How Trump 2.0 could reshape US foreign policy, with the New York Times' David Sanger

Transcript: How Trump 2.0 could reshape US foreign policy, with the New York Times' David Sanger

Ian Bremmer:

Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This is where you can find extended versions of my conversations on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer and today we are looking at the wide-reaching geopolitical implications of a second Trump presidency. On January 20 2025, Donald Trump will re-assume the most powerful office in the world, amidst the global backdrop of two major wars, comparatively weaker US allies, more aggressive rogue states, and a more complex and competitive geopolitical architecture. And he'll be taking the reins of the world's most powerful office with full support of the Senate, the House, and a conservative Supreme Court. Oh, and those moderating guardrails—like Mattis and Kelly—from the first Trump term, gone. In short order, the entire world will know what Trump unleashed looks like. Whether or not that's a good thing is something we'll be discussing today. Here to help me unpack it all is a man who follows US national security and foreign policy closer than most, New York Times White House and National Security correspondent David Sanger. He joins me now.

David Sanger, good to have you back on the show.

David Sanger:

Great to be back with you.

Ian Bremmer:

A lot for us to talk about in this environment. Maybe start, you said that we were going to have foreign policy picks that would be America first as opposed to Neocon. What did you mean by that and do you still feel as strongly about it?

David Sanger:

Well, it's a Donald Trump administration, which means that ideological consistency is not the currency of the moment. Loyalty is the currency of the moment. A couple of interesting things about the group of people that he has chosen so far. First of all, we saw none of them in the first term. Second, in the first term, Donald Trump was looking for people who looked like they fit the part. They looked like establishment figures. Rex Tillerson, the former chief executive of ExxonMobil. Jim Mattis, incredibly well-respected former combatant commander, four star, comes back out of retirement and so forth. What did Trump discover? That they were a restraint on him doing-

Ian Bremmer:

What he wants.

David Sanger:

... whatever he wanted to go do.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah. Absolutely.

David Sanger:

And every one of them had something in common. They all got fired. And the first thing he did here was not appoint some people, it was announce who he would never appoint.

Ian Bremmer:

Mike Pompeo, Nikki Haley.

David Sanger:

Mike Pompeo, his former secretary of state who said, "You know, it might not be a good idea to blow up the Iran deal." Or Nikki Haley who ran against him, the completely unforgivable step. So what do we have now? Initially, some very conventional choices. Marco Rubio, you may like his politics, you may not like his politics, he's been in the Senate for 14 years. He has been the vice chair of the Intelligence Committee. He's not an out of boundary choice for secretary of state.

Ian Bremmer:

You could imagine him secretary of state under a Mitt Romney administration.

David Sanger:

You could imagine him a secretary of state in the George W. Bush administration.

Ian Bremmer:

Absolutely.

David Sanger:

But it was a slightly different Marco Rubio. It was a Neocon Marco Rubio back then who was tough on Russia. It was the Marco Rubio who two and a half years ago when Russia invaded, denounced the Russians, led the game to start cutting off their funding and close down their markets for oil and gas. He has shifted in recent times, as has Mike Waltz, the newly appointed national security adviser. Only in the past few months as it became clear they were up for positions in the new administration, did they begin to shave back to 'America First,' which was to say, "We're not going to support the Ukrainians. We're not going to give them another $95 billion." They both found reasons to vote against that Ukraine package.

So what does this tell you? At first, when we heard about Waltz and Rubio, we thought, okay, Trump's roughly replicating his first term. Then came the next wave, the revenge nominees. That is Matt Gaetz as Attorney General. A man who was under investigation by the Justice Department that he would be leading as Attorney General, was under investigation by the House Ethics Committee for, among other things, the possibility of drug use and trafficking in minors. That investigation is now being buried away because he quit his House post just a few days ago. We saw Tulsi Gabbard for Director of National Intelligence. Somebody who took an unexplained trip to Syria to try to work with the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad. Somebody who has frequently spouted Russian talking points during the course of the war, blamed the United States at one point for building a biological weapons lab in Ukraine. There's no evidence they ever did that. This person would be sitting-

Ian Bremmer:

She sort of recanted that eventually.

