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Ukraine frustrated by delay on long-range weapons
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Kyiv, Ukraine.
What's the reaction on the discussions ongoing considering the possibility of Ukrainians to use long-range strike weapons?
Well, a lot of dissatisfaction here in Kyiv. There was the visit by Secretary Blinken and Foreign Secretary Lammy here. There were discussions between President Biden and Prime Minister Starmer in Washington, but no decision. And the Ukrainians really want to be able to strike back at the air bases from which the Russians are launching attacks, trying to completely demolish the Ukrainian energy system. I understand discussions will continue and it will have an impact on the mood here and possibly the conduct of the war.
What's the reaction to Germany's decision to partly at least reimpose on their border controls?
The reaction has been rather negative to put it mildly, as an understanding for the domestic political circumstances leading to the decision by the German government. But here's to take one example, Polish Prime Minister Tusk was scheduled to go to Berlin on a working visit. He canceled that in order to make it clear to the Germans that reimposing controls on the German-Polish border he considered to be contrary to the spirit of cooperation. So expect more on that particular story.
Ukraine's Kursk invasion complicates Putin's war efforts
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Tabiano Castello in Italy.
How will the Ukraine Kursk incursion affect Putin's way of handling his war?
No question. It does complicate things for him quite considerably. First, they were trying to say, "Well, this is a quick thing. This will be over. The mighty Russian army is going to throw out the evil Ukrainians within a short period of time." That has clearly not been successful. So, now they're trying to say, "Well, this is not a big thing." They're trying to play it down. But whatever. It does complicate significantly the narrative that Putin has been trying to hand out, some say, or get anchored with the Russians that victory is going to come. It's only question of patience. He will have quite considerable difficulty. More on the political way. In the political respect than in the military with this operation.
What do we expect of Indian Prime Minister Modi's visit to Kyiv in the coming days?
I think it's going to be interesting to see. I would be interesting to see whether he hugs, embraces Zelensky in the way he did in a way that was quite remarkable with Putin when he was in Moscow a couple of weeks ago. And I think that sort of hugging of Putin did create some image problem for India in part of the word, notably in the West. And it will be interesting to see how far he goes in his visit to Kyiv in sort of counterbalancing the impression created by that hugging of Putin in the Kremlin.
Is it time for Ukraine to negotiate with Russia? Journalist Yaroslav Trofimov explains Kyiv's perspective
Listen: Ukraine is at a crossroads. It's been more than two years of brutal, deadly conflict. Despite some shifts to the front lines, neither side has a clear path to military victory, and support for the war effort is flagging amongst Ukrainians. Is it time for President Zelensky to think about negotiating an end to the war? On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer sits with Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent and author of "Our Enemies Will Vanish," about the challenges Ukraine faces, including waning morale and difficulties in military recruitment. Although recent polls indicate that Ukrainians are more receptive to peace talks, Trofimov warns that Russia’s endgame remains unchanged—total erasure of Ukrainian national identity. With the painful history of Soviet-Era aggression still fresh in the national memory, most Ukrainians are resolute that they won’t accept compromise unless it means the return of all internationally recognized land. Trofimov cautions that the absence of security guarantees by NATO and Western allies means Russia's assault on Ukraine is far from over.
Though Bremmer and Trofimov spoke in July before Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, the larger picture remains bleak: no clear path to ending the war, hundreds of thousands of lives lost, and nearly 20% of Ukraine still under occupation. And if Donald Trump wins a second term, continued US military support is uncertain. So, is it time for Ukraine to negotiate with Russia for a swift end to the war? If not, what will be the cost of all this suffering?
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.
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Why Ukraine invaded Russia
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. I wanted to talk a little bit about Russia/Ukraine before news in the United States and the Middle East take it off the headlines again.
The surprise, of course, is that the Ukrainians have invaded Russia. This was a substantial, you'd say more than an incursion, a significant amount of territory presently being held. The Russians have had to, as a consequence, announce a "counter-terrorism operation regime" in Kursk, in Bryansk, and Belgorod, not martial law, but still, that has reduced some of the forces that they can deploy in fighting the front lines in Southeast Ukraine. And it's also certainly embarrassed Putin, embarrassed his senior military leadership. This is supposed to be all about defeating the Ukrainians, and now the Russians have lots of citizens that are facing a war on Russian territory. Now, to be clear, the Ukrainians have no territorial claim on any part of Russia, but there is a feeling of turnabout is fair play.
