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Henry Kissinger: Towering (and polarizing) figure in US foreign policy dies at 100
In memoriam: Dr. Henry Kissinger (1923-2023)
From America to China to the social media universe, the world marked the passing of diplomat and presidential adviser Dr. Henry Kissinger, whose realpolitik approach to foreign policy definitively shaped the course of international relations in the 20th century.
Born in Germany in 1923, Henry Alfred Kissinger emigrated to the United States in 1938 and became a citizen in 1943. He served three years in the US Army and later in the Counter Intelligence Corps, earned a Ph.D., and became a professor of international relations at Harvard before embarking on a diplomatic career in the service of three American presidents – John F. Kennedy, Richard Nixon, and Gerald R. Ford.
At the time, America was mired in conflict: The Vietnam War seemed intractable, the Cold War raged white hot, and the Middle East was a tinderbox. Kissinger’s realpolitik approach helped the United States navigate all these conflicts. As national security adviser and later as secretary of state, Kissinger was instrumental in opening diplomatic relations with China in 1972 and negotiating the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) with the former Soviet Union. He defined the term “shuttle diplomacy” for his mediation work in the Middle East during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
That year, Kissinger was also awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in brokering a ceasefire to the Vietnam War, together with Vietnamese diplomat Le Duc Tho (who refused to accept). Admirers lauded him as a skilled tactician in a time of great peril. Nixon’s daughters, Tricia Nixon Cox and Julie Nixon Eisenhower, said their father and Kissinger enjoyed “a partnership that produced a generation of peace for our nation.” Former US President George W. Bush said "America has lost one of the most dependable and distinctive voices on foreign affairs.”
Kissinger was not without controversy, however. Detractors blamed him for the deaths of millions of Cambodians during the Vietnam War and for supporting repressive regimes including that of Augusto Pinochet in Chile. Upon his death, Rolling Stone Magazine ran the headline, “Henry Kissinger, war criminal beloved by America’s ruling class, finally dies.” On X, "RIP BOZO," referring to a meme celebrating someone's death, trended in the top 10 together with "IT FINALLY HAPPENED," while "War criminal" reached the top 25.
Kissinger would have likely met these criticisms with the same sangfroid that marked his diplomatic career. Shortly before his 100th birthday, he told CBS that such comments are “… a reflection of their ignorance.”
After leaving the US government, Kissinger continued to provide counsel to world leaders until the last days of his life. In September, he met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in New York; in July, he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing. The Chinese Ambassador to the United States Xie Feng said he was “deeply shocked and saddened” by Kissinger’s death. “He will always remain alive in the hearts of the Chinese people as a most valued old friend.”
Kissinger was also a prolific author, penning 21 books on topics as varied as politics in the nuclear age, the rise of China, the art of diplomacy, and most recently, the promise and perils of artificial intelligence. He leaves behind his wife of nearly 50 years, Nancy Kissinger, his two children from a previous marriage, Elizabeth and David, and five grandchildren.
WATCH: On Henry Kissinger's 100th birthday in May, GZERO's Ian Bremmer reflected on his legacy.
From foes to friends: NATO's history of absorbing its enemies
NATO and Russia have been enemies since the beginning of the Cold War. But could there be a time in the future where Russia is a partner, maybe even an ally? That's not happening any time soon, but if history is any indication, it's not such a crazy idea: alliance has absorbed its enemies before.
GZERO World goes back in time to the height of the Cold War, nuclear paranoia, and the formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955.
Let's talk a walk down NATO memory lane. Don't forget to duck and cover.
Watch the GZERO World episode: Russia vs. NATO: Heightened risk of war
Ukraine’s war and the non-Western world
A new poll provides more evidence that Western and non-Western countries just don’t agree on how best to respond to the war in Ukraine.
Most Americans and Europeans say their governments should help Ukraine repel Russian invaders. Many say Russia’s threat extends beyond Ukraine. People and leaders in non-Western countries mainly want the war to end as quickly as possible, even if Ukraine must surrender some of its land to Russia to bring peace.
That’s not necessarily the message you might take from a recent vote on this subject in the UN General Assembly. On Feb. 24, the invasion’s one-year anniversary, 141 countries voted to condemn the invasion and to demand that Russia “immediately, completely and unconditionally” withdraw from Ukraine. Thirty-two countries abstained. Just six – Belarus, North Korea, Syria, Eritrea, Nicaragua, and Mali – voted with Russia against the motion.
