Trending Now
We have updated our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for Eurasia Group and its affiliates, including GZERO Media, to clarify the types of data we collect, how we collect it, how we use data and with whom we share data. By using our website you consent to our Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, including the transfer of your personal data to the United States from your country of residence, and our use of cookies described in our Cookie Policy.
{{ subpage.title }}
Collage of Ian Bremmer, Donald Trump, and other world leaders.
American backsliding, Trump-Xi standoff, Iran bombing, and more: Your questions, answered
If you feel like you're drowning in the 24-hour news tsunami lately, you're not alone. Headlines are moving at the speed of light, massively consequential policies are being announced (then rolled back) via social media, and longstanding global alliances seem to shift with each passing day. It's hard enough just trying to keep up, let alone separate the signal from the noise.
Because a weekly long-form column often can't do justice to everything happening simultaneously across our increasingly chaotic world, I invited readers to ask their most pressing questions on all things political and geopolitical. You wanted to know about everything from the contents of Donald Trump’s heart to the risk of a Taiwan invasion to the future of the dollar and, yes, whether I'd ride Moose like a moose jockey given the opportunity.
Below is the first batch of answers, with questions lightly edited for clarity. If you have something you’d like to ask me, submit your questions here and I’ll take as many as I can in the upcoming weeks.
Let's dive in.
How well do you think the outside world truly understands the goals and motivations of the Trump administration?
Not particularly well, since it's unclear for people in the United States, too. President Trump individually concentrates so much more decision-making authority than any other president in modern US history, which is why the on-again-off-again tariff policy has been so chaotic. Past administrations have not necessarily been more transparent – Trump certainly speaks his mind constantly – but they have been far more process and consensus-driven.
Still, there is an underlying driver helping explain Trump’s actions: the use and abuse of power to bring about the president’s favored outcomes in one-on-one settings and, relatedly, to eliminate any checks on his authority domestically (vis-à-vis Congress and the courts) and internationally (multilateral frameworks, standards, commitments, treaties, agreements, etc.). That – Trump’s will to power – more than any concrete policy agenda is the unifying thread. Remember, Trump was a Democrat before he was a Republican. Ultimately, he’s driven not by ideology but by the search for maximum leverage he can use to crush opponents and score “wins.”
Are you concerned at all about the possibility of regime change in the US? On a daily basis, the Trump administration is doing stuff right out of a totalitarian playbook, and everybody seems to be folding their cards because they either don't understand the stakes or they hope it's somehow going to pass. As a scared European from a country with a totalitarian past, I personally doubt it will.
I’m less concerned than some because of the decentralized nature of America’s federal government (with many critical functions, including election administration, delegated to state and local authorities) as well as our professionalized, independent military. Trump’s authoritarian impulses also remain constrained by the president’s own lack of discipline and interest in the business of governance. This was the case during his first term and is still true now, as both Signalgate and Liberation Day made clear.
On the other hand, President Trump is far less constrained politically than last time, having consolidated control of the GOP, surrounded himself with yes men who encourage his most destructive whims, and asserted absolute power over the entire federal government. He’s also less constrained by markets/the private sector and the reelection imperative, and he faces a Democratic Party in absolute disarray.
The upshot is Trump won’t be as effective as many fear in undoing checks and balances, largely because his authoritarianism will continue to be tempered by his policymaking incompetence. But I admit that the risk of serious, structural damage to the US rule of law and democratic institutions is growing. I’m more concerned about this than I thought I’d be three months ago.
While globalization has been a boon for the US consumer, it has assisted in the relative decline of US manufacturing over the past 40 years. What policies would you recommend, if any, to (re)grow US manufacturing?
Not Trump’s present tariff policy, which will hurt rather than help US manufacturing. A majority of America’s goods imports are intermediate inputs, capital equipment, and raw materials that US manufacturers rely on to produce other goods, both for domestic consumption and for export. By making these imports more expensive, tariffs harm US producers and exporters (in addition to consumers via higher prices). Add to that the massive uncertainty about what tariff changes tomorrow may bring, and there are also no incentives for companies to build new factories in America.
