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How Trump fails, nuclearization, geopolitics on AI, and more: Your questions, answered
This is the third and last mailbag of the spring season. Check out the previous two here and here. I will resume the newsletter’s regularly scheduled programming next week, but I hope you’ve found this detour from long-form columns valuable and that I’ve covered some of the things that might have been on your mind.
Here we go (as always, questions lightly edited for clarity).
Gun to your head, what Democrat stands the best chance of becoming president in 2028?
Given how much the country – and the world – will change in the next couple of years, I suspect it'll be someone that nobody has on their shortlist right now. Or did you put money on “The Apprentice” host changing the course of history back in 2013?
School taught us the Founding Fathers created a government of checks and balances, yet I don't see Congress stepping in to curb a dictator-type president. Why?
The system of checks and balances the framers designed in 1787 is resilient, but it has never been failproof. After all, the Constitution is a piece of paper – it isn’t self-enforcing. Ben Franklin’s “a republic, if you can keep it” shows the Founding Fathers recognized as much. One of the things the system needs to work is vigorous conflict between the branches. In other words, elected officials (looking at you, lawmakers) need to be willing to put duty to their office and their country above loyalty to their party.
But the modern American political system, with nationalized parties facing nationalized interests, nationalized polarization, and nationalized partisan media, has no ambition “to counteract ambition” as James Madison intended. This is especially true in Donald Trump’s GOP, which is cowed by the president’s political hold over the Republican voter base and media ecosystem. There’s also a big collective action problem – no one wants to be the first to stick their neck out, at least not until the crisis gets “big enough” to merit losing their jobs.
Given that virtually all of Trump’s actions are via executive orders and, therefore, can be overturned by the next administration, how big of a long-term effect do you think he will have?
Quite big. He’s setting precedents with the destruction of democratic norms, politicization of institutions, erosion of the rule of law, and expansion of executive authority that the next president will be able to build on if they so choose. As my colleagues and I flagged in this year’s Top Risk #2, Rule of Don, “Once precedents are broken by one party, the other tends to follow suit more easily.”
And let’s keep in mind there’s a decent chance the next president is someone Trump effectively anoints, which – presuming he’s still around after 2028 – could mean he’d still have a lot of direct influence. This assumes that free and fair elections are not materially disrupted through the weaponization of the “power ministries” (Justice Department, FBI, IRS). It’s far from my base case given state and local administration of elections, but still, a fatter tail risk than I’m comfortable with.
What’s the most likely way Trump can fail?
After hubris comes nemesis. The pattern is relatively familiar: Trump overplays his hand by picking more and bigger fights than he can win, gets kicked in the head by reality, and is either forced to backtrack or suffers a decline in the polls that threatens to splinter off Republicans in Congress and constrains his ability to implement his agenda.
Whether it’s China responding forcefully to the tariffs, markets revolting against attacks on Fed chair Jay Powell, or Harvard defending its academic independence, we’re already seeing meaningful snapback functions limiting the president. Not from traditional institutions, the courts, or multilateral treaties, but from powerful forces domestically and internationally that are refusing to take it on the chin. When you want to live by the law of the jungle and claim the title of apex predator, you have to win the big fights.
Will Trump’s dramatic “you are on your own” security messaging drive more countries to acquire their own nuclear weapons?
Absolutely, it’s a rational thing to consider in a G-Zero world. I doubt any of them will go nuclear over the next four years, but America’s unreliability already has a number of US allies and partners searching for alternatives to the US umbrella. Germany is likely to work out some form of nuclear-sharing with France and the United Kingdom, whose umbrella could extend across Europe and cover Poland as well. The Poles are also openly contemplating developing independent capabilities. South Korea and Japan are more likely to get their own nukes as a deterrent to Chinese aggression. The big open question is the Middle East, where Saudi Arabia (and maybe Turkey?) could also go down this path if Iran negotiations fail. Bottom line, we’re headed for an era of nuclear proliferation.
What did you think the G-Zero meant? Vibes? Papers? Essays?
How should Canada manage the small but important risk of invasion from the US?
