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Trump's Jan. 6 trial could now hurt his re-election bid
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
Will the US-proposed cease-fire plan for Israel and Hamas come to fruition amidst reports of hostage deaths?
It's not done until it's done. There are a lot of ways that it can blow up. And, you know, Netanyahu probably wants to take it to the Knesset and get, you know, support for it. And nonetheless, Hamas can always say no. But I would bet on it. I think we are going to see more hostages released. There's a lot of pressure on Israel to give away more to get that done in terms of a cease-fire. And there's a lot of pressure on Hamas to accept a longer cease-fire and see if they can keep it going. So I think we'll get at least four weeks in return for a significant number of hostages that are released. That doesn't mean that we get a peace plan. It doesn't mean we see a two-state solution. It certainly doesn't mean that the cease-fire is going to hold for longer than that period of time or even the entire period of time submitted to. There are plenty of actors that still want to see war continue on the ground.
How will upcoming elections in Pakistan affect its broader geopolitical standing in the world?
I'd say badly, but in reality not very much. I mean, the big deal is that the most popular person to run in Pakistan is not allowed to run. That's Imran Khan, the very charismatic cricketer whose party has basically been dismantled and who is himself said to be a criminal for charges that at the very least look politicized and at the worst look pretty much made up. That's not great for a democracy, even one where the military still holds an enormous amount of power. And ultimately, you're going to see a lot of instability in Pakistan, probably a lot of violence in the midst of an economy that's doing very, very badly.
Finally, the US appeals court ruled that Trump can face trial for election interference. Does this lower the odds on his possible return to the White House?
Well, I mean, it does. If you thought that the appeals court was going to rule any other way. I mean, certainly the fact that these cases are going on and that Trump might be indicted before the election, most likely in the Washington DC case, that would reduce Trump's support base among independents and make it less likely for them to turn out for him, maybe less likely some of them will vote at all than otherwise. And so of all of the wild cards out there that could really hurt Trump, a conviction is a big one, especially a conviction for a felony crime. And the fact that impunity doesn't hold in the way it's been argued by the Trump lawyers does make a difference. Still, if you were having the election right now, Trump wins. And there's a lot of time out there, but it's still a challenging road, perhaps a more challenging road for Biden today than it is for Trump. And that is something that everyone should keep a very close eye on.
Taiwan's Vice President Lai Ching-te, who heads the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, raises his fist after winning the presidential election in Taipei on Jan. 13, 2024.
Taiwan elects pro-independence candidate, calls Beijing’s bluff
Taiwan, one of the freest democracies in Asia, went to the polls on Saturday for a highly anticipated election with implications for both cross-strait and US-China relations.
As we told you last week, Taiwan’s presidential campaign ended up being a close race between independence-leaning candidate William Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, and Hou You-ih of the Kuomintang, aka KMT, who favors closer relations with China.
On the day, Lai came out on top with 40% of the vote, beating Hou by almost 7 percentage points. But Lai’s DPP didn’t have the same success: The party lost control in the legislature, winning 51 of 113 seats, while the KMT netted 52, and the third party, the TPP, won eight.
The defeat of China’s preferred candidate is likely to ruffle some feathers back in Beijing. China sees Taiwan as a breakaway territory and is determined to reunify, by force if necessary, but so far Lai’s remarks have not been escalatory. Also, the DPP’s loss of the legislative majority means Beijing isn’t in the worst-case scenario and might preclude the most aggressive responses.
“Chinese initial reactions are unlikely to be escalatory,” says Eurasia Group expert Ava Shen, “given that Lai's remarks on cross-strait relations after the elections were fairly measured.”
While the DPP losing seats in the legislature, Shen says, “will make it more difficult for Lai to push his domestic agenda through the legislature,” he still has room to maneuver when it comes to foreign policy, cross-strait relations, and defense.
So all eyes now turn to Lai to see how much independence rhetoric he uses in the days and weeks ahead – talk that could help determine China’s response. Any real moves against Taiwan, which is backed by Washington, could lead to a wider conflict.
Supporters of Lai Ching-te, Taiwan's vice president and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's presidential candidate attend, a campaign event in New Taipei City, Taiwan, on Jan. 6, 2024.
Taiwan holds first big election of 2024
The world will be watching when Taiwanese voters head to the polls on Jan. 13 to choose their next president. The first in a series of elections with global ramifications in 2024, Taiwan’s vote will be a flashpoint in the tense US-China relationship. China regards Taiwan as a breakaway territory and has vowed to unify with it, by force if necessary. Taiwan has the backing of the US, which would feel pressured to come to the island’s defense in the event of a conflict with China.
The election is shaping up into a close contest between the independence-leaning candidate William Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, and Hou You-ih of the Kuomintang, aka KMT, who favors closer relations with China.