Globalization is not principally responsible for the decline of US manufacturing over the past half-century. Productivity improvements and automation have reduced the need for manufacturing workers everywhere (even China is now seeing deindustrialization!). In fact, as a very rich country at the productivity frontier, America produces more value-added in manufacturing output today than ever before; it just takes fewer workers than it did after World War 2 to do that. That’s obviously sad for the individuals and communities that have lost jobs. In the aggregate, though, the decline in US manufacturing employment has been offset by an increase in higher-paying service-sector jobs (the average service worker gets paid more than the average manufacturing worker). If you wanted to increase manufacturing jobs, you’d have to either shift people out of those better-paying (often more comfortable) service jobs or grow the population (tough given the administration’s crackdown on immigration).
Now, there are strategic and national security reasons to protect and reshore select industries like semiconductors or batteries. But if you want to boost manufacturing in these core industries, the way to do it is through smart industrial policy: targeted subsidies, tax credits, state and local incentives, direct investments … like the Biden administration’s bipartisan CHIPS Act, which was followed by a manufacturing investment boom.
So maybe start by not undermining good programs for political reasons. Don't beat up on friends and adversaries simultaneously when what you need is to coordinate and trade more with allies. And focus on the broader ecosystem needed to foster investment and build a domestic manufacturing base. That means bolstering the scientific, research, and educational institutions that have made the US a magnet for world-class talent and innovation. Building better infrastructure to increase manufacturing productivity. And ensuring a stable, predictable business environment anchored in the rule of law.
Who blinks first, Xi or Trump? How could they de-escalate their trade tiff given their personal distaste for losing face?
Trump already has, with the unilateral exemption granted to electronic products like semiconductors and smartphones (even if it turns out to be temporary). The question is how many times he needs to blink before there's a climbdown. As they say, a wink is as good as a nod to a blind man, and at least since Covid, Xi has been convinced that China is facing a bipartisan strategy of containment from a hardline United States. Even with the latest exclusions, Trump’s tariffs are so high as to essentially amount to a trade embargo. Combine that with the concerted US efforts to crush Chinese tariff circumvention through third countries, and we’re already seeing the unmanaged decoupling of the most important geopolitical relationship in the world.
Given the deep structural mistrust between the two sides and Beijing’s political ability to “fight until the end,” I don’t see how you can put the toothpaste back in the tube. At most you can get a truce, and only as a result of a direct meeting between Xi and Trump. But Xi has little interest in negotiating directly with Trump at this stage, as it would be a sign of weakness and he doesn’t see the US president as a credible interlocutor.
In the current context, what is keeping China from invading Taiwan? What conditions are they waiting to have in place before "pulling the trigger," so to speak?
I see this scenario as extremely unlikely in the near term. Sure, Trump has basically broadcast that he doesn’t care about territorial integrity, and you could plausibly extend his treatment of Ukraine to Taiwan. But his cabinet is also full of China hawks, and if there’s one US ally every Republican in Washington wants to defend, it’s Taiwan against China. Beijing knows a full-scale invasion would risk direct war with the United States, which would be incredibly destructive to the Chinese economy at a time when they can hardly afford it.
Radical uncertainty about Trump’s response function makes Chinese leaders even more cautious than they normally would be. Beijing would rather wait to invade until the military balance more decisively favors China, its economy is on more solid footing, and the US is led by a more predictable president. But expect them to test US resolve and probe Trump’s response with incremental escalations across the board, none of which should be big enough to lead to a crisis on their own. The risk, however, is that as the US-China relationship breaks down, any accident or miscalculation could escalate into a military crisis given the lack of any conflict resolution channels.
Isn't it possible that Trump's creepy Russia obsession has to do with trying to get Russia as an ally against China?
In part, though there are plenty of other explanations (from his affinity for strongmen, transactional nature, and dislike for Vladimir Putin’s European and “woke” enemies, to his belief that the US shouldn’t waste resources on a war that isn’t core to American interests and Ukraine can’t win). At times, Trump seems more interested in cutting deals with both Putin and Xi Jinping to carve the world into spheres of influence.
But in any case, it’s unrealistic to think Trump could pull off a “reverse Nixon” given Russia and China’s shared interest in a post-American international order and deep commercial, energy, and technological ties. These are not the same countries that Henry Kissinger drove a wedge between 50 years ago (nor are they likely to change anytime soon). There’s nothing that the president of a democratic United States, even one as weakly constrained and authoritarian-minded as Trump, can credibly offer Putin that remotely competes with the kind of long-term strategic alignment he shares with Xi.
