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Why the US is sending aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here. And a Quick Take to kick off your week. A big $90 billion package that has been approved by the US House of Representatives, going through the Senate shortly after months of debate and, all of the package, all three major pieces of it, have some significant, complicated features.
First of all, the biggest piece for Ukraine, $60 billion, massive military support.
They had been in danger of losing significant more territory. This certainly shores them up. It helps the Ukrainians. It makes the Europeans panic less, but, you know, can they longer term hold on? What is the end game? The Ukrainians are, of course, running short not just of material to fight, but also air defense capabilities and, critically, people, soldiers. It's much harder for them to get people for the front lines than it is for the authoritarian, and much larger populated Russia. And so, the intention is that the Ukrainians don't fall apart, but of course, longer term, the idea that the US will continue to be able to provide 60 billion in support year after year. Certainly not true if Trump becomes president, probably not true if Biden wins a second term. What you really want to do is try to find a way to get them in a better position so that negotiations, inevitably, that need to occur with Russia, can be more productive and more constructive from the Ukrainian side, from the European side, from the NATO side. The US kick the can on this last year when the Americans, were in much better position supporting Ukraine. Now it's harder. Always is the case is that you think that things are going to get better. You don't feel like taking the political risk and as a consequence you extend and pretend. And now they're in a worse position. So I'm glad that the money came through. I'm glad the Ukrainians, are still fighting courageously and want to fight courageously. But of course, longer term, this war leads to some degree of partition where the Ukrainians are losing their land.
Israel, closest ally of the United States in the Middle East. Some 17 billion in military support for Israel, also some 9 billion in humanitarian aid in Gaza in this plan.
But, of course, increasingly, the United States does not support Israel continuing to fight against Hamas in Gaza. They want to see a lot more protection for Palestinian civilians, which the Israelis have been reluctant to put in place. They don't want to see a ground offensive into Rafah. Over a million Palestinians shelter in there. The Israelis are fully intent on continuing with that, proceeding with it. They did want to see a cease-fire that was linked directly to a hostage release. Now, increasingly, the US is talking about those two things as critical but delinked. And at the same time as the US is providing all this money, you have sanctions being placed by the United States on battalions of the Israeli Defense Forces engaged in human rights violations. This shows just how impossible this position is for President Biden to maneuver domestically, not to mention internationally. The US is overwhelmingly, the one country that is most supportive of Israel. Biden is overwhelmingly the political leader that is most supportive of Israel. But most of his constituents are not. And this is absolutely going to hurt him, even though it's a foreign policy issue and they don't usually play that heavily in recent decades in the election coming up in November. And you’ll see it, of course, across campuses all over the country, including my own at Columbia.
And then finally Taiwan. And this is in a sense the least controversial, because everyone on the Democratic and Republican side pretty much supports more support for Taiwan, is opposed to China. It's very easy to get lots of legislation that makes life more difficult for China. At the same time, though, the long term strategy of the United States is to make Taiwan less important, less important for the Americans in making sure that semiconductor production, moves from Taiwan to the United States, to other allies, not just a few miles off of the mainland Chinese coast, but also export controls that prevent the Chinese from getting advanced semiconductors from Taiwan as well. In other words, the big US strategy is not just arming the Taiwanese and helping them defend themselves, but also making Taiwan fundamentally less important to mainland China. and one of the main reasons that the Chinese would not be interested in attacking Taiwan long term or squeezing them hard economically long term, is because they're so indispensable to the Chinese economy. This is not going to be the case long term.
In all three of these areas, you've got the United States with friends, but they are less aligned with strategically than they are tactically. And that means that this money that we see going forward is all about kicking the can on short term gains that make sense politically for the US right now. But long term do not resolve the challenges that exist for the US with these countries.
That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Iran attacks Israel
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here, and a Quick Take on a Sunday, which usually means something is not going well, and that is certainly the case in the Middle East, where you had unprecedented strikes by Iran and its proxies against Israel.
Now, on the one hand, clearly a very dangerous thing to do, on the other hand, could have been a hell of a lot worse. What do I mean by that? Well, it is not World War III. Americans warned Iran not to hit the United States, and the Iranians gave a heads-up, days in advance, through a number of actors, most importantly through Iraq. This reminds me very much of after the American servicemen and women, three were killed in Jordan, by an Iranian proxy. The Americans did not want a war to break out with the Iranians directly, waited about a week, gave a heads up through Iraq, of the kind of attack that the Americans were planning, waited four days, gave the Iranians a chance to basically prepare and get their own forces out, and warned them that if this were to happen again, there would be direct consequences, a direct strike on Iran itself.
