We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
Russia's war: no end in sight
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hey everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a happy Monday to you. A Quick Take to kick off your week. Wanted to talk latest on the Russia War.
Seen both sides, significant new attacks. From the Ukrainians, a drone successfully hitting an office tower in Moscow. From Russia, a drone attacking a grain storage and infrastructure facility right on Ukraine's Romanian border. The Ukrainians wanting to show Russia that they can continue to hit deep inside the country, even right at the capital. The Russians wanting to show that they can and will cripple Ukrainian agricultural capabilities now that they have stepped out, the Russians have stepped out of the Black Sea grain deal. Both of these things showing that 500 plus days in the war is not over. It's continuing to cause grave damage to both populations and both also showing that there's very little substantial progress either towards victory of one side, defeat of the other or towards a ceasefire and a breakthrough in negotiations.
Given that state of play, and given that we just had a Vilnius summit, NATO summit that showed that the countries are together and they're providing strong levels of ongoing support for the Ukrainians, that's not going to fall apart anytime soon. But meanwhile, the Russians are defending themselves capably in the front lines against Ukrainian counter offensive, which is not going as well as certainly the Ukrainians or NATO had hoped a couple of months ago before it started. I wanted to look at policy because what US and NATO policy towards the Russia, Ukraine fight is and isn't is sometimes misstated.
NATO and the United States, first and foremost are trying to help defend Ukraine and help them get their land back, certainly the territory that has been taken since February 24th. They have done a pretty good job of that. Certainly the Ukrainians are far more capable in terms of their defenses going forward, and much of the territory that was initially taken by the Russians has now been regained by Ukraine. Certainly not all of it, and again, not very much over the last couple of months, but the Russians do not control most of the territory that they have illegally annexed over a few months ago. And of course, all of the territory they initially took in the north and towards Kyiv and the Northeast, that the Ukrainians have removed them from completely back to the original borders. Secondly, the US and NATO are trying to make sure that Russia doesn't want to do it again, that they understand that this was a mistake, whether or not they admit it as such and that such an attack going forward would be even more so.
In other words, they don't want the Russians to think that they can wait out and have a second bite of this apple. Now so far they seem pretty successful there as well. That's why you continue to have efforts to talk about long-term Ukrainian security guarantees, including eventually a pathway into NATO. But short of that, and before that, commitments that the G-7 will all continue to provide cyber defenses and equipment and training and intelligence for the Ukrainians, all of which is intended to bolster that policy. And then finally want lessons for other countries, notably China, to them, that if you were thinking of invading Taiwan, if you were thinking of attacking territory that really matters to the West, think again, there will be serious consequences. You'll be punished for that. It'll hurt you militarily, it'll hurt you economically. And I think that on that policy as well, there has been so far a fair amount of success.
Now, what the policy is not. It is not a policy to remove Putin from office. It is not a policy of regime change. It is also not a policy to destroy Russia. Russia is a federation. There are different autonomous republics and regions with different nationalities. This is not an intention to do to the Russians what happened to the Soviet Union in the late eighties, culminating in the collapse in 1991. Also very importantly and not discussed very often, it's not an effort to cut off global markets from Russia. I hear a lot, look at, and I put out those numbers myself. Look at how much oil the Indians are buying from Russia. Look at how much the Chinese are now buying from Russia. The American policy, the NATO policy is that India and China should buy that oil at a discount from the Russians. The alternative would be that the markets would be crippled.
The alternatives would be a massive spike in disruptions in supply chain, a major recession that Biden doesn't want and that frankly nobody in NATO wants. So even though you won't see NATO leaders saying, we're so happy the Indians are buying all of this oil, the reality is they are. It's cheaper. The Russians are getting less for it than they would in a properly functioning global market had they not invaded Ukraine. And then the Indians are actually doing more refined product, value add for them that is being exported to Europe so the Europeans can continue to have their economy run. Are the Europeans still essentially consuming a lot of Russian oil? Sure they are. Are the Europeans ending up getting a whole bunch of food from Russia? Yeah, and so is Africa, and so are other countries around the world.