In fact, a Trump-brokered ceasefire in Ukraine and/or a US normalization of relations with Russia might actually strengthen Sino-Russian ties by allowing Beijing to fully embrace its “no limits” friendship with Moscow without risking US sanctions or jeopardizing its relations with Europe.
Given Trump's historically aggressive approach towards Iran and desire to distract from the tariff disaster, how high are your odds that the US and/or Israel will bomb Iran within the next 6 weeks?
Reasonably low since Trump doesn't want a war and is fully committed to trying engagement first, despite Israeli opposition. The difference in the American and Israeli positions is interesting: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently demanded a verifiable end to Iran’s entire nuclear program, whereas Trump seems to have lowered the bar to no weaponization. This is a condition that the Iranians, who have always maintained they have no intention to build a bomb, could potentially live with given their present historical weakness. The odds of an agreement are higher than they have been in a decade.
The Israelis might try to derail the negotiation effort diplomatically and even engage in some low-level provocations to spoil the Iranians’ mood, but they won't directly launch major strikes that could blow back in their face. Publicly sabotaging Trump would be far too risky.
What is the likelihood of the dollar losing its reserve currency status?
Dollar dominance is being eroded by Trump’s unpredictability and policy mix, which have caused a loss of confidence in the US government – and, accordingly, prompted investors to reprice the safety premium commanded by dollar assets.
But losing reserve currency status? That doesn't look imminent given the lack of viable alternatives. The yuan is not, in fact, convertible; China has to resort to draconian capital controls to prevent capital flight, and the country lacks the investor protections, institutional quality, and business environment required to internationalize its currency. The euro is the currency of a still-too-fragmented economic area mired in slow growth and high debt, with shallow capital markets and no banking, fiscal, or political union, where nativist parties could well gain power in the next five years and destabilize domestic politics. And cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are highly volatile, speculative assets with zero intrinsic or legislated value (unlike, say, the dollar, which is backed by America’s current and future wealth – and by the US government’s ability to tax it).
You can’t replace something with nothing, so the dollar’s special status is safe … for now. But Trump’s destruction of America’s reputational capital will cost the country dearly in the years to come. After all, every reserve currency that came before the dollar was dominant until it wasn’t. Investors have historically wanted to hold greenbacks because America’s economic, political, and institutional fundamentals inspired trust. Lose those fundamentals and you lose that trust.
Do you find that your Boston accent helps you come across as authentic?
It’s the first time I've ever considered that. I’d like to think it’s mostly down to being honest with people and not taking myself too seriously. But sure, why not? Can’t hurt.
What is Moose's favorite toy? And was it made in China?
Presently, a squeaky watermelon (it used to be a small bouncy orange ball, but he can't see as well as he used to so he's adapted). No idea where it was made.
NATO membership for Ukraine?
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Sweden will join NATO. Is Ukraine next?
Well, sure, but next doesn't mean tomorrow. Next means like at some indeterminate point, which makes President Zelensky pretty unhappy and he's made that clear, but he has massive amounts of support from NATO right now, and he needs that support to continue. So, it's not like he has a lot of leverage on joining NATO. As long as the Americans are saying it's not going to happen, that means it's not going to happen. No, the real issue is how much and how concrete the multilateral security guarantees that can be provided by NATO to Ukraine actually turn out to be. We will be watching that space.
Is Taiwan readying itself for an invasion by conducting its biggest evacuation drills in years?
I wouldn't say readying for an invasion. I would say, you know, sort of preparing for every contingency, and that means taking care of your people. I mean, the Americans weren't readying themselves for nuclear Armageddon by doing drills in classrooms and by, you know, having bomb shelters, but they had them because we were in a world where nuclear war was thinkable. Well, we're in a world where Chinese, mainland Chinese invasion of Taiwan is very unlikely, but thinkable. And of course, the Taiwanese have to think about it a lot more than you and I do.
Elon vs. Zuck. Thoughts?
