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How Trump 2.0 could reshape US foreign policy, with the New York Times' David Sanger
Listen: On January 20, 2025, Donald Trump will re-assume the most powerful office in the world amidst the global backdrop of two major wars, comparatively weaker US allies, more aggressive rogue states, and a more complex and competitive international architecture. On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer sits down with New York Times national security and White House correspondent David Sanger to talk about what US foreign policy might look like under Trump 2.0.
"It's a Donald Trump administration," Sanger tells Bremmer, which means that ideological consistency is not the currency of the moment. Loyalty is the currency of the moment." Some of Trump's picks so far show how important loyalty is to him and also that he's no longer going to defer to any "adults" in the room. He wants a cabinet that empowers him rather than reining him in. Moreover, Sanger notes that Trump will be taking the reins of the world’s most powerful office with the full support of the Senate, House, and a deeply conservative Supreme Court. Oh, and those moderating guardrails—like Mattis and Kelly—from the first Trump term? Gone. In short order, the entire world will know what Trump unleashed looks like. Whether or not that's a good thing...only time will tell.
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.
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The future of modern warfare
Technology in Ukraine is transforming the battlefield in real time. How will it change the US national security strategy? And could what's happening in Ukraine shift China’s President Xi Jinping’s future plans in Taiwan? Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Admiral James Stravridis joins Ian Bremmer on GZERO World to talk about how technology is creating a “new triad” of warfare, i.e., unmanned systems, cyber and artificial intelligence, and special forces.
Modern conflict no longer requires huge standing armies to fight effectively; just look at Ukraine’s success in the Black Sea. Smaller militaries are increasingly using drones, satellites, and unmanned systems against larger armies. Stavridis says Taiwan is a “resistance fighter’s dream” because of its geography and resources. Plus, it manufactures about half of the world’s computer chips, which China relies on for its technology infrastructure. But Stavridis also warns the same technology is empowering malefactors and terrorist groups, creating dangerous asymmetrical warfare.
“The US will continue to be the preeminent nation at projecting power. China will make a play to do it. Russia, the lights are going to go out,” the Admiral says, “But it’s acts of terrorism and the ability to use weapons of mass disruption, that’s what you need to worry about.”
For more on technology and the transformation of war, check out Admiral Stavridis’ book "2054: A Novel". His newest book, "The Restless Wave", a historical novel about the rise of new technology in the Pacific during WWII, is out October 8.
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don''t miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).
Ian Explains: Will China invade Taiwan?
President Xi Jinping has made it clear he wants to bring Taiwan under Chinese control. But how would he actually send troops to the island? And after watching Russia get bogged down in two years of grinding war in Ukraine, has his calculus changed? On Ian Explains, Ian Bremmer lays out Xi’s strategies for achieving his primary political goal: reunification with Taiwan.
Overall, the chances of an all-out Chinese invasion are slim to none. It would be a huge political and military risk for China, and its economy can’t afford the hit of global sanctions. Beijing is also deeply dependent on Taiwan for its technology infrastructure: Taiwan’s TSMC manufactures more than half of the world’s computer chips that power things like phones and electric cars. But Taiwan’s economy is also dependent on China, its largest trading partner. So Xi could still apply plenty of pressure without sending a single troop to the island. Will Xi try to solve his “Taiwan problem” before he leaves office?
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don''t miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).
Xi Jinping's solution to his "Taiwan problem"
"Xi has made it clear he plans to go solve the Taiwan problem while he's still in office." That's New York Times national security correspondent and New Cold Wars author David Sanger on why China's leader is setting his sights on the slender island off its eastern coast. Xi Jinping has made no secret of his belief that Taiwan belongs to China and that it is a national security imperative to bring it under Chinese sovereignty. But it's also an American national security imperative to prevent Xi from doing so, says Sanger. That's because the small island nation still manufactures the vast majority of the critical semiconductor microchips that power our modern world in both China and the United States.
"What Biden has done here in the semiconductor field of trying to choke the Chinese of the most advanced chips, but also the equipment to make those chips while trying to build up here, is the right step." At the same time, however, the Biden administration's push to manufacture more chips in the United States may also imperil the "silicon shield" that currently protects Taiwan from its Chinese neighbor. Nevertheless, Sanger argues that it's not just an industrial imperative for the United States to become self-sufficient in this area. It's a national defense imperative one as well."For our long-term security, it is much more important to build those [semiconductor factories] fabs than it is to build those aircraft carriers."