And it's very annoying that the food and fertilizer deal has been unilaterally broken by the Russians, and now the Ukrainians will not be able to profit from their food and fertilizer industry, and it's going to hurt a lot of African nations in particular, but Russia will still be able to export a lot of that food. And again, given the importance of those commodities to global markets, that's not going to change anytime soon. The reason I mention this is because at some point the war will be over, at some point there will be a ceasefire, hopefully, as the Ukrainians can take as much of their land back as was stolen from them as possible, and hopefully with very strong and defined and ongoing support from the EU, from the United States, from the G-7, from NATO, that will allow Ukraine to reconstruct, allow them to join the EU, allow them eventually even to join NATO, and hopefully there will also be strong lessons that are maintained by the Russians, by the Chinese, by others around the world that the G7 is cohesive, will respond to breaking of the rule of law, at least in those cases where countries are strategically important to NATO and the G-7.
I'd like to say to all countries around the world, that would certainly be the proper international law response. It would also be the proper human response. I don't think that we are there, but nonetheless, the basic intentions of these policies are so far looking to be pretty strong. The question of course is what do you do beyond that? Because the consequences of Putin invading is that he has screwed up his own country. The consequences of Putin invading is that Prigozhin, who was this very loyal guy that was providing all sorts of paramilitary services for dictatorships across the Middle East and Africa, suddenly had to redeploy to Ukraine because the defense ministry and the regular forces did so badly, his forces got eaten up, and now he's become enemy number one for the Russians, and yet is still walking around in Belarus. That destabilizes Russia. It's not American policy, but it is a knock on consequence of the failure of the invasion and the consequences of the invasion.
What that means is that dealing with the Russians long term is something the Americans are going to have to think a lot more about. You can get the war in Ukraine eventually over and still have a massive problem with a nuclear-armed Putin whose country is much more destabilized, and yet the US has no interest in having a Russia massively destabilized. In that regard, America shares interest with almost everyone in the world, certainly the Chinese, the Indians, the entire Global South. Nobody wants nuclear war. Nobody wants a rogue state like Russia to become destabilized and more risk acceptant. That would undo so many of the proper lessons that hopefully are finally being learned by a lot of countries on the basis of the late, but nonetheless, strong response to the Russian invasion.
So something to spend more time thinking about, especially as we talk about, for example, Putin as a war criminal, which certainly is true, and on the other hand, he'll never be tried for it. And the ability to deal with a war criminal makes it a lot harder long term for Europe, for the United States to have a stable relationship with a post-Ukraine war Russia. How do you square that circle? And if you don't, what kind of a world are you living in? What kind of greater risks are you imputedly willing to tolerate? Something we're going to talk about a lot more.
Anyway, that's it for me on a Monday. Hope everyone's doing well and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan attends the NATO leaders summit in Vilnius, Lithuania.
How Erdogan won the NATO Summit
This week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius is now over. So, who won?
It’s not Ukraine. NATO leaders bathed President Volodymyr Zelensky in waves of warm words and historic-sounding promises. But, as we wrote a day ago, none of that brings his country much closer to the NATO membership he wants. (That said, Ukraine isn’t really a loser, because neither immediate membership nor a timetable to join were ever in the cards.)
Certainly, Sweden is a winner — thanks to Turkey’s willingness to drop its threat to veto the country’s own entrance into NATO. Sweden will become the alliance’s 32nd member by the end of the year.
Russia’s government will declare itself a winner by pointing to (exaggerated) headlines that suggested Ukrainian and NATO leaders spent the week arguing. But the Kremlin’s already hollow win — and its claims of Ukrainian-Western frictions — were undermined when news broke that Ukraine had used a UK-supplied missile to kill a high-ranking Russian general deep inside Russian territory.
