further Iranian escalation. I am at this point hopeful, and I would even say optimistic, that it does not, but optimism feels like exactly the wrong word to describe any of this in the region.
Then the second big question remaining is about the devastation on the ground. In Gaza, for the last year, a million and a half Palestinians are now living on the back of humanitarian aid of on average 125-ish trucks coming in a day. That's compared to 800 to 1000 on average before October 7th. As well as all of those tunnels which have now been sealed, they brought a lot of arms and illicit goods in. They also brought things like food, luxury food stuffs, and other things that you could buy on the gray market in Gaza. Those are closed, and there's no Gaza economy. There's no local Gaza agriculture right now. So the 1.5 million Palestinians are living in an absolutely unimaginable condition on single-digit percentage calories, many of them, in terms of consumption from what they would have been living on before October 7th.
Then you have the West Bank, which has been indirectly involved in the fighting. There's been a lot of skirmishing, a lot of shooting, a lot of people getting killed. And then also Israeli settlers and the IDF taking and securing more land from the Palestinians there. Then of course, in Lebanon in the last two weeks, you have over a million Lebanese who have been displaced from that fighting. Far more will be displaced in all likelihood in the coming weeks. All of this from a humanitarian perspective unacceptable by any yardstick. The United States seen by most of the world as complicit in watching it and not providing the either restraint on Israel or the humanitarian support effectively to help ensure that the suffering is reduced. And of course, this is going to cause hatred and radicalization for generations. And antisemitism was already way too high and on an upswing before October 7th, certainly only greater in this environment a year later.
And of course, with all of this, we don't know what's going to happen with upcoming elections. Kamala Harris came out on "60 Minutes" and described the United States as the best friend of the Israeli people around the world, refused to say whether or not the US was an ally of Prime Minister Netanyahu himself. A very strained relationship between the United States and the Israeli Prime Minister today. While former President Trump came out publicly in the last few days and said that the Israeli government, the Israeli military, should actively take out Iran's nuclear capabilities. So frankly, I would say between Harris and Trump, their policies, their orientation specifically on the Middle East and the Israeli wars in Gaza, in Lebanon, and the fighting we're seeing with Iran, probably the biggest difference on foreign policy between those two candidates would be on this issue. And we will find out in a month plus who is going to lead the United States, but utterly critical as we think about the future of this conflict in the region.
So that is where we are a year after the October 7th terrorist attacks, and now very deep in expanding war that is affecting much of the region. And I will continue to talk about it and follow it for you. So I hope everyone's going well, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
- Iran's next move: Interview with VP Javad Zarif ›
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- Israel’s geopolitical missteps in Gaza ›
- Ian Bremmer: Understanding the Israel-Hamas war ›
- Israel-Hamas war: Who is responsible for Gaza's enormous civilian death toll? ›
- Podcast: The State of the World in 2024 with Ian Bremmer - GZERO Media ›
Iran's next move: Interview with VP Javad Zarif
As the anniversary of the Oct 7th Hamas attacks approaches, tensions in the Middle East are reaching a boiling point. Israel has ramped up its military operations against Iran-backed forces, launching devastating airstrikes across Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen. The assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Israel’s ground offensive into Lebanon has further escalated the conflict, as has Iran sending a wave of missiles towards Israel.
On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer sits down with Iran's new Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif just days before the Nasrallah assassination and Iran’s response. In their conversation, Zarif delves into the far-reaching ramifications of the ongoing conflict. He says, “So the myth of Israeli invincibility is gone. And I think that's a major loss for Israel.” Zarif also speaks about what he calls Iran’s unwavering stance on its right to self-defense and its determination to not fall into Israel’s “trap.”
And with an upcoming election, Zarif weighs in on the prospects of a Harris or Trump administration and addresses accusations of Iranian meddling. Zarif notes, “I don't have any preference. But some may prefer him in Iran. Some may believe that he is more in the national interest of Iran.”
Although Iran’s new president has promised to find common ground with the West, recent events have made it clear that the geopolitical tightrope remains perilously thin. As tensions continue to flare, the world waits and asks: What is Iran's next move?
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).
