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Why is Julian Assange in the news again?
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
What's left to sanction with Russia and have existing sanctions been effective?
There's very little left to sanction with Russia that the Americans and their allies want to sanction. I mean, you could try to cut off Russian oil exports to, say, India, but no one wants to do that because that would cause a global recession. Food, fertilizer, same thing. At the end of the day, the sanctions that the West can put on Russia without a massive impact to themselves and the world they've already put. But because Biden said there'd be hell to pay if anything happened to Navalny in jail and he's dead now, and it's pretty clear the Russians, the Kremlin killed him. That means they have to sound tough. But ultimately, the only thing that is changing Russian behavior is the provision of significant military support to the Ukrainians, and that is determined by US Congress going forward.
Is Israel preventing humanitarian aid from reaching Gaza?
Certainly that is the case, and they've been very reluctant to allow significant humanitarian aid to get into Gaza. Their view is that a lot of that aid would be taken by Hamas, and there's very limited capacity to stop Hamas from doing it. It's terrorist organization. Most of the rest of the world says, yeah, even if that's the case, you've got a couple of million civilians in Gaza whose homes have been destroyed, who've been displaced, that have no other way to live unless you provide them with support. And in very short order, the principal danger to civilians in Gaza will be humanitarian and will not be the war. That's how bad the humanitarian crisis is getting, even though the war fighting continues to go on.
Why is Julian Assange in the news today?
Well, because he is facing one of his last opportunities to avoid extradition to the United States. He is in the UK right now. He's wanted on almost two dozen criminal charges by the United States in regard to he and his organization putting out classified material and diplomatic cables over ten years ago. Those are serious crimes from the United States. But supporters of Assange are all about, look, this is, you know, putting truth to power and shining a light on massive human rights abuses. And if it wasn't for Assange, people wouldn't know about those abuses. It's kind of the same thing people have been saying about Snowden. There is a massive political debate that we can't finish in 180 seconds, but that's why Assange is in the news. We will see what the high court rules.
That’s it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Ukraine joining NATO "is the only option," says Alina Polyakova
GZERO’s Tony Maciulis catches up with Alina Polyakova, President and CEO of the Center for European Analysis, on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference to assess Ukraine’s precarious situation two years after Russia's invasion. Polyakova highlights the intensified military strategy employed by Russia, making the situation dire for Ukraine. She stresses the urgent need for more military support and equipment from Ukraine's allies, especially from the United States.
Polyakova also addresses the debate around Ukraine's potential NATO membership, arguing vehemently for its inclusion. “The only way to secure what have been very positive wins of Western support for Ukraine is to solidify that at the NATO summit by extending an invitation to Ukraine, to even a session talks," Polyakova tells Maciulis. She dismisses the notion that Ukraine's membership would escalate tensions with Russia, asserting that NATO serves as a deterrent to aggression. She emphasizes that Ukraine's integration into NATO is crucial for Europe's long-term security.
Polyakova also clarifies misconceptions about Article 5 of the NATO treaty, stating that it doesn't automatically lead to military intervention. She advocates for starting accession conversations with Ukraine, emphasizing its military capabilities and the benefits it could bring to NATO.
Maciulis and Polyakova also touch on the potential impact of the upcoming US presidential election on Ukraine and NATO. She suggests that while President Trump's rhetoric about NATO has been concerning, his actions have largely supported the alliance. However, she acknowledges uncertainty about the future and the importance of maintaining trust and unity within NATO.
- Will Putin invade Ukraine? ›
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- Why Ukraine is the target of Russian aggression – analyst Alina Polyakova ›
- Ukraine's NATO & EU ambitions ›
- Should NATO embrace Ukraine? ›
- How Russian cyberwarfare could impact Ukraine & NATO response ›
- Sending NATO troops to Ukraine unlikely despite Macron's remarks - GZERO Media ›
Biden & Xi set to agree on regulating military use of AI
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Will Biden and Xi come together to regulate military use of AI?
I think that's one of the areas that we are going to see a level of cooperation. The Chinese are concerned about, first, the Americans being ahead of them in AI, but secondly, about the fact that this could escalate and spiral into mutually assured destruction quickly, if there isn't a level of transparency. That's very different from the unwillingness of the Chinese to engage in high level military talks, for example, on South China Sea or on Taiwan recently. This is an area that I think will be constructive. I'm glad to see it.
