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Taiwan's Vice President Lai Ching-te, who heads the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, raises his fist after winning the presidential election in Taipei on Jan. 13, 2024.
Taiwan elects pro-independence candidate, calls Beijing’s bluff
Taiwan, one of the freest democracies in Asia, went to the polls on Saturday for a highly anticipated election with implications for both cross-strait and US-China relations.
As we told you last week, Taiwan’s presidential campaign ended up being a close race between independence-leaning candidate William Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, and Hou You-ih of the Kuomintang, aka KMT, who favors closer relations with China.
On the day, Lai came out on top with 40% of the vote, beating Hou by almost 7 percentage points. But Lai’s DPP didn’t have the same success: The party lost control in the legislature, winning 51 of 113 seats, while the KMT netted 52, and the third party, the TPP, won eight.
The defeat of China’s preferred candidate is likely to ruffle some feathers back in Beijing. China sees Taiwan as a breakaway territory and is determined to reunify, by force if necessary, but so far Lai’s remarks have not been escalatory. Also, the DPP’s loss of the legislative majority means Beijing isn’t in the worst-case scenario and might preclude the most aggressive responses.
“Chinese initial reactions are unlikely to be escalatory,” says Eurasia Group expert Ava Shen, “given that Lai's remarks on cross-strait relations after the elections were fairly measured.”
While the DPP losing seats in the legislature, Shen says, “will make it more difficult for Lai to push his domestic agenda through the legislature,” he still has room to maneuver when it comes to foreign policy, cross-strait relations, and defense.
So all eyes now turn to Lai to see how much independence rhetoric he uses in the days and weeks ahead – talk that could help determine China’s response. Any real moves against Taiwan, which is backed by Washington, could lead to a wider conflict.
Supporters of Lai Ching-te, Taiwan's vice president and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's presidential candidate attend, a campaign event in New Taipei City, Taiwan, on Jan. 6, 2024.
Taiwan holds first big election of 2024
The world will be watching when Taiwanese voters head to the polls on Jan. 13 to choose their next president. The first in a series of elections with global ramifications in 2024, Taiwan’s vote will be a flashpoint in the tense US-China relationship. China regards Taiwan as a breakaway territory and has vowed to unify with it, by force if necessary. Taiwan has the backing of the US, which would feel pressured to come to the island’s defense in the event of a conflict with China.
The election is shaping up into a close contest between the independence-leaning candidate William Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, and Hou You-ih of the Kuomintang, aka KMT, who favors closer relations with China.
We asked Eurasia Group expert Ava Shen what to watch for.
What is the state of play of the race?
The DPP’s Lai remains the front-runner and has held a consistent lead in this election cycle, but his lead has been narrowing. According to the latest polling data available from Jan. 1-2, he is about five points ahead of the KMT’s Hou, who started gaining ground in late November. Winning the party’s official nomination, with Jaw Shaw-kong chosen as his running mate, has helped Hou consolidate the support of the KMT base. The end to efforts to broker a presidential joint ticket with Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party, or TPP, has also helped.
This momentum gives the KMT a lot of confidence in its ability to mobilize a last-minute surge in support, possibly thanks to strategic voting by TPP supporters who don’t want another DPP administration. Lai remains favored to win, but it’s going to be close. It’s also noteworthy that Lai, if he wins, would probably do so with less than 50% of the vote. That marks a shift from the elections of 2016 and 2020 when current President Tsai Ing-wen comfortably cleared that threshold.
What would a Lai victory mean for relations with China?
Beijing would probably have an immediate negative reaction. It has signaled multiple times that it is deeply wary of Lai, who has a history of comments in favor of full independence for Taiwan, a red line for China. It would respond in two ways. First, it would probably reduce the number of Taiwanese products that are subject to preferential tariff rates under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, the cross-strait trade agreement signed in 2010. In a warning shot to Taiwan’s voters, it excluded 12 Taiwanese products from the agreement in mid-December.
Second, China would likely intensify what it has already been doing in the military sphere. If Beijing judges any of Lai’s post-election remarks to be provocative, it will consider flying larger numbers of fighter jets over the Taiwan Strait, deploying more coast guard or naval vessels, and possibly moving those military assets closer to Taiwan’s main island. It could enter for the first time Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone.
But Lai has moderated his rhetoric recently, hasn’t he?
