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Israel's global image wanes further after killing of aid workers
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Is Netanyahu losing the PR battle amid public outrage over the IDF strike killing seven aid workers?
I think Israel is losing the information war around the world, not just with the Global South, which was certainly true a few months ago, but increasingly even with Israel's closest allies. I'm hearing from the Germans, from the French, you know, from the Canadians, from the United States, that there is really a lot of upset with the unwillingness to take far greater care about civilian casualties while the Israelis are engaging in massive airstrikes still across Gaza. And of course, especially if we see strikes into Rafah, where well over a million Palestinians are trying to shelter. It's a big problem for the Israelis. It's a big problem for Netanyahu, but no end in sight, right now. And the potential for the war to escalate continues to be very, very real.
What's needed to garner bipartisan support for Speaker Mike Johnson's bill for increased Ukraine aid?
We have bipartisan support. There is overwhelming majority support among Democrats and Republicans to pass aid for Ukraine, likely 60 billion. Could be structured as a loan. Doesn't really matter. It’s not like anyone believes the Ukrainians will be in a position to pay it off any time soon. Makes it more palatable for Trump supporters who have heard the former president say, “not one more dime in direct foreign aid,” has to all be structured as loans in case we don't like them in the future, then they have to pay it back. What if they can't? Who knows? But anyway, that's the structure. The point is that the Ukrainians who have continued to be able to mostly hold their defensive lines, they've lost some territory recently, in part because they don't have enough troops on the ground. They are pushing through more mobilization, but also because they don't have enough artillery and ammunition, enough military equipment. And that is coming some from the Europeans, more soon from the Americans this month, I suspect the next couple of weeks that happens.
What's the significance of Turkey's recent local elections setback for President Erdogan's government?
It is the first time in a couple of decades since Erdogan took power that his party did not win. They didn't get a majority, and instead it was the opposition. And that's a big deal. Even those municipal elections. Look, it doesn't mean the end of Erdogan. He doesn't have to stand for presidential elections, no parliamentary elections until 2028. So it's quite a while. But it does show that elections matter in a country like Turkey as much as Erdogan would like them not to. And it is mostly about lack of comfort with his government's performance on the economy, a lot more pressure to perform adequately. And the mayor of Istanbul is an erstwhile serious challenger to the Turkish president. So, I mean, his ability to change the constitution and consolidate more power, his ability to ensure that his party is going to be in control after 2028 has just gone down quite a bit. And that means he has to be more careful, more cautious and more focused on performing on the economy for his own people.
US-Ukraine policy under Trump would be similar to Biden's
Harvard Kennedy School’s Stephen Walt suggests that there’s not as much daylight between Biden and Trump as people might think when it comes to US policy towards Ukraine.
As with Trump, Walt argues, “Biden would also be trying to end this war sooner rather than later.” But where Biden would be looking to support Ukraine in securing the best possible deal in a peace arrangement, Trump might abandon Ukraine, forcing them to rely more on European support for security.
"Trump is fundamentally a nationalist and unilateralist” Walt tells Bremmer in a wide-ranging interview, “…whereas Biden is very much a globalist or internationalist."
Watch full episode here: How the US election will change the world
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.
How the US election will change the world
What role will foreign policy play in the upcoming US presidential election? “More than it usually does,” says Harvard Kennedy School’s Stephen Walt in an interview on GZERO World with Ian Bremmer. “Partly because the economy doesn't seem to be helping Biden as much as it should be, partly because it's hard to look at Biden's foreign policy and tout a lot of big success stories."
In a wide-ranging interview comparing US foreign policy under a second Biden or Trump term, Walt suggests that they may not be as different as people expect. “On a bunch of big issues, the daylight between him and Biden just isn't that great.” It may come as little surprise that Bremmer disagrees.
But Walt says this is especially true in areas like China policy, where Biden's approach has been refined and continued. "The Biden people refined the Trump approach in a number of ways—focused it very much on high-tech—but have if anything, doubled down on the policies that Trump adopted starting in 2017."
And while Walt certainly acknowledges an array of crucial differences between Trump and Biden, he argues that both second administrations may have similar outcomes in areas like the Middle East and Ukraine. That said, he makes clear that while Trump's second term may not drastically change US foreign policy, it could lead to a less supportive stance towards Europe and NATO. "Trump is fundamentally a nationalist, fundamentally a unilateralist, whereas Biden is very much a globalist or internationalist, and that's a key difference.”
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.
- What kind of foreign policy do Americans want? ›
- Will foreign policy decide the 2024 US election? ›
- Biden's Israel policy hurts his 2024 reelection chances from all angles ›
- Biden's 2024 election vulnerabilities and strengths ›
- Chris Coons on the Biden Doctrine: What is Joe Biden’s foreign policy vision? ›
- Why the US is sending aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan - GZERO Media ›
Ian Explains: Will foreign policy decide the 2024 US election?
How much does foreign policy matter in a US presidential election? This year, more than usual.
When pollsters started asking Americans in 1948 what they viewed as the “most important problem” facing the country, foreign policy and international security dominated.
Looking ahead to the 2024 presidential election, Biden has managed to turn a Covid-ravaged economy around, with growth pegged at about three percent per quarter. Wages are going up, unemployment is at an all-time low and the stock market is coming on strongly. By every economic indicator, Biden should be surging. And yet, by every political indicator, he’s floundering.
Biden’s fate in November may hinge on whether he can convince a skeptical electorate that the economy is doing as well as it is...actually doing. But Americans’ views on the Ukraine war have shifted, with a plurality now saying the US is doing too much to help Ukraine. And half of US adults polled in February said that Israel has gone too far on its war with Gaza. Could Biden’s handling of these key foreign policy issues cost him the election in November?