Can the Qatari mediation secure a breakthrough for hostage release in Gaza?
Well, we've been hearing about this for weeks now and it's been imminent and then not happening. Imminent, Not happening. I do think that the level of pressure on Israel, on the Israeli government for not having secured the release of women, of children, I mean, we're talking about a couple of hundred plus civilian hostages living in the most unimaginably horrible environment in Gaza. And I do believe that a breakthrough is pretty likely. We're also going to find out that a lot of these hostages, of course, are already dead. But I'm hopeful and let's keep fingers crossed on that.
Has time run out for Ukraine's counteroffensive?
The much-vaunted counteroffensive, yet it looks like they're not going to be able to take much more territory at this point. And it's hard to imagine they're going to have the military capacity or the troop capacity to do anything else in the foreseeable future. And that means that de facto, the 18% of Ukraine's territory that Russia presently occupies, they're going to continue to occupy going forward. No one's going to accept a partition. No one is going to say that Russia legitimately owns that territory because it is Ukrainian territory. But the reality is unacceptable. And that is where we're going to be an uncomfortable position going forward.
Israel’s response to Oct. 7 plays straight into Hamas’ hands
It has now been over a month since the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas on Oct. 7, when Hamas terrorists infiltrated southern Israel from Gaza and brutally murdered or kidnapped over 1,400 men, women, and children. And frankly, the war is not going all that well for Israel, which is finding itself increasingly – and dangerously – isolated.
Israel certainly had the right to defend itself after such a horrific attack against its civilians. However, I believe Israel’s leaders made a strategic mistake in how they chose to respond. The all-out assault on Gaza surely felt like the right response – maybe even the only response – in the heat of the moment, but it has predictably led to mounting international criticism against the Jewish state and played into Hamas' hands. This was not inevitable.
What else, you might ask, could Israel have done?
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, Israel had a golden opportunity to build a broad multilateral coalition to combat Hamas, much as the United States built a "coalition of the willing" after 9/11 to go into Afghanistan and eradicate al-Qaida. By leveraging the enormous outpouring of international sympathy it had in the wake of the Oct. 7 assault, Israel could have convinced key allies and partners to join forces in an anti-Hamas alliance. The goodwill was there: The US instantly deployed troops and advisers to the region. French President Emmanuel Macron signaled France’s willingness to combat Hamas alongside Israel. Other European nations like the United Kingdom and Germany likely would have followed suit. Even Arab and Gulf states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which loathe Hamas and its Iranian backers, could have been brought into the fold.
But instead of capitalizing on its unprecedently strong geopolitical position, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his war cabinet opted to go it alone. Israel swiftly launched massive bombing campaigns across Gaza, targeting Hamas militants and military infrastructure but also killing thousands of innocent Palestinians (many of whom were used by Hamas as human shields) and decimating civilian infrastructure (some of which was used by Hamas to store weapons, hide militants, and launch rockets). This airborne destruction was followed up with a full-scale ground invasion.
Now, over a month later and with the Palestinian death toll exceeding 10,000, any international sympathy Israel initially gained has all but dissipated and is being replaced by backlash. The Gulf states held three summits over the weekend to discuss solutions to the Gaza crisis, without inviting Israel or explicitly condemning Hamas. As the humanitarian crisis has grown more dire, even normally sympathetic nations have begun speaking out against Israeli excesses. France is calling for a cease-fire. The US, Israel’s strongest ally, is privately threatening to limit military aid if the offensive does not wind down soon, even as publicly it continues to stand very strongly with Israel. And members of the Israeli Cabinet believe that the diplomatic pressure is only going to intensify over the next few weeks as the ground offensive grinds on and the civilian death toll mounts.
Wouldn’t acting with a multilateral coalition have constrained Israel’s response? Wouldn’t it have taken longer to get started, show progress, and achieve its objectives? Wouldn’t it have meant forgoing a ground war in favor of more targeted strikes? Probably so, on all counts. But that all would have been in Israel’s best interest.