In this case, you had the Iranian heads-up that gave the Americans and allies time to pre-position, to provide diplomatic support, both publicly and privately, to the Israelis. Send the head of CENTCOM to Israel, say that American support for Israel was ironclad, help ensure that the Israelis would be able to most effectively defend itself against the coming Iranian attack. That was, on the one hand, a really big deal by the Iranians that was meant to be a maximal display of force and a minimum likelihood of casualties. But still, there was a significant possibility of accident, that you could have a risk that would lead to a war directly between Iran and Israel. Something that the Americans desperately wanted to avoid because it would bring the US in. It would spike oil prices. It would probably mean the end of Biden's, potential of a second presidency. And it, of course, would also mean that Iran was going to get hit massively by the United States and Israel, something they wanted to avoid.
We saw hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles, many from proxies, but many from Iran itself, over 99% of which were taken down. And they were aimed solely at military targets in Israel. So again, lots of effort to try to reduce the risk but the potential that you would have had a number get through, accidentally hitting civilians or having significant military hit, that was a risk that the Iranians were prepared to take. So, it's a big deal, it’s a clear escalation, and it is certainly an effort by the Iranians to say, that if this is to happen again, that the likelihood that there will be a major war between Iran and Israel come what may, is very real. And the Iranians also said, and they said this before the missiles even hit their targets, or in the case of the vast majority of them were intercepted, said through the United Nations mission that this was directly in retaliation for the Israeli strike against an Iranian leader in Damascus, and that the matter, from Iran's perspective, should be considered closed.
In other words, no further attacks were coming. So, trying to in a sense, you know, reduce the likelihood of further escalation, in advance. And clearly, all of that kept the United States from responding directly. So, the US strategy here is do everything possible to show that you will get massive support for Israeli defense and national security in the event of an attack, any attack, but also to try to put maximum constraint on the Israeli government against a response directly against Iran, and that the Americans don't want to support Israel if they were to engage in offensive attacks against Iran at this point.
What are the Israelis going to do? I mean, the hope for the United States is that while Prime Minister Netanyahu wants to do more and suck the United States into a broader war against Iran, that he is going to be constrained from doing so. In part because he was so successful, they now have a major victory on their belt under his watch, being able to defend the Israeli people completely in response to an unprecedented Iranian attack. And there's also going to be a big distraction away from the war in Gaza. Doesn't mean that Israel suddenly loses its isolation or wins the PR war globally, I think that's certainly not going to happen, but, there's less pressure on the Israelis, on the prime minister, in terms of Gaza right now as a consequence of what Iran has done. And there's also less pressure for Netanyahu to be forced out domestically in the near, in the immediate future.
Further, if he were to try to go considerably farther than Benny Gantz wants to, and the war cabinet wants to, in a response against Iran, then Netanyahu risks that they would bolt from the war cabinet and that his government would then fall apart. That's certainly a proximate risk that contains what the Israelis are likely to do. I don't think they'll sit on their hands and do nothing. At the very least, I think there'll be more significant strikes against Iranian proxies in the coming days. And the Israelis will also continue to engage in strikes against Iranian targets as they see them, as is opportune, in proxy states going forward. This is the problem, of course, is that, even though you have averted major escalation in a very dangerous period over the weekend, the Israelis and the Iranians haven't accomplished anything to stabilize their relationship longer-term.
Israel has shown that they are capable of taking out Iranian leaders in Syria, and Iran can't defend them. Iran has no intention of suddenly leaving those proxies to fend for themselves. And further, the likelihood that Israel now gets a breakthrough agreement on hostage release by Hamas, and that leads to a ceasefire, has gone down, at least in the near-term. The other side of that is the likelihood that the Israelis proceed with at least some form of ground attack into Rafah, which the Americans have warned them not to, also has gone up.