But it’s one thing to denounce the invasion. It’s another to arm Ukraine and sanction Russia.
Among the 32 countries that abstained – a group led by China, India, South Africa, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and others – and even in states like Brazil and Turkey that voted with the majority, there is deep resistance to the Western approach to the war. The reasons vary by region and country, but their argument with the West can be grouped into three broad categories.
First, the US and Europe, they say, are prolonging this costly war at a time when world leaders must turn their attention and focus their nation’s resources on other urgent global threats.
As India’s President Narendra Modi said this week in his role as chair of this year’s G20 summit: “After years of progress, we are at risk today of moving back on the sustainable development goals. Many developing countries are struggling with unsustainable debts while trying to ensure food and energy security. They are also most affected by global warming caused by richer countries. This is why India's G20 presidency has tried to give a voice to the Global South.”
It’s noteworthy that Modi delivered these comments in English.
In other words, the longer the war in Ukraine continues, the longer world leaders will be distracted from other challenges and the fewer resources they’ll have left to meet them.
Second, what gives Europeans and Americans the right, some ask, to decide which wars are legitimate and who is guilty of imperialist behavior? The US says Russia launched an invasion under false pretenses, but memories of Americans hunting Iraq for weapons of mass destruction bolster charges of hypocrisy. Many Latin Americans remember that Cold War-era Western crusades against Russian Communism included support for brutal dictatorship in their countries. Many in Africa and the Middle East who live in states whose borders were drawn by Europeans reject European appeals to defend Ukraine against imperialism.
Third, many developing countries value the chance to buy Russian energy and food exports at bargain prices. Western refusal to buy Russian products has given many poorer states the chance to fuel their recovery in this way, and their governments are well aware that any bid to remove these products completely from markets would cut deeply into global supplies, driving world food and fuel prices to dangerous new highs. Many of these countries need post-COVID economic lifelines and continuing to do business with Russia, especially on newly favorable terms, can help.
Americans and Europeans can make counterarguments in all these areas, but leaders and poll respondents in non-Western countries continue to warn that Western governments can’t expect others to share the sacrifices they claim are needed to resolve Western problems.
Should Western governments worry? The US and Europe will continue to supply Ukraine and sanction Russia with or without help from others. But if Western leaders want to effectively isolate Russia, both economically and diplomatically, reluctance and resistance from non-Western countries will limit how much they can hope to accomplish and how quickly.Russia and Pakistan might cut unprecedented oil deal
Cold War rivals Russia and Pakistan are negotiating an agreement for the Russians to start selling cheap oil to energy-starved Pakistan in March.
This will make Islamabad yet another Asian customer of Russian crude at a time when Moscow’s cash inflows are limited by a G7/EU oil cap and sanctions. Also, considering Pakistan is dead broke, payments might be made through a “friendly” country, presumably China – a power play for Beijing, whose yuan will be used for the transactions, giving the currency more sway as an alternative to the US dollar.
How is this deal going to affect American interests in the region? And why is Pakistan, which wants to balance its ties with Washington, giving business to the Russians perhaps through China?
First, some history. Although the agreement isn’t finalized, it’ll be geopolitically novel when it is because Pakistan is an unlikely destination for Russian business. Unlike India, Islamabad and Moscow have had no commercial ties for decades.
Considering Pakistan spent the Cold War spying on the USSR and/or attacking its troops in Afghanistan (the Soviet Union paid back in kind by arming India, Pakistan’s arch-rival), the two sides haven’t exactly behaved like partner-material.
Enter China. Pakistan and China have been “Iron Brothers” for decades. Even though Islamabad was a non-treaty US ally until not too long ago, the Pakistanis and the Chinese have always remained “all-weather friends.”
However, as India settled into the role of becoming America’s strategic partner in the region, displacing Pakistan as the preferred South Asian ally over the last two decades, the Chinese encouraged Pakistan to open up to the Russians, and vice versa. Now, a once hesitant Islamabad doesn’t just want Russian oil, but also natural gas, weapons and more. Still, Islamabad wants to stay aligned with the American camp.
Why is Pakistan doing this? Islamabad’s energy bills make the biggest chunk of its imports. Cheaper oil from Russia will obviously help its escalating balance of payments crisis and ballooning trade deficit.
