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Japan looks south to bolster its security
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is in Manila Friday for a summit with Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. as Tokyo attempts to draw closer to partners in Southeast Asia to hedge against China.
Tokyo already has extensive economic and diplomatic ties to the Philippines, and has strategically cultivated strong relations in Southeast Asia since the late 1970s. However, during this visit, along with a stop in Malaysia this weekend, Kishida hopes to deepen military ties, opening up Japanese defense exports to both countries, and setting up cross-training programs.
Adding a military dimension is an important change for Tokyo. In the wake of World War II, instead of a collective security strategy à la NATO, the United States pursued a “hub and spoke” system in Asia. Countries like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines were all allies of the US, but not of one another, in part to maximize US leverage but also because each country faced diverging threats. What concerned Manila in the 1950s wasn’t necessarily an issue for Tokyo.
Now there’s one problem everyone in the region cares about: the Chinese military. Tokyo is well aware it can no longer rely on technological superiority to protect itself from China — nor can Washington. What it can do is fall back on those longstanding ties and give a boost to partners in Southeast Asia, says Eurasia Group’s Japan Director David Boling.
“Kishida’s visit to the Philippines to strengthen defense cooperation is Japan’s way of reminding China of this: You may be bigger than we are, but we have more friends than you do,” he said.
The race in Indonesia is on
Though Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country (pop. 276 million) and its largest majority Muslim state, it’s long been recognized more for its potential than its accomplishments. But as rivalries grow among the United States, China, and India, this archipelago nation stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific is emerging as a more strategically important partner. It could also become one of the world’s 15 largest economies in the coming years.
Indonesia’s popular current president holds an approval rating of nearly 80% after nine years in power. Yet, Joko Widodo, widely known as Jokowi, is term-limited, and Indonesians will face elections next year to choose his successor. The first round of presidential voting will be held on Feb. 14, with a probable second-round runoff scheduled for June 26.
The deadline for registering presidential candidates for the election closed on Wednesday, and we now know the field. The bottom line: Next year’s election is very likely to produce political continuity.
Defense Minister and former Army General Prabowo Subianto is the favorite, in large part because he’s considered Jokowi’s anointed successor. (Prabowo’s vice presidential running mate is Jokowi’s son.) Prabowo’s strongest challenger, former Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo, is also considered close to Jokowi. The outsider candidate, former Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan, is probably a long shot.
But Prabowo comes with baggage. As an army commander during the closing days of the three-decade Suharto dictatorship, which ended in 1998, he was accused of human rights abuses and banned for a period from entering the United States. He lost the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections to Jokowi. It appears, however, that the incumbent has calculated that Prabowo will allow him to retain political influence.
The greatest threat a Prabowo presidency appears to pose is to Indonesia’s economic policy. He’s viewed as a populist-nationalist, a leader more likely to govern Indonesia’s economy to sustain his popularity rather than to increase the country’s dynamism.
The campaign is now officially underway.
The geopolitics of "Barbie"
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here, and a special update, Quick take, I know you need to hear about this. The geopolitics of "Barbie".
"Barbie" is coming out. No, not in that way. Next week in the United States and the United Kingdom, massive launch. You've seen the dreamhouse, you've seen the buses, you've seen the excitement, and now you've seen the geopolitical backlash. It was not what you were expecting. I certainly don't remember there ever being a political science Barbie. Uh, there is a campaign manager Barbie that they made. That's, that's pretty much the opposite when you think about it. And there's also a Chief Sustainability Officer Barbie, that was of course, made of plastic naturally. But never a geopolitical analyst Barbie. Well, maybe that was a mistake, turns out there's a problem.
In the movie, there's a world map behind Barbie. Unclear why Barbie requires a scene with the world map. I'm sure we're all gonna learn this in a couple of weeks or maybe not. But there it is. World map in crayon. And you can see Greenland that's in yellow of course, and sort of a nine-dash line. Might there be a nine-dash line around Southeast Asia? Well, that's the big question. Vietnam banned the movie from its market saying that that indeed was what was being depicted. The upside is that China has not, it's the largest global movie market at the box office. And Hollywood Studios, of course, very frequently tailor movies to ensure that they get approval from the sensors. Now, the Philippines was also going to ban "Barbie." They've now decided against it as long as the map is blurred. So here's the map. Take a look again. Is Barbie supporting Chinese Neocolonialism? And would Ken approve?