What's going on here? I think there are a few things. First of all, the fact that the Ukrainians can put the Russians under some pressure domestically in a run-up to what everyone expects will eventually be negotiations helps to improve Ukraine's position. And no matter who you talk to, the Europeans, the Democrats in the US, the Republicans in the US, the feeling increasingly is that it is going to be harder for the Ukrainians to continue to fight and defend their territory the way they have for the last two and a half years. And so that means you need to have negotiations in the coming year. Part of that is because the Ukrainians aren't going to have the troops. Part of it is because it's getting harder to raise the money. And that's not just the United States, though there was a fight about that, and certainly it'll get harder next year, especially if Trump/Vance win, but also if Harris/Walz do, but also the Germans just cut back 50% of their expected support for the Ukrainian military in 2025, because they're under fiscal constraints, this is the largest European economy. So either way, there is a clear understanding from all sides that you want to move towards freezing the conflict at a minimum and negotiations and maybe a ceasefire and a longer-term settlement, more ambitiously. Much better from the Ukrainian perspective to do that if they have leverage over Russia too, and they have shown leverage. They can blow up the Black Sea fleet, which was important to Russia's national security, and they can put some areas of Russia, both in terms of missiles and alts and drones, but also in terms of Ukrainian troops at risk.
Now, can the Ukrainians hold Kursk from the Russians? Hard to imagine that. I expect that within the coming weeks they'll be forced out of that territory by the Russians. But clearly, they had the element of surprise. The Russians weren't ready to immediately defend or immediately counterattack against that incursion. So I suspect this is more about the broader negotiations between Russian Ukraine than the idea that there's going to be a territory swap. I don't think you'll get there. I also think there is a little bit of desperation. If you're the Ukrainians, remember, you're running out of troops. So sending more troops into Kursk makes you more vulnerable and weaker on the home front, especially when it's been harder and harder to mobilize those troops. And there's been political opposition to doing that. And I think that's because the Ukrainians understand that they need to make Russia feel insecure sooner rather than later, because it's going to be hard to keep this fighting up for another one, two years or more, irrespective of how the American election goes, but certainly, if it goes against the Ukrainians, that's going to be a problem for them. So this isn't all about that.
Also, we're learning more about Russian response. Let's keep in mind that we've heard from Russian leaders, including former President Medvedev and occasionally even Putin himself, that nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons are on the table, and don't you dare, sort of, allow the Ukrainians to use weapons that could strike into Russia. Don't you dare hit Crimea. Don't you dare hit Russian territory. And every time those ostensible red lines have been broken, the Russian response has been dramatically more restrained than one might have expected from listening to Putin and the Kremlin at face value. That's useful because they've also said similar things about Ukraine in NATO and the West defending Ukraine. And if you're going to get to a negotiated settlement that is acceptable for the Ukrainians, which means that they're going to lose territory, they will be partitioned. They need to have the ability to defend their territory for the long-term in a credible way. And the best way to ensure that is get them into NATO. The best way to ensure that is to get them troops on the ground in territory that the Russians don't occupy.
Now, you can have an alliance, have security guarantees that don't include the entire territory. Japan, for example, has an alliance with the United States. It doesn't include the Northern territories, contested and presently occupied, some of them by Russia. So there's plenty of precedent here. But the point is that few in NATO believe today that Ukraine in NATO, especially the piece of Ukraine that isn't occupied by Russia in NATO, is an existential risk for World War III the way that many of them would've believed that when Russian retaliation and escalation was less known, was less experienced a year ago, certainly two years ago. So, that's interesting.
Final point I want to raise here is that whether Harris or Trump win the election in November, I think we are moving towards a similar outcome. In other words, both of these leaders would like to see an end to the fighting. Both of them would like to see a ceasefire. Both of them would like to see the west move on because they recognize the reality of the fighting on the ground, and in the case of Trump in particular, because he wants to say, "New wars started under Biden/Harris, I end them." The big difference between the two is that Trump is much more likely to make those decisions unilaterally. In other words, tell the Ukrainians and the Russians, "This is the deal, accept it or else," and not necessarily coordinate with NATO allies in advance. Where a Harris administration would be working closely in multilateral fashion with the Europeans and with the Ukrainians to try to get to a similar outcome. In other words, more risk acceptant towards that outcome on the Trump side, more risk averse and more coordinated with allies, harder to get done in some ways, under a Harris administration, but lower likelihood that it really blows up in your face. So how lucky do you feel is the open question, but not as dramatically different as the media would have led you to expect over the course of the past months talking about a potential Trump administration.
So that's a little bit from me on where we are, a very different position in some ways, in the Russia/Ukraine war today, and maybe even, I don't want to call it optimistic, but maybe seeing more of a pathway towards how this fighting can be frozen, if not ended. That's it for me, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Will Ukrainian airstrikes inside Russia shift the war?
Will Ukrainian airstrikes inside Russia shift the war?
