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Israel attacks Iran
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take on the latest in the Middle East crisis. And things actually looking a little bit more stable today than they have over the past couple of weeks. And that is some very welcome news.
The headlines, of course, that the Iranians have been hit by Israel, though no one is saying that Israel has admitted to doing it, in the town of Isfahan. Clearly, military targets and the Iranians trying to knock down those missiles coming over. But this was a significantly more restrained attack than what the Israelis did to kick off this crisis, which was attack an Iranian government building in Damascus and target and assassinate a senior Iranian leader. That led to the Iranian response that we saw over the weekend, which was a significant and serious one, with a few hundred missiles and drones. And now we are in the escalatory portion of the cycle.
The United States said very clearly to Israel, “We're going to help defend you no matter what. We don't want any offensive strikes against Iran. Take the win.” The fact that they said that meant that it was very, very likely that they were going to do something, but that something was going to be restrained, where if the Americans said, “Hey, just take it easy, don't do anything big,” then they’d end up doing something bigger, right? And you give them an inch, they take two inches. This is the way these things work. And it was coordinated with the United States. The US was not involved directly in the military strikes, but they knew it was coming. They had that cooperation, communication from Israel, which was important because the US had to be in position in case the Iranians decided that they were going to strike real time in response to Israel. The Americans were going to help the Israelis defend themselves yet again.
Now, the big question here is not, “Do the Iranians respond in a big way?” They don't. They've already signaled that that's not the intention. You've seen them downplaying the nature of these strikes on Iranian state media. So, this crisis, this proximate crisis between Israel and Iran is now in the rearview mirror. But going forward, what's the likelihood that we can stabilize this war, which is now well beyond just a matter of Israel versus Hamas?
One thing that makes me a little bit more positive is the fact that Bibi Netanyahu is himself in a little more secure position domestically. What do you mean, makes you more positive? Does that mean he's going to last longer? Yes. But it also means he doesn't necessarily have to go ahead with massive strikes against Hamas in Rafah, killing lots of civilians. Or eventually against Hezbollah, pushing them back so that almost 100,000 Israeli citizens can get back to the north. If he wanted to take a win and show that he now has, you know, a historical legacy of leading Israel in defending against an unprecedented strike from Iran, with strong support from the Americans, from the Brits, from the Jordanians, from the Saudis, this is the opportunity that could create Saudi normalization with Israel. This is the opportunity that could create a peace deal that the Palestinians would have some form of governance over the West Bank and Gaza together.
That's the opportunity that comes from this, precisely because Israel domestically now has a leader that doesn't have to look over his shoulder every moment. But the strong effort by Netanyahu, at least as of today, is to still go ahead with these Rafah strikes. You've got the battalions on the ground. You want to use them, you want to take out, these Hamas leaders, irrespective of the civilian cost. And that continues to be very popular among the entire population of Israel as well.
So, when I think about the next couple of weeks, I think that you're not going to get a breakthrough deal on hostages with Hamas, and that means that the fighting only stops if there's a broader agreement. And that broader agreement requires that the Israeli war cabinet is willing to stand down and not continue their war on the ground in Gaza. And in return, has a broader agreement with the Americans, with the Gulf states, and ultimately with a path forward for the Palestinians. Most people around the world would welcome, would love to see that. Getting the Israelis from here to there, especially when you are surrounded by enemies that consider you, to be, illegitimate as a country and refuse to recognize your right to exist, that makes it a lot harder. So that's where we are. But some breathing space for now. The mood in the United States, certainly better than it was at any point over the last week and a half, and that's a good thing.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
Israel, Hamas and US in impasse over cease-fire deal
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week. And I want to talk a little bit about the Middle East because the war is very much still going on.