Yes. He has indicated on the campaign trail that he would maintain the status quo and continue the approach that Tsai has taken to cross-strait relations. Still, from Beijing’s perspective, this is not enough. It does not like Tsai’s cross-strait policies but believes she has exercised restraint in managing tensions. It views Lai as more reckless.
Nonetheless, as I said, Lai is not likely to win by a large margin, and his party will probably lose its majority in the legislature. This is important to Beijing because it sends a signal that the DPP doesn’t have complete control over the island’s politics and that not everyone supports independence. That gives Beijing some hope that the idea of unification is not dead.
So, we think tensions are likely to rise in the event of a Lai victory, but it won’t be a catastrophic situation.
And what would a Hou victory mean for cross-strait relations?
If Hou wins, there is less of a risk of Beijing increasing the pressure against Taipei in the short term. However, there is a risk it will resume aggressive tactics over the long term if Hou doesn’t agree to upgrade cross-strait ties economically and politically. China wants to move toward more regular contact between government officials on both sides and take steps toward unification.
Hou has said he wants to start with more cultural and economic engagement, and if things go well, gradually progress to more political exchange, something that Taiwanese society broadly opposes. So, he's saying he wants to put off the political engagement that Beijing is seeking, and the question is, how long is Beijing going to patiently wait?
What’s at stake for the US in this election?
The US’s official stance is that it has no preferred candidate, and I think it has been consistent in maintaining this approach even in private interactions with Taiwan counterparts. The bilateral relationship is robust, and all three of the main Taiwanese parties are committed to close US ties.
That said, President Joe Biden’s administration likely recognizes that a Lai victory has the potential to jeopardize the recent stabilization of the fraught US-China relationship if it provokes an aggressive Chinese response, putting the US under pressure to offer a gesture of support. As Eurasia Group noted in its Top Risks 2024 report, Lai is one of a handful of “dangerous friends,” a group of friendly world leaders who may draw the US into expanded conflicts this year.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
Hou Yu-ih, left, candidate for Taiwan's presidency from the main opposition Kuomintang Party, and Jaw Shaw-Kong, vice presidential candidate, wave at the Central Election Commission in Taipei on Nov. 24, 2023.
Taiwan’s unity ticket falls apart at the altar
The opposition’s shotgun wedding is off in Taiwan. Just two weeks ago, with the blessing of Beijing, the Kuomintang Party and the Taiwan People’s Party announced their intention to field a single candidate in the country’s Jan. 13 election in the hopes of defeating the ruling Democratic Progressive Party. It was a move cheered by China, which is no fan of the current frontrunner, DPP’s pro-independence candidate, William Lai Ching-te.
But on Thursday, negotiations collapsed on the political equivalent of a reality TV show as business magnate and independent candidate Terry Gou moderated a live broadcast of efforts to break the deadlock over which opposition party’s candidate should be on the ballot. After mutual accusations of bad faith, KMT leader Hou Yu-ih read a private text message from TPP rival Ko Wen-Je that said Gou needed to “find a reason” to drop out of the presidential race. In a dramatic finale, KMT negotiators walked off the set as the cameras were rolling.
Both opposition parties have now registered separate candidates in the race. The entire spectacle played into the DPP’s hands, prompting Lai to ask, “Should we dare to hand over the business of running the country to these people?”
The opposition now has little chance of defeating Lai, who further boosted his candidacy last week by naming Hsiao Bi-Kim, Taiwan’s representative to the United States, as his vice-presidential running mate. Since Beijing considers the pair a “union of pro-independence separatists,” analysts agree that a Lai-Hsaio victory would likely further degrade already hostile relations between Taiwan and China, leading to greater military escalation and economic coercion.
People walk next to damaged trees in the aftermath of Hurricane Otis, in Acapulco, Mexico, on Oct. 29, 2023.
Hard Numbers: Otis death toll mounts, Taiwanese march for marriage equality, illegal Indian migrants in the US, South Africa’s rugby win, Sweden proves No. 1
43: The death toll in Acapulco following Hurricane Otis now stands at 43. Another five were killed in nearby Coyuca de Benitez, and dozens of people remain missing. Authorities say more than 220,000 homes and 80% of the hotel sector have been damaged, while more than 513,000 people have lost power.
180,000: An estimated 180,000 people marched on Saturday in a Taipei Pride march – East Asia’s largest – including the country’s leading presidential candidate. The most senior government official to ever attend, Vice President Lai Ching-te declared, "Equal marriage is not the end — it's the starting point for diversity. I will stand steadfast on this path."
