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The Graphic Truth: How NATO absorbed its old foes
For almost half a century, NATO and the Soviet-backed Warsaw Pact alliance glowered at each other from across the Iron Curtain. But after the USSR collapsed, NATO expanded eastward by welcoming former Eastern Bloc members – a development Moscow viewed as a direct challenge to its sphere of influence.
This dynamic has again been a massive point of contention since Moscow unleashed a war against Ukraine, causing states like Finland and Sweden to submit hurried bids to join the defense alliance. Finland joined in the spring. And this week, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had been holding up Sweden's bid, finally gave Stockholm the green light. Here's a look at the history of the alliance's expansion.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin against the backdrop of NATO, Ukrainian and US flags.
No, the US didn’t “provoke” the war in Ukraine
Is the US to blame for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?
That’s what Jeffrey Sachs thinks. In a recent op-ed titled “The War in Ukraine Was Provoked,” the Columbia University professor – a man I’ve known and respected for a solid 25 years, who was once hailed as “the most important economist in the world” and who’s played a leading role in the fight against global poverty – argues that the United States is responsible for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to attack Ukraine 15 months ago.
This claim is morally challenged and factually wrong, but it is not a fringe view. Many other prominent figures such as political scientist John Mearsheimer, billionaire Elon Musk, conservative media star Tucker Carlson, and even Pope Francis have made similar assertions, echoing the Kremlin’s narrative that Russia is but a victim of Western imperialism.
This strain of Putin apologia has taken root in China, pockets of the US far left and far right, and much of the developing world, making it all the more important to debunk it once and for all.
You don’t own me
Sachs’s first big claim is that the US provoked Russia through its “intention to expand NATO to Ukraine and Georgia in order to surround Russia in the Black Sea region by NATO countries.” According to him, this betrayed a promise allegedly made in 1990 by US officials to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would never expand eastward. There are several issues to unpack here.
First, it’s a myth that the last Soviet president was guaranteed a permanent buffer zone between Europe and Russia back in 1990. Declassified transcripts from the talks show that neither Gorbachev nor other Soviet officials ever raised the prospect of NATO accession for Warsaw Pact countries, and Gorbachev himself denied that the West had ever committed to anything about NATO expansion beyond Germany.
Second, as a voluntary association, NATO has no unilateral ability to “expand” – and it has always been reluctant to do so. But Central and Eastern European states have agency, and they demanded to join NATO to protect themselves from Russian aggression despite initial objections from NATO members. It was the Ukrainian people – not officials in Washington and Brussels – that voted in 2019 to enshrine NATO and European Union membership as national goals, largely as a response to Russia’s threats (on which Putin has acted). Far from being pushed or imposed by the US and its allies, NATO enlargement was actively sought by Eastern European countries, which had to actively convince members to accept them.
Third, NATO enlargement never posed a military threat to Russia. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, a mutually agreed roadmap for cooperation between NATO and Russia, reflected the alliance’s strictly defensive nature. From 1997 until Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO deployed no nuclear weapons and almost no combat forces on the territory of its new members. Putin himself expressed no concerns about enlargement in 2002 when the process was underway.
Fourth, despite Ukrainian aspirations, NATO membership was never a realistic prospect for Ukraine. While it’s true that at the Bucharest NATO Summit in 2008, NATO promised Ukraine and Georgia accession at some indeterminate time in the future, it didn’t offer a roadmap for it. Indeed, when Ukraine applied for a NATO Membership Action Plan, NATO members rejected the application. The prospect of Ukrainian accession died a second death after the Russian invasion in 2014, as the alliance had little appetite to go to war with Russia. On the eve of the 2022 invasion, Ukraine was no closer to actually joining NATO than it was during the 2008 Bucharest summit 14 years prior.
Putin’s beef with Ukraine has never been about NATO “encirclement,” as evidenced by his muted reaction to the Baltics’ accession in 2004 and Finland’s last month. Rather, it’s always been about Ukrainian sovereignty. He invaded because he doesn’t think Ukraine is a legitimate country with a right to exist separate from Russia. We know this because Putin himself has repeatedly told us that the war’s aim is to reverse Ukrainian independence and recreate the Russian empire. That’s why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s pledge not to join NATO just before the invasion didn’t stop the tanks from rolling in – and why nothing he could have plausibly offered would have.
