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US inching away from Israel on Gaza war
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a Quick Take to kick off your week. And the war in Gaza continues apace. We don't yet have an agreement between Israel and Hamas for a near-term cease fire and for more hostages to be released. Everyone is saying that it's imminent. The Israelis essentially have accepted the terms that have been put forward now by the United States, by Qatar, by Egypt.
Hamas has not yet. But it looks very close. Meanwhile, the United States continues to publicly inch further away from the war position of Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu. This is hurting the US on the global stage with its allies, with the Global South. It's hurting the United States and Biden in particular at home as well with his constituents in an election year.
The United States now at the Security Council, still vetoing permanent cease fire calls, but now pushing for a temporary cease fire. Vice President Kamala Harris for the first time over the weekend calling for an immediate, though temporary cease fire on the ground in Gaza. Biden saying that he opposes any ground war on the ground in Rafah until it is clear that there is a mechanism to ensure the safety of the over 1 million Palestinian civilians that are presently taking shelter there. And there's nothing close to that from Israel right now. And the United States has decided to start airdropping food to the Palestinians against the protestations of the Israel government, who says that they cannot control the safety of the humanitarian aid and cannot ensure that Hamas doesn't have a hold on them. So in an alliance that has had the two countries in lockstep in the days after October 7th, there is now significant gap between them.
The Israeli position is that Hamas, of course, is wholly responsible for the attacks on October 7th and that that justifies Israeli attacks against Gaza to completely destroy Hamas. Hamas operates in civilian areas. They are the ones putting the Palestinian civilian population at risk. And therefore, Hamas is singularly and solely responsible for all Palestinian deaths. Hamas steals resources that come into Gaza both before October 7th and after, massive amounts of aid pre October 7th had come in, but the Palestinian population there was not able to develop in part because of the kleptocracy represented by Hamas leadership. Therefore, they are responsible for the fact, Hamas, that food and medicine and power are not available for civilians. And finally, Hamas is holding hostages still months after October seven civilian hostages. And that humanitarian aid should not come in unless those hostages are released. It’s a point of leverage that the Israelis have over Hamas to get those hostages released.
And again, from Israel's perspective, it's not 50:50, it's not 80:20, it's not 90:10. All of these, the 30,000 plus deaths in Gaza, a majority of which are civilians, are Hamas's responsibility. The US position is not that. The US position is that Israel is far stronger militarily than Hamas's military capabilities. Israel is capable of defending itself, including from ongoing Hamas attacks and therefore should be able to allow aid in to Palestinians on the ground in Gaza without creating more vulnerabilities for Israeli civilians, that the Israelis have a responsibility for doing everything possible to limit Palestinian civilian deaths. And that while there's scope for disagreement and leeway between the US and the Israeli position, the Americans certainly believe that Israel has not done close to enough to ensure that fewer civilians are in harm's way, that fewer civilians are killed, and therefore that Israel is partially responsible for civilian deaths on the ground. Further, that the Palestinians must have a pathway to govern themselves and to have security, and that needs to be done through a two state solution, a two state solution that presently is rejected by the Israeli prime minister.
So US and Israel are, you know, US is closest ally, strongest ally of Israel globally. But those two positions on the war in Gaza, the war against Hamas, are significantly different and they're widening over time. Now, of course, I'm talking about the two countries that are closest here. I'm not talking about the rest of the world. When you talk about most of the countries in the world that are voting against Israel in the Security Council, in the General Assembly resolutions.
When you talk about the Global South, that position is very different. The majority of the world, of course, believes that Hamas is wholly responsible for the civilian terrorism that they engaged in October 7th. But they also believe that Israel is wholly responsible for the Palestinian death, civilian deaths since then. Again, not the US position, not the position of, say, the Germans and the French, but the position of most countries in the world, and indeed increasingly, the position of most countries in the world that Israel is committing a genocide on the ground in Gaza. And the opposition to Israel as a consequence of that is very great indeed. The gap between those two positions, you could drive hundreds of trucks through with humanitarian aid every day into Gaza. And that, of course, is a big part of the problem, that it is true that the idea of a two state solution is now more urgent and is now more on the table for most around the world than it was before October 7th.