So the Hamas war with Israel is nowhere close to ending, the likelihood of continued Palestinian civilian casualties continues to grow, and the potential for further military engagement, both vis-a-vis proxies, including the Houthis in the Red Sea, the fact that the Iranians have also boarded an Israeli linked vessel in the Red Sea and that there is no effective deterrent in place right now between Israel and Iran, despite all sorts of other actors not wanting this to expand into a broader war, that all makes the Middle East right now, more dangerous.
So, I mean, none of us know, what the next shoe is going to be to drop. But if you are looking ahead over the next, let's say, six months, a couple things I think you can say. First, it is more likely that the present Israeli government is going to be in place for longer, and that the war in Gaza is going to continue without a serious effort at stabilization, or at least not one that's consequential.
That's problematic for Biden as you look ahead to the election in November. The potential that this war expands and eventually does drag in the United States and Iran more directly, is also going up. It's not imminent but it is certainly reasonably plausible, and the guardrails on that war are becoming, they are eroding as both sides are taking shots against each other.
So, a dangerous environment. A second war that is not going the way the Americans or anyone else in the world would like it to. And that's how we're kicking off our week.
That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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US-China relationship at its most stable in years as Yellen visits
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. Want to talk about the most important geopolitical relationship in the world, the US and China. Janet Yellen, the secretary of treasury, back over to China yet again, both to help ensure that the relationship is reasonably stable, also to deliver tough messages in places where she feels like that is required, the Biden administration feels it's required. And it's been a useful trip.
On the one hand, the United States, like the Europeans, delivering tough messages on Chinese dumping, on overproduction and low-cost goods going into the American and European markets, because of massive state subsidy, into key sectors. Particular concern on transition energy. On the one hand, great to see more effort to reduce carbon emissions, both in China and globally, and as the prices come down, that's a good thing. On the other hand, really hurting less competitive corporates that don't have that level of state subsidy in the United States and Europe. Tesla was really fast out of the box, hasn't got much support from the White House, but that's been the American champion to the extent that there is one. On the other hand, when you talk about other corporations, American and European, nowhere close to the Chinese. The hundreds of Chinese EV companies that are less expensive, they are higher quality, they are manufacturing at scale, and people can buy them all over the world. So, that is creating a lot of friction.
On the one hand, Americans and Europeans that are saying, “We want to move towards net-zero faster.” On the other hand, if the Chinese government is leaning into that and US and European jobs are at stake, and production is at stake, then they don't feel so comfortable with it. So, that's the primary area of tension between Yellen and her counterparts in China. Having said all of that, the meetings have been open, they've been pretty frank, they've been reasonably friendly, certainly not hostile, and Chinese state media and state influence media has been both very detailed and very fair in their coverage of Yellen, as they have been every high level meeting the Americans have had with the Chinese for months now. And that clearly has been a shift from the top in China, saying, “We don't want you to be picking on the Americans. We want you to show that this is a relationship that is treated with respect, and we want you to cover it reasonably accurately.” That's a big plus.
You know, you go to Russia, you go to Iran, you read their media and I try to follow their media pretty closely, it is overwhelmingly anti-US, anti-Western, strongly propaganda in orientation. That used to be more the case in China. It is not today. In fact, in many ways, I would argue, presently, US media covering US officials, certainly much more hostile, towards China, than the Chinese are towards the United States right now. That's very unusual in this relationship. And in large part it's because the Chinese economy continues to underperform and they're trying to get more American, more Western investment in, they're trying to have less pressure for capital flight out.
There are plenty of other areas where there are big tensions. In particular, we see that with semiconductors, with TSMC now getting, speaking of industrial policy, billions and billions in American government loans, as well as direct grants, subsidies, to expand production in the United States, which TSMC is now planning on doing. The Americans want 20% of semiconductor production globally in the United States by 2030. It is plausible that they get there. A big fact is at TSMC, the world's leading producer of semiconductors, now saying they are going to put their highest end production in part in the United States. That's a big win for the Americans.
It also, over time, makes Taiwan less critically important. That's also true for mainland China, as the Chinese will have to build their own. Finally, when you talk about Taiwan, you talk about the upcoming, in a month, inauguration and an incoming Chinese, Taiwanese president, who is has no engagement with mainland China as former President Ma is meeting with XI Jinping this week. Those things are not connected. They are very far apart. So former president of Taiwan, that China says, “We can work with that guy, we can't work with the incoming guy,” potential for greater tensions going up.