42,000: Approximately 42,000 migrants from India crossed the southern US border illegally between October 2022 and September 2023, according to data compiled by the US Customs and Border Protection. That’s more than double the previous record number from the same period a year earlier. An additional 1,600 have crossed illegally from the northern border, four times the number who crossed in the last three years combined.
4: In what was described as an epic, rainy seesaw of a match, South Africa won its fourth consecutive world rugby title, beating New Zealand 12-11. No team has ever won four titles, making South Africa’s Springboks the undisputed rulers of rugby.
1: Let’s move to Sweden! In a ranking of 87 countries by cost of living, Numbeo ranked Sweden number one for affordability, safety, and overall quality of life. The cost of living in Sweden is, on average, 20.9% lower than in the United States, while renting is 57.5% lower.
Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen
President Tsai Ing-wen visits last African state that recognizes Taiwan's independence
Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen is currently on a diplomatic visit to Eswatini, the country’s last remaining ally on the vast African continent. The southern African country is hardly a natural ally for democratic Taiwan: King Mswati III has ruled the landlocked country of 1.1 million with an iron fist since he assumed the throne in 1986 at age 18. It’s the region’s last absolute monarchy.
What’s Tsai doing there? Eswatini is one of just 13 remaining countries worldwide that has not ditched ties with Taiwan in favor of relations with China, which views the self-ruled territory as part of the mainland. Since Tsai took office in 2016, Beijing has coaxed nine countries into switching alliances, most recently Honduras, and continues to pressure other holdouts to follow suit.
Tsai’s trip – notably on the heels of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to South Africa – saw Taipei dole out $1 million in funds to the kingdom. And it comes ahead of Taiwan’s election in Jan. 2024, where Tsai’s VP William Lai is ahead in the polls. (Tsai is term limited.)
Undated photo posted by Jack Teixeira\'s mother on Veterans Day Nov 11, 2021 on her Facebook page.
What We're Watching: Pentagon leaker suspect arrested, Gershkovich swap chatter, Uruguay’s free trade ambitions
And the suspected leaker is ...
On Thursday afternoon, the FBI arrested a suspect in the most damaging US intel leak in a decade, identifying him as Jack Teixeira, a 21-year-old member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard. Teixeira was reportedly the leader of an online gaming chat group, where he had been allegedly sharing classified files for three years. If convicted of violating the US Espionage Act, he could spend the rest of his life behind bars. Teixeira will appear in a Boston court on Friday.
We know that the chat group was made up of mostly male twentysomethings that loved guns, racist online memes, and, of course, video games. We don’t know what motivated the leaks, what other classified material the leaker had, or whether any of the docs were divulged to a foreign intelligence agency.
Arresting a suspect, though, is just the beginning of damage control for the Pentagon and the Biden administration. Although the content of the leaks surprised few within the broader intel community, many might not have realized the extent to which the US spies on its allies.
Uncle Sam obviously would’ve preferred to have intercepted the message this scandal sends to America’s enemies: US intel is not 100% secure.
Russia is maybe considering swap for Evan Gershkovich
A top Russian diplomat suggested Thursday that Moscow could explore a prisoner swap with the US in order to release American journalist Evan Gershkovich, whom Russian authorities jailed earlier this month on espionage charges.
But first, said Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, the trial against Gershkovich will have to play out in full. That could take as long as a year.
What might Russia want in exchange? Hard to say. Last year, the Kremlin swapped WNBA star Brittney Griner, convicted of a drug offense while traveling in Russia, for notorious arms dealer Viktor Bout. At the time, the Kremlin also reportedly sought the release of a Russian assassin from a German prison, but that swap broke down when the Kremlin refused to also release Paul Whelan, an American currently serving an espionage sentence in Russia.
A year from now, the world, and the Ukraine war, might look very different. But expect the Kremlin to throw the book at Gershkovich to maximize their leverage ahead of any talks about his release.
Meanwhile, elsewhere in Russia’s prison system, opposition leader Alexei Navalny — currently in solitary confinement — has suffered a fresh health crisis that his spokeswoman says is another attempt to poison him.
For context, see our recent interview with Daniel Roher, director of the Oscar-winning documentary Navalny.
Uruguay’s FTA dream
Uruguay's Foreign Minister Francisco Bustillo will soon meet with Chinese officials to take steps toward establishing a Free Trade Agreement between the two countries. Uruguay has wanted an FTA for three decades, and the timing might finally be right as China seeks to increase its influence in South America.
