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Starmer's plan to boost UK economy will take some time
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from the Adriatic Sea.
How is Europe’s policy on Ukraine going to change if Trump arrives in the White House?
Well first, it is not going to change its fundamentals. You should know that the very first thing done by the newly elected European Parliament was to take a very strong and very broadly supportive resolution with very strong support for Ukraine. So what's going to happen is that, yes, Europe will continue that particular line, that it might be necessary. I think it will be necessary to further increase the financial support, the support that Europeans is already substantially higher than the Americans. But if the Americans diminish, reduce, stop, whatever Trump is going to do, then Europe clearly would have to step up even more.
How does Prime Minister Starmer's “renewal plan” make it possible to sort of make Britain great again?
Well, it's early days. It's clearly going to be economic policy that is somewhat more sort of interventionist in different ways. I think the important thing is that he wants to have a new start relationship with Europe. I think that's going to take some time, but I think it's going to have some effect. But, I don't think we will see any dramatic steps in the next few months anyhow. So it's early days.
JD Vance
Strongman politics and working-class appeal: GOP’s foreign policy
On the third day of the Republican National Convention, themed “Make America Strong Once Again,” the GOP laid out their vision for the world, outlining what US foreign policy could look like under Donald Trump and JD Vance.
In his keynote address, Vance officially accepted the nomination to be Trump’s VP running mate and used his working-class upbringing to make his key foreign policy points: that globalization has ruined neighborhoods like his, foreign intervention has led to his friends dying overseas, and that the working class is declining because Washington is in the pocket of multinational corporations.
He said the US needs “a leader who is not in the pocket of big business but answers to the working man, union and nonunion alike … a leader who won’t sell out to multinational corporations.” This runs in contrast to an interview Trump gave this week callingfor a more than $700 billion cut to the corporate tax rate.
Vance couldn’t have been received with more enthusiasm. He called out his grandmother, who he referred to as “Mamaw,” and his mother Beverly, who struggled with drug addiction in his early life, as the crowd broke into chants of “JD’s mom” and “Mamaw.”
“To the people of Middletown, Ohio, and all the forgotten communities in Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and every corner of our nation,” Vance said, shouting out key swing states in this year’s election, “I promise you this: I will never forget where I came from.”
Before he took to the stage, the evening’s speakers painted Trump as a strongman necessary during tumultuous times. They also called for increasing US energy production, hammered Joe Biden on his trade policy and handling of the Afghanistan withdrawal, and called for a crackdown on immigration through the Southern border.
Texas Gov. Greg Abbott was met with a resounding chant of “Send them back! Send them back! Send them back!” during his speech in praising Trump’s immigration agenda, which he said includes plans to deport migrants who enter the US illegally. He was followed by Trump’s former ICE director, Tom Homan, who told undocumented immigrants “You’d better start packing now. You're damn right. Because you’re going home.”
Doug Burgum gave a hint at what energy policy would look like under Trump 2.o. The North Dakota governor is a likely pick for Trump’s Energy Secretary and linked US energy independence with national security, saying that Biden “is using mandates to shut down reliable baseload electricity. That is why your electric bills have shot upwards.” He ended by taking a knock at Biden’s efforts to incentivize Americans to purchase electric vehicles, saying that Trump will let the crowd keep driving gas-powered cars.
He was followed by the parents of the 13 US soldiers killed in the bombing in Kabul amid the Afghanistan withdrawal in 2021 who, alongside military officials, criticized Biden’s handling of the withdrawal and response in the aftermath.
But could Republican criticisms of the withdrawal from Afghanistan under Biden come back to bite them when it comes to defending Trump’s plans for Ukraine? Vance said at the Munich Security Conference earlier this year that it is unrealistic for the US to continue providing the same level of assistance to Ukraine moving forward, and Trump has signaled that he would reduce aid to Ukraine. But would the former president – who prides himself on being a winner – be willing to lose Ukraine?
Tomorrow, on the RNC’s final day, Trump will address the country for the first time since becoming the official Republican nominee – and less than a week after he was nearly assassinated.
Election 2024: Are American allies worried about the US presidential election?
What do NATO allies think of conversations among US voters about President Biden’s age and ability to serve a second term? Are they worried a second Trump presidency will negatively impact the war in Ukraine? On GZERO World, Ian Bremmer sat with Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski on the sidelines of NATO’s 75th-anniversary summit in DC for his take on a potential second Biden or Trump administration. Sikorksi says Poland will have a partner and ally in whoever ends up in the Oval Office.
