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The Global South is angry and mistrustful - Ian Bremmer
Frustrated with the lack of equitable access to vaccines, economic challenges, and climate change impacts while wealthier countries fail to fulfill their pledges, the Global South is angry and mistrustful, said Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group, during a Global Stage livestream event at UN headquarters in New York on September 22, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.
"They feel like their agenda is irrelevant, that they are the takers, not in any way the collaborators or makers on the rule space and how we're going to deal with global governance challenges," Bremmer says.
Its leaders, however, have already started acting to position themselves as key players in the global governance discussions. Before the United Nations General Assembly, dozens of world leaders met for the first-ever Africa Climate Summit in a bid to take agency. They are set to advance the conversation at the COP28 in Dubai next month.
The discussion was moderated by Nicholas Thompson of The Atlantic. It was held by GZERO Media in collaboration with the United Nations, the Complex Risk Analytics Fund, and the Early Warnings for All initiative.
Dive into the conversation to learn about how countries like Brazil and India are shaping the AI space: Can data and AI save lives and make the world safer?
U.S. President Joe Biden holds a press conference in Hanoi, Vietnam.
What's Biden doing in Vietnam?
US President Biden flew to Vietnamon Sunday for a series of meetings with Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. Speaking in Hanoi, Biden said the United States had “strengthened our ties with another critical Indo-Pacific partner,” after Vietnam officially elevated its relationship with Washington to the top level of the country’s three-tier hierarchy for bilateral relations, one also bestowed on both China and Russia.
Both countries loom large during Biden’s visit. While the US President denied the trip is about containing China, there is no doubt that increased US engagement aims to temper Beijing’s influence with Hanoi. And it’s not a one-way street: American overtures are welcome for economic and security reasons. Consider that American imports from Vietnam have nearly doubled since 2019, a bright spot while Vietnam’s overall exports fell for a sixth straight month in August due to softening global demand and China’s worsening economic outlook. Making matters worse for Hanoi, Beijing continues to boost its military presence in the South China Sea.
Crucially, Biden is scheduled to announce steps to help Vietnam diversify away from its reliance on Russian weapons. The timing is no accident: according to an internal Vietnamese document, Hanoi is planning to purchase arms from Russia to upgrade its military, through transfers at a joint Vietnamese and Russian oil venture in Siberia.
Still, US officials have warned that without significant overhauls of its infrastructure, there are limits on how much Vietnam’s economy can grow and rival China as a chief exporter of goods to the US and Europe.
U.S. President Joe Biden visits Raj Ghat memorial with Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi and other G20 leaders.
G20 achieves consensus, but stays cool on climate and Ukraine
The G20 summit in New Delhi wrapped up this weekend, with many praising Indian PM Narendra Modi for getting the G20 nations to agree on a consensus declaration after a month of intense negotiations.
What was agreed to? On climate, member nations agreed “that developing countries need to be supported in their transitions to low carbon/emissions" though it’s not exactly clear what this financing would look like. “Climate justice” remains a contentious issue, as evidenced by Modi’s comments earlier in the week accusing Western nations of forcing the developing world to pay the price for their rapid industrialization.
The G20 declaration also comes just days after the first Africa Climate Summit, where African states pitched themselves as the future of the green economy. In a further testament to the growing importance of Africa, Modi later announced the admission of the African Union as a permanent member of the G20.
But the biggest challenge to consensus was Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and the divide between many Western states and countries in the Global South that want to maintain solid ties with both the US and Russia. While the declaration recognized “the human suffering and negative added impacts of the war in Ukraine with regard to global food and energy security,” – a nod to African nations that have seen supplies disrupted by the conflict – Kyiv was furious that the statement didn’t directly address Russian atrocities.
Indeed, this was a significant departure from the G20’s consensus declaration last year in Bali, which referenced “Russian aggression” and described the conflict as a war “against” Ukraine, not “in” it. And despite the absence of President Putin at the summit, Moscow was notably pleased with the outcome: Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov praised the declaration, calling it "a step in the right direction.”