Possibly. They will make it harder, a lot harder for the Russians to take or advance on Kharkiv further, which is the second largest city in Ukraine, millions of people near the front lines. And if the Russians were to take it or destroy it, level it, you'd have millions of refugees that would be streaming out and into neighboring countries. Not something anyone in NATO wants to see. That is what is less likely to happen, because the Ukrainians can now hit Russian targeting outside of Ukraine.
How might India's trajectory evolve if Modi secures a third term in office?
Looks certainly very likely he's going to get a third term. That's what we've been thinking all the way through. And another five years means strong economic policymaking. Consistency from a Modi who has wanted to make India more investable, a Modi that has wanted to make India more attractive to partners, multinational corporations, financial institutions all over the world. Having said all of that, he has been much more pro-business than pro-competition. And that, of course, makes ultimately India less attractive as a market participant and certainly for a lot of companies, as India grows than it might otherwise be. Still, you're talking about the fifth largest economy in the world on track to becoming the third, growing at 7-8% a year, from a very low base for the next decade. Modi's leadership in India certainly makes you want to bet more on India, not less.
What is the likelihood that Israel and Hamas will agree to Biden's proposed cease-fire deal?
On balance, I still think it's pretty low, in part because the Israelis are not prepared to accept a shift to a permanent cease-fire until Hamas is destroyed. It's not just about Hamas not being able to engage in an October 7th attack again, as Biden has suggested. And that is an arrangement that Hamas is much less willing to sign on to. So, right now, at least, it seems the overlap between the interests of the two combatants, is not yet at a place where we can see a deal.
Two years of war in Ukraine: Power players at the Munich Security Conference weigh in
Listen: It’s been two years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While Ukrainians remain steadfast in their fight, political battles and crisis fatigue in the US and EU make a victory much more elusive. How long can Western allies remain united in their support for Kyiv? Does Ukraine have any chance of winning in this environment? On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer sits with NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoanǎ for a hard look at progress on the battlefield and Ukraine’s future in NATO, just as news broke of the death of Russian dissident Alexei Navalny. Later, Ian talks with another power player at the conference and on the continent, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, about European security, the threat of AI-generated misinformation, and Greece's landmark LGBTQ+ rights law.
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky attends a press conference in Kyiv, Ukraine, on June 28, 2023.
Ukraine extends its reach ... and to some strange places
With the frontlines stuck, and its conventional munitions dwindling, Kyiv is looking to expand its reach against Russian interests – both near and far.
Ukraine’s army is now working with private companies to boost the production of a new class of kamikaze drones that can fly up to 1,000km (621 miles) – far enough to hit Moscow and St. Petersburg.
That’s in addition to President Volodymyr Zelensky’s pledge to build millions more “First Person View” drones – consumer models adapted with explosives – which have helped Ukraine to even the playing field against a larger enemy.
The drones expand Kyiv’s menu of options, says Alex Brideau of Eurasia Group. “They could attempt to hit Russian export facilities for oil and grain in an attempt to choke off revenues that support the war effort.” In recent days, Ukraine has done just that.
Meanwhile, Ukraine is also taking its fight against Russia to ... Sudan? Ukrainian forces are reportedly helping the Sudanese army in its civil war against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, which are allegedly backed by Wagner Group.
That certainly sends a strong “we’ll fight you everywhere” message – but it’s not clear how much it helps with Kyiv’s core issues: entrenched front lines and uncertainty about US aid.
Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky welcomes U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin before their meeting, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine November 20, 2023.
In Ukraine, winter is coming
Ukraine faces a tough winter, and its Western backers know it. That’s why US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin made a surprise visit to Kyiv on Monday to signal “unwavering US support” for the country’s defense. It’s also why EU leaders will gather next month to set Ukraine on the long and winding road toward eventual union membership.
Despite recent advances across the Dnipro River and some long-distance hits scored against Russian forces in Crimea and the Black Sea, Ukraine’s much-hyped counteroffensive has done little to persuade American and European backers that Ukraine can win an outright victory against Russian forces. Fatigue is reportedly high as temps drop along the frontlines. President Volodymyr Zelensky is rumored to face internal feuds about what to do next.
Meanwhile, in the United States, Ukraine’s most important arms and money supplier, continued support is under heavy political pressure. Some conservative Republicans, including GOP presidential candidates, have begun to publicly demand an end to all funding for Ukraine. GOP presidential favorite Donald Trump wants to condition military and financial help for Ukraine on any and all evidence the FBI, IRS, and Justice Department have on, as Trump puts it, “the Biden Crime Family’s corrupt business dealings.”
For now, Ukraine has the weapons and money it needs to continue the fight. But Russian forces still occupy about 18% of Ukraine’s territory, and Western fears of a costly, long-term stalemate have Ukraine’s leaders hoping for warmer and brighter days ahead.