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
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Supporters of Lai Ching-te, Taiwan's vice president and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's presidential candidate attend, a campaign event in New Taipei City, Taiwan, on Jan. 6, 2024.
Taiwan holds first big election of 2024
The world will be watching when Taiwanese voters head to the polls on Jan. 13 to choose their next president. The first in a series of elections with global ramifications in 2024, Taiwan’s vote will be a flashpoint in the tense US-China relationship. China regards Taiwan as a breakaway territory and has vowed to unify with it, by force if necessary. Taiwan has the backing of the US, which would feel pressured to come to the island’s defense in the event of a conflict with China.
The election is shaping up into a close contest between the independence-leaning candidate William Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, and Hou You-ih of the Kuomintang, aka KMT, who favors closer relations with China.
We asked Eurasia Group expert Ava Shen what to watch for.
What is the state of play of the race?
The DPP’s Lai remains the front-runner and has held a consistent lead in this election cycle, but his lead has been narrowing. According to the latest polling data available from Jan. 1-2, he is about five points ahead of the KMT’s Hou, who started gaining ground in late November. Winning the party’s official nomination, with Jaw Shaw-kong chosen as his running mate, has helped Hou consolidate the support of the KMT base. The end to efforts to broker a presidential joint ticket with Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party, or TPP, has also helped.
This momentum gives the KMT a lot of confidence in its ability to mobilize a last-minute surge in support, possibly thanks to strategic voting by TPP supporters who don’t want another DPP administration. Lai remains favored to win, but it’s going to be close. It’s also noteworthy that Lai, if he wins, would probably do so with less than 50% of the vote. That marks a shift from the elections of 2016 and 2020 when current President Tsai Ing-wen comfortably cleared that threshold.
What would a Lai victory mean for relations with China?
Beijing would probably have an immediate negative reaction. It has signaled multiple times that it is deeply wary of Lai, who has a history of comments in favor of full independence for Taiwan, a red line for China. It would respond in two ways. First, it would probably reduce the number of Taiwanese products that are subject to preferential tariff rates under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, the cross-strait trade agreement signed in 2010. In a warning shot to Taiwan’s voters, it excluded 12 Taiwanese products from the agreement in mid-December.
Second, China would likely intensify what it has already been doing in the military sphere. If Beijing judges any of Lai’s post-election remarks to be provocative, it will consider flying larger numbers of fighter jets over the Taiwan Strait, deploying more coast guard or naval vessels, and possibly moving those military assets closer to Taiwan’s main island. It could enter for the first time Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone.
But Lai has moderated his rhetoric recently, hasn’t he?
Yes. He has indicated on the campaign trail that he would maintain the status quo and continue the approach that Tsai has taken to cross-strait relations. Still, from Beijing’s perspective, this is not enough. It does not like Tsai’s cross-strait policies but believes she has exercised restraint in managing tensions. It views Lai as more reckless.
Nonetheless, as I said, Lai is not likely to win by a large margin, and his party will probably lose its majority in the legislature. This is important to Beijing because it sends a signal that the DPP doesn’t have complete control over the island’s politics and that not everyone supports independence. That gives Beijing some hope that the idea of unification is not dead.
So, we think tensions are likely to rise in the event of a Lai victory, but it won’t be a catastrophic situation.
And what would a Hou victory mean for cross-strait relations?
If Hou wins, there is less of a risk of Beijing increasing the pressure against Taipei in the short term. However, there is a risk it will resume aggressive tactics over the long term if Hou doesn’t agree to upgrade cross-strait ties economically and politically. China wants to move toward more regular contact between government officials on both sides and take steps toward unification.
Hou has said he wants to start with more cultural and economic engagement, and if things go well, gradually progress to more political exchange, something that Taiwanese society broadly opposes. So, he's saying he wants to put off the political engagement that Beijing is seeking, and the question is, how long is Beijing going to patiently wait?
What’s at stake for the US in this election?
The US’s official stance is that it has no preferred candidate, and I think it has been consistent in maintaining this approach even in private interactions with Taiwan counterparts. The bilateral relationship is robust, and all three of the main Taiwanese parties are committed to close US ties.
