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Gerald Ford American President and Leonid Brejnev Soviet Leader, on July 30, 1975 at Conference on Security and Cooperation in Helsinki.
Can this Cold War agreement broker peace between Russia and the West?
Fifty years ago, leaders from 35 countries – including rivals from both sides of the Iron Curtain – gathered in the Finnish capital of Helsinki to attend the first Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).
The talks capped three years of Cold War negotiations, culminating in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act – a landmark agreement that laid the groundwork for stabilizing relations between Eastern and Western bloc countries and paved the way for future economic and security cooperation.
“It was a very unusual assembly,” says Ian Bond, deputy director of the Centre for European Reform. “The fact that two sides that were brandishing nuclear weapons at each other were nonetheless able to find an agreement of this sort, is pretty extraordinary in itself.”
What exactly was so groundbreaking about the Helsinki Final Act? The two most significant legacies from the Helsinki Final Act were its principles on state sovereignty – which acknowledged that each state had the right to choose their own alliances, and political, social, economic and cultural systems – and human rights – which pledged signatories to respect fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religions or belief.
In the years that followed, Western governments and Soviet-bloc dissidents used these principles to protest abuses under Moscow and its satellite regimes, facilitating the transition of Central and Eastern Europe to democracy.
“Turning the commitments on human rights provided leverage, not only to Western governments to raise human rights issues with communist bloc counterparts, but to internal opposition within those countries,” says Bond. “This laid the foundations for the fall of the Soviet Union.”
Today, Moscow and the West once again find themselves at odds, principally over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In some ways the relationship is worse now than it was during the depths of the Cold War.
“We’re in a phase where the two sides aren’t really talking to each other and are not really interested in talking to each other,” says Bond, “and that’s particularly true on the Russian side.”
So, could a new Helsinki process broker peace between Russia and the West again? Perhaps, says Bond, but the will to find peace needs to be there first. Helsinki wasn’t a tool for managing active conflict, rather, it was designed to guide parties already committed to de-escalation.
In the lead up to the Helsinki Act, the driving force was a shared recognition that tensions between the East and the West were reaching a breaking point.
“Diplomats tend to overestimate the ability of diplomatic processes to find a solution when the two parties to a conflict…have not themselves already decided that they want [in] a settlement,” says Bond. “The precondition is that both sides have decided that they will get more out of de-escalation than maintaining the conflict. And we’re not at that stage yet.”
For another Helsinki-style breakthrough to happen, both sides need to already be ready to ease tensions and look towards rebuilding some basic level of mutual trust.
What relevance, if any, does the Helsinki Final Act hold today? While the prospect of Russia and West returning to the negotiating table still remains distant, preserving Helsinki’s foundation for cooperation and core principles is vital for any future de-escalation.
“All wars end eventually, and at that point you will need some sort of mechanism for managing the relations between adversarial powers,” says Bond. “And that’s basically what the Helsinki Final Act provided and might provide again.”
President of Costa Rica, Rodrigo Chaves Robles, smiles and points finger up while listening to interpreter headphones during the opening of the Third United Nations Ocean Conference in Nice.
HARD NUMBERS: Corruption bombshell in Costa Rica, Tax Protests in Kenya, flaming butts in Greece, and more…
7: Costa Rica’s attorney general’s office accused 7 government officials – including President Rodrigo Chaves – of illicit campaign financing in 2022. The prosecutors called on the country’s Supreme Court to lift Chaves’ immunity so he could be placed on trial. Chaves’ office has yet to respond to the allegations.
1: Exactly one year after demonstrators stormed the Kenyan parliament to stop a new tax bill, protesters are again taking to the streets to mark that event. Police have responded by cracking down, hurling tear gas canisters at the crowds.
120: ISIS-linked groups in Mozambique’s restive, energy-rich Cabo Delgado province have kidnapped at least 120 children in recent days, according to Human Rights Watch. The groups allegedly use the children for forced labour and marriages, and also as soldiers.
1 billion: Thailand’s health ministry moved to prohibit the sale of recreational cannabis on Tuesday, disrupting an industry that has grown to over $1 billion. The country was the first in Asia to decriminalize cannabis in 2022, but a public backlash over harm to children forced the government to reverse that.
10,000: Authorities arrested a Georgian woman accused of sparking a wildfire that has burned through more than 10,000 acres on the Greek island of Chios. She is suspected of unintentionally starting the blaze by dropping a cigarette butt in the brush..