The fact is that Israel does not and did not face an existential threat from Hamas – or, for that matter, from anybody in the region. Israel possesses nuclear weapons, cutting-edge missile defense systems like the Iron Dome, and the most capable conventional military in the Middle East by an astonishing margin. It was never in serious danger of being militarily overrun, let alone annihilated, by Hamas’ 30,000-strong militia or its relatively crude rocket arsenal. It defies credulity to say that Israel had to strike back with overwhelming force within days and then launch a ground war to head off a nonexistent existential threat from Hamas.
There's no question that Israel has every right to defend its borders and destroy (or, at the very least, decapitate and seriously degrade) Hamas. No one could expect Israel to accept living next to a territory governed by a genocidal death cult bent on its annihilation. But this could have been accomplished at a time of Israel’s choosing, with the support of a broad multilateral coalition, through more focused strikes on discrete military assets, leadership targets, and tunnels. Such a strategically restrained response would have limited civilian casualties while accomplishing Israel’s key security and geopolitical objectives.
Instead, the bloody scorched-earth campaign in Gaza will fail to deliver security for Israelis while inflicting horrible suffering on Gaza’s civilians, providing Hamas with an invaluable propaganda victory and recruitment tool, and fueling anti-Israel sentiment across the world. This strategic miscalculation will leave Israel weaker, not stronger, than it would have been if it had taken a more measured, deliberate, and internationally coordinated approach.
As Hamas surely knew on the eve of Oct. 7, the real threat to Israel was always that its response would alienate its allies and partners, push the Palestinians (and the Arab world, the Global South, and parts of the left in advanced industrial democracies) further into Hamas’ corner and away from the two-state solution, and ultimately undermine Israel’s long-term security. No doubt, that’s exactly what Israel’s enemies were counting on. And so far, they appear to be getting their way.
Israel control in Gaza: No end in sight
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
How long will Israel's indefinite security control in Gaza last?
I think a long, long time. Was it a Colin Powell that said, you know, you break it, you own it in terms of Iraq and Americans were there for a long, long time. I can't see anyone willing to come in and play a security role that will work after the Israelis have wrought absolute destruction on the people and infrastructure of Gaza, which is clearly what is required if you want to destroy Hamas. And indeed Netanyahu has said that they're going to stay and as long as it takes, essentially in terms of security. By the way, the Israeli people strongly don't want that. They don't want an occupation, but they're kind of stuck in one. And that's one of the reasons why a ground war was something to think more carefully about. And look, there are no easy answers for anyone here. This is going to get a lot worse before it gets better.
What do you expect from the Biden-Xi meeting at APEC?
Well, it's definitely happening. Big summit next week in San Francisco. I'll be there, should be a lot of fun. And look, the Chinese, they don't agree with the United States on a lot of policies. There's not a lot of trust in the relationship, but they are adults. And in that regard, they do want ultimately a level of stability. They don't want the world to burn. They'd like, for example, the Israel-Hamas conflict to be over soon. They'd like Russia-Ukraine to be over soon. They're not taking a leadership role on any of these things. And the US meeting, the Biden meeting with Xi, I suspect, is going to be reasonably strong because there's been so much prep for it on a bunch of issues that both countries are trying to build some stability. Fentanyl, for example, artificial intelligence, for example, climate, for example. Having said all of that, Taiwan and technology are the big bugbears in the relationship. And right now they're both heading in a more problematic direction, not in a better one.
Finally, is a nuclear Israel concerning during a time of war?
I'm actually going to say no. A nuclear Israel is actually less concerning in a time of war because it is yet one more reason why the Israelis don't need to feel that they face an existential threat from external enemies. There are a lot of people out there, certainly Hamas, certainly Hezbollah, certainly the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose stated goals are the end of Israel. But they can't come close to bringing it about. And indeed it was the Israeli security failure to under Netanyahu that allowed the October 7th terror attacks to pose such a threat to Israel that it did. So on balance, I'd say it's stabilizing, but I also should say, let's keep in mind that there are some insane people that are on the far right that are still in government in Israel, including the heritage minister who was openly musing about the possibility of using a nuke on Gaza, which is something that should get you fired and Netanyahu hasn't yet, to my knowledge, fired him, which is insane. So, I mean, let's also recognize that there are crazy people in the government, like the Proud Boys of Israel, essentially. And really, they cannot be pushed out fast enough.