Well, my thoughts are mostly about the battle of the social media platforms and the fact that of course you now have the big gorilla in the room with a Twitter competitor. And I've seen it pretty functional for the first several days. Obviously, massive numbers of people are on it, mostly because it's really easy to sign up. They're all coming over from Instagram and it's owned by the same person, by the same shareholders. Unclear to me who's going to win. If I had to bet, I would say that within 6 or 12 months, we're going to have a fragmented social media landscape politically, the way we do blogosphere or cable news, which is, I guess, good for consumer choice, but it's bad for civil society. What else is new?
Will a “silicon shield” help protect Taiwan?
Tensions between Taiwan and China rose to new highs this summer after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s controversial visit to the island prompted a week-long series of Chinese military maneuvers that were even more threatening than usual. China has pledged to retake what it sees as a breakaway territory — through invasion if necessary — and viewed the trip by a top US official as an affront to its sovereignty.
As China asserts its claims to Taiwan more aggressively, the island’s population has grown increasingly averse to reunification. Yet there are powerful reasons for China not to invade Taiwan — not least the fear that America, the island’s longtime ally, would come to its defense. US ties to Taiwan have grown even closer in recent years as it has come to dominate the global production of semiconductors, tiny silicon connectors that serve as the brains of modern electronics.
We asked Xiaomeng Lu, a director in Eurasia Group’s geo-technology practice, to explain how chips fit into Chinese and US calculations toward Taiwan.
How important is Taiwan for the world’s electronics industry?
A single company, TSMC, produces more than 90% of the world’s smallest and most advanced semiconductors, which are used to power high-end servers and sophisticated AI applications. Taiwan is also home to MediaTek, a leading manufacturer of smartphone chipsets; ASE Group, which provides semiconductor assembly and testing services; and GlobalWafers, which makes silicon wafers. Other important Taiwan firms include PC makers ASUS and Acer, as well as contract manufacturers Foxconn, Pegatron, and Wistron. The island’s manufacturing capacity plays a critical role in the global electronics supply chain.
What would be the impact of a Chinese invasion?
Modern semiconductor manufacturing is a complex global ecosystem in which different companies around the world have different specializations. A Chinese invasion would cut Taiwan off from that ecosystem, severing the real-time connections it relies on for things like product designs, materials, chemicals, and equipment. Even in the best-case scenario for China of a rapid, successful invasion in which it gained control of the island without much fighting, international sanctions would probably prevent China from obtaining many key inputs from overseas required to produce chips.
Yet as Russia’s attempt to take over Ukraine has shown, such a move is fraught with risk and uncertainty. An invasion of Taiwan by China would be even more complex, given the body of water separating them. Many semiconductor production facilities are located in areas where China is likely to land troops, so chipmaking offices and factories could unintentionally suffer collateral damage. A prominent Chinese economist affiliated with the government recently said that occupying TSMC factories would be a top priority for China in the event of an invasion. But Taiwan, potentially with US assistance, might choose to destroy them itself rather than let them fall into the hands of China.
How do these risks affect China’s calculations?
Recent events in Hong Kong show that China is willing to inflict damage on a high-performing economy, if necessary, to achieve longstanding political goals. The wrinkle in the case of Taiwan is that its high-tech products – especially its semiconductors – are key to China’s ambitions to establish itself as a global leader in emerging technology areas. Cutting-edge chips support, for example, space and biology research; exposure to advanced technology also offers Chinese engineers the opportunity to acquire new skills.
As a result, China has aimed to maintain commercial ties with TSMC and avoid any measures that would harm it or the broader sector even as its relations with Taiwan and the US have deteriorated. Following Pelosi’s visit, China slapped several sanctions on Taiwan, including a prohibition on the export of Chinese sand for use in the island’s semiconductor industry. This was a purely symbolic measure, however, as Taiwan chip manufacturers do not use Chinese natural sand in silicon wafer production but high-purity quartz sand, primarily obtained from the US.
How worried is the US?
US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo recently said the loss of access to chips from Taiwan would cause a “deep and immediate recession” for the world economy. The current global chip shortage, caused by pandemic-related disruptions, provides a small taste of what a semiconductor supply chain crisis may look like.
Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan included meetings with top semiconductor executives including TSMC Chairman Mark Liu and founder Morris Chang. Pelosi reportedly discussed with them the recently passed CHIPS+ Act, which offers $52 billion in support for semiconductor production. The US has been encouraging TSMC to expand its operations in the US to strengthen ties with the company.