There's been hope, a lot of hope that we would have had a breakthrough deal for an extended cease fire, not a permanent cease fire, the cease fire of some six weeks, and that in return, significant numbers, dozens of the hostages that are still held after many months by Hamas in Gaza would have been released to their families in Israel. That has not happened. And it's not happened in large part because Hamas has refused to continue to negotiate. They basically said we want a permanent cease fire or nothing. And they are essentially daring the Israelis to go ahead with ground strikes in Rafah, where we have about 1.5 million Palestinians that are sheltering. “I have nowhere to go.” And the Americans are very unhappy with the idea that the Israelis would engage in that battle without having a plan for evacuation and protecting those civilians. Hamas is saying “go for it if that's what you want to do.” They're putting, as they have all the way through, their civilians at maximum risk. They're not trying to defend them.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, is trying to stay in power. What that means is he is more than willing to say “no” very loudly, very publicly to the United States. President Biden has said that an attack into Rafah by the Israelis would be a red line, would constitute a red line. And the Netanyahu government has said, “This is not a red line. The red line is destroying Hamas.” And so we're going to do absolutely everything in our power to do that. That includes taking on the tunnels and the military leaders that we believe continue to exist in that territory. Expectation is that is indeed going to happen. There’s going to be a lot more civilians that are killed. Biden is going to be under a lot more pressure, notwithstanding the fact that there is an effort by the Americans and others to provide more humanitarian aid on the ground to the Palestinians. But that is not close to the trucks that could be coming through that the Israelis have been unwilling to allow through.
So, I mean, you're at an impasse and you're an impasse basically until the Israelis feel like the war has been fought to their satisfaction and Netanyahu who is correct about one thing. This isn't just him that's calling the shots. It is the entire Israeli war cabinet, is the Israeli population. Whether or not they like Netanyahu and most of them don't. They want a war that destroys Hamas. They want a war that gets rid of the military capabilities on the ground and under the ground that finds the leaders and kills them. Hamas is very aware of that.
And that's part of the reason why you still have large numbers of hostages that continue to be held. It's quite plausible that the Israelis know where the Hamas leaders are, that they’re surrounded with a whole bunch of innocent civilians, Israeli civilians, and that's why they're still there. If you let them all go then what happens to them? Well, that's the end of them.
So there are many reasons to believe that the war is going to persist for a long time. And I'm not just talking about a month or two. I'm talking about like still happening when US elections are in place in November. That's a real problem for Biden, did a good job with the State of the Union last week, better than most expected. The Middle East is one of the areas that he is most vulnerable right now. He kind of squished it towards the end of the speech, didn't talk about it very much, and is trying to distance himself from the Israeli prime minister. There's only so much he can do given that he's going to continue to provide military support no matter what. He's going to continue to support Iron Dome, no matter what. Israel is going to continue to be America's top ally in the Middle East, no matter what. So on the one hand, he has large numbers of Americans in his own party that are increasingly sympathetic with the Palestinian position, in particularly with the civilian position on the ground. And yet he has very little leverage over his top ally.
That's a serious, serious challenge for him going forward. As long as that persists, you're going to continue to have attacks on ships in the Red Sea. We just saw the first casualties as a consequence of that, price is going to continue to be inefficient and up on the back of that, and you're going to see concerns about broader instability, radicalization particularly from the Palestinian population, but also the broader Arab street, the Muslim population in the Middle East, in Europe, even in the United States.
That's a reality and that's a very big downside for Biden himself. The good news, very good news. He has a little bit of good news, which is that America's efforts against the Houthis, which has degraded their military capabilities by between 30 and 50% of what they are known to have, that's not what they're not known to have, has meant that we have not seen attacks by Iranian proxies against American forces or British forces on the ground. That's a big deal. That is a win and it’s not a huge win, but in the context of so many other things in the Middle East that are going badly, you'll take it.
So anyway, that's where we are right now, and I hope everyone's doing well and I'll talk to you all real soon.
US inching away from Israel on Gaza war
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week. And the war in Gaza continues apace. We don't yet have an agreement between Israel and Hamas for a near-term cease fire and for more hostages to be released. Everyone is saying that it's imminent. The Israelis essentially have accepted the terms that have been put forward now by the United States, by Qatar, by Egypt.
Hamas has not yet. But it looks very close. Meanwhile, the United States continues to publicly inch further away from the war position of Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu. This is hurting the US on the global stage with its allies, with the Global South. It's hurting the United States and Biden in particular at home as well with his constituents in an election year.
