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Thailand's newly appointed Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa reacts during a family photo session with new cabinet ministers at the Government House in Bangkok, Thailand, May 7, 2024.
US ally Thailand moves forward with BRICS membership
On Sunday, Thailand said Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa had delivered an official letter to his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, outlining Bangkok’s intention to join the BRICS alliance, which has gained a reputation as an anti-Western forum in recent years. Thailand holds non-NATO major ally status with the United States, but Maris said it hopes joining the Chinese- and Russian-led group will help it “play a more active role in South-South cooperation.” Things may not come together by the next BRICS summit in October, but Bangkok’s bid is likely to work out.
Is Washington worried? Hardly. For all its ambitions of pushing the dollar out of its dominant trade position and aligning the Global South to mutual political goals, BRICS can’t match actions to rhetoric. The organization doesn’t even have a permanent secretariat to coordinate its activities, and its members often don’t see eye to eye.
Thailand isn’t the first US ally to join (Brazil was), and in January, BRICS expanded to include another major non-NATO ally, Egypt, as well as close US partners Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
So what’s the point? The impotence of BRICS makes joining a low-stakes gambit with some potential upside. It might help Thailand curry favor with China, its largest trade partner and most worrying military threat. But, if not, what has Bangkok really lost?
Modi (not Xi) leads G-20 summit
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and I. Happy post Labor Day to all of you. I'm in London for a very, very brief trip, but I wanted to talk a little bit about the G-20 summit coming up this weekend.
Big news to start, Xi Jinping is not coming. Why not? Lots of speculation, lots of news, lots of ink being spilled except for the fact that people should have known about this a while back. One, the Indian government had been informed at least a month ago that Xi Jinping wasn't planning on attending. And secondly, the Americans have been working on a meeting with Xi Jinping and Biden for months now at APEC in San Francisco in November, and that was widely expected to be the next time the two men would be in the same place at the same time.
Biden is going to the G-20, in other words, Xi Jinping was not. Now, that certainly means it's not a sudden health issue, not a sudden domestic economic crisis or political crisis that stopping him from going. It's a question of how much of this is Chinese irritation at their relationship with India. India's export controls, investment review and screens against China now are frankly stronger than those from the United States against China, not to mention border disputes. And the Chinese trying to limit some of India's influence and roles in multilateral organizations. It's been fairly chippy. I wouldn't say it's overtly hostile, but it's certainly not friendly. And, you know, Xi Jinping might see that he has little interest in turning up at a G-20 that is going to be in India. And is know sort of Modi's great party. Risks antagonizing Modi more, of course, by doing that.
But again, not a decision that was taken recently. Secondly, the fact that Russia is not attending and really can't attend, given Putin and the ICC ruling against him, the fact that the G-20, the one place that you have not been able to get any coordination at this meeting in any of the ministerial is around Ukraine statement. The Chinese have been aligned this time around more with the Russians on this and really don't want to be front and center with Xi Jinping being the holdout facing pressure from the G-20, from all the other countries to get an agreement done. And Modi would certainly be on the other side of that. So would the Americans, frankly, so would all the other attendees. China doesn't want to be seen in that regard as the only country supporting the Russian position. So then you have the issue of China having the BRICS, and that is a group that they've just had some success with a significant expansion to Middle East and North African states. That will happen at the beginning of 2024. It's a meeting that China has a lot more sway over. It is China as by far the largest economy and then the Global South as opposed to the G-20, which is everybody that matters and China certainly not feeling in charge of anything. So in that regard, Xi Jinping has a structural reason to make the G20 less important and make the BRICS summit more important going forward.
I'm particularly interested in how they play that with Russia chairing the BRICS next year and how many of the other BRICS invitees show up at the head of state level. It's going to be, I mean, quite something when you've got, say, the Saudis and the Emiratis and the Brazilians all showing up in Russia for a BRICS summit. I think a lot of them are going to be looking for cover and maybe hoping that one or two say no so that they can say no to. But that's kind of where we are. The G-20 itself should be quite successful. I don't think that it's going to be meaningfully different in terms of Modi's ability to show that he's doing well on the back of Xi not showing up, in part because, of course China's having so many economic challenges at home. While this is really India's year, Modi with very strong popularity inside India, strongest economic growth of any major economy in the world, and moving, driving a more assertive climate policy, a more assertive technology reform policy, and, you know, looking pretty strong in the run up to 2024 India elections.