Also, especially around the South China Sea, in the Philippines, their president coming to the United States this week, He’s going to meet with Biden in addition to Japanese PM Kishida and it's going to be more coordinated and deepening defense relations as the Chinese are pushing the Philippines pretty hard in contested waters that the international legal community has ruled on in favor of the Philippines and the Western position. The Chinese say, “Sorry, we don't accept that outcome.”
So, plenty of areas where there is fighting, plenty of areas with this tension, but lots of communication at the high level and generally speaking, and Yellen said this, but I completely agree, the relationship is more stable than we've seen it, certainly in the first three years of the Biden administration and the four proceeding of Donald Trump.
That's it for me. And I'll talk to you all r- Can Biden-Xi meeting ease tensions? ›
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Israel's global image wanes further after killing of aid workers
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Is Netanyahu losing the PR battle amid public outrage over the IDF strike killing seven aid workers?
I think Israel is losing the information war around the world, not just with the Global South, which was certainly true a few months ago, but increasingly even with Israel's closest allies. I'm hearing from the Germans, from the French, you know, from the Canadians, from the United States, that there is really a lot of upset with the unwillingness to take far greater care about civilian casualties while the Israelis are engaging in massive airstrikes still across Gaza. And of course, especially if we see strikes into Rafah, where well over a million Palestinians are trying to shelter. It's a big problem for the Israelis. It's a big problem for Netanyahu, but no end in sight, right now. And the potential for the war to escalate continues to be very, very real.
What's needed to garner bipartisan support for Speaker Mike Johnson's bill for increased Ukraine aid?
We have bipartisan support. There is overwhelming majority support among Democrats and Republicans to pass aid for Ukraine, likely 60 billion. Could be structured as a loan. Doesn't really matter. It’s not like anyone believes the Ukrainians will be in a position to pay it off any time soon. Makes it more palatable for Trump supporters who have heard the former president say, “not one more dime in direct foreign aid,” has to all be structured as loans in case we don't like them in the future, then they have to pay it back. What if they can't? Who knows? But anyway, that's the structure. The point is that the Ukrainians who have continued to be able to mostly hold their defensive lines, they've lost some territory recently, in part because they don't have enough troops on the ground. They are pushing through more mobilization, but also because they don't have enough artillery and ammunition, enough military equipment. And that is coming some from the Europeans, more soon from the Americans this month, I suspect the next couple of weeks that happens.
What's the significance of Turkey's recent local elections setback for President Erdogan's government?
It is the first time in a couple of decades since Erdogan took power that his party did not win. They didn't get a majority, and instead it was the opposition. And that's a big deal. Even those municipal elections. Look, it doesn't mean the end of Erdogan. He doesn't have to stand for presidential elections, no parliamentary elections until 2028. So it's quite a while. But it does show that elections matter in a country like Turkey as much as Erdogan would like them not to. And it is mostly about lack of comfort with his government's performance on the economy, a lot more pressure to perform adequately. And the mayor of Istanbul is an erstwhile serious challenger to the Turkish president. So, I mean, his ability to change the constitution and consolidate more power, his ability to ensure that his party is going to be in control after 2028 has just gone down quite a bit. And that means he has to be more careful, more cautious and more focused on performing on the economy for his own people.
US-Ukraine policy under Trump would be similar to Biden's
Harvard Kennedy School’s Stephen Walt suggests that there’s not as much daylight between Biden and Trump as people might think when it comes to US policy towards Ukraine.
As with Trump, Walt argues, “Biden would also be trying to end this war sooner rather than later.” But where Biden would be looking to support Ukraine in securing the best possible deal in a peace arrangement, Trump might abandon Ukraine, forcing them to rely more on European support for security.
"Trump is fundamentally a nationalist and unilateralist” Walt tells Bremmer in a wide-ranging interview, “…whereas Biden is very much a globalist or internationalist."
Watch full episode here: How the US election will change the world
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.
US-Israel rift over UN resolution: More drama than long-term impact
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
How will the US-Israel relationship be affected by the US backing a Gaza cease-fire resolution at the UN?