Of course critical question here. Warner Brothers says that "this is a child-like crayon drawing" and it was not intended to make any type of statement that alleged nine-dash line is neither clearly located in the South China Sea region, nor does it have nine dashes. We look carefully. It's only eight. Only eight dashes. That's one fewer dash. Heck it's not even the only dashed line on the map. If you look closely, you'll also see that there's a Cambodia-sized turtle that's located nearby, right on the Asian landmass. And I'm pretty sure that that's already been eaten. But I do think the Warner Brothers folks did know what they were doing. I mean, you know, you're trying hard to get access to the Chinese market, but you don't wanna alienate anyone. So by putting these eight dashes off of Asia, it's an effort to get favor from the Chinese sensors, but also not antagonize the Southeast Asians.
Barbie, you think you're so clever. But this has happened before in 2022. Vietnam and the Philippines both banned Sony Pictures action movie "Uncharted" over their nine-dashed depiction. And that was pretty clear. It was very brief, it was very clear depiction. Also, they stopped screenings both countries of Dreamworks animated film "Abominable" in 2019 due to a scene that showed the nine-dash line. Malaysia made the studio cut the scene from "Abominable," and that's no joke. What the hell are all these people doing with nine-dash lines? Well, you know, all we can say, Fox News had a host that asked, is Barbie a communist? You be the judge. Pics on the spectrum, but it should help "Oppenheimer" at the box office.
That's it for me. Talk to you real soon.
What We’re Watching: Partition 75th anniversary, Kenyan vote count, US-China in Southeast Asia
India & Pakistan turn 75
This year’s Aug. 15 Diamond Jubilee of Partition, when the British Raj split into India and Pakistan, is a complicated affair. India has gained more from independence in 1947 than Pakistan: earlier this summer, the Indian economy crossed the $3.3 trillion mark and officially overtook the UK to become the world’s fifth-largest — a nice touch to celebrate 75 years of independence from its colonial master. But India’s democratic credentials remain under threat by the rise of Hindu nationalism. However, Pakistan’s experiments after Partition — proxy wars, civil war, martial law, and Islamism — brought much suffering to its people. Today, the country is at the verge of another financial crisis and negotiating its 23rd IMF bailout, as well as in talks with its own version of the Taliban. Unfortunately, a growing nuclear arsenal is the only equalizer for the political and economic imbalance between the two countries. But there is still hope yet. After years of making zero progress, India and Pakistan are now involved in a backchannel dialogue, which may bring some normalcy between the old enemies. That, and the cricket, of course: Pakistan has won more games overall against its arch-rival, but never beaten India in a World Cup match.
Kenya's election nailbiter
Six days after Kenya's presidential election, the race between Deputy President William Ruto and opposition leader Raila Odinga is still undeclared. As of Monday afternoon in Nairobi, Ruto is ahead by a slim margin with about half of the vote officially counted, while unofficial media tallies that initially put his rival in the lead now also have Ruto winning. Both sides accuse each other of tampering with the process, which is painstakingly slow to avoid past instances of fraud: in 2007, more than 1,200 people were killed in violent clashes across the country after Odinga claimed the election had been stolen, and in 2017 a string of logistical mistakes forced the Supreme Court to annul the result and order a rerun. The result must be announced no later than Tuesday, a full week after the vote. Also, if neither candidate gets more than 50% of the vote and at least 25% of the ballots cast in a minimum of 24 out of Kenya's 27 counties, the presidential election will for the first time go to a runoff before Sept. 8.