The United States now at the Security Council, still vetoing permanent cease fire calls, but now pushing for a temporary cease fire. Vice President Kamala Harris for the first time over the weekend calling for an immediate, though temporary cease fire on the ground in Gaza. Biden saying that he opposes any ground war on the ground in Rafah until it is clear that there is a mechanism to ensure the safety of the over 1 million Palestinian civilians that are presently taking shelter there. And there's nothing close to that from Israel right now. And the United States has decided to start airdropping food to the Palestinians against the protestations of the Israel government, who says that they cannot control the safety of the humanitarian aid and cannot ensure that Hamas doesn't have a hold on them. So in an alliance that has had the two countries in lockstep in the days after October 7th, there is now significant gap between them.
The Israeli position is that Hamas, of course, is wholly responsible for the attacks on October 7th and that that justifies Israeli attacks against Gaza to completely destroy Hamas. Hamas operates in civilian areas. They are the ones putting the Palestinian civilian population at risk. And therefore, Hamas is singularly and solely responsible for all Palestinian deaths. Hamas steals resources that come into Gaza both before October 7th and after, massive amounts of aid pre October 7th had come in, but the Palestinian population there was not able to develop in part because of the kleptocracy represented by Hamas leadership. Therefore, they are responsible for the fact, Hamas, that food and medicine and power are not available for civilians. And finally, Hamas is holding hostages still months after October seven civilian hostages. And that humanitarian aid should not come in unless those hostages are released. It’s a point of leverage that the Israelis have over Hamas to get those hostages released.
And again, from Israel's perspective, it's not 50:50, it's not 80:20, it's not 90:10. All of these, the 30,000 plus deaths in Gaza, a majority of which are civilians, are Hamas's responsibility. The US position is not that. The US position is that Israel is far stronger militarily than Hamas's military capabilities. Israel is capable of defending itself, including from ongoing Hamas attacks and therefore should be able to allow aid in to Palestinians on the ground in Gaza without creating more vulnerabilities for Israeli civilians, that the Israelis have a responsibility for doing everything possible to limit Palestinian civilian deaths. And that while there's scope for disagreement and leeway between the US and the Israeli position, the Americans certainly believe that Israel has not done close to enough to ensure that fewer civilians are in harm's way, that fewer civilians are killed, and therefore that Israel is partially responsible for civilian deaths on the ground. Further, that the Palestinians must have a pathway to govern themselves and to have security, and that needs to be done through a two state solution, a two state solution that presently is rejected by the Israeli prime minister.
So US and Israel are, you know, US is closest ally, strongest ally of Israel globally. But those two positions on the war in Gaza, the war against Hamas, are significantly different and they're widening over time. Now, of course, I'm talking about the two countries that are closest here. I'm not talking about the rest of the world. When you talk about most of the countries in the world that are voting against Israel in the Security Council, in the General Assembly resolutions.
When you talk about the Global South, that position is very different. The majority of the world, of course, believes that Hamas is wholly responsible for the civilian terrorism that they engaged in October 7th. But they also believe that Israel is wholly responsible for the Palestinian death, civilian deaths since then. Again, not the US position, not the position of, say, the Germans and the French, but the position of most countries in the world, and indeed increasingly, the position of most countries in the world that Israel is committing a genocide on the ground in Gaza. And the opposition to Israel as a consequence of that is very great indeed. The gap between those two positions, you could drive hundreds of trucks through with humanitarian aid every day into Gaza. And that, of course, is a big part of the problem, that it is true that the idea of a two state solution is now more urgent and is now more on the table for most around the world than it was before October 7th.
It's also true that both the Israeli population and the Palestinian populations are much more radical lies today towards each other, against each other than they were before October 7th. The former is a win for the international community and perhaps for Palestinians on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza. The latter is a win for Hamas, is a win for Netanyahu, and is a loss for pretty much everywhere else.
And how do you decide what the balance is going to be going forward? It's going to take a very long time. Look, I mean, radicalized populations can change. I was talking to Yuval Harari just yesterday, wrote that book, Sapiens and Homo Deus, and he talked about the fact that, you know, we had a million people killed in the genocide in Rwanda, and this was only 30 years ago. This was, you know, 10,000 people massacred every day, ten times the number of Jews that were massacred on October 7th. And it didn't just happen on one day. It happened for 100 days, day after day after day, a million people slaughtered. And yet, 30 years later, these two populations are living in peace and stability. So it doesn't mean it can't happen between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but it does mean we are farther away today in many ways than we were before the atrocities of October 7th.