Well, it was high drama yesterday when Prime Minister Netanyahu said he was going to immediately suspend an Israeli delegation that was going to visit the United States on the back of that decision.Very unhappy that the Americans decided to allow it to go ahead and abstain as opposed to by themselves vetoing. And keep in mind that all every other permanent and nonpermanent member of the Security Council has voted in favor. A lot of US allies there. And you know, that would seem to be a big deal, except Yoav Gallant, Minister of Defense, still stayed in the United States and had a series of very productive and high level meetings with his counterparts in the US. And there are still negotiations proceeding that are constructive between the US and Israel and Qatar to engage with Hamas and try to get a temporary cease-fire done and a bunch of hostages released also called for immediate release by the UN Security Council resolution. So I think there's a lot more drama here than there is actual impact on the US-Israel relationship. And certainly a lot of pressure that continues to mount on a very unpopular Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu at home.
Will there be international consequences from the Francis Scott Key bridge collapse in Baltimore?
I mean, it wasn't terrorism. It was an accident, though. I mean, I guess if this was Russia, they'd say the Ukrainians were responsible for it. It is a major port on the Eastern seaboard that looks like it is going to be a real problem to get in and out of. And that means supply chain challenges, especially in terms of cars, millions of which go through Baltimore every year. But, you know, the United States has an economy that's doing quite well. A growth is significant, but not over whelming. And otherwise supply chain is working around the United States for imports. So I suspect that if there's an economic cost here, it's going to be relatively small and short lived.
What message is Russia sending by their public display of torture against accused terrorists?
Well, they're showing that they have a complete indifference to the well-being of any human being. They're also, of course, displaying that the Russian state will go after you with its full force if you are seen to be an enemy of theirs. That is true in terms of the way they treat opposition journalists and politicians. But it's also true in the way they treat suspected terrorists. And they, of course, have forced confessions. I suspect they do have strong evidence, given what we've seen of that over the last few days. But still, I mean, in a system of rule of law, you are innocent until proven guilty in Russia. Of course you are guilty when the government says you are guilty, in particular, when the absolute leader says you're guilty and then you no longer have rights and the state can do with you as they will. We saw that with Mr. Prigozhin, We saw that with Mr. Navalny. And now we're seeing that with four suspected and likely but not yet proven terrorists.
Biden and Trump's Middle East policies are "almost identical" - Harvard's Stephen Walt
In a candid discussion with Ian Bremmer, Harvard Kennedy School professor Stephen Walt highlights the striking similarities between the Biden and Trump administrations' Middle East policies. "It's hard to see a big change between the Trump administration's approach to the Middle East and what the Biden administration was doing up until October 7." Walt notes that Biden's actions have mirrored Trump's, from failing to fulfill promises like reopening the US Consulate in Jerusalem to continuing Trump's approach with the Abraham Accords.
Despite occasional frustrations and ongoing conflicts in the region, both administrations have maintained strong support for Israel, with little indication of significant policy shifts. Walt also emphasizes the cautious approach of both presidents regarding Iran, suggesting that neither side desires a full-scale conflict, given the complexities and potential repercussions in the volatile Middle East. “For the United States to get involved in yet another large Middle East war seems to me is contrary to our interests, but it's also contrary to most of Donald Trump's instincts.”
Watch full episode here: How the US election will change the world
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.
How the US election will change the world
What role will foreign policy play in the upcoming US presidential election? “More than it usually does,” says Harvard Kennedy School’s Stephen Walt in an interview on GZERO World with Ian Bremmer. “Partly because the economy doesn't seem to be helping Biden as much as it should be, partly because it's hard to look at Biden's foreign policy and tout a lot of big success stories."
In a wide-ranging interview comparing US foreign policy under a second Biden or Trump term, Walt suggests that they may not be as different as people expect. “On a bunch of big issues, the daylight between him and Biden just isn't that great.” It may come as little surprise that Bremmer disagrees.
But Walt says this is especially true in areas like China policy, where Biden's approach has been refined and continued. "The Biden people refined the Trump approach in a number of ways—focused it very much on high-tech—but have if anything, doubled down on the policies that Trump adopted starting in 2017."
And while Walt certainly acknowledges an array of crucial differences between Trump and Biden, he argues that both second administrations may have similar outcomes in areas like the Middle East and Ukraine. That said, he makes clear that while Trump's second term may not drastically change US foreign policy, it could lead to a less supportive stance towards Europe and NATO. "Trump is fundamentally a nationalist, fundamentally a unilateralist, whereas Biden is very much a globalist or internationalist, and that's a key difference.”
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.
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