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Ian Bremmer on the forces behind the geopolitical recession
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take for you today. I want to talk to you about the geopolitical recession that we, the world, are now in. What is a geopolitical recession you ask?
Well, economic recessions you kind of understand. We have boom cycles and bust cycles. They happen frequently. So frequently that we even have solid measurements for when an advanced industrial economy is in a technical recession. That's two quarters in a row of negative growth. Or when the world is experiencing a recessionary year. They happen frequently in the United States since World War II, every seven to 10 years on average. And that means that we have been through many of those cycles, and we can recognize them and we know that we don't like them. We want to respond to them.
And whether you are an advanced industrial economy, a free market economy, or whether you are an authoritarian state and a state capitalist system, either way, you've got central bankers and finance ministers or treasury secretaries that are using monetary and fiscal tools to try to minimize the impact of a recession and get back towards effective more sustainable growth.
Okay, so that's the economic side. But I'm not an economist. I'm a political scientist. Are there cycles in geopolitics? And the answer is yes. But they're a lot longer. And because the cycles are longer, playing out over several generations, we don't live through a lot of them individually. And so, we don't recognize them as a pattern. But we are right now in a geopolitical recession.
What causes a geopolitical recession? Well, basically it's when the balance of power becomes misaligned, out of whack, with the rules of the road geopolitically. With how the world order is structured, the institutions, the architecture. So, for example, the global order that we have been living through both after World War II through the Cold War, and then through Soviet collapse, was all about a number of global institutions and architecture that the United States created with its allies, its friends, after World War II was over.
So, the world has just gone through this horrible cataclysm, a geopolitical depression, and now we've got a boom cycle. And the United States is creating the United Nations and the WTO and the IMF and all of these other global institutions with the idea being support for collective security, support for a multilateral free trade architecture, support for rule of law, promotion of human rights, promotion of democracy all over the world. Generally speaking, the United States created a whole bunch of global institutions that reflected what the United States thought about how the world should be run.
Then over time, the balance of power changes, but the institutions don't. At least not as much because they're sticky, because it takes a lot of political capital to change them. People kick the can down the road. Let somebody else do it. And when that gap grows too wide, then the geopolitical order starts to shake. It becomes much more unstable.
So, what happened here? Three big reasons why we are now in a geopolitical recession. Number one, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia was not integrated into the West, not into the EU, not into NATO. They're angry about it. They blame the United States. They are now a chaos actor on the global stage, at least insofar as the advanced industrial economies. The G7 are concerned, and their top allies are fellow chaos actors: North Korea and Iran. That's reason number one.
Reason number two, China was integrated into the global order, particularly the global economy on the notion that as they got wealthier, as they benefited from that, they would become responsible stakeholders. And what that means for Americans is that they're going to align with these US led global institutions and values and norms. They'll support rule of law. They'll become more politically liberalized. They'll become more economically free market in orientation. The Chinese have gotten much wealthier. They're now a technological peer to the United States, no one else is close, ahead in some areas, behind in others. But they absolutely have not aligned with the United States. And that is making a lot of Americans and a lot of American allies very concerned, and it's leading to confrontation between the two most powerful countries.
Number three, while those first two things were going on, lots of people in the West, and especially the United States, increasingly felt like their own leaders, their political leaders, their business leaders, their corporate leaders, their media leaders, their elites, were promoting globalism, were promoting a bunch of things for a global order that didn't help them. So, all of those ideas about collective security and promotion of democracy and promoting free trade, not interested, because the average American doesn't feel like they're benefiting from it.
And certainly that is a big reason why Trump won, not just once, but twice, and more decisively the second time around. And so now, not only do you have the Russians acting like rogues with allies, and the Chinese much more powerful, but not aligned with the US-led global system. But you have the Americans saying, "We're not very interested in promoting that global system anymore. In fact, we're more interested in the law of the jungle."
It's a worldview that's closer to the Chinese. Not multilateralism but just one-on-one relations where you are stronger and you tell the other country what you want to have done. It's very transactional, it's very pragmatic. Doesn't really matter what kind of values that country holds. If you're Trump, you'll do a deal with Russia or China or an ally, and you'll criticize and pressure anybody if they're not behaving the way you want to. The fact that there are common values doesn't really matter. The fact that you're part of the same infrastructure and architecture doesn't really matter. It's, "What are you doing for me now?"