And that's something the entire world needs to pay a lot more attention to, needs to work a lot more on. That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
A Palestinian woman reacts to an Israeli airstrike amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip, on March 3, 2024.
Israel no-shows Gaza ceasefire talks
On Sunday, Israel boycotted talks in Cairo after Hamas rejected its demand for a list of hostages who still remain alive, though other parties carried on. Hope for a Gaza cease-fire is fading despite earlier US optimism that a deal was possible ahead of next week’s Ramadan deadline.
On Saturday, a US official told reporters that Israel had agreed to the framework of a deal and "the onus right now is on Hamas” to respond. But in addition to the rejected demand for a hostage list, the proposal does not meet Hamas’ main demand for a permanent end to the war, and a Palestinian official told Reuters the deal was ”not there yet” after Hamas officials arrived in Cairo.
Meanwhile, at least 15 children have starved to death in northern Gaza, according to health authorities, raising fears of mass famine. The United States air-dropped aid into the enclave on Saturday, but not at any scale that can solve the problem: The operation dropped some 38,000 meals, while over 2 million Gazans need food. US Vice President Kamala Harris called for Israel to allow more aid into Gaza on Sunday, ahead of a visit from Israeli war cabinet member Benny Gantz — a visit which could add complications.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly dressed down Gantz — his political rival — over the latter’s “unauthorized” upcoming trip to Washington. Gantz claims his meetings with Harris on Monday and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Tuesday will strengthen ties between the two countries and gain support for Israel’s ground campaign.
But Netanyahu loyalists see it as a power play — President Joe Biden’s relationship with Netanyahu is reportedly at a low point – and accuse Gantz of acting like a “Trojan horse.” We’ll be watching his reception in Washington and the reaction in Jerusalem.
As Israel presses conflict, US frustration grows
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week. Of course it is the Middle East that we are first and foremost exercised about. Not the biggest topic in Europe for the Munich Security Conference. That was Navalny and Russia and Ukraine. But back in the United States and for most of the rest of the world, it is still the Middle East.
And that is in part because there is less optimism about an imminent deal on the remaining hostages, which has led the Israeli government to step up the pressure, saying if you don't give all of the hostages back, in short order, that they're going to engage in ground warfare against Rafah, where over a million Palestinians are sheltering, if we can call it that, having already been resettled from other parts in the rest of Gaza, and they have nowhere to go.
The Americans are deeply concerned about this. And that's why you see the United States shifting towards support of a Security Council resolution that would call for a temporary cease fire. Now, that's not all that much a temporary cease fire and it's, you know, not necessary really going to lead the Israelis to take a different position. But it does show frustration, public frustration from the Biden administration that the war is not going where they want, that it continues to see massive amounts of civilian casualties.
And the Israeli government isn't listening to their quiet pressure. Of course, that's causing difficulties for Biden at home during an election year. I also see the Israelis pushing on Rafah because they are hoping that that's going to force Hamas into a more acceptable deal on how many hostages are freed, with how many Palestinian prisoners they have to give up, all of that stuff. But if it doesn't work, of course, that means that the pressure on Netanyahu and the Israeli war cabinet to go in to Rafah with tanks, with troops, with far more civilian casualties, far more pressure on the Palestinians to get the hell out, no matter the consequences. Some getting into Egypt, potentially breaking the Egypt-Israel peace deal. You also see that with the Saudis, who publicly are saying there's no chance that they are willing to engage in a breakthrough normalization of diplomatic relations with the Israelis as long as Netanyahu is in power, as long as there's no two-state solution, as long as there are any Israeli troops on the ground in Gaza, that is considerably more pessimistic than they were even a few weeks ago. So the general travel of this conflict continues to be negative and towards escalation, towards more conflict across the region.