David Sanger:

She did eventually. But she would be sitting atop the structure of 70,000 intelligence professionals across 16 or 17 different agencies and preparing the presidential daily brief of what President Trump sees each day. Something for which he's had no training and no experience.

Ian Bremmer:

Is it fair to say that Tulsi Gabbard's publicly professed views of the world are close to ideologically opposite from those of Mike Waltz and Marco Rubio, even Mike Waltz and Marco Rubio today? I mean, it does not feel like you put these people in the room, they're going to have very much that they would agree on involving America's foreign policy and national security.

David Sanger:

Yeah, I think that's probably true. Certainly true of the old Mike Waltz of even a few months ago. Now, Iran could be a really interesting example. Here's a country that the US intelligence agencies believe stepped out and tried to assassinate President Trump for his killing of General Soleimani back in 2020. Her view of Iran has been a much softer one, one that doesn't seem to line up with most of the Iran hawks, and they're almost all Iran hawks, that have been appointed so far. Of course, this list goes on and on. For defense secretary, the choice of a former Fox host whose only military experience before has been serving but serving at one point in a National Guard unit that didn't trust him enough to have him out guarding the last inauguration. Seems like a strange choice along the way. None of these folks have been vetted in the normal way.

Ian Bremmer:

And indeed won't be vetted in the normal way because the FBI is not being allowed by President-elect Trump to come and vet them.

David Sanger:

Presumably because he's afraid of what it was they will say. Or they'll come back and say, "We would not recommend this person for security clearance."

Ian Bremmer:

Now, the Trump people would say it's because the FBI has become a politicized institution, is itself not trusted, and needs redress and reform. I mean, this is part of the issue is that the institutions themselves in the United States have become the object of politics, not the policies but the institutions. Is that correct to say?

David Sanger:

It is not only correct to say that, Ian, beyond that, what we have seen is people being put on top of these institutions with the explicit assumption that they're there to go disassemble those institutions from their current state. Which is exactly what the supporters of President Trump were looking for. He was explicit about this. If you voted for Donald Trump in the 2024 election, it was probably with a thought that these institutions need to be blown up. Now, what we haven't heard is what's the image for what they should do from this period forward, other than complete loyalty and fealty to the new president. The president says, "I've got a mandate now." And the truth of the matter is he has a much bigger mandate than he did in 2016. But even with this, we're looking at barely 50% of the vote it looks like. But he's going to come in governing with the thought that he has a mandate, he never has to face the voters again. So he's going to do this agenda the way he wants to do it.

Ian Bremmer:

Where do you think policies will actually change the most under a Trump administration? Because a lot of talk, but the US is still a pretty big set of institutions, hard to move the much. Trump experienced that quite a bit in his first administration. It's not like this is a guy who's super interested in executing on policy and it's not like he's appointed a bunch of people that know how to work bureaucracy in the United States. So I could easily see a bunch of people that say a lot of things, but don't necessarily do a lot of things. Is that an overstatement or do you believe there's some areas that truly you're going to see significant change? What are they?

David Sanger:

So on the first question, can you move what he calls the "deep state?" The answer to that depends on how much he learned in the first term. In the first term, he had a hard time executing on his policies for the first three years because frankly, he didn't understand how the levers of government work. Today, he understands that, but he's appointed some people now who do not. And the question is, does he fill them in with veterans who know how to actually do this? One has to assume that they're going to be more competent at dismantling these organizations than they were in the first term when it was his stated desire, but he had no idea how to do it.

Ian Bremmer:

Are you sure of that? I mean, I'm asking you, I'm pushing because as you said, no one's returning from the first term.

David Sanger:

That's right.

Ian Bremmer:

So I mean, it wasn't like Trump was spending a lot of time figuring out how to build or rebuild institutions or blow them up. And if these people have just as little experience as first term Trump did, then shouldn't we expect the same sort of results?

David Sanger:

We may. You do reform and change in organizations, not just from the secretary level, but from the critical deputies that you put in. And my guess is he's going to bring back some loyalists from the first term. We've already seen that at the White House. Stephen Miller coming back in as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy. Essentially the same kind of role that he played before, but he's been through four years of this. And my guess is that if you look at the first big issue that he's going to take up mass deportation. They're going to work on doing that a lot more quickly in the first term than anything they got done in the first four years from 2016 to 2020.