The true summit winner is Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He exited the event with a spring in his step …
… by earning concessions from Sweden, which will now back the expansion of a free trade agreement between the EU and Turkey. Sweden has also recently amended its Constitution to pass new counterterrorism legislation that Erdogan demanded, and agreed to extradite some of the Turks who’ve been charged with crimes by Ankara.
… by reminding Europe, Turkey’s largest export market, that he’s worth bargaining with. Erdogan’s support for Ukraine — including by selling Kyiv military drones — has won praise in Europe. But Erdogan remains the one NATO leader of consequence who can speak directly with Russia’s Vladimir Putin. Both these things bolster Erdogan’s importance for the alliance, but his willingness to lift objections to Sweden’s entry, as he did for Finland, has earned him much goodwill, at least for now.
…by reminding Putin he’s not a pushover. At times, Russia has appeared to bully Erdogan’s government. In 2016, in response to Turkey shooting down a Russian fighter plane over Syria in November 2015, Putin inflicted real damage on Turkey’s economy by blocking Russian tourists from visiting. By voting for NATO enlargement, Erdogan reminds Putin that Turkey still has partners far more powerful than Russia.
…by winning a promise he can buy F-16s from the United States. In 2017, Turkey defied US objections and bought surface-to-air missile systems from Russia. Washington then responded with sanctions. But by greenlighting Sweden’s bid to join NATO, Turkey will soon be allowed to buy US-made fighter jets that are badly needed to upgrade Turkey’s air force. And that’s over the objections of many in Washington, who feel Erdogan’s history of jailing journalists and undermining democratic institutions in Turkey should have prevented the deal.
… and by showing Turkish voters that he’s still a major international player.
There is one last twist. Erdogan has decided to make Sweden sweat a little longer by saying Turkey’s parliament won’t officially vote on the Nordic country’s NATO membership until October.
When haggling with the Turkish president, nothing ever comes easy.
NATO summit, the future of US-China, Elon vs. Zuck, and more: Your questions, answered
It's summer in the Northern Hemisphere, which means: you get to ask me anything.
That's right — it's the time of the year when I take your best questions on anything politics, geopolitics, and personal. Want to know what I think about the 2024 US elections? The war in Ukraine? The meaning of life? Follow me on Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn and look out for future AMAs if you want a chance at getting your question answered.
I picked 10 questions this time. Some of them have been slightly edited for clarity.
What do you make of the NATO Summit outcomes? (Sophia Müller)
The big news was Turkey's President Recept Tayyip Erdogan finally agreeing to let Sweden into the alliance. It was going to happen eventually, but it’s a nice surprise for the US and NATO members that it happened now. Much less surprising (aka not at all) is that Ukraine’s NATO accession keeps getting pushed off into the indeterminate future. While military support for Ukraine will keep expanding week in and week out, core NATO members (especially the US and Germany) have no intention of getting automatically dragged into a direct fight with Russia. They’re perfectly happy fighting a proxy war, but they don’t want to risk a World War III that puts their own troops in harm’s way. That’s the same reason why the Americans refuse to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine. Not everyone agrees, of course: the Poles, the Balts, the Finns, and even the French (of late) want immediate membership. That said, the other thing the summit showed is that NATO only keeps getting stronger. Members are overall very well aligned, and the alliance has become critical to their national security — not just in the North Atlantic but everywhere (watch your step, Beijing). I guess Russia starting a land war in Europe will do that...
Was it the right call for the US to approve cluster munitions for Ukraine? (Chloe Li)
On balance, I say no. There’s a reason why these weapons are banned (though neither the US, Russia, nor Ukraine are signatories to the ban): they are brutally dangerous to civilians for many years after they’ve been used. Yes, the Russians have been using them throughout the war, but that doesn’t mean we should want more of them in the fight. Now, I understand why Biden is doing this. The US and its allies are running very low on artillery ammunition, which the Ukrainians need much more of to take back and defend their territory. But the US has plenty of cluster munitions, which would actually be pretty useful on the battleground for Ukraine. And Biden wants to do everything he can to help ensure the Ukrainian counteroffensive is successful. Be that as it may, the US dragging itself down to the level the Russians have been fighting on is ultimately detrimental to core American interests and our moral standing.