It's also true that both the Israeli population and the Palestinian populations are much more radical lies today towards each other, against each other than they were before October 7th. The former is a win for the international community and perhaps for Palestinians on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza. The latter is a win for Hamas, is a win for Netanyahu, and is a loss for pretty much everywhere else.
And how do you decide what the balance is going to be going forward? It's going to take a very long time. Look, I mean, radicalized populations can change. I was talking to Yuval Harari just yesterday, wrote that book, Sapiens and Homo Deus, and he talked about the fact that, you know, we had a million people killed in the genocide in Rwanda, and this was only 30 years ago. This was, you know, 10,000 people massacred every day, ten times the number of Jews that were massacred on October 7th. And it didn't just happen on one day. It happened for 100 days, day after day after day, a million people slaughtered. And yet, 30 years later, these two populations are living in peace and stability. So it doesn't mean it can't happen between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but it does mean we are farther away today in many ways than we were before the atrocities of October 7th.
And that's something the entire world needs to pay a lot more attention to, needs to work a lot more on. That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Is Modi's India a friend or foe to the US?
What is an ally? How is it different from a strategic partner? At what point does a shared interest between two nations bloom into a full-fledged alliance? Those questions are at the heart of the DC-Delhi relationship.
So, is India a US ally? Based on the pomp and circumstance surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington in June, the answer seems obvious, right? They love us! We love them! End of story. Right?
Ian's guest today, award-winning Indian journalist and Washington Post columnist Barkha Dutt, has some tough love to share: Sorry America, India will never be your ally. "India's hardwired from inception, as an independent country," Dutt tells Bremmer, "to be what what used to be called non-aligned, and what India's foreign minister now calls multi-lateralism ... India is asserting her moment in time."
On the other hand, both nations share a common interest in countering a rising China. So how does Dutt square that circle? Tune in to “GZERO World with Ian Bremmer” on US public television starting this Friday, July 7, to watch the full interview. Check local listings.
India is not a US ally ... or is it?
If the United States and India were ever to make it Facebook official, their status would be: "It's Complicated." These two global behemoths may seem like close allies, especially judging by the warm welcome President Biden gave Prime Minister Modi during his White House visit in June, but in reality, they are anything but best friends.
During the Cold War era, India maintained a "strategically non-aligned" global status and it has tried to stay on the geopolitical fence since fall of the Soviet Union. But when Russia invaded Ukraine and Delhi refused to explicitly condemn Moscow, India's self-proclaimed "multilateral" approach was severely tested.
On the show this week, a deep dive into the nation that recently surpassed China to become the most populous country on earth. Ian is joined by award-winning broadcast journalist and Washington Post contributor Barkha Dutt to talk US-India relations, the state of democracy within India, and how the trauma of COVID has reshaped the country.
Tune in to “GZERO World with Ian Bremmer” on US public television starting this Friday, July 7, to watch the full interview. Check local listings.
Biden vs. Trump redux: what we know so far
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A couple of obvious points to begin with US elections. One, of course, they take far too long. Two, they cost far too much money. Three, we are so, so tired of both of those facts because they are such a distraction from being able to get policy done for almost 50% of the entire electoral calendar. Having said all of that, this is a particularly unfortunate upcoming election because we have two candidates that very few people are enthusiastic about. It's Biden versus Trump redux. That's not absolutely certain yet, but you would bet on it. And a couple of points that I think are a little less obvious.
First, whether or not Biden should run again. Everyone is saying, "Oh my God. Can't we get somebody else? He's 80 years old, he's going to be 82 if he wins. That's too old for anyone to be a CEO. Why would we be putting that person in a job that has such incredible importance globally?" And I get it. I absolutely get it. I think it's too old for the position. I'd rather have younger people running. But if you are interested in running the candidate that's most likely to win, do you go with an incumbent president or do you go with somebody else having no idea who that someone else is? And the answer seems to me is reasonably likely you go with the incumbent president. There are huge benefits in the US political system in running as an incumbent. If Biden decides he isn't going to run, Kamala Harris, who is much more unpopular than he is and certainly much more untested, and to the extent that she's tested, she's much more unproven than Biden, would be a weaker candidate, I think almost everyone would agree, than Biden would.
