Trending Now
We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters form a human chain in front of the crowd gathered near the family home of slain Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, where the Hamas militant group prepares to hand over Israeli and Thai hostages to a Red Cross team in Khan Yunis, on January 30, 2025, as part of their third hostage-prisoner exchange..
Hamas: Then & Now
Israel hunted Yahya Sinwar — the Hamas leader and mastermind of the Oct. 7 attack — for over a year. He was hidden deep within Gaza’s shadowy tunnel networks. Surrounded by guards and shielded by hostages, he remained untouchable — until he wasn’t. In Rafah last October, Sinwar was killed not in a targeted operation but during a routine skirmish with a patrol unit. It was only after the smoke cleared that Israeli troops even realized they had taken out their No. 1 enemy.
His death marked a turning point for Hamas, and the leadership role fell to his brother, Mohammed Sinwar, the chief planner behind Gaza’s tunnel infrastructure and Hamas’ former head of logistics and manpower. Six months into his leadership, the question looms: Where does the group stand today?
Then: Under Yahya Sinwar, Hamas operated from a position of relative strength, calculating that the time was right for the group to attack Israel, believing that Iran and Hezbollah would follow suit and that the humanitarian crisis that would inevitably follow in Gaza would only benefit Hamas by spurring international backlash against Israel.
Mohammed Sinwar assumed control of the group at a time of growing weakness. The wider regional response his brother had counted on never materialized. Iran is increasingly focused on domestic stability, and Hezbollah is now badly weakened. And while Israel has faced international criticism for its actions in Gaza, it continues to receive robust military support from key allies like the United States.
Now: Eighteen months into Israel’s ground campaign in Gaza, Hamas is militarily diminished, organizationally disjointed, and politically weak. Since the breakdown of a ceasefire in March, Israeli attacks on the enclave have resumed, and the already catastrophic humanitarian crisis has only deepened amid restricted aid deliveries.
“Hamas is less cohesive than it probably has been at any point in the last decade,” says Jonathan Panikoff, director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiativeat the Atlantic Council. “There seem to be major shortages in their military arsenal.” Their only remaining leverage, he notes, is the 59 hostages still believed to be held in Gaza – of whom only around 24 are thought to be alive.
Yahya Sinwar was able to seamlessly coordinate between Hamas’ regional allies, its political arm — the Council of Five based in Doha, Qatar — and its fighters on the ground. However, under the leadership of his brother, that cohesion has broken down. Now, the Council, which would be central to any future ceasefire negotiations, is seen as “too far removed politically,” Panikoff says.
“They're not going to be able to control what happens on the ground in Gaza if there’s a disagreement between those on the ground in the strip and the Council.”
Since Hamas came to power in 2007, the group has maintained its grip by controlling access to jobs, presenting itself as the vanguard against Israeli occupation, and, of course, by having a zero-tolerance policy for dissent.
But in recent weeks, public frustration has begun to boil over. As the humanitarian crisis deepens, protests have erupted inside Gaza — most notably in early April, when hundreds of Palestinians marched through Beit Lahia in the North, demanding that Hamas relinquish control and end the war with Israel.
Still, Panikoff cautions against overstating the momentum behind the movement: “At the end of the day, it’s still Hamas that has the guns and the weapons. Even with protests, it’s hard to imagine the people of Gaza being able to mount a meaningful uprising.”
Inside Hamas, however, cracks may be forming. Panikoff notes that some within the lower ranks are ready for the war to end. “After a year and a half of fighting, weapons and ammunition are running low. Resupply from Iran is going to be harder than before. I have no doubt there are many who would prefer that Mohammed Sinwar cut a deal — release the hostages, bring Palestinian prisoners home, and move on.”
But Sinwar himself isn’t signaling that he is ready to listen to them anytime soon. While mediators from Qatar and Egypt put forward a new plan to end the conflict in Gaza last week, it hinges on Hamas relinquishing its arms and a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, something that Panikoff says “will probably never be realistic.”
“We’re stuck in this cycle, and I don’t know how you get out of it.”
Smoke rises from a burning building in North Gaza, as seen from the Israel-Gaza border, March 23, 2025.
Israel ramps up military offensives as Bibi battles the courts
Israel stepped up its attacks against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon this weekend. The Israeli military ordered the evacuation of Rafah and confirmed the killing of a Hamas leader on Sunday, while the Israeli cabinet approved a proposal to create a directorate to advance the “voluntary departure” of Palestinians from Gaza. In Lebanon, Israel carried out airstrikes in retaliation for rockets fired into Israel. The strikes killed seven people, including a child, according to Lebanon’s health ministry, and prompted fears of a “new war” in the region.