With some level of Putin opposition building in Russia, what are the chances of Putin being unseated? (Jeff Muchow)
The odds of Putin being unseated are zero … until right after it happens. In other words, if it happens, it’s likely to be sudden and with no external signaling or foreknowledge. The downside of taking Putin on for any Russian citizen and their family/loved ones remains absolute if they fail. And we haven’t seen any grassroots demonstrations or major defections. The Wagner “coup” was unprecedented, but it had no immediate impact on Russia’s status quo. Clearly, though, there’s lots more pressure now that Prigozhin openly challenged him and lived to see another day (for now). Deeper, systemic, and potentially existential fault lines in the system have been exposed – and they can’t be un-exposed. The war in Ukraine has gone terribly for Russia’s military, and a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive could make this even more evident. Elite fracture, especially within the national security complex, is much more likely in an environment where Russia’s strongman no longer looks so … strong. A successful challenge to Putin’s rule is still a tail risk, but whereas a month ago it seemed unthinkable, today it’s considerably more plausible.
Why is Gavin Newsom not running for president? (Ade of Nigeria)
Nobody serious is prepared to challenge Biden if the incumbent president decides he wants to run (as he has), even though most Democratic leaders I know privately tell me they would rather he didn’t run again. While Biden’s age is a massive liability, he is the incumbent president and has the full support of his party’s establishment, so he’d have the overwhelming advantage in a contested primary (not to mention that he has reformed the primary calendar in his favor). Most Democratic voters and elites correctly recognize that Biden, a known quantity with proven electability and a 1-0 record against Republican frontrunner Donald Trump, is their best chance of keeping the White House. No one else in the field can boast about that.
Do you still believe that the US is the best country to live in the world? (Mahadi Hasan)
For me personally, absolutely. I’m never going to move. But that answer is dependent on so many factors. There are lots of countries that the US could (and should) learn from to improve our quality of life and well-being: most every advanced democracy on keeping money out of politics, Canada on reasonable gun control, the Nordics on health care and primary education, and the list goes on and on. But all these countries can also learn things from the United States — especially on how to integrate immigrants, entrepreneurship, and fostering a culture of risk-taking, invention, and innovation. There’s a reason why people from all over the world want to move to America despite its many flaws ...
Where’s the US-China relationship heading? (Brian Li)
Right now, in a negative direction. Despite ongoing (and moderately successful) efforts by both sides to improve high-level diplomacy, the relationship itself isn’t improving … and it’s unlikely to in the near future. There’s a floor under it, but it’s being tested by challenging domestic politics and an increasing misalignment between economics and national security. The strong economic interdependence between the two countries will remain for the foreseeable future, even as it’s progressively eroded by “derisking” on both sides. But in an environment of zero trust and no high-level military-to-military dialogue, the potential for “accidents” will continue to grow. And the more the two economies decouple, the higher the odds of direct conflict – most likely over Taiwan, as the hotspot where the underlying status quo is most quickly changing.
Do you still believe we’re in a G-Zero world? (@KaroshiProspect)
Yes, sadly. Global institutions are still not aligned with the underlying balance of power. But as I explained in my recent TED Talk, I also think we are quickly moving away from this leaderless G-Zero world and toward a world with three different global orders: a multipolar economic order, a unipolar security order, and a digital order whose balance of power is still to be determined.
When people talk about geopolitical risks, it's always implicitly downside risks. But what are some of your top *upside* risk scenarios over the next 1, 5, and 20 years? (Alex Holmes)
My answer’s the same for all time horizons: AI being used to massively improve education, health, climate, and, heck, every field of science. I’ve never been more excited about the upside potential of humanity than I am by the promise of AI. (Simultaneously, I’ve never been more concerned about the tail risks that we’re not going to be around for long). Yay, us!