75: Today marks 75 years since the start of the Korean war, which pitted Soviet-and-Chinese backed North Korea against the US-backed South in the first major clash of the Cold War. The three year long conflict, known as “the forgotten war” in the US, killed as many as three million people, but resulted in little change to the borders of the divided Korean peninsula. And technically, it never ended.
East and West German citizens celebrate as they climb the Berlin Wall at the Brandenburg Gate after the opening of the East German border was announced, on November 9, 1989.
You had to be there: How our memories shape our politics
– By Willis Sparks
Sometimes I find myself talking with one of my super-smart, well-informed younger acquaintances about some major event from “recent” history. I’ll tell them I remember watching nightly coverage of the fate of Americans held hostage in Tehran by furious Iranian students while I was in high school. Or, sitting on the floor of my grad school apartment, watching live TV coverage of Chinese tanks crushing Chinese protesters, and later of giddy Germans dancing and drinking atop the Berlin Wall. Then there’s the sunny fall morning when a plane struck a tower in lower Manhattan.
Then I remember that the person I’m speaking with wasn’t yet born when most (or any) of these things happened.
Everywhere in the world, succeeding generations have formative experiences that shape their understanding not only of the past but of the present and future. When we think about the politics of various countries today, this “horizon of memory” can help us consider something important about what’s happening and why.
50.5% of Americans are under 40. This means they have little memory of the Cold War, and didn’t grow up with the assumption that America has a “responsibility to lead” on the global stage. If you didn’t experience Cold War hopes and fears firsthand, you might find it odd that US presidents were once called “leader of the free world.”
43.3% of Germans are under 40. I haven’t visited Berlin since there were two of them. I went in the spring of 1990 because I wanted to put my hand on the Wall, to touch history, before it was gone. No German under the age of 40 will remember that surreal historical inflection point or the complex (sometimes contradictory) feelings triggered by Germany’s reunification.
45.9% of Russians and 42.4% of Ukrainians are under 40. No Russian under 40 will remember the Soviet superpower and the daily life that came with it. Even the Mikhail Gorbachev-period that I saw for myself on a visit to Moscow in April 1989 will be largely unfamiliar. Across the border, no Ukrainian under 40 will remember life in an empire ruled from the Kremlin. On both sides of the border, Vladimir Putin’s arguments about Russia’s historic claims to Kyiv land differently with people over 60 than those who are 30.
69.4% of South Africans are under 40. Everyone in that country knows the African National Congress was once the party of liberation. But unless you’re over 40, you likely won’t remember the astonishing day in February 1990 when a smiling Nelson Mandela, imprisoned for 27 years, walked out of his small cell in suit and tie. Nor will you recall the widely shared jolt of raw idealism when he became his country’s president. If you’re under 40, the ANC is the party of power.
64% of Brazilians are under 45. No Brazilian under 45 can remember living under the military dictatorship that was the “Fifth Brazilian Republic,” which lasted from 1964 to 1985. For them, debates over threats to democracy posed by former President Jair Bolsonaro might not resonate as they do for their parents.
78% of Iranians are under 50. No Iranian under 50 will remember life before the revolution that established the Islamic Republic (1979). They know the days of the Shah only through the happy or unhappy memories of their parents and the ideological education they continue to receive.
Without doubt, these events are crucial for all of us. No matter our age today, these are the movements of history on which we build the world around us. But I know my grandparents understood the poverty and fear of the 1930s differently than I ever can. My parents came of age in the peaceful but paranoid 1950s and entered adulthood with the Cuban Missile Crisis.
At 60, I’m blessed to have seen some dramatic historical turning points and to value the perspective they offer. But I’ve also learned that politics, anywhere and everywhere, is impossible to understand without reminders of our horizons of memory — and respect for the assumptions, beliefs, and aspirations of those who’ve engaged the wider world since.
What memories of historical events have shaped your worldview? Let us know here, and if you include your name and where you’re writing from we may include your response in an upcoming edition.April 29, 1975: Vietnamese refugees line up on the deck of USS Hancock for processing following evacuation from Saigon.