But the biggest issue is with dwindling foreign exchange reserves. A year ago, Pakistan had $17 billion in the bank. Today, foreign reserves have dwindled to $4.3 billion, which will pay for less than a month of imports.
To manage the dollar crunch, Pakistan could use the Chinese yuan in a swap with China to pay Russia once the oil flows in (it expects to get 35% of its annual crude oil imports from 70 million barrels of Russian crude), putting its import-regime firmly in the China-Russia camp.
Pakistan thus finds itself between a rock and a hard place: It needs the cheap Russian oil but also wants to avoid antagonizing the US and its friends in the Gulf, Pakistan’s main energy suppliers — especially considering that Islamabad has been negotiating bailouts with the Washington-backed IMF and deferred oil payments from the Saudis and the Emiratis.
While the Pakistanis defend their position by citing neighboring India as an example of a country that buys Russian oil even as it tilts towards the US and deals with the Gulf states, Islamabad is in a very different position compared to New Delhi because Pakistan is crawling toward default.
But that’s exactly how Washington and Beijing might find confluence to stop Pakistan from failing. “The US view on this is that countries like Pakistan may at times be strategically important, but in the great power competition between China and US, it doesn’t matter a whole lot,” says Uzair Younus, director of the Pakistan Initiative at the Atlantic Council.
Beyond Pakistan’s limited importance as a partner for counterterrorism in Afghanistan, he assesses that the view from Washington is that if others want to share the burden of propping up Pakistan and stabilizing its economy, so be it.
“The US remains a strategic market for Pakistan and that is not going away any time soon. So there will be a relationship there,” says Younus, with the caveat that Washington is likely to prioritize its strategic interests elsewhere for the time being.
Or maybe the Russia-Pakistan oil deal won’t matter that much to the US and its Gulf buddies. For Tamanna Salikuddin, director of South Asia programs at the US Institute of Peace, although the deal will be watched with much interest in Washington, it is going to reinforce the views of American policymakers who already believe that Pakistan is on the Chinese side versus the US camp.
“That Pakistan is now on the ‘China-Russia side’ versus the ‘US-India side’ will be further evident,” she explains. “Even if we're not trying to create political blocs, they emerge sometimes without any effort on our part.”
Cuban Missile Crisis turns 60
Sixty years ago, the world got as close it's ever been to nuclear war.
For 13 days, the US and the USSR played a dangerous cat-and-mouse game over Soviet nuclear missiles parked in Cuba. The Cold War nearly got hot.
In the end, a shared sense of humanity allowed a diplomatic solution. The world breathed a sigh of relief.
Would Moscow and Washington do the same if Vladimir Putin uses nukes in Ukraine?
Watch the GZERO World episode: Chinese Power
- Will Putin drop a nuke on Ukraine? - GZERO Media ›
- Nuclear weapons: more dangerous than ever? - GZERO Media ›
- Nuclear weapons could be used; Russia's war gets more dangerous ... ›
- Another nuclear showdown? - GZERO Media ›
- How close are we to a second Cuban Missile Crisis? - GZERO Media ›
- Odds of US-NATO war rising - GZERO Media ›
China's zero-COVID, elections in Brazil, Cold War 2.0: Your Questions, Answered
Summer is over, and with it, this summer’s mailbag series is coming to an end.
After over 1,000 questions and exactly 100 answers (I am on vacation, after all), it’s been a pleasure.
Note: This is the fifth and final installment of a five-part summer mailbag series responding to reader questions. You can find the first part here, the second part here,, the third part here, and the fourth part here. Some of the questions that follow have been slightly edited for clarity. If you have questions you want answered, ask them in the comments section below or follow me on Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn and look out for future AMAs.
A worker wearing protective gear walks next to barriers that separate from the street a neighborhood in lockdown as a measure against Covid-19. (Hector Retamal/AFP via Getty Images)
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Why is Xi Jinping so committed to zero-Covid? Would using other nations' vaccines be so devastating to their nationalistic rhetoric that they have to sacrifice years of being in lockdown? What exactly do you think Xi's game plan is? (Sheng T)
Because China was complacent for two years after having massive initial success containing the virus…and in the meantime, Covid changed dramatically. Now it’s too late—if they open up suddenly, with most people having no immunity from prior infection and only moderate vaccine immunity (due to only moderate vaccination rates and poor vaccine effectiveness against the newer variants), China’s hospitals would quickly get overwhelmed and millions would likely die. They can’t import foreign vaccines without losing tremendous face because they so played them up as inferior to homegrown ones. So they’re locked in until they develop effective mRNA vaccines and stockpile enough therapeutics to offset elderly vaccine hesitancy. And that’s not happening until well into 2023.