A win for Modi? One thing many observers agree on, however, was that the summit achieved India’s goal of boosting its global diplomatic bonafides, in part aimed at countering China’s influence in Asia and Africa. It helped, of course, that Xi Jinping also chose to stay home.
EU support for Ukraine holding up better than anyone expected
Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations, shares his perspective on European politics from Kyiv this week.
How is European support for the war in Ukraine holding up?
I think it's holding up fairly well. If you look at the latest figures that are out, it shows that total European support is substantially higher than American support. Of course, the American is more important, the US on the military side. But the European figures are higher and new multi tens of billion dollar packages coming from the European Union. It is holding up much better than anyone could have thought.
With both Putin and Xi Jinping absent, what's so significant and what's going to be the outcome of the G-20 summit in India?
Yes, both are absent. Putin for fairly obvious reasons. Xi Jinping, a lot of speculation why he is, for the first time ever, not part of the G-20 summit. It could be a snub to India. Could be also that he has domestic worries that it needs to take care of. But it will be important to see if they manage to bridge the gap over primarily the Russia war against Ukraine in the summit communique. A year ago in Indonesia, they managed to get to communicate together, but it's not been successful so far. So India is up for a big test of his global ambitions. Can they get something together from the G-20? Let's see.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, seen here addressing a G20 Development Ministers’ meeting in June, is set to host the group's summit in New Delhi this weekend.
Weekend at Modi’s
Well, this weekend is the moment Indian PM Narendra Modi has been waiting for, with world leaders set to gather for the G20 Summit in New Delhi.
For Modi, it’s a big chance to show the world that India is a rising and responsible power that can broker solutions to multilateral challenges — climate change, food security, inflation — while advocating, in particular, for the interests of the so-called “Global South” (an imperfect catchall for pretty much anything outside of Europe, the US, and Japan).
Modi’s mission. One of his main goals is to hammer out a plan in which rich countries and multilateral lenders make more capital available to developing countries that need it to finance green energy transitions and cope with the ravages of climate change.
But can he herd these cats? This year’s G20 has been fractious, with disagreements over how to describe the Ukraine war scuttling progress in other areas. So far, not a single G20 meeting has produced a joint communiqué.
Chinese President Xi Jinping's decision to skip the event also looms large. It was seen as a snub to New Delhi amid worsening China-India relations, but Modi will certainly want to show that he can shine for the Global South without sharing the spotlight with Beijing.
Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden is showing up with his own agenda, looking to convince the Global South that US-led financial institutions are better financial partners for economic development than Beijing. China’s deepening economic woes, and Xi's absence, may help Biden out.
The upshot: Modi in the middle. India's PM will have to work hard to broker consensus at a particularly divisive time. If this weekend’s meeting of leaders fails to issue a joint communiqué, it would be a G20 first — but certainly not one Modi will want to be remembered for.In blow to China, US secures closer partnership with Vietnam
On his way back from the G20 meeting in India, US President Joe Biden will stop off in Vietnam on Sept. 10 to seal an agreement to deepen US ties with the Southeast Asian country. The two former enemies will upgrade their bilateral relationship from a “comprehensive partnership” to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” the highest level in Vietnam’s diplomatic hierarchy. This new top-tier diplomatic status places the US on par with China, Russia, India, and South Korea.
The change may pave the way for weapons sales and closer maritime cooperation. But possibly even more important at a time of intense US-China competition is the symbolism of Vietnam, a Chinese neighbor and fellow communist country, moving closer to the US. We asked Eurasia Group expert Peter Mumford to explain the motivations behind the deal for both sides.
For Vietnam, what is the importance of its relationship with the US?
Vietnam has long had very complicated relations with China, its giant northern neighbor. The two have close (and deepening) economic ties. Yet the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979 and ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea have fueled widespread anti-China sentiment among Vietnam’s population. Strengthening relations with the US, Japan, and other players are crucial to Hanoi’s geopolitical hedging strategy as well its (unsuccessful, so far) attempts to reduce its economic dependence on China.