Southeast Asia tiptoes on US-China
Over the weekend, the US and Chinese militaries held separate military drills with Southeast Asian partners less than two weeks after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's mega-controversial trip to Taiwan, to which China responded by its biggest-ever show of force around the self-governing island. Chinese fighter jets participated in joint exercises with the Thai air force, while American and Indonesian troops wrapped up their two-week Garuda Shield live-fire drills, which Australia, Japan, and Singapore joined for the first time. The war games come amid heightened tensions in the region over Taiwan: many Southeast Asian countries are now “keeping their head down” to avoid picking sides between Beijing, who they do by far the most trade with, and Washington, which has given them more military aid for decades. No one wants to rock the boat in the region, where more than 10 years ago China and the Philippines — a former US colony that America is treaty-bound to defend — came to the brink of war over a disputed shoal in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, China kicked off Monday another round of military exercises near Taiwan after a group of US lawmakers visited the island the day before.We are heading to a Taiwan crisis
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here, and a Quick Take for you as we kick off this Monday on Taiwan. Not the place we wanted to be talking about. Certainly not the place Biden wanted to be talking about. But it looks like House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is going to Taiwan after all. Biden himself did not know, late last week. And Pelosi had announced her Asia trip this weekend, with four countries listed. On a quick read, it looked like that said she wasn't going, but actually just left it out. It did say in the note that it was including those four states, so clearly they were leaving themselves space.
It is surprising, frankly, because President Biden absolutely didn't want Pelosi to go on this trip. Certainly not now. Certainly in the run-up to the Party Congress and Xi Jinping's succession for this third term. He had found out, and the White House had found out a couple of weeks ago, that she was planning the trip. This was private at this point. None of it was in the media.
And the White House made it very clear to Pelosi's office that they didn't think this was a good idea; that it would be seen as provocative and would lead to escalation. Didn't mean she had to cancel. Could mean she could postpone after the Party Congress. They understood that she wanted to make this trip while she's still Speaker of the House, looking forward to her legacy and because she's been historically very strong-willed and outspoken on China and democracy issues for decades. But not right now.
Unfortunately, that back and forth leaked. The fact that Pelosi was going on the trip, was planning to go on the trip, leaked. And that of course made life a lot more difficult because, once it's out there publicly, if Pelosi then says she's not going, she looks like she's backing down, and she doesn't care. And so much for her democracy legacy. And she's pretty strong-willed. And if Biden lets her go, then, it looks like he's can't keep a hold on his own Democratic caucus.
And if meanwhile, she cancels, then it looks like Biden's being soft on Taiwan. And look, this is a bad look for everybody. And what's the principal takeaway? I guess one is that maybe 80 year olds shouldn't be making big decisions on US foreign policy. But to look into the issue itself, we should recognize, over the last year and a half, the headlines on Taiwan had been frequently that Biden is being too tough on Taiwan. That he's saying, three times now, that the United States would defend Taiwan if China attacks it. And that, at face value, is a change in stated US-Taiwan policy.
Biden's also made it clear he wasn't changing Taiwan policy. But the headlines were all that he was being too tough. Now it's, "Biden's being too soft on Taiwan. Why is he pushing Pelosi not to go? Everyone has the right to." Back when Gingrich was House Speaker, he went and visited Taiwan. That's of course decades ago. And it was very different. The balance of power between the US and China was different then. But also, the timing was not as significant in potentially embarrassing the Chinese leadership, making them feel like they're losing face and have to respond.
The world has changed. And the Chinese have been very clear. They were warning the United States not to do this; that this would lead to a significant reaction, both military and diplomatic from the Chinese. I do accept them at their word on that. I'm sure there are going to be many people that say, "How dare the Chinese tell the Americans what to do?" And, "This is not something the US likes at all." That's true. And the Americans certainly aren't used to other countries telling them that there are red lines. But of course, the Americans do it all the time. And do it to China all the time. And the Chinese, when it really matters to the Americans, usually accept it.
For example, when the Americans told China just a couple months ago, "We hear that you're thinking about providing military support to the Russians. Do not dare or else. We know you're thinking about breaking sanctions on Russia. Don't you dare or else." And the Chinese response was they weren't happy about it, of course. In fact, they were pretty angry about it. But they ended up ceding to American demand. So, it's not as if suddenly the Chinese have all the power and the Americans no longer tell the Chinese what to do.