We also see that in West Bank. We also see that with the skirmishing and the missiles going from Israel into Lebanon, from Lebanon and Hezbollah into Israel. Look, I am still, on balance optimistic that a deal is going to get done, but that deal is not going to end the fighting. It's a temporary reprieve that will allow the Americans and others to do everything they can to try to extend the cease fire, to try to create conditions for political and security, you know, leadership on the ground in Gaza.
I think the ability to stick that landing is virtually zero. The other thing that's happening is Israel is getting more isolated. The Europeans continue to support Israel, but they're under the same pressure that Biden administration is. Their youth are just as angry at what's happening on the ground and just as supportive of the Palestinians as they are in the United States. That surprised a lot of European leaders I spoke with last week, especially the Germans who have been very outspoken in their support for Israel and are feeling a lot of pressure from their domestic constituencies to dial that back. And then you see the rest of the world where Israel is increasingly isolated. That was reflected with President Lula from Brazil, who compared the war in Gaza to the Holocaust.
It's an appalling comparison. No matter what you think about the war in Gaza, this was Hitler trying to kill, trying to exterminate the Jews with millions dead and Israel is calling Lula persona non grata. They're demanding an apology. I hope that he will give one. But the broader point here is that what Lula is saying publicly is what a lot of leaders from the Global South have a sentiment privately. They believe this is a genocide being committed against the Palestinians. They are angry with the Israelis. They feel like everything needs to be done to stop the fighting, that they're acting with impunity, that they're the villain, they're the bad guy. And this is, again, only a few months after the acts of October 7th, the Israelis, from my perspective, have lost the information war globally and they've lost the political support from a majority of the world's governments around the world. They never had that strongly, but they had opportunities. Certainly they were in a stronger geopolitical position before October 7th. They really aren't now and Lula's announcements, intemperate announcements reflect that change.
That's it for me. And I'll talk to you all real soon.
US aid for Israel & Ukraine hangs in the balance
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Will the House pass the Senate-approved aid package for Ukraine and Israel?
Well, certainly not if the Freedom Caucus and the Speaker of the House have anything to say about it. So, I mean, as of today, what the Senate has passed with a lot of Republicans on board looks dead in the House. But of course, the ability to jam the House and force them to accept something or there's no government funding, that is a game of chicken that we've seen before and the Senate may well continue to be ready to play. So it is not dead yet, but aid is looking challenging. And let's be clear, irrespective of what happens for 2024, it's going to be very hard to get any more aid for the Ukrainians going forward. And everybody is deeply aware of that reality.
How likely will Israel proceed with a ground invasion of Rafah in Gaza?
Well, keep in mind, this is right on the border with Egypt. The Egyptians have said that this will blow up their peace agreement with Israel if they decide to go into that space full on with a ground invasion. There's already been some incursions, including one that freed two hostages held by Hamas. So clearly that has huge support from the Israeli population as a whole. The Biden administration has publicly said that they don't want to see a ground invasion, especially because there are no circumstances, at least not set up yet, that the Palestinians who continue to be forced to move and move and move will be safe in this environment. I think that we are very close to a temporary cease fire and more hostages being released. So part of this is pressure from Israel to get that done. If you made me bet right now, I'd say we actually see the deal first. But that is not going to end eventual hostilities from ticking back up between the Israelis and Hamas in Gaza.
What are the wider implications for the Indonesia presidential election?
More state influence over key industries in the economy. Probably a little bit more willingness to blow out the budget from a fiscal perspective. But the likely winner, Prabowo, his vice presidential running mate, is the son of Jokowi, the president of Indonesia. And that implies first geopolitically, very similar orientation to have balanced relations between China economically but the US strategically. I don't see that changing at all. There is still a big question about whether they're going to move the capital. This has been a massive effort with a lot of money that is at play and it's not clear that Prabowo is as convinced that that needs to be the legacy as Jokowi has been. That'll be worth watching very carefully when he becomes president, for those that care. I do, hope you do, too.