So at this point, especially with Modi having talked with over 100 leaders in preparation to the G-20 summit and seeing a lot of irritation with the United States on the back of unilateralism, America firstism and questions of where the US is going post 2024. A lot of Belt and Road countries feeling like they're not getting the kind of support they have historically from the Chinese. This is a big opportunity and India with some role to fill and they've historically not wanting to be a big geopolitical player, especially outside of the region, that is changing a lot under Modi.
So we're watching that all weekend and I hope everyone's doing well. Talk to you soon. Bye.
The new BRICS expansion and the Global South agenda
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. And a happy end of summer back to school. Labor Day is coming up in a week and I am going to be back and at it in New York and around the world. But for now, a Quick Take and want to talk a little bit about the BRICS.
You saw the summit last week in South Africa, the headlines going into the summit, at least from the United States and its allies, was all about how Putin wasn't going to be allowed to attend. He had to attend virtually. One of the members of the BRICS, they can only send their foreign minister. Doesn't that show that, you know, the International Criminal Court means something, even though the Americans aren't actually a signatory to it? But that wasn't the real story.
The real story is that after a significant amount of Chinese diplomatic effort to expand the BRICS and make it more meaningful, which other members were skeptical about, there was significant success and an announcement that there will be six new members invited to join at the beginning of 2024. That's a very meaningful expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Argentina, UAE, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Presuming this all goes ahead, the BRICS will be the most important grouping of the so-called Global South. And I use that term advisedly because it's not quite clear that China is really a member of the Global South. It's much more important economically as a creditor of the Global South and increasingly wanting to have great influence over it, which a lot of members of the Global South want to resist. I'll get into that in a minute. But still, if you compare to what's been going on among the developing members of the G-20 to try to set a common agenda that more aligns with their interests as opposed to those of the United States and its allies in the G-7 who have become increasingly tight-knit post-Trump and post the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
I would say the BRICS are now supplanting that process as the most important piece of international architecture to watch, engage with, and to drive an agenda that matters to the countries of the Global South. And I think that the agenda-setting will be important on climate, it will be important on finance and the global economy. Maybe a bit on Russia, Ukraine, and also in efforts to resist weaponization of the US dollar. In other words, these are a whole bunch of countries that don't really like the fact that the Americans have leveraged a dominant position in the international financial system and as global reserve currency to have more influence over their own economic outcomes. I don't think this really means dollarization or the replacement with a BRICS currency any time soon. The role of the US dollar in global reserve currencies held by central banks around the world has been roughly the same for the last 20 years, and that, I suspect, will be true in another 10, another 15, 20 years as well. But nonetheless, in terms of a willingness of a whole bunch of countries to say we are not happy with the present global agenda as being set in their interests by the United States and allies, the BRICS will be an alternative, that is important, that will matter more economically over time and on some issues will be cohesive. So in that regard, I think it is important and I think we should spend more time following it and covering it.
As you know, we do other major sub-global confabs out there. A few points as rejoinders to that though, first of all, Argentina is not actually going to join. The present Argentine government very happy to. That is a leftist government that is much more aligned with China in particular. Their economy is falling apart. It is almost certain that after elections we will have a center-right or perhaps a far right libertarian government, either Bullrich or Milei in charge of Argentina. Both have said that they would not join the BRICS. So let's take Argentina out of the equation.
The countries that are left, it's interesting. It's all kind of one very broad region. We're talking about the Middle East and kind of northeast Africa. So again, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Let's look at what that means. In the case of the Middle East, this is the region of the world that is becoming much less aligned with the United States, much more focused on the fact that they have to be self-sufficient, in part because the Americans aren't as interested, in part because the Americans are core competitors for energy, fossil fuel, energy development and export, then the Saudis, the Emiratis, and the Iranians.