We asked Eurasia Group expert Ava Shen what to watch for.
What is the state of play of the race?
The DPP’s Lai remains the front-runner and has held a consistent lead in this election cycle, but his lead has been narrowing. According to the latest polling data available from Jan. 1-2, he is about five points ahead of the KMT’s Hou, who started gaining ground in late November. Winning the party’s official nomination, with Jaw Shaw-kong chosen as his running mate, has helped Hou consolidate the support of the KMT base. The end to efforts to broker a presidential joint ticket with Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party, or TPP, has also helped.
This momentum gives the KMT a lot of confidence in its ability to mobilize a last-minute surge in support, possibly thanks to strategic voting by TPP supporters who don’t want another DPP administration. Lai remains favored to win, but it’s going to be close. It’s also noteworthy that Lai, if he wins, would probably do so with less than 50% of the vote. That marks a shift from the elections of 2016 and 2020 when current President Tsai Ing-wen comfortably cleared that threshold.
What would a Lai victory mean for relations with China?
Beijing would probably have an immediate negative reaction. It has signaled multiple times that it is deeply wary of Lai, who has a history of comments in favor of full independence for Taiwan, a red line for China. It would respond in two ways. First, it would probably reduce the number of Taiwanese products that are subject to preferential tariff rates under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, the cross-strait trade agreement signed in 2010. In a warning shot to Taiwan’s voters, it excluded 12 Taiwanese products from the agreement in mid-December.
Second, China would likely intensify what it has already been doing in the military sphere. If Beijing judges any of Lai’s post-election remarks to be provocative, it will consider flying larger numbers of fighter jets over the Taiwan Strait, deploying more coast guard or naval vessels, and possibly moving those military assets closer to Taiwan’s main island. It could enter for the first time Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone.
But Lai has moderated his rhetoric recently, hasn’t he?
Yes. He has indicated on the campaign trail that he would maintain the status quo and continue the approach that Tsai has taken to cross-strait relations. Still, from Beijing’s perspective, this is not enough. It does not like Tsai’s cross-strait policies but believes she has exercised restraint in managing tensions. It views Lai as more reckless.
Nonetheless, as I said, Lai is not likely to win by a large margin, and his party will probably lose its majority in the legislature. This is important to Beijing because it sends a signal that the DPP doesn’t have complete control over the island’s politics and that not everyone supports independence. That gives Beijing some hope that the idea of unification is not dead.
So, we think tensions are likely to rise in the event of a Lai victory, but it won’t be a catastrophic situation.
And what would a Hou victory mean for cross-strait relations?
If Hou wins, there is less of a risk of Beijing increasing the pressure against Taipei in the short term. However, there is a risk it will resume aggressive tactics over the long term if Hou doesn’t agree to upgrade cross-strait ties economically and politically. China wants to move toward more regular contact between government officials on both sides and take steps toward unification.
Hou has said he wants to start with more cultural and economic engagement, and if things go well, gradually progress to more political exchange, something that Taiwanese society broadly opposes. So, he's saying he wants to put off the political engagement that Beijing is seeking, and the question is, how long is Beijing going to patiently wait?
What’s at stake for the US in this election?
The US’s official stance is that it has no preferred candidate, and I think it has been consistent in maintaining this approach even in private interactions with Taiwan counterparts. The bilateral relationship is robust, and all three of the main Taiwanese parties are committed to close US ties.
That said, President Joe Biden’s administration likely recognizes that a Lai victory has the potential to jeopardize the recent stabilization of the fraught US-China relationship if it provokes an aggressive Chinese response, putting the US under pressure to offer a gesture of support. As Eurasia Group noted in its Top Risks 2024 report, Lai is one of a handful of “dangerous friends,” a group of friendly world leaders who may draw the US into expanded conflicts this year.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
Trump's immunity claim: US democracy in crisis
Ian Bremmer shares his insights on global politics this week on World In :60.
First , how will the appeals court decision on Trump's presidential immunity claim play into your Top Risk of 2024?
Well, the top risk is the US election, the US versus itself. What we see is that Trump is having more time to campaign before decisions are made, potential convictions are made while the primaries are playing out. In other words, he's likely to get the nomination before he's going to be convicted of anything. And what that means is, he'll have all the Republicans behind him. And at that point, if he gets convicted, it's kind of too late because the people that are going to vote for him are on the other side. So, yeah, this is increasingly a democracy in crisis. That's what we're looking at in the United States in 2024.
How will the upcoming Taiwan presidential election affect its relationship with both the United States and China?