Ian Bremmer:

I accept that. So let's look at policy for a second. And start with China, which has been comparatively well managed in the last year by the Biden administration. Not so much at the beginning. Chinese Xi Jinping just met with Biden and said, "We welcome working with a new Trump administration." Do you think the Trump administration welcomes working with Xi Jinping?

David Sanger:

So when President Trump has talked about China during the campaign, he has discussed only one issue that deals with only one dimension of an incredibly broad competition with China.

Ian Bremmer:

You mean the tariffs?

David Sanger:

And that's been tariffs. Right. And he's talked about 60% maybe higher tariffs. Now, maybe that's just a bargaining position. This is Donald Trump, everything's for a deal. And if I was the Chinese, my first view of Donald Trump is well dangle some new shiny trade deal in front of him and he'll be amenable on anything. That's how they got out of some of the sanctions that they were worried about in the first term. Here's the big question for China. If you were looking at the three elements of the Biden policy, part one was trade. He's the one who put 100% tariffs on new Chinese all electric cars. So he was trying to sort of preempt the Trump argument before there were any Chinese cars on the streets in America. He did not pull back on any of the Trump era tariffs. He didn't expand them much other than the cars, but didn't do that.

The second thing he did was a strategy of depriving China of the most advanced semiconductors, we've discussed this before, while trying to build up the industry here in the United States. This is for the core technology that everything else depends on. And here I think there will be some change. President Trump at the end of his campaign expressed great doubt about the CHIPS and Science Act, which by the way, had its origins in his previous presidency. But we'll set that aside for a moment. And what he said was, "With tariffs, you can force everybody to build these chips here in the United States."

Ian Bremmer:

So you don't need the subsidies?

David Sanger:

You don't need the subsidies. I might argue the flip side of that after spending a lot of time and work on a book on the question of why it is that we let the manufacturing of our most advanced chips all go to Taiwan. I guess my answer to that would be the United States can't afford at this point to put huge tariffs on imported advanced semiconductors because we don't make them right now. Everything we get, we're getting from Taiwan Semiconductor. And so to do that would be to make our own products uncompetitive. Secondly, the question's going to be, will President Trump continue President Biden's statements that the United States would come to the aid of Taiwan if it was invaded or choked off by the Chinese? I'm having a really hard time imagining Donald Trump looking at a globe saying, "This island is way over there. The Chinese are 100 miles away, we're thousands of miles away. This would be far worse than any conflict over Ukraine or something." I can't imagine him saying that an 'America First' policy would call for the defense of Taiwan.

Ian Bremmer:

And yet Republicans in Congress are among the strongest in diplomatic, economic and military support for Taiwan.

David Sanger:

Including Marco Rubio.

Ian Bremmer:

And many of the point people that he's just appointed would also subscribe to that. And it's not as if Taiwan is a top priority for Trump. You'll remember first term when Trump was there, he took a congratulatory phone call from the Taiwanese president, caused a crisis, Kissinger had to clean it up.

David Sanger:

That's right. And Henry Kissinger isn't around right now to go play cleanup.

Ian Bremmer:

But he's got Elon.

David Sanger:

That's true.

Ian Bremmer:

Is that the way he fixed-

David Sanger:

So Elon Musk may be the secret envoy to China. Because Musk has so many business interests related to China right now and so many interests that he would like to see. He'd love to see Starlink become part of that. He'd love to see China begin to take up some of what SpaceX does. He'd love access to those markets. This raises the most interesting question, which is what do you do if your special envoy on big relationships also tends to have huge potential economic relationships with the country that he's dealing with? Now, that didn't seem to bother him in the first term when it dealt with the Trump organization's investments around the world.

Ian Bremmer:

But that was small and non-strategic.

David Sanger:

That's right. And so this time it's going to get big, strategic and quite messy. And it's all related, of course, to what he does with Ukraine. Because no one's watching the Ukraine drama play out more carefully than Xi Jinping.

Ian Bremmer:

So we can move to Russia-Ukraine. There's been a phone call, of course, between Trump and Zelensky. Elon was on it. But since then, Zelenskyy has said a whole bunch of things that he never would've said under Biden. Like, "I can see this war being over soon because of Trump coming in." Do you think this is going to be one of Trump's earliest wins?