So some of it is the US paying less attention, some of it is US driving a climate agenda to a greater degree than they were before. Some of it is the Americans are not a part of OPEC and competing with OPEC. And so for all of these reasons, what you see is the countries from the Middle East wanting to go more their own way, wanting to balance and hedge and be a part of everything. So keep their security relations with the US if they're Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but also work more closely with the Chinese and with everyone else that has significant demand for that energy. Hence the Saudis and the Iranians having a diplomatic engagement that the Chinese, that breakthrough sponsored by China, hence the Saudis inviting everyone, the Americans and the Chinese and the Ukrainians, everyone but Russia to be a part of what has been so far the most significant diplomatic effort around the Russian-Ukraine war and the fact that the Saudis, the Emirates and the Iranians are all now joining the BRICS is a significant additional movement. I would argue the Middle East is becoming more geopolitically stable, but also less aligned with the United States, more playing a balancing role with everyone. In the case of Ethiopia, that is a very significant, very populous country in Africa that is overwhelmingly aligned economically with China. That's where the money is. The United States doesn't play much of a role.
I think the next round of BRICS expansion looking forward is probably more likely to have the most interest from other sub-Saharan African countries. How many actually join is an open question, but that's certainly the easiest grouping that you can see wanting to be a part of the BRICS for all the reasons we just talked about. And then finally, I would say, let's also recognize what the BRICS is not. The BRICS is not a China-led competitor to the G-7, and that is because most of the countries that are in the BRICS, not all, but most do not want it to be. They don't want it to be led by China. Think about India in that regard in particular. And they don't want it to be a competitor to the G-7 where they have to join one and not the other. They want to have good economic relations with both. The economic order is a multipolar order. It is not a Cold War environment, and the security order is driven primarily by the United States. And you have to put BRICS expansion into that broader global framework. So the BRICS will matter more economically. They will facilitate far more Middle Eastern hedging. They will also facilitate greater agenda-setting in the global economy, broadly defined by the Global South. But that is not suddenly a decoupling of the world into G-7 versus BRICS. That's certainly not what we're going to see. So very important, a meaningful diplomatic win for the Chinese, not aligned with what the United States is trying to accomplish with the G-7 and with NATO broadly speaking, but not directly confrontational either. It's messy, it's nuanced. It doesn't easily lend itself to a five-second headline, but a ten-minute Quick Take. What the hell?
So anyway, that's it for me. Hope everyone's doing well. Enjoy this last days of summer and I'll talk to you all real soon.
President of China Xi Jinping arrives at the 2023
What’s come out of the BRICS summit?
There’s perhaps never been more global attention on the annual BRICS summit – a bloc of five large developing countries including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – that just wrapped in Johannesburg.
That’s because Russia’s war in Ukraine has put renewed emphasis on the diplomatic power of Global South states that want to maintain solid relations with both the West and with US foes – like Russia.
So, what came out of the meeting often dismissed as a talk shop? All five states appeared to back expansion of the bloc. Though more than 20 states have put in formal bids to join, Brazil and India have been less keen on membership growth. But India’s PM Narendra Modi and Brazil’s President Lula da Silva both came out in support of expansion, which Russia and China have been pushing hard for in a bid to rival US-dominated institutions. Meanwhile, South Africa said on Wednesday that the group, which is based on consensus decision-making, had come up with a mechanism for new members to apply, though no details were given.
Heads of state from B,I,C,S attended in person, while R’s Vladimir Putin participated virtually because South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa didn’t want to have to deal with the prospect of arresting the Russian president if he stepped foot on South African soil. (Pretoria is a party to the International Criminal Court, which has issued an arrest warrant for Putin for war crimes.)
Keeping Putin at arm’s length was easy enough to pull off this time around. But as Russia takes over BRICS chairmanship and is set to host the next summit in Kazan, Russia, in Oct. 2024, it’ll be much more awkward for Brazil, South Africa, and India to navigate this diplomatic balancing act.