But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s biggest fight might be internal. Last week, he announced the firing of Shin Bet security head Ronen Bar over alleged failures to prevent the Oct. 7 attacks in 2023. Bar had been investigating Netanyahu’s office for allegations of corruption.
On Friday, the Israeli courts stayed Bar’s dismissal pending further hearings. Now, the Israeli prime minister is attempting to remove Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara, who vocally opposed the dismissal of Bar and has clashed with Netanyahu over his proposed overhaul of the judicial system, an issue which has Israelis taking to the streets regularly to protest his attempts to expand executive power.
On Sunday, the Israeli cabinet unanimously passed a no-confidence motion against Baharav-Miara for “ongoing substantial differences of opinion between the government and the attorney general, which prevents effective collaboration.” The issue of her removal will now go to a committee expected to be stacked with Netanyahu loyalists, whose decision can then be appealed to the Supreme Court.
That process could take weeks and set up a showdown between the executive and judicial branches of government. Opposition leader Yair Lapid warned that if Netanyahu defies the courts, Israel “will no longer [be] a democracy” – and that citizens may stop paying taxes in protest.Syrian troops sit atop a tank as they head toward the Syrian-Lebanese border following clashes with Lebanese soldiers and armed groups, in Qusayr, Syria, March 17, 2025.
Hezbollah takes on Syria’s new army
Fighting erupted across the border that separates Syria and Lebanon over the weekend. The new government in Syria claims the militant group Hezbollah triggered this violence by crossing into Syrian territory on Saturday, kidnapping three Syrian soldiers, and then executing them inside Lebanon. Hezbollah denies the allegation, and Lebanon’s state media blames the killing on local clans and militias. The two sides agreed to halt the fighting late Monday night.
The Syrian government and Hezbollah have historically acted as allies, but two important changes have occurred. First, Israel has pounded Hezbollah positions inside Lebanon in recent months, badly weakening the group and killing most of its leadership. Second, the current Syrian regime is composed of fighters who defeated the government of Bashar Assad, which had been Hezbollah’s reliable regional partner. Assad now lives in Moscow under Russian President Vladimir Putin’s protection.
Hezbollah has good reason for frustration. In the past, when its fighters needed more weapons and materiel, Iran provided them by sending reinforcements across Syrian territory. The new Syrian government has severed that channel. The Lebanese and Syrian armies say they have increased cross-border communication to restore calm, though Hezbollah representatives remain defiant.
An Israeli soldier stands next to a gate on a road near the Israel-Lebanon border, in Israel, on March 12, 2025.
Israel and Lebanon are set for border talks
Israel and Lebanon have agreed to start talks “as soon as possible” on their disputed land border nearly four months after a ceasefire paused the most recent war between the two countries.
The Netanyahu and Trump administrations announced on Tuesday that Israel, Lebanon, France, and the US would establish working groups to negotiate the Israel-Lebanon border, the presence of Israeli troops in southern Lebanon, and the release of Lebanese detainees held in Israel.
Israel freed five Lebanese prisoners this week who had been captured during last year’s war in what Jerusalem called “a gesture” to the newly elected Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.
The state of affairs: IDF troops control five points in southern Lebanon where Israel says Hezbollah still poses a threat to Israelis in the northern part of the Jewish state. Hezbollah, meanwhile, has accused Israel of violating the November ceasefire by failing to withdraw its troops and launching sporadic attacks. Between the Nov. 27 ceasefire and mid-January, the data collection group Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project recorded hundreds of air strikes, shellings, and infrastructure demolitions by Israel.
The extent of the talks remains unclear. A senior Israeli official told the Times of Israel that the aim of the negotiations is “to reach normalization” with Lebanon. But a US official told Fox News the goal of mutual recognition and “normalization” of ties was “overblown” and risked stalling progress on agreeing to a set border between the two Levantine nations. The Lebanese government denied claims that the talks could lead to a permanent normalization.Gaza ceasefire likely as Biden and Trump both push
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
A Gaza ceasefire has gained momentum. What is the likelihood a deal will be reached soon?