Can we expect Europe to move away from fossil fuel (and Russian gas) reliance by going nuclear? It seems like a no-brainer in the long term despite its steep implementation costs. (Marcelo F)
No—it’s not a singular fix. There’s lots of popular opposition to nuclear in Europe, and France’s experience isn’t ideal (nuclear there has proven to be expensive, and nearly 50% of capacity is presently offline due to maintenance and other challenges). But it’s certainly a part of the solution, along with greater energy efficiency, diversification of sources for fossil fuels in transition, and renewables.
What will it take to decarbonize the U.S. economy quickly? (Zoe L)
We’ve come a long way already. Per capita carbon emissions in the U.S. are currently roughly what they were in the 1940s, in large part because we’ve successfully transitioned from coal to natural gas. Going forward, the key driver of further decarbonization will be investments in new technology, and in making existing technologies (solar, wind, EVs, batteries) cheaper. The misnamed “Inflation Reduction Act” will make a significant difference in that regard. Personally, I’d really love to see a nuclear fusion breakthrough. The efforts feel more serious this time around…
Do you think India's democracy will survive the next 25 years? (Classmate A)
Yes. The bigger question is whether the world’s governments will still be the principal actors on the global stage in 50 years. About that, I’m not so sure…
What would be the long-term implications of a permanently split Ukraine? (Ramsey T)
Depends on the nature of the split and whether Ukrainians accept it as a baseline. A return to pre-February 24 borders would be a split (Crimea would stay Russian) but one that could potentially lead to peace. Short of that, it’s hard to imagine an end to hostilities. I worry about what this means for Russia long term. They’ve made themselves into an Iran-like rogue state… but with 6,000 nuclear warheads. Not good for the world.
What do you think about John J. Mearsheimer’s prediction on Ukraine? Could this dreadful war have been avoided? (Andrea P)
I think he’s fixated on blaming the West. Yes, the West made all sorts of errors. We didn’t make an effort to integrate Russia into the West after the Cold War, and we didn’t hit the Russians hard enough for their invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. Ultimately, though, this war is on Putin, not the West.
How do you evaluate Turkey’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war? (Burak P)
Overall it’s been constructive, especially on the food security front. But it’s also been highly opportunistic, cognizant of the opportunities the war provides to rehabilitate Turkey’s image and relatively poor diplomatic/geostrategic standing.
When will the war in Ukraine end? (Victor C)
No time soon, I’m afraid.
What is China doing right, if anything? How can West learn to do the same? (Asad F)
They are investing massively in STEM education, high-tech industries, and green energy technologies. The United States is finally starting to do this with the CHIPS Act and the “Inflation Reduction Act,” but we’re behind the curve. Another advantage China has is its political system tends to promote leaders on the basis of meritocracy. The US political system, not so much (though in part that’s because it’s nowhere near as powerful or consequential).
When you look at the Ukraine war and the conflict in Northern Ethiopia, do you think we are at the beginning of Cold War 2.0? (Isahaq A)
Yes—specifically in terms of NATO and the G-7 versus Russia. And it has elements of a hot war, even. But it’s not a global cold war like we experienced before the Soviet collapse, and it’s certainly not a fight among equals. Russia’s allies are Belarus and a couple of minor rogue states. That’s it. Not even Kazakhstan, which is supporting US/EU sanctions. Europe is united on one side of the Iron Curtain. China’s “friendship without limits” with Russia has turned out to be a friendship without very many benefits. And developing countries want nothing to do with a new cold war and will continue to do business both with the West and with Russia.