By continuing to make clear that the threat is unacceptable – a view shared by a large majority of Americans, too. As Canadians just did by electing Mark Carney as prime minister, something that was unthinkable only a couple of months ago when his Liberal Party was dead in the water. That should tell Trump (who, by the way, had already ruled out direct military intervention) everything he needs to know about Canadians’ reaction function to foreign aggression.
Can American power be used to stop the bloodshed in Gaza and broker any kind of durable Israeli-Palestinian peace? Should it?
Should it? Of course. Can it? Not in any way that seems politically plausible. After all, Trump is even more pro-Israel than Biden was, and that was a high bar to clear already after what we saw last year. He doesn’t care about the well-being of the Palestinian population. And beyond Biden and Trump, most American voters don’t care enough about foreign lives to change their leaders’ calculus.
Absent heavy political pressure from Washington that isn’t coming, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has little reason to ease the pressure on Gaza, let alone to enter a broader peace process that could end his political career and maybe even land him in prison. Not only does he need to keep the far-right faction of his coalition onside, but most Israeli citizens now support the continuation of the fighting … and no longer support a two-state solution.
How do you think it will end between Ukraine and Russia? Will the Ukrainians be able to get their lands back?
Ukraine will be de facto partitioned, as we said in last year’s Top Risks report. That may be uncontroversial now, but it wasn’t a popular call to make in January 2024, when most of the West (to say nothing of the Ukrainians) was still demanding that Ukraine get all its land back. It wasn’t going to happen then, and it isn’t going to happen now. That would still be true if Kamala Harris had won the US presidency. Even Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledges that Ukraine is militarily incapable of retaking all its territory, while Russia won’t agree to a voluntary return. The question is how much each side will lose – and how much leverage each will gain – by the time they decide enough’s enough. That time just hasn’t arrived yet.
How do you think AI will impact geopolitics by 2040?
I expect we will not recognize our geopolitical order. International relations presume a state-based system with major powers cooperating and competing in the diplomatic, economic, and security realms. Artificial intelligence will blow that premise out of the water. As the digital realm becomes the dominant geopolitical arena, we will shift to a hybrid order where technology companies and governments compete for influence.
States will either completely integrate AI into their systems of governance and decision-making or they’ll be left behind by non-state actors that are growing increasingly sovereign not just in the digital space but in society, the economy, and national security. Closed political systems will have an evolutionary advantage, as power will lie with whoever controls the most data. Open systems will increasingly move toward more centralization, lest they become marginalized in global influence.
In the long run, would you bet against the US? Is it still the land of opportunity?
I’d bet against all national governments in the long run. They are too slow-moving to adapt to what’s coming. Many people living in today’s United States may well continue to thrive in this future. But it will increasingly be up to us – not governments – to make ourselves fit for purpose.
If 75% of the world’s economy and 95% of the world’s population keep globalizing, especially its fastest-growing parts, is it accurate to talk about deglobalization?
No, you’re right, the world as a whole is not deglobalizing. Certainly not digitally, less so once the AI revolution goes truly global. But it is accurate to talk about the United States actively deglobalizing and the US-China relationship decoupling. Both of which have massive structural, long-term implications.
How can we return to a state where facts are less strongly disputed? Can social media ever recover from having become a manipulation-friendly propaganda machine?
Two small but useful, pro-social ideas to start. First, only verify actual people, not bots. Second, make platforms legally responsible for the content created and shared by large accounts that they algorithmically promote. The goal is not to constrain free speech – which, to be clear, should be protected according to our constitution and laws – but to weaken the present incentives to intentionally engineer and maximize outrage and anger to drive user engagement at the expense of our societies and democracies.
Why should I care so much about what’s going on in the world? It feels like it’s more of a headache than anything else. I am doing nothing with all the information that I absorb except complain, get angry, stand in disbelief, and of course, enjoy a lot of memes. But it weighs on me, and sometimes I wonder what the point is.
