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Iran-Israel crisis: Dangers still high with little room for diplomacy
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Does the Iran-Israel crisis offer a unique opportunity for diplomacy?
I don't think so. They certainly give an opportunity for a bunch of countries to reengage with Israel. We're seeing that with Jordan, with Saudi Arabia, and to show the Iranians that they are still considered to be the big concern as an enemy in the region, a disrupter. But that's very different from saying we're going to see a breakthrough in relations. You're not resetting deterrence. Iran is going to continue to lead the axis of resistance and provide weapons and intelligence and engage in strikes against targets across the region. Israel will still hit Iranians that are operating there. So going forward, I think the dangers are still pretty high.
Is Germany's Scholz meeting with Xi in Beijing indicating a shift in Europe-China trade tensions?
Not really. Here, the fact that Scholz has a large number of German CEOs in tow means that, yes, he's concerned that the Chinese are providing support to Russia, maybe even increasingly dual-use military support to Russia in the war in Ukraine. He's concerned about Chinese industrial policy that's undermining, the interests of Americans and Europeans economically. But ultimately he is very reliant on investment and trade with China, and he's going to continue to support that. He is not fully aligned with his government on this issue, not his advisors, not his foreign minister, and certainly not the other parties in the coalition. But it is Scholz's perspective. And as a consequence, it is going to be a pretty friendly trip.
Why is Sudan's year-long conflict gone largely unnoticed?
Well, we write about it a fair amount, but I mean, the fact that it is in a part of the world that doesn't have economic implications. So you blow up Ukraine, and Russia is in a fight, and energy prices and food and fertilizer prices go up. Major conflict in Sudan. A lot of people suffer, a lot of people die, but the rest of the world has no impact economically. Also, most of the refugees, people fleeing, fleeing to neighboring African countries, they're not coming over to Mexico, the United States or to Poland and to Germany. And that just doesn't lead to a lot of attention. Final point is that there aren't a lot of journalists on the ground from the West in Sudan. And so not a lot of people are actually covering this. So for all of those reasons, not getting a lot of attention, but we'll keep talking about it.
What will Israel's invasion of Rafah look like?
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
How will Iran respond to the attack on their consulate in Syria?
An Israeli strike that killed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leader of Iran in Syria. So on the one hand, Iranian citizen, high-level military official. On the other hand, not in Iran itself, in Syria supporting proxy attacks. Clearly the Iranians have been willing to push hard using the leverage they have in the so-called acts of resistance to engage in strikes against civilian shipping, against Western military capabilities, and against Israel.
The Israelis are showing that they will attack wherever they think fit against them, but Iran has been reluctant to allow this to potentially lead to escalation in a direct war against Iran, which is why it's hard to imagine the Iranians engaging in direct strikes against Israel itself. Ballistic missile strikes from Iran into Israel. So in other words, if you're going to hit Israel, you try to use proxies or you try to hit Israelis outside of Israel itself. Israeli diplomatic facilities, for example, that's where I think you're more likely to see escalation. Escalation seems almost certain from the Iranians, but containing it also is something the Americans and Israel are trying very, very hard to do and that continues to be the case like when we saw the American servicemen killed in Jordan a couple months ago.
What will Israel's invasion of Rafah look like?
Assuming it happens, remember Netanyahu was saying that he has a date now for the strike, but he said that strikes were going to start once Ramadan began if there had not been an agreement on this six-week, hostages for temporary ceasefire deal. There wasn't such a deal, Netanyahu backed off, he could back off again. Also, the ultimatum from the United States is not about a war in Rafah. It is about a large-scale ground war without providing the ability for the Palestinians to evacuate and get humanitarian aid.
Between those two positions there's a lot of wiggle room and one expects that the Israeli government, as they are thinking about those strikes, which I do believe will come, will try to claim domestically that they're doing what they need to clear up Hamas and claim to the Americans that it is at a reduced cost of civilians and it is engaged in the spirit of working with the Americans and not requiring Biden to shut down offensive support for Israel. That's where we are.
What's the fallout from Ecuador's raid of a Mexican embassy?
Well, the first thing is President Noboa of Ecuador, this is political. This is a former vice president who was taking, was sheltering in the Mexican embassy. You raid it, that is a breach of international law, but there is a security, largely security referendum, nationwide referendum coming up in just a couple of weeks in Ecuador that Noboa wants to win. He is ahead, it looks like he will win it now, and this is going to be very popular on the ground.