Observers have referred to Taiwan’s unique status in the semiconductor industry as a “silicon shield” that both discourages Chinese aggression and encourages US backing for the island.
How has the Taiwan semiconductor industry navigated escalating geopolitical tensions?
Though TSMC has tried to maintain good relations with China, it has moved closer to the US to maintain access to its technology and political alignment with Taipei. The company has committed to building a $12 billion advanced semiconductor plant in Arizona and has expressed interest in receiving CHIPS funding to cover some costs.
However, TSMC has resisted pressure to shift its most cutting-edge production technology to the US, citing concerns such as commercial feasibility, talent shortage, and cultural issues. It is also likely responding to Taipei’s concerns that doing so could erode US resolve to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack. Nobody on the island wants to weaken the “silicon shield” protecting it.
Ukraine war dominates Davos discussions
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60 from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
Is the Russia-Ukraine war dominating the conversation in Davos?
Yes, it is. There is only one side of the conversation here. Not true globally, but in Davos, there are no Russian delegates. And I mean, frankly, pretty much every single person attending is saying as much as they can in favor of Ukraine. You see a lot of people kind of dressing the part and certainly you're in Europe. And so as a consequence, the fact that this is a war in Europe that ends the peace dividend, it's been topic number one, topic number two, topic number three. Kept me pretty busy, frankly.
Are tensions between China and the United States escalating with Biden's recent pledge to defend Taiwan militarily?
It's kind of the third time he's already said this and it's the third time that the White House has walked it back. I think it's more important this time around because he did it in Asia and he also did it in response to a pointed question saying in the context of Ukraine, what about Taiwan? And he talked for a bit about it. He is like, "yeah, if it came to that, then we'd definitely defend them." That of course, is not official US policy. In the past, Biden's advisors have been privately kind of happy that he's making it seem like the United States has a more aggressive posture, especially because inside domestic US politics, that is generally speaking a popular position. Don't want to see Biden is soft on China. The reality is the United States doesn't need this position right now, especially because on the back of the United States leading a much stronger coalition in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Russian military not doing well, the fact is that Ukraine, there are lessons for the Chinese and Taiwan that are actually going relatively well for the United States. So why would you cause this trouble? I suspect the Chinese will be much cooler diplomatically over the course of the coming weeks.
How will Australia's new prime minister reshape its politics?
Frankly, on foreign policy, not so much. Strong member of the Quad, strongly supported the United States on Russia, for example. But when I think about the future, I would say climate change is the one big 180 that we're going to see in Australia's role globally. This is a country that had been focusing more on coal, had been one of the biggest, not climate deniers, but certainly slow moving in terms of renewability. Now you have a prime minister that wants to make Australia into a climate change superpower. That is an enormous issue that has been exercising, the Australian people dealing with massive droughts, for example, for a long time now. And it's a place that you'll see a little bit of positive movement in what's otherwise going to be a very challenging COP summit coming up in Sharm el-Sheikh later this year.
- Russian war crimes exhibit at Davos reveals civilian death toll in ... ›
- Is the world coming apart? Drama at Davos - GZERO Media ›
- A different Davos amid geopolitical conflicts and security issues - GZERO Media ›
- Ian Bremmer: Russia's war in Ukraine makes Davos "discomfiting" - GZERO Media ›
- Wolfgang Ischinger: Ukraine made German foreign policy go "out the window" - GZERO Media ›
- Highlights from Davos 2022 - GZERO Media ›
- The yet-unseen consequences of Russia's war in Ukraine - GZERO Media ›
- More Russia-NATO confrontation ahead in Ukraine war - GZERO Media ›
- What happened at Davos - GZERO Media ›
- Russian war crimes exhibit at Davos reveals civilian toll in Ukraine - GZERO Media ›
- Next steps for a world at a make-or-break moment: Davos 2022 - GZERO Media ›
Hard Numbers: EU semiconductors, Ortega vs students, Taiwan missile defense upgrade, US mask mandates, TikToking at 92
48 billion: The EU plans to spend $48 billion to become a major chipmaking hub in response to the global semiconductor shortage. The US also wants to produce more homegrown semiconductors and reduce its dependency on Asian suppliers.