“Once you start interfering in the internal party, political affairs of other countries, you’re on a very slippery slope,” Sikorski warns, “Poland wants to have the best possible relations with the US, whoever is your president goes without saying.”
Despite concerns from Democratic voters about Biden’s stamina and cognitive abilities, Sikorski says that at a recent summit, he found Biden “focused, strategic, and actually quite amusing.” He also notes that the Polish government has good relations with both candidates and disputes the idea that a second Trump term would limit further US aid to Ukraine. He concedes that Donald Trump was right on many issues, like the necessity of all NATO members to meet requirements for defense spending. Ultimately, Trump responds to strength and power, and accepting defeat or a settlement on Putin’s terms in Ukraine may not align with the image he wants to project on the global stage.
Watch the full episode: Ukraine can still win this war, says Poland's FM
Season 7 of GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, launches nationwide on public television stations (check local listings).
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At NATO Summit, Polish FM Radek Sikorski weighs in on Ukraine war
Listen: Does Ukraine have the strength, stamina, and support to win the war against Russia? On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer sat down with Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski on the sidelines of NATO’s 75th-anniversary summit in Washington, DC, for his perspective on the war, European unity, and whether NATO allies can remain united long enough to see Ukraine through to victory. Despite uncertainty about the 2024 US election, Ukraine’s struggle to recruit new troops, and rogue alliance member Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán meeting with Putin, Sikorski is confident Ukraine will ultimately prevail.
Poland is an important part of that defense strategy. The country, which has a 300-mile border with Ukraine, contributes a larger percentage of its GDP to defense spending than any other NATO member, including the US, and has taken in almost a million Ukrainian refugees. Sikorski says that NATO is “back to basics” in its original mission of repelling and defending against an aggressive Russia and that Putin severely misjudged the strength of European and NATO unity in the lead-up to the invasion. Two and a half years into a bloody, brutal war with no end in sight, making sure that unity remains rock solid for as long as Ukraine needs is an urgent priority.
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.
Are we on the brink of a new cold war?
“We are back in a period of superpower competition that will probably go on for decades. And that, if we're lucky, remains a cold war.” David Sanger, a Pulitzer prize-winning national security correspondent for The New York Times, joins Ian Bremmer on a new episode of GZERO World to offer a clear-eyed take on America’s adversaries. He’s out with a new book called "New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West." The takeaway: we’re entering a new and increasingly unstable era of geopolitics where the US, China, and Russia will be vying for power and influence like never before. China's rise as a world leader and economic powerhouse, along with Russia's nuclear saber-rattling and increasing military cooperation, poses an unprecedented challenge to US dominance.
But unlike the Cold War that dominated the 20th century, where the US and the Soviet Union could operate essentially independently from each other, the world today is far more connected. "It's a cold war that bears almost no resemblance to the one that you and I are old enough to remember, because in that Cold War, we had a single competitor, and we weren't dependent on them, nor they on us for very much."
Sanger also talks about America’s missed opportunities and misjudgments in dealing with Russia and China. There were early hopes of engagement with Russia under Yeltsin's presidency, which quickly eroded when Putin came to power. Similarly, there was a belief that integrating China into the global economy would lead to political reform. However, this bet did not play out as expected, with the Communist Party using digital forces for explicit repression techniques. "It became pretty evident, pretty clearly that the Communist party had learned how to take these same digital forces and use them for the most explicitly designed repression techniques we have ever seen.”
But one area where both Russia and China have a shared interest? Pitting Americans against each other. “They have every incentive, both Russia and China, to be subtle actors in the background of this coming presidential election,” Sanger tells Bremmer. “And that's one area where if they are not cooperating, it would pay them off considerably to coordinate.”
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
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Why the US is sending aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here. And a Quick Take to kick off your week. A big $90 billion package that has been approved by the US House of Representatives, going through the Senate shortly after months of debate and, all of the package, all three major pieces of it, have some significant, complicated features.
First of all, the biggest piece for Ukraine, $60 billion, massive military support.