Because it involves your fellow humans. They’re just like you, only slightly more irritating. And they’re all we have. They’re worth caring about, even if you, your family, and your friends are all doing just fine. Because those people suffering in lands near and far could be you, your family, or your friends. That they aren’t is just an accident, luck of the draw. As John Donne wrote, “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.” If you hear a bell tolling … it may well be tolling for you, my friend.
With all of the chaos unfolding in the US, do you ever wish that you were back in Antarctica?
Not in the slightest. It’s way too cold, and there’s nothing much interesting happening there. Though the whole no Wi-Fi thing would be occasionally welcome.
Does Moose profit from your use of his name, image, and likeness? If not, can I offer him some pro bono legal assistance?
Moose is in it for the art, not the money. Plus, he’s family. He gets two, sometimes three, meals a day – even on days when his content doesn’t perform very well.
Exclusive: Ian Bremmer’s Top Risks for 2025
Every January, Eurasia Group, our parent company, produces a report with its forecast for the Top 10 Risks for the world in the year ahead. Its authors are EG President Ian Bremmer and EG Chairman Cliff Kupchan.
Here are brief summaries of the most important risks that will preoccupy world leaders, business decision-makers, and the rest of us in 2025, according to Bremmer and Kupchan. You can read the full report here.
1. The G-Zero wins
A G-Zero world is an era when no one power or group of powers is both willing and able to drive a global agenda and maintain international order. We’ve been living with this lack of international leadership for nearly a decade now. But in 2025, the problem will get a lot worse.
Bremmer and Kupchan argue that we should expect new and expanding power vacuums, emboldened rogue actors, and a heightened risk of dangerous accidents, miscalculations, and conflict. The risk of a geopolitical crisis, they warn, “is higher than at any point in our lifetimes.”
Russia and China remain challengers to the Western-led security order, though in very different ways. Rising inequality, shifting demographics, and warp-speed technological change have persuaded a growing number of citizens in advanced industrial democracies that “globalism” hasn’t worked in their favor. And the world’s military superpower will again be led by the only post-World War II president who rejects the assumption that a US global leadership role serves the American people.
Bremmer and Kupchan detail three ways out of what they call a “geopolitical recession.” One, reform existing institutions like the UN, IMF, and others to operate more effectively and command broad legitimacy. Two, build replacement institutions that better reflect the underlying balance of power. Three, impose a new set of rules by force. Different actors are pursuing all three of these strategies. But in 2025, it’s the third option where challengers to the system are devoting their attention, time, and resources.
This Top Risk is not a single event, the authors suggest. It’s the cumulative impact of the intensifying G-Zero leadership deficit and the deepening geopolitical recession on the breakdown of the global order. The result is a uniquely dangerous period of world history on par with the 1930s or the early Cold War.
And just when we were celebrating the end of 2024.
2. Rule of Don
Donald Trump’s second term will not be like his first, Bremmer and Kupchan predict. Emboldened by the scale of his 2024 election victory and the support of a unified Republican Party, Trump will enter office more experienced and better organized than in 2017. He will populate his administration with loyalists who now have a better understanding of how the federal government works. His consolidated control over Republicans in Congress, a 6-3 conservative majority on the Supreme Court, and a friendlier media environment will help him advance his agenda.
From this solid foundation, Trump will work to purge the federal bureaucracy of professional civil servants and replace them with political loyalists, particularly at the Justice Department and the FBI. This consolidation of power will “stretch the norms of Washington to their breaking point,” according to Bremmer and Kupchan. The erosion of independent checks on executive power and an active undermining of the rule of law, they argue, will leave more of US policy dependent on the arbitrary decisions and personal whims of one powerful man in Washington rather than on established and politically impartial legal principles.
Democracy itself, the report cautions, will not be threatened. The US isn’t Hungary. But Trump’s indifference, in some cases hostility, to longstanding American values will set dangerous new precedents in “political vandalism” for future presidents of both parties.
3. US-China breakdown
The détente established by Joe Biden and Xi Jinping at Woodside in November 2023 kept US-China tensions reasonably contained in 2024. But Trump’s return to office will unleash an “unmanaged decoupling in the world’s most important geopolitical relationship.” That, in turn, risks a major economic disruption and a broader crisis.