That said, President Joe Biden’s administration likely recognizes that a Lai victory has the potential to jeopardize the recent stabilization of the fraught US-China relationship if it provokes an aggressive Chinese response, putting the US under pressure to offer a gesture of support. As Eurasia Group noted in its Top Risks 2024 report, Lai is one of a handful of “dangerous friends,” a group of friendly world leaders who may draw the US into expanded conflicts this year.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
Eric Chu, Taiwan’s main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) chairman, Hou Yu-ih, KMT presidential candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, former Taiwan president and Ke Wen-je, presidential candidate from the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) pose after thier meeting on November 15, 2023.
Will Taiwan’s opposition unity ticket remain united?
The two main Taiwanese opposition parties are deadlocked over how to interpret the polls that will determine which of their preferred presidential candidates squares up against incumbent party candidate William Lai in January. If they don’t reach an agreement by Wednesday — it’s looking unlikely — Lai’s probable victory will likely raise tensions across the Taiwan Strait and pose problems for the US-China relationship.
Last week, the Kuomintang Party, backing Hou Yu-ih, and the Taiwan People’s Party, backing Ko Wen-je, announced an agreement by which one of the two men would bow out based on the results of public and internal polling. Doing so would prevent splitting the opposition vote and put Lai under serious pressure. However, by Sunday, each side was squabbling about which specific polls merited inclusion and how to measure the margin of error.
There’s still a chance they can smooth it out, but they’ll need to act fast, says Eurasia Group Taiwan expert Ava Shen. The candidates need to be registered by Friday to be on the ballot come January.
Should they fail, Lai’s chances of winning remain high, much to the chagrin of officials in Beijing who would prefer the more dovish cross-strait policies of either Hou or Ko. Lai’s recent announcement that Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s former representative to the US, will be his running mate has done nothing to alleviate Beijing’s concerns. Hsiao was deeply involved in organizing former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit last year, which infuriated China and caused a major rupture in US ties.
“[Hsiao’s] nomination has further convinced Beijing that this is not a government that Beijing could work with if they come to power,” said Shen. “And, in turn, Beijing would perceive more utility in cranking up the pressure on Taiwan through military means and through economic coercion measures.”
The Eastern Theatre Command of the People\'s Liberation Army (PLA) released photo of exercises involving missile strikes, warplanes, and ship movements crossing the midline of the Taiwan Strait
China raises the stakes further in the Taiwan Strait
Last week was a busy one for naval traffic in the Taiwan Strait, as the U.S. and Canada sailed warships through as a reminder to China, and the world, that Taiwan’s partners will ensure that the waterway remains freely navigable.
This week, China responded with its own traffic.
Between Sunday and Monday, China flew over 100 warplanes towards Taiwan, with 40 of them crossing the midway point between the two, the “median line.” While Chinese flights like this aren’t uncommon, the number of planes set a record. That’s a sign Beijing may be stepping up activity in response to perceived aggression from the U.S. (and Canada).
The latest tit-for-tats over Taiwan come as Canada and the US seem to be pulling in slightly different directions when it comes to China. The Biden administration has lately been looking to stabilize relations with its chief rival, while Trudeau’s government is launching an inquiry into foreign political interference that spotlights Beijing.
Soldier miniatures are seen in front of displayed Chinese and Taiwanese flags.
US vs. China in Taiwan
The US and China may not be in a Cold War — but they could end up fighting a hot war over Taiwan.
For many, the question is not if but when Xi Jinping will decide to invade the self-ruled island. Maybe 2025, especially if a pro-independence candidate wins Taiwan's presidential election next year and the US president is distracted by messy domestic politics. Another option is 2027, when Xi has told the Chinese military to be ready to attack. Or perhaps he will just kick the can down the road until his final deadline, 2049, when the People’s Republic turns 100.
Regardless, annexing Taiwan by force would be a huge gamble for China.
For one thing, Xi knows that no matter how much China boosts defense spending, its military has not been tested in combat since 1979, when it — checks notes — lost a border war with Vietnam. For another, China's leader is probably having second thoughts after the Western response to Russia's war in Ukraine.
What's more, the US is treaty-bound, under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, to help Taiwan defend itself. (Not defend Taiwan, whatever President Biden says.) But getting weapons to Taiwan under China's nose will risk direct conflict with US forces, potentially triggering World War III.
Finally, if you think the war in Ukraine did a number on the global economy, a US-China fight over Taiwan would be much worse. The island is a chipmaking superpower, and the potential hit to global supply chains is uncharted territory.