They had been in danger of losing significant more territory. This certainly shores them up. It helps the Ukrainians. It makes the Europeans panic less, but, you know, can they longer term hold on? What is the end game? The Ukrainians are, of course, running short not just of material to fight, but also air defense capabilities and, critically, people, soldiers. It's much harder for them to get people for the front lines than it is for the authoritarian, and much larger populated Russia. And so, the intention is that the Ukrainians don't fall apart, but of course, longer term, the idea that the US will continue to be able to provide 60 billion in support year after year. Certainly not true if Trump becomes president, probably not true if Biden wins a second term. What you really want to do is try to find a way to get them in a better position so that negotiations, inevitably, that need to occur with Russia, can be more productive and more constructive from the Ukrainian side, from the European side, from the NATO side. The US kick the can on this last year when the Americans, were in much better position supporting Ukraine. Now it's harder. Always is the case is that you think that things are going to get better. You don't feel like taking the political risk and as a consequence you extend and pretend. And now they're in a worse position. So I'm glad that the money came through. I'm glad the Ukrainians, are still fighting courageously and want to fight courageously. But of course, longer term, this war leads to some degree of partition where the Ukrainians are losing their land.
Israel, closest ally of the United States in the Middle East. Some 17 billion in military support for Israel, also some 9 billion in humanitarian aid in Gaza in this plan.
But, of course, increasingly, the United States does not support Israel continuing to fight against Hamas in Gaza. They want to see a lot more protection for Palestinian civilians, which the Israelis have been reluctant to put in place. They don't want to see a ground offensive into Rafah. Over a million Palestinians shelter in there. The Israelis are fully intent on continuing with that, proceeding with it. They did want to see a cease-fire that was linked directly to a hostage release. Now, increasingly, the US is talking about those two things as critical but delinked. And at the same time as the US is providing all this money, you have sanctions being placed by the United States on battalions of the Israeli Defense Forces engaged in human rights violations. This shows just how impossible this position is for President Biden to maneuver domestically, not to mention internationally. The US is overwhelmingly, the one country that is most supportive of Israel. Biden is overwhelmingly the political leader that is most supportive of Israel. But most of his constituents are not. And this is absolutely going to hurt him, even though it's a foreign policy issue and they don't usually play that heavily in recent decades in the election coming up in November. And you’ll see it, of course, across campuses all over the country, including my own at Columbia.
And then finally Taiwan. And this is in a sense the least controversial, because everyone on the Democratic and Republican side pretty much supports more support for Taiwan, is opposed to China. It's very easy to get lots of legislation that makes life more difficult for China. At the same time, though, the long term strategy of the United States is to make Taiwan less important, less important for the Americans in making sure that semiconductor production, moves from Taiwan to the United States, to other allies, not just a few miles off of the mainland Chinese coast, but also export controls that prevent the Chinese from getting advanced semiconductors from Taiwan as well. In other words, the big US strategy is not just arming the Taiwanese and helping them defend themselves, but also making Taiwan fundamentally less important to mainland China. and one of the main reasons that the Chinese would not be interested in attacking Taiwan long term or squeezing them hard economically long term, is because they're so indispensable to the Chinese economy. This is not going to be the case long term.
In all three of these areas, you've got the United States with friends, but they are less aligned with strategically than they are tactically. And that means that this money that we see going forward is all about kicking the can on short term gains that make sense politically for the US right now. But long term do not resolve the challenges that exist for the US with these countries.
That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Iran attacks Israel
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here, and a Quick Take on a Sunday, which usually means something is not going well, and that is certainly the case in the Middle East, where you had unprecedented strikes by Iran and its proxies against Israel.
Now, on the one hand, clearly a very dangerous thing to do, on the other hand, could have been a hell of a lot worse. What do I mean by that? Well, it is not World War III. Americans warned Iran not to hit the United States, and the Iranians gave a heads-up, days in advance, through a number of actors, most importantly through Iraq. This reminds me very much of after the American servicemen and women, three were killed in Jordan, by an Iranian proxy. The Americans did not want a war to break out with the Iranians directly, waited about a week, gave a heads up through Iraq, of the kind of attack that the Americans were planning, waited four days, gave the Iranians a chance to basically prepare and get their own forces out, and warned them that if this were to happen again, there would be direct consequences, a direct strike on Iran itself.