I do think there are better candidates out there. Gretchen Whitmer, for example, the governor of Michigan, Jared Polis, the governor of Colorado. There are others that I don't consider as effective, but nonetheless would be strong candidates like Governor Gavin Newsom of California. There are plenty of others, Gina Raimondo, for example, the secretary of commerce, it would be a pretty wide group, but would they be more effective and more likely to win if they aren't the incumbent president? And there, I think the answer is no, especially because the incumbent president isn't going to be doing a lot of campaigning for whoever that person is, and Biden is not up for that kind of a schedule, intense schedule, whether he's running or it's somebody else. I'm sympathetic to the view that even though Biden has capacity to be present until he is 86, is a serious concern that he might well be the most effective person for the Democrats to run. And especially running a relatively uncontested campaign. When you're running against Kennedy and Williamson, you're basically running an uncontested campaign.
Now, I also think that those people who say that Biden is incoherent and incompetent, that's performative, that's partisan, that is certainly not anyone who has spent time with Biden in conversation as president. I have, many, many people I know have, whether you're talking about members of cabinet or senators or other heads of state, Biden's ability, his mental coherence and cogency to handle the basics of the job and the importance of those meetings and decisions has not, in my view, substantially eroded over the last couple of years. I also do think, though, that there's a real question mark. He has lost a step or two, certainly physically in the last 10 years, and I do worry that this could be an issue over the course of his presidency. So if Biden becomes president a second time and he's going to run with Kamala again, is there a real likelihood that Kamala Harris becomes president? Of course, there is, and that's something that I think is going to be a concern for a lot of certainly independent voters.
Then on the Republican side, Trump is not a slam dunk, but at this point, he's at least a layup. He's a jumper from the free-throw line. He's likely to get the nomination. In part, he's likely because he's running a relatively smarter campaign, he's trying hard to lock up key endorsements early that will crowd out others like DeSantis maybe from even deciding that they're going to run, but certainly makes it more of an uphill struggle. He's raising a lot of money. He's spending that money already in targeted advertisements to go after, to kneecap those that would be potentially the stronger folks in the race.
I think it's likely that he is the nominee. I think he's too old. Though he strikes me as much more physically robust than Biden, I think his unfitness is primarily not about his age, though it's a concern. His unfitness has to do with everything else about the quality of his person, his lack of ethics and morals, and of course, what we have seen from his first term in governance and not his administration, but how he personally has acted in that office. Something that I think would be a concern to a greater degree if he runs again. Now, a lot of people I hear saying, "Well, if Trump gets the presidency again, then he's going to have no one good around him because they will refuse to work with him, and it'll be a completely incompetent administration." I think that's precisely wrong. I think once Trump gets the nomination, almost all of the GOP will line up behind him.
I think Nikki Haley, it's very clear that her run is an effort to become Trump's VP, and if she gets that, she's one of the most capable and competent Republicans out there through when she was governor, when she was UN ambassador. There's no question about that. And do I think that she would be effective as a VP? Frankly, more so than Pence. I think Pompeo would still be there. I think that a shocking number of GOP members, maybe not Chris Christie, maybe not Asa Hutchinson, certainly not Liz Cheney, not Mitt Romney, but the strong majority of Republicans would support Trump, and they would even be willing if they got the right position to join the administration. The bigger danger, I think, is that a Trump administration, having been through four years, will know what they need to do to have much more impact in what they want to get done, not just in terms of policy, which is generally less problematic, but in terms of eroding democracy.
For example, really hollowing out civil service in a lot of administrations that they think are stopping them from doing things they want to do. The brittleness of US institutions after another four years of a Trump administration, I think, would be a lot greater than they were after the first four, where his impact on those institutions as a whole was relatively limited.