Saigon’s Last Day: The fall, the flight, and the aftermath of the Vietnam War
April 30 marks 50 years since North Vietnamese troops overran the capital of US-aligned South Vietnam, ending what is known locally as the Resistance War against America. Despite strong US-Vietnam reconciliation in recent decades, US President Donald Trump has forbidden American diplomats to observe the anniversary of this transformative moment — but those who survived the chaos that followed will never forget the trauma echoing down through the generations.
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Saigon, April 29, 1975. For six weeks, South Vietnamese forces have been falling back in the face of a determined communist offensive. American troops have been gone for two years. The feeble government is in disarray. The people are traumatized by three decades of war and three million deaths.
Bing Crosby’s “White Christmas” begins playing on radios across the capital.
Some Saigonese know it’s a sign: It is time to run.
Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, now a Columbia University history professor, was just five months old, the youngest of nine children. After a failed first escape attempt by helicopter, her family heard about an uncle with access to an oil transport boat. More than 100 refugees crammed aboard the small vessel, where they waited for hours to set sail. Nguyen’s father nearly became separated when he dashed back into the city in a futile attempt to find more relatives.
At nightfall, they finally departed, crossing enemy-controlled territory under cover of darkness before being ordered onto an ammunition barge floating off the coast, bursting with over 1,000 refugees.
“When the sun rose the next day, April 30, we realized Saigon had fallen,” says Nguyen.
They were far from safety. The cable anchoring the barge in place severed, and they came under mortar fire as it drifted helplessly. Somehow, no one was killed in the shelling, but the refugees had no water and scant food, and they were baking under the unrelenting sun of the Mekong Delta.
Later that day, after dark, a US ship arrived to take on refugees, but as hundreds of bodies crowded toward their rescuers, they tipped the barge.
“People fell off, and it was in the middle of the night. Many drowned,” says Nguyen. “My brother watched a child fall in the water and then the father dive in after – they were never seen again.”
Baby Lien-Hang and her siblings all made it onto the second ship that arrived and transited through camps in Guam, Wake Island, and Hawaii, then a series of military bases on the US mainland. Months later, the family finally settled permanently in Pennsylvania. But for those who could not find a way out of Saigon that day, the odyssey is just beginning.
The revolution arrives
Americans often think of April 30, 1975, as the end of the Vietnam War. But for Vietnamese, “the fall of Saigon signals not just the victory of North Vietnam, but the peak of their revolution,” says Tuong Vu, a political science professor at the University of Oregon.
The Communist Party of Vietnam rapidly began purging society of threats to their regime, including former South Vietnamese officials and soldiers, capitalists, religious clergy, intellectuals, and ethnic Chinese and Khmer. The new government also seized property, collectivized agriculture, and removed hundreds of thousands of urban residents to the countryside for farming.
Erin Phuong Steinhauer, now the head of the Vietnam Society, was five years old when she watched North Vietnamese tanks roll down Nguyen Hue Boulevard and crash through the gates of the presidential palace. Her family were wealthy proprietors of camera shops, and her father was a former soldier for South Vietnam.
Shortly after the fall of Saigon, troops arrived at their home to take him away. He would spend the next four years in a re-education camp – a prison meant to indoctrinate and punish perceived enemies of the state – suffering extreme deprivations, forced labor, and brainwashing. The family’s property was confiscated, and Erin and nine of her siblings went to live with their grandparents.
“Then they arrested my mother, and interrogated her,” says Steinhauer. For a week, she slept in a corrugated panel box. “They kept her there and asked her over and over: ‘Where is your money? Where did you hide everything? What are your plans?’”
She returned deeply traumatized – but the family had a lifeline. Erin’s mother had hidden gold with relatives in the countryside, and over the next four years, the family used it to make risky escapes in small groups to Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, where Erin arrived with her mother and sisters in 1979.
“It was a strange feeling when we escaped Vietnam. I remember my dreams before 1975 were in bright color,” says Steinhauer. “Afterward, they were in dull grey overtones.”
Overextension and reform
The Communist Party’s policies strangled economic growth, and Vietnam’s situation was further complicated by China’s split with the USSR. Hanoi sided with Moscow, which had provided advanced weapons and advisors during the war with the US.
Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge regime in neighboring Cambodia leaned on Beijing for support. Vietnam invaded its neighbor in 1978 to remove Pol Pot’s regime after over a year of border conflicts and failed peace talks, leading to an 11-year-long occupation and a brief punitive war with China in 1979.