The US has the global reserve currency, a much bigger economy, the dominant global military. And power is asymmetrically still very much in the hands of the United States around the world. But this issue does really matter to China, more than almost anything else on the global stage. And of course, China doesn't see Taiwan as a foreign policy issue. They see it as a domestic policy issue.
The Americans of course, most assertively do not. And that hence creates this policy of strategic ambiguity where both sides try to coexist with dueling perceptions of reality that don't really line up with each other.
Biden is not personally responsible for Pelosi going. Again, he tried to stop her. But at the same time, he is Commander in Chief. She is taking a military plane. If he had really wanted to stop her, he could have. He chose not to. He didn't want that confrontation with Pelosi. So now, he's going to have it with the Chinese.
Look, the impact. China says there's going to be a military response. The likelihood of a direct military confrontation, where the Chinese would escort the plane out of China airspace, I think is vanishingly small. The Chinese military is obviously not going to shoot down Pelosi's plane. That would cause war. But there's going to be a high military alert on both sides. And greater mistakes are clearly possible. And inadvertent escalation's clearly possible in that environment.
I think, more broadly, what we would expect would be that China will change what it considers to be the red lines of Taiwan sovereignty at their Party Congress. Who can visit Taiwan for example, or how the Taiwanese business people are allowed, and under what conditions, to conduct business with mainland China, all of which would be seen as significantly escalatory and creating greater tripwires that could lead to direct confrontation between the US and China, and American allies and China, over Taiwan. Absolutely not what anyone right now wants to see. Not the Americans dealing with a cold war with elements of hot war with the Russians over Ukraine. And more broadly, not the Chinese dealing with a significant economic challenge with zero-COVID and a plummeting demographics and all sorts of internal economic bubbles that's making it harder for them to manage their system.
Nobody really wants a crisis over Taiwan right now. And yet, that's exactly where we seem to be heading. It's still true, of course, Pelosi's not there yet. And while there has been reporting from the United States and from Taiwan and from China that she's intending to go, she could still decide not to make this trip at the last moment. Certainly, I personally hope that's the decision that she makes. The Biden administration certainly hopes that. The Chinese government certainly hopes that. We will see. But as they say, "Hope is not a policy," and everyone has to prepare for the worst potential outcomes here.
At the beginning of August, it's supposed to be quieter. And yet, we know frequently August doesn't give it what we want. That's it for me. And I hope everyone's doing well. Talk to you all real soon.
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What We’re Watching: G7 warns Russia, Israeli PM in UAE, Blinken in Southeast Asia, Nicaragua ditches Taiwan, Poland may stiff EU
Russia’s big plans for Ukraine. G7 foreign ministers warned Sunday of “massive consequences” if Russia invades Ukraine. It was the first joint statement by the group of rich democracies since recent satellite images revealed a significant buildup of Russian troops and military equipment on the border with Ukraine. Indeed, according to reports, the force that Moscow is massing near Ukraine is larger than the one it used to annex Crimea in 2014. This comes after the Pentagon said that Russia could have 175,000 troops on the border by the end of January in order to invade the former Soviet republic. In an attempt to lower the temperature last week, President Biden and Vladimir Putin held a long video call, but the Russian president was not deterred by Biden’s threat of more economic sanctions if Russia escalates further. Putin says he wants NATO not to expand membership any further into the former Soviet Union, and to stop military cooperation with Ukraine. Moscow will reportedly send a proposal for a security arrangement this week. But Putin, who has already indicated his willingness to threaten European energy markets, also knows all too well that while Washington talks a tough game, it is not willing to send in troops to defend Ukraine.