So given all of that, we are now in a serious geopolitical recession. What I call a G-Zero world. Not a G7, not a G20, where there's an absence of global leadership. Now, what's very interesting about that G-Zero world, what's very interesting about this geopolitical recession that I believe that we're in is that the United States is in a particularly strong position right now. Particularly strong compared to its adversaries like China facing the worst economic conditions since the 90s, maybe even the 70s. Like Russia in a period of severe economic decline, and other decline, national security, political. And Iran, which has basically just lost their empire, their empire by proxy, the Axis of Resistance in the Middle East. The US is also much stronger relationally to its allies. America's technology capabilities becoming so dominant compared to what the Europeans, the Japanese, the South Koreans, the Canadians don't have. America's military capabilities. The strength of the US economy coming out of the pandemic compared to every other G7 democracy shows that the United States can get a lot more done in a geopolitical recession. Can ensure that its will is followed.
Also, the fact that Trump is consolidated so much more power this time around compared to 2017 when he was first president. Last time, he had all of these establishment Republicans that didn't really support him, all the way from Mike Pence, his vice president, to Mad Dog Mattis, to Mike Pompeo, to Nikki Haley, to Gary Cohn, and on and on and on. This time around, not at all. Everyone is aligned with Trump.
Also last time, the GOP, the Republican Party, didn't feel like they had to ride Trump's coattails. He wasn't as popular as a lot of they were in their own individual campaigns. This time around not at all. Trump's much more popular than them, they need him much more. And that's happening at a time when so many allied governments are very, very weak. And that's a problem, right? For them. If you're Canada and your government's imploding, or you're South Korea and your government's imploding, or you're Germany, your government's imploding, or France and your government's imploding. Or even countries like the United Kingdom and Japan where the establishment is very, very vulnerable, and very unpopular, Trump's ability to tell you, "This is what we want. And by the way, we are a lot more effective at playing the law of the jungle than either our allies or our adversaries."
It's going to be very hard for them not to kiss the ring, not to provide big wins for the Americans. So, lots of wins for Trump, and that's what we're going to see over the course of the coming year, and a lot of defense being played by a lot of those other countries around the world. But is that sustainable?
Because to get out of a geopolitical recession, you ultimately need to create new rules of the road. You need new global architecture, especially because our challenges, whether it's climate change or an arms race, nuclear weapons, whether it's AI and new disruptive technologies, for good and for bad, they all are global challenges and global opportunities. But we are increasingly fragmenting our responses to national and even local levels.
So, this is not a sustainable trajectory, and that is what we're going to spend an awful lot of time looking at over the coming year, over the coming administration, and going beyond. Because, of course, this is the first time that any of us have experienced a country, the United States, essentially unwinding, undoing its own order. These global institutions that Trump and others are saying are globalist and not useful for the Americans to align with are institutions the United States initially created to help run the world in America's own image, but the US no longer believes that that works for it. And that is a fantastically interesting, but also unnerving, unsettling, and unstable time for us all geopolitically.
So, that's what a geopolitical recession is. I hope you found this worthwhile, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
Will Trumponomics cause a slowdown for the US economy?
Donald Trump’s economic agenda blends deregulation, anti-immigration policies, higher tariffs, and loose fiscal policy—an approach that "cuts in multiple different directions," says Jon Lieber during a GZERO livestream to discuss the 2025 Top Risks report. Lieber says deregulation could boost productivity, while measures like deportations and trade barriers risk straining industries reliant on foreign labor and open markets. With markets pricing in optimism but key sectors facing uncertainty, the impact of Trumponomics will hinge on how far the administration goes in implementing its campaign promises in 2025 and beyond.
Take a deep dive with the panel in our full discussion, livestreamed on Jan. 6 here.
Trump in front of a map on fire.
What Trump wants from Greenland, Canada, Panama … and more
In a G-Zero world, where no one country or group of countries is willing and able to provide global leadership, the law of the jungle prevails. And the law of the jungle says the apex predator gets to do whatever he can get away with, while others either get on board or become lunchmeat.
President-elect Donald Trump, just days away from taking over the world’s largest economy and most powerful military, spent the past week showing exactly what that will mean in practice. His threats to use economic and military coercion to take control of Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal are outlandish, but they send a clear message to the world: In Trump’s second term, it's his way or the highway.
Trump's worldview represents a decisive rejection of America’s postwar commitment to global collective security, free trade, and democracy promotion in favor of transactionalism. The United States is increasingly adopting a rather Chinese approach to international relations: bilateral deal-making with little regard for common values, the rule of law, multilateralism, or the global public good. With the idea being that the world’s most powerful country will play that game more effectively than Beijing. It’s called “America First” for a reason.
Does this mean Trump actually intends to buy Greenland, make Canada the 51st state, and seize the Panama Canal? No (… probably). Trump didn’t believe Mexico would pay for his border wall in his first term, but the threat helped pressure the Mexican government to devote more resources to curbing migration flows, which Trump then claimed as a win. The playbook this time will be no different (because Trump himself hasn’t changed): make outrageous, unrealistic demands of weaker foreign leaders to extract concessions – both from the targeted countries in question and from others looking to avoid coming into Trump’s crosshairs in the first place.