“The Soviet Union, with its weak economy, became totally exhausted because of overreach,” says Vu. Straining under the weight of the war in Afghanistan and the arms race with the US, Moscow “was forced to consider economic reform, and in turn, encouraged the Vietnamese to reform as well.”
In 1986, the death of Party Secretary Le Duan allowed new leadership to initiate the Doi Moi reforms, gradually opening Vietnam’s market and sending out political feelers to former enemies.
“After 1986, Vietnam engaged with the global community again, moving away from the Soviet orbit,” says Nguyen. “It is the end of the international marginalization that came about with its war against Cambodia and China.”
Reconciliation with Washington
Repairing relations with the United States remained a slow process, in large part due to an American embargo, and formal diplomatic ties were not fully reestablished until 1995. The relationship strengthened rapidly in the following years, including defense and diplomatic cooperation, but most crucially through trade. Access to US markets helped the Vietnamese economy grow at an astounding pace, with per-capita GDP in 2023 more than 14 times higher than it was in 1995, and total US trade volume over 248 times larger.
That close relationship is part of why many Vietnam observers were shocked when the Trump administration ordered its diplomats in Hanoi to avoid any ceremonies recognizing the 50th anniversary of the fall of Saigon.
“It’s a smack in the face,” says Steinhauer. Though a symbolic gesture, “It invalidates everything we have gone through – not just Vietnamese-Americans, but US veterans, and the people of Vietnam, and the hundreds of diplomats who worked to broker reconciliation over the past 30 years. All of that seems like it is meaningless to this administration.”
Opinion: After 25 years, has Putin "won"?
An aging, visibly infirm president is about to hand off power to an authoritarian-minded successor with a mandate to restore “order” and “sovereignty.”
Sound familiar? Da. It’s New Year’s Eve 1999, and a bloated, barely intelligible Boris Yeltsin is handing the Kremlin over to a shifty young spook named Vladimir Putin. “Take care of Russia,” he famously said before staggering out of the room.
When Vladimir Vladimirovich first took power 25 years ago, the world was a different place. Cell phones weren’t smart yet. Lou Bega was burning up the charts with “Mambo Number Five.” The most feared hacking group in the world wasn’t called “Fancy Bear” or “Salt Typhoon” but “Napster.”
It was also a world in which the US was at the pinnacle of its post-Cold War triumphalism. The disputed elections, disastrous wars, and crippling financial crises of the 21st century were still – just barely – in the future.
History had ended, or at least been paused. Uncle Sam had won the Cold War. Free markets, free trade, and liberal democracy were on the march globally, gloriously, and inevitably. So too, it seemed, was NATO, which began expanding eastward in the 1990s.
Putin did not like this world. From his perspective it was a world that treated Russia either as an afterthought or as a charity case. He resented the high-handed moralizing from the West about “democracy.” He dreamed of a “multipolar” world where the US couldn’t boss Russia around or humiliate the Kremlin and its friends.
Now, five US presidents, three Russian invasions, and countless predictions of his demise later, Putin is still standing. And as a result, he has lasted long enough to witness the return of Donald Trump to the White House – this time not with an asterisk but with a mandate.
In a way, Trump’s return means Putin has finally won. Not because of the silly notion that Trump is a “Russian agent” – but because it closes the door, finally and fully, on the post-Cold War era that Putin confronted when he first came to power.
Trumpism is, at its core, a rebuke to all the pieties of that era: that globalism would trump nationalism, that free trade and open societies had an inherent appeal, and that there were international “norms” that the US was responsible for policing.
Trump, whether you like him or not, isn’t interested in a high-handed foreign policy based on abstract “values.” He doesn’t care whether Russia is a democracy or an empire. He questions the net benefit of decades-old US alliances like NATO. He has already blown apart what Robert Lighthizer, his first-term trade czar, calls the “free trade theology” that held sway in Washington for decades.
His worldview is a zero-sum, mercantilist, hyper-nationalistic one. Putin, in many ways, can relate. When Trump talks about using force to take over the Panama Canal, Greenland, or Canada because these things would be in America’s national interest as a hemispheric power, for example, he is speaking a political language from before the “end of history.” This is a language Putin speaks fluently. Panama isn’t quite Crimea, but you get the idea.