In this case, you had the Iranian heads-up that gave the Americans and allies time to pre-position, to provide diplomatic support, both publicly and privately, to the Israelis. Send the head of CENTCOM to Israel, say that American support for Israel was ironclad, help ensure that the Israelis would be able to most effectively defend itself against the coming Iranian attack. That was, on the one hand, a really big deal by the Iranians that was meant to be a maximal display of force and a minimum likelihood of casualties. But still, there was a significant possibility of accident, that you could have a risk that would lead to a war directly between Iran and Israel. Something that the Americans desperately wanted to avoid because it would bring the US in. It would spike oil prices. It would probably mean the end of Biden's, potential of a second presidency. And it, of course, would also mean that Iran was going to get hit massively by the United States and Israel, something they wanted to avoid.
We saw hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles, many from proxies, but many from Iran itself, over 99% of which were taken down. And they were aimed solely at military targets in Israel. So again, lots of effort to try to reduce the risk but the potential that you would have had a number get through, accidentally hitting civilians or having significant military hit, that was a risk that the Iranians were prepared to take. So, it's a big deal, it’s a clear escalation, and it is certainly an effort by the Iranians to say, that if this is to happen again, that the likelihood that there will be a major war between Iran and Israel come what may, is very real. And the Iranians also said, and they said this before the missiles even hit their targets, or in the case of the vast majority of them were intercepted, said through the United Nations mission that this was directly in retaliation for the Israeli strike against an Iranian leader in Damascus, and that the matter, from Iran's perspective, should be considered closed.
In other words, no further attacks were coming. So, trying to in a sense, you know, reduce the likelihood of further escalation, in advance. And clearly, all of that kept the United States from responding directly. So, the US strategy here is do everything possible to show that you will get massive support for Israeli defense and national security in the event of an attack, any attack, but also to try to put maximum constraint on the Israeli government against a response directly against Iran, and that the Americans don't want to support Israel if they were to engage in offensive attacks against Iran at this point.
What are the Israelis going to do? I mean, the hope for the United States is that while Prime Minister Netanyahu wants to do more and suck the United States into a broader war against Iran, that he is going to be constrained from doing so. In part because he was so successful, they now have a major victory on their belt under his watch, being able to defend the Israeli people completely in response to an unprecedented Iranian attack. And there's also going to be a big distraction away from the war in Gaza. Doesn't mean that Israel suddenly loses its isolation or wins the PR war globally, I think that's certainly not going to happen, but, there's less pressure on the Israelis, on the prime minister, in terms of Gaza right now as a consequence of what Iran has done. And there's also less pressure for Netanyahu to be forced out domestically in the near, in the immediate future.
Further, if he were to try to go considerably farther than Benny Gantz wants to, and the war cabinet wants to, in a response against Iran, then Netanyahu risks that they would bolt from the war cabinet and that his government would then fall apart. That's certainly a proximate risk that contains what the Israelis are likely to do. I don't think they'll sit on their hands and do nothing. At the very least, I think there'll be more significant strikes against Iranian proxies in the coming days. And the Israelis will also continue to engage in strikes against Iranian targets as they see them, as is opportune, in proxy states going forward. This is the problem, of course, is that, even though you have averted major escalation in a very dangerous period over the weekend, the Israelis and the Iranians haven't accomplished anything to stabilize their relationship longer-term.
Israel has shown that they are capable of taking out Iranian leaders in Syria, and Iran can't defend them. Iran has no intention of suddenly leaving those proxies to fend for themselves. And further, the likelihood that Israel now gets a breakthrough agreement on hostage release by Hamas, and that leads to a ceasefire, has gone down, at least in the near-term. The other side of that is the likelihood that the Israelis proceed with at least some form of ground attack into Rafah, which the Americans have warned them not to, also has gone up.
So the Hamas war with Israel is nowhere close to ending, the likelihood of continued Palestinian civilian casualties continues to grow, and the potential for further military engagement, both vis-a-vis proxies, including the Houthis in the Red Sea, the fact that the Iranians have also boarded an Israeli linked vessel in the Red Sea and that there is no effective deterrent in place right now between Israel and Iran, despite all sorts of other actors not wanting this to expand into a broader war, that all makes the Middle East right now, more dangerous.
So, I mean, none of us know, what the next shoe is going to be to drop. But if you are looking ahead over the next, let's say, six months, a couple things I think you can say. First, it is more likely that the present Israeli government is going to be in place for longer, and that the war in Gaza is going to continue without a serious effort at stabilization, or at least not one that's consequential.