It’s already clear that foreign policy will play an outsize role in this year’s election. So will immigration, which topped Gallup’s “most important problem” list in February and which is both a foreign policy issue and an economic one.
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.
- Journalist Robin Wright explains why Biden’s foreign policy comes up short ›
- Israel-Hamas war: Biden's second foreign policy crisis ›
- Henry Kissinger: Towering (and polarizing) figure in US foreign policy dies at 100 ›
- Pioneering Black American leaders in US foreign policy ›
- Biden vs Trump foreign policy: Political scientist Stephen Walt weighs in - GZERO Media ›
- Why the US is sending aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan - GZERO Media ›
Why the Israel-Hamas war is so dangerous long-term, according to Rahm Emanuel
US Ambassador to Japan, Rahm Emanuel, is keen to stay in his lane. In an exclusive and wide-ranging interview in Tokyo, Japan, on GZERO World, he tells Ian Bremmer this more than once. But that doesn't mean he can't weigh in, at least a bit, on two raging conflicts outside of Asia: the Israel-Hamas war and the conflict in Ukraine.
On Ukraine, Emanuel is more confident that the fighting won't spiral into a larger regional war. On Israel-Hamas? That's more complicated. But when Ian presses him on whether the Gaza war will expand regionally, Emanuel is not so sure. "Not regional," Emanuel explains, "but long-term in Israel's security, which is essential to our security interest as a country."
Watch the GZERO World with Ian Bremmer episode: The complicated US-Japan relationship
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld.
A Ukrainian military helicopter takes off to carry out a mission
The other battle in Ukraine
Ukrainian and Russian officials said on Thursday that Ukraine’s much-anticipated counteroffensive against Russian forces has begun.
There will be much talk this summer about where the fighting is concentrated, though Ukraine may well begin in one area and suddenly focus its firepower on another front to deceive Russian forces. There will be speculation about Kyiv’s territorial gains, much of it centered on arguments that Ukraine must break the so-called land bridge that connects Russian fighters in the eastern Donbas region with Russian forces in Crimea.
But the true significance of what’s about to happen is broader than that. In America and Europe, optimism has grown that Ukraine will soon post some big wins. Ukraine’s government and military know expectations are high.
That’s why, even if it doesn’t end the war, Ukraine’s counteroffensive will be a game-changer, whether it succeeds or fails.
To sustain the support which remains the lifeblood of its war effort and the foundation of its hopes for the future, Ukraine’s true strategic objective in coming weeks will be simply to prove to its US and European backers that its soldiers can use the advanced weapons, training, and money the West has provided to win the war on Ukrainian terms. Russia’s objective is to prove that it can’t.
If, after the counteroffensive has run its course in coming months, Kyiv can convince its allies that victory is achievable, Western support will likely remain strong. If the Russians prove they can absorb Ukrainian blows and blunt the force of this advance, there will be many more critics inside Europe and the United States who say support for Ukraine is prohibitively expensive and unsustainable, helping Russia outlast Ukraine and the West to win a war of attrition.
In short, we’ll all closely follow coverage of what’s happening on the ground in Ukraine in coming weeks. We’ll study maps to assess the breakthroughs or breakdowns of its advances. We’ll be watching to see how much pain and dread Russian fighters are willing and able to withstand, how much lasting damage they can inflict, and how much more dysfunction and infighting among their commanders they can tolerate.
But the other big battle will be for control of the narrative. Who’s winning? Who’s losing? What are we learning about how long the fight may last and what it might cost? That’s the other battle in Ukraine. And we should all question with care every bit of news we see and hear, because information remains among the war’s most powerful weapons.
A person holds up a double flag of Ukraine and the US at a rally in Times Square in New York to mark the one-year anniversary of Russia's invasion.
Hard Numbers: Fresh military aid for Kyiv, US & Taliban on same side for once, Colombia’s bloody distinction, end of streaming in Italy, political scientist breaks turkeys’ monopoly of violence
6: The Taliban and the US agree on almost nothing but this: ISIS is the enemy. Taliban forces killed six members of a local ISIS offshoot in northern Afghanistan on Tuesday, while the US picked off an ISIS leader in Syria on the same day. Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the Taliban have struggled to put down a ferocious ISIS-K insurgency.
186: Last year, 186 human rights activists were murdered in Colombia – nearly half of the total worldwide. Since the government’s landmark 2016 peace deal with Marxist rebels, local social leaders have been targeted as cartels and smaller armed groups take over swathes of territory that the government is still unable to control. Left-wing President Gustavo Petro, who took office in August, has promised to negotiate a “total peace,” but that strategy isn’t going great either.
100,000:Tu Vuò Fa' L'Americano? It could cost you now. The right-wing Italian government of PM Giorgia Meloni is pushing a bill to levy fines of up to €100,000 for needlessly using English words (un meeting, lo streaming, il chewing gum) in official communications. Proponents say it’s important to protect the language of Dante from contamination. Critics say it’s pointless to draw borders around languages, with one opposition MP noting that even Meloni once famously described herself as “un underdog.”
2: A recent attack by two Boston turkeys (actual birds, not Pats fans) left a USPS mail carrier in the hospital needing a hip replacement. The geopolitical relevance of this story, if you are wondering, lies in who rescued the postal worker from the avian assault: legendary Harvard political science professor Theda Skocpol. As an old pal of ours pointed out, “preeminent theorist of the disintegration and reconstitution of state capacity has to rescue a mailman from violence because the Postmaster General couldn't.”