Israeli PM meets Emirati prince. Naftali Bennett landed Sunday in Abu Dhabi, marking the first-ever official visit by an Israeli PM to the United Arab Emirates. Bennett met with Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed, the de-facto Emirati leader. The visit is a sign of the endurance of four groundbreaking diplomatic agreements between Israel and Arab states brokered by the Trump administration in 2020. Since then, previously covert relations between the UAE and Israel have warmed significantly: Abu Dhabi has become a popular tourist destination for thousands of Israelis, while bilateral trade reached a whopping $600 million in the first seven months of this year. In the past, the Emiratis made diplomatic ties with Israel contingent on peace efforts with the Palestinians, but Bennett’s visit highlights the changed priorities of the Gulf states, now more concerned with partnering with Israel to contain a nuclear Iran. The Saudis, for their part, share strategic interests with their Gulf partners — and have been cooperating with Israel on intelligence and security behind closed doors for years. But so far, Riyadh has been unwilling to formalize diplomatic ties with Israel for a variety of reasons, including unfavorable public opinion toward Israel.
Blinken tours Southeast Asia. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken kicks off on Monday his first Southeast Asian trip as America's top diplomat with stops in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Following similar tours by VP Kamala Harris and Defense chief Lloyd Austin, Blinken wants to bolster US defense cooperation with ASEAN, an economic bloc made up of Southeast Asian countries, to build a bulwark against China in the South China Sea. He will also pitch Joe Biden's vision for US-led Indo-Pacific trade as an alternative to doing more trade with China, and talk up Southeast Asia as an alternative business destination for US companies looking to abandon China. But what ASEAN really wants is tariff-free access to the US market, a non-starter for Biden because he says big trade deals with low-wage countries will hurt low-skilled American workers. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian countries are in a bind of their own: doing more business with the US as an alternative to China will create jobs, but the Chinese won't be happy about it — and nowadays they carry a lot more economic sway in the region than America does.
Taiwan’s decreasing diplomatic traction.Nicaragua is the latest country to drop recognition of Taiwan in favor of the People's Republic of China, which considers the self-governing island as part of its territory. Beijing has long lobbied aggressively for the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan with both carrots (mostly promising a lot of cash to those who switch sides) and sticks (like downgrading ties with Lithuania for allowing Taiwan to open a de-facto embassy in Vilnius). China's efforts are paying off: today only 13 mostly small nations plus the Vatican still recognize Taiwan and not the People’s Republic, down from 21 just five years ago. But in Central America the tilt towards Beijing also has to do with US sanctions against the authoritarian leaders of first El Salvador — which ditched Taiwan to embrace China three years ago — and now Nicaragua. Meanwhile, China continues to invest big in the region, and will likely spend more money in Nicaragua very soon. Ironically, Washington’s actions to aid democracy in Central America may actually bring some of its countries closer to America's authoritarian rival.
Poland and the EU are at it again. It’s clear that there’s no love lost these days between Warsaw and Brussels, who have been at loggerheads in recent years over rule-of-law issues, particularly a spate of reforms in Poland that undermine the judiciary’s independence. Poland upped the ante Sunday, saying it would withhold payments to the EU budget and veto EU laws if Brussels follows through on a previous threat to delay COVID relief funds after Poland’s top court ruled that its own constitution trumps EU law. The EU has said that disbursement of funds to “illiberal” member states Hungary and Poland is contingent on domestic democratic reforms — a mechanism that the two Eastern European states have now challenged in court. Poland is legally obligated to pay its EU dues in order to reap the bloc’s benefits, but clearly Warsaw is banking on Brussels acquiescing in the near term. However, the EU knows that Poland might not want to push the boundaries much further because a majority of Poles want to remain part of the EU. Who will cave first?What We're Watching: Blinken goes to Southeast Asia
Blinken tours Southeast Asia. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken kicks off on Monday his first Southeast Asian trip as America's top diplomat with stops in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Following similar tours by VP Kamala Harris and Defense chief Lloyd Austin, Blinken wants to bolster US defense cooperation with ASEAN, an economic bloc made up of Southeast Asian countries, to build a bulwark against China in the South China Sea. He will also pitch Joe Biden's vision for US-led Indo-Pacific trade as an alternative to doing more trade with China, and talk up Southeast Asia as an alternative business destination for US companies looking to abandon China. But what ASEAN really wants is tariff-free access to the US market, a non-starter for Biden because he says big trade deals with low-wage countries will hurt low-skilled American workers. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian countries are in a bind of their own: doing more business with the US as an alternative to China will create jobs, but the Chinese won't be happy about it — and nowadays they carry a lot more economic sway in the region than America does.