- Are US threats making Iran rethink retaliation against Israel? ›
- Will Israel strike Iran – and if so, how hard? ›
- Israel invades southern Lebanon, threatens Iran ›
- Iran launches ballistic missiles at Israel in revenge attack ›
- Israel hits Iran directly – what next? ›
- How October 7th changed Israel and the Middle East - GZERO Media ›
- Israel's next move - GZERO Media ›
The politics of the Paris Olympics
As the political drama ramps up in the US, Democrats have acted with remarkable speed and solidarity to pass the torch to VP Kamala Harris. At the same time, the world’s most elite athletes are gathering along the Seine in Paris to light a more literal torch, of the Olympic variety.
Washington Post sports columnist Sally Jenkins joins Ian Bremmer on GZERO World to talk about some of the biggest stories leading into the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris, including security challenges, the ban on Russia’s Olympic Committee due to the war in Ukraine, and growing calls for reform within the IOC, which has faced accusations of corruption and bid rigging in recent years. The IOC insists the Games aren’t political, but in practice, that’s never really been the case. This year, a doping scandal involving Chinese swimmers, Russian disinformation, and mounting calls for Israeli athletes to compete under a neutral flag threaten to overshadow the City of Light’s big celebration. Jenkins and Bremmer also dig into Saudi sportswashing, China’s relationship with pro sports teams in the US, and the WNBA’s most-watched season in history.
Season 7 of GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, launches nationwide on public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don''t miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).
Politics, power, and the Paris Olympics: Insight from WashPo sports columnist Sally Jenkins
Listen: The 2024 Summer Olympic Games kick off in Paris this week as the world’s most elite athletes representing more than 200 countries gather in the French capital to compete for gold. Over the next two weeks, we’ll see triumphant wins, heartbreaking losses, superhuman feats of strength, and touching displays of international sportsmanship. But politics loom large at the Olympics, threatening to overshadow the City of Light’s big celebration. Washington Post sports columnist Sally Jenkins joins Ian Bremmer on the GZERO World Podcast to discuss the biggest stories heading into the 2024 Olympics, including the ban on Russia’s Olympic Committee, calls for Israeli athletes to compete under a neutral flag, and security concerns at what Jenkins calls “the most sprawling and urban Olympics in history.” They also dig into the problem with Saudi sportswashing, the NBA’s financial interest in China, and a transformative WNBA season that’s bringing more eyeballs to games than ever before.
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.
- Paris 2024 Olympics chief: “We are ready” ›
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Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks during his meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama at the United Nations in New York September 21, 2011. Netanyahu said Wednesday that direct negotiation was the only way to achieve a stable Middle East peace and the Palestinian effort to secure U.N. recognition of statehood ''will not succeed.''
Mr. Netanyahu goes to Washington
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is addressing a joint meeting of Congress on Wednesday, visiting Washington at an awkward moment in US-Israel relations and amid ongoing international efforts for a cease-fire in Gaza.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, China helped facilitate an agreement between Hamas and its longtime political rival, Fatah, on Tuesday that would see the two Palestinian groups form a government together. Both Israel and the US have already thrown cold water on the deal, given their opposition to Hamas remaining in power in any capacity.
Netanyahu’s speech also comes at a chaotic time in US politics, with the country still reeling from the assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump as well as President Joe Biden’s decision to drop out of the 2024 race.
Tough crowd. Netanyahu’s prosecution of the war against Hamas in Gaza – and vocal opposition to a two-state solution – has made him unpopular with a number of Democratic lawmakers while also creating tensions with the Biden administration. Some Democratic lawmakers are expected to boycott his speech, and Vice President Kamala Harris, now the front-runner for the Democratic presidential nomination, will not preside over the Senate during the address due to a campaign event in Indianapolis.
Thousands are also poised to protest in the nation’s capital against the war in Gaza during Netanyahu’s visit, though pro-Israel demonstrators are also expected to turn up in Washington.
Given these circumstances, Netanyahu is likely to strike a more bipartisan tone than in the past and will probably focus on “the historical link and strategic value of the Israel-US relationship” in his speech, says Sofia Meranto, a Middle East analyst for Eurasia Group. During an address to Congress in 2015, Netanyahu controversially ripped into the nuclear deal with Iran that was being orchestrated by the Obama administration, infuriating many Democrats.
Netanyahu wants to use his Wednesday speech to “showcase that he has a unique relationship with US leaders — an argument he leans on domestically — and try to dispel sentiment in Israel that he has damaged the relationship with Washington,” adds Meranto.