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A Palestinian woman inspects a house that was destroyed after an Israeli airstrike in Rafah, April 24, 2024.
Rafah braces for Israeli invasion as famine looms
As the World Food Programme warns that Gaza is getting closer to famine by the day, US troops are set to begin constructing a floating pier off the northern coast of the enclave to increase the flow of desperately needed aid. The project is expected to be done by early May.
Meanwhile, Israel continues to lay the groundwork for an invasion of Rafah, the southern Gaza city where over a million Palestinians are sheltering. Israel has pummeled Rafah with airstrikes in recent days, and the Israeli military is gathering tanks and armored vehicles near the southern Gaza border ahead of the expected operation.
The Israeli government, which says Rafah is the last Hamas stronghold in Gaza, has rebuffed international opposition to a ground offensive. Israel also says it’s taking steps to help evacuate civilians before invading, and satellite images suggest
Months of unsuccessful efforts to secure a new truce in the war have kept the door open for a Rafah operation. On Wednesday, a top Hamas official said the militant group would lay down its arms if Israel accepted an independent Palestinian state with pre-1967 borders — but there’s virtually no chance of that happening, particularly given the current Israeli government firmly opposes Palestinian statehood.
For now, all eyes are on Rafah. “We are afraid of what will happen in Rafah. The level of alert is very high,” Ibrahim Khraishi, the Palestinian ambassador to the United Nations, said Thursday.
Why the US is sending aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here. And a Quick Take to kick off your week. A big $90 billion package that has been approved by the US House of Representatives, going through the Senate shortly after months of debate and, all of the package, all three major pieces of it, have some significant, complicated features.
First of all, the biggest piece for Ukraine, $60 billion, massive military support.
They had been in danger of losing significant more territory. This certainly shores them up. It helps the Ukrainians. It makes the Europeans panic less, but, you know, can they longer term hold on? What is the end game? The Ukrainians are, of course, running short not just of material to fight, but also air defense capabilities and, critically, people, soldiers. It's much harder for them to get people for the front lines than it is for the authoritarian, and much larger populated Russia. And so, the intention is that the Ukrainians don't fall apart, but of course, longer term, the idea that the US will continue to be able to provide 60 billion in support year after year. Certainly not true if Trump becomes president, probably not true if Biden wins a second term. What you really want to do is try to find a way to get them in a better position so that negotiations, inevitably, that need to occur with Russia, can be more productive and more constructive from the Ukrainian side, from the European side, from the NATO side. The US kick the can on this last year when the Americans, were in much better position supporting Ukraine. Now it's harder. Always is the case is that you think that things are going to get better. You don't feel like taking the political risk and as a consequence you extend and pretend. And now they're in a worse position. So I'm glad that the money came through. I'm glad the Ukrainians, are still fighting courageously and want to fight courageously. But of course, longer term, this war leads to some degree of partition where the Ukrainians are losing their land.
Israel, closest ally of the United States in the Middle East. Some 17 billion in military support for Israel, also some 9 billion in humanitarian aid in Gaza in this plan.
But, of course, increasingly, the United States does not support Israel continuing to fight against Hamas in Gaza. They want to see a lot more protection for Palestinian civilians, which the Israelis have been reluctant to put in place. They don't want to see a ground offensive into Rafah. Over a million Palestinians shelter in there. The Israelis are fully intent on continuing with that, proceeding with it. They did want to see a cease-fire that was linked directly to a hostage release. Now, increasingly, the US is talking about those two things as critical but delinked. And at the same time as the US is providing all this money, you have sanctions being placed by the United States on battalions of the Israeli Defense Forces engaged in human rights violations. This shows just how impossible this position is for President Biden to maneuver domestically, not to mention internationally. The US is overwhelmingly, the one country that is most supportive of Israel. Biden is overwhelmingly the political leader that is most supportive of Israel. But most of his constituents are not. And this is absolutely going to hurt him, even though it's a foreign policy issue and they don't usually play that heavily in recent decades in the election coming up in November. And you’ll see it, of course, across campuses all over the country, including my own at Columbia.