When a giant sneezes: How the US response to 9/11 reshaped the world
In the narrowest sense, the 9/11 attacks were something that happened only in New York, Washington, and a field in Pennsylvania. But how the US responded — unleashing an open-ended Global War on Terror, launching wars and nation-building occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and dramatically reshaping the government's powers of surveillance at home — sent shockwaves around the world.
In many places, the effects are still felt: in the shattering of the MIddle East, in the rise of China, in the upheavals of South Asia, or in the newly complicated relationships between Washington and old allies in Europe and Turkey. And remember when the US and Russia were — for a few weeks there — seemingly the closest of friends?
We asked analysts at Eurasia Group, our parent company, to give us a quick recap of how 9/11 and its aftermath have affected the regions they cover. Enjoy.
China: The golden opportunity — Neil Thomas
The Global War on Terror that Washington chose to pursue after 9/11 led to a sustained US foreign policy focus on the Middle East that distracted significantly from China's rise as a regional heavyweight and a global power. Before becoming US president in January 2001, George W. Bush backed his predecessor Bill Clinton's campaign to establish permanent normal trading relations with China and support its admission to the World Trade Organization, but he promised a tougher stance that treated Beijing as a "strategic competitor." That attitude changed after 9/11.
Beijing presented itself as an ally in the Global War on Terror and the Bush administration was eager for international cooperation. Meanwhile, China experienced phenomenal economic growth that enabled Beijing to expand its international influence, modernize the People's Liberation Army, and consolidate contentious territorial claims — all without significant pushback from Washington. Beijing even persuaded the US government to designate a Uyghur militant group known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist organization (a decision that was reversed last November).
That move to target ETIM reflected Beijing's post-9/11 reframing of its Uyghur ethnic minority, a traditionally Muslim group concentrated in China's western Xinjiang region, as a potential terrorist threat. Especially after ethnic violence in Xinjiang in 2009 and deadly attacks by Uighur terrorists in 2011 and 2013, Chinese leaders increasingly deployed rhetoric and techniques from the Global War on Terror to pursue repressive policies of "counter-extremism" and "de-radicalization." This campaign evolved into a wholesale crackdown on Uyghur identity and culture that includes the forced detention of millions of Uyghurs in "vocational education and training centers."
The Middle East: Two decades of upheaval— Sofia Meranto & Ahmed Morsy
Twenty years after 9/11, the Middle East is still grappling with its impacts. A highly tumultuous period followed the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and a decade later the Arab Spring sent another round of shockwaves across the region.
The Iraq War, right in the heart of the Middle East, was perhaps the most jarring for regional leaders. The subsequent chaos bred wider instability and spawned the birth of terrorist groups like ISIS, further fracturing states like Iraq and Syria.
The US Global War on Terror and its policy of "either you are with us, or against us" shaped domestic policies in pivotal ways as well. On the one hand, it created space for authoritarian leaders to crack down not only on extremist groups but on other critics in their midst as well. But on the other, the subsequent US democratization agenda pressured some to make cosmetic liberalizing reforms.
Meanwhile, despite efforts to dissociate the war on terror from a war with Islam, the perception in the Middle East is that Islamophobia rose palpably in the West after 9/11.
Today, Washington is clearly exploring ways to draw down its involvement in the Middle East. Taken together with the messy Afghanistan exit, this has raised concerns for Gulf countries, which have historically relied heavily on the US security umbrella. And there are a number of unresolved regional issues — including Lebanon's collapse, Syria's post-war role, Iran's regional and nuclear ambitions, and the moribund Middle East peace process — that will demand that regional powers develop ways to coordinate better and lower tensions.
Lastly, twenty years after the attack on the US, the reach of al-Qaeda reach is undoubtedly more limited — as is the threat of ISIS compared to a decade ago — but the jury is still out on how serious a terrorist threat could emerge out of Afghanistan, where the Taliban is now back in power.