Is your money on Elon or Zuck if they throw down in the octagon together? (Joshua Morganstern)
This fight is one of the stupidest ideas I’ve heard in a long time – and the bar is high. Having said that, if there’s anyone who should be in a cage match, it’s probably two men who think Ayn Rand is high literature ... I expect that if they go through it (big if), they’ll probably play-fight for two or three rounds before they announce a tie or some such BS.
What’s your beef with cats? (@freeulysses_tj)
It’s unclear whether they have any use for people.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg holds a press conference at the summit in Vilnius, Lithuania.
Is Ukraine inching closer to NATO?
The central question at this week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius: How can the alliance provide Ukraine with maximum military and financial support while keeping its strategic options open by dodging a firm commitment to when and how Ukraine will join?
It’s been 15 years since NATO leaders first pledged that Ukraine will become a member. The official summit communiqué, released on Tuesday, reaffirmed that promise. But now that Ukraine is fighting for its survival against Russia, President Volodymyr Zelensky has pushed hard for all the support he can get, including a fast-tracked membership process that leads to a security guarantee.
NATO and Ukraine have both made clear Ukraine can’t join while the country is still at war. But on Tuesday, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg used a news conference to outline new pledges of support.
He said NATO will…
- Provide multi-year help for Ukraine's transition to NATO training standards.
- Form a NATO-Ukraine council that will hold its first meeting on Wednesday.
- Shift Ukraine’s membership path from a two-step process to a one-step process.
These three pledges raise three new questions.
- Ukraine has trained with NATO for years, mainly on peacekeeping, and surely the war with Russia will help align Ukraine much more closely with NATO’s way of doing things. So what’s new here?
- How will a NATO-Ukraine Council change the war or speed Ukraine’s admission to the alliance?
- Will the new one-step process take six months or 30 years?
Let’s add two more questions …
- Will Zelensky be satisfied with these steps?
- If not, what will he do about it?
Biden attends NATO Summit
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hey, everybody. Ian Bremmer here, and a happy Monday to you. A Quick Take to kick off your week.
And this week the big news is coming from NATO, the summit that will start within a day in Vilnius. Heads of state from all the key NATO countries, including of course President Biden. And the big topic will be Ukraine. Not the only one big question about Sweden, whether or not they're joining NATO or not. Erdogan can always decide to change his mind and cut a deal at the last minute. But the big news is what's going to happen with Ukraine, with continued military support for Ukraine that we still see expanding pretty much every week. And all, both in terms of the amount and also the types of armaments, and I'll get into that in a moment. And also as to where we stand on NATO membership and a pathway to that for Ukraine itself. Erdogan interestingly very strongly supporting Ukraine to get into NATO, also providing directly some Asov battalion leaders to the Ukrainians that, you know, he had told the Russians he wasn't going to do. This is a couple of indicators and there are many that the grain deal between the Ukrainians, the West and the Russians is not going to get extended in another week's time. Erdogan was critical to that deal. That relationship with Russia is getting more brittle by the day. At the same time, Ukraine is not about to get an immediate pathway into NATO, and Biden made that clear with my friend Fareed Zakaria. Over the weekend, Biden's perspective is, "Hey, we're fighting a war in Ukraine by proxy. We're giving all of the equipment, all the weapons, but we don't want the Americans directly fighting on the ground."
Don't want, a no fly zone with, you know, American fighter pilots defending Ukraine directly. That would both risk a direct war with the Russians, essentially, World War III is what we're talking about. And it's also just unacceptable. The Americans and other NATO allies don't want their own troops directly in harm's way. They're happy to fight a proxy war. They're not happy to fight directly. And that is not a unified position, by the way, the Polish government, the Balts, the Fins now a part of NATO increasingly willing to say, "Yes, we should be giving Ukraine membership now. And that doesn't mean we have to deploy Article 5, everybody knows we're not going to be fighting directly, but they need that security umbrella going forward. It's the only way that we can guarantee that the Russians won't invade again."