And then finally Taiwan. And this is in a sense the least controversial, because everyone on the Democratic and Republican side pretty much supports more support for Taiwan, is opposed to China. It's very easy to get lots of legislation that makes life more difficult for China. At the same time, though, the long term strategy of the United States is to make Taiwan less important, less important for the Americans in making sure that semiconductor production, moves from Taiwan to the United States, to other allies, not just a few miles off of the mainland Chinese coast, but also export controls that prevent the Chinese from getting advanced semiconductors from Taiwan as well. In other words, the big US strategy is not just arming the Taiwanese and helping them defend themselves, but also making Taiwan fundamentally less important to mainland China. and one of the main reasons that the Chinese would not be interested in attacking Taiwan long term or squeezing them hard economically long term, is because they're so indispensable to the Chinese economy. This is not going to be the case long term.
In all three of these areas, you've got the United States with friends, but they are less aligned with strategically than they are tactically. And that means that this money that we see going forward is all about kicking the can on short term gains that make sense politically for the US right now. But long term do not resolve the challenges that exist for the US with these countries.
That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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What will Israel's invasion of Rafah look like?
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
How will Iran respond to the attack on their consulate in Syria?
An Israeli strike that killed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leader of Iran in Syria. So on the one hand, Iranian citizen, high-level military official. On the other hand, not in Iran itself, in Syria supporting proxy attacks. Clearly the Iranians have been willing to push hard using the leverage they have in the so-called acts of resistance to engage in strikes against civilian shipping, against Western military capabilities, and against Israel.
The Israelis are showing that they will attack wherever they think fit against them, but Iran has been reluctant to allow this to potentially lead to escalation in a direct war against Iran, which is why it's hard to imagine the Iranians engaging in direct strikes against Israel itself. Ballistic missile strikes from Iran into Israel. So in other words, if you're going to hit Israel, you try to use proxies or you try to hit Israelis outside of Israel itself. Israeli diplomatic facilities, for example, that's where I think you're more likely to see escalation. Escalation seems almost certain from the Iranians, but containing it also is something the Americans and Israel are trying very, very hard to do and that continues to be the case like when we saw the American servicemen killed in Jordan a couple months ago.
What will Israel's invasion of Rafah look like?
Assuming it happens, remember Netanyahu was saying that he has a date now for the strike, but he said that strikes were going to start once Ramadan began if there had not been an agreement on this six-week, hostages for temporary ceasefire deal. There wasn't such a deal, Netanyahu backed off, he could back off again. Also, the ultimatum from the United States is not about a war in Rafah. It is about a large-scale ground war without providing the ability for the Palestinians to evacuate and get humanitarian aid.
Between those two positions there's a lot of wiggle room and one expects that the Israeli government, as they are thinking about those strikes, which I do believe will come, will try to claim domestically that they're doing what they need to clear up Hamas and claim to the Americans that it is at a reduced cost of civilians and it is engaged in the spirit of working with the Americans and not requiring Biden to shut down offensive support for Israel. That's where we are.
What's the fallout from Ecuador's raid of a Mexican embassy?
Well, the first thing is President Noboa of Ecuador, this is political. This is a former vice president who was taking, was sheltering in the Mexican embassy. You raid it, that is a breach of international law, but there is a security, largely security referendum, nationwide referendum coming up in just a couple of weeks in Ecuador that Noboa wants to win. He is ahead, it looks like he will win it now, and this is going to be very popular on the ground.
Guy had been sort of on their wanted list for a long time, but they decided to take that action now because of the domestic politics. So it helps him. Probably doesn't kill the IMF deal that is presently being negotiated, but certainly suspends diplomatic relations between the two countries and it's probably going to affect trade too. So you've alienated the Mexicans, but given the near-term political benefit for the Ecuadorian president, he thought that was a risk worth taking. Lots of impunity in this environment. It's one consistency that we see in our geopolitical recession, our GZERO world.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Palestinians react as they inspect damages at Al Shifa Hospital after Israeli forces withdrew from the Hospital and the area around it following a two-week operation, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, in Gaza City April 1, 2024.