Turkey: Ties in Tatters— Emre Peker
The 9/11 attacks coincided with a sea change in Turkish politics. After a decade marred by economic crises, terrorism, and social upheavals, Turkish voters rejected mainstream parties in November 2002 elections, sweeping Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party to power. And while Turkey had been quick to support NATO's Afghanistan mission post-9/11, the new government refused to back George W. Bush's 2003 foray into Iraq. That marked an unusual break with the US, which would only grow in the coming years.
While Ankara remained sensitive to security threats from Islamist radicals, Erdogan did away with the old establishment's strict secularism. That provided openings for cooperation with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas — despite US protestations. And amid growing hostility towards Washington in the Middle East during the Bush years, Turkey emerged as a regional soft power, leveraging its status as a majority-Muslim NATO member with aspirations to join the EU.
When Barack Obama was elected president in 2008, he tried to bolster ties with Ankara as part of a broader effort to repair Washington's terrible image in the region. That push, however, didn't survive into Obama's second term as Ankara and Washington increasingly came to blows over Syria and other issues.
As Turkey dropped its broadly neutral foreign policies to pursue regime change in Syria, throw its weight behind the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, intervene in the Libyan conflict, and stake out claims in contested Eastern Mediterranean waters, Erdogan found himself increasingly at odds with Middle Eastern rivals and major powers alike.
Tensions even grew between Turkey and its NATO partners, over Ankara's tactical partnerships with NATO rival Russia. Where the Trump administration largely enabled Erdogan to operate unchecked, Biden is looking to opportunistically engage Turkey despite ongoing disagreements on issues ranging from where Turkey buys its weapons to how Erdogan has weakened Turkey's democracy.
Overall,9/11 — coupled with political trends in the US and Turkey — left the once-strong Washington-Ankara alliance in tatters, a condition from which it is unlikely to recover any time soon.
Russia and Central Asia: Remember the good old days? — Alex Brideau
Given how bad US-Russia ties are these days, it's hard to remember that things between Washington and Moscow were actually pretty good in the aftermath of 9/11. President Vladimir Putin was the first world leader to contact Bush after the planes hit the towers. Intelligence sharing and Russian support for US bases in Central Asia as part of the Afghanistan invasion soon followed.
Russia was, at the time, in the third year of a renewed conflict against separatists in Chechnya who were fighting under the banner of Islam and who would soon wage terrorist attacks of their own elsewhere in Russia. Putin promptly framed that conflict, which had fueled his own political rise, as part of the West's Global War on Terror. Central Asian authoritarians and democratic governments alike worked with the US to protect against threats of terrorism in their own countries. Even after that cooperation stopped, regional leaders continued to repress any groups that might pose risks to their governments, often by framing them as "extremists."
US-Russia cooperation did not last long. By 2007, Moscow's opposition to the invasion of Iraq, combined with resentment of US policy in other areas, led Putin to blast Washington in a speech in Munich, and elsewhere to draw a jawdropping comparison between the Bush administration and Nazi Germany. The relationship deteriorated further after Russia's 2008 war with Georgia and collapsed almost entirely after the Russian seizure of Ukraine's Crimea region in 2014.
The Kremlin meanwhile took advantage of Washington's increasing aversion to direct engagement with the Middle East in the 2010s to build up its own presence in the region. Moscow intervened directly in the Syrian civil war and indirectly in post-Qaddafi Libya, while trying to build up new economic and security relationships with a range of partners.
In 2021, with the Taliban back in control of Afghanistan, Russia and Central Asia face similar concerns about security and regional stability to those of twenty years ago. But this time around, cooperation with the US is sure to be much less intensive and enthusiastic.
Europe: Solidarity and skepticism— Naz Masraff
Europe was united in horror and solidarity after the September 11 attacks twenty years ago. In a now famous essay, the editor of the prominent French daily Le Monde proclaimed, "we are all Americans." He wasn't referring to France alone.