And by the way, Macron, who in the early days, the French president, of the war thought that was entirely too provocative, has flipped his view. And now in terms of NATO is aligned with the Poles and the Balts, which is very interesting, while the Americans, I think, are still closer to the German position. Be that as it may, there's an enormous amount of support that the West is providing to Ukraine militarily, the US is leading it. And I think what we are moving towards are multilateral guarantees. In other words that NATO collectively would be prepared to provide commitments to Ukraine, that going forward, they will continue to ensure that Ukrainian troops are trained, are equipped. Intelligence is provided. In other words that there are treaty obligations to Ukraine to help them defend themselves very effectively. That prevents the Russians from believing they get another bite of that apple, that they can wait NATO out, and that eventually Russia will be able to accomplish militarily what they've not been able to accomplish in the first 500 plus days of this war.
The other big thing that's being debated are the cluster munitions that are now going to be provided by the United States. They are not a signatory, of the ban of cluster munitions. And these things are banned because they are so brutally dangerous to civilians. A lot of those bomb pieces that are then on the ground and can sit around for a long time until, you know, civilian inadvertently months, years later walks, trips over it, it acts like a landmine, a kid curious picks it up, maims or kills the kid. I mean, anyone that has seen these cluster munitions in operation, and I know a lot of people that have been involved in NGOs that have tried to help clean them up in places in war zones they've been used, understands just how brutally dehumanizing these weapons are.
So, no, you absolutely don't want them in the fight. Having said that, the Russians aren't signatories. The Ukrainians aren't signatories, and the Russians have been using these weapons all the way through the war. So it's not with the fact that the Kremlin has come out and they said, how dare the Americans provide cluster munitions is just yet another point of massive hypocrisy of the war crimes that the Russians have committed. Now, I understand why Biden is doing this. The Americans are very very low on ammunition all in and want to give the Ukrainians everything they can to help ensure that the counteroffensive is successful. So far, the last couple months, very little land, Ukrainian land has been retaken by the Ukrainians, even as they have initiated this counteroffensive. Part of that reason, not all of it, part of that reason is because they lack ammunition. Part of it is they don't have any air defenses that are effective, any air cover in the region. And so as the Ukrainians take more land, they'll have a hard time defending those soldiers that'll be exposed. But be that as it may, you know, there is a question that the Ukrainians are not in the same position as NATO, you know, the Biden administration is saying, "we're going to defend Ukrainians as long as it takes that the Ukrainians are in charge of these negotiations." It makes one think that the Ukrainians are basically an American core national interest. The reality is that NATO is a core American national interest. The United States is a core national interest and long-term fighting and long-term security, long-term American ability to ensure that its values are promoted globally does mean that you don't want to be dragging yourself down to the same brutal fighting that the Russians are doing.
This has gotten the Americans in trouble in Iraq, in Afghanistan. Gotten Americans in trouble in Guantanamo, in Abu Ghraib. And so if I were Biden, would I approve these weapon systems for the Ukrainians? It would be very hard after many months of, you know, sort of thinking about it, maybe I would, but maybe that's why I'm not Biden. I mean, look, I'm never going to be elected president, but also is, I never would be interested in serving in a position like that, in part because the Americans do not have the same level of moral authority on the global stage that say, Canada does or Germany does, or Japan does. And you know, let's keep in mind, Japan and Germany, we're talking about countries that were involved in fighting World War II and actually being the initiators of World War II with massive brutality, but also systems that recognized that what they did was fundamentally inhumane and brutal and needed to be never repeated. And therefore the institutions had to grow and learn and become more morally accountable to their own people and globally. And I fear that the United States does not have that level of lesson taking from so many of its mistakes over the past several generations, you know, from Vietnam and from some of the others that I've just mentioned. And in that regard, even as it makes it harder for the Ukrainians to take additional territory in the counteroffensive, I would be a "no", on these cluster munitions. But I think it's a good place to debate and I'm more than happy to have that debate publicly over the coming weeks and months.