Brazil's President Jair Bolsonaro has been compared with former U.S. president Donald Trump.(Jim Lo Scalzo-Pool/Getty Images)
What do you think about the upcoming elections in Brazil? Will there be consequences on the global stage? (Bernardo S)
It’s Lula’s to lose, although the race will tighten in coming weeks as the economy improves. In terms of policy, Lula and Bolsonaro aren’t exactly polar opposites on economics, where they are both more moderate than their rhetoric would seem to indicate. That means there should be broad continuity regardless of who wins. The big difference globally would be on climate, where Lula is much more aligned with other governments around the world. A big question is whether when Bolsonaro (likely) loses he will attempt to delegitimize and overturn the election the way Trump did in 2020. If he does, the chances he’ll succeed are minimal (the military and the courts would defend the rule of law), but it could still lead to a lot of violence. That’d be very destabilizing for Latin America’s largest economy.
Every democratically elected national leader appears to face record-low approval ratings and an upcoming, near-certain defeat at the ballot. Has this level of unrest at a global level ever happened before? What are the implications of such volatility? (Jack S)
It’s true that there seems to be a lot more populism and anti-establishment sentiment than in the recent past, which strongly suggests that the social contract in democracies isn’t working and needs to be redressed, or else democratic governance will start seriously crumbling. But keep in mind this is much more of a problem in the United States than, say, Canada, Germany, or Japan. So I wouldn’t overgeneralize or panic just yet.
Is globalization over? (Tiago S)
Not at all. While there’s some decoupling going on (between Russia and the West, between the US and China on areas of national security, by “my country first” populists around the world trying to score political points), the extent of it is limited by economic self-interest. In fact, the world is still the most integrated it’s ever been. But globalization is no longer being actively driven by the United States (or anyone else). That means that it’s being fought over, not that it’s over. The economic drivers of globalization are just too powerful.
Are we headed into a cold war with China? What are your expectations for the Sino-American relationship in the long term? (Johnny K)
No. There’s too much economic interdependence between the two countries, and both sides are well-aware that war would be mutually assured destruction. But there’s enormous uncertainty in the long-term relationship, which is entirely devoid of trust. Both countries are facing massive domestic challenges. China’s are primarily economic (though they could become political as well). America’s are primarily political (though they could become economic as well). If these two developments keep getting worse, we’ll likely see more conflict.
Is it true you grew up in the projects? What lessons did that teach you? (Allan S)
Yes. It’s hard to know for sure how the experience shaped me in the absence of a counterfactual, but off the top of my head: it motivates me to work hard, it makes me recognize the importance of understanding networks/stakeholders and not presuming performance alone gets you where you want to go, and it gives me an outsider perspective that is useful for being clear-minded about the advantages and disadvantages of different systems (as opposed to thinking that everything should run like the “Washington consensus”).
How do you find passion when it comes to work? (Steven T)
The subject matter—the state of our world and, most importantly, the people on it—is endlessly fascinating. And given that we’re in a period of nearly unprecedented uncertainty—a real transition point for the world—the work feels meaningful.
How do U.S. allies around the world see U.S. division and the upcoming elections in 2022 and 2024? How do they prepare for what may be coming? (Linda B)
They’re deeply, deeply concerned. The Europeans are working to strengthen the EU and related institutions to get some “strategic autonomy” from the U.S., should they need it. Some Asian allies are hedging or balancing toward China. While some U.S. allies like Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom largely have no choice but to stick with us, albeit each for different reasons.
What will it take to repair American democracy and restore its standing as the beacon of democratic ideals in the world? (Max B)
It will take a generation of hard work. Specifically, we need to invest in improving equality of opportunity for Americans who no longer have the mobility of their parents and grandparents, and we need to take money out of the political system to better align incentives for the public good.
With all the uncertainty (economics) and conflict (international relations) currently, what gives you the most hope? (Christian G)
That this is precisely the time when we get to rebuild our 20th-century global institutions to make them fit for the (first half of the) 21st century. That’s a terrific opportunity we should not waste.
What is the meaning of life? (Stefen S)
To keep a sense of wonder about our existence. For me, philosophically, that means keeping an open mind and never stopping asking myself that very question.
🔔 And if you haven't already, don't forget to subscribe to my free newsletter, GZERO Daily by Ian Bremmer, to get new posts delivered to your inbox.
Russia-Ukraine war: How we got here
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and happy Monday to you all. Plenty going on. Of course, still very much focused first and foremost, on the war in Ukraine, the Russians continuing to fight, shifting the battle ground primarily to the southeast around Donbas but of course, engaging in bombing and artillery all over the country and negotiations frankly nowhere close to resolution.