Trump will set new tariffs on Chinese goods to pressure Beijing for concessions on a host of issues, and China’s leaders, despite real economic weakness at home, will respond more forcefully to prove to both Trump and China’s people that they can and will fight back.
Tensions over Taiwan will likely rise, though a true crisis remains unlikely in 2025. But Trump administration actions targeting the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy and visas for Chinese students will further inflame tensions.
Technology policy will be the true frontline in this conflict, Bremmer and Kupchan assert. China’s leaders insist that Washington wants to stunt China’s technological growth to protect the US position as world No. 1. Battles over trade and investment in everything from semiconductors to critical minerals will erupt in 2025.
4. Trumponomics
In January, Trump will inherit a robust US economy. Output has risen above pre-pandemic trends, unemployment remains near 4%, and an inflation rate nearing the Federal Reserve’s 2% target encourages investors to expect interest rate cuts. But Bremmer and Kupchan warn that Trump’s policies will bring higher inflation and lower growth in 2025.
First, Trump will significantly hike tariffs to correct “unfair” practices and reduce America’s trade deficit, which he views as intrinsically bad for the country. When US consumers face fewer affordable options on many goods, inflation will rise again, leaving interest rates higher and slowing growth. The dollar will strengthen, the report forecasts, making US exports less competitive. Some countries targeted by Trump will retaliate with measures that hurt American exporters and raise the risk of a disruptive global trade war.
Second, there is Trump’s immigration policy, which could deport up to 1 million people in 2025, Bremmer and Kupchan argue, and as many as five million over the course of his four-year term. Reduced illegal immigration and mass deportations will shrink the US workforce, drive up wages and consumer prices, and reduce the productive capacity of the economy, they insist, and legal immigration won’t fill the gap.
5. Russia still rogue
Russia is now the world’s leading rogue power by a large margin, the report’s authors argue, and Vladimir Putin will pursue more policies that undermine the US-led global order, despite a likely ceasefire in Ukraine. Russia will take hostile action against EU countries with cyber, sabotage, and other “asymmetric attacks,” and will build on its strategic military partnership with Iran and North Korea in 2025.
Donald Trump will likely achieve the ceasefire in Ukraine he has promised, and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky needs a halt to a war his country is slowly losing. Russia is advancing on the battlefield, but 600,000 Russian casualties and three years of sanctions give Putin good reason to cut a ceasefire deal with Trump. The agreement's terms, Bremmer and Kupchan predict, will freeze forces in place and leave Russia in de facto control of conquered territory. Both sides will rearm, and sporadic fighting will continue along the line of control, the report forecasts. The fragile ceasefire will probably continue through 2025, “but not much longer.”
Yet, the ceasefire itself will create new problems beyond Ukraine. The Nordics, the Baltic countries, and Poland will support a Ukrainian military buildup during the ceasefire. France, Germany, Italy, and others will likely provide security guarantees to Ukraine and bolster Ukrainian and EU defenses. EU sanctions on Russia will remain in place, giving Putin more reason to interfere in their domestic politics, just as they used cyber and other tools to interfere in Romania’s election in November 2024 and in the US too, according to US officials. Bremmer and Kupchan predict Putin will continue attempts at sabotage and even assassination in many Western countries, and continue to use Telegram to instill pro-Kremlin views in citizens of European countries.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said in December that Moscow was “preparing for long-term confrontation, with Ukraine and with us.” Russia will do more than any other country to subvert the global order in 2025.
For the rest of the Top Risks 2025, read the full report here.
Disclaimer: Willis Sparks has contributed to these Top Risks reports for the past 20 years.