Guy had been sort of on their wanted list for a long time, but they decided to take that action now because of the domestic politics. So it helps him. Probably doesn't kill the IMF deal that is presently being negotiated, but certainly suspends diplomatic relations between the two countries and it's probably going to affect trade too. So you've alienated the Mexicans, but given the near-term political benefit for the Ecuadorian president, he thought that was a risk worth taking. Lots of impunity in this environment. It's one consistency that we see in our geopolitical recession, our GZERO world.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Iran is protecting itself through restraint in Israel-Hamas war, says Kim Ghattas
Will Iran use Hezbollah fighters to help Hamas in Gaza?
On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer spoke with Beirut-based journalist Kim Ghattas about the rising tensions on Israel’s northern border with Lebanon, as Israeli Defense Forces and Hezbollah fighters exchange daily rocket fire and thousands of people on both sides flee their homes. Like Hamas, Hezbollah has an eradicationist ideology that calls for the destruction of the state of Israel, a position that could be untenable if the border clashes continue to escalate. Hezbollah is Iran’s most powerful proxy, but Ghattas doesn’t think it’s in Tehran’s interest to use the militant group to further Hamas’s goals.
“For 44 years Iran has claimed that is a supporter of the Palestinian people,” Ghattas explains, “I think Iran has come to realize that its use of the Palestinian cause has bumped up against the limits of what’s possible.”
Ghattas points out that Hezbollah’s primary purpose for Iran is to serve as a deterrent against potential strikes by Israel or the United States. The biggest priority now is to find a diplomatic solution to the Palestinian question. Given the urgency of the situation in Gaza, Iran may be more willing to discuss the possibility of a two-state solution, a position that would have been impossible to imagine even a few years ago.
Watch the GZERO World with Ian Bremmer episode: Israel, Hamas, and Hezbollah: Fears of escalation grow
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.
Israel’s geopolitical missteps in Gaza
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Back to the Middle East. We are now over a month of war between Israel and Hamas following the October 7th terror attacks. And frankly, it is not going all that well. What I mean by that is, it's an awful lot of carnage. It's an awful lot of political division around the world. And Israel, with the exception of a strong relationship with the United States, feels increasingly isolated. That's certainly in the message I was hearing from the Europeans over the last week, getting more and more uncomfortable as this war goes on. The Americans privately saying that to the Israelis, though publicly, certainly standing very, very strongly with them. And members of the Israeli cabinet increasingly believing that the pressure on them is going to grow significantly over the next few weeks as the war continues.
So is there anything else they could have done, right? Because I mean, if you're saying, well, this is really challenging, the fight and it's leading to enormous backlash and, you know, from the region and from the Global South and even from countries that are quite friendly and well-disposed to Israel, then what might you have suggested they do instead?
And here my view is, when you have enormous support from the West in particular, but also sympathies more broadly, following these horrible terrorist attacks on October 7th. And let's remember, I mean, this was civilians that were targeted, that were brutally murdered. This was not Israeli settlers who were fighting on the right. It certainly wasn't the military, was actually progressives on the left. It was the people that were most oriented to peace, were the ones that were gunned down and tortured and taken hostage by Hamas in Gaza. So if there was ever a time that the Israelis were going to have sympathy, it would be right after this. And my view is use that in the same way the United States did after 9/11. And they built a coalition of the willing with dozens of countries that were prepared to support them to go into Afghanistan, and specifically to take out Al-Qaeda. You build that coalition. There were countries, of course, NATO's allies, no surprise, the UK and France and Canada. But I mean, countries like Georgia were involved in sending people to UAE.
And this, I think, is an opportunity that the Israelis really did have. When French President Macron traveled to Israel, he said that they were prepared to join the fight against Hamas, join the fight on terror with the Israelis. The Americans, of course, immediately sending, you know, sort of troops to the region, as well as troops on the ground to act as advisors, a lot of intelligence support. I think you would have gotten significant support from the Germans in this environment, from the UK, in this environment. And the point here is that in the immediate weeks after the attacks, instead of massive bombing attacks and then a ground war instead, work first and foremost on a coalition, build multilateral support, heck, work with the Saudis. The Gulf states are strongly interested in working with Israel. They hate Hamas. They want the end of Hamas. They find, you know, this would be a dangerous movement that's much more aligned with their enemies. The Iranians. So Israel had a very strong geopolitical position and the ability to use it if their initial response was, “we're going to be stronger, we're going to build on all of this sympathy to have not just us fighting against Hamas, but everybody.”
Now, would that have constrained what Israel would have done? Would it have meant that they would have been more pinpoint in their bombing? It would have taken longer, that there wouldn't have been a ground war? Maybe so. But having said all of that, Israel is massively more capable militarily than Hamas is, and they have vastly better border security and they have incredible missile defense and they would have gotten more technological and military support from allies and friends all over the world following these attacks. I don't believe that there is an existential risk to Israel from Hamas. I don't believe there's an existential risk from anybody in the region in terms of military capabilities.