What happens? Damned if I know. I'm not going to sit here and tell you I think I have a strong view of who's going to actually win the election. I think we're far off from that. I saw the Washington Post poll like everyone else did, that shows that right now, Trump is actually leading Biden head-to-head. It's the first major poll that showed that. Before, most have showed that Biden would win head-to-head against Trump. I think part of it has to do with how Biden holds up from a health perspective. Part of it has to do with how well the economy looks. Part of it has to do with how Trump is able to campaign. And we've got a long, long way to go with a lot of moving parts and also some fairly substantial global crises that we and others are dealing with on the global stage before people go to the ballot box on November in 2024.
Having said that, a lot of people are going to get really exhausted by this campaign, and I'm sorry for everyone, but we are at the beginning of it, and it's a long slog, and I'll be talking you through. So everyone, be good. I'll talk to you soon. Bye
The Graphic Truth: Criminalizing LGBTQ love
Last week, Uganda’s parliament passed legislation that criminalizes identifying as LGBTQ, which puts individuals at risk of life imprisonment, or in some cases, even death. Similarly, draconian legislation over identifying as LGBTQ is under consideration in Ghana, and VP Kamala Harris’s visit to Zambia this week – for a summit celebrating democracy – is stoking anti-LGBTQ rhetoric. As of 2023, many parts of the world are still unsafe for the LGBTQ community, as same-sex acts are deemed illegal in 65 countries, from Latin America to Oceania. The death penalty is a possibility in 11 countries worldwide. We look at the range of penalties in Africa and Asia, the two continents with the highest number of countries criminalizing same-sex acts.
What We’re Watching: Zambia warns against anti-LGBTQ protests, AI scares tech leaders
Zambia warns against anti-LGBTQ protests ahead of Harris’s arrival
Zambia’s President Hakainde Hichilema is warning against anti-LGBTQ protests ahead of US Veep Kamala Harris’s visit Friday, part of a three-nation Africa tour aimed at shoring up US relations across Africa.
While in Lusaka, Harris will (virtually) address the Summit for Democracy, a Biden-crafted international conference designed to bolster democratic institutions and norms amid rising global authoritarianism. But dozens of Zambian opposition MPs claim the summit also aims to introduce gay rights to the country.
The opposition Patriotic Front Party reportedly plans to hold protests before the summit, but Hichilema has called for calm and for a dialogue with his opponents. Earlier this month, he vowed to maintain Zambia’s laws criminalizing consensual same-sex acts, which carry a life sentence.
This isn’t the first time gay rights have come up during Harris’s tour. In Ghana, she noted that LGBTQ rights are human rights but did not discuss the proposed Ghanaian bill to criminalize LGBTQ identification and advocacy. Harris’s visit also follows Uganda’s adoption last week of a draconian law that criminalizes identifying as LGBTQ, which could involve the death penalty in some cases.
Is AI getting too smart, too fast?
Yes, according to billionaire Elon Musk and over 1,000 other artificial intelligence luminaries, who've published an open letter calling for a six-month "pause" on further AI development. Why? So it doesn't threaten humanity by creating digital minds so powerful that they can't be controlled by humans.
But perhaps "humanity" is code for white-collar jobs. After all, Goldman Sachs just warned that AI could put up to 300 million people out of work in a decade. Most at-risk jobs are desk gigs, not blue-collar manufacturing jobs we once thought would be wiped out by automation.
Should that be more or less important than stopping AI from automating political misinformation in social media? And what if China takes advantage of the pause to beat the US in the AI race? Let us know your thoughts on taking an AI break here.
What We’re Watching: Bank of England intervenes, Pyongyang provocations, Israel-Lebanon gas deal
Bank of England to the rescue?
The Bank of England stepped in Wednesday to try and calm markets that had gone haywire after the Conservative British government, led by new PM Liz Truss, introduced £45 billion ($49 billion) worth of tax cuts despite sky-high inflation. The bank will fork out £65 billion ($70 billion) to buy government bonds “at an urgent pace” to try to revive investor confidence and boost the pound, which recently fell to a record low against the US dollar. This development comes after the International Monetary Fund issued an unusual rebuke this week of British fiscal policy, warning that the tax cuts would exacerbate inequality. There are also concerns that some pension funds, which invest in government bonds, could be made insolvent following the collapse of UK government bond prices in recent weeks. Though the bank’s intervention is significant, there’s no indication that the Truss government is willing to reverse course (i.e. limit borrowing) to regain market trust. Meanwhile, in a keynote speech Wednesday, Labour leader Keir Starmer said Tories had “crashed the pound,” noting that “this is a Labour moment.” Indeed, Labour is currently trouncing the Conservatives in the polls, but Starmer would need to maintain this momentum until the next general election, which must be held by January 2025.