David Sanger:

There are two areas where he could get early wins. I mean, clearly Bibi Netanyahu is holding out a deal in-

Ian Bremmer:

Lebanon.

David Sanger:

... in Lebanon. That could be an early win. The question here is what do you call a win? What would Trump like? Trump would love to come in as the man who ended the Ukraine war. He doesn't particularly care whether or not it ends on terms that give Vladimir Putin 20% of the country and therefore ratifies Putin's bet that he could expand Russia's borders by doing the invasion. So during the Biden administration, the byword was nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. Which was to say, "We're not going to go negotiate with the Russians behind Ukraine's back and then force them into a deal." I'm not entirely sure, Ian, how it is that you get an agreement in 24 hours to end the war.

But the only way I can imagine in my limited way for how you do that in 24 hours is you have a call with Vladimir Putin and you say, "Vlad, what do you need?" And he's going to say, "Well, how about the 20% of the country I already have and a commitment that Ukraine-

Ian Bremmer:

Can't join NATO.

David Sanger:

... will never join NATO." Or can't join them for 30 years or something like that. And then the next phone call you could imagine could be Donald Trump to Zelensky, "Do I have a deal for you. For a mere 20% of your country and for a commitment that you will not join NATO, you'll get peace, you'll get investment. I'll send my best hotel buddies over to think about how they can rebuild Kyiv. It'll be beautiful. You'll continue to be able to have a corridor down to ship your grain out from across the Black Sea." And so you can easily imagine him sort of forcing a deal. And Zelensky wouldn't have much of a choice because the alternative would be a full cut off of US aid.

Ian Bremmer:

Right. Which he utterly and desperately needs. And look, certainly Zelensky has shown in the last couple weeks that he recognizes that he needs desperately to stay on Trump's good side.

David Sanger:

The sign for this, Ian, is that all of a sudden the Ukrainians are talking about what do the security guarantees look like? Now, remember when they gave back the nuclear weapons that were on their soil, they got a security guarantee that was supposed to be signed up to by the United States, Britain-

Ian Bremmer:

And Russia.

David Sanger:

... and Russia. And that turned out not to be terribly valuable in 2022.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, they'd be much better off with nukes right now.

David Sanger:

If their nukes were under their control, which in the old world, they really never were. But absolutely. And you heard Zelensky began to muse about nuclear weapons a few weeks ago. Here's the problem with the deal that's coming together. At one point, American officials said their goal here was, this was during the Biden era, to make sure that Russia could never do anything like this again. Not to Ukraine, not to anybody else. They've clearly failed at that objective. And the deal that seems to be everyone's dancing around would give some territory to Russia. But I don't understand what would keep Russia from using some time to rebuild, learn the lessons from the mistakes they made and move to take the rest of Ukraine.

Ian Bremmer:

What would prevent them would be a constellation of countries beyond Ukraine prepared to defend Ukraine. So if the Poles, the Balts, the Nordics, the French, for example, were prepared to put troops on the ground in Ukraine, even without NATO, you could see a situation where Putin would need to think twice before he wanted to continue. Now, are we going to see that from the countries that are most concerned about Ukraine right now?

David Sanger:

First order question is, is Vladimir Putin interested in a negotiation right now? He may think things are going his way and he should just keep rolling for a while and then negotiate. Okay, second order question is-

Ian Bremmer:

And he is taking more territory right now as we speak.

David Sanger:

As we speak. And so he may think, yeah, give this another six months, then let's talk. Second thing that could be going on is, are all of the countries that you named willing to go do that if the United States is not part of the game, at least providing arms and intelligence? Because the one thing they can't do is provide the level of support the US has done. Not just financially, but none of the countries you named have active satellite networks that are watching the Russians 24/7. None of them can help you with the reality today that we're in a world of constant surveillance where it's very hard to move troops without being seen. The US has those powers. Is the US prepared to be part of that security guarantee? And if it is, why not do it through all of NATO?

Ian Bremmer:

So do you think that in five years time NATO is still a functional, US-led, multilateral collective security alliance?