I remember when I was with Netanyahu once at a conference in Herzliya in Israel, and he came and spoke to some of us, a small group, I think it was 30 or 40 folks. And there were some investors in the room and he was talking. The first half of the meeting was all about how Israel was the best possible place to invest. And of course, had, you know, very high ratings in terms of credit and transparency and rule of law. And as a democracy in the region, all of these things. And, you know, everyone's nodding along. And then the second half of the meeting is how the Iranians need to be contained and how they represent an existential threat to Israel. And I mean, both of these things cannot be true at the same time, right? I mean, if you're saying that it's a fantastic place to invest, then it probably isn't really a place that other people can take out.
Israel, of course, has, though, unstated, a serious nuclear force, and they have massive military capabilities and incredibly well-trained Israeli Defense Force. Now, the point here is that, you know, Netanyahu took his eye off the ball, stopped paying attention to border security, undermined the Israeli defense Force's capacities as they were focused on the West Bank, took his eye off the ball on intelligence. But after October 7th, that was never going to happen again. The entire people, the entire country, with a massive additional number of troops being sent precisely to defend Israel. So I don't think it's credible to say that, if the Israelis didn't strike back massively within days and then engage in a massive ground war, that they were suddenly facing an existential further risk from Hamas. No, the risk came because the Israelis, who have every right to defend their borders, weren't doing so before October 7th and needed to do so after October 7th. There's no question that no one should expect Israel to be living next to a territory that is governed by Hamas. And they were going to need to take that leadership at a very least out and have vastly better security capabilities.
But that could be done at a time of Israel's choosing when they had built up much more multilateral support and when they were engaging not by themselves, but with others. And that was absolutely possible, certainly more possible than what we have today. The fact that the French government is saying that they're calling for a ceasefire, they certainly weren't doing that even a week ago. The Americans are privately, increasingly telling the Israelis that you're going to need to stop this relatively soon or the US will limit the military support that's being provided to Israel, three plus billion dollars a year. The fact that, you know, the Gulf states are having summits in the region, Israel's not a part of it. They're not being invited. They're working together. They're not condemning Hamas directly. This is a problem. And I think that, you know, at the end of the day, as much as everyone out there should have sympathy for the brutality that Israel was experiencing on October 7th and the 200 plus hostages that Hamas is still holding today. I mean, any human being has to have sympathy for Israel and for the Jewish people on the back of that.
It is a horrible, horrible thing. But the steps that they have taken geopolitically, the military steps they've taken on the ground, frankly, in my view, is weak in their position. The only thing that is going to ultimately cause an existential risk to Israel and to the Jewish people in Israel, is if they continue to fall into the trap that Hamas has played for them, has placed for them. And so far that appears to be, unfortunately, where they're going. So anyway, that's my view on all of this. I'm sure that nobody agrees with it 100%. But, you know, I promise to always give you my best sense and tell you what I think can be authentic with everybody. And I certainly hope that this doesn't continue to explode and that at the very least, we can keep the fighting itself contained to Gaza and that the humanitarian damage and devastation that we're seeing on the ground gets more limited going forward as opposed to continuing to expand.
I'm not hopeful. I don't expect it. I expect more violence from the settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank. And I even think that the northern front with Lebanon and Hezbollah appears to be opening up a little bit more. But that is certainly what none of us want. And we will see where we go from there.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Ian Explains: How Israel & Iran went from friends to enemies
Fun fact: Israel and Iran used to be friends…sort of.
Israel and Iran's complex relationship in the Middle East has seen dramatic shifts, to say the least, Ian Bremmer explains on GZERO World. Iran, as with most of the rest of the Middle East, originally opposed the creation of Israel in 1948 and its UN membership in 1949. But Israel, Iran and Turkey's shared interests as non-Arab states in the region led to covert trade relationships and an intelligence-sharing program codenamed 'Trident Alliance' from 1956 to 1979.
The Iranian Revolution in 1979, however, led to a staunchly anti-Zionist regime in Tehran. In 2023, the major concern is Iran's influence, particularly through Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, which possesses a formidable missile arsenal dwarfing that of Hamas. Iran's proxies, like the Houthi militias in Yemen, have been targeting US assets, resulting in the redirection of the US military in the region and even airstrikes in Eastern Syria.
But there’s a big difference between skirmishes with Iran proxy forces and an all-out US-Israel-Iran war. And given Iran’s nuclear ambitions, that’s something that absolutely no-one, including the Ayatollah in Tehran, wants.
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.
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