That's problematic for Biden as you look ahead to the election in November. The potential that this war expands and eventually does drag in the United States and Iran more directly, is also going up. It's not imminent but it is certainly reasonably plausible, and the guardrails on that war are becoming, they are eroding as both sides are taking shots against each other.
So, a dangerous environment. A second war that is not going the way the Americans or anyone else in the world would like it to. And that's how we're kicking off our week.
That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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US-China relationship at its most stable in years as Yellen visits
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. Want to talk about the most important geopolitical relationship in the world, the US and China. Janet Yellen, the secretary of treasury, back over to China yet again, both to help ensure that the relationship is reasonably stable, also to deliver tough messages in places where she feels like that is required, the Biden administration feels it's required. And it's been a useful trip.
On the one hand, the United States, like the Europeans, delivering tough messages on Chinese dumping, on overproduction and low-cost goods going into the American and European markets, because of massive state subsidy, into key sectors. Particular concern on transition energy. On the one hand, great to see more effort to reduce carbon emissions, both in China and globally, and as the prices come down, that's a good thing. On the other hand, really hurting less competitive corporates that don't have that level of state subsidy in the United States and Europe. Tesla was really fast out of the box, hasn't got much support from the White House, but that's been the American champion to the extent that there is one. On the other hand, when you talk about other corporations, American and European, nowhere close to the Chinese. The hundreds of Chinese EV companies that are less expensive, they are higher quality, they are manufacturing at scale, and people can buy them all over the world. So, that is creating a lot of friction.
On the one hand, Americans and Europeans that are saying, “We want to move towards net-zero faster.” On the other hand, if the Chinese government is leaning into that and US and European jobs are at stake, and production is at stake, then they don't feel so comfortable with it. So, that's the primary area of tension between Yellen and her counterparts in China. Having said all of that, the meetings have been open, they've been pretty frank, they've been reasonably friendly, certainly not hostile, and Chinese state media and state influence media has been both very detailed and very fair in their coverage of Yellen, as they have been every high level meeting the Americans have had with the Chinese for months now. And that clearly has been a shift from the top in China, saying, “We don't want you to be picking on the Americans. We want you to show that this is a relationship that is treated with respect, and we want you to cover it reasonably accurately.” That's a big plus.
You know, you go to Russia, you go to Iran, you read their media and I try to follow their media pretty closely, it is overwhelmingly anti-US, anti-Western, strongly propaganda in orientation. That used to be more the case in China. It is not today. In fact, in many ways, I would argue, presently, US media covering US officials, certainly much more hostile, towards China, than the Chinese are towards the United States right now. That's very unusual in this relationship. And in large part it's because the Chinese economy continues to underperform and they're trying to get more American, more Western investment in, they're trying to have less pressure for capital flight out.
There are plenty of other areas where there are big tensions. In particular, we see that with semiconductors, with TSMC now getting, speaking of industrial policy, billions and billions in American government loans, as well as direct grants, subsidies, to expand production in the United States, which TSMC is now planning on doing. The Americans want 20% of semiconductor production globally in the United States by 2030. It is plausible that they get there. A big fact is at TSMC, the world's leading producer of semiconductors, now saying they are going to put their highest end production in part in the United States. That's a big win for the Americans.
It also, over time, makes Taiwan less critically important. That's also true for mainland China, as the Chinese will have to build their own. Finally, when you talk about Taiwan, you talk about the upcoming, in a month, inauguration and an incoming Chinese, Taiwanese president, who is has no engagement with mainland China as former President Ma is meeting with XI Jinping this week. Those things are not connected. They are very far apart. So former president of Taiwan, that China says, “We can work with that guy, we can't work with the incoming guy,” potential for greater tensions going up.
Also, especially around the South China Sea, in the Philippines, their president coming to the United States this week, He’s going to meet with Biden in addition to Japanese PM Kishida and it's going to be more coordinated and deepening defense relations as the Chinese are pushing the Philippines pretty hard in contested waters that the international legal community has ruled on in favor of the Philippines and the Western position. The Chinese say, “Sorry, we don't accept that outcome.”
So, plenty of areas where there is fighting, plenty of areas with this tension, but lots of communication at the high level and generally speaking, and Yellen said this, but I completely agree, the relationship is more stable than we've seen it, certainly in the first three years of the Biden administration and the four proceeding of Donald Trump.
That's it for me. And I'll talk to you all r- Can Biden-Xi meeting ease tensions? ›
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