North Korean nuclear test jitters ahead of Harris trip to Seoul
Kim Jong Un loves to put on a big fireworks show to welcome top US officials to South Korea. But will North Korea's supreme leader literally go nuclear when Vice President Kamala Harris visits South Korea later this week? Washington is warning that Pyongyang might follow up this year’s flurry of missile launches with its first atomic test since 2017 … while Harris is in Seoul. Kim is likely upset that US and South Korean forces are holding joint military drills, which the North Koreans regard as a provocation. On the one hand, testing a nuke would put North Korea on everyone’s radar like the country hasn’t been since 2018, when Kim hung out with former President Donald Trump. On the other, Pyongyang passed on an opportunity to make a bigger atomic splash when President Joe Biden went to South Korea in May. Also, Kim might want to avoid doing anything rash that might upstage his friend, China’s Xi Jinping, who doesn't want any more trouble ahead of the 20th Communist Party Congress in mid-October.
Israel and Lebanon near a maritime deal
While Israel and Lebanon have fought several bloody wars, their most recent battle has been a maritime dispute over drilling rights in the Mediterranean Sea’s Karish gas field. Israel discovered the 860-square-kilometer field (332 square miles) in 2013 and plans to take it online in 2023 after years of delays. But Lebanon claims part of the field falls within its exclusive economic zone, something Israel refutes. What’s more, Hezbollah, a formidable player in Lebanese politics (deemed a terror group by the US), has called Israeli extraction at Karish a “red line” and has threatened to attack. In July, Hezbollah sent drones over the field, which Israel shot down. While Israel plans to produce most of this gas for domestic use, it could help boost production in the eastern Mediterranean, freeing up other sources for export – which could help Europe wean itself from Russian supplies in the longterm. Israel has tapped into several lucrative gas fields to become a net energy exporter in recent years, strengthening energy ties with former regional foes, Egypt and Jordan, and investing in LNG platforms. Lebanese President Michel Aoun recently said the US-driven talks are in their “final stage” and that a deal could soon be signed.
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The Pacific rebellion scaring Washington
The US is scrambling to step up its diplomatic game with Pacific Island leaders following a breakdown of unity at a regional summit this week that analysts warn could weaken resistance to China’s plans for controversial security alliances.
Vice President Kamala Harris addressed the Pacific Islands Forum on Tuesday, announcing that the US would open embassies in Kiribati and Tonga and appoint its first-ever regional envoy. Washington will triple its annual funding to help the Pacific Island nations combat climate change and illegal fishing to $60 million a year for a decade, she said.
The flurry of announcements followed a decision by Kiribati, a nation of 120,000 people, that it was withdrawing from the PIF — a grouping that normally includes 17 other countries — on the eve of the body’s annual summit this week. The Marshall Islands opted out of the meeting, with its leader saying that he wanted to attend but that his parliament forbade him from participating.
The leaders of Nauru and Cook Islands also didn’t attend, citing domestic political reasons and COVID-19.
For half a century, the forum has relied on strength in numbers to argue globally for the shared concerns — from climate change to nuclear non-proliferation — of what are mostly small nations, plus Australia and New Zealand. But in recent years, the region has increasingly become a theater of geopolitical competition between the West and Beijing, as China has emerged as a top lender: By 2021, it had loaned $1.34 billion to the region, second only to the Asian Development Bank.
Those tensions came to a head earlier this year, when China inked a security pact with the Solomon Islands, sparking fears in Washington and Canberra that it was eyeing a military presence in the Pacific. Beijing then tried to prod all 10 Pacific Island countries that recognize it (and not Taiwan) into signing a regional security agreement during a May visit by Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
Countries pushed back, demanding that China bring the draft deal before the PIF. But the newly fractured forum hobbles the group’s authority to repulse external pressures, according to Peter Kenilorea Jr., an opposition member of parliament in the Solomon Islands and a former UN official who’s critical of his country’s embrace of China.