To any European country with the right capabilities, joining the US in the War on Terror seemed an obvious choice at first. Bin Laden's presumed location, and intelligence of Al Qaeda bases were enough to convince even a reluctant Germany to send troops to Afghanistan under the self-defense terms of the UN Charter.
But the rift with the US over Iraq sowed division within Europe itself. The UK, along with Spain and most future member states in Central and Eastern Europe, backed Washington, while Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the more reluctant France and Germany as "Old Europe." The EU's great eastward expansion of 2004 still took place, but Iraq was probably the first moment at which it became clear that a common EU security and defense policy might be impossible.
Anti-American sentiment — which had retreated to the eccentric margins after September 11 — became the norm as chaos unfolded in Iraq and terrorist attacks happened on European soil: Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. EU leaders and citizens alike tended to blame the chaos on President Bush.
To this day, Europe is still grappling with the consequences of decisions made in the aftermath of September 11. Afghans and Iraqis formed a large part of the wave of refugees in the 2015 migration crisis. And just as EU capitals scaled back their operations in Afghanistan, new terrorist threats forced them to deploy in the Sahel and over Syria.
Moreover, twenty years after 9/11, a new debate is roiling Europe: whether to develop more strategic autonomy in ways that would move the continent away from the familiar US-backed security architecture. Europe is certainly willing to be more assertive now, but it's hard to see the EU developing real strategic autonomy from Washington and broader geopolitical independence any time soon.
South Asia: Pivotal Pakistan— Peter Mumford
Apart from Afghanistan, which is its own story entirely, the post-9/11 impacts on South Asia were most acute in the rival nuclear-armed states of Pakistan and India. Pakistan, of course, became central to events in Afghanistan and the broader war on terror, with Washington often placing more emphasis on its (complex, sometimes strained) relationship with Islamabad than it did on ties with India. US dependency on Pakistan to maintain military operations in Afghanistan also became an issue of concern in New Delhi.
That said, India was happy to see Pakistan tied up with issues on its northern border with Afghanistan. India also benefited from a change in how the US and international community viewed terrorism. When Pakistan-backed terrorists attacked India's parliament in December 2001, Pakistan was shocked to find the US not calling for restraint by India, something that it would almost certainly have done prior to 9/11. India was also pleased to see the US pay more attention to broader threats posed by Islamist terrorism.
Following the killing of Osama bin Laden (in Pakistan, no less) and subsequent winding down of US military operations in Afghanistan, Washington's attention increasingly shifted from Pakistan to India, with US-India relations becoming closer in recent years. But that relationship has also deepened because of mutual concerns about China's growing power — something that would have happened regardless. In some ways, 9/11 and the Afghanistan and Iraq wars distracted the US from improving bilateral ties with India sooner than it did.
Southeast Asia: Terrorism faded, but China arrived— Peter Mumford
The years following 9/11 saw a sharp increase in the Islamist terrorist threat in Southeast Asia, with al-Qaeda affiliates and other extremist groups seemingly emboldened. This was most noticeable in Indonesia, with the Bali bombings in 2002, and attacks on the Marriott hotel in Jakarta in 2003 and 2009 — which killed both Indonesians and foreigners. The Philippines also experienced a rise in terrorism threats, as did, to a lesser extent, Malaysia.
US counterterrorism assistance, in the form of funding, training, and intel sharing, helped to reduce (though certainly not eliminate) the terrorist threat in the region. That said, the US-led global war on terror, and particular the war in Iraq, increased anti-US sentiment in Muslim-majority Indonesia and Malaysia — to some extent this also strengthened Islamist political parties in these countries, though other factors such as rising inequality and intensified identity politics, were also at play. These sentiments softened, though were reignited to some extent by Donald Trump's "Muslim ban".
In the meantime, with the US distracted by the global war on terror, a rising China was able more easily to extend its influence in the region, even beyond these Muslim-majority countries. President Barack Obama sought to address this through his somewhat stillborn "pivot to Asia" but subsequent administrations have been forced to reckon more directly with Chinese competition.
What about where you live? How did 9/11 or the US response change things -- either in the immediate aftermath or over the past 20 years?