We didn’t start the fire
Sachs’s second claim is that the US further provoked Russia and actually started the war when it “[installed] a Russophobic regime in Ukraine by the violent overthrow of Ukraine’s pro-Russian President, Viktor Yanukovych, in February 2014.” This one is problematic as well.
For starters, the US did not orchestrate the Euromaidan protests. They started organically when, under pressure from Moscow, Yanukovych refused to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement – which had passed the Ukrainian parliament with a large majority and enjoyed broad support among the population. They had nothing to do with the US or NATO accession, and participation was mostly limited to students. Only after Yanukovych ordered the police to brutally beat the peaceful protesters and passed “dictatorship laws” curtailing freedom of press and assembly did the demonstrations turn massive.
Likewise, the US didn’t force Yanukovych to direct his security forces to shoot protesters, killing over 100 and triggering the Revolution of Dignity. Nor did Washington push him to try to create a separatist republic in Kharkiv before fleeing to Russia with a reported $1 billion in cash stolen from the central bank’s reserves. It was the Moscow-supported Yanukovych who chose to pull away from the EU, kill protesters, and try to split his country. In the end, his “violent overthrow” was achieved through a peaceful vote to oust him by more than two-thirds of the Ukrainian parliament.
Where I do agree with Sachs is that the war started nine years ago – not when Yanukovych was overthrown by his own people, but when Russia sent “little green men” to take control of the Donbas and illegally annexed Crimea.
If I could turn back time
Nothing the US, NATO, or Ukraine did or didn't do caused Russia to launch a war of aggression against its neighbor. Putin chose to do this, and the responsibility is his and his alone. Having said that, it’s clear in hindsight that the US and its allies did make a number of missteps that made Putin’s decision more likely.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the West left Russia behind. Instead of making its prosperity, partnership, and cooperation a top priority like they did with the defeated Germans and Japanese after World War II, Americans and Europeans largely ignored Russia. There was no Marshall Plan for Russian reconstruction, no real effort to help Russia transition to a democratic market economy, to integrate it into the US-led global order, or to give it a proper stake in the European security architecture. Passing on the chance to turn Russia into another post-war Germany or Japan was a huge missed opportunity.
The West then failed to anticipate that the EU’s and NATO's eastward expansion would enhance Russia's threat perception in their backyard, something Russian officials in the early 1990s made clear and key US officials seemed to understand at the time. Even though no promise not to expand was ever made and it was the former Warsaw Pact countries themselves that demanded to join these organizations to safeguard their sovereignty from Russian threats, the West should have foreseen that this would feed Russia’s already acute sense of insecurity and humiliation.
Finally, the West failed to respond forcefully to previous Russian aggressions. When Putin invaded Georgia in 2008, the West did nothing. When Russia then invaded eastern Ukraine and annexed Crimea in 2014, the West did pitifully little. This inaction was also a breach of a promise the US and the UK made in 1994 to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity – a promise that got Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons and make itself vulnerable to aggression in the first place. By failing to act in 2008 and 2014 (and by setting an example of disregard for international law in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan), the West gave Russia good reasons to believe that it could get away with invading Ukraine a second time.
Maybe if the West hadn’t made these missteps, Russia wouldn’t be a rogue regime with imperial designs and a chip on its shoulder. Maybe it still would. Either way, nothing the West did or didn’t do forced Putin’s hand. The blame lies entirely with him.
From foes to friends: NATO's history of absorbing its enemies
NATO and Russia have been enemies since the beginning of the Cold War. But could there be a time in the future where Russia is a partner, maybe even an ally? That's not happening any time soon, but if history is any indication, it's not such a crazy idea: alliance has absorbed its enemies before.
GZERO World goes back in time to the height of the Cold War, nuclear paranoia, and the formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955.
Let's talk a walk down NATO memory lane. Don't forget to duck and cover.
