Israel & Hezbollah: What to expect next
August 26, 2024
VIDEOSGZERO World with Ian BremmerQuick TakePUPPET REGIMEIan ExplainsGZERO ReportsAsk IanGlobal Stage
Site Navigation
Search
Human content,
AI powered search.
Latest Stories
Sign up for GZERO Daily.
Get our latest updates and insights delivered to your inbox.
Puppet Regime is up for a Webby Award!
VOTE HERE
Quick Take
Ian Bremmer, political scientist and president of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media, shares insights on global political events.
Presented by
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: A Quick Take to kick off your week. The Middle East back in the headlines, though fortunately, not as dramatic, a blow-up, as many had feared. This is the Hezbollah-Israel conflict, the Northern front, as it were. And the Israelis had assassinated one of the founders of Hezbollah a month ago, and a lot of concern and waiting as to what Hezbollah would do to respond. We saw that over the weekend, several hundred missiles being launched from Lebanon into Israel. The United States and Israel with advanced intelligence on the coming strikes, and were able to launch preemptive strikes that apparently took out about two-thirds of the missiles that were going to be launched. But Lebanon, Hezbollah continuing going ahead with those strikes and not a lot of damage. Not a lot of damage by the Israelis with the preemptive strikes. A few military dead in Lebanon, and it looks like one Israeli military officer killed from the Hezbollah strikes.
A couple of points here that are really relevant. First is that there was no civilian targets. There were no government targets. This was all military infrastructure and capabilities from both sides. So even though this is a significant exchange of fire, it is certainly something that is not intended to escalate further. It is meant to be retaliation for Israel's strikes, and then sit and wait and see. The second point is that not only that, we've also seen that this is disentangled from Iran, and we saw that the Israelis, of course, were able to assassinate the political leader of Hamas, Haniyeh, and that was in Tehran on the occasion of the inauguration of the new Iranian president, deeply embarrassing for the Iranians. It's been a month and there's been no Iranian retaliation despite the fact that the Supreme leader and others in the Iranian government structure had said that major strikes were coming within hours, that's not the case.
They are waiting and they are waiting, perhaps, for a target of opportunity, but also clearly not looking to dramatically escalate. And what we're seeing here, and this has become more clear over the last nine months now, ten months of the war, is that the two most powerful antagonists of Israel, Iran and Hezbollah, are really not looking to take any action that could escalate into a broader Middle Eastern war. They are, no question, abiding enemies of Israel. They don't recognize Israel's right to exist, but they also are considerably less powerful than Israel militarily. And they also understand that the United States has coordinated and would coordinate with Israel if we were to see an expansion of hostilities, so they've been very cautious. And that on the one hand, gives Israel a blinking yellowlight feeling like they can take more action against Iranian proxies and as well as inside Iran.
They can take more action against Hezbollah without risking a broader war, but also has, I think, calmed the markets, has helped keep oil prices comparatively low around 80 bucks right now, despite the fact that we have this major war going on in the Middle East. A couple things that I would focus on that makes you feel a little less comfortable than that reality. The first is that there's a very big difference between Hezbollah and Iran who are politically entrenched, have a lot of resources, have the ability to defend themselves, and can live with the status quo for a long time, and Iran's proxies less powerful proxies. And here, of course, I'm thinking specifically about the Houthis, but I'm also thinking about Hamas itself and other terrorist actors. The story that should have gotten a lot more attention was the Houthis blowing up a Greek tanker that led to an oil spill three times greater in volume than what we saw with the Exxon Valdez.
That's a massive problem, and the Houthis are continuing to engage in strikes as they have the opportunity against not only ships of any flag but also against US and UK military targets, so they are much less constrained. They are much more willing to take action that could lead to significant escalation than the Iranians and Hezbollah. Clearly, Hamas was willing to do that on October 7th. They're still willing to do that. They just don't have the military capability. What we haven't seen, thankfully, is a lot of radical Islamic terrorism against Israeli targets or Western targets in the Middle East or more broadly, but certainly to the extent that they have those capabilities, one would expect that to happen as well, so that's one significant caution here. A second is that right now if Hezbollah were to engage in large-scale strikes against Israel, they would have the ability to overwhelm Israel's defenses, the Iron Dome, and missile defenses, and therefore kill an awful lot of Israelis.
In other words... And then of course, Hezbollah would itself get destroyed, and we'd have a major war between Israel and Lebanon that the Americans would likely get involved in, at least indirectly, maybe directly. Nobody wants that. But the fact that Hezbollah has that capacity should in principle, constrain the Israelis in terms of what they are and aren't willing to do against Hezbollah. Now, Israeli military leaders are talking a lot about a new military system called Iron Beam, which is supposedly coming online in Israel next year. And that system should be able to defend Israel against far, far greater numbers of simultaneous missile strikes, drone strikes from Hezbollah. Over 95% of inbound would be taken out. In other words, Hezbollah would no longer have the capability to overwhelm Israeli defenses. Certainly, one would think that would change Israel's willingness to take action against Hezbollah without concern that they would be facing a dangerous retaliation.
And so the question is, does that change the decision-making process, the calculus of Hassan Nasrallah and his advisors who run Hezbollah? In other words, is the next six, twelve months becoming much more dangerous between Hezbollah and Israel because the balance of power is changing? We talk about Russia-Ukraine. Part of the reason the war hasn't changed very much over the past six months is because the balance of power hasn't been changing. This is potentially dangerous in the Middle East, and it's worth greater focus than I think the northern front has gotten over the past few months, especially because it continues to look very unlikely that we're going to have an agreed-to ceasefire in the near future. So that's where we are.Keep reading...Show less
More from Quick Take
GZERO Series
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer
Puppet Regime
Quick Take
ask ian
Ian Explains
GZERO Reports
GZERO Europe
The Debrief
© 2026 GZERO Media. All Rights Reserved | A Eurasia Group company.
GZERO Daily: our free newsletter about global politics
Keep up with what’s going on around the world - and why it matters.