But I wanted to talk a little bit about how we got here, why this happened. And it goes without saying, but still needs to be said that of course, the direct responsibility for this invasion is on President Putin 100%. There was no justification, you could not remotely claim that Ukraine's government needed to be denazified. There was no act of genocide being committed against Russians on the ground in the occupied territories. This was all fake and Putin is responsible for the atrocities on the ground for the damage to the Ukrainian economy, for the incredible loss of life we see happening across the country, including to his own forces. He's responsible for all of that.
But how did we get here? Why did it happen? And if you want to have that conversation, you can't just talk about Russia, you have to talk about the West. And I think it's worth spending a little time on that.
First of all, and perhaps the biggest point is that historically the Russians were ignored after the Soviet Union collapsed. Keep in mind that there was a European Union for all of these former East European Warsaw bloc aligned states. And indeed, the EU expanded dramatically, and that meant full integration into those institutions, an incredible wealth that they would be able to develop. And it's been a great success story for most of them. Look at where the Polish economy is today compared to where it was in 1989. It tells you almost everything you need to go. There have been some political successes, there have been others that have been somewhat less so. Look at Hungary and look at Viktor Orbán being able to solidify his win in an only somewhat free and not particularly fair election. But overall, that's been extraordinary. NATO too expanded and allowed all of these countries right up to the Russian border to have national security, to be engaged in a collective security process where their militaries would be trained properly, where they would be defended by the entire alliance if they were unjustly attacked.
What did Russia get? And the answer is not very much. They got shock therapy, they got a bunch of Western economic advisors that were willing to go in and say, "Here's the way you should restructure and reform your economy." Some of which was intelligent, some of which was theoretically correct, but had no recognition of the realities on the ground. Certainly, when I think about all of the auctions that occurred and just how corrupt and incapable the Russians were to actually privatize large areas of the society that instead got wholly ripped off by a bunch of oligarchs, there was no Marshall Plan for Russia. There was no strong effort to integrate Russia into global institutions and architecture even when Yeltsin was president, who was strongly aligned with the United States and had a cabinet around him that really wanted to be a part of that. Instead, you got the NATO-Russia joint council, which was never really anything other than meetings that the Russians could attend but with no intention or effort to try to integrate them. Then you got the G7 plus one. What's a plus one? It's not your spouse, plus one's a date. Next time you come, you'll bring a different plus one. It was very clear to the Russians that there wasn't a lot of interest.
Now, why not? Why didn't the Americans and the Europeans try after end of the Cold War, when the Americans won and the Democrats won, why didn't they do with the Russians what they did after World War II with the defeated Germans and the Japanese? And I think a big piece of it is because the Americans didn't fight a war, because the win basically fell into our lap. And the reality is that if you have this peace dividend, you have to be willing to spend a fair amount of it to keep it. And instead, it was basically treated as free money. It was treated as, this is a great success for globalization and the Russians will eventually find their way in. So, I think that was an enormous missed opportunity. And it was basically, if the Russians were going to fail well, it wasn't the American's responsibility or the allies' responsibility to do a lot about it.
Furthermore, when the Russians getting angrier then started to take steps to redress a global order that they felt increasingly left behind and humiliated from, the West didn't pay much attention and furthermore didn't uphold their own principles. So, the US opened NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine back in 2008 at the Bucharest Summit. They promised that both of those countries would be able to join, but they didn't really have any intention of how they'd bring that about.
And when Russia then invaded Georgia just a few months later, it was August if I remember correctly because a lot of these things happened in August, nothing. I mean very... There was a discussion internally in the Bush cabinet and Dick Cheney was angry and said, "We've got to defend these guys." But the reality was nothing was done. There was no intention to have crippling sanctions against the Russians that would destroy their economy or provide weapon systems to Georgians. Very much a democracy led by someone who was a bit of firebrand that wasn't trusted very much in the US, Mikheil Saakashvili, much in the way that Zelenskyy by the way was felt about, was responded to in the United States before the war in Ukraine. But of course, we didn't have social media back then, you didn't have the global perspective of what was happening on the ground and the United States basically did nothing.
Then in 2014 when the Russians invaded Ukraine, and not only annex Crimea, but also took and denied taking territory on the ground in the Donbas in southeast Ukraine, what did the Americans do? And the answer is not very much. Again, not providing weapons, not providing much support, limited sanctions. And in fact, in 2018, when the Russians held the World Cup, a lot of you remember this, and they're still invading, they're still occupying this Ukrainian territory, active fight is still going on across the line of conflict, a bunch of European leaders actually fly to Russia to meet with Putin and attend the World Cup.