Watch the GZERO World episode: Russia vs. NATO: Heightened risk of war
Russia vs. NATO: Heightened risk of war
Russia's war in Ukraine has significantly increased the likelihood of direct confrontation with NATO. Moscow is rattling the nuclear saber, NATO just added 830 miles of territory on the Russian border, and tensions are higher than ever. Russia now sees NATO as its enemy and vice versa. But does that mean war is inevitable?
On GZERO World, former US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder warns that Russian military aggression poses a real and present danger, making the current situation arguably worse than its been since the end of the Cold War. The possibility of all-out military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed superpowers is the highest it has been since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Daalder says in a conversation with Ian Bremmer.
Meanwhile, Russia still has some friends left. And non-aligned countries like India, Brazil, and South Africa remain on the fence because they have strong ties with both Washington and Moscow.
Daalder also highlights the potential impact of Turkey's upcoming election on NATO. President Erdoğan has been blocking Sweden's membership in the alliance, but the opposition candidate is campaigning on a platform of leaning closer to the West. If Erdogan loses reelection, it could mean Turkey becomes a stronger ally and partner at a crucial time for NATO.
Odds of NATO-Russia war rising
Russia's war in Ukraine has dramatically raised the odds of a direct confrontation with NATO due to Western sanctions against Moscow. Russia now considers NATO to be its enemy, and vice versa, former US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder tells Ian Bremmer on GZERO World. In fact, Daalder explains, Russian military aggression is a very real and present danger.
That makes the current situation in some ways even worse than during the Cold War, when the United States and Soviet Union tried to find ways to coexist and set up arms control agreements.
But now all of that is gone. Russia has even walked away from New Start, the last nuclear weapons treaty between Washington and Moscow.For Daalder, who is also the president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, the possibility of all-out war between the world's two nuclear superpowers is the highest it's been since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Watch the full interview on an upcoming episode of GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, airing on US public television nationwide. Check local listings.
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NATO's confidence as Ukraine enters year 2 of war
In 2022, NATO got its groove back. Sweden and Finland applied for membership after decades of thinking it was safer to stay neutral. Germany announced a huge increase in defense spending, and walked back their own red line of sending weapons to conflict zones. In 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, and only 3 of NATO’s then-28 members met the target of spending 2% of GDP on defense. Now, nine countries do, and 19 more have plans to hit 2% by 2024. Still, it’s a hard argument to make as global inflation limits the buying power of those military budgets.
Ian Bremmer spoke with NATO’s Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană about the lessons learned during year one of the war and what comes next. Despite the cohesion, there’s tension brewing: NATO members have very different ideas about how far to go in supporting Ukraine; they blame each other for delays in weapon deliveries; And Turkey, of course, still holding up Finland and Sweden’s membership; no to mention there’s a limit to global trust and information sharing.
Watch the interview on this week's episode of "GZERO World with Ian Bremmer," airing on US public television stations nationwide. Check your local listings.
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U.S. President Joe Biden walks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy during an unannounced visit, in Kyiv, Ukraine.
Can the US keep Europe together?
Just days out from the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, US President Joe Biden is making a splash in Europe. After a surprise stop in Kyiv on Monday, Biden is now in Poland, where he is expected to give a formal address at the Royal Castle gardens in Warsaw on the global state of democracy. He's also set to meet a group of nine eastern European leaders.
Biden’s trip comes amid growing fears in the region of both an imminent military escalation in Ukraine and concern for how long European cohesion on supporting Kyiv will last. This view was reinforced when Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki recently said: “We must admit that it will be a big challenge to keep the EU member countries enthusiastic.”
Over the past year, there’s been much attention on how a united Europe has served as a crucial punitive force against Russia. But as the war lingers, anxiety is growing about whether deviating interests within Europe could, over time, splinter its war response.
First, what are the differing views within the European camp? Post-Soviet states, like the three Baltic nations, as well as fearful neighbors – like the Scandinavian and Balkan countries – have adopted a hawkish Russia stance. They know what it’s like to live under the fist of an oppressive Soviet state or to be bullied by an expansionist Russia. Crucially, Poland, which has emerged as an anchor for Eastern European unity, recalls all too well how the country was carved up in 1939 between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Fearful of Russia's imperialist aspirations, Warsaw has been channeling its fears by upping its defense budget.