In addition, Vietnam has long seen its ally Russia as a counterbalance to China, but Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has made it a less reliable partner and, more importantly, pushed it closer to Beijing. This increases the need for Vietnam to find other ways to hedge its China risk. Yet Hanoi will not move as far toward the US as some in Washington might hope – it will always seek to balance relations with the US and China.
How does Vietnam fit into the US’s strategy toward China and Asia more broadly?
Vietnam’s complex relationship with China as well as its popularity as a destination for firms from the US and other countries moving production out of China have made it increasingly important to Washington. The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy identifies Vietnam as one of the “leading regional partners” with which it wishes to deepen relations. Kurt Campbell, the US National Security Council’s coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, has referred to India and Vietnam as the two key “swing states” that will define the future of Asia.
While the focus on strengthening relations with Vietnam is not new in Washington, these efforts were undermined during Donald Trump’s administration by its greater focus on reducing the growing bilateral trade deficit, which included accusing Hanoi of currency manipulation. The US still has some trade-related concerns – including the likely rerouting of Chinese exports to the US via Vietnam – but Biden’s team is more focused on improving bilateral relations.
How does China view the deepening US-Vietnam ties?
Beijing will be concerned to see its southern neighbor granting Washington an upgrade in ties; in a sign of ruffled feathers, China dispatched Liu Jianchao, a senior official, to Hanoi this week where he met with Vietnam’s leader General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. It’s important to note, however, that China’s own actions – that is, its increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea – contributed to this decision by Vietnam. This marks another self-inflicted wound for Beijing, alongside pushing the Philippines back into Washington’s orbit after a period of strained relations. Nevertheless, Hanoi will be wary of antagonizing Beijing and likely will agree to upgrade relations with several other countries as well (Australia, Singapore, and Indonesia) to dilute the impact of doing so with the US.
Biden’s trip to Vietnam follows his decision to skip the ASEAN summit earlier in the week – what does that say about the US’s strategy toward Southeast Asia?
Biden’s absence from the summit in Jakarta, Indonesia, exacerbated grumblings that the region appears to be a low priority for Washington. Yet it’s probably an indication that Washington sees investing in bilateral relations with key Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam as likely to deliver greater geopolitical returns than working with ASEAN as a bloc. (In this regard, Indonesia President Joko Widodo may take Biden’s absence as something of a personal slight, although he hosted the US president for the G20 Summit in Bali last year). In the Indo-Pacific more broadly, the US is focused on wooing India while reinforcing alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, and promoting the Quad grouping of the US, Japan, India, and Australia.
That said, the US was still represented at the US-ASEAN Summit and East Asia Summit at a very senior level with the attendance of Vice President Kamala Harris. Arguably this is on a par with China’s representation: President Xi Jinping rarely attends the China-ASEAN Summit or East Asia Summit, usually delegating these to the premier instead, as occurred again this year.
Edited by Jonathan House, Senior Editor at Eurasia Group
U.S. President Joe Biden boards Air Force One.
What’s Biden doing in Asia?
US President Joe Biden will head to Asia on Thursday, making two crucial diplomatic stops in India and Vietnam.
Why India? Biden will visit India – or should we say “Bharat” – for the G20 summit, which will be attended by a host of global heavyweights, though notably not China’s Xi Jinping or Russia’s Vladimir Putin.
Biden’s agenda will largely focus on World Bank reform in hopes that countries in the Global South come to see Western-led lending organizations as preferable to Chinese-driven institutions.
Meanwhile, as was the case with previous gatherings in recent months, India’s PM Narendra Modi will likely try to shift the conversation away from Ukraine to cover issues that, he says, are of greater importance to countries in the Global South. (For instance, Modi recently proposed that the African Union be made a full member of the G20.)
Biden will then head to Vietnam as Washington seeks closer ties with Hanoi in a bid to build a bulwark against China in the Asia Pacific.