Getting an FTA with China has been a priority for Uruguay’s President Luis Lacalle Pou's administration. The meeting will come on the heels of trade talks between Brazil and China, countries that saw their two-way trade hit a record $171.5 billion in 2022. Uruguay wants in on the action.
China has deepened its trade relationships in Latin America throughout the 21st century, beating out the US as the region's largest trading partner. Beijing benefits politically from these partnerships, gaining votes at the UN and support for Chinese appointees to multinational institutions, as well as the ability to implement technology standards into regional infrastructure.
But not all of Uruguay's neighbors are comfortable with China's swelling influence in the region, or with Uruguay flying solo. Uruguay is facing resistance from other Mercosur countries that favor negotiating regional trade deals as a bloc. Paraguay, which still recognizes Taipei in lieu of the government in Beijing, is leading the pushback – a conflict that could test one of the bloc’s few rules: a restriction on making preferential agreements with third countries.
Comparative maps showing which countries had official diplomatic ties with Taiwan just before the UN recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971 to today.
The Graphic Truth: Taiwan's shrinking recognition
Honduras announced this week that it’ll sever official diplomatic ties with Taiwan and instead recognize China. This would bring the number of countries with formal ties to the self-ruled island down to 13, with only two Central American allies (Belize and Guatemala) remaining. China, which considers Taiwan a breakaway province, has been playing tug-of-war with Taipei for influence in Latin America for years. We look at which countries had official diplomatic ties with Taipei in 1971, just before the UN switched recognition of China’s government to the People’s Republic, compared to today.
French President Emmanuel Macron.
What We’re Watching: A big day for Macron, Taiwan’s friend list, Russia droning on
A tense France waits
It’s a big day for French President Emmanuel Macron. After months of protests, strikes, and piling up trash, the National Assembly is set to decide on whether – and how – to vote on the president’s very unpopular pension reform plan, which would raise the national retirement age by two years to 64. (For a reminder of what’s at stake with this reform, why Macron says it is necessary, and why two-thirds of French despise it, see our explainer here.)
With only a slim majority in the lower house, Macron’s bloc needs support from at least some center-right lawmakers from Les Republicains to see this through, but it is still unclear if he’ll have the numbers, particularly since some of his own coalition members say they won't back the bill.
Macron now faces a very tough choice: call for a vote and risk losing the fight over his biggest domestic priority, which would see him turned into a lame duck president for the remainder of his five-year term. Or trigger a constitutional loophole that would rush the bill through without a vote but risk setting the streets on fire. If he chooses the latter, unions warn, his government will pay a hefty price...
Honduras unfriends Taiwan
(The People's Republic of) China swiped one of Taiwan's few remaining diplomatic chips this week when Honduras announced it'll change official recognition of China's government from Taipei to Beijing.
It's unclear why Honduran President Xiomara Castro — who promised to switch sides before she was elected in 2021 but then walked it back once in power — changed her mind again. Regardless, Honduras’ U-turn will surely overshadow Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s visit next week to Central America. Taiwan still has friends there in Belize and Guatemala, but Xi Jinping is spending big in the region to counter Taipei's diplomatic clout.
China, for its part, is paying more attention to the second leg of Tsai's trip. She also plans to travel to California to meet US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, who finally decided against irking Beijing by emulating his predecessor with his own Taiwan visit.
Where’s the drone?
After the encounter between a Russian fighter jet and an American-made drone above the Black Sea, some have warned of a risk of an escalation in the Ukraine war that pits Russia directly against the US. That’s extremely unlikely.
The Biden administration, which on Thursday gave the US military the green light to release footage of the crash, has been clear and consistent that its support for Ukraine won’t include actions that bring US and NATO soldiers into direct conflict with Russian forces. And though Vladimir Putin has tried to persuade Russians and the world that Russia’s at war with the West, he has avoided any action that might push his military into a broader war it would quickly lose. (If Putin wanted a wider war, it would be very easy to start one.)
Nor is this incident particularly unusual. As the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War noted on Tuesday, “Russian forces have used coercive signaling against US and allied flights and naval vessels for decades in multiple theaters without triggering conflict.” The US will continue to use drones in the Black Sea to provide Ukraine with intel on Russian actions. But there is one aspect of this story we’re still watching: Can Russia recover the wreckage of the drone? If so, and it’s in decent condition, it might give Russian engineers access to advanced drone technologies they don’t already have.