- Ian Bremmer explains the 10 Top Risks of 2025 - GZERO Media ›
- Unpacking the biggest global threats of 2025 - GZERO Media ›
- Podcast: The Top Geopolitical Risks of 2025, a live conversation with Ian Bremmer and global experts - GZERO Media ›
- What happens when no one’s in charge - GZERO Media ›
- Top Risks 2025: America's role in the crumbling global order - GZERO Media ›
- Ian Bremmer on the forces behind the geopolitical recession - GZERO Media ›
- The rise of a leaderless world: Why 2025 marks a turning point, with Francis Fukuyama - GZERO Media ›
- The rise of global impunity in a G-Zero world - GZERO Media ›
Incumbents in trouble, Putin’s bet, Conservative Canada, and more: Your questions, answered
Another heat wave, another mailbag.
Thank you to all who’ve sent questions. The response to last week’s edition was overwhelmingly positive, so please keep ‘em coming. If you want a chance to have your questions answered, shoot me an email here or follow me on Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, and Threads, and look out for future AMAs. The only questions that are off-limits are boring ones.
Looking at the elections in France, the UK, and the US, would you agree that 2024 might be shaping up to be the year of anti-incumbents?
Funny you should ask – my latest Quick Take tackles that exact question. Long story short: Yes, this is a deeply challenging time to be an incumbent, and the massively underrated reason why is that people all over the world are still reeling from the aftereffects of the pandemic.
There are, of course, plenty of local and idiosyncratic reasons why the French, the Brits, the Indians, the South Africans, and so many others were unhappy with their leadership. But the one thing incumbents everywhere had in common is voters blamed them for all the unprecedented disruption they’ve experienced since COVID-19, from lockdowns and vaccine mandates to supply chain disruptions, inflation, migration, and crime. In this environment, if the Republican candidate in the United States was anyone other than the historically unpopular Donald Trump, we’d be looking at a GOP landslide – and that’s against anyone that the Democrats put up, let alone a debate/age-diminished Joe Biden.
What US election result is Putin hoping for?
Putin clearly prefers Trump – a more transactional president who admires strongmen, shuns traditional US allies, and believes “common values” are irrelevant to international relations. Trump dislikes Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and has expressed a desire to engage with Putin directly and unilaterally to end the war on terms more favorable to Russia. Putin also benefits from more chaos in the US political system and stands to benefit from a contested US election outcome that turns Americans more inward, against each other, and away from international leadership in diplomatic, economic, and – especially – security matters.
If Trump is elected and turns his back on Ukraine, how likely is it that Western Europe will crank up its own war machine and get the job done?
They’ll certainly try to do more. That’s especially true of NATO’s frontline states: Poland, the Baltics, and the Nordics. But France, one of Europe’s leading proponents of common defense capabilities and support for Ukraine under President Emmanuel Macron, may not be in a position to do more given the result of its recent parliamentary election. Germany, the continent’s largest economy, may be reluctant to lean in given the fiscal troubles facing the government’s weak and fractious coalition. And some other countries like Viktor Orban’s Hungary and Robert Fico’s Slovakia will align themselves more with Trump, dividing what has hitherto been a strongly unified Europe on the issue.
Where do you see breaking points for the Russian and Ukrainian people in this war?
It’s much closer for Ukraine. Kyiv is running low on valuable young men who can be mobilized, trained, and sent to the front to fight. Ukrainian support for the war has eroded accordingly. That matters more than it would if the same were happening in Russia because Ukraine remains a democracy, however imperfect.
A little over a year after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s aborted coup, I don’t see any near-term breaking points for the Russian people. Though large-scale casualties are certainly making the war less popular among the population at large, the Kremlin is able to sustain its “meat grinder” campaign by drawing from a pool of disenfranchised convicts, ethnic minorities, and mercenaries. Not that “ordinary” Russians are substantially more enfranchised …
What will it take for the Chinese to give up on Putin? What can America do to hasten the process?
There’s no reason for them to do so. After all, India – a key strategic partner of the United States and the West more broadly – has also significantly increased its trade with Russia, with no adverse consequences for Delhi. If the US were to start imposing significant secondary sanctions on Chinese companies or banks over expanded dual-use exports to Russia, that’d probably get Beijing to reduce its exposure to the Kremlin’s war machine at the margins. But there’s nothing the US is likely to do in the near future (under Biden or Trump) that could completely break the China-Russia relationship.