That's it for me. I hope everyone's doing well, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Expect another Erdogan presidency for Turkey
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden, shares his perspective from Stockholm, Sweden.
How was the outcome of the Turkish election?
Well, we haven't seen the end of it, but the first round, which was not decisive concerning the presidency. Erdogan just short of 50%, but his coalition did capture the majority in parliament and that will be decisive advantage when it goes to the second round for the presidency on May 28th. Erdogan managed to mobilize the nationalists more conservative, more sort of proud Turkish, somewhat more rural Turks against the more modern, Western, younger. We'll see. But in all likelihood, May 28th for Erdogan.
How are preparations shaping up for the NATO Summit in Vilnius in mid-July?
Well, first there's the question, of course, with whether Turkey and Hungary will by then have ratified the Swedish succession as well in addition to Finland. We'll see. But then is the rather controversial question of Ukraine's application for membership. One doesn't want to avoid the trauma, the failure of the Bucharest Summit of 2008, so I guess there will be afford some sort of compromise, with just short membership, not quite membership, and hopefully concentrate on the concrete need and aid and assistance that Ukraine is needing right now on the battlefield and financial for its rather depleted state coffers.
- Why is Erdogan still popular? ›
- War in Ukraine heading to "violent" new phase, warns NATO's Mircea Geoană ›
- António Guterres: Ukraine war united NATO, but further divided the world ›
- Should NATO embrace Ukraine? ›
- Hard Numbers: Iranian atheists hanged, Lithuania’s costly NATO summit, Israeli airstrikes in Gaza, Russian drones over Kyiv, lollipops and wine in the Aussie bush ›
G-7, NATO summits show Russia may “win” in Ukraine but will lose against a united West
G-7, NATO summits show Russia may “win” in Ukraine but will lose against a united West
All eyes were on Europe this week, where world leaders met in Germany’s Bavarian Alps for the G-7 summit before heading to Madrid for the NATO summit. Both gatherings were the most significant of their kind in over a decade, thanks to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its threat to the international order.
The meetings, which are usually largely symbolic, had a few tangible outcomes.
The United States and its G-7 allies—the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan—committed $4.5 billion to address the global food crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. They announced a ban on imports of Russian gold, one of Russia’s major pre-invasion exports. They imposed new sanctions curtailing Russia’s ability to import key inputs for its arms industry. There were discussions of setting a price cap on Russian oil, which if enacted would sharply dent Russia’s export revenues while at the same time maintaining global supply and potentially reducing global oil prices.
Want to understand the world a little better? Subscribe to GZERO Daily by Ian Bremmer for free and get new posts delivered to your inbox every week.
Turkey agreed to drop its veto on Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership bids (even though President Erdogan hedged a tad on his way out), mostly clearing the path for an expansion of the military alliance that would more than double the length of its border with Russia. NATO leaders agreed on a new strategic vision putting the alliance on a war footing—NATO is increasing its high-readiness forces from 40,000 to 300,000—and positioning Russia as the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability.” Many NATO members including the United States also pledged increases in collective defense spending, additional troop deployments, and further military aid for Ukraine.
Heads of state gather for the family photo at the NATO Summit in Madrid. Celestino Arce/NurPhoto via Getty Image
But the biggest takeaway was just how aligned advanced industrial democracies remain in support of Ukraine and in opposition to Russia. Despite the remarkable political weakness of their leaders and the mounting economic pain they are feeling as a result of their response to Russia’s aggression, these countries continue to show little daylight on Ukraine.
That’s not to say they all see exactly eye to eye on everything. The Americans and the Brits have a different position on, say, the appropriate level of military assistance than the Germans and the French. Every government has its own idea of how best to help Ukraine defeat Russia.