Well, the election is close to a coin flip between the sitting vice president, William Lai, and the DPP. And the opposition in the KMT has more stable relationship, cross-strait relations with mainland China. If Lai wins, which is slightly, slightly more likely than not, the Chinese government is going to respond negatively. And that doesn't mean war, but it does mean sharp economic relations. It means that trade relations will be hindered and it may, at the worst, mean that some ships are going to be inspected. That will certainly hurt US-China relations. But that's in the context of a US-China relationship that both sides want to manage this year. They don't want additional crisis. So I'm less worried about this election next week than a lot of other people are.
With Israel conducting airstrikes in Lebanon, is an expanded war in the Middle East inevitable?
I'm having a very hard time seeing how we will be able to maintain a contained war in Gaza over the course of the year.There are far too many ways for this to extend and expand, both in the West Bank, in Lebanon, with Hezbollah in the Red Sea, with Iranian proxies in Syria, in Iraq, with Iran itself, and of course, given radicalism of Islamic extremist groups, lone wolves, all the rest. I mean, you have to get an awful lot of things right and lucky to keep the war contained, if I can call it that, to where it is right now. On balance, I would bet very strongly this war is set to get significantly worse.
That's it for me and I'll talk to you all real soon.
- A world of conflict: The top risks of 2024 ›
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- Trump’s immunity claim under scrutiny ›
- The Taiwan election and its AI implications ›
- US vs. China in Taiwan ›
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The Taiwan election and its AI implications
Taylor Owen, professor at the Max Bell School of Public Policy at McGill University and director of its Centre for Media, Technology & Democracy, co-hosts GZERO AI, our new weekly video series intended to help you keep up and make sense of the latest news on the AI revolution. In this episode of the series, Taylor Owen looks at the first election in Taiwan and the implications it could have for the future of technology, including AI.
Hi, I'm Taylor Owen. This is GZERO AI. So welcome to 2024, the year where over 50 Democratic countries head to the polls. And we're only a few days away from the first.
On January 13, Taiwanese voters will head to the ballot to elect a new president in an election that could have a profound effect on the global economy and on the future of AI. Let me explain. So the front-runner in this election is Lai Ching-te, a member of the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party. Lai is generally viewed as being in favor of Taiwanese independence, but the Chinese Communist Party has called him a separatist with a confrontational mentality.
But what does this have to do with the future of AI? Well, it all revolves around a single company, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company or TSMC. TSMC makes more than 90% of the world's most advanced chips, the kinds of chips that power much of artificial intelligence. And they make those chips on the Western coast of Taiwan, only 110 miles from mainland China.
So let's assume that Democratic Progressive Party wins, as many expect they will, and that the conflict with Beijing escalates. Well, what happens then? Well, it seems to me there are at least two possibilities. One is that because China is so dependent on TSMC, as we all are, for their chips, that they wouldn't risk an actual attack. This is often referred to as Taiwan Silicon Shield, a kind of new era of mutually assured destruction.
The other possibility, though, is that China does attack Taiwan. And if that happens, it's not inconceivable that Taiwan would preemptively destroy TSMC's manufacturing facilities. And even if China did take control, before that happens, it's unlikely they could continue production. Chip manufacturing is just too contingent on global cooperation.
If TSMC ultimately goes down, the global technology industry could be thrown into turmoil. Virtually no country in the world would be able to build cell phones or cell phone towers. PC production would fall by at least a third, maybe half, and everything from the appliance industry to the automotive industry would take a hit. It would be a global economic crisis, and the progress on AI would be set back years.
While it remains to be seen how this story will play out, one thing is really clear. The global computing industry has a number of incredibly vulnerable choke points, companies like TSMC that an entire industry is dependent on. While diversifying something as complex as chip manufacturing will be difficult and require a ton of capital and real democratic leadership, it may be essential if you want to stabilize the industry. Otherwise, the future of technology may be vulnerable to the whims of volatile players like the CCP.
I'm Taylor Owen and thanks for watching.
Terry Gou, a 72-year-old billionaire and founder of iPhone maker Foxconn, campaigns for his presidential bid in Taipei
Terry Gou says China can’t pressure him. China says ‘Watch us.’
Terry Gou is the billionaire founder of electronics giant Foxconn, the manufacturer of Apple iPhones in mainland China, and he’s one of Taiwan’s richest men. Gou has historically supported the opposition – and China-friendlier – Kuomintang, or KMT. But he recently announced that would run independently for the presidency, taking on KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih as well as more hawkish candidates.
Foxconn’s extensive business in China prompted questions of undue influence from Beijing, but Gou has said he won’t let Beijing push him around – and that he doubts China would want to face the geopolitical implications of disrupting Foxconn’s business.
Famous last words? On Sunday, state media reported that tax authorities are scrutinizing Foxconn subsidiaries while the natural resources ministry looks into the company’s land use practices. Foxconn’s stock price on the Shanghai exchange slid 10% on the news before triggering an emergency halt in trading.