We've heard this news before. At least five times over the last year that we've heard we were almost at a Gaza ceasefire. This time around though it looks much more likely. Why is that? Because Trump is about to be president, because Trump's envoys and Biden's envoys have been working together on these issues, and also because that means pressing the Israeli government in a way that feels much more serious if you are the prime minister. And also because Trump has been pressing Hamas. And so, I think the unilateralism is there. The fact the deal was already very close, and now this means Biden gets to say he got the deal and Trump gets to say he's ended a war, at least for the time being, and a lot more hostages get freed. So yeah, this time around it looks pretty likely.
What do I make of a potential sale of TikTok to Elon Musk?
Well, it's just been announced that the Chinese are considering it. I always thought that it was more likely than not that if the Supreme Court were to uphold a ban that the Chinese would probably allow a sale to go through. Though they were going to say they were never going to until the last moment because why give up leverage when you don't necessarily have to? So their historic unwillingness doesn't mean to me that they're actually unwilling. To the extent that there is a deal and it goes to Elon, he becomes more powerful, and he also is seen by the Chinese as owing them one. So would he facilitate an improved, a more stable relationship between the US and China? It's an early indication that he could play a role. He hasn't said anything on the China front yet, but certainly you would expect that he would meet with the high-level envoy that's going to the inauguration that Xi Jinping was invited to on the 20th. That's what we should watch in the next week. Okay, that's it for that one.
What does Lebanon's new president mean for Hezbollah?
Weaker Hezbollah, but so much is going to be determined on what Israel decides to do on the ground in the south of Lebanon. Are they staying there for a longer period of time? We've heard news of late that they intend to maintain that occupation in a longer than just couple of weeks, couple of months environment, which makes it harder to keep Hezbollah from starting fighting again. On balance, I think this ceasefire is looking a little shakier right now, even with the new Lebanese president than it had a few weeks ago. We'll see. But if it does break down, the level of fighting won't be what it was a few months ago because Hezbollah doesn't have that capacity and the Iranians can't restock their weapons because Assad has fallen in Syria.
A look back at the Top Risks of 2024
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: As 2024 comes to a close, we always look back on our Top Risks. How we did at the beginning of the year. I back in January, referred to this as the "Voldemort of years," at least geopolitically. The year that must not be named because of three major conflicts that we expected were going to only get worse over the course of the year. The Russia-Ukraine war, the war in the Middle East, and the war between the United States and itself. Those absolutely played out.
First, the risk on Russia-Ukraine, where we said that Ukraine would effectively be partitioned. Not a popular thing to say back in January, and not something that we were hoping for. Just something that we believed was going to happen, even irrespective of how the US elections turned out. The fact that Ukrainians were going to be much more overstretched in the ability to fight. The fact that the Russians would be able to maintain the war machine, and the fact that the Europeans and the Americans were increasingly tiring of a war with lots of attention in other places.
All of that meant that Ukrainians would increasingly be desperate. And we really saw that in particular with this spectacular Ukrainian attack into Kursk taking Russian territory, but needing 40,000 of their troops to accomplish it away from their front lines. As the year comes to a close, Ukraine is losing territory faster than at any point since the beginning of the war. And they increasingly recognize not only that they need to start negotiations, but they're going to have to end up trading some land for peace and for security guarantees from the West. So indeed Ukraine today, de facto partitioned.
Number two, the war in the Middle East, which we believed was going to expand significantly. At the beginning of the year, we were talking about Gaza. Now of course, we're talking about the 'Axis of Resistance,' a year when in Yemen the Houthis were popping off rockets and missiles against civilian tanker traffic going through the Red Sea and also against the United States and other military assets in the region, and the Americans and others hitting them back. We saw the war open to include Hezbollah and Lebanon. We saw the war also threaten to bring Israel and Iran together directly as they exchanged fire against each other and as the Israelis were able to decimate Iran's proxies.
Some good news on this front. First of all, the fact that ultimately the United States, Israel, and most importantly, Iran, showed restraint and risk aversion in what would've been a much more devastating fight. And what would've led oil prices to go well over a hundred if that war broken out. That did not occur. And also the fact that the Israelis have been able to show military dominance, which meant that there is no more effective 'Axis of Resistance' at the end of this year. In fact, the big surprise that not only did the war expand, but Assad is gone. Not because of Obama who said that over 10 years ago, but rather because they were unable to respond to HTS supported by Turkey, a rebellion against Assad, and the Russians, and the Iranians. Assad's support base were inadequate to keep him in power. He now sits in Moscow.