But the core desire to support the Ukrainian government, to ensure they can push Russia back, to punish the Russian regime and sever relations with them—that desire is shared by everyone in the West. Such a degree of agreement on any issue between leaders with wildly different ideologies, interests, and constraints was unthinkable before the Russian invasion of February 24. And as the war enters its fifth month, that unity is showing no signs of fraying.
Might cracks emerge going forward?
Despite facing staunch Ukrainian resistance, Russian forces now control 98% of the Luhansk region and about two-thirds of Donetsk. They will likely continue to make gradual gains in the Donbas in the coming months. The longer the war goes on and the more the U.S. and its allies get hit with high inflation and soaring energy prices, the more likely it is that support for Ukraine will eventually waver.
The reason Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called into the G-7 summit and said he wants the war to be over by wintertime is that he knows that come winter, his American and European counterparts are going to face enormous public backlash due to persistently high inflation and soaring food and energy prices. He rightly worries that six months from now, as the fighting on the ground settles into an unstable stalemate, Western leaders won’t have the political capital to sustain the level of support for Ukraine they were able to show in the first four months.
Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky delivers a video statement at the NATO Summit.Gabriel Bouys/AFP via Getty Images
That’s why he is so adamantly pressuring the West to ramp up its military and financial aid before it’s too late: so that when international support for Ukraine inevitably dries up, the country is in the best position it can be to continue fighting and, eventually, to negotiate.
Make no mistake, over time support for Ukraine will diminish, and Russia will gain the upper hand. Ultimately, it is very likely that the Russians will end up in a better military and territorial position in Ukraine than they were before they invaded. They will have seized most of the Donbas, probably formally annexed it as part of Russia, and they will have a land bridge to Crimea.
At the same time, though, the longer the war goes on, the more leverage the Russians will lose vis-à-vis the West. There is no conceivable scenario in which Russia ends up in a better economic and geostrategic position than it was before February 24. Once the Russian economy is fully decoupled from the West, any power that Moscow once had over Western capitals will be gone for good.
Long term, the U.S. and its allies will adapt to the loss of Russian oil and gas. The same cannot be said of Russia’s ability to withstand the loss of not just export markets but also, most importantly, access to imports critical to its manufacturing and military capabilities.
While Russia may “win” in Ukraine, it will most definitely lose against the West.
🔔 And if you haven't already, don't forget to subscribe to my free newsletter, GZERO Daily by Ian Bremmer, to get new posts delivered to your inbox.
NATO Summit most important post-Berlin Wall
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60:
First, what is the significance of Japan and South Korea's presence at the NATO summit?
First of all, this is by far the most important NATO summit we've seen since the Wall has come down. Japan and South Korea, a very big deal. Trilateral meeting with President Biden, the two American allies most important that have a dysfunctional relationship, fundamentally dysfunctional on the global stage, and increasingly they are trying to align Kishida, the Prime Minister, and Yoon, the President of South Korea, trying to make that happen. Also, we're increasingly seeing a transformation of NATO to not just being a North Atlantic Alliance, but increasingly taking on global security issues. China's more of a focus. Asian allies, more of a focus. Keep in mind, New Zealand and Australia also there.
Okay, with China lowering its quarantine period, do they finally have control of COVID-19?
No, they're lowering their quarantine period, but it's still very extended for anybody that would be thinking about coming. It's not like they're going to open up for tourists all of a sudden, or even a lot of business travel. And secondly, they are also increasing testing. Those are all things that are going to eventually help move them towards normalization, but they are still minimum of months away from anything that would look like a post zero-COVID policy. I think it's probably mid-2023 is what we're really looking at.
Also, will new G7 sanctions on Russia be effective at stopping the war in Ukraine?
No, no they won't. The only thing that's going to stop the war in Ukraine, frankly, is the Russians running out of troops and getting exhausted, which is closer to coming. And that means territorial gains are going to be harder to come by over the coming months and then we're closer to a frozen conflict. But that doesn't end the war, it just freezes the war. And that's a big problem because it means that Russia's relationship with NATO going forward is fundamentally broken, fundamentally hostile, and cold war with elements of hot war.