At his annual marathon press conference a few weeks ago, Putin reflected on the past quarter century, telling BBC’s journalist Steve Rosenberg that he was proud to have “pulled Russia back from the abyss,” after inheriting a deeply indebted, politically fragmented, and listless country from Yeltsin.
Perhaps that’s true, but Russia today is a country locked in a costly conflict of Putin’s choosing, with a shrinking and aging population, a war-warped economy, and a flagging technological base. Shorn of its traditional partners in Europe, Moscow is increasingly dependent either on rogue pariahs like North Korea and Iran, or a superpower China that dwarfs Russia in economic and military capacity.
Over the past 25 years, Putin outlasted the “post-Cold War” world that he resented. But it’s less obvious that he has “taken care of Russia” well enough for it to thrive and prosper over the next quarter century of whatever comes next.
Putin needs Xi to win the war in Ukraine
David Sanger, Pulitzer prize-winning New York Times journalist and author of "New Cold Wars," discusses the evolving relationship between China and Russia, highlighting its asymmetry and significance in today's geopolitical landscape. He points out how much the tables have turned. During the Cold War of the 20th Century, the Soviet Union was the dominant power when it came to its relationship with China. Decades later, it's clear that China holds the upper hand. "China holds more cards than the Russians do," Sanger tells Ian Bremmer. Not only that, Russia's Vladimir Putin needs China's Xi Jinping by his side in order to prevail in his war with Ukraine. "He [Putin] needs that Chinese technology desperately... He does not have a choice except to deal with the Chinese on Chinese terms right now."
And what does that mean for China's interests when it comes to the United States? "If you're Xi," Sanger says, "the two best things that can happen to you is that the US is tied up in Ukraine or ripping itself apart about the aid and consumed again in the Middle East." And at least in that respect, Xi seems to be getting everything he wants.
Watch Ian Bremmer's full interview with David Sanger on GZERO World - Are we on the brink of a new cold war?
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
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Are we on the brink of a new cold war?
“We are back in a period of superpower competition that will probably go on for decades. And that, if we're lucky, remains a cold war.” David Sanger, a Pulitzer prize-winning national security correspondent for The New York Times, joins Ian Bremmer on a new episode of GZERO World to offer a clear-eyed take on America’s adversaries. He’s out with a new book called "New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West." The takeaway: we’re entering a new and increasingly unstable era of geopolitics where the US, China, and Russia will be vying for power and influence like never before. China's rise as a world leader and economic powerhouse, along with Russia's nuclear saber-rattling and increasing military cooperation, poses an unprecedented challenge to US dominance.
But unlike the Cold War that dominated the 20th century, where the US and the Soviet Union could operate essentially independently from each other, the world today is far more connected. "It's a cold war that bears almost no resemblance to the one that you and I are old enough to remember, because in that Cold War, we had a single competitor, and we weren't dependent on them, nor they on us for very much."
Sanger also talks about America’s missed opportunities and misjudgments in dealing with Russia and China. There were early hopes of engagement with Russia under Yeltsin's presidency, which quickly eroded when Putin came to power. Similarly, there was a belief that integrating China into the global economy would lead to political reform. However, this bet did not play out as expected, with the Communist Party using digital forces for explicit repression techniques. "It became pretty evident, pretty clearly that the Communist party had learned how to take these same digital forces and use them for the most explicitly designed repression techniques we have ever seen.”
But one area where both Russia and China have a shared interest? Pitting Americans against each other. “They have every incentive, both Russia and China, to be subtle actors in the background of this coming presidential election,” Sanger tells Bremmer. “And that's one area where if they are not cooperating, it would pay them off considerably to coordinate.”
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week on US public television (check local listings) and online.
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The next era of global superpower competition: a conversation with the New York Times' David Sanger
Listen: In 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin met at a summit and described their “friendship without limits.” But how close is that friendship, really? Should the US be worried about their growing military and economic cooperation? On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer sits down with Pulitzer prize-winning national security correspondent for The New York Times David Sanger to talk about China, Russia, the US, and the 21st-century struggle for global dominance. Sanger’s newest book, “New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West,” looks at the new and increasingly unstable era of geopolitics where the US, China, and Russia are vying for power and influence like never before. Bremmer and Sanger discuss the US intelligence failures that led to the current geopolitical reality, what the US needs to do to combat the growing cooperation between our two biggest adversaries, and why semiconductor factories are more important to national security than aircraft carriers.
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