But the view is very different from much of Central and Western Europe — particularly Germany, which, in the post-Cold War years intertwined its economy with Russia’s. The same is true for other EU countries, including Italy and Austria. This economic interdependence has at times slowed some states from adopting the same full-throttled anti-Russia stance as those who feel more directly threatened by Moscow.
“There are many cleavages between Eastern European countries, the Baltic states, and Western European countries,” says Engjellushe Morina, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Eastern Europeans and Baltics have different expectations of European unity because they live right next door to Russia.”
As the war in Ukraine metastasizes, there’s increasing fear among Eastern European states that the rest of Europe, reeling from inflation and other domestic crises (the French right now … ils sont malheureux!), will lose patience with the West’s maximum pressure campaign.
But this would appear to counter a dominant view that Eastern Europe’s clout has grown since the war broke out: “Our voice is now louder and more heard,” Romania’s foreign minister said recently. What’s more, some analysts have credited the bloc’s powerful advocacy with having pushed the Biden administration – followed by European heavyweights – to give Ukraine heavier military equipment.
A divided East. But while Eastern European leaders may have played a more prominent role in leading the charge in recent months – compared, for instance, to 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea – varying priorities impede the bloc from presenting a united front.
Consider that Poland, for its part, abhors the Kremlin and has taken in more Ukrainian refugees than any other country, while Hungary’s PM Viktor Orban, long cozy with Moscow, said this week that he would not break ties with Russia. Serbia is closely aligned with the Kremlin and has not joined NATO, choosing to maintain a neutral defense posture, while Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia are NATO members. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has warned that Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova are vulnerable to Russian interference.
Another limiting factor is that the Eastern Europeans don’t have the goods. Estonian PM Kaja Kallas acknowledged this recently when she said, “it’s very easy for me to say … ‘Of course, give fighter jets [to Ukraine] but — I don’t have them.” Likewise, while Poland has called for NATO members to send Kyiv fighter jets, it said that its stockpiles are limited and it needs Washington to lead the way. And even when they do have the goods, Europe's eastern flank often can’t send them to third parties without getting the go-ahead from the heavyweights that produced them. This dynamic was highlighted in recent months when Ukraine pushed for the US, the UK, and Germany to send advanced battle tanks, paving the way for other European allies to do the same.
America's job. As the war passes the one-year mark, the endurance of a united Europe on Ukraine will continue to depend on how well the US can keep the group in check. Why? Because no Europeans seem up to the task.
“There are no European leaders to maintain this unity,” Morina says, adding, “we don‘t see any powerful European countries like France or Germany taking the lead.”
Should Ukraine be offered NATO membership?
Finnish leaders know how to have a good time, which is probably why Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto recently sat down with Ian Bremmer to discuss Finland’s NATO accession.Threats from the Kremlin had kept Finland (and Sweden) from joining the alliance for 75 years. But the invasion of Ukraine changed all that. In May, Finland’s long-serving President Sauli Niinistö rang his old friend, Vladimir Putin. “It’s not me, it’s you,” Niinistö intimated to the Russian leader.
Putin reacted calmly, and those decades of threats have resulted in … zilch. Haavisto says Putin is too preoccupied with the Ukraine offensive to worry about Finland – he notes that Finns can see Russia moving its military away from their border, presumably to beef up reinforcements on the frontlines.
But that doesn’t mean joining NATO has been smooth sailing for the land of a thousand lakes. A surprise hiccup came from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has an axe to grind with the Nordics over things like their alleged support for a Kurdish group in Syria they say is linked to the PKK, which Ankara regards as a terrorist group. Erdoğan said neither Finland nor Sweden should be allowed to join NATO while harboring “terrorists.” But the three came to a tentative agreement in June to move forward with the membership process.
The Finns’ bid to join NATO was fueled by its changing security situation when the neighbor with whom Finland shares an 830-mile border suddenly brought war back to the continent. So imagine how Ukraine has felt for years … Sure, the members of NATO have now welcomed Ukraine’s bid to join. But in retrospect, should membership have been extended to Kyiv before now?
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