I mean, so obviously not many consequences for all of this. And so as a consequence of all of that, the Russians, I think themselves had good reason to believe that they could get away with engaging in and redressing what they felt was an unjust humiliation and the West wouldn't do much about it. Now, more recently you have a people that did indeed feel increasingly humiliated. The Russian economy not doing very well, you'll remember when President Obama said that Russia wasn't a great power, a regional power and they're in decline. Now by the way, analytically, I agree with that. But if you're president of the United States, why do that? When you are winning, why do that? You never punch down.
It reminded me of Obama when Trump was there at the White House Correspondents' Dinner. And by the way, Obama had plenty of reasons to be very angry with Trump? Keep in mind this was the guy that started the birther movement against Obama and said that he's born in Kenya, born in Indonesia, prove it, show your passport, show your birth certificate. And it became a really big deal. So if you're Obama, you absolutely have personal animus against Trump. But then you're president of the United States and you're up there giving a speech of the WHCD, at the White House Correspondents' Dinner, and there's Trump in the audience and the right thing to do as president is nothing. The right thing to do as president is be graceful. You've made it. Never punch down. And Obama couldn't help himself. Took a victory lap, stuck his thumb down. He made Trump look like an idiot. You could see the humiliation and the anger on Trump's face. And in retrospect, was this something that probably motivated him more to take on politics, motivated him more to go after Obama on every single occasion when he could and undo everything Obama had done when he became president? Yeah. Yeah. That's the kind of thing that I think someone like Trump would absolutely take personally.
And does Putin take it personally against the United States for decades of what he sees to be as not only not paying attention, but stick in your finger in and saying, "These guys are no good, these guys are worthless"? Absolutely. So I think that there is a bunch of that. And also from the Russian perspective, the United States itself is hypocritical, doesn't have much of a leg to stand on.
When Russia annexed Crimea, a lot of the language that they used to justify the annexation was taken from the American decision to recognize the independence of Kosovo, which again, from a human rights perspective, the Americans had a lot of reason to do it. But in terms of international law, was actually a breach of international law. There's no justification for it so the Russians say, "Well, see, the Americans can do it, we can do it too." Let's keep in mind the Americans promised international law to defend Ukraine in 1994, signed an agreement together with the UK and the Russians. The Ukrainians gave up their nuclear weapons, we're going to ensure that we defend their territorial integrity. Wasn't worth the piece of paper it was printed on because when the Russians invaded 2014, the Americans don't even talk about this document. Well, why would they care in 2022? It's a big question.
Iraq, Afghanistan, these are wars of choice, massive human rights abuses by the United States. So is it just that the Americans call themselves, ourselves, I'm an American, the leader of the free world. If you're Russia, you say, "Look, this is all just moral relativism, everyone's equally bad, no one's telling the truth so I should be able to get away with whatever I can do from a power position"?
Again, I want to be clear. Putin is the one supporting and committing war crimes. And no, I refuse to compare what he is ordering against the democratic country that has done literally nothing but want to govern itself. And there aren't Nazis running the country, that's insane. No, this isn't the Taliban chopping off heads and hands, the most abusive country in the world towards women, harboring bin Laden. No, it's not Iraq with a massive human rights abuses under Saddam Hussein historically, after they invade Kuwait and the Americans come back and attack them.
There are plenty of reasons to oppose American history of intervention and unjust war. That is not the same thing as what the Russians are doing right now to the Ukrainian people. But we do need to be accountable for how we got here. And if we want to be honest with ourselves about that, well, then we have to broaden the conversation beyond just the Russian President Vladimir Putin.
So that's a little bit for me.
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New Cold War: Russia has "permanently" broken relations with EU & US
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: As we head to the weekend, we are sadly into the second week of this Russia war in Ukraine, and no end in sight.
Of course, if you're in Russia, you're not supposed to call it a war. It's actually illegal to call it a war. It's a special military operation. If you call it a war or otherwise, describe fake news on the war as is considered by the Russian government, you face up to 15 years in prison. The level of brutality that the Russians are exerting upon innocent Ukrainians who have done nothing wrong, other than elected an independent and democratic government and want to determine their own future, as well as the brutality that the Russians are increasingly exerting against their own Russian citizens is horrifying and has met with revulsion with most of the world. There was a General Assembly, UN General Assembly resolution condemning the Russian invasion and four countries in the world voted with the Russians, Eritrea, Syria, Belarus, and North Korea.