What makes this time different is Trump’s far stronger hand at home and abroad. Not only does he have a mandate, control of Congress and the Republican Party, and a 6-3 Supreme Court, but he will also have a more ideologically aligned and loyal administration. His personalistic leadership style and consolidation of power – what we call Rule of Don in our 2025 Top Risks report – mean US domestic and foreign policy will increasingly depend on the decisions of one man and his inner circle, precisely what the Founding Fathers sought to prevent through constitutional checks and balances.
Meanwhile, the United States is comparatively more powerful today relative to 2017 vis-à-vis its adversaries – with China experiencing its worst economic crisis in decades, Russia in serious decline, and Iran having lost its proxy empire – as well as its allies, most of which have weak and unpopular leadership.
The combination of Trump’s consolidated power at home, America’s greater might abroad, and the president-elect’s willingness to wield that power unilaterally for transactional gain means the incoming administration will rack up significant early wins. With the world more dangerous than ever, few governments or corporations want to risk becoming the apex predator’s next prey.
We’re already seeing these dynamics play out domestically, where major companies are falling in line to avoid running afoul of the incoming administration. Mark Zuckerberg’s dramatic shift on Meta’s content moderation reflects a broader recognition that resistance is futile – better to align with Trump and his advisor-in-chief Elon Musk than to fight them. And if you think Meta, Apple, and the like are humiliating themselves at Mar-a-Lago, that’s nothing compared to the lengths that foreign governments will go to stay off Trump's radar or avoid his wrath.
Mexico’s new president, Claudia Sheinbaum, will do everything possible to fix a bilateral relationship that Trump believes is broken. It will take more and longer than she wants, but I think she’ll get there. The European Union, despite likely trade tensions and possibly tit-for-tat tariffs, will probably reach a deal that satisfies Trump and ultimately bolsters Europe’s “strategic autonomy.” NATO members won’t increase defense spending to a whopping 5% of GDP as Trump recently demanded (the US itself spends around 3.4% of GDP), but most will continue to boost their military expenditures.
Even seemingly absurd threats, such as a military takeover of the Panama Canal, will likely force real concessions like limits on Chinese investments, reduced transit fees, or enhanced cooperation on migration across the Darien Gap. And while Trump will neither purchase nor invade Greenland, his shenanigans have brought the issue of the territory’s independence from NATO ally Denmark to the fore, putting Copenhagen in a bind and raising the prospect of increased US access to the resource-rich and strategically vital Arctic island.
But Trump’s transactional approach won’t work everywhere, and in some cases, it will backfire. China isn’t prepared to offer meaningful enough concessions to achieve a grand bargain, especially amid an absence of communication and management channels. Early tariff hikes and mounting US provocations (at least as perceived by Beijing) in the coming months are likely to cause a breakdown in US-China relations this year.
Indeed, while many countries will seek to accommodate Trump to avoid confrontation, others will see no choice but to dig in. This includes one of America’s oldest allies and its largest trading partner, Canada. Trump’s annexation rhetoric and threats of 25% tariffs have touched a nerve north of the border, pushing politicians across the Canadian political spectrum to prepare aggressive responses ahead of the Liberal Party’s internal leadership race and the country’s general elections. Neither the ruling Liberals nor the opposition Conservatives can afford to appear weak in the face of US bullying. Trump’s tactics are fueling Canadian nationalism, reducing room for compromise, and making harder-line retaliation that hurts America’s interests more likely – the opposite of his presumed objectives.
The United Kingdom’s current predicament offers a telling example of the dilemmas facing many US allies. British officials are holding crisis meetings to determine how to respond to the incessant direct attacks from Elon Musk, who is now actively intervening in the domestic politics of US allies (including not just the UK but also Germany and the EU itself) with what we can assume is at least the tacit consent of President-elect Trump. They worry that pushing back against the world’s wealthiest individual could trigger retaliation from Trump himself, with whom Prime Minister Keir Starmer wants a good working relationship. But doing nothing is not an option when Musk’s invectives are believed to have jeopardized the personal safety of British cabinet members. There’s also a concern that passivity would embolden both Musk and Trump to push even harder for advantage.
This gets at a broader challenge: Even as it yields short-term wins, the president-elect’s coercive diplomacy will reflect and reinforce the broader breakdown of international order I described last week. The US remains the world’s most powerful nation by far. But rather than providing global public goods like collective security and free trade, it's using that power to extract concessions for itself through bilateral pressure. Trump’s defenders say that his unpredictability is a feature, not a bug, and that keeping friends and foes guessing is how he gets things done. But the uncertainty it creates poses enormous risks for governments and businesses trying to survive in the jungle.