And now finally, the US versus itself. A year of only more significant division and polarization inside my own country, the United States. And we've seen that play out. First of all with a Biden that was running for the presidency and had no capacity to serve for another four years, refused to step down, was finally essentially forced out, forced to step down by everyone around him, including former President Obama, former speaker Pelosi, and all of the rest. On the Trump side, two, not one, attempted assassinations, one by this much. And if that had occurred, we'd be in a hell of a lot more difficult position now as a country. The election did go off without a hitch, and was accepted as free and fair, thankfully. And now the United States looks forward to a new president. But the divisions inside the US, the weakening of America's political institutions only growing over the course of 2024.
So those were our top three risks. You can look at all 10, and see how we did go back and check it out on the link that we have here. And also take a look in early January. Watch out for our Top Risks of 2025. It will be something you do not want to miss.
- Eurasia Group’s Top Global Risks 2024 ›
- Why 2024 is the Voldemort of years ›
- 2024's top global risks: The trifecta of wars threatening global peace ›
- A world of conflict: The top risks of 2024 ›
- Ian Bremmer explains the 10 Top Risks of 2025 - GZERO Media ›
- Unpacking the biggest global threats of 2025 - GZERO Media ›
- Podcast: The Top Geopolitical Risks of 2025, a live conversation with Ian Bremmer and global experts - GZERO Media ›
- Top Risks 2025: America's role in the crumbling global order - GZERO Media ›
Israeli strikes put ancient Roman ruins of Baalbek at risk
Israeli airstrikes targeting Baalbek, Lebanon, threaten some of the best-preserved ancient Roman ruins anywhere in the world. The temples of Bacchus and Jupiter, which are designated UNESCO World Heritage sites, have stood in Baalbek for over two millennia. The city is located in a region of eastern Lebanon dominated by Hezbollah, so it's become a critical target amid Israel’s offensive.
In November, an airstrike hit a parking lot just meters from the temples, destroying other buildings on the site and covering the ruins in dust and debris. Archaeological experts worry that if the tentative ceasefire in Lebanon doesn’t hold, an important piece of the world’s cultural heritage is at risk of disappearing completely. Fin DePencier was on the ground in Baalbek, Lebanon for GZERO Reports to survey the damage and hear from locals, who see the site as a source of pride in a country torn apart by sectarian division.
“The owner of these sites is not Lebanon,” says local tour guide Fahmi Sharif, “but all humanity”
Watch full episode: Syria after Assad.
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).
Rebel forces seized Mengh Airbase and the city of Tel Rifaat in the Aleppo countryside on December 1, 2024, following clashes with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian regime forces.
Syrian rebels clash with Kurds as Assad’s backers spring into action
In case anyone has forgotten just how complicated Syria’s civil war always was, the recent drama around Aleppo escalated on Monday as the Syrian National Army, a group backed by Turkey, attacked US-backed Kurdish groups near the city.
Meanwhile, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, the formerly al-Qaida-linked Islamist group at the forefront of the recent rebel offensive in Aleppo, has reportedly ordered Kurdish militias to leave the area altogether and go eastward to Rojava, a de facto autonomous Kurdish area in northeastern Syria.
Aren’t the Kurds against the Assad regime, too? Yes, but that’s not the beef. HTS works with the Turkish proxies and relies on Ankara for political support in high-level negotiations to end the war. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is angling for an advantageous position on the war’s aftermath and said his “greatest wish” was “for the instability that has been going on for 13 years to end.”
For Turkey, that means both weakening Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and cutting the Kurds down to size, as it has long-standing problems with Kurdish separatists at home.
Don’t forget, Turkey is also a US ally — a NATO member, in fact — so urging its proxies to fight US proxies in a theatre where Russian forces also actively operate causes headaches in Washington. Russian warplanes bombed rebel-held areas of Aleppo on Monday, not far from where Turkish F-16s shot down a Russian Su-24 that strayed over the border in 2015. Quite an explosive position for a lame-duck US president.
Speaking of proxies… Iran-backed militias crossed into Syria from Iraq to help shore up Assad’s counterattack as well. Assad will be glad for that help as the Lebanon-based Iranian proxy group Hezbollah, once a major pillar of support for Assad’s regime, said Monday it would not deploy fighters to Syria right now. The group is still regrouping after getting mauled by Israel and is warily watching as last week’s ceasefire in that conflict appears to be breaking down already.
Where is the US in all this? Washington had reportedly held talks before the Aleppo offensive with the UAE about lifting sanctions on Syria in exchange for Assad distancing himself from Iran and Russia. That seems unlikely now that Assad’s back is against the wall and he needs all the help he can get. Beyond milquetoast calls for de-escalation, Washington has thus far kept its cards close to its vest.