It is an astonishing level of opposition, strong opposition and strong opposition that is willing to pay a serious price in order to be in strong opposition that we're seeing from countries around the world. Here's the problem. The Russians, yes, they will win militarily. They will be able to capture Kyiv. They will be able to remove Zelensky from power in Kyiv, but I see no circumstance under which Putin emerges from this crisis in anything but a dramatically worse position, both politically inside his own country, economically, in terms of how Russia is doing, as well as geopolitically and Russia's position, particularly as it relates to European security. There is no circumstance under which I can see that Putin wouldn't have been radically better off if he just hadn't invaded Ukraine.
And on the one hand, you can say, that's good because it means he's losing. And you want someone to lose when they take an action like that. On the other hand, not only does this come at the expense of millions and millions of Ukrainians who will be uprooted from their homes and thousands and thousands who will die, but also it's very hard to see a climbdown because if Putin loses no matter what, and Putin understands this isn't a democracy. He's not voted out of power. He loses, he very easily, that's the end of him. You can see how he will intend to continue to escalate. And that makes this environment closer to a worst case scenario. And I don't mean nuclear war, World War III. I mean worst case compared to where we were two weeks ago, before the war started with where we are now, almost everything points towards escalation. There are negotiations going on between Russia and Ukraine. They have agreed in principle on providing humanitarian corridors for Ukrainians to leave war zones.
But of course, that's one of the only things they can agree on for completely different reasons. For the Ukrainians, because they want to protect the Ukrainian people and they care about them and for the Russians, because they want it to be easier for them to take over these cities and they don't want the blow back, but that doesn't lead to an outcome that brings the two countries closer together. Doesn't facilitate further negotiation at all. The Russians are miles apart from anything that could lead to at this point, a cease fire, or climbdown. Now once the Russians take Kyiv and removes Zelensky from power, then you can imagine a cease fire, but it's hard to imagine a cease fire that could lead to Russia's reintegration into the global economy, or could lead to any reduction of these sanctions because Russia's position will have been remove and overthrow the Ukrainian government, occupy large pieces of Ukrainian territory plus all of these Ukrainians that are dead. You can't bring any of that back.
So I fear that for the foreseeable future we are looking at a new Cold War and indeed a new iron curtain behind which, it is we're not doing a lot of business. We're not traveling. We're not doing a lot of student exchanges. We're not engaging with each other. We are decoupling. Now this is not autarky for the Russian economy, because of course they will still be very closely linked and increasingly closely linked to China, which will soon be the largest economy in the world. And given that reality and China's basically at technological parity with the United States and they can buy a great deal of Russian oil and gas once they build the gas infrastructure over time, won't take that long. Certainly you can buy a lot of Russian food.
Plus you've got countries like India and the Gulf states and Brazil, other major economies that will continue to work with the Russian irrespective of what happens in Ukraine. So it's not like Russia's becoming North Korea, but Russia's relations with Europe and the United States I think are broken for good, permanently. It's hard to see them come back. And so, as I think about what we're likely to see over the coming weeks, I do think we're going to see military escalation. We're going to continue to see a proxy war, and we're going to continue to see the Russian economy implode, which will put more pressure on Putin. And what happens to Putin? Now silver lining, yes, the Europeans are much stronger. EU, UK relations are stronger. US, EU relations are stronger. And frankly, even for five minutes at the beginning of the State of the Union speech that Biden gave you could squint and pretend that the Americans had a functional democracy.
Even in the US there's general agreement that the Americans are doing the right thing and that Putin is the problem here, not Biden, not Trump, none of that, it's Putin. It won't last, but nonetheless. But going beyond, that are there any silver linings from the global perspective? And right now, at least the answer for that is no.
It's Friday. I hope everyone enjoys themselves this evening, relaxes over the weekend. We clearly have a lot of work to do together and I'm here for it, but that's where we are as of today. And I'll talk to you all real soon.
For more of Ian Bremmer's weekly analyses, subscribe to his GZERO World newsletter at ianbremmer.bulletin.com