David Sanger:

This is a topic on which I would not bet a day's pay. Do I think that Donald Trump is going to pull out? No. Do I think that Donald Trump will threaten to pull out? Probably. At the moment that the United States no longer expresses support for NATO, does the alliance mean much? Because it's the critical provider of all of those things I just described. And so the essence of the NATO Alliance is the certainty that adversaries have that if they invade a NATO nation, they're at war with the United States.

That's why Putin has not let a single stray rocket, missile, troop invasion go into NATO territory. He hasn't even attacked equipment coming into Ukraine while it was still on NATO territory. He does not want to get into that conflict. It could be a very different thing if he thinks that Donald Trump is really not going to back NATO in that case. And I could imagine him testing with a smaller NATO country. I don't know if it's Lithuania or if it's Estonia, but some place where the briefing for Donald Trump would start with a big map that shows where they are and a really little country, and him asking the question, do I want to get into a war with Russia over this little piece of territory?

Ian Bremmer:

So the attractiveness to Putin of probes and tests in the coming years is going way up?

David Sanger:

Absolutely. Because he is not certain how Trump will respond. President Trump has suggested that in conversations with Putin in the past, he has warned him in the sternest of terms. I think we have reason to doubt that.

Ian Bremmer:

So let's move to the Middle East. And of course, Trump's best relations in the world have been with the Gulf states, have been with the Israelis. You said that you thought this is an easy win on Lebanon. I can see that, there's already been a lot of work done with the Biden administration on that issue. How about with the Saudis and the Israelis? Do you think that we're going to see an extension of the Abraham Accords going forward?

David Sanger:

You could very well. Let's face it, the Abraham Accords were the one foreign policy gem that the Trump administration left Biden. And the Biden folks made no bones about it. They said Abraham Accords were great and their only desire here was to expand them to a deal with Saudi Arabia that would have called for a separate Palestinian state, wasn't clear if Bibi Netanyahu was going to sign up for that. And for a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia that-

Ian Bremmer:

A civilian nuclear.

David Sanger:

A civilian nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia that would've allowed the Saudis to produce their own nuclear fuel, much as the Iranians do. This goes against 20 years of US precedent here, where they say, "None of these countries, including the UAE, needed to produce their own uranium. Let's not create the possibility of a bomb project here." They were willing to toss that aside in return for a bunch of guarantees and inspection, but to allow the Saudis to go do this.

Ian Bremmer:

That does feel quaint in today's environment. And that's not much of a give from the Americans really.

David Sanger:

It does feel quaint. On the other hand, it's a rough precedent for them to sign up to after years of nonproliferation theory, in which we said, "No reason to give a country the right to produce their own stuff and run the risk of becoming an Iran, becoming a North Korea." At some point, I suspect that Donald Trump's got a much better chance of getting that deal together now than Joe Biden did.

Ian Bremmer:

Even though there's no Palestinian state in the works?

David Sanger:

That's right. And the question is, do the Saudis stick to their insistence on that?

Ian Bremmer:

Would you say no?

David Sanger:

It's hard to tell, I suspect no.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah. I think I'm with you on that.

David Sanger:

However, the message to Bibi Netanyahu is going to be, do whatever it is you need to do in these wars, Bibi.

Ian Bremmer:

But end them.

David Sanger:

But end them.

Ian Bremmer:

I mean, Trump doesn't want unending wars in the Middle East under Trump.

David Sanger:

That's certainly right. But his message so far has been do what you need to do. So you're not going to see letters like the one you saw a few months ago or a month ago from Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin, that says, "You are in violation of US law about allowing humanitarian goods to flow into Gaza." In which they said, "We would have to go review whether we can ship arms to you." Well, they finished their review and the answer is, we're still shipping arms. But what was Netanyahu's bet? Ignore the Biden administration because Donald Trump might get elected. And he rolled the dice and he won big time.

Ian Bremmer:

Was that really the bet? Or was it just ignore the Biden administration because Biden's going to do everything for us anyway?

David Sanger:

Really good question, Ian. I think the first bet was yours, that Biden in the end will not make good on the leverage the United States has. But I think at some point in the spring when things got really testy with the Biden administration, then I think Netanyahu just shut down and said, "Let's see who wins this election." Because he'd probably be operating somewhat differently right now.