People walk past the Sandton Convention Centre, where the BRICS Summit is being held in Johannesburg, South Africa.
Will anything come out of the BRICS summit?
A meeting of five large – and dissimilar – developing countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – is currently underway in Johannesburg, South Africa, and there’s plenty of stuff to talk about.
The heads of state of each country are attending in person, excluding Russia’s Vladimir Putin, who is opting for a virtual meetup after the International Criminal Court released a warrant for his arrest earlier this year.
So, what’s on the agenda? One key sticking point is the bloc's potential expansion. More than 20 countries have put in official bids to join the group, with Iran, in particular, very keen to be tapped, making another pitch to the Chinese just before the summit began.
While Russia and China have pushed for expansions, believing it will help counter US-dominated institutions, the other three states, US allies, don’t want to undercut relations with Washington. They prefer to cast BRICS as broadly focused on emphasizing Global South interests, and not as a counterweight to US influence. Still, South Africa and Brazil support expansion to some degree: Brazil’s President Lula da Silva says that he backs the addition of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, and Indonesia, though it will likely be a long time before the member states reach a consensus on future bloc eligibility.
De-dollarization of the global economy also looms large over the summit. Beijing in particular has accused Washington of “weaponizing” the US dollar after imposing crippling sanctions on Russia, while the other BRICS states are also keen to see the greenback lose some of its dominance and to do more trade in local currencies. (However, the BRICS’s chief financial institution says it has no immediate plans to create its own currency.)
While there are signs that this message is resonating throughout the Global South – Argentina recently struck a deal with China to pay its International Monetary Fund debt in yuan – analysts broadly agree that the US dollar will remain the dominant force in global trade and finance (Ian Bremmer explained why in a recent column).
Since Russia invaded Ukraine, there’s been renewed attention on this group of important non-aligned nations. Washington, for its part, has tried hard to get states in the Global South to condemn Russia’s war and distance themselves from the Kremlin, but that attempt has largely fallen flat. This dynamic has emphasized a truism in global affairs: Most countries prefer not to choose between the US and its rivals.
Still, BRICS's disparate national and geopolitical interests, and overall lack of cohesion (consider that India and China remain regional rivals who have fought several bloody conflicts) impede it from making any significant progress – at least for now.
BRICS countries
Viewpoint: BRICS countries seek to expand global influence
The BRICS grouping of five large developing countries will hold its annual summit from Aug. 22-24 in Johannesburg, South Africa, at a time of rising influence. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa account for more than 25% of the world’s economic output and more than 40% of its population. Yet diverging national interests and broader geopolitical forces make it difficult for the bloc to act as a cohesive unit.
The potential for geopolitics to play a spoiler role was highlighted when the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened to upend this week’s summit by putting South Africa in the awkward position of having to detain him if he were to attend. In the end, South Africa and Russia agreed that he would participate virtually.
We asked Eurasia Group experts Ali Wyne and Christine Hilt what to watch at the gathering.
Will there be any lingering fallout from the episode of Putin’s arrest warrant for Ukraine war crimes?
Only that Russia will not be able to advance its agenda as forcefully. Because South Africa was able to accommodate a hybrid format — with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attending in person — Russia will claim that its global relationships remain strong and that Western isolation efforts are failing. The West, however, will cite the format as evidence of Russian exclusion from international structures. Pretoria ultimately emerges as the primary winner; the summit will remain in South Africa, and the government managed to navigate the thorny issue of Russian attendance while also diffusing tensions with the US and other Western partners over its non-aligned position on the Russia-Ukraine war.
What are the main points on the agenda?
Potential BRICS expansion will be the most important issue. Although approximately 40 countries have formally applied for or expressed interest in membership, according to some media reports, BRICS members do not agree on how to move forward — a critical requirement for any final decisions. China is the most vocal proponent of expansion, viewing the BRICS as another prominent organization where it can increase its influence, support the growth of parallel international institutions, and counter the US. Russia is also on record as favoring expansion, as it seeks to promote alternatives to Western structures.