How would a Trump presidency strengthen China?
Trump and Biden have similar China policies. The biggest difference is the extent of tariffs Trump is prepared to impose, which would have a more significant negative impact on both the Chinese and the US economy (unless Beijing was prepared to cut a significant and unexpected deal). China’s biggest strategic opportunity in that environment would be to divide and conquer: Exploit concerns from US allies that find themselves constrained or undermined by a more unilateralist Trump administration to improve its relations with them and potentially drive a wedge between them and the Americans.
What’s the biggest geopolitical risk in the world today?
The biggest risk is still “the United States vs. itself”: A presidential election in the world’s most divided and dysfunctional advanced industrial democracy that will do untold damage to America’s social fabric, political institutions, and international standing no matter who wins. Have a look at the full list of Top 10 Risks we put out in January. I really wish they weren’t standing up as well as they are …
How do the leaders of other countries feel about a potential Conservative government coming to power in Canada?
At the risk of sounding harsh, most world leaders aren’t thinking about Canada at all – and for good reason. The stakes of the country’s upcoming election may feel existential to my liberal friends up north who are about to lose power after nine years in office, but the reality is that Canada’s democracy isn’t in crisis like America’s is.
Despite his right-wing populist rhetoric, when it comes to policy substance, Conservative leader and likely next prime minister Pierre Poilievre is closer to Mitch McConnell’s brand of Koch-friendly conservatism than to the nativist, authoritarian, protectionist Trumpism that ruffles feathers in foreign capitals. Sure, a Conservative government will lead to closer alignment with the US in a Trump administration, but either way it would remain a very friendly and stable relationship. It will also lower taxes, lean more strongly into energy and related infrastructure development, and promote other pro-business policies. Critically, agree or disagree with his rather conventional platform, Poilievre has done nothing to suggest he’d undermine the legitimacy of Canada’s democracy. Must be nice, eh?
Do you think the AfD will win the next German election?
No. Despite the party’s meteoric decade-long rise, Germany’s coalition politics are designed to deliver centrist outcomes at the national level, and the Alternative for Germany is still seen as way too radical, Nazi-coded, and incompetent. But it’s certainly plausible that they’ll eventually be part of a government. After all, most of the structural elements that made the AfD a force are still in place: unchecked migration, a weak economy, deep discontent in Germany’s east, and plenty of space to the right of the decidedly moderate and pro-European Christian Democratic Union, aka CDU, for them to exploit.
Can RFK Jr. win?
Win … back his reputation? It’s hard to say. He’s better known now and seems to have a fair number of committed online fans (I say “seems to” because I can’t be sure how many are real vs. bots). I could see him selling merchandise, writing a book, and going on the public speaking circuit. If you’re earnestly asking about the 2024 election, I’d say he has a better chance of winning the lottery than he does of carrying a single state.
Does either of the major US parties have a realistic plan to bring down the deficit?
No. Both presidential candidates’ platforms and track records show little concern for fiscal deficits or pro-cyclical government spending (though Trump added more to the national debt in his first term than Biden has). This is not ideal at a time when interest rates are high and debt servicing costs are rising as a share of the federal budget.
I'm not saying that all deficit spending is bad or equally bad. When we look at companies, we always consider both sides of the balance sheet: liabilities and assets. The same should be true for sovereigns. That’s why I generally support deficit spending that can reasonably be expected to lead to asymmetric increases in the nation’s long-term asset base (e.g., any positive-return investment in education, health care, infrastructure, decarbonization, etc.). Trillions of dollars on failed wars … not so much.
The circumstances and timing matter greatly, too. Fiscal stimulus – even of the not-so-productive variety – is the right thing to do during recessions, when aggregate demand needs a kick in the ass, interest rates are low, and the spending pays for itself many times over with growth. Conversely, the right time for the government to tighten its belt is during the boom … now.
How big a business is Eurasia Group? Is it relatively large, medium, or small/boutique compared to its peers?