Israel’s Shifa raid ends. Is Rafah next?
The Israeli military on Monday confirmed its withdrawal from Shifa Hospital, Gaza’s largest health facility, concluding a raid that lasted roughly two weeks and sparked criticism from the WHO and international rights groups.
Israel says the raid, which reportedly left the hospital in ruins, destroyed a terrorist base and may have garnered intel that could help locate hostages held by Hamas since Oct. 7, 2023. Israel’s war tactics are increasingly being scrutinized globally, including by the US – the Jewish State’s top ally.
At home, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is facing a serious domestic backlash over his handling of the war. Tens of thousands of Israelis took to the streets over the weekend to call for his removal and a hostage deal. Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s coalition is threatened by divisions over conscription exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Jews.
Is Rafah next? Netanyahu pushed back against critics on Sunday, noting that he has done all he can to secure the release of the Israeli hostages – and saying that Rafah remains in his sights.
The US and Israel held a virtual meeting Monday on alternatives to invading Rafah, but few expect Netanyahu – who has said there will be “no victory” without entering Rafah – to change course.
Busy Bibi: On Monday, Netanyahu also announced he would temporarily shut down Al Jazeera in Israel, referring to it as a “terror channel” and accusing the Doha-based outlet of participating in the Oct. 7 attacks. In yet another sign of the growing rift between the US and Israel, the White House said: "A move like this is concerning.”
Israel, Hamas and US in impasse over cease-fire deal
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week. And I want to talk a little bit about the Middle East because the war is very much still going on.
There's been hope, a lot of hope that we would have had a breakthrough deal for an extended cease fire, not a permanent cease fire, the cease fire of some six weeks, and that in return, significant numbers, dozens of the hostages that are still held after many months by Hamas in Gaza would have been released to their families in Israel. That has not happened. And it's not happened in large part because Hamas has refused to continue to negotiate. They basically said we want a permanent cease fire or nothing. And they are essentially daring the Israelis to go ahead with ground strikes in Rafah, where we have about 1.5 million Palestinians that are sheltering. “I have nowhere to go.” And the Americans are very unhappy with the idea that the Israelis would engage in that battle without having a plan for evacuation and protecting those civilians. Hamas is saying “go for it if that's what you want to do.” They're putting, as they have all the way through, their civilians at maximum risk. They're not trying to defend them.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, is trying to stay in power. What that means is he is more than willing to say “no” very loudly, very publicly to the United States. President Biden has said that an attack into Rafah by the Israelis would be a red line, would constitute a red line. And the Netanyahu government has said, “This is not a red line. The red line is destroying Hamas.” And so we're going to do absolutely everything in our power to do that. That includes taking on the tunnels and the military leaders that we believe continue to exist in that territory. Expectation is that is indeed going to happen. There’s going to be a lot more civilians that are killed. Biden is going to be under a lot more pressure, notwithstanding the fact that there is an effort by the Americans and others to provide more humanitarian aid on the ground to the Palestinians. But that is not close to the trucks that could be coming through that the Israelis have been unwilling to allow through.
So, I mean, you're at an impasse and you're an impasse basically until the Israelis feel like the war has been fought to their satisfaction and Netanyahu who is correct about one thing. This isn't just him that's calling the shots. It is the entire Israeli war cabinet, is the Israeli population. Whether or not they like Netanyahu and most of them don't. They want a war that destroys Hamas. They want a war that gets rid of the military capabilities on the ground and under the ground that finds the leaders and kills them. Hamas is very aware of that.
And that's part of the reason why you still have large numbers of hostages that continue to be held. It's quite plausible that the Israelis know where the Hamas leaders are, that they’re surrounded with a whole bunch of innocent civilians, Israeli civilians, and that's why they're still there. If you let them all go then what happens to them? Well, that's the end of them.