Hanoi, which also enjoys warmish ties with Beijing despite an ongoing maritime dispute, is keen to elevate relations with the US, its largest export market. Indeed, Vietnam has benefited from the deepening trade row between Washington and Beijing, having emerged as an alternative source of supply for US markets.
China, unsurprisingly, is unimpressed, organizing its own high-level visit to Vietnam this week in a bid to shore up “political trust.”
Modi (not Xi) leads G-20 summit
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: Hi, everybody. Ian Bremmer here and I. Happy post Labor Day to all of you. I'm in London for a very, very brief trip, but I wanted to talk a little bit about the G-20 summit coming up this weekend.
Big news to start, Xi Jinping is not coming. Why not? Lots of speculation, lots of news, lots of ink being spilled except for the fact that people should have known about this a while back. One, the Indian government had been informed at least a month ago that Xi Jinping wasn't planning on attending. And secondly, the Americans have been working on a meeting with Xi Jinping and Biden for months now at APEC in San Francisco in November, and that was widely expected to be the next time the two men would be in the same place at the same time.
Biden is going to the G-20, in other words, Xi Jinping was not. Now, that certainly means it's not a sudden health issue, not a sudden domestic economic crisis or political crisis that stopping him from going. It's a question of how much of this is Chinese irritation at their relationship with India. India's export controls, investment review and screens against China now are frankly stronger than those from the United States against China, not to mention border disputes. And the Chinese trying to limit some of India's influence and roles in multilateral organizations. It's been fairly chippy. I wouldn't say it's overtly hostile, but it's certainly not friendly. And, you know, Xi Jinping might see that he has little interest in turning up at a G-20 that is going to be in India. And is know sort of Modi's great party. Risks antagonizing Modi more, of course, by doing that.
But again, not a decision that was taken recently. Secondly, the fact that Russia is not attending and really can't attend, given Putin and the ICC ruling against him, the fact that the G-20, the one place that you have not been able to get any coordination at this meeting in any of the ministerial is around Ukraine statement. The Chinese have been aligned this time around more with the Russians on this and really don't want to be front and center with Xi Jinping being the holdout facing pressure from the G-20, from all the other countries to get an agreement done. And Modi would certainly be on the other side of that. So would the Americans, frankly, so would all the other attendees. China doesn't want to be seen in that regard as the only country supporting the Russian position. So then you have the issue of China having the BRICS, and that is a group that they've just had some success with a significant expansion to Middle East and North African states. That will happen at the beginning of 2024. It's a meeting that China has a lot more sway over. It is China as by far the largest economy and then the Global South as opposed to the G-20, which is everybody that matters and China certainly not feeling in charge of anything. So in that regard, Xi Jinping has a structural reason to make the G20 less important and make the BRICS summit more important going forward.
I'm particularly interested in how they play that with Russia chairing the BRICS next year and how many of the other BRICS invitees show up at the head of state level. It's going to be, I mean, quite something when you've got, say, the Saudis and the Emiratis and the Brazilians all showing up in Russia for a BRICS summit. I think a lot of them are going to be looking for cover and maybe hoping that one or two say no so that they can say no to. But that's kind of where we are. The G-20 itself should be quite successful. I don't think that it's going to be meaningfully different in terms of Modi's ability to show that he's doing well on the back of Xi not showing up, in part because, of course China's having so many economic challenges at home. While this is really India's year, Modi with very strong popularity inside India, strongest economic growth of any major economy in the world, and moving, driving a more assertive climate policy, a more assertive technology reform policy, and, you know, looking pretty strong in the run up to 2024 India elections.
So at this point, especially with Modi having talked with over 100 leaders in preparation to the G-20 summit and seeing a lot of irritation with the United States on the back of unilateralism, America firstism and questions of where the US is going post 2024. A lot of Belt and Road countries feeling like they're not getting the kind of support they have historically from the Chinese. This is a big opportunity and India with some role to fill and they've historically not wanting to be a big geopolitical player, especially outside of the region, that is changing a lot under Modi.
So we're watching that all weekend and I hope everyone's doing well. Talk to you soon. Bye.