Ian Bremmer:

One place we see a lot of ideological alignment from the Trump appointees is of course on Israel. This has to be the strongest, most pro-Israel constellation of leaders, and in some ways, the most overtly anti-Palestinian constellation of leaders that a US administration has ever seen. I'm thinking not just of the top cabinet officials, but also Elise Stefanik for UN, Mike Huckabee for ambassador.

David Sanger:

So let's look at those two, Ian. First of all, he appointed his UN ambassador and his Israel ambassador before he appointed a secretary of state. Which tells you he wasn't really terribly interested in what his future secretary of state thought about these ambassadors will report. Nominally Elise would report to the secretary of state. Usually you appoint a secretary of state and then you say, "Okay, let's have a discussion about who should be at the UN, who should be in Israel, and by the way, who should be in China and Russia." Which he hasn't done yet at all. So what's that tell you? That tells you that Donald Trump wanted to send the message. These two ambassadors report straight to me.

Second, in Mike Huckabee, he picked somebody from the evangelical side of the Republican Party who has said in the past that the Palestinians don't really exist as a people, that the West Bank isn't really a separate territory, it is just part of Israel. And so he's laid his cards out pretty well on the table. The question is, does this so poison the chances that the United States could act as something of a intermediary between the Palestinians and the Israelis? Which has been the sort of traditional role. Or is he saying with this, we are so far in the camp with the current Israeli government that we're not going to pretend to go do that, we're going to get a peace deal here by doing it directly with Netanyahu?

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah, I think Trump's position would be, look, we created a two-state solution as part of the Abraham Accords last time around. Take it or leave it. Palestinians refused to take it. And so now we no longer support a two-state solution.

David Sanger:

Well, I'm not sure that Donald Trump was ever a real full supporter of the two-state solution in the first term. There was a famous moment where he said, "Two states, one state, kind of whatever works. I mean, it doesn't make that big a difference." Well, it makes a big difference. And I think if you're the Palestinians, you're going to think to yourself, you may be forced into a deal here because both Hamas and Hezbollah have been left in such terrible shape. I think the real crunch with Netanyahu though doesn't come over Gaza.

Ian Bremmer:

Gaza.

David Sanger:

It doesn't come over Lebanon.

Ian Bremmer:

It's Iran.

David Sanger:

It's Iran. It's the big element here. I don't think that Donald Trump wants to get into a direct conflict with Iran. He pulled back from many opportunities to do so in his first term.

Ian Bremmer:

And Elon went and met with the Iranian ambassador to the UN for an hour.

David Sanger:

And we never really heard what that was all about.

Ian Bremmer:

Well, we kind of heard from the Iranians in talking to the Europeans and others. That they're very interested in seeing if they can engage.

David Sanger:

Right.

Ian Bremmer:

So I mean, at least the channels are open.

David Sanger:

They are. And wouldn't it be a remarkable thing, an astounding thing, maybe a Nobel Prize winning thing, if you could get a deal between the United States and Iran that Donald Trump brought along?

Ian Bremmer:

If so, it would clearly be a stronger deal than JCPOA was under Obama. It would have to be.

David Sanger:

Or at least he would have to cast it as such. He's tried nuclear diplomacy once.

Ian Bremmer:

With the North Koreans.

David Sanger:

It didn't work out so well. By my count, they've got 60 to 100 nuclear weapons now. The end of the Singapore meeting, the first meeting with Kim Jong Un, at one point the president said during a press conference in response to a question I asked there, "Oh, I think within months you will see the North Koreans turning over their nuclear weapons." Well, it didn't happen. If you're the Iranians right now, you've got a really tough choice because your proxies are in tough shape. Your own missiles don't seem to be able to get inside Israel terribly well, given the last two experiences. So there's going to be a faction in Iran that's going to say, "Our only choice here is, lift the fatwa on nuclear weapons. Let's go for building it." And there's going to be another choice saying, "That's the one thing with Donald Trump we can't do."

Ian Bremmer:

You can't do. Or with the Israelis for that matter.

David Sanger:

That's right.

Ian Bremmer:

Yeah. David Sanger, good have you on.

David Sanger:

Great to be with you.

Ian Bremmer:

That's it for today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast. Do you like what you heard? Of course you do. Why not make it official? Why don't you rate and review GZERO World, five stars, only five stars, otherwise don't do it. On Apple, Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts. And tell your friends.