So there are many reasons to believe that the war is going to persist for a long time. And I'm not just talking about a month or two. I'm talking about like still happening when US elections are in place in November. That's a real problem for Biden, did a good job with the State of the Union last week, better than most expected. The Middle East is one of the areas that he is most vulnerable right now. He kind of squished it towards the end of the speech, didn't talk about it very much, and is trying to distance himself from the Israeli prime minister. There's only so much he can do given that he's going to continue to provide military support no matter what. He's going to continue to support Iron Dome, no matter what. Israel is going to continue to be America's top ally in the Middle East, no matter what. So on the one hand, he has large numbers of Americans in his own party that are increasingly sympathetic with the Palestinian position, in particularly with the civilian position on the ground. And yet he has very little leverage over his top ally.
That's a serious, serious challenge for him going forward. As long as that persists, you're going to continue to have attacks on ships in the Red Sea. We just saw the first casualties as a consequence of that, price is going to continue to be inefficient and up on the back of that, and you're going to see concerns about broader instability, radicalization particularly from the Palestinian population, but also the broader Arab street, the Muslim population in the Middle East, in Europe, even in the United States.
That's a reality and that's a very big downside for Biden himself. The good news, very good news. He has a little bit of good news, which is that America's efforts against the Houthis, which has degraded their military capabilities by between 30 and 50% of what they are known to have, that's not what they're not known to have, has meant that we have not seen attacks by Iranian proxies against American forces or British forces on the ground. That's a big deal. That is a win and it’s not a huge win, but in the context of so many other things in the Middle East that are going badly, you'll take it.
So anyway, that's where we are right now, and I hope everyone's doing well and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Palestinians gather near a building damaged in an Israeli air strike, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip March 9, 2024.
How firm is Biden’s “red line” on Rafah?
Gazans are anticipating an Israeli ground invasion of Rafah now that the March 10 deadline has arrived, despite warnings — albeit mixed ones — from the US president against the attack.
On Saturday, Joe Bidensaid Israel would cross a “red line” if it went through with its planned ground invasion without a plan to evacuate the 1.5 million people sheltering in Rafah. Then, almost in the same breath, Biden said “there’s no red line” that would lead him “to cut off all weapons” to Israel and endanger its safety. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for his part, says he will press forward with the planned attack.
Biden had expressed optimism that a truce could be reached by this point, including hostage releases that would meet Israeli conditions and head off an attack on Gaza. Leaked diplomatic cables last week indicated the US government believes an invasion would lead to “catastrophic humanitarian consequences.”
Even if the invasion is briefly delayed, Gazans are starving as Israel permits only a trickle of aid to enter by truck, and airdrops of food have done very little to relieve the suffering. The European Union has prepared to dispatch a ship with humanitarian aid from Cyprus, and the US says it will construct a temporary pier that can be used to bring in aid by water. However, it could take two months to come online — and even then would struggle to match what trucks entering from Israel could provide.
US inching away from Israel on Gaza war
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week. And the war in Gaza continues apace. We don't yet have an agreement between Israel and Hamas for a near-term cease fire and for more hostages to be released. Everyone is saying that it's imminent. The Israelis essentially have accepted the terms that have been put forward now by the United States, by Qatar, by Egypt.
Hamas has not yet. But it looks very close. Meanwhile, the United States continues to publicly inch further away from the war position of Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu. This is hurting the US on the global stage with its allies, with the Global South. It's hurting the United States and Biden in particular at home as well with his constituents in an election year.
The United States now at the Security Council, still vetoing permanent cease fire calls, but now pushing for a temporary cease fire. Vice President Kamala Harris for the first time over the weekend calling for an immediate, though temporary cease fire on the ground in Gaza. Biden saying that he opposes any ground war on the ground in Rafah until it is clear that there is a mechanism to ensure the safety of the over 1 million Palestinian civilians that are presently taking shelter there. And there's nothing close to that from Israel right now. And the United States has decided to start airdropping food to the Palestinians against the protestations of the Israel government, who says that they cannot control the safety of the humanitarian aid and cannot ensure that Hamas doesn't have a hold on them. So in an alliance that has had the two countries in lockstep in the days after October 7th, there is now significant gap between them.