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- China hawks’ Beijing trip makes a Biden-Xi summit more likely ›
- Can Biden-Xi meeting ease tensions? ›
Biden's 2024 election vulnerabilities and strengths
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here. And a Quick Take to kick off your week on a Monday here in New York City. And yeah, everyone, everyone talking about those polls, New York Times and Siena showing that Biden is behind Trump, not just in overall popularity, but also specifically in how voters in key swing states will vote. And, of course, that's the Electoral College. That's how you actually get elected president of United States. So, yeah, Biden supporters very concerned about that. But we are a year away, so it is early.
Having said that, a few things that I think are worth paying attention to. Number one, 71% of Americans say Biden, 80-year-old Biden is too old to run for president. Look, very few people actually work regularly with an 80-year-old. So I get it. And in a year's time, I'm fairly confident he's going to be a year older. So this is not something that Biden can do much of anything about. And there is material downside. Having said that, Biden is more obviously aging physically where intellectually, you know, one one-on-one in small meetings, he's still actually able to hold down meetings reasonably well.
Trump, on the other hand, at least if you've watched him recently and I've seen a couple of his rallies, is very physically robust, intellectually seems to be losing a lot more of the zip on his fastball. And I suspect that once he gets the nomination, which is virtually certain at this point, he's going to get a lot more real time coverage, more people are going to see that. So it plays definitely against Biden. But I don't think it's quite as dramatic a gap as we presently see.
Other issues out there I think are harder to address. Illegal immigration, for example, which is now not just about border red states, but it's about blue sanctuary cities that were happy being sanctuary cities when they have many illegal immigrants coming in. But you suddenly bring them in. They say, wait a second, we were fine with sanctuary city in theory, but in practice, this isn't going to work. And you see this happening in New York. You see it happening in San Francisco, in Chicago, in a bunch of cities around the country, and also hard to address because you had very limited immigration. While the pandemic was on, people weren't moving. Two and a half years of pent up demand. Now they are. And the willingness of Biden to play hardball, specifically with the Mexican government and the southern Mexican border, which is where the people are coming up through so far, has not been what it needs to be. Hard to imagine that issue gets much better.
The one that can get better for Biden is the economy, where increasingly the US economy is significantly outperforming those of other advanced industrial democracies post-Pandemic. And while inflation is high, it is coming down, though from a high base. And rates, no one expects they're going to continue to be raised by the Fed. In fact, indeed, they may well come down a little bit next year and that soft landing will likely help soften Biden's numbers on that side. Having said all of that, foreign policy is now becoming a vulnerability for Biden in a way that it really hasn't been over the last year or so. And few Americans actually vote on foreign policy. But when you talk about a huge issue, like 100 billion US dollars going to support Ukraine for a war that increasingly looks like a stalemate, where the counter offensive talked about for many months looks like a failure, and where it was a bipartisan issue of support for Ukraine, it's now become a partisan issue of Democrats strongly supporting more money for the Ukrainians. Republicans saying that's been too much money for the Ukrainians. And when Trump gets the nomination, the Republican Party presently voting more with the Dems likely to shift away from that support. And so I can easily see an environment where Ukraine feels like it's getting partitioned, which no one will accept and therefore is an unacceptable reality when Biden is running for reelection. That's been a signature foreign policy of his and he will be vulnerable to the Republicans.
The other issue, of course, is the Middle East. Now, if you can contain the Middle East war to Gaza and Israel, probably won't have much impact come next November. But if it expands, the impact on oil prices as well as the likelihood that US forces in the region are directly involved in some of the fighting with Iranian Shia proxies across the region, Yemen and Syria and Iraq and Lebanon and maybe even with Iran itself. That's a vulnerability too. Not to mention the fact that right now Biden's getting only just above 20% support from Arab American voters in the United States who are really important in places like Michigan, where they're 5% of the voting population, or Pennsylvania, where they're over 2%, both of which are larger than Biden's actual victory in those states back in 2020 elections.
So he has vulnerabilities there. And increasingly, the Biden administration is worried that, you know, this is going to be a challenge and there's not a lot of things they can do to ensure outcomes that are better. So in an environment where domestic policy looks okay, but people aren't focused as much on it, they're not as happy as they want to be on a couple of core issues. And suddenly foreign policy is a vulnerability, that to me feels challenging. Now against all of that, you have the fact that Biden is the president and incumbent presidents always historically do better in the United States, even unpopular ones. They get a bump because they can drive the agenda and they can drive the media coverage. That continues to be true for Biden. It's one of the strongest arguments for him to actually run a second time.
