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North Macedonia's EU membership bid complicated by new nationalist government
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden, shares his perspective on European politics from Arizona, US.
What's the outcome and the likely result of the North Macedonia parliamentary election?
A new government, more nationalist, more rightists coming in. And the problem with that is that North Macedonia has made a number of concessions in order to make its EU path possible. First concessions through Greece in terms of the names and the number of concessions through France and a number of concessions through Bulgaria on minority and related issues. And the new government has got to say no to a lot of these things. And that further complicates the EU process, which is highly regrettable because the country in substance really deserves to move forward on that process.
What was the result of Xi Jinping's much celebrated tour of Europe?
Well, the tour was really restricted to France, where he had the usual talks with President Macron and I think Macron was an alliance, was an alliance had the right words concerning what China is doing in terms of supporting Ukraine, which is supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine, which is creating problems in the relationship to Europe, whether it's sorted out any of the economic issues remains to be seen. And then, of course, he went on to Serbia and to Hungary, which are much more China-friendly countries and much publicity and new agreements of different sorts. But if you to talk about the overall relationship between China and Europe, the European Union, I don't think much was changed by this particular trip.
Xi Jinping's solution to his "Taiwan problem"
"Xi has made it clear he plans to go solve the Taiwan problem while he's still in office." That's New York Times national security correspondent and New Cold Wars author David Sanger on why China's leader is setting his sights on the slender island off its eastern coast. Xi Jinping has made no secret of his belief that Taiwan belongs to China and that it is a national security imperative to bring it under Chinese sovereignty. But it's also an American national security imperative to prevent Xi from doing so, says Sanger. That's because the small island nation still manufactures the vast majority of the critical semiconductor microchips that power our modern world in both China and the United States.
"What Biden has done here in the semiconductor field of trying to choke the Chinese of the most advanced chips, but also the equipment to make those chips while trying to build up here, is the right step." At the same time, however, the Biden administration's push to manufacture more chips in the United States may also imperil the "silicon shield" that currently protects Taiwan from its Chinese neighbor. Nevertheless, Sanger argues that it's not just an industrial imperative for the United States to become self-sufficient in this area. It's a national defense imperative one as well."For our long-term security, it is much more important to build those [semiconductor factories] fabs than it is to build those aircraft carriers."
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
- Biden, chips, and the Silicon Shield ›
- The geopolitics of the chips that make your tech work ›
- Graphene: Could it reduce chip-making costs? ›
- Taiwan’s outsize importance in manufacturing semiconductor chips ›
- The semiconductor battle is heating up ›
- Why the US-China relationship is more stable than you might think - GZERO Media ›
US TikTok ban: China’s complaints are a double standard
Beijing blocks US technology companies like Facebook, Google, and X from operating in China. So why is the Chinese government so upset over the proposed TikTok ban in Congress? US Ambassador to China Nick Burns discussed China’s double standard when it comes to foreign tech firms on GZERO World with Ian Bremmer. The US has been pushing for TikTok’s Chinese parent company, ByteDance, to sell the app’s US operation, and millions of nationalist netizens on Chinese social media are decrying it as another example of the US limiting China’s global rise.
Burns says the idea that American firms could operate in China by following Chinese data and national security laws isn’t a convincing argument because a wide swath of US tech has been blocked for years, and China’s “Great Firewall” was set up to insulate Chinese people from the rest of the world. China’s rationale for US tech companies’ absence in China, he says, is fundamentally anti-democratic.
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
- China’s tech crackdown & the Jack Ma problem ›
- TikTok, Huawei, and the US-China tech arms race ›
- US-China tech tensions: the impact on the global digital landscape ›
- US-China tech “Cold War” is on ›
- US-China relationship at its most stable in years as Yellen visits ›
- Why the US-China relationship is more stable than you might think - GZERO Media ›
China shouldn’t “coerce or intimidate” the Philippines in the South China Sea, says US Ambassador
Tensions are rising between China and the Philippines over control of the South China Sea, which Beijing sees as its territory, and Manila as its exclusive economic zone. On GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, US Ambassador Nick Burns explained the US position that it is concerned about China’s aggression in the South China Sea, particularly at Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef where Manila deliberately beached a ship in 1999 and has used as a military outpost ever since.