The Israeli position is that Hamas, of course, is wholly responsible for the attacks on October 7th and that that justifies Israeli attacks against Gaza to completely destroy Hamas. Hamas operates in civilian areas. They are the ones putting the Palestinian civilian population at risk. And therefore, Hamas is singularly and solely responsible for all Palestinian deaths. Hamas steals resources that come into Gaza both before October 7th and after, massive amounts of aid pre October 7th had come in, but the Palestinian population there was not able to develop in part because of the kleptocracy represented by Hamas leadership. Therefore, they are responsible for the fact, Hamas, that food and medicine and power are not available for civilians. And finally, Hamas is holding hostages still months after October seven civilian hostages. And that humanitarian aid should not come in unless those hostages are released. It’s a point of leverage that the Israelis have over Hamas to get those hostages released.
And again, from Israel's perspective, it's not 50:50, it's not 80:20, it's not 90:10. All of these, the 30,000 plus deaths in Gaza, a majority of which are civilians, are Hamas's responsibility. The US position is not that. The US position is that Israel is far stronger militarily than Hamas's military capabilities. Israel is capable of defending itself, including from ongoing Hamas attacks and therefore should be able to allow aid in to Palestinians on the ground in Gaza without creating more vulnerabilities for Israeli civilians, that the Israelis have a responsibility for doing everything possible to limit Palestinian civilian deaths. And that while there's scope for disagreement and leeway between the US and the Israeli position, the Americans certainly believe that Israel has not done close to enough to ensure that fewer civilians are in harm's way, that fewer civilians are killed, and therefore that Israel is partially responsible for civilian deaths on the ground. Further, that the Palestinians must have a pathway to govern themselves and to have security, and that needs to be done through a two state solution, a two state solution that presently is rejected by the Israeli prime minister.
So US and Israel are, you know, US is closest ally, strongest ally of Israel globally. But those two positions on the war in Gaza, the war against Hamas, are significantly different and they're widening over time. Now, of course, I'm talking about the two countries that are closest here. I'm not talking about the rest of the world. When you talk about most of the countries in the world that are voting against Israel in the Security Council, in the General Assembly resolutions.
When you talk about the Global South, that position is very different. The majority of the world, of course, believes that Hamas is wholly responsible for the civilian terrorism that they engaged in October 7th. But they also believe that Israel is wholly responsible for the Palestinian death, civilian deaths since then. Again, not the US position, not the position of, say, the Germans and the French, but the position of most countries in the world, and indeed increasingly, the position of most countries in the world that Israel is committing a genocide on the ground in Gaza. And the opposition to Israel as a consequence of that is very great indeed. The gap between those two positions, you could drive hundreds of trucks through with humanitarian aid every day into Gaza. And that, of course, is a big part of the problem, that it is true that the idea of a two state solution is now more urgent and is now more on the table for most around the world than it was before October 7th.
It's also true that both the Israeli population and the Palestinian populations are much more radical lies today towards each other, against each other than they were before October 7th. The former is a win for the international community and perhaps for Palestinians on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza. The latter is a win for Hamas, is a win for Netanyahu, and is a loss for pretty much everywhere else.
And how do you decide what the balance is going to be going forward? It's going to take a very long time. Look, I mean, radicalized populations can change. I was talking to Yuval Harari just yesterday, wrote that book, Sapiens and Homo Deus, and he talked about the fact that, you know, we had a million people killed in the genocide in Rwanda, and this was only 30 years ago. This was, you know, 10,000 people massacred every day, ten times the number of Jews that were massacred on October 7th. And it didn't just happen on one day. It happened for 100 days, day after day after day, a million people slaughtered. And yet, 30 years later, these two populations are living in peace and stability. So it doesn't mean it can't happen between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but it does mean we are farther away today in many ways than we were before the atrocities of October 7th.