Beyond that, you've got the abortion issue, which continues to play strongly for Biden, very badly for Republicans. It was a conservative Supreme Court with key Supreme Court justices appointed by Trump that rid the country of Roe versus Wade, which ended up which was a quite popular decision by the Supreme Court for the majority of red and blue voters across the country. And there's a backlash that you see there. It's also one of the reasons why Kamala Harris is no longer seen as much of a drag on the Biden administration. In fact, in many ways, Biden is seen as much of a drag as Kamala is, especially in this last vote. And that's because she's been given not just immigration, which is a loser issue, but she's also been given abortion, which has been a winner issue. And as she's talked around the country, she's done better on that front.
Final point, of course, is Trump's unfitness. And while this is all played in 91 indictments, some of which are very real cases, some of which are politicized, but this is going to become a bigger turnoff for independent votes as people spend more time focusing not on Democrat versus Republican, but Biden versus Trump once the nominations happen. That's a vulnerability, too. So a long electoral cycle that no one wants to deal with, with two candidates that most people are very unexcited about. I guess we're going to have to talk about it more. But that's where we stand right now.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Biden’s Arab-American exodus
US President Joe Biden’s policy towards Israel has cost him support among a community that could decide his fate in several swing states next year. A new poll by the Arab-American Institute shows just 17% of Arab-American voters now support him – a staggering drop from nearly 60% back in 2020. In addition, barely a quarter of Arab-Americans said they identify as Democrats now, the first time in a quarter century of polling that the number has fallen below 50%.
The reason? Two-thirds of Arab Americans disapprove of Biden’s handling of the Israel-Hamas conflict, in which he has given “rock solid” financial, military, and moral support to Israel. And while Biden has recently urged Israel to minimize civilian deaths, he’s also downplayed the importance – and even the credibility – of Palestinian casualty figures.
This view diverges from the broader US feeling. Polling shows 52% of Americans say Biden’s level of support for Israel is just right, with another 20% saying Washington should do more for Israel. Small wonder that two-thirds of Arab Americans said they don’t feel comfortable expressing concerns about Palestinians publicly.
Who’s picking up Arab-American allegiances? Support for Trump, one of the most pro-Israel US presidents in memory, surged past Biden to about 40%, while nearly one in five Arab-Americans are considering third-party candidates. As one Arab-American leader told Time, “the policies are basically the same. Except when Trump does it, you get some pushback from the Democratic Party.”
Could this affect the 2024 election? Arab Americans account for about 5% of the vote in up-for-grabs Michigan, which Biden won by 2.8 points in 2020. They also represent as much as 2% of the electorate in Pennsylvania, which Biden won by 1.2 points.America's tightrope walk with the Israel-Hamas war
As the death toll mounts in Israel’s war with Hamas, Ian Bremmer looks at the role the US government should play in the conflict and whether that role is as clear-cut today as it was right after the attack on October 7. President Biden made a politically and personally dangerous trip to Israel this week, showing solidarity for America’s closest ally in the Middle East. But the administration must walk a fine line between supporting Israel’s right to defend itself and preventing the humanitarian crisis in Gaza from spiraling out of control.
On this episode of GZERO World, we get the view from both sides of the aisle on Capitol Hill, first with Senator Chris Murphy, the Connecticut Democrat who sits on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and then with Republican Representative Mike Waltz of Florida, a member of the House Foreign Affairs committee.
Also: a dispatch from Lebanon. A little over 50 miles from the Israeli border, there are few signs of the violent conflict capturing the world's attention. For now, at least. Further south, there have been almost daily exchanges of rocket fire between the Israeli Defense Forces and Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militant group that dominates southern Lebanon and is a regional power in its own right. GZERO correspondent Fin DePoncier is in Beirut to hear from its diverse population about what they think about their country's precarious position and what it would mean if Lebanon gets dragged into Israel's war with Hamas. Some people see themselves as entirely removed from the conflict, and others would pick up arms to fight, but everyone is bracing for the worst. For now, all eyes are on Hezbollah and the southern border.
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.
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