“China should not seek to coerce or intimidate the government of the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal,” Burns stresses, “The Philippines has an absolute right to resupply their forces.”
Burns emphasizes broad international support for the Philippines’ rights in the area, referencing the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between Washington and Manila. Tensions in the region have escalated sharply since Chinese and Philippine coast guard vessels collided in early March, injuring four Filipino crew members. Burns says China needs to act responsibly and commit to a peaceful resolution on the issue.Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
US aims to maintain military advantage over China by controlling tech
“In critical areas, essential for our national security, we're not going to permit trade,” Burns says, “There's a lot of complaints that I receive from my Chinese counterparts about our de-risking strategy, and I remind them you're doing the same thing.”
Prohibiting the sale of semiconductors isn’t about limiting China’s economy or tech industry, but about maintaining America’s advantage in the race for military development. Burns points to growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific, where the US is keenly interested in maintaining military superiority, and says that so far Washington’s action has been limited to a small yard. Limiting chip exports, he says, is the only way to prevent Chinese leadership from acquiring powerful technologies that could tip the balance of power.Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
Where the US & China agree - and where they don't
“This is largely a competitive relationship,” Burns tells Bremmer. It’ll likely be a systemic rivalry well into the 2030s between the two largest economies in the world and the two strongest militaries in the world, so what happens here is very consequential.”
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
Ian Explains: Xi Jinping's nationalist agenda is rebuilding walls around China
On Ian Explains, Ian Bremmer breaks down how Xi Jinping is turning China inwards at a time when it can’t afford to close itself off. Since assuming the presidency in 2012, Xi has consolidated power within the Communist Party to become China’s most dominant ruler since Chairman Mao Zedong. Under Xi’s watch, China has rolled back democratic rights in Hong Kong, implemented crackdowns on the powerful tech, finance, and real estate sectors, restricted English in schools, and even expanded the definition of espionage so broadly that basic interactions with foreigners are viewed as suspect.
President Xi’s nationalist vision has become so dominant that it's written into the Constitution and official history of the People’s Republic. But will that vision make China hostile to the very ideas that fueled its economic transformation in the first place?
Watch the upcoming episode of GZERO World with Ian Bremmer on US public television (check local listings) and at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld.
(Now former) Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang attends a press conference after talks with his Dutch counterpart Wopke Hoekstra in Beijing.
China's missing foreign minister is out (of a job)
A full month after he vanished from public view, China confirmed the exit of Qin Gang as foreign minister. Qin will be replaced by Wang Yi, who had the job for almost a decade before Qin and is currently the country's most senior diplomat. (Wang also runs foreign policy for the ruling Communist Party, which puts him higher in the CCP pecking order than Qin).
Qin was a rising star who was fast-tracked to the post by Xi Jinping despite a bitter rivalry with Wang. But then he abruptly disappeared, initially for health reasons, as rumors swirled that he was cheating on his wife with a journalist. The Chinese government did not give any reason for his departure.
While the shakeup probably won't have much of an impact on China's foreign policy, which like everything is stage-managed by Xi himself, it might have two spillover effects.
First, with Wang again in charge, Chinese diplomats could feel emboldened to return to aggressive "wolf warrior" rhetoric — right when Beijing is trying to restore dialogue with the US and cool things down with Europe. That said, Wang, 69, will likely only take over the job for one or two years until a suitable replacement is found.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, Qin's departure is (potentially) bad news for his mentor. While state media will quietly sweep the scandal under the rug, the messiness of it all does show that political infighting is still bubbling under the surface even under Xi's tight control of the party. And it highlights one of the main dangers of "Maximum Xi," Eurasia Group's No. 2 top geopolitical risk for 2023: "With few checks and balances left to constrain him and no dissenting voices to challenge his views, Xi's ability to make big mistakes is also unrivaled."
On the one hand, Qin's exit — although probably driven by personal reasons over policy — sure looks like an unforced error by China's leader. On the other, as we've seen with ending zero COVID, Xi also has an uncanny ability to move past screwups very quickly and then act like they never happened.