“Our strength lies in acting together,” said Kenilorea Jr., whose father was the first prime minister of the Solomon Islands after independence in 1978. “The Pacific region must think of its security collectively. Individually, each of us is much weaker.”
Already, Beijing is renovating a World War II airstrip in Kiribati. China and Kiribati have insisted that it will only be used for civilian use. But the opacity of China’s hush-hush security deal with the Solomon Islands has raised questions over Beijing’s true intentions in the region. The details of that pact haven’t been made public — but a leaked draft said it would allow China to send warships to the Pacific Islands region.
Officially, Kiribati’s decision to walk out of the PIF has to do with regional politics rather than a global scramble for influence. The grouping’s top post has traditionally rotated between the three sets of islands in the region: Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia. It was Micronesia’s turn to lead the PIF last year. After voting led to a Polynesian candidate winning, Kiribati and other Micronesian nations — Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Nauru — declared they would quit the organization.
But a meeting last month in Fiji appeared to have quelled that rebellion, with a written commitment that the next leader of the PIF would be Micronesian. For the moment, Kiribati’s refusal to accept that assurance — the reason it has cited for its pullout from the group — is unlikely to trigger an exodus of other nations, said Larissa Stünkel, a research fellow at the Stockholm-based Institute for Security & Development Policy’s China Center. Other Micronesian nations appear satisfied with the agreement they arrived at in June, she said — though the Marshall Islands’ status is unclear, with its government keen to stay in the PIF but its parliament insisting on a walkout. “I doubt that we will see more surprise departures from the PIF.”
What is clear, though, is that Kiribati’s exit from the group weakens the PIF, said experts. The biggest beneficiary? Beijing, which denies any role in causing the fissures within the bloc. “A weakened forum would open the door to more overt great power maneuvering, especially on China’s part,” said Marc Lanteigne, an associate professor of political science at the Arctic University of Norway, whose work focuses on the Indo-Pacific region.
Individually, small Pacific Island nations are more vulnerable to the economic allurements China promises — and that the West has failed to match. China’s loans indeed lead to unsustainable debts: Samoa owes Beijing an amount equivalent to 30% of its GDP, while Vanuatu’s debt to China is nearly a quarter of its GDP.
But Robert Sikol Bohn, a former member of Vanuatu’s parliament who now serves as an adviser to the country’s foreign ministry, said China’s money also results in visible infrastructure projects that local politicians can showcase to their electorate as achievements, whether it’s a soccer stadium in the Solomon Islands, an airstrip in Kiribati, or the Parliament building in Vanuatu. The Solomon Islands and Kiribati both dumped their recognition of Taiwan in 2019 to commit to ties with China instead.
“Australia and the U.S. focus their support on good governance and strengthening democracy,” said Bohn. “That’s just not as sexy for a politician to sell as ports, airfields, and buildings.”
The cracks in the PIF also threaten to undermine the region’s fight against climate change. The island nations face threats from illegal fishing by Chinese trawlers. But the West isn’t completely blameless either, said Stünkel, referring to former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s support for coal. Bohn agreed. “Sometimes, I wonder about the West: Are they even listening to what we’re trying to tell them?” he asked.
It's a failing that Harris acknowledged in her address to the PIF. “We recognize that in recent years, the Pacific Islands may not have received the diplomatic attention and support that you deserve,” she said. “We are going to change that.”
This represents a shift away from Washington’s approach in recent years of letting Australia and New Zealand take the lead in managing the West’s ties with Pacific Island nations. There’s greater recognition that the U.S. needs to get more involved.
“Kiribati has served as a wakeup call for Washington,” Kenilorea Jr. said. “The big question is: How long will it stay awake?”
Charu Kasturi is a freelance writer specializing in foreign affairs. He is based in Bangalore, India, and often writes for outlets such as Al Jazeera and Foreign Policy.