Brazil and South Africa are both concerned about diluting their own influence in the organization, while India’s primary concern remains China’s growing influence. Current messaging suggests that summit discussions will focus on establishing membership criteria, allowing reticent BRICS members to slow the expansion process down without being viewed as roadblocks.
Other agenda items will likely include current geopolitical issues, infrastructure development in emerging markets, and ongoing efforts to flesh out the structure and portfolio of the BRICS’ New Development Bank.
How will the Russia-Ukraine war affect discussions?
It has already had an impact, of course, with the controversy over the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Putin. Still, given that Russia is a member of the BRICS and that none of the other four members have sanctioned it, the war is unlikely to be a major topic of conversation at the summit. Since Putin will only be attending virtually, Moscow would not be well-positioned to propose a unified BRICS statement on the war; neither he nor Lavrov is likely to run the risk of presenting a statement that could be rebuffed.
China’s participation in peace talks in Saudi Arabia earlier this month has prompted some speculation that it may be tiring of Russia’s refusal to negotiate, especially as Russia was not invited to join. While Beijing wants to be seen as playing a constructive diplomatic role, there is little evidence that this effort includes any intention to recalibrate its relationship with Moscow.
How about the India-China rivalry?
This rivalry arguably does more to limit the cohesion of the BRICS than any other factor. And while India’s relationship with Russia is not as strained, Delhi worries about Moscow’s growing reliance on Beijing. India judges that China exercises growing sway over both the BRICS and another prominent grouping of countries, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, that observers see as a counterweight to Western influence. Delhi assesses that it can advance its national interests more effectively in fora where China is either not present or has a far less prominent voice, including the Quad (with the US, Australia, and Japan), I2U2 (with Israel, the UAE, and the US), and the G20.
What are Brazil’s and South Africa’s priorities?
Brazil has been focused on slowing down the expansion conversation; its concerns center on membership in what is seen as a pro-China organization and dilution of its influence. On Aug. 2, however, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva pushed back publicly on reporting that Brazil was the main holdout on including new countries and issued a more supportive statement on possible expansion. Given that China is making inroads to reduce Indian resistance to expansion, the Brazilians do not want to be seen as the sole holdouts. Their strategy will thus be to slow expansion and be very selective about who is admitted.
South Africa’s main priority for the summit will be to reaffirm its role as the key player on the African continent (hence this year’s theme, “BRICS and Africa”), including by potentially pushing for multilateral reforms that would give the African Union a permanent G20 seat (a possibility that will be on the agenda at next month’s G20 meeting in Delhi). Pretoria will also focus on increasing support for the NDB and obtaining agreements to support South Africa’s Just Transition and increased trade and development. It will likely seek to avoid significant discussion on security issues, hoping to mitigate Western concerns about its non-aligned position on the Russia-Ukraine war.
Given the current geopolitical environment, how do you expect the BRICS to evolve in the near to medium term?
The BRICS have never been — and are unlikely to become — a coherent geopolitical entity. The India-China rivalry is intensifying, and Brazil, India, and South Africa all wish to avoid the perception that the bloc is an anti-US counterweight. The group’s expansion prospects are uncertain, with only a few more countries likely to get in, and a BRICS common currency is unlikely to materialize in the near to medium term.
But the grouping’s influence should not be discounted. Its members have grown rapidly since economist Jim O’Neil coined the term “BRIC” in 2001 (the group expanded to include South Africa in December 2010), especially China and India, whose GDPs have doubled over the past decade. While China and Russia are the most vocally opposed to US influence, all five seek to promote a more multipolar international system and reduce the centrality of the US dollar in global finance. And if one takes a wider aperture — considering not only the bloc’s potential expansion but also the incorporation of Iran into the SCO and the growing sway of “swing states” such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey — one sees the emergence of an international system in which the Global South and middle powers will wield steadily more geopolitical heft.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
Russia's President Vladimir Putin smiles with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2019
BRICS: Party planning problems ...
How we got here: In March, the International Criminal Court indicted Putin for war crimes in connection with Russia’s systematic abduction of children from Ukraine.