And that's something the entire world needs to pay a lot more attention to, needs to work a lot more on. That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
As Israel presses conflict, US frustration grows
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week. Of course it is the Middle East that we are first and foremost exercised about. Not the biggest topic in Europe for the Munich Security Conference. That was Navalny and Russia and Ukraine. But back in the United States and for most of the rest of the world, it is still the Middle East.
And that is in part because there is less optimism about an imminent deal on the remaining hostages, which has led the Israeli government to step up the pressure, saying if you don't give all of the hostages back, in short order, that they're going to engage in ground warfare against Rafah, where over a million Palestinians are sheltering, if we can call it that, having already been resettled from other parts in the rest of Gaza, and they have nowhere to go.
The Americans are deeply concerned about this. And that's why you see the United States shifting towards support of a Security Council resolution that would call for a temporary cease fire. Now, that's not all that much a temporary cease fire and it's, you know, not necessary really going to lead the Israelis to take a different position. But it does show frustration, public frustration from the Biden administration that the war is not going where they want, that it continues to see massive amounts of civilian casualties.
And the Israeli government isn't listening to their quiet pressure. Of course, that's causing difficulties for Biden at home during an election year. I also see the Israelis pushing on Rafah because they are hoping that that's going to force Hamas into a more acceptable deal on how many hostages are freed, with how many Palestinian prisoners they have to give up, all of that stuff. But if it doesn't work, of course, that means that the pressure on Netanyahu and the Israeli war cabinet to go in to Rafah with tanks, with troops, with far more civilian casualties, far more pressure on the Palestinians to get the hell out, no matter the consequences. Some getting into Egypt, potentially breaking the Egypt-Israel peace deal. You also see that with the Saudis, who publicly are saying there's no chance that they are willing to engage in a breakthrough normalization of diplomatic relations with the Israelis as long as Netanyahu is in power, as long as there's no two-state solution, as long as there are any Israeli troops on the ground in Gaza, that is considerably more pessimistic than they were even a few weeks ago. So the general travel of this conflict continues to be negative and towards escalation, towards more conflict across the region.
We also see that in West Bank. We also see that with the skirmishing and the missiles going from Israel into Lebanon, from Lebanon and Hezbollah into Israel. Look, I am still, on balance optimistic that a deal is going to get done, but that deal is not going to end the fighting. It's a temporary reprieve that will allow the Americans and others to do everything they can to try to extend the cease fire, to try to create conditions for political and security, you know, leadership on the ground in Gaza.
I think the ability to stick that landing is virtually zero. The other thing that's happening is Israel is getting more isolated. The Europeans continue to support Israel, but they're under the same pressure that Biden administration is. Their youth are just as angry at what's happening on the ground and just as supportive of the Palestinians as they are in the United States. That surprised a lot of European leaders I spoke with last week, especially the Germans who have been very outspoken in their support for Israel and are feeling a lot of pressure from their domestic constituencies to dial that back. And then you see the rest of the world where Israel is increasingly isolated. That was reflected with President Lula from Brazil, who compared the war in Gaza to the Holocaust.
It's an appalling comparison. No matter what you think about the war in Gaza, this was Hitler trying to kill, trying to exterminate the Jews with millions dead and Israel is calling Lula persona non grata. They're demanding an apology. I hope that he will give one. But the broader point here is that what Lula is saying publicly is what a lot of leaders from the Global South have a sentiment privately. They believe this is a genocide being committed against the Palestinians. They are angry with the Israelis. They feel like everything needs to be done to stop the fighting, that they're acting with impunity, that they're the villain, they're the bad guy. And this is, again, only a few months after the acts of October 7th, the Israelis, from my perspective, have lost the information war globally and they've lost the political support from a majority of the world's governments around the world. They never had that strongly, but they had opportunities. Certainly they were in a stronger geopolitical position before October 7th. They really aren't now and Lula's announcements, intemperate announcements reflect that change.
That's it for me. And I'll talk to you all real soon.