We’re almost 250 employees – pretty small for an organization that helps people understand the world. Our principal competitive challenge is employing enough senior leadership to take on all the new opportunities we’re lucky to have. We have a lot of talent, but it’s a big world out there, and it’s not getting any less challenging.
The next era of global superpower competition: a conversation with the New York Times' David Sanger
Listen: In 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin met at a summit and described their “friendship without limits.” But how close is that friendship, really? Should the US be worried about their growing military and economic cooperation? On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer sits down with Pulitzer prize-winning national security correspondent for The New York Times David Sanger to talk about China, Russia, the US, and the 21st-century struggle for global dominance. Sanger’s newest book, “New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West,” looks at the new and increasingly unstable era of geopolitics where the US, China, and Russia are vying for power and influence like never before. Bremmer and Sanger discuss the US intelligence failures that led to the current geopolitical reality, what the US needs to do to combat the growing cooperation between our two biggest adversaries, and why semiconductor factories are more important to national security than aircraft carriers.
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.- Podcast: Not infallible: Russia, China, and US democracy with Tom Nichols & Anne-Marie Slaughter ›
- Podcast: How a US-China war could happen: Warning from ret. admiral James Stavridis ›
- The biggest threats to US national security, foreign and domestic ›
- Podcast: China's great economic slowdown ›
- Podcast: Why Putin will fail: former Finnish PM Alexander Stubb ›
- Putin needs Xi to win the war in Ukraine - GZERO Media ›
Podcast: The case for global optimism with Steven Pinker
Listen: War in Ukraine. Global poverty on the rise. Hunger, too. Not to mention a persistent pandemic. It doesn't feel like a particularly good time to be alive. And yet, Harvard psychologist Stephen Pinker argues that things are getting better today than ever across the world, based on the metrics that matter. Like laundry.
In 1920, the average American spent 11.5 hours a week doing laundry (and that average American was almost always a woman, dudes just wore dirty clothes). By 2014, the number had dropped to 1.5 hours a week, thanks to what renowned public health scholar Hans Rosling called "greatest invention of the Industrial Revolution”: the washing machine. By freeing people of washing laundry by hand, this new technology allowed parents to devote more time to educating their children, and it allowed women to cultivate a life beyond the washboard.
The automation of laundry is just one of many metrics that Pinker, uses to measure human progress. But how does his optimistic view of the state of the world stack up against the brutality of the modern world? Ian Bremmers asks this "relentlessly optimistic macro thinker" to share his view of the world on the GZERO World podcast.
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.- Podcast: Brave new big tech world: Nicholas Thompson's perspective ›
- Podcast: How we avoid irreversible damage & "total disaster": The UN chief's warning for a world experiencing multiple crises ›
- Podcast: The LSE’s Minouche Shafik on how to fix our broken society ›
- Podcast: Tracking the rapid rise of human-enhancing biotech with Siddhartha Mukherjee - GZERO Media ›
- Why the world isn't fair: Yuval Noah Harari on AI, Ukraine, and Gaza - GZERO Media ›
Podcast: Antisemitism's tragic persistence
Listen: Delve into a thought-provoking conversation that confronts the unsettling resurgence of antisemitism, tracing its historical roots and contemporary manifestations. A recent report from the Anti-Defamation League documents 3,700 instances of antisemitic harassment, vandalism, and assault— including the heart-wrenching attack at Pittsburgh's Tree of Life synagogue in 2018, a grim reminder of the deadliest assault on the Jewish community in the United States — and paints a troubling broader picture of modern antisemitism around the world.
Sitting down with Ian Bremmer on the GZERO World Podcast is Noa Tishby, an Israeli actress, writer, and activist who previously held the role of Israel's Special Envoy for Combating Antisemitism. She is no stranger to controversy, having taken a principled stand against her nation's controversial judicial reform agenda. She shares her unique perspective about the history and causes of antisemitism and how it connects to Israel's right to exist and its identity. The discussion turns to the contentious boundary between critiquing Israeli policies and crossing into antisemitism, and also addresses a crucial question—when does the spectrum of extremist politics morph into hate?
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.