- Stalled deal on US border security leaves Ukraine in the lurch ›
- Poll: American support for Ukraine aid is falling ›
- Hard Numbers: March shows solidarity for Israel, US Army overturns convictions of Black soldiers, US inflation cools, EU falls short on artillery shells for Ukraine, House passes funding bill ›
- Zelensky's US trip likely to secure aid for Ukraine ›
- US aid for Israel: How much and since when? ›
Sweden's NATO membership is imminent after Turkey's approval
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week from Davos on World In :60.
With the Turkish parliament officially approving Sweden's membership of NATO, will Hungary remain the lone holdout?
I don't expect it. I think that Sweden is joining. Erdogan still has to sign. So, I mean, isn't done done done until the signatures on. But NATO is being sold very, very effectively by Vladimir Putin, continues to expand.
How will the West react to North Korea arming Russia for the war in Ukraine?
Well, the interesting thing, it's not just that North Korea is arming Russia, that Russia is helping North Korea in return, including advancing their ICBM program, which historically was a red line for the Americans. But what are they going to do about it now? I also notice the North Koreans just kind of blew up their big monument for reunification with the South Koreans. They’re saying the South Koreans are permanent enemy, that reunification is no longer an interest of theirs. You know, the North Koreans now have more room to cause trouble because the Chinese aren't the only country out there that is liking them and restraining them. The Russians provide support and they're much more of a chaos actor. It would not surprise me if we're going to see more trouble from the North Koreans in the coming months.
Is a temporary ceasefire between Israel and Hamas likely in exchange for the release of all remaining hostages?
Well, the US would love to see that. Qatar would love to see that. The Israelis are now willing to consider deals that even a couple of weeks ago they were not. Things are not going as well for them on the ground. They don't really have a strategic endgame in Gaza or with Hamas right now. And there’s even more internal dissent within the war cabinet. I don't see Hamas, though, supporting giving away all of the hostages, which is leverage for them in return for a short-term ceasefire. They're taking a maximalist view. Israel has to pull all of their troops out if they would consider that. And the ceasefire has to be more than a couple of months. You know, functionally permanent. It does not seem at all to me that we are close to a deal. Let's put it that way.
srael, Tel-Aviv, 2024-01-20. Israelis opposed to Netanyahu gathered in Tel Aviv to demand the return of the hostages kidnapped by Hamas during the attacks of October 7, 2023.
Netanyahu rejects Hamas-proposed deal for hostage return
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin "Bibi" Netanyahu reaffirmed his hardline position against a Palestinian state on Saturday, shortly after a telephone discussion with Joe Biden in which the US president suggested a two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinian territories.
Bibi’s office threw cold water on the idea, clarifying that “[A]fter Hamas is destroyed Israel must retain security control over Gaza to ensure that Gaza will no longer pose a threat to Israel, a requirement that contradicts the demand for Palestinian sovereignty."
While Bibi claims his strategy will safeguard Israel's security, others see it as an attempt to appease right-wing elements in his coalition government. That’s not sitting well with allies abroad, including US Democrats. One of them, Maryland Sen. Chris Van Hollen, is advancing an amendment to the use of US national security aid, obliging countries receiving American military aid to use the weapons in accordance with US law, international humanitarian law, and the laws of armed conflict. As of Friday, the bill had 18 Democratic cosponsors.
And there’s division in Israel
On Sunday, Bibi rejected a deal proposed by Hamas that would have seen Israeli hostages released in exchange for Israeli troops withdrawing from Gaza, the release of Palestinian prisoners, and recognition of Hamas' government of Gaza. He said the terms would leave Hamas intact and encourage them to attack again.
But not everyone agrees with his tough stance. The Hostages and Missing Families Forum began a protest outside Netanyahu's residence, vowing to stay put until he accepts a deal. Even before the prime minister rejected Hamas' offer, thousands of protesters took to the streets in Tel Aviv on Saturday demanding new elections.
Bibi's stance is also dividing the Israeli cabinet and the country’s military. Gadi Eisenkot, a former army chief now serving in the war cabinet, stated, "It’s an 'illusion' to believe that the hostages could be rescued alive through military operations." According to four senior military officers interviewed by the New York Times, the twin objectives of freeing the hostages and destroying Hamas are now mutually incompatible.
We’ll be watching to see whether increased pressure makes him change gears — or leads to a change of leadership.