6: Nicaragua’s parliament passed a law authorizing the state to take control of six universities deemed to be critical of strongman President Daniel Ortega. Students from all six schools participated in the 2018 street protests, which failed to oust Ortega.
100 million: The Pentagon has approved selling Taiwan $100 million worth of US-made tech to upgrade the self-governing island’s Patriot missile defense system. Washington doesn’t officially recognize Taiwan but continues to supply weapons to Taipei amid rising tensions with China.
5: New York is the fifth US state to announce plans to lift some mask mandates as COVID cases fall. Other states looking to ease restrictions include California, Connecticut, Delaware, and Oregon.
80 million: A 92-year-old Malawian musician was invited to dine with the president and stay at a swanky hotel after a song he performed for his daughter got more than 80 million views on TikTok. Giddes Chalamanda didn’t post the video himself because he doesn’t have a smartphone (or the electricity to charge one).
What would a Chinese invasion of Taiwan look like?
When asked about where a US-China war may start, US Admiral James Stavridis (Ret.) doesn't hesitate: Taiwan. He suggests that China may believe the US is distracted by internal politics: "I think it would be a miscalculation on the part of the Chinese, but they may calculate that now is the moment." How would a move against Taiwan play out? Stavridis speculates how the Chinese military may plan to invade the island on the upcoming episode of GZERO World, which begins airing on US public television Friday, May 14. Check local listings.
Visitors look at Chinese Air Force fighter jets at a military base in Hangzhou.
What We’re Watching: China targets Taiwan, Palestinian election heats up, Russia-Ukraine border tensions
Chinese jets swarm Taiwan: This week, multiple Chinese warplanes penetrated Taiwan's airspace. While Beijing does this quite often to flex its muscles, this time the jets took a different route, and one even got close to the Japanese island of Yonaguni, located less than 70 miles (113 kilometers) north of Taiwan. The maneuvers have been interpreted by experts as a direct warning from the Chinese to Japan not to overplay its hand. (It's worth noting that Tokyo could get dragged into a US conflict with China over Taiwan because, like Taiwan, it has a mutual defense treaty with the US.) More broadly, the flight patterns also indicate that China could surround Taiwan on three sides in an eventual invasion, cutting off the territory from US and Japanese military support. All this comes as the Biden administration has expressed serious concern (paywall) that Beijing is indeed planning to invade Taiwan in the very near term. With US-China relations getting hot, more rumblings over an invasion of Taiwan will surely turn the temperature even higher.
Palestinians' election shake-up: Next month, the Palestinian Authority will hold its first elections since 2006 — and things have started to get very interesting. Palestinian militant Marwan Barghouti, a longtime PA member who is serving multiple life sentences for murdering Israelis, plans to challenge longtime leader Mahmoud Abbas for the presidency. Abbas — who at 85 has led the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority for 16 years and postponed elections in the past for fear of losing — is now facing formidable opposition from two former Fatah veterans: Barghouti, who is extremely popular with Palestinian voters, and Mahmoud Dahlan, a former PA security chief who was exiled after a fierce dispute with the current leadership (Dahlan has been banned from running, but says he will persevere). While Barghouti is doing well in the polls, analysts say that his split with Abbas could help the rival Hamas militant group, which rules the Gaza Strip with an iron fist. Legislative elections are currently scheduled for May 22 and presidential polls for July 31. When elections were last held, a PA-Hamas dispute turned bloody, resulting in an enduring split in Palestinian leadership. What will happen this time?
Russian troops on Ukraine's doorstep: As fighting surged between Russian-backed separatists and government forces in eastern Ukraine this week, Moscow deployed several thousand of its own troops to the Ukrainian border, raising fears that the low-level conflict could get much uglier. The uptick in violence leaves a ceasefire from last summer in tatters. It's now been seven years since Ukrainian protesters ousted a pro-Moscow president, leading Russia to annex Crimea and foment a civil war that brought pro-Moscow separatists to power in two Ukrainian provinces along the Russian border. Peace talks between the two sides have repeatedly broken down over the question of who should do what first: Ukraine wants control over its border, while Russia wants Kyiv to devolve significant power to the separatists and legitimize them with elections. The Russians say their recent troop movements are nothing to worry about and no one else's business, but the Pentagon now considers the uptick in violence an "imminent crisis."