This is the essence of the G-Zero world: Not just an absence of global leadership, but the deliberate dismantling of the systems and norms that have guided international relations for decades by its erstwhile lynchpin. Trump isn’t the cause – he’s its leading symptom and beneficiary. But his return to power will accelerate the trend toward a more dangerous, crisis-prone international system. The apex predator may rack up some impressive kills, but the jungle will grow deadlier and more savage for everyone – including, eventually, for the United States, too.
Ian Bremmer: Trump is a symptom of a dysfunctional "G-Zero world"
In a political environment plagued by instability and polarization, who is poised to benefit? 2025 has kicked the G-Zero world into high gear: a world characterized by a growing vacuum in global governance. The anti-establishment wave and anti-incumbency trend that swept major democracies this past year underscore the dramatic shift. President-elect Donald Trump is the leading symptom, in many ways, the most powerful beneficiary of the G-Zero, argues Eurasia Group founder and president Ian Bremmer during a GZERO livestream to discuss the 2025 Top Risks report. He says that America’s embrace of a more “transactional worldview,” indifference to rule of law, and focus on rule of jungle will play to Trump’s hand and agenda. Bremmer adds that a G-Zero world and “a consolidated America First are the same thing, but jut from different perspectives. G-Zero is what happens with everybody else, and America First is what happens with the Americans.” With a tipsy-turvy year ahead, the world will be watching how Trump will navigate this moment in time.
Take a deep dive with the panel in our full discussion, livestreamed on Jan. 6 here.
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Get ready for Trump's team of China hawks, warns The New Yorker's Susan Glasser
China is in for an unprecedentedly tough time. Donald Trump’s cabinet of China hawks signals a potentially more confrontational stance with Beijing, a foreign policy approach that will function not unlike the first Trump administration's over Russia, says The New Yorker's Susan Glasser during a GZERO livestream to discuss the 2025 Top Risks report. Glasser argues that it will be a kind of push-pull relationship between more establishment, old-fashioned conservative types and “Trump’s own impulses and instincts." She adds that “he’s going to want to keep American business tycoons happy. He’s got Elon Musk whispering in his ear at all times.” So, to what extent will the China hawks be able to impose their agenda in a Trump 2.0 administration?
Take a deep dive with the panel in our full discussion, livestreamed on Jan. 6 here.
Francis Fukuyama on the new leaderless global order
In a wide-ranging conversation on GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, Francis Fukuyama warns that the United States is losing its ability to lead globally as political polarization and a lack of bipartisan consensus undermine its long-term influence. He argues that America’s retreat from the liberal world order it once championed creates a dangerous power vacuum, inviting instability and the resurgence of the law of the jungle in international relations.
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
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Top Risks 2025: America's role in the crumbling global order
Is international order on the precipice of collapse? 2025 is poised to be a turbulent year for the geopolitical landscape. From Canada and South Korea to Japan and Germany, the world faces a “deepening and rare absence of global leadership with more chaos than any time since the 1930s,” says Eurasia Group chairman Cliff Kupchan during a GZERO livestream to discuss the 2025 Top Risks report. Kupchan highlights that the US is at the heart of it. He warns that it is a country that has “abdicated its throne,” which has created a dynamic that is “very prone to vacuums and misperceptions.” With no other country willing or able to take the reins and lead, the world is left in a vulnerable position facing unprecedented geopolitical risks.
Take a deep dive with the panel in our full discussion, livestreamed on Jan. 6 here.
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- Ian Bremmer on the forces behind the geopolitical recession - GZERO Media ›
Podcast: The Top Geopolitical Risks of 2025, a live conversation with Ian Bremmer and global experts
Listen: It's officially the new year, and 2025 will bring a whole new set of challenges as governments react to the shifting policies of the incoming Trump administration, instability in the Middle East, China’s economic weakness, and a world where the global order feels increasingly tenuous. 2025 will be a year of heightened geopolitical risks and global disorder, with the world no longer aligned with the balance of power. So what should we be paying attention to, and what’s the world’s #1 concern for the year ahead? Each year, The Eurasia Group, GZERO’s parent company, forecasts the top political risks most likely to play out over the year. On this special edition of the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer analyzes the Eurasia Group's Top Risks of 2025 report with Cliff Kupchan, Eurasia Group’s chairman and a leader of the firm’s global macro coverage; Susan Glasser, staff writer at the New Yorker; and Jon Lieber, Eurasia Group’s head of research and managing director, United States. The conversation is moderated by Evan Solomon, GZERO Media’s publisher.
Subscribe to the GZERO World Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.
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