“It’s not Terry Gou’s policy positions that are problematic for Beijing,” says Eurasia Group China expert Anna Ashton, “it’s that he is dividing the KMT voter base and making it less likely that anyone other than Lai can win,” referring to the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party’s William Lai.
Lai is leading in the polls, supported by 32% of Taiwanese, but he faces a strong challenge from fellow China hawk Ko Wen-je, at 23%. That’s a clear 55% majority of voters backing China hawks — while Gou, the most dovish, is trailing at just 10%. The KMT’s Hou has 17%, leaving him well behind his opponents.
Unless, that is, Gou were to bow out. If Gou’s supporters shift to Hou, and the China-hawk vote stays split, there’s a fighting chance that Beijing can avoid the worst outcome for its interests. Who said Beijing doesn’t understand democracies?
Terry Gou, Foxconn founder announces bid for Taiwan presidency during a press event in Taipei
Foxconn founder joins race to become Taiwan’s president
Terry Gou, the billionaire founder of Foxconn, has thrown his hat in the ring for Taiwan’s presidency – making waves in an election that will have wide-ranging implications for the Western Pacific. Having failed to win the opposition party’s nomination, Gou will run as an independent focused on taking down the ruling Democratic People’s Party, which he blames for the increasingly fractious relationship between Taiwan and China.
But ironically, Gou’s candidacy makes a DPP win more likely in the January 2024 election by pulling votes away from the other two candidates hoping to beat DPP nominee, Vice President Lai Ching-te.
Gou – who is polling in last place at just 15.2% – has expressed interest in teaming up with another opposition candidate to avoid splitting votes. But Lai has a formidable lead at 33.9%, and if all three opposition candidates remain in the race, it is likely the DPP will prevail.
Gou and the other two opposition candidates support closer ties between Taiwan and China. Gou, who has called for talks under the one-China framework to reconvene, has been questioned about a potential conflict of interest because of Foxconn’s huge investments in China. Having stepped down as chairman in 2019, Gou denies that Beijing would have any leverage over him, and while he remains a substantial investor in the company, he has said he would “sacrifice” his personal assets in China in the event of an attack on Taiwan.
The DPP, meanwhile, champions Taiwan’s autonomy from China, much to Beijing’s disdain. To rile up pro-China voters, Beijing has threatened that a win by Lai could lead to military action, a warning that opposition candidates point to as evidence that the DPP is responsible for rising tensions with Beijing.
Voter intention for Taiwan's presidential poll in 2024.
The Graphic Truth: Taiwan's surprising third-party challenger
Taiwan goes to the polls in January 2024 in what is likely the most consequential presidential election since the self-ruled island embraced democracy in 1996. As usual, the vote will be all about ... China.
Looking to replace term-limited President Tsai Ing-wen are VP William Lai, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, and Hou Yu-ih, a former top cop nominated by the opposition Kuomintang Party. The DPP and the KMT have always dominated Taiwanese politics, with the former taking a tougher line on relations with the mainland. But this time a third-party candidate wants to give them a run for their money.
Enter Ko Wen-je, a two-time former mayor of the capital, Taipei, who's running on the first-ever presidential ticket of the upstart Taiwan People's Party. Ko — who sometimes expresses himself awkwardly because he has Asperger’s syndrome — has been grabbing headlines after recently placing second in the presidential polls ahead of Hou.
Ko is gaining traction thanks to his popularity with young voters fed up with the establishment parties, says Eurasia Group analyst Ava Shen. But he also has many detractors.
"To those who support him, Ko is a much-needed third force that could alter the polarized landscape in Taiwanese politics," Shen explains. "To those who are critical of him, Ko is an inexperienced politician with controversial gaffes and an unclear platform, unfit for national government."
Still, the TPP candidate offers something different to voters: Ko doesn't bang people over the head about relations with China, preferring to focus on domestic issues such as energy and housing — as if he were running for local office instead of the presidency.
When he does talk about how he'd deal with Xi Jinping, Ko styles himself as a pragmatist who will neither provoke China like the DPP nor defer to it like the KMT. Yet, his enemies see the TPP presidential hopeful as a tad closer to KMT appeasement, fueling speculation that Ko might be a Manchurian Candidate.
Shen doesn’t buy it. “Beijing still prefers Hou and the KMT to win; it is not yet clear how Beijing feels about Ko and the TPP,” she says. “Nevertheless, Ko's position on cross-strait relations appears to be more moderate than Lai’s — which could appeal to China.”
Whether or not Ko is cozier with Xi than he lets on, he faces long odds of winning Taiwan's presidency, since the TPP lacks an established voter base. What's more, KMT supporters are putting pressure on Ko to become Hou's running mate and consolidate the anti-DPP vote.
So far, though, the TPP hopeful says he's in the race to win it. But if by doing so he ends up handing the election to Lai, Beijing will not be pleased.