So if Putin sets foot in South Africa, a member of the ICC, the authorities there are technically obligated to arrest him and send him to The Hague. To be fair, there’s about a snowball’s chance in Pretoria of that happening, but how to hold the summit without him?
South Africa is in a bind. The BRICS summit is an important symbolic event for a group representing the Global South. But South Africa is already facing criticism from the US for cozying up to Putin since his invasion of Ukraine, and Washington has even accused the government there of tacitly allowing arms shipments to Russia.
One solution is to ask Putin to attend by Zoom, a slight that the Russian president might not accept at all. Another is for South Africa to either ignore the ICC warrant or pass legislation that overrides its obligation to carry it out. A third is, reportedly, to ask China to host the party instead.
But the dilemma is about more than South Africa; it’s about the long-standing question of whether the BRICS, a group of powerful countries with very different economies, political systems, and societies, can really agree on key issues with important consequences.
G7 alignment & US political challenges
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi everybody. Ian Bremmer here and a happy Monday. Quick take to start off your week as President Biden is back in the United States after the G7 Summit in Hiroshima.
What do we think? How did it go? Well, I mean a couple of very different takes. First of all, the G7 is enormously aligned, most particularly on Russia. I have never seen this level of outpouring of support. Every individual member of the G7 engaged personally with Ukrainian President Zelensky, the level of international aid coordination, diplomatic engagement, military support across the board continues to be at exceptionally high levels, not what Putin would've expected, not what the G7 would've expected before the Russian invasion, and that certainly helps to put Zelensky in a stronger position to negotiate with the Russians after a counter offensive over the coming months.
Furthermore, on China, more coordination from the G7, the term of art is de-risking, and everyone is increasingly using that term concerns about Chinese economic coercion. Not that the Chinese are the only country in the world that engages in economic coercion. People have been on the other side of that from the United States, from other G7 economies. But when the G7 gets together and compares notes and sees how the Chinese are willing to use a dominant economic position to engage and lever political pressure on those countries, the G7 realizes they are much better off coordinating their policies than they are by themselves. And you are seeing that.
Now, most of that is the Europeans moving more closely to the United States in concerns about Chinese political security and economic practices. Some of it is the Americans talking less about decoupling and accepting a more proactive continuity of overall G7 China economic relations and interdependence that is important and necessary. But what's significant is that these relations are coordinated and the Chinese see that, and they see that they are not able to drive a bus through divisions between the United States and Canada on one side, Europeans on the other in how China is able to engage politically, and that does matter.
Having said all of that, that sounds like a great G7 for everyone concerned, but of course, a lot of these leaders are quite weak at home, quite unpopular at home, and the big problem is absolutely President Biden who had to cut short a dinner with the heads of state and then had to cancel a trip to Papua New Guinea, doesn't sound all that important, except all of the leaders of the Pacific Island states were coming to PNG in order to meet with Biden. These are countries where the Chinese are dominant economically and the Americans are trying to provide more security relations. Couldn't do that. Canceled on the BRICS summit too, visit to Australia, and to the Prime Minister in his hometown. Kind of embarrassing, at the last minute, he got a phone call, at least from Biden before the announcement. Papua New Guinea only got it afterwards. Well, they're
tiny place, but still doesn't look great.
And why is it happening? Dysfunction in the US political system and everyone gets that the debt limit needs to be resolved. Everyone gets that the Americans have to make good on paying off debts that they have already incurred, and yet Congress and the US president continue to be headlong moving towards crisis. Only 10 days left until June 1st in the so-called X date. According to Janet Yellen, Secretary of Treasury, that is when the debt comes due. And you don't have enough time at this point to get a deal that then can be voted through the House of Representatives without Republicans bolting from McCarthy and undermining his speakership.
So at this point, either there's going to be a short term extension or you're going to hit the X date. One of those two things I think is going to happen. In other words, there is going to be a much bigger crisis, at least sense of crisis before you can resolve this problem and that level of US political dysfunction on display in the G7, on display with the Chinese, on display most everywhere in the world, the biggest challenge to America's strength continues to be at home politically.
That's it for me. I'll talk to you all real soon.